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
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JANUARY, 1861.

ARTICLE I.

THEODORE PARKER.

THERE is an underlying character in men, and in their acts, of which they are themselves often unconscious, but which may prove, in the end, of momentous import. So, there is an underlying character in sects and parties, often of more consequence than anything that they profess or do. The creed and the reasoning of a philosophical or theological school, frequently presupposes principles not announced, but, on the contrary, disowned and scorned, which are yet, in reality, adopted and enthroned, and are sure to work their way forth into public acts and into acknowledged authority.

The Unitarians of Massachusetts separated from their Orthodox brethren, on the doctrines of Christ's divinity and atonement and of human depravity and need of regeneration by the Holy Spirit. But, inasmuch as these doctrines are taught in the Bible, the Unitarian position *involved* theories of inspiration and of interpretation, with a general scheme of divine and human relations, which were not at first acknowledged, and which, perhaps, all the earlier adherents of the system would have summarily rejected. But the principles were really presupposed in the conclusions which Unitarians had reached; and, accordingly, there was, from

the first, a logical necessity that they should work themselves out into an open acknowledgment; and that, when thus publicly avowed, their further conclusions, also, should be owned and pushed. For a long time the process went on slowly and even timidly; for it was a loosening of the foundations of our Christianity, and involved the overthrow of its whole fabric. Men instinctively shrank from the conclusions of their own system and denied them. But the hour and the man came at last. On the 19th of May, 1841, at the ordination of a young minister over the Hawes Place Unitarian Church, in Boston, another Unitarian minister, then the pastor of a small church at West Roxbury, himself not yet thirty-one years of age, preached a sermon from Luke 21 : 33 : "*Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my word shall not pass away ;*" which sermon, at a stroke, made Unitarian premises consistent with Unitarian conclusions, and logically developed from those premises further results of a startling tenor. The preacher's subject was, "*The Transient and Permanent in Christianity ;*" and he claimed that the most vital doctrines of Christianity had been as changeable as its forms of worship; while there is a "pure Religion which exists eternal in the constitution of the soul and the mind of God," and "is always the same." In this discourse, Christianity, stripped of the rags and tatters of beggarly superstitions, stands forth at last, in the words of the author, "a very simple thing," — "absolute, pure morality; absolute, pure religion; the love of man; the love of God, without let or hindrance;" its "only creed," "the great truth," "*there is a God!*" "its watch-word, be perfect as your Father in heaven; the only form it demands, a divine life — doing the best thing, in the best way, from the highest motives — perfect obedience to the great law of God." These principles were affirmed to constitute the real, the permanent Christianity, while all else was declared to be ephemeral.

The discourse sent a violent shock through the religious community of eastern Massachusetts, and its views met with scarcely more favor from the public organs of the

Unitarian, than from those of evangelical denominations. It at once gave its author notoriety, made him the leader of a party, and opened to him a position of influence which he continued to fill for some nineteen years, with marked ability and no inconsiderable appearance of success. He has now finished his labors; and the present seems an appropriate occasion for inquiring, what he has accomplished for theology and religion.

There is something very attractive, especially to youthful and sanguine temperaments, in the idea with which Mr. Parker set out. Here is an old religion, he says, which has grains of the purest gold mingled with much dross; seeds of truly Promethean fire buried under masses of lifeless ashes. I have sifted out the gold; I have rescued the seed of divine life, and here I give them to the world! Surely, if this be so, every heart shall call him Blessed!

What, then, is this new system, which has eliminated all that is permanent from the crudeness of our perishable Christianity, so as to present it pure and entire, for the world's use in all coming time? The question is both easy and difficult to answer: easy, because the works before us are frank and bold; difficult, because they are uniformly lacking in systematic arrangement and thoroughness, not seldom presenting us with statements too vague to do justice to the subject or credit to the author.

The reader at once falls upon an illustration of this looseness, in Mr. Parker's definitions and statements respecting "Religion," contained in his earliest work, entitled, "A Discourse on Matters Pertaining to Religion." On the 44th page of the third edition of this book, "Absolute Religion" is defined as "*voluntary obedience to the laws of God, inward and outward obedience to the law he has written on our nature;*" and on the 227th page, the further explanation is added, that it is "perfect love towards God and man, exhibited in a life," etc.; and, in harmony with these, we again read: "There can be but one religion which is absolutely true." To these statements, no one would make objection.

But, on the 7th page, we are told : " There is but one religion, as but one ocean, though we call it faith in our church, and Infidelity out of our church." Here we have quite a different proposition ; viz., that the religion of the Infidel and the Christian is *the same*. Expressions of similar tenor seem to be favorites with our author, of which the following may be taken as specimens : " Religion, like love, is always the same thing in kind " (p. 223). " Religion itself must be the same thing in each man ; not a similar thing, but just the same thing, differing only in *degree*, not in kind, and in its direction towards one or many objects." " The religious element must appear under various forms, . . . as to the number and nature of its objects, the Deities " (p. 46). " Though religion itself is always the same in all," its doctrines and rites vary. " The phenomena of Religion, — like those of Science and Art, — must vary from land to land, and age to age, with the varying civilization of mankind ; must be one thing in New Zealand and the first century, and something quite different in New England and the fifty-ninth century " (p. 48). " Piety, or love of God, is the substance of religion ; morality, or love of man, its form " (p. 46). " There is no monopoly of religion, by any nation or any age. Religion itself is one and the same. He that worships God truly, in whatever form, worships the only God " (p. 104). " The great doctrines of Christianity were known long before Christ " (p. 226). " Christianity really differs specifically from all other forms of religion in this respect : it is *Absolute Religion* and *Absolute Morality* " (p. 269). " Jesus taught *Absolute Religion*, *Absolute Morality*, nothing less, nothing more " (p. 240). There might be some interest in inquiring here, how much " love of God," and how much " love of man," Mr. Parker really believed to be contained in the religion of cannibals and pirates ; but this, with other questions that vigorously thrust themselves forward, would be aside from our present purpose. The above quotations, which we believe are fairly made, the reader will readily condense into the following statements : Religion is always the same, in each man, and is possessed by all

men ; differing merely in degree and in form of outward manifestation. It consists in that love toward God and man, which is obedience to God's law ; and absolute religion is neither more nor less than Christianity itself ; by which is meant, simply, the piety and morality which made up the doctrine of Jesus. In all ages, and all nations, among all sects of believers and of infidels, there is but this one religion, though we call it Heathenism here, and Moham-medanism there ; Polytheism in Athens, and Fetichism in Sockatoo ; in Henry Martyn, Christianity, and in Tom Paine, Infidelity.

Now, it avails not to say, that the author *means* that the religions (or irreligions) of all these times, places, and persons, are the same *so far* as they partake of "perfect love towards God and man ;" or that he affirms such *love* to be the same, wherever found. Nothing can justify him in so confounding Christ with Belial, as he does in these sentences ; and the kindest criticism can not acquit him from the charge of an inaccuracy and carelessness which should not be found in a reformer of creeds and a leader in theological progress. For, what does he, in effect, teach the masses who flocked to hear him, on this momentous theme ? He instructs them that they are to cast away their preconceived notions respecting the enormities of heathenism, and the vastness of the difference between gross idol-worship and Christianity ; and are hereafter to believe that these are *fundamentally* one. What difference exists, is merely a matter of form and of degree. He gives his congregation, in substance, to understand, that Infidels and Christians are alike Christians, in that they all possess religion, which is always one, always, of course, the true religion, always, we fairly infer, "love towards God and man," "obedience to the law of God," the teachings of Jesus Christ, and "nothing less, nothing more." And so, Celsus and Augustine walk hand in hand, owning, for substance, the same religious faith ; Paul and Tiberius Caesar are seen taking sweet counsel together ; Jesus and Judas have kissed each other ; while all the modern representatives and embod-

iments of these most violent contrasts, souls that abide in delighted communion with the Saviour, and souls that abhor the very syllables of his name, the purest and gentlest spirits who, through much tribulation and baptisms of fire and of the Holy Ghost, have been made white and clean (the pure in heart, who see God), and the grossest and vilest in wilful and obstinate iniquity — cannibals of New Zealand, pirates on the high seas, seducers, men-stealers, and betray-ers — must be esteemed not only as having some religion, but as all having the same religion, essentially the same, however the “forms” may vary, “piety” being “its substance,” and “morality its form.” These several examples of religion differ simply in degree and manifestation. Mr. Parker’s system would be without consistency and without meaning, if it should refuse to speak as kindly of any man. It tells all men that they are good ; and that whatever their belief or their life may be, their character and their religion are both *substantially* identical with the religion and the character of Christ. They may not have as much as he ; and they may have a different way of showing what they possess ; but they possess the reality. Now, the truth which lies buried and lost under Mr. Parker’s statements, is this : There is but one true and absolute religion ; that of Jesus, and its vital essence is, the *supreme love* of God, and a love of man therewith agreeing. Whoever has this supreme love of God, possesses the substance of true religion ; who-so hath it not, has not the substance of true religion. And if he professes any other religion, in professing that, he clings to what is false, to a sham, a corruption, and deceit. But whoso, under the outward form merely of another worship, really worships God in spirit and in truth, *i. e.*, with a *supreme* devotion to him, he worships God, let the form in which he syllables his name be what it may. But whoso, under the name of God, does not worship him thus, in spirit and in truth, he does not worship him at all. There may be a Brahmin bowing in an Indian temple in true worship ; and there may be a minister lifting his hands in prayer amid a Christian congregation, who, in the eye of God, is but using vain repetitions as the heathen do.

Furthermore : Although all men are not possessed of the reality of true religion, all men possess the natural faculties whereby they are capable of true religion ; all have hearts and consciences. There is a sacred place within every human soul, a house for God, wherein his law is set up ; and when God has been welcomed and enthroned there, and his law is acknowledged and obeyed, then the soul has become his temple and the man is truly religious. But is he religious while hating the thought of God, and wilfully trampling on his law ? Simple and charming as Mr. Parker's theory is, it is not to be taken, for its simplicity and its liberality, in place of the truth.

But we must examine Mr. Parker's exhibition of some of the more important religious truths. First in order, stands the Doctrine concerning God. This he has more thoroughly elaborated than any other ; and his statements here are less open to objection, than on most of the topics of theology. The views given in his works are substantially those which have long been known as "Deism," modified, however, by a more modern philosophy and warmed by a more earnest philanthropy than has ordinarily characterized adherents of this system, though, perhaps, himself surpassed in this, by French Deists of the time of the Revolution. He calls his doctrine, *Theism*. The knowledge of God is declared an intuition of Reason. The "idea" is alike in all men, true and changeless ; the "conception," ever inadequate and ever changing. God is *personal*, in the sense that he has not "the limitations of unconscious matter" (p. 150) ; but is *not* "personal and conscious as Joseph and Peter, or unconscious and impersonal as the moss or the celestial ether" (p. 151). "He is the ground of nature, what is permanent in the passing, what is real in the apparent." "The powers of nature — gravitation, electricity, growth — are but modes of God's action." "All Nature is but an exhibition of God to the senses ; the veil of smoke on which his shadow falls ; the dew-drop in which the heaven of his magnificence is poorly imaged." The law of nature "is but the will of

God ; a mode of divine action." " All the natural action of the material world is God's action." " There is no point of spirit, and no atom of soul, but God is there." He is " immanent in all matter and all spirit." " Is not truth as much a phenomenon of God, as motion of matter ? " Such expressions would seem to indicate a Pantheistic philosophy as their ground ; but Pantheists are, in the same connection, controverted by name, both those who " resolve all into matter," and those who say, " the sum total of finite spirit, that is, God." We read : " God transcends matter and spirit, and is different in kind from the finite universe." God is " Being, Cause, Knowledge, Love, each with no conceivable limitation." To express it in one word, a Being of infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness. All kinds of perfection of being are attributed to him ; and, " as the result of these," " the perfection of Will, absolute freedom." And yet, the relation between man and God is described as though it were a merely natural relation, like that " between light and the eye, sound and the ear, food and the palate." " We have direct access to him through Reason, Conscience, and the Religious Sentiment, just as we have direct access to nature through the eye, the ear, or the hand." " Through these channels, and by means of a law, certain, regular, and universal as gravitation, God inspires men." " Inspiration is coëxtensive with the race." " There is nothing in God to fear." " You cannot fear infinite justice."

Not a few of the foregoing statements must strike any thoughtful reader as ill-considered and infelicitous. The truth is, that, notwithstanding the contemptuous tone of these works toward the evangelical theology, their most elaborate philosophico-theological discussion is far inferior in point of comprehensiveness, precision, and completeness, to similar treatises of orthodox divines ; and, judged by any high, scholastic standard, must be set down as fragmentary, crude, and not free from confusion and seeming contradiction. The aim of these " Discourses " may not have permitted their author to discuss his topics in scholastic form, or even with the nicety of phrase appropriate to a highly

cultivated, thoughtful, cautious, discriminating audience ; and yet, it is not unreasonable to claim, that he should at least have used a scholarly accuracy. The fact that they for whom, in the main, he may be supposed to have written, were by no means likely to supply any lack of definiteness or completeness on his part, but, on the contrary, to hold what they got, more vaguely and fragmentarily than it had been given them, was but an additional reason for the most conscientious exactness and the most studious thoroughness of treatment. That a book or a sermon is intended for the benefit of those who have not the time or the disposition to follow out the steps of a nice and profound investigation, is surely no excuse for vagueness ; but a most imperative reason for making the truth bold and strong, and for constructing with the greatest care, that underlying philosophy which determines the choice of terms and the shapings of phrase ; to the end that, if important distinctions fail to be seen, they may yet be felt, in a healthful and balanced final impression. But here Mr. Parker cannot be said to have succeeded. In some of his statements, God stands before us in the distinctness of a glorious personality ; in others, a natural element ; and we no sooner fasten our eyes upon the apparition of his presence, than it subtly fades and vanishes, hiding itself under the all-manifoldness of the universe.

Serious as are the theoretical defects in Mr. Parker's treatment of this high theme, they are less grave than those of a practical nature. In these discussions, we are not made to look upon God as the high *Moral Governor* of the Universe, to whom all are accountable, stainless from everlasting ; whose love of holiness is also hatred of sin, and of our sin ; but we continually find ourselves in the presence of a certain large, diffuse, ineffable glory, — whether personal or elemental we cannot always tell, — but certainly an omnipresence that, do what we will, *is sure to be on our side*.

In the Bible, there is heard, as it were, the voice of a solemn angel, saying, " Who shall ascend thy holy hill ? " and a sovereign voice replies : " He that hath clean hands and a

pure heart; who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity; "and, "a broken and contrite heart God will not despise." The elder, in the Apocalyptic Vision, answered unto the apostle, and said: "These are they which have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb." No such voices are echoed from Mr. Parker's theology; but there, all distinctions are drowned in a jubilant chorus of good and bad, who sing together in the same breath, in praise of the goodness which has not been too hard upon their sins, and of the inexorable justice which has exacted the uttermost farthing. This, at last, *paid*, they enter into their joy, having worked their own way thither, by their long struggle and endurance. There is no grace; all is of works. There is no place for faith, but only for sight and sense. God is *all* love; and yet his justice knows not the quality of mercy, — and the love is not holiness.

While, therefore, in words affirming the holiness of God, in effect Mr. Parker may be said to have left out this attribute. No prominence is given to it in his system; no emphasis is laid on it in his rhetoric; its nature and its working in the sphere of the divine government are not unfolded. The divine holiness is not recognized as having a permanent influence in the affairs of the universe, clothed with the dignity of an eternal fact and law. The reader is not made to feel that God's conscience is of infinite and enduring strictness; and there is afforded us no foundation for *law* other than natural necessity. With Mr. Parker, "law" was but another name for the necessary nature of things; nor is there any basis in God, as he has presented him, upon which a moral law could rest; we see no principle in the divine mind from which it could be born, — and God is shorn of his majesty. The heavens are tremulous above us, indeed, with roseate glory, and are shedding sweet influences, from everlasting; but they have lost their eternal stars and their solemn depths, the awe and the lesson of their mystery, and their infinite voice of authority. Yes, and they have also lost the glory of their true, pure light, and their healthful consolations. That despised God, of the Old Testa-

ment, whom Mr. Parker names with Zeus and Odin, Baal and Osiris, but who "is of purer eyes than to *behold* evil," and who "cannot *look* upon iniquity," is not found in his book. "Zeus," we are told, "is licentious ; Hermes will steal," and "Jehovah is narrow." Alas ! had this prophet no vision !

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom ; and the knowledge of God lies at the basis of all true knowledge of man, alike in his individual character and destiny, and in his social, civil, and universal relations. The idea of God is the one greatest and most essential truth ; and any error here will be sure to repeat, and is likely to magnify, itself, in our notion of man and of his position in the divine order. It is the grand seed-thought of our minds ; and any vice in that, affects the whole outgrowth. Accordingly, as Mr. Parker fails of presenting a comprehensive and adequate statement, either theoretical or practical, of the truth concerning God, his failure is almost necessarily worse when he treats of man and of man's relations with God. His general doctrine may be gathered from the following extracts :

"Men . . . are still born as pure (qu. as impure ?) as Adam" (Crit. and Misc. Works, p. 4). "The hypothesis . . . of a garden of Eden, a perfect condition of man on earth in ancient times, is purely gratuitous." "All Pagan antiquity offers nothing akin to our lives of pious men." "The popular view of sin and holiness was then low" (do. p. 80). "The character of the gods, as it was painted by the popular mythology of Egypt, Greece, and India, like some of the legends of the Old Testament, served to confound moral distinctions and encourage crime." But "there was no devil, no pandemonium in ancient Polytheism as in the modern Church. Antiquity has no such disgrace to bear." The "mythological tales," however, were "blasphemies against the gods." "But goodness never dies out of man's heart. Mankind pass slowly from stage to stage ;

"Slowly as spreads the green of earth
O'er the receding ocean's bed,
Dim as the distant stars come forth,
Uncertain as a vision fled,"

seems the gradual progress of the race. But in the midst of the absurd doctrines of the priests, . . . pure hearts beat, and lofty minds rose above the grovelling ideas of the temple and the market-place."

In these quotations, the writer's doctrine of "Original Sin" is given, together with hints of his doctrine of Human Redemption. He seems to teach, in substance, as follows: Man was originally created as bad as he is now, — in fact, worse; for, although in some respects the present day is behind the past, the world has been slowly growing better since the beginning. The ancients had no devil or pandemonium, indeed, — which are to be understood as a figment of modern superstition, — but, on the other hand, no proper conception of sin and holiness. Goodness, however, never dying out of man's heart, has been continually working off his native iniquity; and, as a crude planet, just out of its fire-bath, through long geologic eras cools and grows green, coming up, little by little, through deliberately revolving aeons, to be a realm of life and beauty and order, and moving ever toward a higher life and a more perfect beauty and a more complete order, so has it been with mankind; and, like some emerging continent, borne slowly upward by internal fires or crystallizations, so the race is still rising, sublimely, by inherent, occult forces, from the salt ooze of a contentious, frothy, monster-breeding barbarism (breeding none, however, so bad as the *two* of our own day), and clothing itself with garments of light and of beauty. This, we are left to suppose, comes about by the operation of *natural causes*, in contradistinction from that working of God, as an intelligent and voluntary *personal* cause, in which Christians believe.

But we shall better appreciate our author's treatment of this subject after looking into his views of human freedom, and his account of the difference between man and all inferior orders of existence. The following statements will show us what he has taught upon this important theme:

Upon the 163d page of his "Discourse," we are told that the law of nature is the will of God, immanent in matter,

and owes its uniformity to the Divine immutability; and that the things of nature "obey this law from necessity." "From this view," our author adds, "it does not follow that animals are *mere machines*, with no consciousness, only that they have not free will. However, in some of the superior animals there is some small degree of freedom apparent. The dog and the elephant seem sometimes to exercise a mind, and to become in some measure emancipated from their instincts." In another place, however, he affirms that animals have no "consciousness, so far as we know," "at least nothing which is the same with our self-consciousness. They have no moral will; no power in general to do otherwise than as they do" (p. 164). "They do what they cannot help doing. Their obedience, therefore, is not their merit, but their necessity." "There is, therefore, no room for caprice in this the 'inorganic, vegetable and animal' department." God is "immanent" in the animal, as in the vegetable and mineral creation, his "influence" being "modified by the capacities of the objects in Nature." Again, we read (Serm. on Theism, etc., p. 189): "In nature there is only one force, the direct statical and dynamical action of matter," and so it is easy to calculate the result of her "mechanical, vegetable, electrical, and vital forces. But in the world of man, there is a certain amount of freedom, and that seems to make the question difficult. In that part of the world of nature, not endowed with animal life, there is no margin of oscillation." "In the world of animals, there is a small margin of oscillation, but you are pretty sure to know what the animals will do." "But man has a certain amount of freedom; a larger margin of oscillation, wherein he vibrates from side to side." He then proceeds to argue, that, although this "greater complexity" makes the calculation of human action more difficult, for man, it can offer no difficulties at all to God; inasmuch as (p. 192) "God, as the cause of man's freedom of will, must have perfectly understood the powers of that freedom," with all the action of these powers; and, hence "the quantity of human oscillation with all the consequences thereof must

be perfectly known to God." "Though human caprice and freedom be a contingent force, yet God knows human caprice when he makes it; knows exactly the amount of that contingent force and what it will bring about." "To God, contingents of caprice and consequents of necessity must be equally dear, both before and after the event." Again (p. 197), he reasons as follows: "The evil the suffering must come either from my nature—my human nature—as man, my individual nature as the son of John and Hannah; or from my circumstances; or from the joint action of these two;—God must have known all these elements of the problem, and so, known the result." Once more (p. 295), he says: "This freedom has its limitations, and is not absolute." In comparison with a shadfish, Socrates has a good deal of freedom, and is not so much subordinate to his organization or his circumstances as they; but in comparison with the infinite freedom of God his volativeness is little. To speak figuratively, it seems as if man was tied by two tethers,—the one of historic circumstance, the other of his physical organization; the cord is elastic and may be lengthened by use, or shortened by abuse and neglect; and within the variable limit of his tether man has freedom, but cannot go beyond it." Thus "there are other agents beside God using the power derived from him, to work after their own caprice."

Now, let us see what intelligible doctrine is here taught, concerning that essential nature of man, which distinguishes him from brutes and from still lower forms of being. In the first place, our author clearly declares the whole realm of mineral and vegetable nature to be under the law of necessity. Secondly, most animals are under the same law. Thirdly, some animals have "a small degree of freedom,"—this freedom consisting in the "exercise of a mind" and "emancipation from their instincts." Fourthly, animals have "no power in general to do otherwise than as they do—no moral will." Fifthly, in animals the "caprice," "the margin of oscillation," is very small. Sixthly, in man this

is larger; offering great difficulties to human calculations, though none to God, since he knows all the factors accurately, to wit, human nature, individual nature and circumstances,—in all which it seems to be implied that the nature of the connection between motives and actions is precisely the same with that between physical cause and effect; necessity ruling both alike, and the complexity being the only difficulty in the case. Seventhly, our author uses caprice and freedom as interchangeable terms, and recognizes no specific difference between them. Beings, therefore, capable of caprice are free. But, eighthly, he seems in other connections to understand by freedom, an exemption from limits of “organization and circumstance,” — God, the Absolute Being, possessing, therefore, perfect freedom, and his creatures different degrees of freedom proportionate to their several degrees of exemption. According to which definition, strictly interpreted, no created being is free; since no created being is exempt from limits of structure and condition. But our author explicitly teaches, that man and some animals are free agents; and his language implies that the “shad-fish,” with his short “tether,” has a certain measure of freedom, as Socrates, by his longer one, is enabled to enjoy a larger liberty. But, on this conception, not only animals, but all plants, and all elements, have *some* freedom; for there is not an atom of matter tied up so tight to its stake, as to be utterly unable in any case to act. It becomes, therefore, a pertinent inquiry: What is, by definition, the particular length of tether that constitutes the freedom of intelligent souls and of God? And, how large a “margin of oscillation” will suffice for a “moral will,” and to make a being responsible? And, how much “caprice” does it take, to be equivalent to that liberty which is the consummate flower and crown of our being’s powers, making us sons of God? And, as God is infinite in freedom, is he infinite in caprice? And is it, indeed, in stormy gusts of passion, in changeful moods of fancy, in varying tremblings of sensitive nerves, in hap-hazard leaps of mere impulsive “nature,” jerks of some blind, occult,

reasonless energy, that the freedom consists, whereby we are personal and responsible beings, in the image of God !

We think the reader must concede that Mr. Parker's philosophy gives no intelligible answer to the question : What distinguishes man from the lower realm of nature ? And it will be found that no well-digested views upon this important topic, underlie his rhetoric, mould his phrases or give form and consistency to his general scheme. In short, it is impossible to believe that Mr. Parker had *thought out* this subject.

But any serious confusion here would seem to necessitate confusion upon the whole matter of *sin and holiness, the moral law and its penalty*, — in brief, upon the whole position of man as a moral and accountable being. A wise inconsistency alone could have saved our author from further error in all the outgrowths of theory or of precept from this stock. What do we find ?

On the 368th page of his "Sermon on Theism, Atheism, and The Popular Theology," a formal definition and description of *sin* is given in the following terms : "A sin is a conscious, and voluntary, or wilful, violation of a known law of God. To do wickedly is a sin. This does not come from lack of intellectual perception, nor from lack of moral perception ; but from an unwillingness to do the known right, and a willingness to do the known wrong. It comes from some other deficiency, a compound deficiency, — from a lack of affectional power, or of religious power, or from a perverse will." Again, on p. 369, "Sin is a violation of the rule of right ; and so, is distinguished from a mistake. It is conscious and voluntary ; and so is distinguished from an error. It is a violation of a Natural Law of God ; and is thus distinguished from a crime." "A subjective sin is a violation of what is thought to be a natural law, but is not ; and an objective sin, a conscious violation of what is a natural law. In each case the integrity of consciousness is disturbed, — so much for definition of terms."

He is elsewhere careful, in like manner, to distinguish between an "error" and a "sin." "An error" (p. 365), "is

the unconscious and involuntary violation of some rule of right, of the Moral Law of God. It is to the conscience what a mistake is to the intellect,—it is a moral mistake, as a mistake is an intellectual error.”

He argues (pp. 369–373) against the Pantheist’s denial of sin; affirming that, upon this theory, you must deny all “difference between right and wrong; or else that man has any power of free will to choose between them.” But of this difference and this power, he considers all men conscious.

On the 402d page, he still further elucidates his doctrine of sin. “A man knows the moral law of God.” Conscience says, “‘Thou oughtest.’ There it stops and leaves us free to obey or disobey.” “I know the right; I have the power to do or to refuse to do it.” He then goes on to show, that, if conscience or the affections were really to compel his soul to acts of holiness, he would only “gravitate” thereto; and should “cease to be a free, spiritual, individuality.” “It is not I, but the force.” The exposition here given is clear, full, and beautiful. “If I do not obey my sense of right,” adds our author, “straightway there comes remorse; I gnaw upon myself.” “Remorse, the pain of sin,—that is my work. This comes obviously to warn us of the ruin which lies before us; for as the violation of the natural material conditions of bodily life leads to dissolution of the body, so the wilful constant violation of the natural conditions of spiritual well-being leads to the destruction thereof.” This last statement is stronger than Mr. Parker’s doctrine really justifies. It must be taken as a slip of his conscience and reason. But, again, we read (p. 405): “Sin is a wrong choice: a preference of the wrong way to the right one,” not “for its own sake, as an end; but as a means for some actual good it is thought to lead to. It is one of the incidents of our attempt to get command over all our faculties. In learning to walk, how often we stumble!” “Sin is a corresponding incident,—we learn self-command by experiments, experiments which fail. I think this evil rather underrated.” Our author here proceeds

to warn young men against "conscious violations of their integrity," "the experience of which," he says, "will torment you long, till sorrow has washed the maiming brand out of your memory, and long years of goodness have filled up the smarting scar." But is it not a little consoling to be told, on the next page, the 206th, that, "As we get command over the body only by experiment, learning to run, to walk, to swim, only by trial; . . . so by experiments are we to learn the proper uses of the will, to keep the law of God when known." And again (p. 208): "Sin is said to be a 'fall,' yea, as the child's attempt to walk is a stumble. But the child through stumbling learns to walk erect; every fall is a fall upward." In the same tone, on p. 409, he remarks: "Nay my own blunders in babyhood, manhood, — blunders of the body, of the spirit, — do they disturb me now? They are outgrown and half forgot. I learned something by each one. So is it with sin." Adding (p. 414): "Men often exaggerate the amount of sin, — its quantitative evil, not its qualitative. Much that passes by this name is mistake or error." He discusses elaborately the uses of pain, and proves it beneficent, but shuts his eyes, apparently, to the far more difficult question of the uses of sin; reminds us that "man oscillates in his march as the moon nods in her course; pain marks the limit of the vibration" (p. 410); that "the pain of sin is the pain of surgery, nay, the pain of growth (p. 412); that "suffering shames" us "from conscious wrong," and "keeps our wrong in check;" and, with something of courage and even of triumph, exclaims: "In the next life I hope to suffer till I learn the mastery of myself, and keep the conditions of my higher life. Through the Red Sea of pain I will march to the promised land, the divine ideal guiding from before, the Egyptian actual urging from behind." There is, therefore, a clear benefit to be got from pain; but what from sin? Or, is sin a necessity, as the stammerings and stumblings of infancy, as the nutation of the planets, and the aching of young limbs in the season of too rapid growth?

We are willing to leave it with any reader, whatever his

philosophy or his religion, to say, whether the theory of sin, and, what is of even greater importance, the *feeling* of sin, which shaped the concluding quotations given above, does not essentially differ from that which shaped the earlier ones? Mr. Parker's first statements fastened the sin upon the personal will, that is, on the person himself, in his central identity; his latter statements, make it an effect of nature, a necessary phenomenon, one of those transitions of growth, to deplore which, would be as really a mark of simplicity, as to lament that children must be two feet high before they are three feet, or that they take delight in the baubles of infancy, before those of manhood can have any charm for them. But it would be unfair to charge this naturalistic theory upon Mr. Parker. If he held it, we must suppose it to have been somehow qualified, in his mind, by the other. No; the charge against him is, that his statements are confused, vague, and fundamentally inconsistent with one another; and that, owing to these defects, together with the audacity and incorrectness of many of his views, the final impression of much that he has written must be unfavorable to religion and morals. It is the sure instinct of the human heart, to hug, with utmost tenacity, those comforting assurances which soothe the agitated conscience, and those delusive theories which explain away the guilt of sin. Whatever Mr. Parker's own belief might have been respecting sin, guilt, and punishment, he *teaches* naturalism, pantheism. If a writer offers two theories to his readers, they may be expected to select the one which best agrees with their own passions and desires.

We come next to a consideration of Mr. Parker's doctrine concerning Deliverance from Sin. This includes the subjects of Inspiration, Revelation, A Mediator, Miracles, Spiritual Regeneration, and Growth in Holiness.

In order to do this portion of Mr. Parker's system full justice, the reader should, in the beginning, conceive of himself as at a loss to know what sin is, and how he feels, or ought to feel, in regard to it. Let him imagine himself, at

one time, oppressed with a crushing sense of guilt, at another, accounting for all his transgressions, and benignantly contemplating them, as a parent contemplates the first efforts of his child to walk; let him invite the justice of God to work its work upon him, and rejoice that "through the Red Sea of pain," he is to "march to the promised land;" first, let him inveigh against the wickedness of the wicked, — men-stealers, and betrayers, and false teachers, — and then let him excuse them, on the ground of original imperfections not yet rooted out and infelicities of circumstance impossible to be overcome; thus, blaming and not blaming, remorseful and not remorseful, with confused notions of moral freedom, and feeble views of the Divine holiness; with this preparation, let him enter upon the question of human redemption and sanctification, and the discussion of God's dealings with his creature, through inspiration and revelation, and a mediator, for effecting a new birth and an eternal spiritual growth. Should he succeed ever so perfectly in this, he will still inadequately represent to himself the condition of a disciple of Mr. Parker, at this stage of his religious investigations. But how did our author himself meet these great questions that concern the present relations of the soul with its Maker? Let us commence with his views of Inspiration.

The reader will remember that Mr. Parker lays great stress upon the truth, which he strangely regards as unrecognized in the popular theology, that "God fills each point of spirit as of space." Starting from this basis, he proceeds to affirm, in language already quoted (*sup.* p. 8), that inspiration takes place in accordance with a purely natural law, certain and universal as gravitation. "Inspiration is coëxtensive with the race." "Prayer is a sally into the infinite spiritual world, whence we bring back light and truth." "There is no Mediator between man and God." "There can be but one *mode* of Inspiration," — "the action of the Highest within the soul, the Divine presence imparting light." Newton was not less inspired than Simon Peter; and there are no "different kinds or modes of inspiration in different per-

sons, nations, or ages, in Minos or Moses, in Gentiles or Jews, in the first century or the last." "The *degree* of inspiration must depend on two things, — on the man's Quantity of Being and Quantity of Obedience." "Inspiration is the consequent of a faithful use of our faculties." "The poet reveals Poetry; the artist, Art; the philosopher, Science; the saint, Religion." The various forms of inspiration are illustrated in the examples of Minos and Moses, David, Pindar, John the Baptist, Gerson, Luther, Böhme, Fenelon, Fox, Plato, Newton, Milton, Isaiah, Leibnitz, Paul, Mozart, Raphael, Phidias, Praxiteles, Orpheus (we give these names in Mr. Parker's order; see "Discourse," p. 208), who all "receive into their various forms, the one spirit from God most high." Inspiration "is coëxtensive with the faithful use of man's natural powers. Men call it miraculous, but nothing is more natural."

The above passages give a clear view of our author's notion of inspiration. It is that which properly forms a part of the theory of Pantheism; and the remainder of that theory is needed, to give it a logical foundation, consistency, and completeness. If you start with assuming, that the only real God is a natural element; the Original, whence all existing things have arisen, and which still holds them, through all their changes, in its all-embracing bosom; the one First Energy, of which all particular forces are but parts; the one Substance, of which all substances are modifications; the Fountain of power, attribute, and faculty, whence alone fresh *incrementa* can be had, for aught that lives, and whereby living things become more full of life, and strength, and beauty, — start with this hypothesis, and Mr. Parker's theory of inspiration is a perfectly logical consequence. In-spiration is but the in-breathing of the original and universal element. He has the most of it who has the most being. Strictly, the phrase, "quantity of obedience," is one which, in this philosophy, can have no meaning, since it presupposes a moral law, while here there is only a natural law; and implies a proper freedom, while here there is naught but necessity. The amount of obedience,

under such a system, is a strict measure of the amount of being. There is a similar inconsistency in representing inspiration as being "coëxtensive with the *faithful* use of man's natural powers." The word "faithful," is out of place here; for it is only in a figurative sense, or by way of accommodation to popular usage or prejudice, that Pantheism can charge unfaithfulness upon any existence. The presence of these terms is readily explained; for no one imagines that Mr. Parker was really a Pantheist. And yet, it is not a little extraordinary, that, while distinctly and emphatically disclaiming and refuting Pantheism, he should have fallen into a theory of inspiration so obviously and baldly Pantheistic, not in certain forms and phrases merely, but in its very essence and in all its leading statements. The only satisfactory clue to this enigma, seems to be found in the inconsistencies which have characterized our author's treatment of other subjects.

But, change now the basis from which you start. Instead of Brahma, begin with God, and at once a different theory springs into form. Jehovah "fills each point of spirit as of space;" not, however, as a natural element, but as a personal Omnipotence. He is our Maker, and our Preserver. His is all the substance of which we consist, and all the energy wherewith it is endowed. All our springs are in him. He sustains us while we endure as we are, and from him come all fresh inflowings whereby his creatures grow, in strength, beauty, or goodness. But he is no merely elemental spring, no unconscious giver, like soil, air, and light; he is a spirit. "We have direct access to him through Reason, Conscience, and the Religious Sentiment;" and, indeed, through our whole nature, physical as well as spiritual, — for "in him do we live, move, and have our being." But much of this union is too deep for consciousness, and we only know that it exists, because we see its logical necessity, and because it is revealed. A conscious access we also have — a communing of our spirits with the Spirit, of the child with his eternal Father. Prayer is a going forth from that state wherein we are clouded with selfish

desire and passion, shut up within our own private world, into the clearness, the largeness, and the glory of God's own holy and blissful presence; a most genuine, real, and conscious intercourse of the finite soul with the Infinite Soul; the communion of a personal being with that mysterious, awful, sacred, beloved ONE, who is all that we can understand by "person" or "spirit," and infinitely more, nearer, and dearer to us than our very selves. There may be various modes of inspiration; as, *e. g.*, that whereby God works within us so as to promote our steady growth in the direction in which our nature points, but beyond the measure of our original endowment. Though not ordinarily called inspiration, this would certainly be an in-breathing of God. Then, there is that divine operation, whereby for a limited season our faculties are refined or heightened in their action, so as to reach results otherwise unattainable. Again, there is the special and immediate communication of truths or facts, as between man and man. These, and possibly other modes of inspiration, are admissible under the theory of which we speak. God has "direct access" to his children at all times, and at all times his children have direct access to him; and this, "according to a law," *more* "certain than that of gravitation" (for heaven and earth shall pass away), the law contained in the eternal Reason, wherein God shapes his eternal decree and act. There are subordinate laws, however, whereby God, in part, regulates this blessed action within our souls; and in a modified and limited sense it is true, that a certain kind of the divine in-breathing varies as "the quantity of being and obedience," and depends upon our own fidelity. Whoso opens the door shall find that the Father enters in and sups with him. Some inspiration, again, is miraculous, and some may be viewed as natural; the former, being an action of God *other* than that which he was pleased to include within the known laws of our being; the latter (which is only figuratively named inspiration), a divine action within the strict limits of those laws.

Such is the Christian theory. Mr. Parker's differs from

it in being both intellectually and spiritually poorer, less clear, less discriminating, and less satisfying to mind and heart. All in it of any value is included in the scriptural view, and is only a refraction of its glory.

Our author's general doctrine concerning a revelation, grows out of his theory of inspiration and his conception of God. "Inspiration" being regarded as "the light of *all* our being, the background of *all* our faculties," it follows that Dorcas was as really inspired in her making of coats as Moses in giving the law; and that the two tables engraved on Sinai were no more really a revelation from God, than were the Twelve Tables of Rome or the laws of Numa. In a word, the only revelation known to Mr. Parker's philosophy, was that communication of light and power from God, whereby men daily live, and move, and have their being, — the working of a natural law, just as purely natural as any of the laws of matter. He affirms that God's immutability shuts out the possibility of any other kind of communication from him. All truth that is known, is properly said to be known by revelation, and is but the necessary result of natural causes — varying with the quantity of our being and (our author illogically adds) obedience.

Mr. Parker, therefore, very consistently found all the truth accessible to man wrapped up in man's "Reason and the Religious Sentiment." "No teacher can be superior" to these. No being of higher spiritual scope, and of broader and riper experience, not even God himself, — we must infer, — can claim an authority higher, for us, than that of these faculties; for, God is *in* man, being present in his "Reason and Religious Sentiment," and working in the action of these faculties as in the attraction of material molecules and in the orderly revolutions of the heavens. There "is no Mediator between God and man."

The utter folly of this manner of talk — for it is worthy of no higher name — comes out into full relief, under the first steady look. For, even in the case of matter itself, the

action of God is not in accordance with "a regular, *natural* law." What is creation, but a working of God by a moral law, that is, for an intelligible end and with a moral purpose? Is there a natural law whereby he originates natural law?

Again: Is it a satisfying view of God, which represents him as having so buried and lost himself in his creation, that there is nothing left of Deity now, save the necessary thousand-fold activity of the universe? But this must be, if God is tied to a regular, *natural* law, in all his actions.

Furthermore: There are, doubtless, some *facts* within the circumference of the universe and of eternity, of which a given man is, at a given moment, ignorant; but which, nevertheless, are, in their nature, apprehensible by his mind and heart, so that the knowledge of their existence is communicable to him; and God, if personal, as Mr. Parker avers, can communicate such facts; which communication would clearly be a "revelation" of a kind which Mr. Parker's theory denies. These facts may nearly concern us, since our life is not shut up to earth; the knowledge of them might throw great light upon difficulties, and free us from thraldoms, since the truth maketh free; and, therefore, a teacher bringing this revelation might have an authority which Reason and Sentiment could not claim for themselves, since, through him, God would be telling us what he does not tell us through them, — truths and realities beyond the reach of their intuition. It is *possible*, therefore, that a teacher should be sent from God, who should be a mediator between God and his infant children, erring here, as they are, from the right way, and miserably stumbling upon dark mountains. An angel, or an archangel, or, at least, the Divine Word himself, impersonation of the Eternal Life and Love and Wisdom, may speak to me; and, with such authority, that I freely give up my "Reason and Religious Sentiment," to be taught and led of him. All this is reasonable; and if also real, then it is most blessed and glorious and full of thanksgiving.

But again: Mr. Parker concedes that all men have the

"idea" of God, although no man attains to a perfect "conception" of him; while most men, especially those who lived in the earlier ages, have rested in conceptions exceedingly gross and false. Now why could not Mr. Parker have held, 1. That, even in the earliest ages, it was permitted to a few favored minds, to compass a worthy conception of God. 2. That God's Spirit was working in these loftiest souls,—and, indeed, in all souls,—a Light lighting every man, and especially lighting these chosen men, wisely chosen of God, for reasons which we cannot know, and can but partially guess. 3. That thus, under a perpetual and universal, in connection with such particular, Divine supervision, this spiritual knowledge was handed down from generation to generation, till, at last, it was found that God, in the exercise of that wisdom and love which embrace all being and all duration, had communicated and put on record a conception of himself, a revelation of his glorious majesty, a knowledge of his mighty acts, and a history of his dealings with man, so high, and pure, and true, that this RECORD was worthy ever to remain a sacred Authority for the race, and to be revered as a revelation of God from God. 4. That while, in this great achievement, men must needs rejoice, they, nevertheless, often forget the mighty process of its completion, as it toiled through the slow centuries of an experience divinely ordered and divinely attended—an ever growing record of God's presence and of the truth that he had inwrought and revealed. Men are charmed with these blossoms of heavenly odor, but do not always meditate, as they ought, upon the divine life-principle which produced the flowers, and fail to discern the sacred roots, trailing far in darkness, or even the Light which touched this beauty and healing virtue into being.

What objection can reasonably be urged to such a theory? But if so much as this be true, if the Bible really gives us a Revelation from God, then we do well in looking to it for instruction, in making it our guide and owning it "the Master of the soul."

Mr. Parker tells us, as though it were the end of contro-

versy, that "a verbal revelation can never communicate a simple idea, like that of God, Justice, Love, Religion." But he does *not* say, that no verbal revelation can stir into action a dormant faculty, and stimulate it with so vital an awakening that a new thought of God shall be born, like an angel, within the soul, and a new impulse of love shall be given, transforming the character and making a new man. For this would have been, to deny the very work which was his own fond ambition and his solace. Nor, again, does our author affirm, that no verbal revelation *accompanied* by the powerful working of the Spirit of God, can impart a simple idea, — which is the true Christian doctrine; for this would be to deny creation as well as progress, the existence of simple ideas and their possibility. For, if this be impossible now, it has always been impossible; and no simple ideas exist in any minds, except they have eternally existed there.

It is clear, then, as the sunlight, that if we believe in a personal God, we must also believe in the possible truth of the Christian doctrines of Inspiration and Revelation, and in their high intrinsic probability. If we go further, and believe in the Christian's God, we must accept his doctrine of Revelation as the statement of a blessed reality. God speaks, and we devoutly listen; he instructs and commands, and we trustfully and humbly obey; he breathes the love of his boundless heart, and not even

"That undisturbed song of pure concert,
Aye sung before the sapphire-colored throne,"

can speak the adoration of our gratitude.

We have not room to follow our author through the details of his statement and attempted refutation of the Christian doctrine of the sacred scriptures, but can merely present the outline. The views denounced in Mr. Parker's works are summed up in the following words: "*The Bible is master to the soul*; superior to Reason; truer than Conscience; greater and more trustworthy than the Religious Sentiment" (Disc. p. 305). We understand these

books to teach the reverse of all this : that the soul is master of the Bible ; that Reason is superior to it ; the Conscience more true ; and the Religious Sentiment greater and more trustworthy. We are instructed, that the Bible contains two grand divisions essentially contradictory of each other, the Old and the New Testaments ; the one setting forth a religion of fear, and the other of love ; one resting on a special revelation to Moses, the other based simply on the revelation given to all men. " One half of the Bible repeals the other half." The God of the Old Testament is " a man of war, cruel, capricious, revengeful, hateful, and not to be trusted." He " eats and drinks, makes contracts with his favorites, is angry, resentful, sudden and quick in quarrel, and changes his plans at the advice of a cool man." At first, he is but a " local deity ;" but at last, we have " the only living and true God," and in the New Testament, " a Father full of love." Such representations manifest as little candor as reverence ; and fail of meriting a respectful consideration. To tell us that the Being who " in the beginning created the heavens and the earth " is merely " a local deity," and to affirm that neither Moses nor David knew anything of a God, long-suffering, merciful and gracious, full of compassion, slow to anger, and of great mercy, who, like as a father pitieth his children, pitieth them that fear him, crowning them with loving kindness and tender mercies, forgiving all their iniquities, and healing all their diseases, and redeeming their life from destruction, — to say such things, is to confess a headstrong and virulent prejudice and to court commiseration and neglect.

As the reader would expect, the works now under review bring forward the familiar objections against the Bible and its several parts. The book of Genesis, the history of the patriarchs and of the captivity, the Law, the Psalms, and the Prophets, are by turn saluted with stale assaults. Our author insists upon interpreting literally all phraseology applied to Jehovah, and strives to hold that " Moses had foul ideas of God." Of the laws, he says : " They contain a mingling of good and bad, wise and absurd, and if men

will maintain that God is their author, we must still apply to them the words which Ezekiel puts into his mouth (20 : 25): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live;" or say, with Jeremiah (7 : 22): "I spake not unto your fathers in the day that I brought them out of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings or sacrifices." Thus he quotes their own God against them, and flings his infallible Word in their faces — *in a joke* ! For it is impossible to suppose that Mr. Parker really understood Ezekiel to have owned, in the name and by the authority of God, that the Divine statutes were not fit to live by; or that Jeremiah intended to represent Jehovah as denying that he spake unto the fathers !

We are not aware that any of Mr. Parker's objections to the scriptures are new, or in any important respect original. Nor, if they were, could it be necessary to wade through *all* the shallows and swamps of an author who affords such examples as have been quoted, or to devour the whole of an apple of Sodom, after proving its hollowness and tasting its ashes. There is little danger that the common sense of the people will accept, in opposition to the word of our Saviour himself, the declaration, that Jesus rejected "the chaff of Moses and the husk of Ezekiel, with their 'Thus saith the Lord,' leaving" them "to go to their own place, where the wind might carry them." The voice of the Lord himself rises serenely above all this loud irreverence, and proclaims, of these same prophets, in words that will be audible and authoritative to the latest hour of time : "I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil."

In concluding this topic, we have only to call attention to the contrast between the laudations which Mr. Parker has, in various places, bestowed upon the Bible, and the hideous charges with which he seeks to blacken it. It is but another example of his inconsistency and carelessness.

The doctrine of Miracles is disposed of in the manner that would be expected from our author's treatment of Revelation, and from the inaccuracy that has hitherto pervaded

his discussions. He prepares the way for what he has to say, by some observations upon the proper criterion of certainty, applicable to the matter in hand. The matter in hand is, Christianity. Christianity he limits to certain "eternal truths," which are "matters of reflection," or "of intuition," and so, to be made plain to those who possess these two faculties by the simple process of using them. If the question be raised: "How do I know that Christianity is true?" Mr. Parker seems to think it a fair reply, to inquire, in return: "How do I know . . . that half is less than the whole; that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?" questions which every student of intellectual philosophy recognizes as specifically different, so as to furnish no answer at all.

But, having laid down the definition, that Christianity is merely a system of abstract truths or intuitions, it is very easy to follow that with the statement, that no *wonders* can make these truths either more clear or more certain.

But, taking Mr. Parker's own premises, his conclusion is not legitimate. There may be truths of reflection which surpass the reach of man's present reflective power; and intuitions, high and grand, of which he has not the faintest beholding. And it is, therefore, in the nature of things possible, — nor does it seem essentially improbable, — that a being of superior order should furnish to men the results attained by his own loftier faculties; which results men might, at first, hesitate to receive; but the exhibition of certain wonders, of certain *facts*, hidden, hitherto, behind the veil of the universe, might make some of these truths more clear; and the performance of certain other wonders, might be so recognized as agreeing with this Being's claim to superiority, and might so clothe him with a sacred authority and personal glory, as to make other truths more sure, and even make them certain, resting as they do upon his mere testimony.

But is Mr. Parker right in his definition? Does the law: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself, *constitute* Christianity? Surely, if

Christ was what the apostles believed him to be, and what the Church throughout the world with joy has ever recognized and confessed, then there is a great historical truth, a *glorious fact*, which constitutes the distinguishing peculiarity of Christianity. Moreover, whether the belief of the Church be true or false, the usage of centuries has limited the name "Christianity" to the religion which acknowledges that fact. If Mr. Parker denies the reality of the fact, he need not also deny the dictionary, and take this appropriated word to designate his alien and hostile system. If the meaning of a word may thus be changed, at any one's caprice, the boundaries of truth and falsehood are confused, reasoning is but idle play, and Reason is dethroned. Whether Mr. Parker's views, therefore, be right or wrong, Christianity stands as a system of *combined truths and facts*. This materially alters the aspect of the case. For, obviously, even if it were granted, that miracles could be of no use in proving truths of reflection and intuition, the concession no longer holds, when the inquiry respects historical realities. Now, we are not anxious to use the miracles of Christ for the purpose of convincing men that the law, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," is a good law; but we would use them for the purpose of more fully satisfying the world of Christ's own divine nature and mission. His miracles constitute one of the stones of the immutable arch upon which this great doctrine rests.

Christians claim, that Christ was more than man, that he was a union of the divine and human natures in one person. They assert this as a *fact*; and, certainly, if it be a fact, it is one of mighty import. The advocates of Mr. Parker's views would, unquestionably, themselves concede that weighty deductions follow, if this thesis stands. Does it stand?

If Christ was more than man, there must have been some particulars in which he was more; some of his powers must have been superior to human powers; and this superiority must have appeared; must have appeared in certain particulars; and these particulars must have been wonders — mir-

acles. If, in Christ, the Eternal Word was really present, then, in him, a really superhuman power was present, able to do, and naturally doing, things obviously superhuman; and such things he *must* do, or remain, at best, but vaguely and indecisively manifested. And if God visited the world in the person of Christ, for the very purpose (in part) of manifesting himself, and illustrating his love, then miracles are a necessity; for no merely human act could indicate, much less demonstrate to dull minds, and impress upon reluctant hearts, the reality of God's very presence.

On the supposition, therefore, that the Christian claim is true, miracles are not only to be regarded as natural and probable, but as morally necessary; and the Christian scheme would be essentially self-contradictory if it did not include them. To claim that a certain being is human, and yet concede that he exhibits and that he possesses the powers of an animal only, is to say and straight unsay. In like manner, if we affirm that Christ was Divine, and also grant that he owned no superhuman faculties, and wrought no miraculous deeds, we do but utter jargon. In short, it is just as natural, and just as necessary (upon the Christian theory), that *Christ* should work miracles, as that *a man* should reason; that the one should manifest a divine power, as that the other should manifest a human power.

Then, again: Christ came into the world a mighty force, turning its current. He must, therefore, take strong hold upon men, and must *impress* them profoundly. Do we not see what an *important use* miracles had in making that impression? so that, in three short years, a greater work was done, than any wrought by any other human being in a long life? Who can say that this would have been possible without miracles? And Christ's miracles are of use still. They preserve the consistency of the Gospel story, and render it credible. They impress us — when we duly accept them, as in reason bound — with a sense and realization of the very presence of God in Christ, which we could not possibly have had, if we beheld in Jesus only the gentle traits of wisdom and goodness, and none of the signs of God-like might.

To sum it all up, as we contemplate that wonderful history contained in the gospels, so simple, so human, and yet so transcendent and divine, we are forced to own, that miracles are *in place* in that life of our Lord ; that there was a sufficient moral end for their introduction, identical with the end of Christ's own coming ; that they did their work at the time when they were wrought ; that they continue their work now ; that it is most reasonable and satisfying, to mind and heart, to believe in them ; that they stand, and shall ever stand, bright witnesses, testifying — God !

Thus does it become very clear, that the Christian doctrines of a Mediator and of Miracles are in harmony, and that they strengthen one another ; each appears reasonable when viewed in the other's light. And, indeed, as to the question of a Mediator, it seems neither unreasonable nor unkind to say, that the world will be better prepared to listen to denials of the existence and of the need of a mediator between God and man, when it no longer sees *men trying to mediate* between that Infinite Light and its own darkness. But so long as philosophers confess the "idea" of God to be incomprehensible by man (see Discourse, B. I. ch. ii.), and that they themselves partake of the life-giving glory of this unattainable truth only through a mediating "conception ;" and so long as philosophers offer *themselves* to men as high-priests of the ineffable mysteries inspired with an afflatus as genuine as any that the race has known, we shall not find it easy to believe, that the idea of mediation contains in it anything repulsive to human instincts or reason. And until these our neighbors who are so anxious to be the bringers-in of a new religion, shall exhibit a nobler mediation than we learn of in scripture, we shall cling to that. To a Christian mind, it is delightful to think of Jesus Christ as a *Mediator*, a true revealer of God, taking the things in the heavens, eternal and unseen, and showing them unto us ; as a blending of God and man, in such a way that we can *see* God, — so far as human boundaries will contain him and human powers can present him ; and as a shadowing forth, also, of that glory of the Father which

passeth understanding, but which we can yet recognize and adore — the ineffable divineness of Deity. If our minds are of limited scope, we see no absurdity in our receiving instruction from a mind of broader vision ; if our souls are weak, we feel no impropriety in their being made strong by communion with a nobler soul ; if our hearts are corrupt, it does not hurt our pride to hope that they may become pure through union with God in Christ ; if we are but men, and sinful men, we adore that divine love which gives us a Mediator whom we can know and love and trust, and who will cause us to be owned of God, and will make us to be partakers of the divine nature. True, we rejoice in a direct communion with the Father ; but we find this communion much nearer, in that we have known Christ and come through Christ.

But it is impossible to treat of these important themes in full. We must now hasten to a brief comparison of Mr. Parker's doctrine of Progress, with the Christian doctrines of Regeneration and Sanctification. We understand our author to teach, that man is ever rising, like a submerged continent, by a *natural law*, to wit, the continually increasing influx of a divine energy. Thus we may imagine the globe to blossom in favored spots with civilization, just as on sunny and sheltered slopes are seen the earliest green and gold of spring. The Christian idea is different ; namely, that man rises from his ignorance and baseness, not in accordance with laws of mere nature, but by a moral law, — regnant over all natural laws, and using them, — by none other, in fact, than the eternal dictate and decree of perfect Reason and infinite Love. We hold, that God intelligently and lovingly gives his Spirit in the fullest measure which this absolute reason and goodness allow ; ever wisely and benignly ministering this divine gift to his children, in accordance with a plan which comprehends the two-fold infinity of all existence and his own glory — whereof existence is only a ray. No natural law necessitates God in this ; but he acts in and by a moral law, a method of his own

mind and free will. Thus, we hold that the world is moving on, because we believe in God, and that he is moving it; which, indeed, we think that we can see; but if we saw it not, we should believe it all the same, believing in God. The new progress of the individual soul commences, according to this view, when, upon some fresh influx of divine energy, the selfish and blinded heart is so filled with the light and power of the truth as to be "persuaded and enabled" to love God supremely, and voluntarily gives itself to this love and its service forever. And the new progress of the soul continues as it began, in the co-working of man's free will with the Spirit of God, and the filling the soul with the fulness of God, ordinarily through the instrumentality of means specially appointed of God, as the way of this pleasantness and peace.

Mr. Parker's view makes the progress of the soul but a part of the general cosmic change, whereby the existing universe is slowly *cycling* upward, and present forms of being are becoming higher forms. The Christian view makes the regeneration of each soul a personal working together of God and man; wherein each loves the other, and the weakness of the creature is helped out of its hopeless difficulty by divine strength, and the great want of the finite is filled by the incoming of the Infinite, — earth's sinful and sorrowful child (sorrowing now with a godly sorrow) being taken back into the Father's arms and blessed with the measureless bounty of his grace. The Christian view is most reasonable, noble, comforting, and inspiring; and has been instrumental in convincing the world of sin and bringing it to God. The Pantheistic theory agrees neither with reason nor with experience, and is powerless to turn men from their iniquities. Through the one, the Spirit of the Lord endows the soul with a divine and permanent energy; the other gives but pleasing illusions and a passing intoxication of fancy, sure to be followed by a heaviness, a weariness, and a pang. "Follow the body's laws and be in health of body, — the spirit's laws and secure health of soul and happiness," is very old and very sound advice. But

the nothingness of these prudential maxims when confronted with the madness and anguish of the world, has been only too thoroughly tested. Yet such is the remedy which modern *Deism*, striving to make itself something new by changing the smoother consonant to an aspirate, still presumes to offer for the world's sin and sorrow. Obey the laws of your being, says Mr. Parker; "*Mens sana in corpore sano!*" Seneca and Aristotle have done better than that; and Socrates and Plato, much better. How unspeakably inferior all this, to that wisdom and power of God revealed in scripture and made familiar to the experience of so many thousands of hearts; that effectual calling, which, in bringing the soul to Christ, shows it its own sin and God's holiness, and puts it in living communion with the Holy Ghost, who instructs the heart in the ways of heavenly love, transforms it with eternal influences, comforts it with Christ's own peace, and binds it in endless union with God. How new, and fresh, and beautiful comes this Christian revelation to hearts weary with the forceless droning of a superannuated philosophy. It is pleasant as fruits of paradise, to prodigals starving on "the husks."

We have not room to pursue further our investigation into the *positive* teachings of Mr. Parker, in theology, but must hasten briefly to call attention to the position he assumes towards Christianity, and to the *scope of his denials*. As was remarked near the beginning of this Article, Mr. Parker reduces Christianity to the "two great commandments;" and, strange to say, finds its "essential peculiarity" in that which he defines as the essence of all and every religion, the element whereby they are all one. In this, and *not* in the "miraculous birth, the incarnation, the God-man, the miracles, . . . the atonement, the resurrection," "the ascension," and the other doctrines of scripture and the creeds, he finds the distinctive characteristic of the Christian religion. All besides, — doctrine or fact, — is but the husk, having but a temporary use, or else a morbid growth, of no use whatever. "The notions men form about the scriptures,

and the nature and authority of Christ, have nothing to do with Christianity," says our author, "except as its aids or its adversaries." "Their connection with Christianity appears accidental; for if Jesus had taught at Athens, and not at Jerusalem; if he had wrought no miracle, and none but the human nature had ever been ascribed to him; if the Old Testament had forever perished at his birth, — Christianity would still have been the word of God; it would have lost none of its truths." And yet, Mr. Parker seems to have doubted whether *Strauss* is justified in calling himself a Christian, — though so far as respects his life he abides the test, — because of the peculiar theologic dogmas advocated in his "*Leben Jesu*" (Crit. and Misc. Writ., p. 295). It is but just to add, however, that, in another passage, our author speaks with more care and discrimination; when, after remarking that "all religions have this common point, *an acknowledged sense of dependence on God*, and each religion has some special peculiarity of its own which distinguishes it from all others," he goes on to say that, while "the essential peculiarity of Christianity is indeed its absolute character," its "formal and theoretic peculiarity" is contained in the doctrine "*that God has made the highest revelation of himself to man through Jesus of Nazareth.*"¹ In this inconsistency, he is still *self-consistent*, and exemplifies a leading trait of his works. But to return.

"Real Christianity," that is to say, the "two great commandments," Mr. Parker says, is permanent; all else is transitory — "fleeting as the leaves upon the trees," which

"Fall successive and successive rise."

To illustrate this transitoriness, he selects two doctrines, the one respecting the origin and authority of scripture, and the other relating to "the nature and authority of Christ." But the former, which he describes as originally "a presumption of bigoted Jews," he also declares "has been for

¹ We have grossly misunderstood Mr. Parker, if he did not think, and if he does not teach, that he himself has given a higher one. Mr. Parker had the same reason for accusing our Saviour of teaching the selfishness and malignity of the Father, as for charging this upon Christians. (See below.)

centuries the general opinion of the Christian church, both Catholic and Protestant ;” and, “still worse, it is now the general opinion of religious sects at this day” (Crit. and Misc. Writ., p. 147). Mr. Parker says this, *while in the act* of showing wherein “this transitoriness of doctrines appears.” The foremost doctrine, therefore, which he is at pains to select as remarkable for the briefness of its ephemeral existence, originated, by his own showing, at least as early as the era of Moses ; and the same doctrine, after having for ages formed a centre of union for the *whole church*, is still generally held, he sorrowfully assures us, by the religious denominations into which the world is at the present hour divided ! After reading this, no one will be very greatly surprised to find Mr. Parker inquiring, with every appearance of utmost simplicity and seriousness, “Did Christ ever demand that man should assent to the doctrines of the Old Testament ?”

Mr. Parker was no more fortunate in the second doctrine which he chose as an illustration of “the transient” in Christianity, or in his exposition of its changes. For he testifies that, “almost every sect that has ever been known makes Christianity rest on the personal authority of Jesus.” And this, notwithstanding,—to use his own words again,—“it seems difficult to conceive any reason, why moral and religious truths should rest for their support on the personal authority of their revealer.” Upon his own representations, then, the two doctrines whose transitoriness he offers as the most striking illustrations of the obvious truth of his charge, have undergone no essential change since the beginning.

His attempt to prove the vacillation of Christian faith in regard to Christ’s divine nature is no more successful ; and, as though some power were ever working within the depths of his mind, and counter-working its conscious aim and striving, he at once launches forth into a stirring and rhythmic eulogy of the Bible and its wondrous, perennial beneficence ; in the midst of which he felicitously illustrates the unity of its two main divisions (elsewhere represented by him as mutually contradictory), reminding us that “as the first

book of the Old Testament tells man he is made in the image of God, the first of the New Testament gives us the motto, *Be perfect as your Father in heaven.*"

But not only does our author attempt to fix the charge of transitoriness upon many of the details of Christian doctrine, he attacks Christianity itself. The teachings of Jesus, indeed, or, more properly, a portion of them, call forth his loudest laudations; and he affirms that "the wisest son of man has not measured their height;" that "this Galilean youth strode before the world whole thousands of years,—so much of Divinity was in him. His words solve the questions of the present age. In him, the Godlike and the human met and embraced." But these eulogies of Christ, which so pointedly contradict the fundamental assumption of Mr. Parker's works, are followed by a sweeping and fierce denunciation of the Christianity since Christ. Nor is it the author's aim in this, merely to show that believers have always failed of reaching the full height and scope of their Lord's doctrine. His shafts are launched against Christianity itself. The first page of the Introduction to his "Discourse," declares that "what is popularly taught and accepted as religion is not fitted to make the world purer." (And yet, it should be remarked, in passing, that he afterwards devotes eight pages to an enumeration of the "merits" of Romanism, in which he goes into a rhapsody over the wondrous benefits it has wrought; and gives one page to the "merit" of Protestantism, and several more to the good fruits of its various denominations.) "Our theology," he affirms, "is mainly based on the superficial and transient element. It stands by the forbearance of the sceptic." Again: "In respect of doctrines as well as forms, we see all is transitory. Everywhere is instability and insecurity. Opinions have changed most on points deemed most vital" (Crit. and Misc. Writ., p. 158). Still again: "The Christianity of the sects, of the pulpit, of society, is ephemeral,—a transitory fly." In these, and in multitudes of similar expressions, it is beyond all question that Mr. Parker refers, not to minor matters about which existing

evangelical denominations differ, but to the main substance of Christian theology; to that body of truth which has ever been the medium of conveying the living substance of the truth into human hearts, and the chief instrument of the Spirit of God in the conversion of souls. Thus it is against *Christianity itself*, as it now exists, and as it has in all ages existed, and against nearly all that is in it except the two grand principles of the law, that Mr. Parker has waged this merciless, reckless, and most absurd war. It will be instructive to follow him a little further in this assault, and to note more particularly the mode and spirit of his attack. We will look, in the first place, at some of his representations of *Christian doctrines*.

In the seventh chapter of the second book of his "*Discourse*," our author tells us that "Supernaturalism," as he calls the theology of the churches, "denies the ability of man to discover, of himself, the existence of God, or find out that it is better to love his brother than to hate him, to subject the passions to reason, desire to duty, rather than subject reason to passion, duty to desire." "Men know there is a God, and distinction between right and wrong, only by hearsay, as they know there was a flood in the time of Noah or Deucalion." [This, of men who believe with Paul, that "the invisible things of God are understood by the things that are made."] "It [Supernaturalism] denies that God is present and active in all spirit as in all space." [A denial exemplified in the doctrines of "Omnipresence," "Preservation," "Providence," and of the "Holy Spirit."] "The God of Supernaturalism is a God afar off." [In whom we live, move, and have our being.] He "was but transiently present with our race, and has now left it altogether." [Although, "not a sparrow falls to the ground" without our Father.] So, too, in the Introduction, "For all theological purposes, God might have been buried after the ascension of Jesus." "Instead of the Father of All for our God, we have two idols, the Bible and Jesus of Nazareth" [As though Christ had dethroned God; and his disciples no longer prayed "*Our Father*."]]

In his sermon upon "The Popular Theology," Mr. Parker indicates his *own sense* of the gulf between himself and the believers of his day, as follows: "I mean to say distinctly that between the ideas of the foremost religious men of this age and the popular theology of the churches, there is a greater chasm, a wider and deeper gulf, than there was between the ideas of St. Paul or Tertullian and those of the Jews and pagans who were around them." The "theology" even of Jesus "seems to have had many Jewish notions in it, wholly untenable in our day;" and yet, "if Jesus were to come back and preach his ideas of theology as he set them forth in Judea, they would not be accepted as Christianity." "In the popular theology God is represented as a finite and imperfect God. It is not said so in words; the contrary is often said; nevertheless it is so." "The popular theology regards God as eminently malignant, though it does not say so in plain words." It acknowledges "three persons in the godhead, first, God the Father, made to appear remarkable for three things,—first, for great power to will and do; second, for great selfishness; third, for great destructiveness,"—"the grimmest object in the universe, not loving and not lovely." "It is no doctrine of the popular theology that Christ actually loves transgressors, and as little that God loves them." "The Holy Ghost is not represented as loving wicked men, that is, men who lack conventional faith, or who are deficient in conventional righteousness." "All this" (the above and more of the same sort) "is acknowledged and writ down in the creeds of Catholic and Protestant, and in this they do not differ." "There is really a fourth person in the popular idea of God, in the Christian theology, to wit, the Devil." "The power assigned to the Devil, and the influence over men, commonly attributed to him, is much greater, since the creation, than that of all the three other persons put together." "There is no mistake in this reasoning" (in proof of the last quoted statement), "strange as it may seem. It takes all these four persons to make up and represent the popular theological notion of God."

The doctrine concerning man is travestied and held up to mockery in similar style; and coming next to that of the relation between God and man, he writes as follows: "Jesus calls God 'THE FATHER.'" "But by the popular theology God is king,"—"three elements" being "conspicuous in his character," "power," "selfishness," and "destructiveness." "He cares little for the welfare of his creatures, though he pretends to care much. Men must fear their king; this is the highest thing you can do. You must pray to God by attorney. Your prayer will make him alter his mind and change his purpose, if you employ the right attorney in the right way." "The classic mythology represents the ancient heathen gods as selfish in their ruling propensity; and the popular theology represents God as selfish in his love of power, of glory, and terribly selfish in his wrath. Accordingly, such actions are ascribed to the Deity in the popular theology as in almost any country of Christendom would send a man to the gallows."

The doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement, and of Decrees, are equally misrepresented; and Mr. Parker concludes his account of the theology of Christendom with a crazy tirade against the doctrine of the Holy Ghost. "The Holy Ghost," he tells his hearers, "is represented as going about seeking to inspire men with the will to be saved. He does not come into assemblies of men of science, who are seeking to learn the laws of God." "He does not come into assemblies of men trying to make the world better off, and men better." "He attends camp-meetings, is present at 'revivals,' frequents tract societies and the like." "The Holy Ghost of theology has nothing to do with schemes for making the world better, or men better." "Such my friends," he says in conclusion, "is the popular theology as a theory of the universe. This is the theology which lies at the basis of ~~all~~ the prevailing sects." "Man is a worm, and God is represented as a mighty heel to crush him down to hell." "God is not represented as a friend, but the worst foe to man." "Which is the worst, to believe there is no God who is mind, cause, and providence , or to

believe there is a God who is almighty, yet omnipotently malignant, who consciously aims the forces of the universe at the wretched head of his own child." "Which, I say, is the worst,—to declare with the atheist, 'There is no God, , or to paint the cause, the mind, the providence of the world as a hideous devil?'"

Now, it is impossible to suppose that Mr. Parker was incompetent to attain a more correct understanding of Christian theology than the above quotations indicate; and it is difficult to realize that these grossly abusive and perverse utterances were made in entire simplicity of godly sincerity. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves that Mr. Parker did not know better when dispensing this stuff to his congregations; and that there was not something of malignity in effusions reeking and glistening with such scorn. It is melancholy to think, that an audience of intelligent and respectable men and women were persuaded to swallow this concoction, and count it as the bread and the wine of heaven.

We might proceed further with quotations, and show that Mr. Parker, in many passages, charges the Christian religion of his day with being "separated from life," hostile to science and to philanthropy, degrading to mind and heart. "Religion," he says, "is no restraint in business, no restraint in politics, and in literature is not felt. It dares not speak against drunkenness and prostitution; it is a dumb religion, and dares not even oppose the stealing of men out of their houses in this town." "When," he exclaims, "did the Christianity of the church ever denounce a popular sin; the desolation of intemperance; the butchery of Indians; the soul-destroying traffic in the flesh and blood of men 'for whom Christ died'?" (Disc. p. 471.) But we have not room for more of these things, except to acknowledge that Mr. Parker had discovered, at the time when he published his *Sermon on "Practical Theism,"* p. 245, that in the "*Albany Convention*," in 1852, orthodox ministers had, at last, ventured to "protest against the sin of slavery." "This," he

says, "is the first time; and it marks the turning of the tide which ere long will leave this old theology all high and dry upon the sand, a Tadmor in the desert."

We should have believed it impossible, had not the fact thus thrust itself into our faces, that an intelligent gentleman could have lived for forty years in the city of Boston and its vicinity, busying himself from early youth with questions of religion and public morals, and yet remain so ignorant of facts of public notoriety, upon subjects which most engaged his own attention, as the above extract shows Mr. Parker to have been: of such facts, *e. g.* as the following:— That thirty years before he was born,¹ the Methodist Episcopal Church had pronounced (in 1780) with unmistakable meaning upon the *sinfulness* of slavery, and had taken measures to clear itself wholly from connection there-

¹ The action of the Conference in 1780, "four years before the organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church," was as follows: *Question.* Ought not those travelling preachers who hold slaves, to give promises to set them free? *Answer.* Yes.

Question. Does this Conference acknowledge that slavery is contrary to the laws of God, man, and nature, and hurtful to society; contrary to the dictates of conscience and pure religion, and doing that which we would not others should do to us and ours? Do we pass our disapprobation on all our friends who keep slaves, and advise their freedom? *Answer.* Yes.

At the next Conference in 1783, they voted, in regard to their "local preachers who held Slaves," etc., to "try them another year," . . . "It may then be necessary to suspend them."

In 1784, the matter of buying and selling slaves was taken hold of in a similar spirit; the question concerning the local preachers received further attention; and vigorous measures were planned, with much minute detail, as a practical answer to the inquiry: "What methods can we take to *extirpate Slavery*?" The subject came up before the Conferences of 1785, 1789, 1792, 1796, 1800, 1804, 1808, 1812, 1816, 1820; during all which time the Conference was evidently *not forgetful* of its duty toward the enslaved, whether it rightly understood it or not.

In the year 1787, the Synod of New York and Philadelphia, — at that time the highest judicatory in the Presbyterian Church in the United States, — commended the "general principles in favor of universal liberty," and counselled particular measures for the procurement of "the final abolition of Slavery in America." In 1818, the Assembly took more decided action; a part of which was in the following words: "We consider the voluntary enslaving of one part of the human race by another, as a gross violation of the most precious and sacred rights of human nature, as utterly inconsistent with the law of God" — the paper adopted occupying from three to four pages in the Minutes, and being characterized throughout by great vigor, distinctness, and fulness of expression.

with, and looking toward a general emancipation ; which endeavor was vigorously continued for many years, and, indeed, has never been given up ;—that when he was hardly eight years old (1818), the Presbyterian church had denounced slavery in the most emphatic terms ; that before as well as after the revolution, Congregational ministers had preached against it ; while two years previous to that “Albany Convention,” which protested for “the first time,”—and so, turned that rising tide which in its ebb was soon to leave the Christian theology a “Tadmor in the desert,”—the Presbyterian church (N.S.) concluded a series of annual and triennial “protests” against slaveholding, by pronouncing it “an offence,” in the proper import of that term as used in the “Book of Discipline,” except when justified by circumstances making it, for the time being, an act of necessity or mercy ;—that the Temperance movement originated with Orthodox ministers, and has ever received its best support from such ministers and their churches ; that the same men, in connection with the Quakers, were prominent founders and advocates of the Peace societies ; while Orthodox missionaries again were the only men who have suffered imprisonment in behalf of the Indian ; and, in general, that the great accusation against the *Puritans*, clergy and laity alike, has been, from the beginning, is now, and is likely to be, for some time to come, that they insist upon applying the precepts of the Gospel to all details of public and of private life, and obstinately preach the omnipresent force of the “higher law.” We cannot think Mr. Parker dishonest in these extraordinary mistakes ; but we stand in dumb amazement before the might of that prejudice which could have kept such a man so imperfectly informed.

But Mr. Parker went further yet, and published to the world his opinion, that the two and thirty thousand Christian ministers in the United States “scarce lessen any vice of the State, the press, or the market.” That is to say : Governments here would be scarcely more corrupt, good publications would be about as numerous, and about as good, and bad publications but little more numerous and

little worse, and the morals of our trade would be about the same as now, if the American clergy were stricken out of existence. This was Mr. Parker's judgment. So, too, of the missions to "the heathens," he says: "Small good comes of it; but did they teach industry, thrift, letters, honesty, temperance, justice, mercy, with rational ideas of God and man, what a conversion would there be of the Gentiles!"—a passage indicative, again, of imperfect information. Had Mr. Parker known the facts familiar to nearly all intelligent members of Orthodox churches, he would never have penned such a sentence as that. Where can the church member be found, who does not know, that the missionaries *are* at pains to promote "industry," "honesty," and "thrift;" and that, while laying their hand at the root of the tree, and seeking to get the *heart* right,—whence the issues of life proceed,—they are watchful, also, over the whole outgoing of the life, and encourage, with the greatest zeal, those personal habits and those social usages which tend to refine and elevate the character, and such employments as are promotive of comfort and of the triumph of man over nature. The very scholars in the Sunday schools could have taught our author as much as this. Mr. Parker, however, seems to have been as little acquainted with the real condition of the heathen themselves, as with the efforts of his neighbors in their behalf, asking, whether Christian nations have a superiority over the South Asiatics, and the Chinese, in temperance, chastity, honesty, justice and mercy, equal to their mental superiority? and answering, that "it is notorious they have not." A recent traveller,¹ however, of the most extensive observation and not amenable to the charge of an extreme orthodoxy, expresses himself concerning one of these nations as follows: "It is my deliberate opinion, that the Chinese are, morally, the most debased people on the face of the earth. Forms of vice which in other countries are barely named, are in China so common that they excite no comment among the natives. They

¹ See Bayard Taylor's "India, China and Japan."

constitute the surface level, and below them there are deeps on deeps of depravity so shocking and horrible that their character can not even be hinted!"

We fear that it will be impossible to speak the truth concerning Mr. Parker, without saying what will be very displeasing to his friends. But let not these friends suppose that any contempt is cherished for their leader and champion, or any unkind feeling entertained towards those who agree with him. We understand too well the force of the currents on which he was borne astray, and have too much respect for whatsoever was noble or lovely in his character and life, as well as too much sympathy with the trouble that comes of doubt and denial, to harbor bitterness toward him or his followers.

THEODORE PARKER was a man of remarkable powers. Endowed with a physical constitution of rare energy, which, but for one inherited defect, would probably have borne up, even under his fierce taxation, to a good old age, he was able to do an amount of intellectual and *passional* work that few men equal. His intellect was capacious and strong, not lacking in powers of analysis, remarkable for imaginative vigor and a faculty of effective expression, insatiate after all sorts of knowledge, but not conscientiously exact, either in research or in statement; voracious rather than veracious; often rude and careless; often false, always unreliable. In denunciative eloquence, sarcasm and scorn and abhorrence, he was certainly among the first of men. Nor was he wanting in that nobler eloquence, which makes the beauties of the natural world its instrument, and stirs the soul with sublime joys; or even in that other, higher yet, which appeals directly to the moral nature, awakens its intuitions and its passions and benevolent desires. But the highest sphere of all seems to have been above his reach; and those tender and solemn views of God and of man and of man's state and destiny, which melt the soul into profound sorrow, love and prayer, which overcome it with awe

unutterable, which fill it and thrill it and empower it with the forces of a new life, in an immutable purpose, earnest as death, strong in God, those views which come through the knowledge of the truth as it is in Jesus, imparted by the Holy Ghost, we do not find in Mr. Parker's writings. His attempts upon purely spiritual themes, so far as we have observed, may be set down as failures; and the reader is made to feel that, in them, his author has overstepped the limits of experience, and is drawing mainly upon imagination and desire.

A pretty careful and extended perusal of Mr. Parker's works has deeply impressed us with the conviction, that the amount of his *accurate* and *reliable* knowledge was by no means remarkable. We do not recall a single important topic which he has treated in a manner indicative of thorough scholarship. Haste, incorrectness, confusion, misconception and misrepresentation are well nigh omnipresent. We confess to a profound suspicion respecting even that wonderful facility in the acquisition of languages, of which his admirers tell us. The only important translation from his hand, made from the language with which, among all foreign tongues, he may fairly be presumed to have been most familiar, was so faulty, that its author was pronounced by a prominent British Quarterly,¹ to be "grossly ignorant of German," and was held up to ridicule as "a conceited and ignorant translator." And it is indeed very difficult to conceive, that a person of such headlong temper, whose mental habit was so obviously loose and void of scholarly conscientiousness, could have been thorough in his mastery of languages.

Mr. Parker cherished many generous and benevolent impulses. He was a lover of liberty and a hater of oppression; and advocated with strong earnestness whatever he believed to be the cause of freedom, justice, or humanity. He pitied the poor and the unfortunate, and sought to comfort and help them; and was, we are most ready to believe, a true friend, faithful and loving. His prejudices were vehement,

¹ North Brit. Rev. VII., pp. 357, 358.

and sometimes blinded him to facts that even thrust themselves upon his attention. He was sadly lacking in reverence, as also in that subtle sympathy which so appreciates the attitude of other minds as, in a measure, to compensate for the lack of an instinct of respect. His works are disfigured with phraseology of a justly offensive kind, audacious and contemptuous. His later style is ordinarily inferior to his earlier, and marks the degeneracy of an intellect that breaks away from *laws*, being characterized by a license that is not liberty, and made weak by over-much strength.

This vigorous and independent writer was by no means an original thinker. His arguments against Christianity are put in his own dress, indeed, and with rare audacity and eloquence; they are fairly his own, and yet are not new. We do not recollect a single original contribution, on his part, to the munitions of the adversaries. Abounding in forcible popular appeals and in telling paragraphs for popular use, his books contain little careful reasoning; and it may be said with utmost exactness, that *he has proved nothing*. Indeed, it was not his nature to prove, but to assert. He was a dogmatist, and of the most truculent sort. He puts forth slight claim upon our reverence as a philosopher, still less as a theologian; but stands strongly forth a popular orator and declaimer; a rhapsodist, with skill to open the fountains of wrath, and to stir the multitude to mutiny; but as a spiritual teacher, a guide and shepherd of souls, untrustworthy, and, from the very habit of his mind, incompetent.

Mr. Parker gives us, in his letter to the members of his society, an enumeration of the projects entering into his plan of life; from which, as also from his published works, it appears that, while assuming for his main task the subversion of Christian ideas and the establishment of a theology more widely diverse from the popular system, as he says, than Christianity from Judaism or from Paganism, he intended to take in hand the questions of poverty, drunkenness, prostitution, and crime (prison discipline and the refor-

mation of criminals), the "education and guidance of the poorer Irish," and slavery :— a plan redolent of youthful enthusiasm and ambition, but more extensive than a man of sound discretion would have undertaken, and in its most important departments too lofty for his powers. The reformer of philosophy needs, himself, to be a profound and exhaustive thinker ; the creator of a new and better theology must be a divine ; the bringer in of a higher phase of religion must be a man of profound reverence, piety, and devotion, comprehending and presenting the results of religious speculation and life in practical forms, and whose rational instinct is superior to other men's reasoning, and whose spiritual intuition so far supersedes experience, that he begins where many others, after long toil, are happy to end. But Mr. Parker was none of these. Nor does he appear to have taken in the greatness of these several tasks sufficiently for the due comprehension of their difficulty. Had he appreciated the full grandeur of such enterprises, and reflected upon what the achievement of any one of them involved, he would have thought the easiest too difficult for one man's strength and life. As it was, with his lack of method and of carefulness, and with his haste and passion and unfairness, he accomplished little, — less than at first seems, far less than his followers think, or himself thought, infinitely less than his desire and expectation. Especially is this true of his negative work, his assaults upon religious belief. Here, rose the massive walls of the Christian theology, built with honest and careful hands, toiling in pious seriousness through eighteen centuries, its plans wrought over by able and conscientious architects, its several parts fitted and cemented together with devout painstaking, and its whole the expression of the Christian experience of the truth. Up comes our errant knight, with beating drum and clanging trumpet, and thinks, seemingly, that by one brave rush, these ancient walls, so deeply founded and so strongly cemented, will be made to disappear ; and that, directly, he will have others reared in their place, loftier, and stronger, and fairer to look upon ; while at the same time he is taking in hand such

playthings as the institution which holds four millions of men in hereditary bondage, and is throttling the several hydras and gorgons dire which infest society and the state.

Let us thank him for his benevolent wishes ; and let us not smile unkindly at their extravagance, or at the folly of his no-methods ; nor of the wrong that he did, let us speak too harshly, for he has, in reality, wrought much less harm than most have been wont to suppose. It is not by such attacks as these that the Christian Doctrine is to be subverted. It will stand until a better can be put in its place. Mr. Parker has not diminished the strength of evangelic Christendom ; and the force of his wild assault has mainly spent itself upon the outlying border-sects that verge upon the broad waste of Infidelity. The howling storm has passed by ; and only rotten or rootless trees have been levelled in its path. Our author's admirers seem to think of him as of some great headland pushing loftily out into the stream of time and turning the current of events ; whereas he may rather be likened to a sunken and still sinking rock, around which, once, the waves stormed, but over which the steady tide is flowing, with a ripple and a murmur still, but these each year diminishing, so that at last, nothing more than a feeble eddy shall remind us of the transitoriness of denial.

Theodore Parker has gone, and his influence has mainly departed with him. Personal friends will still cherish the memory of his noble qualities and his pleasant companionship ; those already committed to his errors, or strongly inclined to them, will be confirmed in their misbelief ; and a few youthful minds will, for some time yet, be led astray by reading his books ; but these books are not such as will bear a careful study, are not of permanent value, are not destined to be accepted as sound authority, to be consulted as monitors of the soul in its eternal interests, or as oracles of political or of social philosophy. They are essentially ephemeral. Mr. Parker *spoke for the hour*. While he was speaking, he was powerful ; but his speech lacked the wisdom that makes language immortal.

There remains, indeed, a last act in this tragedy of thought; for there are deductions from Mr. Parker's theories, which he has, himself, been at pains elaborately to refute, but which have already been made by some of those who have accepted his teachings, and will certainly be made by others. One depth more opens at the feet of them that have wound their way down into the enchanted hollow whither he so boldly beckons; and a denial of a personal God and of immortality, must break at last the thin crust, and let his venturesome disciples down into gulfs of Atheism.

We have but one life here, and that is very precious to us. Nor to us alone; a human life is in itself a precious thing, and no soul in which the sense of humanity dwells can see a life thrown away, without a deep, uprising sorrow. Here was a man who thought that he was doing a great work, for the welfare of his kind and for the glory of God; he meant to do it, he had the strength to do it, he labored hard to do it; he bore contumely, he was stung with the grief of separation from those whom he honored, and of whom he had hoped honor in return; he was wounded in the house of them that he had been wont to esteem his friends, he died before his time, worn down with over much work, and the chafing of his spirit,—all this, and yet the final result of his life, so far as recognizable now, is, an injury done to religion and little good to the cause of either liberty or morality.

Had this man, gifted with the rare faculty of making the people hear him, risen to an appreciation of the vastness and the sacredness of the dread themes that he discussed, so as to have been led to treat them with the tenderness, the sobriety, and the carefulness which they justly claim; had he duly measured the value of past labors, rightly estimated the difficulty and peril of attempts at improvements, felt less acutely the necessity of doing a great work, *himself*, and been penetrated so profoundly with faith in the divine sovereignty, as to participate, as a man may, in the divine patience; had he lived and labored in such a

spirit and method, a far nobler work would he have wrought, and a more honorable record would he have left in the annals of his country and of the church. But his natural tendencies and his whole education were so against him, that he failed of the spiritual *insight* which is essential to the true "divine," and which would have put him in possession of the central meaning of the Christian system, and have shown him that it is all that he understood by "the absolute religion" and more, to wit: the absolute religion in a shape to be vitally apprehended and appropriated by mankind, so as to be the means of transforming the marred nature of our sinful race back into the image of the glory of its first estate, of God's eternal archetype. These causes of error were greatly aggravated, also, by that antagonism into which his opinions and the spirit of his advocacy brought him, and which irresistibly intensified his faults. Let the mantle of charity be thrown over all; and after fitly recognizing what it is our duty to see and to declare, let every soul cherish thoughts of tenderness. Well did the Apostle pray without ceasing, for his brethren, that God would give them the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Christ. God grant it to us all.

ARTICLE II.

THE THEOLOGY OF SOPHOCLES.

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[Concluded from Vol. XVII., p. 619.]

Antigone.

In its leading characters, the *Antigone* bears a strong resemblance to the *Electra*. The central figure in each, on whom all eyes are fastened, and who gives name to the piece, is a young woman, who stands up for the right, in opposi-

tion to the ruling powers, and is willing to sacrifice herself in the performance of a duty, which she owes to her kindred, to justice, and to the gods. In each, the heroine, who is made of sterner stuff, and possesses the martyr-spirit, is contrasted with a sister, of more complying disposition, the representative of ordinary womanhood. Antigone is offset by Ismene, as Electra is by Crysothemis, and is exalted to a higher pitch of heroism and self-sacrificing devotion by the contrast. But Electra has the sympathy and support of the chorus, which is made up of noble women, like herself; while the chorus in Antigone, consisting of Theban senators and courtiers, after a few feeble attempts to withstand oppression, yield a servile submission to the tyrant, and leave the more manly, more heroic woman to stand up, unfriended and alone, against despotism, clothed with the forms of the law and the powers of the state. Moreover, Electra has a brother to lean upon, who takes the active part in the work of vengeance, while Antigone, although she has a lover who pleads her cause, is forbidden by female delicacy to ask his coöperation, or even to mention his name; and so she goes, alone, to perform, with her own hand, the prohibited rites of sepulture to her brother. This, however, she is the better able to do, because there is no room for doubt or conflict in her own bosom. Electra, in avenging her father's death, is obliged to lift her hand against the life of her mother. The ties of nature bind her to both her parents. The claims of filial duty might well impel her in opposite directions. But in Antigone, however plausible the pleas by which the ruling powers justify their actions to their own consciences, it could not but appear to her a clear case of wrong to the dead on one side, and of duty to the dead on the other. Whether, therefore, we consider the holy cause in which she is enlisted, or the solitary grandeur in which she resists the mandates of the government, Antigone carries with her our undivided sympathy, and rises to a moral sublimity that finds its parallel only in the annals of martyrdom, in which tender and delicate, yet heroic and devoted, women have ever borne a conspicuous part.

Not the least interesting feature to modern readers — and

doubtless a point of chief interest to the writer also and his contemporaries — is the conflict between human government and divine authority; in other words now familiar to our ears, the conflict between the lower and “the higher law,” which lies at the foundation of the plot, and makes itself prominent in the dialogue. Creon is an eloquent advocate of the divine right of kings to do wrong; and of that still more subtle and demoralizing heresy: “our country, right or wrong.” Antigone asserts the eternal and immutable supremacy of the law and government of God, with a clearness and force, which should put to the blush the professedly Christian but practically atheistic politicians and divines, who deny the existence, in *political affairs*, of any higher law than the law of the land — of any will paramount to the will of the people.

After the defeat of the confederate chiefs and the death of the two brothers, rival claimants to the throne of Oedipus, which Aeschylus has sketched, with such a masterly hand, in his “Seven against Thebes,” Creon, who as nearest of kin, has now succeeded to the throne, awards sepulchral honors to Eteocles; but forbids, under the severest penalties, the burial of Polynices, as a traitor to his country. Antigone, in open disobedience to the inhuman mandate, performs the last sad offices to her unhappy brother, and falls beneath the vengeance of the king. But the blow recoils, with overwhelming force, upon the whole family of the oppressor. The law of the land seizes on its victim; but divine justice soon overtakes the maker and executioner of the law. Warned by providence and awakened to a sense of his guilt and folly by visible tokens of divine displeasure, he begins to retrace his steps. But it is now too late. The storm has already gathered; and now it bursts, and not only strikes down the guilty, but involves also the innocent, who are connected with the guilty; nay, it strikes the personally guilty chiefly through those members of his family who are personally innocent.

Here, not only the conclusion, as in Ajax, but the whole plot, turns on the sacredness of the right of burial; sacred in the sight of the gods, as well as in the eyes of men: and here

too, as in Ajax, Trachiniae, and Oedipus, suicide is the last resource of those who find the ills of life too heavy to be borne.

The opening scene between the two sisters is pathetic, and almost painful, especially in the want of sympathy and sisterly tenderness between those who now have no earthly resource but their love for one another. But it is of dramatic rather than theological interest.

Creon, on whom the sceptre has now devolved, next appears before the councillors of the state, who constitute the chorus; and, after a preface, in which he justifies his course by the most plausible reasons of patriotism and state policy, to which he is willing to sacrifice even the ties of friendship and relationship, he makes public proclamation forbidding the burial of that son of Oedipus who, in asserting his right to the throne, had dared to levy war, in foreign lands, against his own country. The chorus, who had just been celebrating the fall of the confederate chiefs beneath the walls, now, as in duty bound, acknowledge Creon's right to rule over the *dead as well as the living* (214). Scarcely has the proclamation gone forth from his lips, when a messenger arrives bringing intelligence that some one has already dared to sprinkle dust over the dead. The chorus venture humbly to raise the question, whether this may not be a divinely ordered deed (*Σεήλατον τοῦργον τόδε*, 278). But Creon sternly rebukes the thought that the gods can honor one so accursed; and from this time the chorus are little more than politicians, courtiers, echoes of the king. In the spirit of an Asiatic despot, Creon threatens death to the messenger himself, if he does not detect the guilty person; and the chorus, in place of the high-toned moral and religious sentiments which such tyranny and impiety should elicit, goes off into a splendid lyric declamation (332—375) on the marvellous inventive powers of mankind,¹ the gods of this lower world, and the conquerors of all but death.

The messenger now returns, bringing with him the young

¹ Very like, — perhaps the original of Hamlet's celebrated panegyric: "What a piece of work is Man." See also Eccl. 7:29: "They have sought out many inventions."

Antigone; and relates how, when the guard had removed the slight covering of earth that had been cast upon the body, — an act of impiety which was followed by whirlwinds and sweeping clouds of dust, the visible tokens of heaven's displeasure, she had been detected in again scattering dust and pouring libations on the dead. When asked by Creon, if she knew the royal command, she frankly avows her intentional disobedience. When further asked, how she dared to disobey, she makes this heroic, this martyr-like, this almost inspired answer :

Ne'er did eternal Jove such laws ordain,
Or justice, throned amid the Infernal Powers,
Who on mankind these holier rites imposed.
Nor can I deem thine edict armed with power
To contravene the firm unwritten laws
Of the just gods, thyself a weak, frail mortal!
These are no laws of yesterday: they live
Forevermore, and none can trace their birth. — (450 seq.)

Creon declares that, though sprung from his own sister, Antigone shall suffer the full penalty of her disobedience; and, crowning cruelty with impiety (for Jupiter is already making mad whom he intends to destroy), he gratuitously adds :

Were she sprung from one
Dearer than all whom *Hercian Jove* defends,
She and her sister shall not now evade
A shameful death. — (486 seq.)

Antigone bids him hasten his tyrannical will; enough for her is the holy praise of having done her duty to her brother.

Cre. Doth it not shame thee to dissent from these? ¹

Ant. I cannot think it shame to love my brother.

Cre. Was not he too, who died for Thebes, thy brother?

Why then dishonor him to grace the guilty?

Ant. The dead entombed will not approve thy words.

Cre. Yet he wronged his country :

The other fought undaunted in her cause.

Ant. Still Death ² at least demands an equal law.

Cre. Ne'er should the base be honored like the noble.

¹ The Chorus.

² δ' Ἀϊδης.

Ant. Who knows, if this be holy in the shades ?¹

Cre. Death cannot change a foe into a friend.

Ant. My love shall go with thine, but not my hate.²

Cre. Go, then, and love them in the tomb ;¹ but know.

No woman rules in Thebes, while Creon lives.—(510 seq.)

Ismene enters, and is charged with being an accomplice of Antigone. With true womanly fortitude and beautiful sisterly affection, she consents to share the guilt, if her sister does not refuse. But Antigone, whose heart is steeled, even against her sister, by the terrible process through which she has passed, scorns a friend who loves only in words, and denies her sister's right, though tenderly pleading for it now as a privilege, to die with her whose life has long been devoted to the dead. Ismene now turns to Creon (who thinks that of the two maidens, the one has gone mad, and the other was born so), and pleads for the life of Antigone, urging especially that she is the affianced bride of Creon's son. But Creon answers that she is already dead, and Hades shall put a stop to the intended nuptials. And the chorus, as if her doom were fixed, descant at length on the wretchedness of families, on which there rests an hereditary taint or curse :

But when a house is struck by angry Fate,
Through all its line what ceaseless miseries flow !
I see the ancient miseries of thy race,
O Labdacus, arising from the dead
With fresh despair ; nor sires from sons efface
The curse some angry Power hath rivetted
Forever on thy destined line ! —(583 seq.)

This curse, however, is not irrespective of the character and conduct of the individuals. Their own folly and madness conspire with divine vengeance : *Ἀτῆ, Ἀνοία* and *Ἐρινύς* reap, together, the bloody harvest, and the imperishable, irresistible might of Jove presides over all :

Κατ' αὖ νιν θεῶν φοινία τῶν
Νεπτέρων ἀμῆ κοπῖς,
Λόγου τ' ἀνοία καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς, κ. τ. λ. —(601 seq. cf. 584.)

¹ Κότω.

² The flexibility and expressiveness of the Greek in this verse is inimitable ; οὐ τοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφην. — (523).

Grand, worthy almost of some Hebrew prophet, is the description of the unsleeping, undecaying power and dominion of Jove :

Spurning the power of age, enthroned in might,
Thou dwell'st mid heaven's broad light.
This was, in ages past, thy firm decree,
Is now, and shall, forever, be :
That none of mortal race, on earth, shall know
A life of joy serene, a course unmarked by woe. — (606-14.)

The chorus do not seem to be aware that they are thus not only deploring the calamities of the house of Oedipus, but foreshadowing those which are soon to fall upon the family of Creon. And yet more distinctly, though still unconsciously, do coming events cast their shadows before, as the chorus descant, in the conclusion of their song (615 seq.), upon the delusive power of hope, and the blinding force of passion, changing evil to apparent good, in the eyes of him whom the god is hurrying to destruction.

As the chorus conclude this unconscious prophecy, Haemon, the son of Creon and the affianced husband of Antigone enters ; and, with a filial deference which contrasts beautifully with the unfeeling, unparental sternness of his sire, pleads, not so much his own cause, or that of his affianced bride, as the character, reputation, and well-being of his father. The son now takes up the doctrine of the higher law, while the father, as the advocate of the lower, lays down the doctrine of implicit obedience to the powers that be, in all things whatsoever, whether right or wrong :

Kaì σμικρὰ, καὶ δίκαια καὶ τάναντία. — (667)

Haem. That is no state, which crouches to one despot.

Cre. Oh thou most vile !

Wouldst thou withstand thy father ?

Haem. When I see

My father swerve from justice.

Cre. Do I err,

Revering my own laws ?

Haem. Dost thou revere them,

When thou wouldst trample on the laws of heaven ?

(737-745).

The unnatural father at length proceeds so far as to threaten to put to death the bride of Haemon before his own eyes. Haemon declares that shall never be, but he will leave his father's sight forever. As he goes away, the chorus express their fears that he may perpetrate some act of rashness. But Creon, blinded by pride and passion, says : Let him do it : still he shall not save Antigone.

To a spot
By mortal foot untrodden, will I lead her,
And deep immure her in a rocky cave,
Leaving enough of sustenance to provide
A due atonement, that the State may shun
Pollution from her death.¹ There let her call
On gloomy Hades, the sole power she owns,
To shield her from her doom ; or learn, though late,
At least this lesson : 'tis a bootless task
To render homage to the Powers of hell. — (773 seq.)

A chorus succeeds, celebrating the irresistible power of Love :

*Ἐρως ἀνίκητε μάχαν. — (781)

and then Antigone is brought in, under guard, and she and the choir bewail, in responsive strains, like Jephthah's daughter and her companions, her unhappy lot, to be wedded only to death ; or, what is worse, to live, Niobe-like, petrified with grief, tears ever flowing down her rocky cheeks. The chorus, however, do not admit that she is an innocent sufferer :

Deeply, my daughter, hast thou sinned
Against the exalted throne of right.

And they even add sentiments worthy the lips of their master Creon :

Religion bids us grace the dead ;
But Might, when regal might bears sway,
Must never, never be contemned.

Creon, at length, breaks off the lamentation by hurrying

¹ How like the *ceremonial scruples* of the Jews, when they were intent on shedding the blood of their innocent victim. — John 19 : 28.

her away to a living death, to which she goes expostulating with the gods and struggling with her own doubts of divine justice :

Which of your laws, ye Powers, have I transgressed ?
Yet wherefore do I turn me to the gods ?
If acts like these are sanctioned by the gods,
I will address me to my doom in silence. — (921 seq.)

The next chorus still expatiates on the irresistible power of Destiny, as illustrated in its victims, from Danae to Antigone :

Ἄλλὰ κἀπ' ἐκείνα
Μοῖραι μακραίωνες ἔσχον, ὦ παῖ. — (986-7)

The blind old prophet Tiresias (the same who denounced on Oedipus his doom, in the presence of Creon) now breaks in upon Creon himself, like one of those sudden and awful appearances of Elijah to the king of Israel, and strives to arrest him in his career of madness. In the exercise of his holy calling as a prophet-priest, he has seen frightful omens : birds with dissonant cries tearing each other, and the hallowed fire on the altar casting out the offerings as unholy ; and he interprets these omens dire as tokens of the divine displeasure at the king's unrelenting refusal to permit the burial of the son of Oedipus. At the same time, addressing him kindly as his son, and reminding him that to err is human, he calls upon him to remedy the error by retracing his steps, as now he may, while it is not yet too late :

Ἐπὴν δ' ἀμάρτη, κείνος οὐκ ἔτ' ἔστ' ἀνὴρ
Ἄβουλος οὐδ' ἀνολβος, ὅστις ἐς κακὸν
Πεσὼν ἀκείται, μὴδ' ἀκίνητος πέλει. — (1025 seq.)

But the king is still unrelenting. He charges the prophet with bribery, criminales the whole race of prophets as a venal race, and even dares, indirectly, to defy the avenging bolts of heaven, by declaring that, though Jove's eagles should carry the dead body to the throne of Jove himself, not even the fear of such pollution (*μίασμα*) should induce him to permit

the burial, for he knows well that no mortal *can* pollute the gods :

Ἐὺ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι
Θεοὺς μαιίνειν οὔτις ἀνθρώπων σθένει. — (1044)

Now the king has received his last warning. The minister of God has made his last effort to save him. And now the insulted prophet, not without some apparent mixture of personal resentment, proceeds to denounce upon him the just recompense of his crimes according to the ancient *lex talionis*: life for life — one dead from his own family for the dead whom he has wronged and dishonored (*νέκυν νεκρῶν ἀμοιβὴν ἀντιδοῦς*, 1067). And since he has intermeddled with matters with which neither he nor the gods above have any proper part, the powers beneath, the *after-destroying Erinyes of Hades and of the gods* (*ὑστεροφθόροι . . . Ἀιδου καὶ Θεῶν Ἐρινύες*, 1075) are already lying in wait to avenge upon him the invasion of their prerogatives.

No sooner has the prophet departed, than the king begins to stagger under the weight of the curses that have fallen upon him ; and yielding, now, to the counsels of the choir, he takes measures for the *immediate* reparation of his wrong, since the curses of the gods are swift-footed to cut off (*συντέμνειν*¹) the evil-minded. But it is already too late to repair the mischief. He sends his attendants, with all speed, to release Antigone. But it is too late. He hastens himself to bathe and bury the body of Polynices, imploring Pluto and Proserpine to restrain their anger. But it is too late. The chorus intercede with Bacchus, the patron god of the city, and Phoebus, the son of Jove. But it is too late. Prayers and efforts are now unavailing. While they yet utter the language of prayer, a messenger comes and announces that all is lost.² Antigone has made way with herself by a noose woven from her own dress ; and Haemon, embracing her lifeless body, lies

¹ Cf. Rom. 9 : 28 ; *συντέμνων ἐν δικαιοσύνη*.

² The poet has put into the mouth of this messenger words of high import and remarkable conciseness touching the perpetual obligations of *truth* ; *ῥᾶδον ἢ ἄλθαι* *ἀεί* (1195). They chime well with the *higher law* doctrine of the tragedy.

weltering in his own blood. Eurydice, the wife of Creon, hears the overwhelming news, and without uttering a word, goes away to follow the example of her only son. And while Creon is lamenting the death of that son, and cursing his own folly as its cause, a second messenger comes to him announcing the death of his wife, and that she died imprecating curses on his head as the murderer of their child. He takes all the blame to himself, and prays for death, bereft, as he is, by his own blind folly, of friends and resources, with all adverse in the present, and an intolerable fate overhanging him in the future. And the drama closes with this reflection of the chorus, summing up the moral lessons of the piece :

There is no guide to happiness on earth,
Save Wisdom ; nor behooves it us to fail
In reverence to the gods. High sounding vaunts
Inflict due vengeance on the haughty head,
And teach late wisdom to its dark old age.

Some critics have strenuously maintained that the Antigone was intended to censure, alike, the transgressor of human statutes and the violator of divine laws. Both laws do, indeed, claim their victims. But the moral lesson, gathered from the piece by the chorus, applies directly to the arrogance and impiety of the *aged* Creon (*γῆρα τὸ φρονεῖν ἐδίδαξαν*). Moreover, as we have before remarked, the sympathies of the audience are with Antigone. *Her* death is viewed as a calamity, in which she is involved by the curse on her family ; while Creon confesses, with his own lips, that the ruin which has fallen upon *his* entire family is the just punishment of his own evil counsels (1269). The transgressor of human statutes, even though he acts in obedience to his own conscience, transgresses at his peril.¹ But the violator of divine law, even though in obedience to human statutes, incurs a more dreadful and inevitable doom. The perpetual and unchangeable supremacy of the divine law over all human laws and constitutions, is the instructive lesson, which the poet has bequeathed, to the ages, in this immortal drama.

¹ Cf. Hickok's Moral Philos. Part Second, Chap. VIII.

The *Antigone* is the only drama of Sophocles, we might almost say the only poem of ancient Greece (leaving brief lyrics out of the question), in which love between the sexes — pure, unwedded love, like that which forms the staple of modern poetry and romance — holds any important place. And here it is not the cardinal point in the plot, or the main-spring of the action. It is not even the sole cause of the suicide of *Haemon*. The unnatural cruelty and injustice of his father furnishes the immediate impulse to that fatal act. And *Antigone*, the heroine of the play, while she bewails her virginity with a tragic pathos worthy of *Jephtha's* daughter, and a frankness little in accordance with modern notions of female delicacy, never once alludes to the young prince to whom she had been betrothed. This suggests one of the most remarkable contrasts between the literature of ancient and modern times. Is the controlling power of woman in modern society, and the never-failing charm of love in modern literature — is it owing to race, or to religion? Is it the offspring of Teutonic blood, or is it the fruit of Christianity, elevating the sex, purifying the relation, frowning on unchastity with a severity of which we find no trace among Greeks or barbarians, and appropriating purity and fidelity in the marriage state as the sacred symbol of the union between Christ and the church, and of the normal relation between God and the human soul? ¹

Oedipus Tyrannus.

The two *Oedipuses* and *Antigone* are so closely connected in the subject matter, in the characters, and in the continued operation of the same moral causes, that some have even called them a *trilogy*; though it is quite certain that they were composed at wide intervals of time, and not performed together; the *Antigone*, which is the last in the supposed trilogy, having been written the earliest of all the extant tragedies of Sophocles, the *Oedipus Tyrannus* about the middle, and the *Oedipus Coloneus* the last, and not exhibited

¹ Compare *Antig.* 909 seq., where *Antigone* sets the fraternal tie above the filial or the conjugal, with *Eph.* 5 : 25—31, and even with such passages of the Old Testament, as *Gen.* 2 : 24.

on the stage till after the death of the poet. Following the order of time and causation, in the connected series, we should have reserved the Antigone to the last. But Antigone so resembles Electra, that we could speak of it most easily and concisely in that connection. And the two Oedipuses form a *bilogy* (if we may be allowed the coinage of a convenient though unauthorized word), so complete in itself and so in harmony with the concluding epoch of the poet's life, that we cannot consent to let even Antigone come after them in our analysis.

The preliminary history of Oedipus is too familiar to require repetition. Doomed before his conception to be the murderer of his father, and thus the avenger of the crimes of his ancestors; begotten by that father in the recklessness of intoxication, against a solemn resolution not to approach his mother; exposed immediately after his birth, by that mother, in the mountains and forests of Cithaeron; found there by one of the shepherds of the king of Corinth, whose wife, being childless, prevailed upon her husband to adopt him as their son; brought up till manhood as heir-apparent to the Corinthian throne; fleeing his adopted home to avoid the doom (revealed to him by an oracle) of killing his supposed parent and, in that very flight, falling in with his real father, and, in a quarrel by the way, unintentionally putting him to death; coming to Thebes just in time to rescue the city from the devouring Sphinx, and receive the kingdom as a free gift at the hands of the grateful people; honored with the hand, in marriage, of the late queen, and blessed(?), by her, with sons and daughters; reigning with wisdom and in the hearts of a willing and obedient people, who look up to him as their father—down to the opening scene of the tragedy he is, in his own estimation and to all human appearance, among the most fortunate of men.

But the wisdom which baffled the Sphinx and saved the people, is not sufficient to baffle the Fates and save himself. Every step he has taken to escape his destiny, has only brought him nearer to his inevitable doom. Every round of the ladder by which he has climbed to the throne, is stained,

though unawares to himself, with blood and crime. His very prosperity has not only awakened the jealousy of the gods, but it has, in some measure, hardened his own heart; so that he will not go down, altogether innocent and undeserving, to his ruin. All the critics, from Aristotle downwards, have remarked the consummate skill with which the poet has adjusted the character of Oedipus: with so large a measure of good in it as to enlist our sympathy strongly in his misfortunes, yet not so free from the taint of pride and evil passion that our moral sentiments are shocked, when we see him suffer. He is neither a god nor a demon. *Mentem mortalia tangunt*. And as we behold this solver of enigmas and saviour of his people, this imperfect yet, on the whole, wise and good king, drawn as if by fascination within the circle of the destroyer; like the parent bird, moved at first by love of her offspring, then fluttering with fear, and finally screaming with anguish, but still by all her fluttering and fear borne continually nearer the fatal centre — as we see every measure which he uses to gain light involving him in thicker darkness, and every struggle which he makes to extricate himself plunging him deeper in the mire — we behold a striking illustration of the doctrine of holy writ, that “the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God stronger than men.” We see, also, one of those examples of imputed guilt, of hereditary crime and calamity, which are not unfrequent in the history of the world, which the scriptures describe as the visiting of the iniquities of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of those that hate God, and which, however mysterious, however apparently irreconcilable with our ideas of divine justice, in themselves considered, manifestly serve an important purpose in the natural government of the world, by the fearful lessons which they teach of the evil consequences of sin as affecting, perchance, generations yet unborn; and, if our sense of justice is offended, it is at least partially reconciled by the intuitive conviction that, so far as there is partial injustice to any individual, it will, sooner or later, meet with full reparation — that the *Oedipus Tyrannus* will be followed by the *Oedipus Coloneus*, if not in this life, yet surely in the next.

A wasting pestilence has fallen upon the city Thebes (as we learn from the opening dialogue between Oedipus and the priest of Zeus), which is consuming the fruits of the earth, the herds of cattle, and the race of men, and enriching Hades with groans and lamentations. The people instinctively impute it to the anger of the gods; for unsophisticated minds are at the farthest possible remove from that philosophical scepticism, or atheistic materialism, which severs natural from all connection with moral causes; and with their religious leaders they betake themselves, with prayers and offerings, to the altars especially of Zeus, Athena, and Apollo. They gather in crowds, with suppliant branches, about the altar in front of the palace, and look to their king (the very person who is the occasion of their sufferings — affecting picture of human ignorance and helplessness!) as, next to the gods and under their teaching, able to find some way of reconciliation and deliverance:

Ἄνδρῶν δὲ πρῶτον ἐν τε συμφοραῖς βίου
Κρίνοντες, ἐν τε δαιμόνων ξυναλλαγαῖς.¹ — (33-4)

Oedipus comes forth and assures them of his sympathy, nay his sleepless anxiety, and informs them that he has already sent his brother-in-law, Creon, to the Pythian oracle to learn what he must do; and when he learns, he will not fail to do it. While he yet speaks, Creon appears crowned with laurel, and announces as the will of the god, that they must remove the polluting curse of the land (*μίλασμα χώρας*, 97), by exiling the murderers of Laius, or expiating his blood by shedding theirs (*φόνῳ φόνον πάλιν λύοντας*, 100). After making some inquiry into the facts attending the murder (which took place just before the affair of the Sphinx, as he learns without once being reminded of his own slaying a royal personage at that time), Oedipus responds that, with the help of Apollo, he will do all in his power to avenge, at once, the land and the god; and he will labor to disperse the de-

¹ The same word so often used in the scriptures to denote reconciliation to God.

filament (μύσος, 138), for his own sake also ; though he little suspects how nearly it concerns himself. The chorus, aged and venerable men, trembling at the unknown import of the oracle (which they call the oracle of Zeus, though proceeding from the healing Delian god at Delphi), invoke the interposition of Athena, Artemis, and Apollo, triple averters of death (τρισσοὶ ἀλεξίμοροι, 163), also father Zeus and Bacchus, the patron-god of Thebes, to smite Ares, the fire-bearing god,¹ and drive him from the country. This choral prayer ended, Oedipus makes proclamation of his intentions, inviting all who have any knowledge of the murder to make it known, with the assurance that, if guilty themselves, they shall, in that case, suffer only exile ; but denouncing the direst woes on the man who should harbor the murderer ; even though himself should be the man :

This man, whoe'er he be, let none that owns
Our sceptre and our sway, presume to grant
The shelter of a house ; let none accost him ;
Let none associate with him in the vows
And victims of the gods, or sprinkle o'er him
The lustral stream ; let all, from every roof,
Chase far the dire pollution, as the word
Of Phoebus, by his oracle, enjoined. — (236—243)
Yea, on myself, if, conscious of the deed,
I grant the wretch asylum in my house,
The same dread curse, in all its vengeance, fall.² — (249—51)

But to those who coöperate with him in the discovery, may the allied Justice (Dike) and all the gods ever grant their favoring presence.

The chorus, thus laid under a curse (ἀπαῖον, 276), declare their ignorance of the deed, and advise Oedipus, in this matter known only to the gods, to have recourse to the seer Tiresias, the royal seer, whose vision is most nearly the same with that of royal Phoebus (ἄνακτ' ἀνακτι ταῦθ' ὁρῶντ',³ 284).

¹ The priest of Zeus calls the Pestilence by the same name, πυφόρος θεός, 27.

² In his fatal blindness, as if possessed by some higher power, and compelled in mockery to foreshadow with his own lips the whole dreadful future, he says that he will toil for Laius, as for his own father.

³ Cf. Dan. 5:11: "Wisdom, like the wisdom of the gods, was found in him," etc.

Oedipus replies, that in this, too, he has already anticipated their suggestion, and sent two messengers for the prophet. The prophet soon arrives. The king addresses him with the utmost reverence, as one who revolves (literally, dispenses—*ρομῶν*,¹ 300) everything on earth and in heaven, the only guardian and preserver of the state, and intreats him to disclose his knowledge, whether derived from birds or by any other method of divination, and so deliver the city. The whole dreadful truth seems to flash at once upon the mind of the prophet. He deplores the possession of wisdom that is not profitable to the possessor, as the prophets of the Old Testament and the New found the book of prophecy bitter in their souls,² and begs to be sent home at once, since it will be better, both for him and the king. Oedipus, seconded by the chorus, adjures him not to withhold the knowledge he possesses. Tiresias charges them with folly, and refuses. Oedipus is at length provoked, and declares his suspicion, that the prophet himself was an accomplice in the deed. The prophet turns instantly upon him, pronounces *him* the unhal- lowed polluter (*ἀνοσίῳ μιάστορι*, 353) of the land, and bids him execute on *himself* his dreadful curse. Oedipus threatens punishment for such treasonable words. Tiresias replies, that he has nothing to fear, if there is any power in truth :

Εἵπερ τί γ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας σθένος. — (369)

The king taunts the prophet with utter blindness of the mind as well as all the senses. The prophet answers, that that reproach will soon return, with all its force, upon the king. The king says, a blind man cannot harm him. The prophet answers, it is not a blind man he has to fear ; but Apollo, whose concern it is, can maintain the credit of his own oracles.

Oedipus, who seems honestly to regard his wisdom and his

¹ As if "the man of God," were in the place of God himself, and did what he predicted, cf. Jer. 1 : 10 ; I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms, to root out and to pull down and to destroy, and to throw down, to build and to plant.

² Cf. Ezek. 2 : 10 ; Jer. 20 : 14—18 ; Rev. 10 : 10.

power, both so soon to fail him, as objects of envy to those around him, charges Tiresias with being suborned by Creon, at whose instance he had sent for him, and inquires, where the boasted wisdom of the prophet was when he, the ignorant Oedipus, solved the riddle of the Sphinx. Tiresias now throws off all restraint, declares that he is a servant of Loxias, not of Oedipus or Creon, and predicts in full, though still in somewhat enigmatical terms, the woes that are soon to overwhelm Oedipus and his family, bereft, blinded, and driven from the land by the *δεινόπλους* 'Αρά of his own father and mother. At the same time he throws out incidental hints touching his parentage, which, with all his skill in solving enigmas, Oedipus cannot understand.

The prophet gone, the chorus take up something of his spirit, and exult over the now certain and speedy punishment of the murderer, overtaken and overwhelmed by the *ever-living, hovering* oracles that proceed from Delphi, centre of the earth, by the unerring Fates (*Κῆρες ἀναπλάκῃτοι*, 472), and by the son of Jove armed with fire and lightnings; though they are still slow to accept any intimations against their sovereign, who had been found so wise and friendly to the state in the matter of the Sphinx.

In the ensuing interview between Oedipus and Creon, the monarch carries his suspicions, or rather his charges and threats, to such a height of injustice, as to prepare, and in some measure reconcile, the spectators to his fall. Jocasta, the wife of Oedipus and the sister of Creon, interposes to allay their strife. The choir also, or the choir-leader in its behalf, takes part in the dialogue, and begs of Oedipus not to charge with crimes unproved a friend "who calls the gods to witness for his truth;" but to reverence him who, before, was not a child, and now is *great*, since he is *under oath*¹ (680 seq.). The king goes so far as to reflect upon the loyalty of the chorus. The choir-leader calls the sun, the god, leader of all gods (*πάντων θεῶν θεὸν πρόμουν*), to witness

¹ This idea of being bound by an oath or curse is expressed in three different ways in the connection, *ἐν ὅρκῳ*, 653; *ἀραιός*, 644; *ἐναγῆ*, 656.

his innocence, praying that he may perish without god and without friend (*ἄθεος ἄφιλος*, 661), if he harbors an unloyal thought. The king at length yields the life of Creon to the intreaties of Jocasta and the chorus, but still hates him and frowns him from his presence in an unforgiving spirit, which elicits from Creon the prophetic answer :

Even in relenting art thou stern ; thy wrath,
Too far indulged, most fearful. Souls like thine
Are the just authors of their own remorse. — (678-5)

In the endeavor to pacify her husband, Jocasta proceeds to show how little reliance can be placed on any pretended oracles among men, by relating the oracle which had predicted that Laius should fall by his own son ; whereas, their only son had been left to die, in infancy, on the mountains, and Laius had fallen by the hand of foreigners, where three ways met. This incidental, chance allusion to *three ways*, awakens, at length, the recollections and the fears of Oedipus ; and thus her own lips confirm the truth of the oracle in the very attempt to prove it false. On further inquiry, the time and place are found to agree with his own encounter on the way to Thebes. The description of Laius and his attendants, also, answers to his own recollections ; and a slave, sole survivor of the train, who, at his own earnest request when Oedipus was crowned, had been allowed to retire to some rural charge, is sent for to make the matter sure. Meanwhile Oedipus relates to his wife his early history at Corinth, his flight from home to avoid the killing of his parent, and his encounter, at the three corners between Corinth and Thebes, trembling the while with apprehension, lest he had, unwittingly, pronounced upon himself a dreadful curse. But Jocasta still blindly insists, that even if Laius fell by the hand of Oedipus, he could not have fallen by the hand of his own son ; so that the oracle, she argues with bitter and impious madness, is false at any rate, and unworthy of the slightest regard ; to which conclusion the deluded Oedipus also gives, at least, a partial assent (*καλῶς νομίζεις*, 859). But the chorus, so far from falling in with this sceptical reasoning, gives utterance to these lofty strains, in vindication of eternal truth and eternal law :

O, be the lot forever mine
 Unsullied to maintain,
 In act and word, with awe divine,
 What potent laws ordain.
 Laws spring from purer realms above :
 Their father is the Olympian Jove.
 Ne'er shall oblivion veil their front sublime,
 Th' indwelling god is great, nor dreads the waste of time :

*Μέγας ἐν ταύτοις θεὸς
 Οὐδὲ γηράσκει. — (863-72)*

And this sublime strophe is followed by a full and dark picture of the daring impiety that will universally prevail, if men lose their reverence for divine truth and justice, ending in the concise and expressive line :

**Ἐρῶει δὲ τὰ θεῖα. — (910)*

Overcome by the fears of her lord, which she cannot allay, Jocasta goes to the altar of Apollo, with garlands and incense, and prays the god to bring them some righteous deliverance. But when a messenger arrives from Corinth announcing the death of Polybus, the supposed father of Oedipus, the evil spirit of unbelief and impiety returns upon her with increased violence :

Vain oracles !
 Where are your bodings now ? My Oedipus,
 Fearing to slay this man, forsook his country :
 Now Fate, and not his hand, hath laid him low. (946-9)

And Oedipus again falls into the same snare, into which his Eve has already fallen before him :

Ha ! is it thus ? Then, lady, who would heed
 The Pythian shrine oracular, or birds
 Clanging in air, by whose vain auspices
 I was foredoomed the murderer of my father ? — (964 seq.)

The unhappy pair are now ripe for ruin. From these heights of presumption they are to be hurled, in a moment, to the depths of despair ; and the very messenger who has raised them to such a pitch of exaltation, is to dash their

hopes and occasion their fall. In order to relieve Oedipus of his only remaining fear, which is that he may yet defile the bed of his mother, the messenger informs Oedipus that he is not, in reality, the son of Polybus, but a foundling, whom he himself (the messenger) had rescued from an ignominious and cruel death, on the mountains of Citheron, to which rescue his very name (*Οἰδίπους*, or he of the swollen feet) bore testimony. Jocasta now sees, at a glance, the whole dreadful truth, and adjures her husband to investigate no further. But he is bent upon solving the mystery of his birth, which tortured him in former years, and insists on seeing the herdsman who had delivered the exposed infant into the hands of the Corinthian; and *she* goes away, in silence and despair, to put an end to her own life. The herdsman comes. It is the same aged servant who, when Oedipus was crowned, had fled the court in the vain hope of concealing the dreadful fact of which his breast was the sole repository. Between the chattering Corinthian and the frantic Oedipus, his secret is extorted from him. Oedipus sees the frightful gulf of infamy and ruin which yawns before him, and prays for darkness to hide it from him :

Woe! woe! 'tis all too fatally unveiled.
 Thou light! O may I now behold thy beams
 For the last time! Unhallowed was my birth,
 In closest ties united, where such ties
 Were most unnatural; with that blood defiled
 From whose pollution most the heart recoils. — (1182-5)

And then he leaves the stage.

The chorus bewail the sad destiny of mankind, "of vanity and woe combined," and deplore the fall of the sphinx-vanquishing Oedipus from the proudest height of earthly wisdom and glory to the lowest depth of ignominy, horror, and despair. A messenger now appears and gives a detailed account of the suicide of Jocasta, and of Oedipus, over her dead body, tearing out his own eyes with her golden clasps :

That never, never more
 Her should they see, the sufferings he endured,
 Or the dire deeds he wrought. — (1271-4)

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And while the messenger is yet speaking, Oedipus, having burst the palace gate, shows himself to public view, as the guilty murderer of his father, mother, and all his house; and when asked, by the sympathizing chorus, what god impelled him to such violence on himself, he replies:

'T was Phoebus, Phoebus, O my friends, above,
Who wrought my doom of woe,
My hopeless agony :
But this dark deed no hand save mine hath dared. — (1329–33)

The chorus intimate that he might better have died at once, than pine in darkness. But he answers, that he could not endure the sight of his father and mother in the lower world :

Descending to the dead, I know not how
I could have borne to gaze upon my sire,
Or my unhappy mother ; for to them
Crimes dark as mine not death can e'er atone. — (1371–4)

Oedipus is now, morally and politically, dead. The throne is, *ipso facto*, vacated, as palpably, as immediately, as if the king had deceased ; and the wronged and suspected Creon succeeds to the sovereignty. Of him, who comes not to insult the fallen monarch, but to remove him to the palace from the public gaze, and from the light of the sun, Oedipus asks but one boon — exile. Taught, by his predecessor's fall, to respect the oracle, Creon replies, that he must first ask the pleasure of the god. Oedipus now bethinks him of his daughters, commends them to the care of Creon, and, when suffered to place his hands upon them, blesses Creon for the privilege, and breathes out his love and sorrow — sorrow for their inheritance of shame — in tones of disinterested and pathetic tenderness, which melt the heart of the spectator. Yielding to necessity, he now retires within the palace, to await the disposal of the ruling powers on earth and in heaven ; and the chorus express the moral of the tragedy in these concluding words, addressed to their fellow citizens :

Sons of Thebes, my native city, this great Oedipus survey,
Who resolved the famed enigma, who for virtue far renowned,

Nought of favor recked or fortune, with transcendent glory crowned.
Mark him now dismayed, degraded, tost on waves of wildest woe.
Think on this, short-sighted mortal, and till life's deciding close,
Dare not pronounce thy fellow truly happy, truly blest,
Till, the bounds of life passed over, yet unharmed, he sinks to rest.

God alone is happy, God alone is wise, God alone is great, God alone is good. This seems to be the moral and religious lesson, expressed in the language of Christian piety which the Oedipus is intended to inculcate : Not only is human power weakness, and human wisdom folly, but all human good is evil in comparison with the divine standard. Oedipus is an object of felicitation and envy in the eyes of men. He is the wise man of his age. But when he sets himself in opposition to the oracles of Apollo and strives to defeat the plans and purposes of heaven, we are astonished at the blindness and infatuation which mark his course. He is a good man in the view of the world. His people love and honor him as a good king ; but, in his mysterious providence, the deity "plunges him in the ditch, and his own clothes abhor him." He finds himself stained with involuntary crimes, and loathes himself for his imputed guilt. To-day, like Job, he sits on the throne, the greatest of all the kings and princes of the age ; to-morrow, like Job, he sits in ashes, bereft of his power and forsaken by his friends, pitied if not despised by all who were wont to do him reverence. . In the Oedipus at Colonus, we shall see whether, like Job, he in the end receives the double of all his former prosperity. Certainly, in his terrible fall, we see the same apparently blind, all-controlling, irresistible power, which men call destiny, and which even Christians call mysterious and inscrutable providence.

Oedipus at Colonus.

With our sympathies thus enlisted in the fate of Oedipus, we are now prepared to follow him to the last scene of his life at Colonus. An interval of some years has passed away ; his sons have grown up ; the younger is in possession of his throne ; the older, at the head of confederate armies, is marching to possess himself, by force, of the birthright which has

been wrested from him ; his daughters, also, have arrived at maturity, and, while both serve as props of his declining years, and eyes for him in his blindness, Antigone already manifests that peculiar fervor of feeling and strength, which are more conspicuously displayed in the drama bearing her name, and which have rendered that name immortal. The Oedipus Coloneus is a natural sequel to the Oedipus Tyrannus. But there is more of contrast than of resemblance in the incidents, and in the situation of the leading character who gives name to both. The one is the compensation of the other. If fortune, or the fates, or the gods, or the laws of the universe (different names, in Greek, for essentially the same thing), or, to use an expression of our author, which harmonizes and combines them all, if *the god in them* (*ἐν τοῦτοις θεοῖς*, Oed. Tyr. 871) has heretofore dealt hardly with Oedipus, he is now to receive his compensation. If the sins of his ancestors have involved him, more through ignorance and necessity than of his own free will, in an unequal controversy with higher powers, he is now reconciled and blessed with a departure from these scenes of earthly conflict, amid supernatural tokens of divine favor. If Creon and his own sons have treated him selfishly and cruelly, in the days of his humiliation, the sceptre of more than regal power is now in his hands ; and it is now their turn to solicit and plead in vain. If his native city, Thebes, has too soon forgotten his services, and ungratefully banished him from the realm, she now supplicates in vain, and endeavors to compel his return ; while Athens, which grants him an asylum in his apparent helplessness, has thus, unconsciously, reared for herself a bulwark in her suburbs, which her enemies shall never pass.

The Oedipus Coloneus of Sophocles brings us to the same asylum of human law, and the sanctuary of the same divinities, as the Eumenides of Aeschylus. Oedipus in the former, like Orestes in the latter, comes to the sanctuary of the Furies at Athens for rest from his weary wanderings, for expiation of his involuntary crimes, for reconciliation to the retributive and avenging powers. Orestes is welcomed and protected by Athena, the patron-goddess of the city ; Oedipus,

by Theseus, its demigod hero and king. Athena summons the elders of her people to a court and council, and so institutes the Areopagus. Theseus takes counsel of the priests and at the altars of the gods. In both poets, the proceeding is partly civil and partly religious. In both, the human and the divine, the powers of earth and the powers of heaven conspire to effect a reconciliation. In Aeschylus, the furies appear, in person, in that fiendlike form which we always associate with the name, pursue their victim like hounds hunting their prey, dance in chorus around him, and howl their curses on his head. In Sophocles, in accordance with the advancing refinement of the age, and under the guidance of his own cultivated genius, they are invisible, and their dreadful power is only shadowed forth by the suppressed breath with which their name is mentioned, and the shuddering horror with which the beholders see Oedipus unwittingly invade their sanctuary. But in both, the vengeful powers are appeased, the *Erinyes* are transformed into the *Eumenides*, the wrathful deities into the gracious ones. And, as in the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus, they are conducted to their sanctuary with songs and rejoicings, by the magistrates and the whole people; so, in the *Oedipus Coloneus*, all nature sympathizes with the calm and sweet peace which has succeeded to the storm: the olive and the vine spring up, in unwonted beauty about the sanctuary of the appeased Furies, and the nightingale sings perpetually in the branches. Of course, neither the spectators in the ancient theatre, nor the poet himself, saw, in these conceptions, all the breadth and depth of meaning, which we find in them. They were "unconscious prophecies" — "shadows of good things," which could be fully understood only when the Substance had come, and the True Light shone upon the world. But we cannot but see, in them, ideas, or germs of ideas, of profound moral and spiritual significance. Perhaps the primary aim of the poet was, in the language of Schlegel,¹ "to confer glory on Athens, as the sacred abode of law and humanity, where the crimes of the illustrious families of other countries might, by a higher

¹ Lectures on Dramatic Literature, Lec. IV.

mediation, be at last propitiated; and hence an enduring prosperity was predicted to the Athenian people." But, as Schlegel himself confesses, "when the rancor of these goddesses of rage is exhausted, it seems as if the whole human race were redeemed from their power."

At the opening of the drama, Oedipus is seen, aged and blind, leaning on the arm of Antigone, and entering the suburbs of Athens. The scene is thus described by her who is at once the staff and the eyes of her father :

O Oedipus,

My much afflicted father, the high towers
Which girt the city, rise in distant view ;
The spot on which we stand, I deem, is holy.
Where laurels, olives, vines, in one green shade,
Are close inwoven ; and within the grove,
The nightingales make frequent melody.
Rest, now, thy faltering limbs on this rude stone.
Such lengthened wanderings ill befit thine age. — (14-20)

Scarcely has he taken his seat, when he is warned to remove his feet, for it is holy ground, and must not be profaned by mortal footsteps :

"Ἐξελλθ', ἔχεις γὰρ χώρον οὐκ ἄγνόν πατεῖν. — (37)
From mortal touch and mortal dwelling pure,¹
Is that mysterious grove ; the awful Powers,²
Daughters of Earth and Darkness, dwell within.

Oed. By what most holy name should I invoke them ?

Athen. We call them, in this land, th' Eumenides,
The all-beholding Powers ;³ in other lands,
By various lofty title men adore them. — (39-43)

In answer to further questions, he is informed that the whole suburb is sacred to Poseidon, Prometheus, and Colonus, whose name it bears. When the Athenian with whom he holds this conversation withdraws to apprise the king, Oedipus addresses his prayers to the august powers, of dreadful aspect (*πότηναι δεινῶπες*, 84) and entreats them to receive him propitiously, in accordance with the oracle of Phoebus,

¹ ἄδικτος οὐδ' οἰκητός.

² αἱ ἑμφοβοὶ θεαί, 39.

³ πάνθ' ὀρώσας.

which had predicted that his days should at length come to a peaceful end at the hospitable abode of the venerable goddesses (Θεῶν Σεμνῶν ἔδραν καὶ ξενόδοτασιν, 90), amid thunderings, lightnings, and earthquakes, as signs from heaven (σημεία).

As the company of aged men draw near, who constitute the chorus, Oedipus screens himself in the thickest of the grove; and they, as they search for him, sing with trembling voice :

Who, who is this sad, aged wanderer ?
Doubtless of foreign land, or his rash foot
Had never trod the grove
Of those unconquered virgin Powers,¹
Whose name we tremble but to breathe,
Whose mystic shrine we pass
With far-averted eye,
And pondering, silent and devout,
On happier omens there. — (117-34)

Oedipus comes forth at their call. With shuddering, they bid him beware, lest he bring upon himself a more dreadful curse than his present blindness; and, not daring to tread where he stands, they guide him with *words*, as he withdraws, step by step, and seats himself, again, on the sloping verge of the rocky pavement. As, in obedience to their demand, he discloses his name and race, they are still more appalled, and bid him quit the land forever. Antigone intercedes for her father, pleading for that peculiar *respect* due to the miserable, which we call *pity*, but which the Greek tragedians call *αἰδώς*.² They reply :

Know, child of Oedipus, we pity thee,
Nor gaze, relentless, on thy woe-worn sire ;
But we revere the gods, nor dare rescind
The firm decision of our former mandate. (254-7)

Oedipus responds by appealing to the far-famed piety³ and

¹ ἀμαμακτέταν κοῖραν.

² 247. Cf. Aesch. Sup. 577 δακρύων πένθιμον αἰδῶ : tears of sorrow and pity (respect).

³ τὰς γ' Ἀθήνας φασὶ θεοσεβεστάτας εἶναι, 260. So below, 1006, Oedipus says, if

humanity of Athens: vain boast, if a stranger is to be thus inhumanly banished for a name; palliates his crimes as committed in *retaliation* and in ignorance, and adjures them by the gods, whom they profess to venerate, to spare him now that, in obedience to their will, he has withdrawn himself from the inner sanctuary of the Eumenides. Overcome at length by entreaties, and overawed by something supernatural in the air and words of the mysterious stranger, they consent to wait the final sentence of their king.

Meanwhile Ismene, Antigone's gentle sister, arrives from Thebes, bringing news of the furious war which her brothers are waging for the throne; of a recent oracle which declared that he (Oedipus) whose downfall the gods had formerly willed, but whom now they purpose to exalt, holds in his hands the balance of power and victory; and that, for this reason Creon is already on his way to bear him back to the *borders* of the State, that they may hold this now powerful arbiter in their possession, though they are still resolved that his tomb shall not defile Theban ground. The indignation of Oedipus is roused by this new insult, added to the long neglect and injury with which he has been treated by his sons; and he imprecates destruction on them both, while he promises lasting benefit to Athens, if her citizens, with her tutelary gods, will now stand forth for his protection. Drawn towards him now by patriotism as well as compassion, the chorus instruct him how to propitiate (*θέσσαι καθαρμὸν*, 466) the Eumenides: first, with three libations of honey and pure water, *without wine*, poured out upon the ground towards the rising sun; then, with thrice nine olive branches, fresh-plucked and planted on the spot which drank the libations; and then, to offer this prayer:

Propitious, so we call them, that, with minds
Propitious, they their votary would receive
And save. — (486-7)

any land knows how to honor and worship the gods, Athens excels in this. This explains the *δαιοδαίμονες* in Paul's address to the Athenians on Mars' Hill. Acts 17:22. Xenophon (Cyp. III. 3, 58) uses *δαιοδαίμονες* as a synonym with *θεοεβείς*.

Too blind and infirm to perform these rites himself, he devolves the duty on Ismene.

While the chorus are extracting from his reluctant lips some further confession of his calamities and involuntary crimes, Theseus arrives, and without waiting for petitions or any address, assures at once the anxious heart of the suppliant stranger with these comforting words :

Unfold thy wish : and arduous were th' emprise,
When thou should'st ask my utmost aid in vain.
I, too, was nurtured in a foreign land,
As thou art now ; an exile's woes, to me,
An exile's perils, are familiar all.
Then never, never, from the stranger's prayer,
Who comes like thee, relentless will I turn,
Or needful aid withhold. — (560-6)

With the humility and yet the majesty befitting the double consciousness of what he is and what the gods intend to make him, Oedipus answers :

I come to offer thee this withered frame,
A gift to sight unseemly ; yet endowed
With costlier treasures than the loveliest form ; — (576-8)

adding, that the value of the boon will be understood only when he is dead, and Theseus has attended to his burial. Previous to that, he has nothing to ask but protection against his unnatural sons and his ungrateful countrymen, who would fain bear him back by force, where once he would gladly have remained ; but where, now, he is resolved never more to return. Theseus expostulates with him on the folly of such resentment, in such wretchedness. But Oedipus is unrelenting. Athens is now his home and country ; and when war shall arise, between Athens and Thebes, as war will rise in the changeful course of human destiny, though now all is peace :

Then this cold body, in the sleep of death
Entombed, shall drink their¹ warm and vital blood,
If Jove be mightiest still, and Jove-born Phoebus
Retain his truth unbroken.
Εἰ Ζεὺς ἔτι Ζεὺς, χὼ Διὸς Φοῖβος σαφής. — (623)

¹ Of the Thebans.

Theseus pledges him protection, offering him an asylum here, or in the palace, as he chooses. "Would to heaven," he answers :

Would to heaven
I might attend thee, but the spot is here. — (644)

And when his fears return and agitate him, Theseus reassures him, declaring that his word is as sacred as his oath ; that his name, alone, will suffice to protect him from insult ; and, moreover :

If Phoebus hither was indeed thy guide,
Without my feebler aid, his arm can save thee. — (644-5)

The choral song, which follows (668—719), celebrates the beauty of Colonus in strains of poetry and eloquence, which betray the poet's love and admiration for his birth-place ; and which, at the same time, remind the Christian reader of the glowing language in which the Hebrew prophets describe rejoicing nature under the reign of the coming Messiah.¹ We will not mar it by translation or synopsis. It is a glorification of Athens, which the patriotic and tasteful Athenians might well reward, as they did reward it, when he read it before his judges, by an instant acquittal and a more than regal triumph. But it seems to be also something more : piety joins with patriotism in celebrating Colonus, as not only the sanctuary of the Eumenides, but the favorite haunt of Aphrodite and the Muses (691-2), and the sacred abode of Athena, Poseidon, and Zeus :

Morian ² Jove, with guardian care,
Watches, ever wakeful, there ;
And Athena's eye of blue
Guards her own loved olive too.

Antigone breaks in upon the concluding strains of this magnificent song, by saying, that now the might and glory of Athens are to be put to the test. Creon approaches with his

¹ Is. 35 : v. 2 ; 35 : 12—13, etc., etc.

² That is, guardian of the *μυριαί*, or sacred Olives.

body-guard. He addresses the aged citizens of the country with respect; says he comes only to restore the wretched outcast to his native land; and then turns his intreaties, not unmixed with compassion, to the unhappy Oedipus. Oedipus scorns his pity, withheld when it would have been gladly received, and extended only when it was no longer needed. He charges Creon not only with cruelty in times past, but with false pretences now, since it was not his intention to restore him to his home, but only to take him to the border. His body shall not go there; but his spirit shall ever dwell there as an avenging demon of the land (*χώρας ἀλάστωρ οὐμὸς*, 788), and his sons shall inherit of his kingdom only soil enough to die on:

Is not my presage of the doom of Thebes,
More sure than thine; yea, tis e'en trebly sure,
As drawn from truer prophets, Phoebus' self,
And his dread sire, the all-controlling Jove. — (791-3)

Unable otherwise to bow his stubborn soul, Creon informs him that he has already seized one of his daughters (Ismene, who had gone away to prepare the offerings), and proceeds to take, by force, his only remaining support and solace. He even threatens to drag Oedipus himself from his asylum; and Oedipus defends himself by frightful curses. Summoned from the altar near by, where he had been offering a bullock to Poseidon, Theseus interposes, arrests Creon, sends forces, at once, for the recovery of the daughters, and censures, with dignified severity, the double crime, against the country and the gods, of forcing a suppliant from its altars. Creon endeavors to justify himself by expatiating on the crimes of Oedipus, which have forfeited even the right of asylum. This rouses Oedipus. He replies at much length. He confesses his crimes, but casts the responsibility on the gods (*θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὐτῶ φίλον*, 964), angry, perchance, at his race aforetime; and he exculpates himself as only a foredoomed and involuntary murderer. How can I reasonably be held responsible for a deed which was involuntary:

Πῶς γ' ἂν τὸ γ' ἄκον πράγμ' ἂν' εἰκότως ψέγοις. — (977)

and not only involuntary, but decreed and predicted before I was born or even conceived (973)? questions going to the root of human accountability, which have always been asked in the world, and never fully answered.

While the king and his attendants are executing the mandates of justice, the chorus express their wish to join in the pursuit and offer prayers for the right to Phoebus, Athena, and Zeus :

Jove, Jove to-day will aid the right,
And I forbode a prosperous fight. — (1079-80)
Thou of the all-pervading eye,
In heaven by subject-gods adored,¹
Jove ! from thy radiant throne on high,
Send might and joy and victory
To grace my country's lord !
Daughter of Jove, Athena, hear ;
Thou Phoebus, lift thy fatal spear, etc. — (1085-91)

The daughters are soon brought back, and Oedipus clasps them to his bosom. Theseus informs him, that some person, kindred to him, is sitting at the altar of Poseidon, who begs the privilege of a few words with Oedipus. From the description, Oedipus recognizes his son Polynices, and at first refuses to see him. But the remonstrances of Theseus and the intreaties of Antigone, pleading not only the ties of nature but reverence for the gods, prevail to win his reluctant consent. Polynices enters, alone, and in tears, deploring the misery he sees, confessing the wrong of which he has been guilty, and pleading for forgiveness :

By the throne
Of mighty Jove, associate of his sway,
Sits gentle Mercy, judge of human deeds ;
Let her be present to thy soul, my father.
'Αλλ', ἔστι γὰρ καὶ Ζηνὶ σύνθακος θρόνῳ
Αἰδῶς ἐπ' ἔργοις πᾶσι, καὶ πρὸς σοὶ, πάτερ,
Παρασταθήτω.² — (1266-9).

¹ ἰὸ θεῶν παντάρχα Ζεῦ παντόπτα, κ. τ. λ. 1085.

² See what is said of αἰδώς (mercy, pity) above, p. 79. Here she is personified, or rather regarded as a goddess, the sharer of the throne of the supreme ; just as Justice is represented below, 1382.

Oedipus maintains an awful silence. But Antigone encourages her brother at least to make known his wishes; and he proceeds. He has been deprived of the throne, his rightful inheritance, by his younger brother. The fell cause of all their feud was the avenging curse of their father. He has married the daughter of the king of Argos and rallied, together with him, six other chiefs, a seven-fold force in all, for the recovery of his inheritance. And now he solicits his father's presence and blessing, since :

If faith be due to heaven's prophetic voice,
Whom thou shalt succor, them must victory grace. — (1331,2)

For a long time, Oedipus deigns no answer. But at length his resentment and indignation burst forth in reproaches and curses too frightful to repeat, too dreadful for a son to hear from a father's lips. Neither of his sons shall possess his throne. The blood of both shall stain the plain of Thebes. Such were the curses which he pronounced upon them before; and now he invokes, again, the Curses to come as his allies, and teach his sons not to dishonor their parents. *They* therefore (the *Curses*, 'Απαί) shall occupy the throne, which else had been his sons', *if ancient Justice sits associate with Zeus and guardian of primeval laws* :

Εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ παλαίφατος
Δίκη ξύνεδρος¹ Ζηνὸς ἀρχαίους νόμους. — (1381,2)

Thus I curse thee, he concludes in language more dreadful than the curses of king Lear, *thus I curse thee; and I invoke the gloomy paternal darkness of Tartarus*,² *to remove thee hence*

¹ Quite another sharer of Jove's throne from the Mercy (Αἰδώς), to whom Polynices makes his appeal (1268, see p. 84.) The epithet παλαίφατος is applied especially to *Justice*, as here; to *Oracles*, 454; and to *Providence* Trach. 825 : τὰς παλαίφατον προνομίας, and means literally *spoken long ago*. The *primeval law* especially intended in this connection must be that of *honor to parents*. Cf. Theol. of Aesch. pp. 360—384. Bib. Sac. April, 1859.

² τοῦ Ταρτάρου στυγρὸν πατρῶον Ἔρεβος. The meaning of πατρῶον, *paternal*, is doubtful, some understanding *Erebus* to be represented as the father or guardian of *Tartarus*; and others (as Hermann and Wunder), supposing it to mean the *darkness*, that envelops *Laius*, *father* of Oedipus.

to thine own place ;¹ and I invoke these goddesses, the Furies ; and I invoke Ares, who inspired you with fearful hate. (1389-92.)

Horrible as these curses are, the chorus take it for granted that they will be fulfilled to the letter. Polynices bows, in despair, to his fate, and goes away resolved not to acquaint his confederates with his doom ; but in silence to meet, with them, his destiny, asking only of his sisters, that when he has fallen, he may not be robbed of interment with proper funeral rites. Antigone utters not a word of remonstrance against the maledictions of her father ; but, with true sisterly tenderness, beseeches her brother not to return to the war, since if he does, those maledictions — oracles she calls them (*μαντεύματα*, 1425) — will come upon him as sure as the decrees of fate.

Now (as if, in giving utterance to these prophetic curses on the last male offspring of his accursed race, he had fulfilled his earthly destiny) Jove's thunders begin to peal, in fearful echoes, over his head. He recognizes them as the appointed signal of his death, and sends, in haste, to Theseus. The chorus, overwhelmed with fear and amazement, betake themselves to prayer. Theseus comes, calm yet full of sympathy, to receive the last counsels and benedictions of Oedipus. Oedipus summons him to follow *him* (for the blind is now to be the guide of the seeing) to the spot where he is to die. That spot, never to be named to any human being, will afford a surer defence than spears and shields. There, also, he will disclose to his royal ear secrets which he would not reveal to his dearest friend, and which Theseus must communicate only to his successor, as he draws near the end of life. These secrets will render Athens impregnable against the Thebans. And now, led by an unseen hand (*Ἐρμῆς ὁ πομπὸς, ἥ τε νεπέτρα θεός*, 1548), leading his daughters and the king of Athens towards the mysterious spot, he passes off the stage, while the chorus, trembling with awe and almost doubting if it is right to invoke the infernal deities, beseech

¹ Ἀποικίῳ, lit. to remove from home to a colony or other residence. Plato uses it of the transfer to the Islands of the blest. Rep. 5196.

Pluto, Proserpine, the Eumenides, and Cerberus himself, to grant the stranger an open (*ἐν καθάρῳ*, clear, 1575) and peaceful entrance to the regions below, that he may *thus* be recompensed for the many sufferings which, without his fault (*μάλιστα*, 1565), may have come upon him.

This prayer ended, a messenger enters and narrates, at length, the death of Oedipus: Having arrived *at the threshold* of the *steep descent* (*τὸν καταβάκτην ὁδὸν*, sc. "Αἴδου, 1590), with the help of his daughter he bathed in pure water from the hill of Demeter, put on a new attire instead of the filthy garments of which he had divested himself; and then, summoned by the thunder of Infernal Zeus, he embraced his daughters and bade them an affectionate farewell. A brief silence ensued; and then a voice was heard, which caused the hair to stand up on the head of every one who heard it: a voice calling distinctly for Oedipus to hasten his departure. Commending his daughters to the care of Theseus, he now sends them away, with all attendants, and was left alone with the Athenian king. As soon as the messenger and those with him had recovered from their awe sufficiently to look behind them, the king was seen standing alone and holding his hand over his eyes, as if to shade them from some sight too fearful to behold, and, soon after, worshipping in one and the same prayer the powers of heaven and earth (*γῆν τε ἅμα καὶ τὸν θεῶν Ὀλυμπον*, 1655). But what became of *him*, the wonderful, the illustrious stranger, no mortal knew but Theseus. He was not struck by the thunderbolt, nor swept into the sea, nor wasted by pain and sickness; some god conducted him away, or the earth opened its *kind* bosom to receive him. For such a man, remarks the messenger, is not to be mourned, but if any one is to be admired and envied in his death, that man is Oedipus.

The daughters now reappear, bewailing their loss. But Theseus forbids them to mourn for one to whom grace is reserved in the lower world (*χάρις ἣ χθονία ἀπόκειται*,¹ 1753);

¹ Possibly this may mean only one who was pleased and happy in the manner of his death, though it more naturally refers to something reserved, laid up in another world.

for that were to provoke the divine displeasure (*νέμεσις γάρ*). Antigone, with characteristic ardor and fearlessness, begs to see the place of her father's death. But Theseus declares, *that* is forbidden by the charge of Oedipus himself and by the all-hearing oath (*Ὀρκος*) of Zeus, who heard what passed between them. And with true paternal kindness he unites with the chorus in comforting the orphan children, assuring them that all had happened according to the wishes of their father and the sovereign will of Jove.

Counterpart and kindred to the instinctive satisfaction with which we behold the perpetrator of many and great crimes, who has long gone unwhipped of justice, brought at length to condign punishment — counterpart and kindred to this is the pleasure with which we see the unfortunate victim of untoward circumstances and adverse fates, who, without any particular crime or fault of his own, has been involved in heavy calamities, restored to his former prosperity and standing, or in some other way compensated, and more than compensated, for all that he had suffered and lost. The former is the satisfaction afforded by *Electra*, and many other tragedies, and also by the book of *Esther*. The latter is the pleasure derived from *Oedipus* and the book of *Job*. The *Oedipus at Colonus* is a pathetic and beautiful picture of one, who had long been pursued by the avenging Furies of his own involuntary crimes and the real crimes of his father's house, finding an asylum at last in the sanctuary of those Furies appeased and reconciled — one who had been crushed beneath the weight of imputed rather than personal guilt, the power of Destiny, the injustice of men, and the apparent anger of the gods, dying in the possession of such power and estimation among men, and amid such manifestations of divine favor as fully to counterbalance all the inequalities and ills of life. The plot is manifestly constructed on the principle of such a compensation. This principle is distinctly recognized in the prayer of the chorus (1565-7).¹ Oedipus receives "the double" as manifestly as Job, though in a very different time and manner. The recompense does not come till the very hour of his departure from the present life, when,

¹ See p. 87.

of course, it cannot consist in his restoration to twice his original wealth and prosperity and kingly power. But it comes in a way no less striking and impressive. The Theban exile is invited and intreated to return to Thebes. But he refuses, and becomes a citizen and more than citizen of *Athens* — a counsellor, and no ordinary counsellor, of her demigod and founder-king. The dethroned monarch is still king, and more than king, at Thebes. He not only holds the sceptre and gives it to whom he will, but victory or defeat to the contending armies, and life or death to the opposing chiefs, hang on his lips. The neglected and despised old man, who lately wandered alone, supported only by his loving, sorrowing daughters, while all others shunned him as if smitten with leprosy or plague, departs this life amid lightnings and thunders, commotion in nature, and voices from another world, such as, according to an idea quite current among the nations of antiquity, mark the exit only of prophets, lawgivers,¹ the greatest benefactors of mankind and the special favorites of heaven.

The exaltation of Oedipus to such a height of glory, is almost as mysterious as his fall. The poet does not enter into the philosophy of it. He only gives us the facts. He sheds no light on the ground of the reconciliation. And as to the character of Oedipus, it is no better at Colonus than at Thebes. Certainly he is no saint according to the standard of the New Testament, or even of the Old. He is almost as far from the meekness and godly fear of Moses, as he is from the loving and forgiving spirit of Christ. He is almost as ignorant of himself, as he is of the character and government of God; and his views of sin are as inadequate as his ideas of redemption and reconciliation. He is as unconscious of his personal need of forgiveness, as he is destitute of the gospel requisites to be forgiven. How impersonal and impalpable are his conceptions of the powers above and the powers beneath! Near and peculiar as the

¹ This idea meets its realization in the mysterious death and burial of Moses, Deut. 34 : 1—6. So far from militating against the *reality*, the *idea* confirms it — leads us to *anticipate* it so that we should be *disappointed* if there were no answering fact in the scriptures.

relations are into which he is brought to them, how little is there that is clear, and how much less that is attractive and endearing about them! How dark and cold, how dim and distant, is the view of death and the passage to another world, which we get in this nearest approach that Greek tragedy ever made towards a revelation of that passage, when compared with that which the Christian obtains, as he stands by the cross of the penitent and forgiven thief, and hears the promise: "This day shalt thou be with me in paradise;" or as he looks on at the stoning of Stephen, and sees heaven opened and the dying martyr, like his dying Lord, praying for the forgiveness of his enemies, and then rising, almost visibly, to the immediate presence of his Saviour, saying: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit."

Longinus cites, as a fine example of the sublime, the scene where Oedipus suddenly disappears, and Theseus remains alone, gazing after him with his hands over his eyes, which are almost blinded by the awful spectacle. In a poetical and critical point of view, the passage deserves all the critic's commendation. But scenes of more spiritual sublimity and at the same time scenes of sweet and serene beauty, in which heaven is brought down to earth, and God comes nearer to the presence, clearer to the vision and infinitely dearer to the hearts of men, are common occurrences in the actual experience of Christians, who gaze after their departing Christian friends, as the disciples gazed after their ascending Lord, and hear them sing, as they ascend: "O death, where is thy sting; O grave, where is thy victory."

Religion holds a prominent place in Greek tragedy, as, in some form or other, it always has done and always will do in real life. The existence and providence of God, his universal government, and his eternal and immutable laws, with their unfailing rewards and inevitable penalties, are constantly recognized. This is the point, perhaps, in which the tragedies approach nearest to the unapproachable light and glory of the scriptures; and too many who bear the name of Christians might refresh their convictions and elevate their conceptions of the supremacy of the di-

vine law and the certainty of retribution, by a familiar acquaintance with the doctrine of the divine *Nemesis*, as it stands out on the pages of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. The frailty, ignorance, and imperfection of men are also confessed. The necessity of a revelation of the divine will, by prophets and oracles, is universally acknowledged. Prayer is offered. An existence after death is implied. And the connection between this life and the next, the dependence of men on a higher power, and the necessity of obedience to a higher law, though sometimes called in question, are more often strenuously asserted.

Some ideas exist not only of a fall, but also of a recovery ; some ideas, not only of a controversy between the gods and wicked men, but of the possibility, in some cases at least, and the blessedness, of reconciliation. Such ideas are universal. They belong to man as man ; and they lie at the foundation, not only of natural, but revealed religion.

But as they appear in the Greek tragedies, these ideas are too much ideas of the reason and the imagination ; too little of the conscience and the heart. This is true, perhaps, generally, of the religion of cultivated nations ; and true of too many nominal Christians. But it is emphatically true of the Greeks. Their religion was ideal, poetical, aesthetic, rather than real, practical, personal. There is more of the religious element in Sophocles than there is in Shakspeare ; but there is far less of the ethical element. The conscience is less developed. The writer seems to know less of its nature and power ; and his characters who are fit subjects for its compunctious visitings, seldom or never writhe under its tortures. And those sublime utterances touching the retributive providence and government of God, which hold very much the same place in the Greek dramatist, as the remorse of conscience does in the English, proceed, not from the criminals who are to experience the retribution, but from the chorus and the better characters, who look on, and expect it, or see it fall on others. The want of an enlightened, sensitive conscience, is the grand defect in the Greek character, as it is seen either in the literature or in the history of the people.

And we see a decided growth of this ideal tendency in passing from Aeschylus to Sophocles; owing partly, perhaps, to the genius of the individual poet, but partly, also, we must think, to the advancing culture of the people. It seems as if, as they advanced in time and progressed in the cultivation of literature and art, they receded from the fountain of moral and religious truth, and the ideas of the primeval revelation lost their vital power. In Sophocles, more than in Aeschylus, there is room for the feeling, in some passages, at least, that the gods are powers or personifications, rather than persons. Law and providence are more nearly another name for destiny, though *the god in them* is still, at times, brought out with great distinctness. Worship approaches somewhat the modern pantheistic worship, though it is still far from the unreality and absurdity of the latter. Prayer is a sublime or beautiful song. A veil is drawn over the unseen world, and its awful retributions are but dimly projected on the confines of the present scene.

As a natural consequence of the prevalence of the imagination over the conscience, of the aesthetic over the moral, in the character of the Greeks, their ideas of holiness and sin, and hence also of reconciliation and redemption, are sadly defective. Here, however, all religions are defective in comparison with the religion of the Bible. Holiness and sin are new ideas, almost new words in the Bible, so frequent is their occurrence, so profound is their significance, so over-awing their power. Other books talk of infirmities, vices, crimes — the infirmities of this man, the vices of that man, and the crimes of the few. The Bible convicts every man of personal sinfulness in the sight of a personal and holy God. The Hindoos worshipped Might, in Juggernaut and other monstrous forms; the Assyrians, the Powers of Nature, as idealized in their winged lions, and bulls; the Persians, Light; the Egyptians, Life; the Greeks, Beauty — human beauty as the image of divine; the Romans, Law — the law of the State, as the representative of the law of God.¹ The Jew and the Christian alone worship a God of *holiness* —

¹ Cf. Robertson's Sermons, First Series, Sermon XI.

"GLORIOUS IN HOLINESS." You will get no such idea of God as that, from all the poetry and philosophy of the ages.¹ Yet that is the idea conceived of God by the Hebrew lawgiver, a thousand years before Sophocles and Plato were born. And as the higher idea always involves the lower, so, in this case, holiness is, at once, the greatest might, the purest light, the highest life, the truest nature, the divinest beauty, and the most perfect law ; while, over and above all these, it is the only proper standard of personal, moral, spiritual *character* that can stand the test of all earthly temptations, and the more fiery trial of the final judgment.

The chorus, in the Greek tragedy, sing of the all-seeing, all-powerful Zeus, with his oracle-inspiring, Loxian son, and his wise and terrible daughter, the triple powers of heaven ; and also of the avenging deities, the dreadful powers of hell ; and as they sing, the actors and spectators tremble at their majesty and might. The seraphim of the Old Testament, and the living creatures in the New, veil their faces before Him who was, and is, and is to come, and cry HOLY ! HOLY ! HOLY ! And prophets and kings, the wisest and best men on earth, overwhelmed by a sense of their comparative impurity, cry out "Wo is me ! for I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell among a people of unclean lips ; for I have seen the King, the Lord of hosts !" And saints and angels, in heaven, prostrate themselves before the throne, saying, Thou, alone, art holy.

It is just this lively consciousness of *sin*, educated by all the history, and prophecy and sacrifices and shadows of the Old Testament, and quickened into yet higher sensibility by the Word and Spirit of the New, which gives such a new and strange significance to the ideas and the very words Atonement, Reconciliation, Justification, Sanctification, and the whole plan of salvation, which is revealed in the Gospel of Christ. "The exceeding sinfulness of sin" is the logical and practical antithesis of a God "glorious in holiness." And when men see and feel their "exceeding sinfulness" in the

¹ It is not denied, that holiness is an *attribute* of the supreme God of the Greeks ; but it is not his characteristic and his glory.

presence of a thrice holy God, then they are prepared to appreciate the unspeakable preciousness of the Christian revelation, which brings to such men life, salvation, and comfort through the divine Trinity. Blessed, glorious gospel of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost! How it shines brighter and purer in comparison with the brightest lights that have ever twinkled and faded in the long night of ages!

ARTICLE III.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, AND ITS RECENT THEOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS.

BY PROF. JOSEPH HAVEN, D. D., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.

IN October, 1829, appeared, in the *Edinburgh Review*, an Article sharply criticising the *Cours de Philosophie* (then recently published) by Victor Cousin. This Article, by its profound and masterly analysis, its critical sharpness, its combined candor and fearlessness, its remarkable erudition, at once attracted attention as the work of no ordinary mind. It was understood to be from the pen of Sir William Hamilton, baronet, of the ancient family of that name, a lawyer by profession, at that time filling the chair of civil law and universal history in the university of Edinburgh; known to the literary circles of the metropolis as a man of extensive and varied acquisition, but not previously of established repute in the world of letters. A few years previously he had been an unsuccessful competitor with Wilson for the chair of Moral Philosophy in the university.

On the Continent, at the time of which we speak, few names were more illustrious, in the world of letters and philosophy than that of Victor Cousin, then in the height of his fame as professor of philosophy to the faculty of letters at Paris. His personal history, his learning, his reputation as a

critic and an author, his familiar acquaintance with systems of philosophy, ancient and modern, his clearness of thought united with a beautiful transparency of style, and a glowing fervor of delivery, rendered him, as a lecturer, peculiarly attractive. Audiences of two thousand persons, not unfrequently, thronged his lecture room to listen to the discussion of themes not usually considered attractive by the multitude.

To assail the favorite theory of a philosopher so distinguished, might seem hazardous; but the masterly ability with which the attack was made, placed the writer in the front rank of philosophical critics.¹

¹ To his honor be it said, no one was more ready to acknowledge that ability, and do honor to his antagonist, than Victor Cousin himself. When subsequently, Hamilton became a competitor with Combe, and many other candidates, for the chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Edinburgh, Cousin interested himself to secure his appointment. In a letter written for that purpose to a friend of his in Scotland, he speaks in the highest terms of Hamilton's qualifications for that office. A paragraph or two we are tempted to subjoin as showing Cousin's estimate of the man.

After speaking of the differences of their respective systems, and of Sir William Hamilton as of all men in Europe the acknowledged defender and representative of the Scotch philosophy, by his invaluable Articles in the Edinburgh Review, and noticing particularly the Article above referred to, as civil in form, but severe in substance, and the most weighty of anything that had been written in criticism of his views, he goes on to say: "It is not I who would solicit Scotland in behalf of Mr. Hamilton, it is Scotland herself who should honor with her suffrage him who, since Dugald Stewart, alone represents her in Europe."

"In fact that which characterizes Mr. Hamilton is precisely the Scotch spirit, and if he is devoted to the philosophy of Reid and Stewart, it is only because that philosophy is the Scottish spirit itself applied to metaphysic. Mr. Hamilton never strays from the high road of common sense; and at the same time he has much genius and sagacity; and I assure you (I know it by experience), that his logic is by no means convenient to his antagonist. Inferior to Reid in invention, and originality, and to Stewart in grace and delicacy, he is perhaps superior to both, and certainly to the latter in rigor of dialectic; and I will add in extent of erudition. Mr. Hamilton knows all systems, ancient and modern, and his critique of them is often the true Scottish spirit. His independence is equal to his learning. He is specially eminent in logic. I will speak here as a man of the trade. Be assured that Mr. Hamilton is the man of all your countrymen who best understands Aristotle, and if there is in the three realms of his Britannic Majesty a chair of logic vacant, hesitate not, hasten to bestow it on Mr. Hamilton. . . .

In fine, my dear sir, if it savor not too much of pretention and arrogance on my part, I beseech you to say in my name, to those on whom depends this nomination, that they hold perhaps in their hands the philosophic future of Scot-

This Article was followed, in the succeeding year, by another, on the philosophy of perception, in review of Jouffroy's edition of the works of Reid, in which the leading principles of the author's doctrine of perception were first promulged, and the merits of other systems, particularly the doctrines of Brown, subjected to the most severe and rigid criticism. Three years later appeared, in the same quarterly, and from the same pen, the famous article on logic, in which the English logicians, and especially Whately, are somewhat severely handled. The reputation of the writer, as at once a formidable critic and a most profound and original thinker, was now fully established; and, in 1836, he was elected to the chair of logic and metaphysics in the university of Edinburgh, which he filled until his death in 1856.

Of the general characteristics of Hamilton as a philosophical writer, there is little need to speak, since they are already so widely known. Since Kant, the world has seen no greater thinker than this man; nor was ever the sage of Königsberg his superior. One knows not which most to admire, his wonderful power of analysis, or his erudition, equally wonderful; qualities which, in combination, render him, at once, the most formidable critic of other systems, and the most clear and far-seeing discernor of truth in matters of subtle speculation, that has appeared since the revival of letters. His

land; and that it is a stranger, exempt from all spirit of party, and clique, who earnestly entreats them to remember that it is for them to give a successor to Reid and Stewart; and that in a matter of such importance they will not disregard the opinion of Europe."

"I know not who are Mr. Hamilton's competitors, but I rejoice for Scotland, if there is one who has received from disinterested strangers, conversant with these matters, the like public eulogium.

"Adieu, my dear sir, etc.

V. COUSIN."

"PARIS, June 1, 1836."

The original may be found in the preface to M. Peisse's "*Fragments de Philosophie*, par W. Hamilton." It were difficult to say whether this letter, so generous in its estimate of a philosophical opponent, reflects higher credit upon Hamilton, or upon Cousin himself. Letters of a similar nature, it may here be remarked, were on the same occasion, placed before the Council of Patrons, from eighteen savans and men of letters of all nations — a part of which shows the impression already made upon the cultivated mind of Europe by the genius of Hamilton.

range of information was almost literally boundless, comprehending not merely matters connected with philosophy, but all topics of general knowledge. More widely conversant with metaphysical literature than perhaps any other man living, he seemed equally familiar with the whole range of theological, historical, and classical lore. After the manner of Leibnitz, and of Aristotle — to both of whom, in other respects also, his mind bore a marked resemblance — he seems to have made himself master of what the human mind had, as yet, in its progress, attained, as the preparatory step toward the enlargement of those boundaries, by contributions of his own. To that power of philosophic analysis by which he was able, as by intuition, to resolve the most intricate and complicated problem of thought into its simple and primary elements, and that remarkable erudition by which he was able to take in, at a glance, the whole range of previous thought and labor on any subject, we have but to add a style almost without a parallel for precision, definiteness, and strength, and we have the chief elements of this man's power as a thinker and writer.

Nor was he wanting in that attribute inseparable from true greatness, candor towards those from whom he differed. Terrible as were the weapons of his criticism, no man knew better how to respect an antagonist, even while demolishing his opinions. Thus, for example, he speaks of Cousin : “ a philosopher, for whose genius and character I already had the warmest admiration, an admiration which every succeeding year has only augmented, justified, and confirmed. Nor, in saying this, need I make any reservation ; for I admire even where I dissent ; and were M. Cousin's speculations on the absolute utterly abolished, to him would still remain the honor of doing more himself, and of contributing more to what has been done by others, in the furtherance of an enlightened philosophy, than any other living individual in France — I might say in Europe.”

In personal appearance, Hamilton was dignified and prepossessing, of somewhat commanding form and bearing, resembling in some respects our countryman the late Daniel

Webster. There was the same lofty and massive brow, the same repose and majesty of the features, and that certain stateliness of manner, which marks a kingly soul, conscious of its own power. In the later years of his life, this natural reserve was increased by a difficulty of utterance, resulting from a partial paralysis of the vocal organs. Under these circumstances, a stranger, on first introduction, would hardly feel at ease ; while, at the same time, he could not fail to be impressed with the whole appearance and conversation of the man. In the respects mentioned, Hamilton contrasted strongly with Schelling, whom in those days, not long before his death, one might have seen, at Berlin, a lean and shrivelled old man, but full of vivacity and fire, bowed and worn with the labors of years, but retaining all the enthusiasm of younger days, — busily engaged, to the very last, in elaborating his second system of philosophy, and, to this end, combating his own former views ; — pleasantly remarking that he found himself, and his own former pupils, the most difficult of all his antagonists to refute.

As a psychologist, Hamilton should not be judged merely by the lectures on metaphysics published since his death. Interesting and able as they undoubtedly are, and containing much that is profound and original, they are not the measure of his strength, nor are they the result of his maturer studies. Prepared, in the first instance, merely for the classroom, thrown off in haste during the progress of the session, at the rate of three per week, each lecture usually on the night preceding its delivery, and the whole course within the period of five months, never subsequently rewritten, nor even revised for publication, by the author — they are by no means to be taken as the final and careful statement of his views. As such he did not, himself, regard them. They were the earlier and (it is not too much to say) the cruder productions of his mind. Taken as a system of mental science, they are singularly incomplete ; dwelling at undue length on preliminary matters, and elaborating, in detail, certain portions of the science, as, for example, the doctrine of perception, to the almost entire exclusion of other and equally important topics ;

giving but a meagre outline of the sensibilities, and nothing, or almost nothing, upon the will. These features, together with occasional inconsistencies, and inadvertences of statement, are the natural result of the circumstances under which the work was originally prepared. It is not to these lectures, consequently, but to the notes and dissertations appended to his edition of Reid, and the Articles in the *Edinburgh Review*, subsequently collected and published, under his own eye, entitled *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*, that we should refer for the real system and the true strength of the man. Even in these, it must be confessed, the system lies fragmentary and incomplete. It is to be regretted that we have not, from his own pen, and as the result of his riper and later studies, a carefully prepared treatise on psychology.

It is not, however, merely or chiefly as a psychologist that Hamilton is to be regarded. His mind was logical rather than metaphysical, we should judge, in its natural bias. It is from the point of view and with the eye of a logician, that he usually looks at the problems of philosophy, little given to and little believing in the speculations of a pure ontology, nor, on the other hand, in his observation of the mind, content with merely reviewing the given facts and phenomena of consciousness, but seeking to reduce them, if possible, to order under those great laws of thought, of which logic is, with him, the expression and the science. It was to logic, as is well known, that the chief strength and the principal studies of his later years were directed; and it was upon his labors in this department that he wished his reputation chiefly to rest.

The tendency to a logical explanation of psychological phenomena and metaphysical problems, is shown, for example, in the manner in which he deals with the doctrine of the infinite and absolute, as held by transcendental writers; educating the general law that all thought lies in the interval between two extremes, unconditioned and inconceivable, but of which extremes one or the other must, by law of excluded middle, be true; deriving thus the grand principle that all thought is conditioned, and all knowledge limited and rela-

tive ; and, finally, reducing to this general law the principle of causality, which, by Leibnitz, Kant, Reid, Stewart, Cousin, and the great body of English and French philosophers, has been held to be an original principle or datum of the human mind.

With these remarks, of a general nature, upon the character of Hamilton as a philosopher, we proceed to notice, more particularly, some specific features of his system.

Were we required to point out the peculiarities of his system, in what chief aspects the Scotch philosophy, as held by this great master, presents itself, as compared with other and previous systems — passing by the whole science of logic, which he claims to have reconstructed and amplified, and confining ourselves to psychology — we should name first and chiefly *the doctrine of perception*, with the closely related topic of consciousness ; while, as a general principle underlying the whole system, and fundamental to it, appears the doctrine of the relativity and consequent limitation of human thought ; or, as it may be termed, *the doctrine of the conditioned*. To these points our attention will chiefly be directed in the present Article.

A brief survey of the state of philosophical speculation in Europe, at the time when Hamilton appeared, will best enable us to appreciate his labors, and his contributions to philosophy, in respect to the points now named.

The earlier part of the present century witnessed a peculiar awakening and activity of the philosophic mind in Europe. The previous century had closed, and the present opens, with the philosophy of Locke in the ascendant ; as indeed it had long been, both in Great Britain and in France. In the latter country, that philosophy was known, indeed, chiefly through the medium of Condillac, who, in developing, may be said to have corrupted, the doctrines of Locke. In England, also, Hume, embracing the general principles of the system which Locke had advanced, and carrying them to their extreme but legitimate conclusions, had laid the foundations of a wide and

dangerous scepticism in philosophy. Alarmed by these results, there had already arisen, at the close of the last century, a reaction of the public mind, in certain quarters. Simultaneously, in Germany and in Britain, did such reaction manifest itself; and in both as the result of Hume's speculations; Kant in the former, and Reid in the latter, maintaining that above and beyond the ideas derived from experience and observation, there are in the mind, connate, if not innate, certain great principles, universal and necessary, prior to, and the foundation of, all experience. Such, in brief, was the philosophic life of the last half of the eighteenth century: Condillac in France, and Hume in England, carrying out, to false positions, the principles of Locke; Reid in Scotland, and Kant in Germany, laying, each in his own way, the foundations of a better system.

The influence of Kant became speedily predominant in Germany; and before his death, in 1804, he was acknowledged as the master mind of Europe, in the domain of speculative thought; while, in turn, the sober, common-sense philosophy (as it has been termed) of the Scotch school, was gradually attracting attention, and gaining influence, both in Britain and France. To this result, as regards the latter country, the labors of Royer Collard, who advocated this system, and subsequently of Jouffroy (who gave to his countrymen an excellent edition of the Works of Reid, and of the Moral Philosophy of Stewart), greatly contributed.

Such were the intellectual influences predominant in the department of philosophic science, in the early part of the present century,—the period when Sir William Hamilton, then passing from childhood to those years when the mind usually receives its first impulses and impressions in this direction, may be supposed to have commenced his studies in philosophy. Fichte had then come into notoriety as professor in the leading university of Germany. Schelling and Hegel were just coming upon the stage. It is easy to see the influence which would be exerted upon a youthful and inquisitive mind by the leading theories, and the philosophic spirit of the time. Adopting in the main, and as the basis of

his views, the ground-principles of Reid, he is, at the same time, an admirer, if not in some sense a disciple, of Kant; and, in the general spirit and drift of his philosophy, as well as in some of its specific doctrines, may be traced the influence of the sage of Königsberg. In the grand doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, and the consequent denial of the possibility of knowing the absolute and infinite, he is with Kant, as against Schelling and Cousin. In the rejection, in fact, of the whole scheme of transcendental and rationalistic philosophy, he follows Kant. He adopts the Kantian division (then just coming into use) of the powers of the mind, into three great classes: the faculties of *knowledge*, of *feeling*, and of *will and desire*; which latter are classed together under the title of *conative* powers. He adopts, also, the Kantian notion of freedom.

Passing now to notice, more particularly, the doctrine of *perception* and its connected topics, as held by Hamilton, we need hardly remark that, so far as psychology is concerned, it is here that his chief labor has been expended, and his chief laurels won. It was precisely at this point that philosophy was, just then, most at fault, and most needed the clear discrimination and decision of a master mind. It had long been the prevalent doctrine of the schools, widely divergent as they were on other points, that the mind is immediately cognizant only of its own ideas, and not directly of external objects; the latter being known, so far as they were held to be known at all, only through the medium of the mind's ideas, and not immediately, or face to face. This doctrine, under a great variety of modifications, had passed, as to its essential principle, virtually unchallenged for centuries, and had been the belief, in fact, of the great body of philosophers, ancient and modern. To Reid belongs the honor of announcing positively, and maintaining boldly, though not without occasional inconsistency, the opposite doctrine of the immediate cognizance of external objects in the act of perception. But while he saw clearly the true doctrine, he had not given it, in all respects, its full development, or its ablest statement. Particularly, he had failed to discriminate between the vari-

ous forms which the opposite doctrine had, at different times, and in the different schools, assumed, and had therefore failed to give due sharpness and precision to the statement of the true theory. This it remained for Hamilton to do, and this he has done, fully, completely, and once for all. The doctrine which Reid had left incomplete, he elucidates and perfects, shows it to be the true and only tenable position, and that its rejection, logically and consistently carried out, leads to absolute idealism, or the denial of all objective and external reality. By a masterly analysis he reduces to a system, and gives a complete classification of, the various theories that may be and have been held in regard to perception, draws the dividing line between presentative and representative knowledge, and maintains that we know the external world as we know the operations of our own minds, by immediate and intuitive perception.

“ If we interrogate consciousness concerning the point in question, the response is categorical and clear. When I concentrate my attention in the simplest act of perception, I return from my observation with the most irresistible conviction of *two* facts, or rather two branches of the *same* fact: that *I am*, and that *something different from me exists*. In this act I am conscious of myself, as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the same indivisible moment of intuition. The knowledge of the subject does not precede nor follow the knowledge of the object; neither determines, neither is determined by, the other. The two terms of correlation stand in mutual counterpoise and equal independence; they are given, as connected, in the synthesis of knowledge; but as contrasted, in the antithesis of existence. Such is the fact of perception, as revealed in consciousness; and as it determines mankind, in general, in their equal assurance of the reality of an external world, and of the existence of their own minds. *Consciousness declares our knowledge of material qualities to be intuitive.*” (Discussions on Phil. and Lit., p. 60. Am. edit.)

According as the truth of this testimony of consciousness

is unconditionally admitted, or in part or wholly rejected, there result divers possible and actual systems of philosophy, thus classified by Hamilton. If the veracity of consciousness be fully admitted, and the antithesis of mind and matter, as given in perception, be taken as real, we have the system of *natural realism*. If the reality of the antithesis be denied, we have the scheme of *absolute identity*, mind and matter being mere phenomenal modifications of one common substance. If, further, we deny the independence of one or the other of the two original factors, the subject, or the object, as given in perception, making the subject the original, and deriving the object from it, we have *idealism*; making the object the original, and deriving the subject from it — *materialism*. Or if, again, we deny the reality of both subject and object, as given in the act of perception, consciousness being regarded as merely a phenomenon, we obtain *nihilism*. There is still another course possible — that is, with the idealist, to deny the immediate cognizance of an external world, in the act of perception; while, at the same time, we do not, with the idealist, deny the actual existence of that world; but, on the contrary, assume its existence, on the ground of an irresistible and universal belief in its reality. This system, the most illogical and inconsequent of all, yet in fact adopted by the great majority of philosophers, from the ancients to Descartes, and from Descartes to Brown, is termed, by Hamilton, *cosmothetic idealism*, or *hypothetical realism*.

It is against this system, accordingly, that Sir William directs his chief attack, tracing it to its source, and showing it to be without the shadow of a foundation. It rests upon the tacitly assumed principle — a principle that has strangely passed, unchallenged, through successive schools of philosophy for centuries: that the *relation of knowledge* implies the *analogy of existence*; in other words, that like knows like; or, that what is known must be *similar* to that which knows — a principle that lies at the basis of all systems which deny the immediate cognizance of external objects in perception. To this principle may be traced the *intuitional species* of the schools, the *ideas* of Descartes, the *preëstablished har-*

mony of Leibnitz, the *vision in Deity* of Mallebranche, the *phenomena* of Kant, the *external states* of Brown. This principle Hamilton characterizes as "nothing more than an irrational attempt to explain what is, in itself, inexplicable. How the similar or the same is conscious of itself, is not a whit less inconceivable than how one contrary is immediately percipient of another. It at best only removes our admitted ignorance by one step back ; and then, in place of our knowledge simply originating from the *incomprehensible*, it ostentatiously departs from the *absurd*." (Discussions, etc., p. 68.)

The theory of representative perception is shown, by Hamilton, to be unnecessary, destructive of itself, and destructive of all evidence of the existence of an external world : *unnecessary*, inasmuch as it undertakes to assign a reason for that which requires and admits of no explanation beyond the simple fact ; while the reason assigned is, itself, no less incomprehensible than the theory which it proposes to explain ; it being just as inexplicable how an unknown external object can be *represented* to the mind, as how it can be *immediately* perceived, i. e. *without* representation ; — *destructive of itself*, inasmuch as it denies the veracity of consciousness, which testifies to our immediate perception of an external world, and thus subverts the foundation and destroys the possibility of all knowledge. " The first act of hypothetical realism is thus an act of suicide ; philosophy, thereafter, is at best but an enchanted corpse, awaiting only the exorcism of the sceptic, to relapse into its proper nothingness." The theory is, moreover, destructive of all evidence that an external world really exists ; since the only evidence we have of such a reality is the testimony of consciousness in the act of perception, and that is by the theory deliberately set aside as unreliable ; thus rendering problematical the existence of the very facts which it undertakes to account for.

We cannot follow, in detail, the arguments by which Sir William proceeds to demolish the theory of representative perception, in its various forms. It is sufficient to say that the work is most effectually done ; and the question, it would seem, put at rest for the present, if not for all time.

The precise relation of perception and sensation to each other, is clearly pointed out by Hamilton. Perception is only a special mode of knowledge ; and sensation is a special mode of feeling. The relation is, therefore a *generic* one — the relation which holds, universally, between knowledge and feeling. These are always coëxistent, yet always distinct. And thus it is with respect to perception and sensation. “A cognition is objective : that is, our consciousness is then relative to something different from the present state of the mind itself ; a feeling, on the contrary, is subjective : that is, our consciousness is exclusively limited to the pleasure or pain experienced by the thinking subject. Cognition and feeling are always coëxistent. The purest act of knowledge is always colored by some feeling of pleasure or pain ; for no energy is absolutely indifferent, and the grossest feeling exists only as it is known in consciousness. This being the case of cognition and feeling in general, the same is true of perception and sensation in particular. Perception proper is the consciousness, through the senses, of the qualities of an object known as different from self ; sensation proper is the consciousness of the subjective affection of pleasure or pain, which accompanies that act of knowledge. Perception is thus the objective element in the complex state — the element of cognition ; sensation is the subjective element — the element of feeling.” (Lectures, Metaphysics, p. 335.)

The great law which regulates the phenomena of perception and sensation, in their reciprocal relation to each other — a law which Kant had, indeed, already indicated — is first clearly and prominently announced by Hamilton. It is this : knowledge and feeling, perception and sensation, though always coëxistent, are *always in the inverse ratio of each other* ; a law at once simple and universal, yet overlooked hitherto by the great body of psychologists. That this is the law of mental action is shown by reference to the several senses, in which it appears that, in proportion as any given sense has more of the one element, it has less of the other. In sight, for example, perception is at the maximum ; sensation, at the minimum. Hearing, on the other hand, while

less extensive in its sphere of knowledge than sight, is more intensive in its capacity of sensation. We have greater pleasure and greater pain from single sounds than from single colors. So, also, with regard to touch : in those parts of the body where sensation predominates, perception is feeble ; and the reverse.

The relation of perception and sensation is closely connected with the relation of the primary and secondary qualities of matter : the primary qualities being those in which perception, or the objective element, is dominant ; the secondary, those in which sensation, the subjective element, rises superior. But on this we cannot now enter.

Closely related to the doctrine of perception is that of consciousness, in the Hamiltonian system. It is regarded, not as a distinct faculty, but as involved in, and the basis of, all the specific faculties ; coëxtensive with intelligence, cognition, knowledge. Consciousness and perception, according to this view, are not different things, but the same thing under different aspects. As in geometry, the sides of the triangle suppose the angles, and the angles suppose the sides, and sides and angles are, in reality, indivisible from each other, while yet we think and speak of them as distinct ; so, in the philosophy of mind we may contemplate the same thing now under one, now under another, of its aspects, distinguishing, in thought and expression, what, in nature, are one and indivisible. Thus with respect to consciousness and knowledge. To know, is to *know* that we know ; yet it is convenient to distinguish, and so we call the latter consciousness. The distinction is logical, and not psychological. So far as regards the action of the mind, to know and to know that we know, are one and the same thing.

It is a singular fact, and coincides with the view now given, that, until a comparatively recent date, there was no term, in general use, to denote what we now understand by consciousness. Prior to the time of Descartes, the term *conscientia* had, with few exceptions, been employed in a sense exclusively ethical, corresponding to our term *conscience*. The ethical is the primitive, and the psychological the derivative

meaning. Thus in the various modern languages, of Romanic origin, in which the ethical and the psychological ideas are expressed by the same word — as in the French, the Italian, the Spanish — the employment of these terms in a psychological sense is of recent date. Nor was it until the decline of philosophy that the Greek language appropriated a distinct term for this idea. Plato and Aristotle have no single word by which to express our knowledge of our own mental states. The term *συναισθησις*, in the sense of self-consciousness, was first introduced by the later Platonists and Aristotelians; nor did they appropriate this term to the action of any specific faculty, but regarded it as the general attribute of intelligence.

As thus regarded, consciousness is not limited, in the Hamiltonian philosophy, to the operations of our own minds, as in self-knowledge, self-consciousness, but extends to external objects. We are conscious of the external world, no less than of our own mental states. Whatever we know or perceive, that we are conscious of knowing or perceiving; and to be conscious of knowing or perceiving an object, is to be conscious of the *object* as known or perceived. We cannot know *that* we know, without knowing *what* we know; cannot know that we remember the contents of a chapter or a volume, without knowing what those contents are. To be conscious of perceiving the volume before me, is to be conscious of an act of perception, in distinction from all other mental acts; and also to be conscious that the object perceived is a book, and not some other external object; and that it is this book, and not some other one. But how can this be, if consciousness does not embrace within its sphere the object thus designated?

The knowledge of relatives is one; and as all knowledge is a relation between the mind knowing and the thing known, the conception and consciousness of one of these related terms involves that of the other also; in other words, to be conscious of the knowing, is to be conscious of the thing known. So also, the knowledge of opposites is one. To have the idea of virtue, is to have the idea, also, of vice. To know what is short, we must know what is long. But in

perception, the ego and the non-ego, subject and object, mind and matter, are given as opposites, and are known as such. We know them by one and the same act, one and the same faculty.

If consciousness be taken in this personal sense, as co-extensive with intelligence or knowledge, we can no longer limit it, of course, to the cognizance of what passes within our own minds. The definition which characterizes it as the faculty of self-knowledge, must be set aside as too narrow. If consciousness is equivalent to knowledge in general, then it is not merely one particular kind of knowledge, that is, knowledge of self. In the Hamiltonian sense, we are no more conscious of the ego than of the non-ego, of the subject than of the object, of self than of the book and the ink-stand, as given in every act of perception: the knowledge of relatives is one; the knowledge of opposites is one. When, therefore, we find Hamilton himself, in his lectures, laying down this "as the most general characteristic of consciousness, that it is the recognition, by the thinking subject, of its own acts and affections," the inconsistency of this position with his own doctrine of consciousness, as above given, is obvious.

Consciousness implies, according to Hamilton, several things: it implies *discrimination* of one object from another. We are conscious of anything only as we discriminate that from other things — conscious of one mental state, only as we distinguish it from other mental states. But, to discriminate is to judge; *judgment* is, therefore, implied in every act of consciousness. So, also, *memory*; for we cannot discriminate and compare objects without remembering them in order to discriminate and compare. The notion of self, essential, of course, to consciousness, is the result of memory, as recognizing the permanence and identity of the thinking subject. *Attention*, also, is implied in every act of consciousness, inasmuch as we cannot discriminate without attention.

Attention is, in fact, merely a modification of consciousness, according to Hamilton, and not a distinct faculty, as maintained by Reid and Stewart. It is consciousness and

something more, viz. an act of will : consciousness voluntarily applied to some determinate object — consciousness concentrated.

Here, again, an apparent inconsistency presents itself : for, if attention is merely consciousness voluntarily directed to a particular object, then how can there be, as we are subsequently told there is, such a thing as involuntary attention ; and if, moreover, attention is “consciousness and something more,” how is it that an act of attention is necessary to every exertion of consciousness ? This would seem to imply that all consciousness is consciousness and something more ; that consciousness must be concentrated, in order to consciousness. The inconsistency pertains, however, rather to the mode of expression, than to the general doctrine.

The question whether *all* our mental states are objects of consciousness, Hamilton decides in the negative. The mind is not always conscious, he maintains, of its own modifications. Its furniture is not all put down in the inventory which consciousness furnishes. Of this mental latency, three degrees are distinguished : the first appears in the possession of certain acquired habits ; as, for example, the capacity to make use of a language, or a science, which we are not, at the moment, using. “I know a science or language, not merely while I make a temporary use of it, but inasmuch as I can apply it when and how I will.” The riches of the mind consist, in great part, in these acquired habits, and not in its present momentary activities. Nay, “the infinitely greater part of our spiritual treasures lies, always, beyond the sphere of consciousness, hid in the obscure recesses of the mind.” The second degree of latency appears in the possession of certain systems of knowledge, or habits of action, not ordinarily manifest, or known to exist, but which are revealed to consciousness in certain extraordinary and abnormal states of mind. Thus in delirium, somnambulism, catalepsy, and other like affections, whole systems of knowledge, which have long faded out of mind, come back to consciousness : as, for example, languages spoken in early youth, and the like. Facts of this class, too numerous and well authenticated to be set

aside, and now generally admitted, however inexplicable, go to show that consciousness is not aware of all that passes in the mind.

The third degree of latent modification appears in certain activities and passivities, occurring in the ordinary state, of which we are not directly conscious, but of whose existence we become aware by their effects. In proof of such latency we are referred to the phenomena of perception. In vision, there is a certain expanse of surface, which is the least that can be detected by the eye — the minimum visible. If we suppose this surface divided into two parts, neither of these parts will, by itself, produce any sensible impression on the eye; and yet each of these parts must produce some impression, else the whole would produce none. So, of the minimum audible: the sound of distant waves is made up of a multitude of little sounds, undistinguished by the ear, unknown to consciousness. The same is true of the other senses. The laws of association, also, furnish evidence of the same thing: as every one knows, it is impossible, in many cases, to trace the connection of thought with thought. The connecting links escape us. The truth is, they were never known to consciousness. The first and last of the series only, appear: as when an ivory ball, in motion, impinges on a row of similar balls, at rest; only the last of which is visibly affected by the impulse.

In view of this whole class of facts, Hamilton does not hesitate to maintain the somewhat startling proposition, "that what we are conscious of, is constructed out of what we are not conscious of; that our whole knowledge, in fact, is made up of the unknown and the incognizable." The evidence is such, he thinks, as "not merely to warrant, but to necessitate, the conclusion that the sphere of our conscious modifications is only a small circle in the centre of a far wider sphere of action and passion, of which we are only conscious through its effects." (Lectures, p. 241, 242.)

Without discussing the correctness of this view, it is apparent that if the term *knowledge* is properly applied to any portion of these latent modifications, the proposition that consci-

ousness is coëxtensive with knowledge, requires some modification. If, for example, we may be said to "know a science or a language, not merely while they are in present use, but long after; and when we have no consciousness of any such possessions; then, in these instances at least, we know what we do not know that we know. It can no longer be maintained that "we have no knowledge of which we are not conscious." It would seem inconsistent, moreover, to deny that memory is truly and properly a knowledge of the past, on the ground that "properly speaking, we know only the actual and present," and at the same time to speak of knowing that which we do not even remember. If what is positively remembered is not, properly speaking, known, but only believed, much less that which is not remembered.

The question of mental activities and affections unknown to consciousness, is one of great interest and importance, and deserves a more thorough investigation than it has yet received at the hands of English and American psychologists, by whom, in fact, it can hardly be said to have been at all considered; while, in Germany, since the time of Leibnitz, who first promulgated the doctrine, and of Wolfe, who ably maintained it, it has been regarded as a settled and necessary conclusion. The more recent French philosophers, also, adopt the same view.

We have been occupied, thus far, with the Hamiltonian doctrine of perception and consciousness. There are other points of interest and importance in psychology, to the elucidation of which Hamilton has contributed not a little, but which we cannot here discuss. His views on inductive as distinguished from deductive reasoning—indeed, his whole discussion of the processes of the elaborative faculty in judgment and reasoning—are worthy of the most careful attention. The same is true of his theory of pleasure and pain, and of his analysis and description of the sensibilities. We regard his treatment of these themes as among the most valuable of his contributions to psychology.

But we must pass, without notice, these and other topics, to notice the second of the principal points mentioned at the

outset, the *doctrine of the conditioned*; or, more generally, the principle of the *relativity* and consequent *limitation* of human thought. We can hardly name a problem in philosophy more important and fundamental than this, lying deeper at the base of all systems, and giving shape to all. It raises the question, not of the value and validity of this or that process of thought; this or that mode of operation; this or that specific faculty; but of the value and validity of knowledge itself. To ask whether human thought and knowledge are relative, is to ask whether we know things as they are in themselves, or only as they stand related to us the observers.

To borrow an illustration from the phenomenon of vision: to an observer stationed on some determinate portion of the earth's surface, the position and movements of the heavenly bodies present a certain appearance. As he changes his position, the appearance changes. The knowledge thus obtained is evidently not an absolute but only a relative knowledge, having relation to the position and visual power of the observer. Place him elsewhere, or modify his power of vision, and you change the whole aspect of the phenomenon. Now the question is, whether that which is true, in this case, of one portion of our knowledge, may not be true in all cases and of all our knowledge? Do we know anything as it is *per se*? or, is all our knowledge merely phenomenal—the appearance which things present to our faculties of knowing? If the latter, then would not a modification of our faculties produce an entire change in our knowledge of things? And what evidence have we that the reality corresponds to the appearance; that the presentation given by our present faculties is a true and correct one?

How wide and fearful the sweep of this last question, and how startling the scepticism to which it points, will be evident at a glance. It brings us, so to speak, to the very edge and limit of the solid world, and bids us look off into the infinite space and deep night that lie beyond, and through which we, and our little world, are whirling. Another step—and we are lost!

This problem, as we have said, of the relativity of knowl-

edge, really underlies all our philosophy ; as a single glance at the history of philosophic opinion will show. It meets us, at the outset, among the first questions that engaged the human mind in its earlier speculations. It meets us in the most recent theories and discussions of the latest contending schools. From Zenophanes to Leibnitz, from Parmenides to Schelling and Hegel, it traverses the web of philosophic thought. What is the value, what the certainty, of human knowledge ? Know we realities, or appearances only ? — noumena, or phenomena ? It was the question of the earlier Grecian schools ; solved, ultimately, by those ancient thinkers in the interests of idealism and scepticism. We know but the phenomenal : things are but what they seem ; man is the measure of all things. It has been the question of the German schools, from Kant to Hegel — solved here again, ultimately, in the interest of idealism and scepticism : things are but what they seem — the seeming is the reality. It has been the question of the Scotch school : affirming that while our faculties are limited, and our knowledge therefore limited by our faculties, those faculties are not the limit of existence and reality. But while we know, and can know, merely phenomena, and not things in themselves ; we are, nevertheless, not to regard ourselves and our faculties as the measure of all things. Such, in spirit and substance, the teaching of Reid and Stewart, in Scotland ; of Jouffroy and Collard, in France ; and such the doctrine of Hamilton, as developed in the whole tone of his teaching, and more especially in his philosophy of the conditioned.

The doctrine of the conditioned, as it has been called, rests upon the principle that all that is conceivable in thought lies between two extremes ; which, as mutually contradictory, cannot both be true ; but of which, for the same reason, one must be true ; while, at the same time, neither of these extremes is, itself, conceivable. Thus, for example, we conceive *space*. It is a positive and necessary form of thought. We cannot but conceive it. But how do we conceive it ? It must be either finite or infinite, of course ; for these are contradictory alternatives, of which one or the other must be

true. But we cannot positively conceive, or represent to ourselves as possible, either alternative.

We cannot conceive space as bounded, finite, a whole, beyond which is no further space: this is impossible. Nor, on the other hand, can we realize, in thought, the opposite extreme — the infinity of space. For, travel as far as we will, in thought, we still stop short of the infinite. Here, then, are two inconceivable extremes, of which, as contradictory, one or the other must be true; and between these inconceivable extremes, lies the sphere of the conceivable. Thus it is ever, and in all the relations of thought. Thus, for example, as to *time*. As we must think all things material to exist in space; so we cannot but think all things mental, as well as material, to exist in time: yet we can neither conceive, on the one hand, the absolute commencement of time; nor yet, on the other, can we conceive it as absolutely without limit, or beginning. Thus the conceivable lies, ever, between two incomprehensible extremes. This is a grand law of thought — a law of the mind: the conceivable is bounded, ever, by the inconceivable; only the limited, the conditioned, is cogitable. This law of the mind, first distinctly developed and announced as such by Hamilton, he calls the Law of the Conditioned.

It is evident that this law of mental activity is not a power, a *potency*, but an *impotency*, of the mind. It is a bound or limit, beyond which, in our thinking, we cannot go. Whatever lies beyond this limit, whatever is unconditioned, unbounded, is, to us, and must ever be to us, unknown. It is the position of Hamilton, that this *impotence* or imbecility of the mind, to think the unconditioned, constitutes a great negative principle, to which some of the most important mental phenomena, hitherto regarded as primary data of intelligence, may be referred.

The doctrine of the conditioned, as thus laid down, has special application to the ideas of the *absolute* and *infinite*, the idea of *cause*, and the idea of *freedom*.

And first: as to the ideas of the *absolute* and *infinite*. What are the absolute and the infinite? Can we know them?

Can we conceive them? From the dawn of philosophy, no themes have been more frequently before the human mind, or have occasioned profounder thought. To get beyond the finite and the phenomenal, to know the absolute, to comprehend the One and All, has been the aim and ambition of bold and aspiring systems, from the ancient Eleatic to the modern Eclectic. To the philosophy of the absolute, in all its forms, stands directly opposed the philosophy of the conditioned. The infinite and absolute lie beyond the bounds of possible thought and knowledge to man. They are unknowable; they are inconceivable.

The better to understand the conditions of our problem, let us see what solutions are possible. These are four, and only four. We may say: 1. That the infinite and absolute are conceivable, but not knowable; or, 2. that they are knowable, but not conceivable; or, 3. that they are both knowable and conceivable; or, 4. that they are neither knowable nor conceivable. Each of these positions has been actually maintained, by one or another of the opposing schools.

The first is the position of Kant. The infinite and absolute are not objects of knowledge; but, on the other hand they are positive concepts, and not mere negations of the finite and the relative. A positive knowledge of the unconditioned is impossible. We know, and can know, only by means of our faculties of knowing, which thus afford the conditions of all knowledge. Now these faculties take cognizance, not of the infinite and absolute, but only of the finite and relative — the phenomenal: in other words, not of things in themselves; but only of things as relative to us. The former lie wholly beyond the sphere of our operations.

This strikes at the root, of course, of all purely speculative and *à priori* systems, whether of psychology, theology, or ontology. Rational psychology and transcendental philosophy are, at once, impossible and absurd. We are shut up, positively and strictly, to the sphere of the relative and phenomenal, the sphere of consciousness. Thus Kant, though often regarded as the grand apostle of the transcendental school,

in reality subverts the whole system, by showing all knowledge of anything beyond the finite and relative to be impossible. It is the very object of the Critique of Pure Reason to analyze human knowledge as to its fundamental conditions, and determine its proper sphere. The result is a declaration that the knowledge of the unconditioned is impossible.

But while unknowable, the infinite is not inconceivable. We form notions or ideas of that which lies beyond the bounds of knowledge : the illimitable, the absolute. These ideas have not, indeed, any objective reality. Nay, they involve us in contradictions from which we can find no escape. Still they are conceptions, and not mere negations—positive concepts ; and it is the specific province of reason (*vernunft*), in distinction from understanding (*verstand*), to furnish these ideas. The reason, as thus employed—pure reason—is not, however, to be relied upon as a faculty of positive knowledge. As such it is wholly illusory, conversant with phantoms, not with realities. It is not until we emerge from the domain of *pure* reason, and set ourselves to inquire of *practical* reason, that we can have evidence of the reality of the objects to which these ideas relate.

The tendency of such a system could only be to scepticism. If the pure reason is illusory, how shall we trust the practical? If the ideas of God, the soul, freedom, and immortality, are not to be taken as realities when given by the former, how shall we establish the existence of the same upon the authority of the latter? If the data of the one are mere laws of thought, and not of things, how do we know that it is not so with the other?

This tendency is still further strengthened by the arbitrary limitation of space and time to the sphere of sense, in the Kantian system. We think under the conditions of space and time ; thus we perceive and know all things ; but we are not to infer that the objects of our knowledge are, in reality, what we conceive them to be ; for space and time are not laws of things, but only of our thinking. If so, then when we come into the sphere of the practical reason, or conscience, and find ourselves there under the law of moral obli-

gation, viewing this as right, and that as wrong, what right have we to affirm that this, also, is not merely a law of thought, rather than a law of things? What, then, becomes of our so-called eternal and immutable morality?

Nor was this system terminative of the controversy; on the contrary, it contained, within itself, the germ of a higher transcendentalism, and a more thorough-going philosophy of the absolute, than any that had preceded. In the words of Hamilton: "he had slain the body, but had not exorcised the spectre of the absolute; and this spectre has continued to haunt the schools of Germany even to the present day."

The second is the position of Schelling, and the school of metaphysicians represented by him, who held to the direct apprehension of truths which lie beyond the sphere of sense and of experience, by a capacity of knowledge which is above the understanding and above consciousness, and which they call the power of *intellectual intuition*. By sinking back into the depths of the soul itself, back of all sense-perception, all reasoning, all reflection, all consciousness, the mind has the power, according to these illuminati, of perceiving truth *per se* — things as they are in themselves — the unconditioned, the infinite and absolute, God, matter, soul. These objects cannot, it is true, be conceived by the mind, for they lie beyond the sphere of the understanding; and the attempt to bring them within that sphere involves us, at once, in difficulties and absurdities: we can conceive only the conditioned. But though not capable of being conceived, they may be known by this higher power of immediate intuition. Thus, alone, is philosophy possible; for, as the science of sciences, it is and must be the science of the absolute.

As thus endowed, and in the exercise of this higher power, the mind becomes identified with the absolute itself; the distinction of subject and object, of the knowing and the known, vanishes: reason and the absolute, man and the infinite, are one.

The third position is a modification or combination of the two previous. The infinite and absolute are objects of knowledge, as with Schelling; and also objects of conception, as

with Kant. This is the view of Cousin, the view so ably refuted by Hamilton, in the Article on the philosophy of the conditioned, to which we referred at the beginning. It is the peculiarity of the theory of Schelling, as already stated, that the infinite and absolute are known by a power above consciousness, and superior to the understanding, in the operation of which all distinction of subject and object is lost, the mind knowing and the object known — reason and the absolute — becoming one. Hence, while known to the reason, the objects of this power are incomprehensible to the understanding, which can know only by consciousness and discrimination of differences. With Cousin, on the other hand, the infinite and absolute are known, not by any such indescribable, extraordinary, and paradoxical process, but by the ordinary method of consciousness, which, it is admitted, is implied in all intelligence, and under the conditions of plurality and difference, which are the necessary conditions of all knowledge. As thus known to consciousness, and by the ordinary methods of intelligence, the infinite and absolute may be conceived as well as known.

In opposition to all these, stands the fourth position, that of Hamilton, as already explained: We know, and can know, only the conditioned, the relative, the finite. All thought conditions its object in the very act of thinking. To think is to limit. The infinite and absolute are not positive conceptions, but mere negations of the finite and relative. They cannot be positively conceived, or construed to the mind. The effort to conceive them involves the abstraction of the very conditions which are essential to thought itself. We cannot, for example, conceive an absolute whole; that is, a whole so great that it cannot be, itself, conceived as part of a still greater whole; nor can we conceive an absolute part, that is a part so small that it cannot be, itself, conceived as made up of parts. As an absolute maximum and an absolute minimum are, each and equally, unthinkable, in other words the *absolutely bounded*, so neither can we think the *infinitely unbounded*; for to follow out in thought, on the one hand, the ever widening and growing whole, until it shall

have passed all bounds and stand revealed to thought as the pure infinite, or on the other hand, to follow out the ever-progressing division into parts smaller and still smaller, until in this direction also all bounds are passed, and the infinite is actually reached, would in either case require an infinite process of thought and an infinite time for that process: thus neither the absolute nor the infinite, the positively limited nor the positively unlimited, can possibly be construed to thought, or represented to the imagination.

To this, Schelling would reply: true, the understanding cannot comprehend the infinite and absolute; it knows only as it knows conditions and relations, only by comparing, and distinguishing, and apprehending the differences and relations of objects. The absolute is one, complete, out of relation to any other object; cannot therefore be known by plurality and difference and relation, as the understanding knows. But there is a higher faculty than the understanding; knowledge may transcend consciousness. To the higher reason stand revealed the infinite, the absolute, pure truth, things as they are in themselves. This cannot be comprehended by the understanding, for it lies beyond the sphere of that power; it comes not within the consciousness, for consciousness supposes the distinction of subject and object, the mind knowing and the thing known; while in the cognizance of the infinite this distinction vanishes, and the reason stands face to face with truth, nay is one with the absolute: as exercising this divine faculty, man becomes one with God.

It is a sufficient answer to this purely fanciful hypothesis, to inquire, how it is that we become aware of possessing and exercising so remarkable a faculty? Of course, we are not conscious of it; for, by the supposition, it lies wholly beyond the sphere of consciousness. How, then, do we know it. For if not known at the time when it is called into exercise, how can it be remembered afterward? We remember only that of which we have been conscious.

If, now, Cousin and his followers seek to escape this difficulty by so modifying the theory of Schelling as to bring the knowledge of the absolute within the sphere of conscious-

ness, it is only to fall into the contradiction of affirming that we know, by the laws of the understanding, that which can, by no possibility, come under those laws. The absolute is the complete, the universal ; and, as such, it is absolutely one : to affirm it, is to deny all plurality and difference. But we know, by consciousness and intelligence, only as we distinguish subject and object, only as we discover plurality and difference. To know the absolute, then, by consciousness and the understanding, is to know that which is absolutely one, by discovering in it plurality and difference ; in other words, by discovering it to be what it is not.

Such, in substance, is the inexorable logic with which this remorseless antagonist pursues, through all space and beyond the habitable bounds of thought, the chimera of the possible knowledge, or even the possible conception, of the infinite and absolute.¹

The application of this philosophy of the conditioned to theology, as regards especially our ideas of the supreme Being, is at once obvious and of the highest importance. As infinite and absolute, the God whom we worship is beyond the power of the human mind to comprehend, or adequately conceive. " We must believe in the infinity of God ; but the infinite God cannot by us, in the present limitation of our faculties, be comprehended or conceived. A Deity understood, would be no Deity at all ; and it is blasphemy to say that God only is as we are able to think him to be. We

¹ It should be remarked that Hamilton carefully distinguishes, as those with whom he contends do not, between the absolute and the infinite. With Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Cousin, and the philosophers of the transcendental class generally, the terms *absolute* and *infinite* are used, not as opposed to each other, but to denote in general that which is wholly unconditioned. With Hamilton the absolute is the unconditionally *limited*, — the whole, complete — corresponding to the *τὸ ὅλον* of Aristotle. The infinite on the other hand is the wholly *unlimited*. The one is, with him, the direct opposite of the other ; the one affirming, the other denying, limitation.

It may here be remarked that Prof. Mansel, of whom we shall have occasion presently to speak, uses the term *absolute*, not in the strict sense of Hamilton, as opposed to the infinite, but in the more general sense of the transcendental philosophers, as denoting that which is out of all necessary relation — the opposite of the necessarily relative.

know God according to the finitude of our faculties ; but we believe much that we are incompetent properly to know." (Lectures, p. 531). A God understood would be no God. He can be known only so far as he reveals himself ; known relatively, not absolutely and as he is in himself ; and he can reveal himself only to and through the faculties with which he has seen fit to endow us. The limit of our faculties is the limit of all possible revelation of God to us. By no process of revelation can the finite be made to comprehend the absolute and the infinite. The drop can neither contain nor comprehend the ocean.

But has not God revealed himself to us as infinite and absolute ? He has made known to us the fact that he is so — a fact which it needs no special revelation to teach, since reason assures us that a finite God is no God ; but in making known to us the fact, he has not brought the infinite and absolute within our comprehension. Reason and revelation both assure us that God is infinite ; but they do not enable us to comprehend or grasp in thought, the contents of that infinite. We know *that* God is ; but *what* he is, we do not and cannot fully comprehend. We know that he is *not* finite, *not* dependent, but unlimited and absolute ; but how much is positively comprised under these negatives, we cannot determine. It requires infinity to conceive infinity. Hence — and it is a significant fact — those who claim for man a knowledge of the infinite, have done so, usually, on the ground that the reason in man is part of, and one with, the divine reason, as Cousin ; or, still higher, that man is one and the same with the absolute, as Schelling.

This doctrine of the conditioned may be styled the philosophy of ignorance, rather than of wisdom ; a *nescience*, rather than a *science*, of God. But it is an ignorance which is, itself, the highest wisdom ; for, as Hamilton has well said : "the highest reach of human science is the scientific recognition of human ignorance : ' Qui nescit ignorare, ignorat scire.' " Well may we say, with Grotius : "nescire quaedam magna pars sapientiae est," and with Scaliger : "sapientia est vera, nolle nimis sapere." Such has been the testimony of the most learned and devout, from Chrysostom and Au-

gustine downward. "There are two sorts of ignorance," says Hamilton: "we philosophize to escape ignorance, and the consummation of our philosophy is ignorance; we start from the one, we repose in the other; they are the goals from which and to which, we tend; and the pursuit of knowledge is but a course between two ignorances, as human life is, itself, only a travelling from grave to grave." (Wight's Phil. of Sir Wm. H., p. 517.)

A theology constructed on such principles and on such a basis, must evidently be one of preëminent modesty and humility. It sets out with a confession of ignorance, and ends with a demonstration of the principle from which it sets out. It is a philosophy which "vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up." The God whom it recognizes, and whom it worships, is a God incomprehensible, and past finding out; a God that hideth himself; whom no man hath seen or can see; dwelling in the light that no man can approach unto. The spirit of such a theology is one of deepest reverence and humility. Its language is: "Who, by searching, can find out God; who can find out the Almighty to perfection? Lo! these are parts of his ways; but the thunder of his power who can understand?"

There are two lessons specially taught by the philosophy of the conditioned, as applied to theology: one is, the impossibility of constructing, *à priori*, by reason alone, a science of God; since, start from what point we will, we find ourselves baffled and thrown back in every attempt to approach the infinite; and that not by accident, but of necessity, from the demonstrated nature and laws of human thought. The other is, that the difficulties which we find in theology belong equally to philosophy; are not peculiar to religion alone, nor to one system of religious belief exclusively, nor to revealed in distinction from natural theology, but to all systems alike, and to philosophy as much as to theology. If theology cannot tell us what God is in himself, but only as relative to our limited faculties, neither can philosophy tell us what *anything* is, in itself, but only as relative to our faculties of knowing. If theology cannot explain to our com-

prehension everything which it would have us believe ; philosophy, too, requires us to take upon trust more than it can demonstrate ; and to believe what we cannot understand. If theology recognizes, in its divinity, a being whom it cannot comprehend ; philosophy has never yet found herself able to frame a conception of Deity that was self-consistent, not to say adequate and complete ; and that for the same reason, in either case,— the inability of the human mind to form such a conception.

It has been objected to this philosophy, that it makes the Infinite a mere *negation* : thus ignoring and abolishing the highest object of thought to man. This is not so. It is not the Infinite, but only our *conception* of the Infinite, which it pronounces negative. It is not the Infinite, but only our comprehension of the Infinite, which it denies. That the Infinite is, we know — *that* it is ; but not *what* it is : every attempt to conceive it, lands us in a mere negation of the limited. The following passage, from Mansel, well expresses the truth as to this point : “ When we lift up our eyes to that blue vault of heaven, which is, itself, but the limit of our power of sight, we are compelled to suppose, though we cannot perceive, the existence of space beyond as well as within it ; we regard the boundary of vision as parting the visible from the invisible. And when, in mental contemplation, we are conscious of relation and difference as the limits of our power of thought, we regard them, in like manner, as the boundary between the conceivable and the inconceivable ; though we are unable to penetrate, in thought, beyond the nether sphere, to the unrelated and unlimited which it hides from us. The *absolute* and the *infinite* are thus, like the *inconceivable* and the *im-perceptible*, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible. The attempt to construct, in thought, an object answering to such names, necessarily results in contradiction ; a contradiction, however, which we have, ourselves, produced by the attempt to think ; which exists in the act of thought, but not beyond it ; which destroys the conception as such, but indicates nothing con-

cerning the existence or non-existence of that which we try to conceive. It proves our own impotence, and it proves nothing more. Or, rather, it indirectly leads us to believe in the existence of that Infinite which we cannot conceive; for the denial of its existence includes a contradiction, no less than the assertion of its conceivability. We thus learn that the provinces of reason and faith are not coëxtensive; that it is a duty, enjoined by reason itself, to believe in that which we are unable to comprehend." (*Limits of Religious Thought*, p. 110.)

It is objected to this philosophy, that it leaves unreconciled the difficulties and contradictions which it finds in the attempt to conceive of the infinite; thus leaving reason and faith at hopeless variance. It allows the mind to fall back, baffled and thwarted, in every effort to form a consistent notion of the highest and most important objects of thought, and calls in faith to decide where reason is impotent.

That it presents difficulties which it does not solve, is true; that it shows them to be inseparable from every attempt of the human mind to conceive the unconditioned, is also true. It leaves them unsolved, but it shows them to be insoluble; and it tells us why they are so. But is any other system preferable, in this respect? Is it in the power of a different philosophy to remove the discrepancies, and solve the difficulties, of which it complains? Suppose, with the disciples of a different school, we call in the aid of a higher power, which we call the reason, and place above the understanding and in contrast with it — whose office and province it shall be to take cognizance of those higher truths which the logical understanding finds it impossible to comprehend. Have we thus got rid of the difficulties? Are the contradictions reconciled? Can we now understand the infinite, and comprehend the absolute? Can we now conceive infinite duration, or yet the absolute beginning or absolute termination of existence? Is it not just as difficult, and impossible, as before, to comprehend or conceive these things? Is it not evident that this new and higher power, which we call the reason, stands in precisely the same relation to the understanding, and the

other mental faculties, that faith does in the other system? "The logical understanding is out of its sphere when it undertakes to grasp the higher truth," says the transcendentalist; "that is the province of *reason*: hence difficulties and contradictions." "The human intelligence is out of its sphere, when it undertakes to grasp the unconditioned," says Hamilton; "that is the province of *faith*: hence difficulties and contradictions." The question is now, which of these two shall charge the other with leaving difficulties and contradictions unreconciled? In either system, there is presented to the mind what, it is admitted, we cannot understand: in the one case it is presented as an object of knowledge; in the other, of faith.

And how is this higher faculty of reason to know what it is out of the power of the logical understanding to conceive? Is it by a power above consciousness? Then how do we know that we have such a power? If within the sphere of consciousness, then it is, of course, subject to the laws of consciousness: it must be governed, in its operations, by the ordinary laws of thought. Thought has its fixed laws, and in all our thinking we must and do observe them. Take the idea of the infinite, which is claimed as the special prerogative and province of reason: is it not a thought, a conception? and, as such, is it not subject to the laws which govern all our thinking? Can we, for example, conceive the infinite to be and not to be, at the same time? Or can we conceive that it neither is, nor yet is not? And what have we here but the principles of *contradiction, and excluded middle, which are laws of the logical understanding*? Is it not evident that if we think at all, we must think in accordance with these laws? Yet the logical understanding, we are told, is wholly out of its sphere when it undertakes to grasp the infinite. Pray how is the reason to make known to us, then, this terra incognita? Is this higher faculty so above and in contrast with the understanding, as to set aside the universal and fixed laws of thought? But it is precisely these laws that create the difficulty and impossibility of conceiving the infinite and absolute.

To revert to the original objection, that faith and reason are left at variance by the doctrine of the conditioned : it should be remarked, that the discrepancy is not between faith and reason ; but between reason and reason, between one conception and another, of the human mind. The difficulty is not, how to believe what we cannot adequately comprehend ; but how to reconcile our disagreeing conceptions : how to reconcile our idea of God, as a being and a person, with our idea of him as infinite ; how to conceive of him as absolute, and yet as cause ; how to conceive of the infinite as distinct from and coëxisting with the finite, yet not limited by it. These, and such as these, are the difficulties ; and they are difficulties which the reason (so called) does not escape, nor the philosophy of the absolute, in any of its forms, help us to solve.

But the difficulty, it is further objected, is the same for faith, as for the intellect ; for the faculty of believing, as for the faculty of knowing and conceiving. If we cannot know nor even conceive the infinite, then we certainly cannot believe it ; since it is impossible to believe what we have no conception of. True, we reply, we cannot believe what we have *no* conception of ; but we may, and do, believe what we do not comprehend, and what we have no *positive* conception of : I believe in the immortality of the soul ; but exactly what that immortality comprises, I do not know. I may believe that a given object, *a*, possesses an unknown quality, *x* ; and yet of the value of *x* I may have no conception whatever. I believe that space is infinite ; but I do not, and cannot, conceive what the infinite comprises, nor represent to myself infinite space as a positive object of thought. My conception of it is merely negative : it is the *unlimited*, the non-finite.

The precise relation of faith to understanding, in the philosophy of the conditioned, seems to be misapprehended in some cases. One, at least, of the recent reviewers, has represented that philosophy as placing the foundations of our faith in the processes of the logical understanding. This is entirely a misapprehension. Our belief of the divine exist-

ence is not made, in that system, to rest upon the logical fact that, of two contradictions, one must be true; and therefore there must be an infinite or an absolute, neither of which can, however, be conceived. This is not made the foundation of our faith, but is simply brought in as confirmatory of it, as showing that philosophy has nothing, at least, to say against it. Our faith is uniformly represented as resting on entirely another basis, viz. on the religious consciousness, the moral nature, of man. The consciousness of dependence, the consciousness of moral obligation, the consciousness that we are actually living under a law, and that where there is law there is and must be a lawgiver: these are the grand facts of man's moral nature; and they constitute the actual and sufficient foundation of his faith in the existence of a supreme Being. To this faith scepticism may object: you believe in that which you cannot conceive. To this, philosophy replies: true, but you are obliged to believe many things which you cannot conceive; and then, again, the opposite of what you believe is equally inconceivable. If you cannot conceive God as infinite, neither can you conceive him as finite. If you cannot conceive him as without beginning of days, or end of years, neither can you conceive him as beginning to exist, or as ceasing to be. If you cannot conceive absolute creation, neither can you conceive an infinite series of finite changes. Yet of these two opposites, one *must* be true. Philosophy thus confirms our belief, by showing that reason can bring no valid objection against it. It removes obstacles, and leaves the coast clear for the operations of the higher and positive principle of faith.

The principles thus maintained by Hamilton, in what has been termed the philosophy of the conditioned, are assumed by Prof. Mansel, in his celebrated Bampton Lectures, as the basis and starting-point of his treatise. Planting himself on these principles, he proceeds to carry them out to their legitimate results, as against rationalism in its various forms, sceptic and dogmatic, which would make reason the arbiter of revelation; or, setting aside revelation altogether, would construct, from the principles of reason alone, a pure and *à pri-*

ori science of God. He shows that the pretensions of such a system are altogether baseless and absurd ; that reason has no such knowledge of the divine nature as can constitute the foundation of an independent or rational theology ; that, on the contrary, its fundamental principles and conceptions are self-contradictory and irreconcilable with each other ; and that from the very nature of the human mind, its inability to conceive the unconditioned, this must be the case. The fundamental conceptions of any system of rationalistic theology are, and must be, the notion of the absolute, the infinite, and first cause. These it must combine in its conception of Deity. He must be infinite, that is, free from all possible limitation ; he must be absolute, that is, existing in and by himself, without necessary relation to any other being ; he must be first cause, that is, the producer of all things — himself produced of none. But how are these three elements or notions to be combined ? Are they not incongruous ? Cause is always relative to effect ; the absolute, on the contrary, is that which is out of all relation. How is the absolute to pass over into the relative, the infinite to give rise to the finite ? And how can the finite and the infinite coëxist ? Pantheism or atheism is the logical and inevitable result : the one sacrificing the finite to save the infinite ; the other, the infinite to save the finite. But even here we find no resting place ; for if we deny the existence of the finite, we deny our own existence, and what then becomes of all our reasoning ? If we deny the infinite, we find it equally impossible to conceive the absolute beginning in time, or absolute limitation in space, if the finite. Thus, from whatever side it may be viewed, the rationalistic conception of the infinite is seen to be encompassed with contradictions. We can neither, without contradiction, conceive it to exist, nor not to exist ; as one, nor yet as many ; as personal, nor yet as impersonal ; as conscious, nor as unconscious ; as producing effects, nor as inactive. The conclusion is, that reason is incompetent, of herself, to construct a theology, and is not to be taken as the guide and determiner of faith. Foiled thus in the attempt to grasp the absolute nature of the divine Being, Professor Man-

sel proceeds to show, by an examination of the nature and laws of the human mind, whence the failure results, and why every such attempt necessarily must prove a failure: that thought is not, and cannot be, the measure of existence; that the contradictions which meet us at every step in the endeavor to conceive the infinite arise, not from the nature of the object which we seek to conceive, but from the constitution of the mind conceiving.

Thought is possible only by means of definite conceptions. All thought is, by its very nature, a *limitation*; all knowledge or consciousness implies limitation. It is the apprehension or conception of a thing in some one definite form or aspect; of something in particular, and not of things in general. It is the determination of the mind to one actual, out of many possible modifications. But the infinite is not to be shut up within these limits. The infinite is the wholly *unlimited*. Of course, then, we cannot possibly conceive it. To speak of knowing or conceiving the infinite, is to speak of defining, bounding, limiting the *unlimited*. Nor can the absolute be conceived without equal contradiction. Any object of thought, as conceived, stands in relation to the mind that conceives; is brought into that relation by the very act of conception. But the absolute is that which is out of all relation. When conceived, or brought into relation, it is no longer absolute. It does not follow, from this, that the absolute and infinite do not exist, but only that we cannot conceive them as existing.¹

¹ Does not the difficulty, so far as it lies in the reasons now assigned, pertain to the divine mind, as much as to the human? To conceive is to limit. To know, is to distinguish one thing from another; and all distinction is limitation. But is this a peculiarity of human thinking, and human knowing? In the act of self-knowledge, or self-consciousness, does not God distinguish himself from other objects — the creator, from the created — the infinite from the finite — self from not-self? does he not distinguish between himself and Gabriel or Satan? But this is to limit himself. On the other hand, not thus to distinguish, is to regard himself as the universal whole — and absolute pantheism results.

Is it replied, the divine knowledge and consciousness are different from the human, and therefore, may involve no limitation? That may be. But if the divine consciousness so far differs from the human, as not to distinguish self from not-self, the infinite from the finite; then, whatever else it may be, it cer-

All human knowledge or consciousness, again, is subject to the law of time, under the forms of succession and duration. Whatever object or existence we are conscious of, we are conscious of as succeeding, in time, to some former object of thought or knowledge, and as, itself, occupying time ; nor can we conceive it otherwise. But that which is successive is finite, limited by that which has gone before, and that which is coming after ; and that which is continuous is also finite ; for continuous existence is existence divisible into successive moments, made up of successive portions, each of course finite. It follows, that unless we can escape this law of thought, and for once think *out of* time, no object of human thought can adequately represent the true nature of an infinite Being. Hence it is, also, that we cannot conceive or construe to thought, an act of *creation*, in the strict sense of the term, an absolutely first link in the chain of existence, an absolutely first moment or beginning of anything in time, nor yet of time itself. On the other hand, an infinite succession in time is equally inconceivable. We can neither conceive an infinite duration of finite changes, nor yet an existence prior to duration ?

Personality, also, implies limitation. All our notions of personality are derived from our own, which is relative and limited. The thought and the thinker are relative to each other, and are distinguished from each other. A person is a definite object, one being out of many. "To speak of an absolute and infinite person, is simply to use language, to

tainly is not self-knowledge, or self-consciousness. If it does thus distinguish, then in so doing it involves limitation, in the same way, and for the same reason that human consciousness does.

It is not without reason, then, that the philosophy of the absolute, in its purest form denies consciousness, personality, and intelligence to the infinite. The denial is a logical necessity from the premises. The distance from pantheism to atheism is the distance from premiss to conclusion. The infinite, in the sense of the absolutely unlimited, is, in truth the *pure nothing* of Hegel. To predicate any quality, any attribute, any substance even, of this infinite nothing, is to limit it. The moment it becomes *something*, it becomes definite, no longer infinite.

Is then the Deity to himself unknown, to himself an enigma and a blank ? Or shall we conclude that the idea of the infinite, in the sense of the absolutely unlimited, does not pertain to the true conception of Deity ?

which, however true it may be in a superhuman sense, no mode of human thought can possibly attach itself" (p. 103). Whatever we separate in thought from other things, and distinguish from other objects, becomes to us, by that very act, a *definite* object, limited, conditioned ; and to apply to any such object the term *infinite*, is to affirm and deny in the same breath. We cannot apply the term, therefore, to any definite and positive object of thought. To say that any object or attribute or form is infinite, is to say that the same thing, at one and the same moment, is both finite and infinite.

Shall we then, with the pantheist, deny the personality of God ; or, with the atheist, his infinity ? By no means, either. We must think him personal ; we must think him infinite. True, we cannot reconcile the two representations ; but the impossibility and apparent contradiction may not exist anywhere except in our own minds ; they do not, necessarily, pertain to the nature of God. " The apparent contradiction in this case, as in those previously noticed, is the necessary consequence of an attempt, on the part of the human thinker, to transcend the boundaries of his consciousness. It proves that there are limits to man's power of thought ; and it proves no more" (p. 106).

The work of Prof. Mansel has awakened attention and called forth criticism, in no ordinary degree. It has been reviewed, sometimes sharply, sometimes vaguely, seldom with approbation — sometimes with, but oftener apparently *without*, a clear perception of the design of the treatise and the principles on which it is based — in most of the quarterlies, the leading secular and religious journals, and in special treatises. We have to do with the work, at this time, only in so far as it is founded upon, and a development of, *the philosophy of the conditioned*, in its application to theology. Whatever may be the special merits or defects of Prof. Mansel's treatise, we cannot but regard the principles on which it is based as fundamentally correct, and of the highest importance to theology as well as to philosophy. The philosophy of the absolute — the dream that, by reason alone, indepen-

dently of revelation, man can find out God, can find out the Almighty to perfection ; that the mind of man is capable of comprehending, not phenomena only, but things as they are in themselves ; of transcending the limits which consciousness and the laws of thought impose, and conversing, face to face, with unveiled truth and the most august realities ; — this philosophy, in one or another of its several forms, lies at the basis of the most prevalent and most dangerous errors in science and in religion. It is the essence of rationalism, the root of pantheism, of scepticism, and infidelity. These false systems can be met only by a return to first principles, a careful searching out, and building upon, the right foundation in philosophy. We may discard metaphysical speculation as much as we please ; but the thinking world will continue to speculate, and on its false theories of philosophy will build false systems of religious belief ; which we can successfully encounter only by showing that the foundations on which they rest are radically false. To do this, in respect to the errors named, we must fall back upon the philosophy of the conditioned.

Many of the objections which have been brought against the treatise of Prof. Mansel, are such as lie against the philosophy of the conditioned in general ; and, as such, have been already considered. It has been urged, however, and with apparent force, against this work, by those who would probably accept, in the main, the principles of that philosophy, that it is based upon a false idea of what the infinite really denotes. In the sense in which it is employed by Prof. Mansel, the term *infinite* stands for *the absolutely unlimited*. The reasoning proceeds on that postulate. But while it is easy to show that we cannot conceive of God as infinite in that sense, since to conceive is, with us, to distinguish one thing from another, and that is to limit, in our thought, the object conceived, it does follow that in some other sense (the sense commonly attached to the term) we may not be able to conceive of him.

Whatever may be the strict philosophical meaning of the term *infinite*, it is evident that, in its common theological

use, as applied to Deity, we employ it in a sense different from that now mentioned. To call any being or thing infinite, in the sense of wholly unlimited, is to bring together contradictory ideas ; for a being or thing is a limited object, one out of, or in distinction from, many ; something definite, and therefore the opposite of the infinite. Yet we do and must think and speak of God as infinite. What do we understand, then, by the term as thus employed ? Not, surely, the sum of all existence, the $\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$, or $\tau\acute{o}\ \delta\lambda\omicron\nu$, the absolute whole of things ; but, on the contrary, a Being who, *out of himself*, finds no limits ; none save such as his own being and nature necessarily suppose ; none save those implied in the very term and idea of being. We mean that his duration is unlimited, his power unlimited, his every attribute and perfection unlimited ; in a word, that there is none greater, and that he himself cannot be greater by the addition of any quality or attribute which he does not already possess. This is the idea we form of God when we think of him and speak of him as infinite ; and in this there is involved no contradiction. Still our thought, even in the modified sense now given, is not a positive, but only a negative conception : we do not represent to ourselves as a positive object of thought, much less do we comprehend, this infinity of the divine Being. We approach it only by negations, and we express it accordingly. We cannot positively think the infinite, but we can refuse to think the finite ; and this we do when we say God is infinite.

In the sense now intended, we can apply the term *infinite* to God without any contradiction ; can speak and think of him as a Being, for he is a Being ; as a Person, for he is a Person ; can distinguish him, in thought, from other beings and things, from the created worlds, from Gabriel, from Satan, for he is distinct ; can conceive him, therefore, as a definite, personal existence, possessing intellect, sensibilities, and will. Now, in the strict philosophical sense, all these terms and conceptions are so many limitations and conditions ; and, as such, are contradictory of the infinite ; but, in the sense commonly attached to that term, they involve no such contradiction.

It must be remarked, in justification of the use which Mr. Mansel makes of the term, that it is the sense in which it is employed in the several systems which he is combating, and therefore, very naturally and properly, thus employed by him. In the rational, and transcendental schemes which claim for man the power to know the infinite and the absolute, these terms (not distinguished and contrasted, as with Hamilton) denote the wholly unlimited and unrelated — the sum of all reality. This is the sense attached to the terms by Kant, Wolfe, Spinoza, Hegel, and the rationalists generally. “The metaphysical representation of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality: ‘What kind of an absolute being is that,’ says Hegel, which does not contain, in itself, all that is actual, even evil included?’”

Now it is certainly competent for a critic to hold those whose opinions he controverts, to their own use of terms, and that strictly; and to show that, employing the terms as they do in the present instance, it is impossible, to the human mind, to form any conception of God as infinite and absolute. As against the systems of rational theology, based on the philosophy of the absolute, which he was controverting, we regard the argument of Prof. Mansel as valid. Taking their own definitions, he shows that it is impossible for man to conceive of the infinite and absolute in the sense they intend; and that every attempt to do this, leads to inevitable confusion and absurdity.

The philosophy of the conditioned has been thus far considered with special reference to the ideas of the infinite and absolute. It applies, also, to the idea of *cause*. But here we must be brief. We are under the necessity of thinking, not merely that any given event that may come under our notice has a cause, but that *every* event has, and *must* have, one. This we call the law of causality. We cannot represent to ourselves the possibility of the opposite: the occurrence of any event whatever, without a cause. But why, and whence,

this peculiarity of mental action? Is it an express and positive datum of intelligence, that every event must have a cause; or is it merely the result of our inability to think the unconditioned? The former is the usual answer; Hamilton affirms the latter.

"We cannot know, we cannot think, a thing, except under the attribute of *existence*; we cannot know or think a thing to exist, except as in *time*; and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time, and think it *absolutely to commence*. Now this at once imposes on us the judgment of causality.

"An object is presented to our observation which has phenomenally begun to be. But we cannot construe it to thought, that the object that is *this determinate complement of existence*, had no being at any past moment; because, in that case, once thinking it as existent, we should, again, think it as non-existent, which is, for us, impossible. What, then, can we do — must we do? That the phenomenon presented to us did, *as a phenomenon*, begin to be — this we know by experience; but that the elements of its existence only began, when the phenomenon which they constitute came into manifested being — this we are wholly unable to think. In these circumstances, how do we proceed? There is, for us, only one possible way: we are compelled to believe that the object (that is, the certain grade and quantum of being) whose phenomenal rise into existence we have witnessed, did really exist, prior to this rise, under other forms. But to say that a thing previously existed under different forms, is only to say, in other words, that *a thing had causes*." (Discussions, 581—583.)

According to this view, all apparent commencement of existence must be conceived as merely the evolution of being, out of some previous, into some new, form or mode of existence, the whole quantum of being remaining as before. We can neither conceive the absolute creation, nor the absolute annihilation, of any form or atom of existence; cannot conceive an atom absolutely added to, or absolutely taken from, existence in general. "We are able to conceive, indeed, the

creation of the world ; this, indeed, as easily as the creation of an atom. But what is our thought of creation ? It is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary, creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity. Let us place ourselves, in imagination, at its very crisis. Now can we construe it to thought, that the moment after the universe flashed into material reality, into manifested being, there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its author together, than, the moment before, there subsisted in the Deity alone ? This we are unable to imagine. And what is true of our concept of creation, holds of our concept of annihilation. We can think no real annihilation, no absolute sinking of something into nothing." (Discussions, p. 582.)

To this view of causality, several objections occur. Not to mention the *apparently* pantheistic nature of the theory of creation thus presented, Deity being the sum of existence, and evolving from himself the material universe, so that what is now diffused in space, under the various forms of matter, was once virtually contained in him who is thus the One and All of the ancient philosophies : it may be questioned whether the theory, even if conceded, furnishes a complete explanation of the law of causality. It accounts for the apparent production of existence, but not for the occurrence of change ; whereas, the law of causality applies to all *change* of being, and not merely to the production of being. The apparent production is resolved into change, and the difficulty is thus thrown back one step ; but how shall we account for this change ? This, too, requires a cause. The ice, which presents itself to-day where was water yesterday, is no new existence, we are told, but only the same thing under another form. This we can readily believe. But how came the transformation ? What produced the change ? An oak stands to-day, towering in its majesty and strength, where once an acorn fell. A process of evolution and development has been slowly going on there for a century. Taking to itself whatsoever it needed of carbon, oxygen, or other ele-

ment, from earth, air, water, and the sunbeam, this little germ has evolved, and built itself up into the stately form before us. There is no new material there, nothing which did not, under some other form, previously exist. But whence, we instinctively ask, originated this mysterious process of evolution, and what set it on foot? This is the real question of causality in the case. It is no answer to this question, to say that the elements which now compose the tree, previously existed under some other form; that all apparent beginning is merely evolution of being: the evolution is the very thing to be accounted for.

Again, it may be objected to this theory, that to resolve the law of causality into mere impotence of thought, seems to leave open to question the validity of that law, and of the conclusions based upon it. It is a weakness of our minds that leads us to conceive that every event must have a cause; it is because we cannot think the absolute beginning of anything. If it were not for that, if we could but construe it to thought that the apparent commencement of existence is a real beginning, there would be no necessity for this so-called law. Now it *may be* that this impotence of the human faculties is not the measure and standard of reality. The fact that we cannot *conceive* the absolute commencement, in time, of any portion of existence, does not prove such a commencement impossible, since, by the very philosophy of the conditioned, some things are conceded to be true, which we cannot conceive; nay, we find it equally impossible to think the counter proposition of infinite duration, which we must maintain if one hold to a first Cause of all things, or even to an infinite series of determined causes. Does our inability to conceive infinite duration, prove that also to be impossible? If so, what becomes of our law of causality?

And this leads us to remark that we fail to perceive any reason for the choice of alternative, so far as this theory of causality is concerned. The alternative is the absolute commencement, or infinite non-commencement of existence. Existence takes its rise in time, causeless, groundless, springing from nothing into being, or else in some form it has al-

ways been. The question is, which? One or the other of these counter propositions is and must be true. The former is inconceivable, says Hamilton: we cannot think existence out of being, in either direction, future or past; cannot think that which has actual existence, to have ever had absolutely no existence, in any form; and so we conclude the latter to be the true supposition. But is the latter any less inconceivable? Can we more easily construe it to thought, that a thing shall always have existed, than that it shall begin to exist? Can we conceive infinite duration? By the very first principles of the philosophy of the conditioned, we cannot. Why, then, should we reject the first form of the alternative, on the ground of its inconceivability, rather than the other, on the same ground? Why is it that, practically, all men decide in favor of the latter of the two counter propositions, both and equally inconceivable? There must be a reason for this universal decision of the human mind. Logic can show no reason: she declares that one or the other must be true; but which she knows not, cares not. It is extra-logical, purely psychological, this uniform and universal choice of alternative. The theory which resolves causality into the inability to conceive the unconditioned, seems to us to leave unexplained this great psychological fact.

With all deference to the authority of Sir William Hamilton, and while fully accepting the philosophy of the conditioned in its general principles, we question its applicability to the law of cause. If, however, it is thus applied, would it not have been more in accordance with his own system, and with the demands of the argument, to have presented it in a somewhat modified form? We can neither conceive the absolute commencement, nor yet the infinite non-commencement, that is, infinite duration, of existence; yet, by the law of excluded middle, one or the other of these contradictory propositions must be true. Being must absolutely commence, or being, in some form, must always have existed. In this dilemma observation comes to our aid, and assures us that the apparent beginnings which take place around us, and which at first would seem to favor the supposition of

absolute commencement of existence, are invariably grounded in something lying back of, and giving rise to, these changes ; look where we will, we find no such thing as absolute beginning, but always and everywhere the reverse ; and thus the scale, which, in the hand of simple logic, had hung in even balance, turns now in favor of the proposition, that being, in some form, must always have existed ; in other words, that nothing is uncaused.

The philosophy of the conditioned is applied, also, to the idea of *freedom*. Few words must here suffice. Inasmuch as we cannot conceive the absolute commencement of anything independent, that is, of all previous existence, we cannot, consequently, conceive a cause not itself caused. The will is regarded as a cause ; but, for the reason just stated, it cannot be conceived as an original independent or free cause, a cause which is not itself an effect ; for this would be to conceive an absolute origination. But a cause which is conditioned, determined to its action by other causes or influences, is not a free cause, or a free will. Freedom is, therefore, inconceivable. But so, likewise, is its opposite, necessity ; for it is equally impossible to conceive an infinite non-commencement, an infinite series of conditioned causes, which the latter scheme supposes. Yet, by the laws of thought, of these contradictions, both inconceivable, one must be true : the will must be free, or not free. In this dilemma comes in human consciousness and throws her casting-vote in favor of freedom. We know that we *are* free, though we cannot conceive how.

“ We are unable to conceive an absolute commencement ; we cannot, therefore, conceive a free volition. A determination by motives cannot, to our understanding, escape from necessitation. Nay, were we even to admit as true, what we cannot think as possible, still the doctrine of a motionless volition would be only casualism ; and the free acts of an indifferent are, morally and rationally, as worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined will. *How*, therefore, I repeat, moral liberty is possible, in man or God, we are utterly unable, speculatively, to understand. But practically to *feel*

that we are free, is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability; and this fact of liberty cannot be redargued on the ground that it is incomprehensible; for the philosophy of the conditioned proves, against the necessitarian, that things there are which *may*, nay *must*, be true, of which the understanding is wholly unable to construe to itself the possibility.

“But this philosophy is not only competent to defend the fact of our moral liberty, possible though inconceivable, against the assault of the fatalist; it retorts, against himself, the very objection of incomprehensibility by which the fatalist had thought to triumph over the libertarian. For, while fatalism is a recoil from the more obtrusive inconceivability of an absolute commencement, on the fact of which commencement the doctrine of liberty proceeds, the fatalist is shown to overlook the equal but less obtrusive inconceivability of an infinite non-commencement, on the assertion of which non-commencement his own doctrine of necessity must ultimately rest. As equally unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus theoretically balanced. But practically our consciousness of the moral law, which without a moral liberty in man would be a mendacious imperative, gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the doctrine of fate. We are free in act, if we are accountable for our actions.” (Wight’s *Phil. of Sir W. H.* p. 508—512.)

The only question we should raise respecting this argument, relates to the idea of freedom here implied. Is it essential to a free volition, that it be a volition undetermined by motives? Is a *motiveless* will the only free will? It seems to us that too much is here conceded to the necessitarian. Grant him this, and nothing is easier than for him to show that no such thing as freedom exists, or can exist, in heaven or on earth. Freedom becomes not only *inconceivable*, but *impossible*, on this ground. Neither man nor God possesses any such freedom. To the divine Mind, its own nature, and the eternal fitness of things, are a law; and by this law its action is conditioned. That infinite abhorrence of evil which

dwells ever in the divine Mind and shapes its action, is not itself without a cause. And as to man, who does not know that his choices are influenced and determined by a thousand varying circumstances ; that his very nature, be it what it may, is an ever-present and powerful influence upon his will ; that his reason and moral sense, whether coinciding with or counteracting the impulses of that nature, act also as determining influences ; so that the actual volitions of man are never absolute originations of the will, for which no reason exists, no ground of their being, out of the mere faculty of willing ; but, on the contrary, when we choose, it is always in view of something which influences the choice and which is the reason or ground why we choose as we do. Nor is it possible to choose under other circumstances. Absolute indifference is incompatible with choice. Where there is no preference, there is no choice ; and where no choice, no volition.

Such a freedom as is here supposed is, then, not merely inconceivable, but is neither actual nor possible, whether to God or man. And, accordingly, this is not the freedom for which consciousness gives her casting-vote, when called to decide the vexed question of the will. We are conscious of freedom, but not of the sort of freedom now intended. We know that we are free ; but we also know that our choices are influenced by motives.

While, then, we fully admit the impossibility of *conceiving*, on the one hand, a cause not itself caused ; and, on the other, an infinite series of determined causes, we cannot adopt the idea of freedom here implied ; nor concede that a will under the influence of motives is, for that reason, not a free will.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CHRISTIAN LAW OF SELF-SACRIFICE.¹

BY REV. SAMUEL HARRIS, D. D., PROFESSOR IN BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

It is a German legend, that the emperor Charlemagne comes from his grave, every spring, to bless the land. Up and down the Rhine he walks, flinging his blessing on gardens, vineyards, and fields, to make the seed spring up and to multiply the vintage and the harvest. So the departed good, in the reformations which they effected, in the principles which they taught, in the institutions which they founded, reappear in the scenes of their life-long interest, to quicken every healthful growth, and multiply the ingathering of human joy. And as this Seminary sends out its successive classes, each year scattering its handful of true seed-corn, in the hope that "the fruit thereof shall shake like Lebanon," it is its venerable fathers who reappear, in their abiding influence, and fling their blessing on the churches that they loved and served.

Meeting you, brethren of the Society of Inquiry, as another class are leaving the investigations of your Association for their life-work, our minds naturally go forward, in sympathy, to the coming toils and trials which, as yet, you inadequately understand. In the divine words are mingled joy and sorrow: "He that goeth forth and weepeth, bearing precious seed, shall come again with rejoicing, bringing his sheaves with him." Why, with this promise of sheaves gathered with joy, the vision of tears watering seed sown? Are deeds of beneficence fecundated only when steeped in tears? So, at least, the fact commonly is. Beautiful the vision of a long life in the unruffled enjoyment of

¹ This Article is an address delivered July 31, 1860, at the Anniversary of the Society of Inquiry, in Andover Theological Seminary.

wealth, honor, and refined culture, issuing, through a placid old age, serene into eternity. Not usually such the lives of the world's prophets; but oftener lives of conflict, privation, and peril: the ambition for preëminence satisfied only as Paul's was: "In labors more abundant, in stripes above measure, in prisons more frequent, in deaths oft." You turn with your perplexity to the New Testament, and there find the law of sacrifice propounded by the Lord, as the imperative condition of discipleship: "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me." "Whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple." What then? Is Christianity a system of asceticism? Is humanity only to be denied and crushed by the redemption which promises its perfect development? Does God delight in the sufferings of those who serve him? Is it in indifference to goodness that he leaves the benefactors of men to suffer? These questions touch a topic fundamental in your life-work. Let us pause before you leave these peaceful halls; let us spend this parting hour in considering the Christian law of Self-sacrifice: its ground, its principle, its practical efficacy.

I. The ground of this requirement. Why is it necessary? Not, as is often answered, because the world lies in wickedness, the agencies of benevolence over-tasked, and their resources stinted. These are but the occasions of self-sacrifice, furnished in the economy of God's grace. We must look deeper for the ground of this requirement. And we find that Christianity is essentially a religion of sacrifice. This is sometimes made a reproach. If it is a reproach, it is one which cuts Christianity to the core. But, before considering Christianity as a remedial and redemptive system, it is necessary to consider the supreme moral law of the universe, which Christianity alone has enunciated with completeness and distinctness, and revealed supernaturally as the authoritative will of God; and also to consider the condition of man under this law.

1. The Christian law of self-sacrifice is involved in the supreme and universal moral law. Love is, in its essential

character, sacrificial. The law of self-sacrifice is only the law of love seen on the reverse.

The word *love* is popularly used to denote widely dissimilar mental states : a sensuous appetite, a selfish covetousness, the supreme affection of a holy heart. Thus : " I love an apple," " I love money," " I love God." These all have the common element of desire, and whatever we desire, we are, in popular language, said to love. But love and desire are not synonymous. And, though holy love does not extinguish natural desires, and in one of its phases develops itself in spiritual desires, yet desire is not its distinctive characteristic. Holy love is distinctively characterized by free self-devotement to its object, not by desire for its object. A supreme affection which, when analyzed, is found to be distinctively and essentially desire, must be a supremely selfish affection. Desire seeks possession of the object desired ; love imparts possessions to the object loved. Desire devotes its object to self ; love devotes self to its object. When the supreme affection is essentially desire, the movement of the soul is towards self as a centre, like a whirlpool sucking all things into its own vortex ; when the supreme affection is love, the movement of the soul is from self as a centre, like a fountain pouring itself out in blessing. Love enthrones its object and makes us serve it ; desire seizes its object and makes it serve us. Love adores its object ; desire uses it. Wedded love, devoting to its object the homage of the heart and the service of the hand, is the inspired emblem of holy love ; scornful affection, injurious to the object which it so hotly seeks, is the inspired emblem of sinful desire. The distinctive object of love is a person, who may be honored and served, but cannot be owned and used ; the distinctive object of desire is a thing, a quality, or a truth, which may be owned and used, but cannot be honored and served. God, in the two great commandments, has set apart persons as the objects of love ; but he has left us qualities, truths, things, as legitimate objects of desire : grace and wisdom with which to glorify our souls, earthly things as tools for our use and materials to combine or consume in accomplishing our higher

ends. Love fixing on a thing, a quality, or a doctrine, in exclusive devotement to it and not to persons, would cease to be love, and degenerate into selfish desire. Such self-devotement to a thing, would make its subject a worldling; to a quality of righteousness or a form of service, would make him a pharisee; to a doctrine, would make him a bigot. It would, in truth, be only selfishness inverted, binding self, by the cords of its own desires, a sacrifice to the object which it selfishly sought as a possession. On the other hand, desire, when, uncontrolled by love, it fixes on a person, would make the person a tool, a slave, or a victim.

But it is not only in popular language that these dissimilar mental states are confounded. An American philosophical writer defines love as identical with desire: "That which we love we desire to have present, to possess and to enjoy it. . . . 'The loving an object, and the desiring its enjoyment, are identical.'" ¹ What monstrous systems of Christian ethics must result, when the teachers degrade that which is the noblest possibility of humanity, the love which is the godlike in human character, to a feeling, the definition of which is equally the definition of an epicure's appetite or a miser's greed. It is such love as a wolf has for a lamb, the desire "to have it present, to possess and to enjoy it." It is such love as a gambler has for his victim, the desire to have him present, to possess and to enjoy him. It is not love; it is selfishness, limbed with its myriad desires, like a rapacious giant with a hundred ravening arms. And if your love to God is no more than this, it is selfishness, audacious to seize on God himself, and use him as a familiar to fetch and carry the treasures of the infinite in your service, a Demiurge to make and roll the worlds for you.

Self-devotement is an essential characteristic of love in each of its phases.

Love has always two phases: the receptive and the imparting; the ascending and the descending. We seek something from the object of love, as well as impart to it. These

¹ H. P. Tappan's Review of Edwards on the Will, p. 18.

two phases are popularly designated as faith and love ; but, using the word *love* in the comprehensive sense in which Christ used it, as the general name of all holiness, these must be considered as two phases of love, corresponding to the scriptural distinction of faith and works.

Since the first of these is in its very nature receptive, it may be urged that it cannot be sacrificial. Since it is receptive, it must be accompanied by desires ; even holy love must have its holy aspirations ; and it may be urged that a love characterized by aspiration and reception cannot be sacrificial. A moment's consideration, however, will show the contrary ; the receptive phase of love involves self-devotement ; the desires incident to holy love can exist only by self-abnegation.

Great souls always draw their inferiors to themselves. The founders of schools in philosophy and sects in religion, the authors of reforms and revolutions, the leaders of political parties, the leading minds of a village or a college, draw weaker souls and make them disciples, as certainly as the planets are drawn by the sun, and the moons by their planets. But whenever a man thus becomes a satellite of one greater than himself, there is self-devotement : the man has accepted a master ; he has given his soul into the master's hand, to be informed with opinions and guided in action. This hero-worship, though it is what gives power to every gifted anti-Christ, to gather followers and perpetuate his evil influence, is yet originally good : it is a perverted remnant of the soul's primeval tendency to rise to whatever is higher and better than itself ; for, like Milton's angels,

“ In our proper motion we ascend
Up to our native seat ; descent and fall
To us is adverse.”

So holy love ascends, from sin and weakness, to Christ the deliverer, complete in perfection and mighty to save. Thus manifested, it is faith receiving redeeming grace from his willing hand. But this ascending love is, in its very nature, an act of self-abandonment and self-devotement. In it the

soul accepts its master, yielding its whole being to the plastic hand of the Perfect One, to receive the impress of his thought and will. It is trust in him as Saviour; it is complacency in his character, adoration of his perfections, aspiration to be with him and like him, submission to his authority, loyalty to his person; but, in every manifestation, it is an act of self-surrender to the mighty and gracious one who is drawing the heart to himself.

The same is the characteristic of love descending and imparting—love active in works of beneficence and justice. This needs no argument. As God, when he would save the world, descended to compass himself with humanity, we must go down to the needy and the sinful, to bless them by toiling in their behalf, and giving of what we possess. As Christ died that God might be just, we must endure sacrifices, in allegiance to the right and in vindication of its supremacy.

Love, then, is in its very essence sacrificial, and that in each of its phases. The supreme and universal law of love involves the Christian law of self-sacrifice.

I proceed to consider the condition of man under this law.

2. The second ground of the requirement of self-renunciation is the fact that sin is essentially egoism or self-ism.¹ As love is essentially self-abnegation, sin is essentially self-assertion: a practical affirmation of the absurdity that a created being is sufficient for himself; therefore a repudiation,

¹ We have no word in current usage which satisfactorily expresses the idea. *Egoism* is scholastic, *selfism* is unauthorized, and both are open to the objection that the termination *ism* denotes opinion rather than character. The obsolete word *selfness*, could it be revived, would better meet our want. *Selfishness*, in its common usage, has not a broad enough meaning; it does not denote the rational preference of self as the supreme object of trust, of obedience, of service, and of homage. If used theologically as a definition of sin, it should be explained as having this more comprehensive meaning. The term *self-love* is specifically appropriated by the psychologists. And theologically it seems desirable that the word *love* should be limited to the designation of right affections, in order that holiness and sin may not be designated by the same word.

It should also be observed that this egoism, or selfishness in its broadest sense, is not the self-love of philosophy existing in excess. If so, the difference between holiness and sin is a difference of degree only, and many disastrous errors must result.

by the sinner, of his condition as a creature, and an arrogating, to self, of the Creator's place. It has four principal manifestations, in each of which this essential character appears. It is *self-sufficiency*, the opposite of Christian faith ; in self resources and energies adequate to realize the highest possibilities of the being. It is *self-will*, the opposite of Christian submission : putting the will of self, instead of the will of God, as the supreme law and the supreme providence of the world ; even in philosophy finding no moral law but an autonomy, no moral authority above the sphere of man's own being, no ground of obligation beyond the man's own moral nature. It is *self-seeking*, the opposite of Christian benevolence ; putting self in God's place as the end of all endeavor and the recipient of all service. It is *self-righteousness*, the opposite of Christian humility and reverence, the reflex act of sin ; putting self in God's place as the object of praise and homage. The Gospel, which is to save man from sin, must break down this spiritual primacy of self. It must require self-renunciation.

I proceed to consider Christianity as a remedial and redemptive work.

3. The third ground of the law of self-sacrifice is the fact that redemption — the divine method of delivering man from sin, and realizing the law of love — is sacrificial.

The substance of Christianity is redemption. Its central fact is the historical sacrifice of the incarnation and the cross. The ground-thought which it expresses, is the eternal and immutable excellence of sacrificial love as the divine character ; its eternal and immutable supremacy as the divine law. The ideal which it proposes to realize in the redeemed, is the same sacrificial love. Christianity, therefore, as a fact, as a doctrine, and as a life, is a sacrificial religion. Thus the law of self-renunciation is grounded in the essential character of Christianity.

(1) Christianity *as a fact* is sacrificial. Christianity is not substantially a divine doctrine, but a divine action ; it is not a philosophy, but a redemption ; not a proclamation of divinely authenticated dogmas, but a divine energy supernatu-

rally flowing into the history of man, to redeem him from sin. Of this redemptive action, the historical sacrifice of the incarnate Word is the central fact. The redemptive energy working in the world all flows, in this sacrifice, from God's riven side.

And here is the point of divergence of the two opposite and irreconcilable conceptions of Christianity: the one, with whatever truths, fundamentally wrong; the other, with whatever errors, fundamentally right. If Christ is a teacher only, as the one system teaches, Christianity is a system of philosophy, distinguished from other philosophies only by greater clearness and comprehensiveness. When the deist insists that Jesus borrowed the two great commandments from Moses, that Plato inculcated forgiveness of enemies, that Isocrates taught the golden rule, that Confucius and Zoroaster enunciated Christian precepts,¹ no defence is left us but to show that Jesus was a greater philosopher than they; we are compelled to acknowledge that Tindal had a right to entitle his infidel book "Christianity as old as the Creation." But if Jesus is the God-man, working redemption by sacrifice, as the other system teaches, then Christianity is not a philosophy, not a system of doctrines or ethical precepts, but a divine action, a redemption by God producing a divine life in men. It is made up, not of dogmas, but of facts. It is worthy of remark, that the principle of the former of these systems, on which Liberal Christianity centres, logically ex-

¹ When Christianity is rightly understood, facts like these confirm it. The Bible distinctly asserts that human reason is adequate, without revelation, to discover the moral law, Rom. 1: 20, and 2: 14, 15. When Mr. Buckle affirms "that the system of morals propounded in the New Testament contained no maxim which had not been previously enunciated," he gives his testimony to the truth affirmed by the Metaphysicians and accordant with inspired teaching, that there is a standard of virtue which the human mind, when developed, is sure to discover, and to which, when enunciated and understood, every human being will assent. It must be said, however, that the claims in behalf of heathen philosophy are much too strong. A complete and clear enunciation of the New Testament morality is not to be found in any heathen writer. The moral precepts of those writers are fragmentary; they are mingled with gross errors; and sometimes have a beautiful meaning interpreted into them from Christianity, which the writer never intended and his contemporaries never thought of.

alts doctrines to preëminence, insisting chiefly on "the words of the master;" while the contrasted principle of orthodoxy gives preëminence to the divine action, and the life which it originates.

Christianity, then, being not a philosophy, but a redemption; and consisting, not of dogmas, but of facts; the central fact is a sacrifice: the sacrifice of the Incarnate Son on the cross.

(2) Christianity *as a doctrine*, is sacrificial. The groundthought, which the historical fact of redemption by sacrifice expresses, is the supreme excellence of sacrificial love as a character, and its supreme authority as a law.

In the first place, it discloses to us that God's character—the supreme moral perfection of the universe—is sacrificial love.

If love is in its nature essentially sacrificial, then God's love must be sacrificial by virtue of the fact that it is love. How it is so, is a mystery. God's love never ascends; it cannot be a faith; and in descending love, he cannot literally deny himself. But, in God's love, even as it acts serene and blessed amid the grandeurs of eternity and the glories of the Godhead, the element of self-devotement appears in this, that God always gives, he never receives. God is not an infinite sensitivity, seeking gratification; nor a nature unfolding, according to its own necessary law, under a stimulus from without. God is a person, having the moving spring of his action within himself; by the energy of his own will freely expressing the eternal thought of his wisdom in the self-moved action of his love. As, in the mystery of his infinitude, the perfection of moral agency coëxists with the impossibility of sinning, and his absolute freedom is absolute necessity; so, his love is an activity eternally self-moved and eternally blessed, at once absolute self-devotement and absolute self-satisfaction; and the blessedness of the Godhead is not received from without, but, like the brightness of the sun, is the shining of his love, as it pours forth from within. And here, in this infinite of love, self-moved in its eternal efflux, and blessed without receiving, are possibly the essential attribute and the deepest mystery of the personality of the infinite.

But amid the glories of his eternal love, our finite intellects are blinded by excess of light. What his love is, we know from the incarnation : "being in the form of God, he thought it not robbery to be equal with God ; but stripped¹ himself and took on him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men. And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." This is God's love. It is a mystery indeed ; but every revelation of God, like the veil before the mercy-seat, hides while it reveals him. The incarnation, preëminently the revelation of God, is preëminently the mystery which hides him — the mystery of infinite love, which brings him near, the Redeemer setting up his mercy-seat in the midst of men, and yet makes us most awfully aware of the depths of his incomprehensibleness and the inscrutable solitude of the infinity and eternity which he inhabits.

In the second place, the sacrifice of redemption, as an expiatory sacrifice, presents to us sacrificial love as the supreme law of the universe, and asserts and vindicates its authority. God, in this sacrifice, expresses the eternal authority, the universal application, and the inexorable demand, of this law, and the impossibility of even offering pardon, except in its full satisfaction.

(3) Christianity *as a life* is sacrificial. The ideal which it proposes to realize, in the character of the redeemed, is sacrificial love.

This is true of both faith and works, the scriptural designation of the two prominent phases of human holiness or love, which every right analysis must recognize.

First, it is true of faith. It has already been shown that faith, in its very nature, implies a surrender of self to another. It is love ascending, to a superior, in trust, in aspiration, in adoration, in loyal allegiance. It is love receptive of help from another. The fact that Christianity is redemption through Christ's sacrifice, necessarily brings faith into the foreground of its ideal of a perfect character. It necessitates the doctrine of salvation by faith, and makes faith the

¹ De Wette.

germinant element of the character which it would realize. Christian love, in its nascent state, must be faith. Self-renunciation, therefore, enters fundamentally into the Christian conception of a good man. He renounces confidence in himself. In the consciousness of weakness and ignorance, as a creature, he looks away from himself to God as a helper; in the consciousness of unworthiness and guilt, as a sinner, he looks from himself to God as the Redeemer. He realizes his normal state only as he is in union with God, in Christ; acting in real freedom and true holiness, only as he is acted upon by the divine Spirit.

At this point the Christian ideal of moral perfection differs, not in degree only, but in kind, from the ethical ideal. Morality is founded in self-sufficiency: it proposes an ideal to be realized in self-assertion. The admired ethical system of the stoics is a conspicuous example. It teaches that man's highest law and highest end are within his own being; within himself, also, strength to obey that law and to realize that end; and strength, in seeking that end, to hold himself unruffled by passion and desire within, or by difficulties and enticements without; serene, in the face of pain, bereavement, death, and every conceivable evil. As Horace expresses it:

“ For life and wealth to Jove I'll pray;
These Jove can give or take away;
But for a firm and equal mind,
These blessings in myself I'll find.”¹

Says Schwegler, of the stoic's wise man: “he is exalted above all law and every custom. Even that which is most despicable and base—deception, suicide, murder—he may commit at a proper time and in a virtuous character. In a word, the stoics describe their wise man as a god, and yield him the right to be proud and to boast of his life like Zeus.”²

The same is the essence of all schemes of morality not founded on redemption; schemes which, in different and

¹ “*Haec satis est orare Jovem, qui donat et aufert;
Det vitam, det opes; aequum mihi animum ipse parabo.*”

— Ep. 1:18; 111, 112.

² *Hist. of Phil.*, Seelye's Translation, p. 144.

specious forms have always been current. It is sometimes urged that the popularity of these systems of severe morality disproves the Christian doctrine of human sinfulness. But why should not such a system be popular with sinners? For it is the very gospel of man's sufficiency for himself; it enunciates, as the essential principle of right that which is the essential principle of wrong; it is antagonistic to redemption; and success in realizing its requirements, were it possible, would strengthen the life-principle of sin, and confirm the self-sufficiency which alienates the heart from God. Morality is popular; it is redemption which is scorned. Epictetus is honored; it is Christ who is despised.

Secondly, The same principle of self-abnegation appears in the Christian ideal of the other prominent phase of a holy life, designated in the scriptures as *works*: in love, active in imparting good, discursive to bless mankind, descending to relieve the wretched and to save the sinful. Because Christianity is redemption by Christ's sacrifice, that sacrifice necessarily becomes the type and measure of all Christian love. It is the type: all love is of the same kind, sacrificing self for others — "He laid down his life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." It is the measure: as Christ, being divine, stripped himself of the regal splendors of the divine form, and, in the abasement of humanity, humbled himself to death on the cross; so Christians, being human, must devote — little, indeed, compared with his sacrifice — yet all that a human heart and life can give. The cross, central in redemption, exerts a twofold influence, centripetal and centrifugal. It draws the sinner to itself to look on the holy sufferer "made a curse for us." Then it impels him out into the world, quickened by the same spirit of sacrifice, to toil and suffer to save others; never escaping the attraction of the cross, but moving around it, like a planet around the sun, bearing its light and warmth through the outer darkness of sin.

The sacrificial character of Christianity is sometimes urged as a reproach; it is even objected that the doctrine of redemption by Christ's sacrifice encourages sin by leading men

to trust to the righteousness of another. But the term, applied in reproach, we accept as an honor. Instead of encouraging sin, the sacrificial character of Christianity makes the ideal of moral perfection higher, the authority of the law requiring it more sacred, the motive to obedience stronger — I had almost said, infinitely higher, more sacred, and stronger — than is possible when the sacrificial character of Christ's work is denied. They who deny it have no adequate apprehension of the grandeur of moral distinctions; they do not understand the profound significance of holiness transcending virtue, and of sin transcending vice. On their eyes have not yet opened the loftiest possibilities of human goodness, the godlike sublimity of love, to which the Saviour calls. They cannot be aware that, in sneering at evangelical religion as sacrificial, they sneer at God's love in its most wondrous condescension, and at man's love in its most godlike capability.

From what has been said it is evident that this high ideal, this Christian law of sacrificial love, is not superficial or arbitrary; it is ingrained into the very texture of Christianity; it is the ideal necessarily evolved from the essential character of Christianity.

I can only glance at the fulness and earnestness with which it is enjoined. In the Old Testament, while the sacrifices as such prefigured Christ's vicarious death; as offerings (and those required to be costly — the best of the flocks and the herds, the finest of the wheat) they taught that the spirit of sacrifice must animate the worshipper. In the New Testament, the doctrine is omnipresent as the daylight in the air. It is proclaimed as law. It is propounded as the inexorable condition of discipleship. Here it beams in the examples of saints suffering the loss of all things for Christ; there it glares in the terrible rejection of some rich ruler, who loved property more than Jesus, or of some Demas who forsook him for filthy lucre. Here it smiles in promise: "your Father, which seeth in secret, shall reward you openly;" there it frowns in denunciation: "your riches are corrupted, your garments are moth-eaten, your gold and silver are cankered, and the rust of them shall eat your flesh as it were fire." All, in varied

language, proclaim the law of sacrificial love. "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ," the law which Christ exemplified and vindicated on the cross.

The same ideal is presented in the actual administration of Christ's kingdom. He does not establish it by his visible coming, supernaturally destroying his enemies, and giving his church a toiless victory and an easy reign. That dream is contrary to the fundamental idea of Christianity and to the entire method of its administration. He commits his kingdom to the fidelity of a toiling and suffering church, under the guidance of the Spirit, and permits it slowly to evolve through conflict and self-denial, through alternations of defeat and triumph.

Says Isaac Taylor: "To touch the substantial miseries of degenerate man, is to come within the infection of an infinite sorrow." Jesus was subject to that infection; so are all who labor with him. As he was met by devils crowding the field of action, in numbers and power at no other time paralleled; so always, the more energetic the action of Christ's church, the more terrific the mustering, against her, of the hosts of darkness. The epochs of her triumphs are epochs of Satanic endeavor. As our Saviour, in the very hour of redemption, cried: "this is your hour, and the power of darkness," always the hour of redemption is the hour of the power of darkness. Even the miracle-workers had no permission to work miracles to save themselves from suffering. Able to raise the dead and to control demons, in the advancement of Christ's kingdom, their very handkerchiefs conveying healing virtue to others, they themselves were left under the law of doing good by sacrifice; and, as if no miracle-working power slept within them, were obliged to say: "even unto this present hour we both hunger and thirst, and are naked, and are buffeted, and have no certain dwelling-place."

Thus Christianity as a fact, as a doctrine, and as a life, is sacrificial; and the law of self-renunciation, so fully declared in the Bible, and recognized in the administration of Christ's kingdom, is the ideal of the Christian life, which

necessarily arises from the essential character of Christianity.

4. We may find a fourth ground of the law of self-renunciation, in the constitution of the created universe ; for this is an expression of the same eternal love, which manifests its sacrificial character in Christ.

Here our ignorance does not permit us to construct a complete argument ; but glimpses of the law we can trace. It appears in the natural laws of society : a child is brought into the world by its mother's anguish, and nurtured by parents' toil and suffering. In turn the child grown up, wears out life, perhaps, in nursing a parent through a long sickness, or in the infirmities of age. It is shadowed even in physical arrangements : the dew-drop, which sparkles on a summer's morning, exhales its whole being while refreshing the leaf on which it hangs. When, in the early spring, the crocus lifts its pure whiteness from beneath the reeking mould, when the iris puts on its sapphire crown, when the rose unfolds its queenly splendor, it is as if each graceful form said : "this is all I have, and all I am ; this fragile grace and sweetness — I unfold it all for you." The wild berries nestle in the grass, or droop, inviting, from the vine, as if saying : "this lusciousness is all my wealth ; it is for you." The apples, golden and red, glowing amid the green leaves, seem to be thoughtfully whispering God's own words : "a good tree bringeth forth good fruit." The field submits, without complaint, to be sheared of its yearly harvest mutely waiting the return of blessing at the good pleasure of him that dresseth it ; symbolizing the patient faith of him who does good, hoping for nothing again, except from the good pleasure of God, who is not forgetful to reward the patience of faith and the labor of love ; on the contrary, the land which bears thorns and thistles, though it is allowed to keep its own harvest to enrich itself, yet (emblem of all covetousness) is rejected and nigh unto cursing. The sun walks regally through the heavens, pouring abroad day ; and the stars shining all night, seemingly say : "we are suns ; yet even our opulence of glory we give to others ; our very nature is to shine."

Do not say that this is all fanciful. The creation was cast in the mould of God's love; and each thing bears some impress of the same. Before the solid earth and the ocean were made, before sun or star shone, before chaos, formless and waste, God's eternal wisdom and love filled the void. And when "He spake and it was done," the creative fiat only spoke into finite form some eternal thought of his wisdom, only crystallized into finite realization some definite purpose of his love. Hence everywhere, on land and sea, on the earth and in the star-thronged skies, are traces of that law of sacrifice which expresses the essential character of love. All things that seem otherwise are expressions of love in as yet undeciphered hieroglyphics, the tones of the Father's voice speaking the words of an unknown tongue.

II. The principle or spring of self-sacrifice in the Christian life. This is love itself; a new affection, controlling the life and making the acts of self-denial easy.

Happiness is not bottled up in outward objects—the same definite quantity to be secured by every man who obtains the object. A man's affections determine the sources of his happiness: he finds his joy in what he loves; and is incapable of enjoying its opposite. The scope of a brute's enjoyment is determined for it in its nature; the scope of a man's enjoyment is determined by him in his own free choice. His joys may be angelic; or they may be earthly, sensual, devilish. But when once his heart has fixed on its object, the range of his enjoyment is as effectually limited by his supreme affection as a lamb is, by its nature, shut up to crop the grass, or a hog to wallow in the mire. If he loves God, he is capable of enjoying God; his affection lifts and binds him to God, and enables him to expatiate in the grandeur and blessedness of God's service; like a planet bound, by its own attraction, to the sun, and revolving in a vast orbit in its light. If his heart is on the world, all his desires go out and bind him to the world, like a caterpillar by the viscid threads issuing from its own body, bound, in a filthy web, to the perishing leaf on which it feeds. Nothing, in the half of the kingdom,

could give to Herodias so much happiness as the bloody head of the faithful prophet, who had dared to rebuke her licentiousness. By her revenge, she was shut up to that grim enjoyment as effectually as a tiger, by its nature, to ravening in blood. Nero had the whole known world in his hand, to squeeze it like an orange; and all the sweetness which he could make it yield, was the horrid joy of sensuality and cruelty. If he had had the universe in his hand, as completely as the Roman empire, his character remaining the same, it could have given him no higher joy. The old Friesland chief could see nothing attractive in heaven itself; but when its spiritual character was explained to him, he turned with disgust from the baptismal font, and said: "I would rather feast, with my forefathers, in the halls of Woden, than spend eternity in your starveling Christian heaven." When the heart is fixed on money, or office, or any worldly object, all the desires fasten the soul to that object, as a shell-fish is bound by the wiry fibres of its own being to a rock under the sea; and there, immovably fixed, is capable of no other action than to stretch its slimy feelers, and bring in what it can within its own shell, and digest it into its own cold and sluggish life.

Whether, then, any course of action is to be a source of happiness or the contrary, depends on what the man loves. The upspringing of a new affection, as the love of a first-born child, opens on the soul a new world of joy.

But religion is an affection. It is not a sense of duty, under whose lash the soul creeps through its daily stint of service. It is not prudence, shrewdly sacrificing present joy for future gains, toiling through the gymnastics of Bible-reading and prayer, and getting down nauseous doses of religion, to avert impending death. It is love.

While sinful affection rules the heart, religion comes to the sinner an outward law, bristling all over with prohibitions, and every touch draws blood; it goes against the grain of every desire and purpose; every object which it presents, and every duty which it requires, is repulsive; it is self-denial from beginning to end. Then the sinner is incapable of finding enjoyment in religion; and to bid him enjoy it, is, to use

an illustration from South, as if Moses had bidden the Israelites to quench their thirst at the dry rock, before he had brought any water out of it.

But when the new affection wells up in the heart, all this is changed. A new world of action and joy opens to the man. Religion is no longer an outward law, commanding him against his will ; but an inward affection, drawing him in the way of his own inclination. His hold on o'd sinful objects loosens ; they drop and lie scattered about him, no longer prized ; he easily leaves them for new and purer objects. His gain has become loss ; and his loss, gain. The energies of his being, no longer cramped and crooked in impotence to good, now, in new liberty, walking, and leaping, and praising God, he presses on, exulting in his Maker's service.

This new affection, which is the principle of Christian self-renunciation, is specifically love to Christ, whether existing as faith in him or devotedness to him. We are saved by Christ, not by Christianity. Christianity as a fact, a doctrine, and a life, is all in him. Therefore love to him must be the principle of action distinctive of Christianity, the spring of Christian excellence in every aspect. If religion is submission to authority, or inflexible adherence to the right, or complacency in a holy character, or enthusiasm for an ideal, or benevolence to the needy, it all is involved in love to him, the Supreme Lawgiver, the Just One who died that God might be just, the beauty of the divine perfection, the partaker of humanity who receives service to his redeemed as service to himself.

It is evident, therefore, that Christian self-denial is primarily that first great act of renouncing self in self-devoting love to Christ. It is the surrender of self to Christ in the act of faith. Accordingly, on this the scriptural requirements chiefly centre : " Put off the old man, put on the new." You are liable to think Christian self-denial more than it is ; for you think it a death-shade glooming over the whole Christian life ; a persistent crushing of all life's joys ; whereas, it is simply renouncing self in the surrender of yourself to Christ, which fills life with purer joys and nobler

interests. You are liable to think Christian self-denial less than it is: for you think it is giving some of your property, relinquishing some pleasures, drudging through some duties; whereas, it is immeasurably more than this; it is giving your heart; it is giving yourself. Did Simeon Stylites practise Christian self-denial? No. He renounced earthly goods, but he did not renounce Simeon Stylites. "Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing."¹

It also appears, as to the method of self-denial, that sin is not torn off by force, but drops off through the growth of the new affection; as a man drops his childish plays, not by a self-denying struggle, but because he has outgrown his interest in them. So always self-denial is accomplished, not by a dead lift, but by the spontaneous energy of love.

Hence the preaching of the gospel is not primarily "Renounce self"—as if a man with no new love might by a naked resolution put off his own character, or, to borrow the biblical illustration, as if the Ethiopian might by one desperate leap clear himself from his own skin—but its preaching is, "Look to Jesus," and by faith in him sin will fall away. Thus the Ethiopian does change his skin and the leopard his spots. Thus love always begins in faith, and faith always works by love. And this accords with the scriptural teaching of the impotence of the law and the efficacy of the gospel.

It further appears that self-denial, in the very act of exercising it, is strangely transfigured into self-indulgence; the cross, in the very act of taking it up, is transfigured into a

¹ Perhaps a distinction ought to be made between self-denial and self-renunciation or self-sacrifice. Whenever, for the accomplishment of an object, we forego the gratification of a desire, we may be said to exercise self-denial; but self-renunciation is the renunciation of self as the supreme object of trust, obedience, service, and honor. If this distinction is observed, there may be acts in the spirit of self-renunciation, which have ceased to be self-denial,—like Paul's missionary labors in which he rejoiced. And there may be acts of self-denial when there is no self-renunciation,—like a miser's self-denial in order to hoard. I have not attempted to observe this distinction.

crown. It is a false charge that Christianity, by the severity of its self-denial, crushes human joy. Had you emancipated a slave, who had touched the deepest abasement incident to that system of iniquity, and had become contented with his slavery; had you educated him and opened to him opportunity of remunerative industry, so that he is now incapable of being happy in slavery, and shudders at his former contentment, would you feel guilty of crushing his happiness, or pity him for the sacrifice which he has made? But he did sacrifice the joys of slavery; yes, and gained the joys of freedom. An emblem this of the sacrifice which Christianity requires. The joys of sin are sacrificed, the joys of holiness are gained; the snow-birds are gone, but the summer songsters are tuneful on every spray within the soul as it bursts into leaf and blossom beneath the returning sun. All religious services once repulsive, prayer and praise formerly frozen words rattling like hail around the wintry heart, all works of beneficence once clashing to the selfish soul, all are now transfigured into joy. Under the power of the new affection, what was once self-denial accords with the inclination; the soul has become incapable of enjoying its former sins, and regards it as self-denial to return to them, shuddering at them as an emancipated slave at his contentment in slavery, as a reformed drunkard, in the enjoyment of virtue, of home, and plenty, at his former hilarious carousals. Only so far as sin yet "dwelleth in us" is the service of Christ felt to be a self-denial or recognized as a conflict.

But it will be objected that the innocent, natural desires, must be denied in Christ's service. After love has made religious duties pleasant, we are obliged, in Christ's service, to forego the gratification of natural desires, and to give up comforts, property, and sometimes life. Are these sacrifices also transfigured into joy? So the fact seems to be. Missionaries apparently get more enjoyment out of life than any other class of men. Paul gloried in tribulation. His contemporaries took joyfully the spoiling of their goods. No books were ever written under trials more appalling than

those which attended the writings of the apostles; yet no books breathe a more joyful spirit than these. Even martyrs have been joyful at the stake. This arises from love to Christ. Love to a person makes it easy to toil for him. Enthusiasm for a cause makes it easy to endure privation and to face danger for that cause. So love to Christ, and enthusiasm in his cause, makes toil easy and burdens light.

Here, in justice, it should be said, that self-denial of this kind is incidental to all worldly business, not less than to the service of Christ. Can you attain any great object without sacrifices? Is the enterprising merchant, the successful lawyer, or physician, a man of luxurious ease? Merchants, in foreign commerce, sacrifice home and the blessings of civilized society, as really as do missionaries. Merchants and scholars often sacrifice life in the energy of their action. Nay, Sin itself requires this sort of self-denial. Drunkards eagerly and knowingly sacrifice property and health to their cups. A sailor, who had been flogged, when released grasped the mate in his arms and sprang overboard with him, sacrificing his own life to his revenge.

It follows, from the foregoing views, that they who enter deepest into the spirit of Christian self-renunciation, are least aware of sacrificing anything for Christ. The more intense the love, the less account of service rendered to the beloved; as Jacob heeded not the years of toil for Rachel through his love for her. This is illustrated in worldly passions. The reason why men of business are scarcely aware that they deny themselves, is, that they are so intent on their objects; therefore they make no account of toil and privation to attain it. The raging of appetite makes easy the sacrifice of property and health in drinking; the fierceness of revenge makes it sweet to offer life in its gratification; the greed of avarice makes the miser glory in his rags, as Paul gloried in his tribulation. Love to Christ, and enthusiasm in his cause, produce the same oblivion of sacrifices made for him. They who deny themselves most are least aware of it. Great deeds of Christian love are done

in unconsciousness. And this is precisely what Christ requires in the command: "Let not your left hand know what your right hand doeth." It does not require you to keep your good deeds secret from others; it is of no consequence whether others know them or not. It requires you to keep them secret from yourselves. Be so full of love that you will take no note of the sacrifices to which love inspires you.

Love to Christ, then, is the spring of all acts of self-denial. Love much, serve much. When the tide is out, no human power can lift the great ships that lie bedded in the mud. But when you see the leathery bladders of the sea-weed swinging round, and bubbles and chips float past you upwards, then you know that the tide is turned, and the great ocean is coming to pour its floods into the harbor, to make the ships rise "like a thing of life," to fill every bay and creek and rocky fissure with its inexhaustible fulness. So you may see toils and sacrifices of Christian service seeming too great for your strength; yet if your affections are beginning to flow to Christ, and your thoughts and aspirations are turning to him, these are indications that love is rising in your hearts, with the fulness of God's grace behind it, to fill every susceptibility of your being with its divine fulness, and lift every burden buoyant on its breast.

Here we see the fundamental difference between asceticism and Christian self-renunciation. Asceticism is a suppression and denial of the soul's affections; Christian self-renunciation is the introduction of a new affection displacing the old. The former is a negation of the soul's life; the latter a development of a new and higher life. The former produces a constrained performance of duty, a restraint of desires which do not cease to burn, a sad resignation to necessary evils; the latter produces a new affection which makes duty coincide with inclination, quenches contrary desires, and quickens to positive joy in the accomplishment of God's will. The former, by perpetual constraint, makes a *free* life impossible; the latter brings the will into

coincidence with reason, and ultimates in real freedom, in which obedience to God is unhindered by any opposition from within the soul; the man spontaneously following all his impulses is equally following the requirements of reason, and law disappears and conscience ceases to command amid the quicker and coincident impulses of love. The former, by its self-mortification, makes a *full* life impossible, and goodness becomes a mere negation of sin; the latter, opening a new love, develops life in its utmost fulness, gushing in inexhaustible springs of thought, energy, and joy. The former is founded on the error that the suffering and self-mortification of his creatures are in themselves acceptable to God; the latter on the truth that God delights in the full development of his creatures in life, energy, and joy. The former, therefore, heaping suffering on self to gain the favor of God, is in reality, not Christian self-renunciation, but only a self-righteousness; a form of the self-sufficiency which is the essence of all sin.

Hence, what is needed to unfold the spiritual life, is not necessarily affliction and sorrow, which of themselves are equally fitted to sour the soul or to crush it in despondency; but the discipline, whether of adversity or prosperity, which develops love as a living principle of energy and joy.

III. The practical importance of the Christian law of self-renunciation in individual development and social progress.

When Christ said: "Whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant," he simply announced a fundamental principle of the Christian scheme, that greatness can be realized only by service; that man's highest development is attained only by self-abnegation. What he meant by being a minister and a servant he intimated in those most touching words which he immediately added: "Even as the Son of Man came, not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give his life a ransom for many."

The contrary method is popular at the present day, in the

current philosophy which, with various names and forms, proposes to man his own worthiness as his highest end, and promises to realize it by self-assertion. It is this which has drawn the crowds to the Music Hall in Boston. Says Theodore Parker: "If I wished to teach the nobleness of man, the Old Testament and the New were there with dreadful condemnations of human nature. * * * There was no virtue but the scriptures could furnish an argument against it."¹ Proposing to insure human progress by a philosophy of self-sufficiency and self-assertion irreconcilably antagonistic to the Christian system of sacrificial redemption and self-abnegation, it is not surprising that he found the Bible opposing at every point his methods of inculcating human virtue. The same is the vital principle in the philosophy of Carlisle—a self-asserting stoicism declaring, "If Hell must be dared, it must;" and defiantly challenging for self the power to meet in serenity and triumph all the evils which may assail it from earth or hell, in time or through eternity. It is the essential principle of the infidel political philosophy which underlies the Red Republicanism of Europe, and is penetrating American politics, and displacing the political philosophy of the Puritans. It is proclaimed by Spiritism in the alleged revelation that self-love is the essence of all virtue. It is boldly carried to its legitimate consequences in Secularism—the Working-men's atheism of England; for the fundamental principle of Mr. Holyoake and Mr. Holdreth is, that the purest morality can be realized without the idea of God; and there being no need of the idea, either to interpret our moral convictions, or to realize our moral perfection, it should be quietly dismissed from the mind; so that it is hardly extravagant to say that the spirit of the nineteenth century finds its truest utterance in the mad words of Heinrich Heine: "I am no child; I do not want a heavenly father any more."²

¹ Experience as a Minister, p. 63.

² So Satan speaks:

"For who can yet believe, though after loss,
That all these puissant legions, whose exile
Hath emptied heaven, shall fail to reëscend
Self-raised and repossess their native seat."—*Paradise Lost*, B. 2.

In opposition to this, I affirm that individual development and social progress depend on the Christian law of self-renunciation. The primal promise of the Arch-Deceiver was in accordance with the infidel philosophy : " Ye shall be as gods knowing good and evil." It promises participation in the divine, but the ideal of divinity is intellectual power, and the means of realizing it is self-indulgence ; it promises realization to the deepest desire of human selfishness, the aggrandizement of self by the acquisition of whatever it covets. The gospel also promises participation in the divine : " Ye may be partakers of the divine nature ;" but the ideal of the divine is the sacrificial love of Christ ; and self-renunciation, not acquisition and self-indulgence, the method of realizing it.

Recurring again to the two phases of a right character, the receptive and the imparting, or faith and works, compare, as to their practical efficacy in developing each of these, the Christian scheme of self-abnegation and redemption, and the infidel scheme of self-assertion and self-sufficiency.

1. As to the receptive phase of character, or Faith.

Here the aim must be to realize a character marked by reverence for superior power, wisdom, and goodness, and trust in the same ; humility, in the consciousness of sin and need ; aspirations for the true, the beautiful, and the good ; loyalty to superior authority ; and that peculiar courage in the vindication of truth and right which springs from loyal confidence in a leader powerful in their defence.

This side of a holy character necessarily receives immediate and large development in the Christian scheme of redemption by Christ's sacrifice and salvation by faith in him. It presents the objects of trust, reverence, aspiration, and loyalty, not as abstractions, but concrete in the personal Christ ; and thus introduces the peculiar and overpowering motive of Christianity, affectionate trust in Christ as a personal Saviour. It is objected to evangelical doctrine that, in its zeal to exalt God, it abases and extinguishes the man. But it is the method of man's exaltation. It discloses God

coming near to us in the suffering and sympathizing Redeemer; it draws the soul to God with invitation and promise, to be quickened, purified, and beatified by his transforming grace; it teaches man to trust his Maker as a friend; it teaches man that his normal state is a state of union with him—acting with the highest freedom and power only when acted on by him, and finding bondage and weakness, as well as sin, in alienation from him; it awakens reverence for the divine power, wisdom, and goodness in Christ, and aspirations to be like him; it produces obedience to the law, not as a submission to an abstract proposition, but as a trustful loyalty to the personal Saviour; and in the recognition of God's electing love, individualizing and eternal, makes every one who trusts him fearless to stand up for truth and right, one with God against the world. Thus is developed a character beautiful with reverence, with lofty aspiration, with loyalty, with courage to maintain the right, springing from confidence in "the Captain of our salvation." This phase of Christian character finds its expression in worship.

The philosophy of self-assertion has no legitimate place for this class of virtues. Consequently, carried out it cannot recognize them as virtues, but must leave them to be despised as weaknesses or defects; like those ancient languages which give no name to humility and its family of virtues, and name virtue itself not godliness but manliness. It has given us the pregnant maxim that work is worship, in which it expresses its inherent destitution of the element of faith, and declares that the only availing prayer is our own endeavor.

But the impossibility of realizing a perfect character, without this class of virtues, is too apparent to admit of their total exclusion. Says Arnold: "It is necessary to the highest development of the soul that it should have somewhere an object of reverence enthroned above all doubt or criticism." This even the philosophy of self-assertion has been obliged to acknowledge, and to offer what substitute it can for the Christian's God. It offers humanity-worship—

hero-worship. It bids us honor the worthies of the past. It bids us combine in an ideal the excellencies which have been exhibited in history. It bids us create divinities of shadows — idols compacted of the vanished virtues and fading memory of the dead — divinities without being or life, without authority to command, or mind to know, or mercy to help. These be thy gods; before these learn thy own imperfections; let these kindle thy aspirations for good; let these animate and strengthen thee in thy conflict with evil. Oh, folly profound! oh, madness of unsanctified thought! — to send men, with the Chinese, to worship their own grandfathers; to kindle at these shrines aspirations for truth, beauty, and goodness, which go out like the gilt paper burned without heat at those heathen graves; to launch under these auspices philanthropic enterprises, pretentious in promise and impotent in performance as the miniature boats annually launched by the Japanese on a voyage to the spirits of their ancestors, the wrecks of which strew all the coast before the sun goes down; — to attempt to save men by these pale meditations, and not by faith in Christ; not by the sacrificial love of God in him; nor by the warmth of his compassion on the cross, and the glow of his eternal justice, manifesting the beauty of love and upholding its authority as law; nor by the pulsations of his grace beating in divine influences on the hearts of men.

2. I proceed to consider the practical efficacy of these contrasted schemes in the sphere of *works*; in the development of active and imparting love, of the energies of a wise philanthropy.

Here it is unnecessary to add to what has already been adduced to show that Christianity is effective in this direction. Accordingly the history of the church is crowded, like the evening sky with stars, with missionaries, confessors, reformers, martyrs — self-devoted workers for the welfare of men — heroes of sacrificial love; and the progress of Christianity has been followed by the amelioration of the condition of society, and the introduction of the benign institutions and customs peculiar to Christian civilization.

The legitimate result of the contrary scheme would be the development of a common-place selfishness, or at best of a heroism of self-aggrandizement, the frequency of which in history makes it also common-place. In the current theories of human progress, however, this principle with its legitimate consequences is not presented naked, but under the disguise of philanthropy. Humanity or society is the object of human service; and we are challenged to show wherein this philanthropy differs from self-devoting Christian love. Time forbids a full examination of this peculiar birth of modern civilization, this strange hybrid, gotten from the ethics of Christianity by the philosophy of infidelity.

It would be easy to show that by denying redemption it obliterates the grandest motives to self-sacrificing love and overlooks the divine grace which alone quickens the human heart to its exercise.

It would be easy to show that it belittles our conception of humanity: for to make humanity the end of service is a conception immeasurably inferior to that which recognizes humanity itself as existing for God's glory, its whole history taken up into redemption, exalted to divine relations, and invested with divine grandeur. When redemption disappears, the dimensions of the moral universe shrink, as at the disappearance of the modern astronomy the starry heavens would dwindle into a crystal dome spangled with brilliants. In the same proportion would all human rights and obligations dwindle, and the criminality of violating them would be lessened.

It would be easy to appeal to the history of such philanthropy from the first French revolution until now, and show the advocacy of human rights issuing in the Reign of Terror; in successive and fruitless convulsions of society; in agrarianism; in the demand that government provide bread for the people; in schemes of socialism that lose the individual in the organization; in reforms that degenerate into agitation, as Walton says: "Whetting the knife till there is no steel left to make it useful;" in philanthropy avowing hostility to the churches and the Bible; in benevolent movements

in which the rust of denunciation and hate has eaten out all the benevolence, and love to all mankind is preached by Ishmaelites whose hands are against every man's hand.

But leaving these considerations I confine myself to this single suggestion: the self-abnegation involved in the sacrificial character of Christianity is the only effectual preservative of the personal rights of the individual in his devotement to the service of the race. An ungodly philanthropy has two distinct and seemingly incompatible developments, each of which is continually appearing in its history. If the self-sufficiency which is at the bottom comes practically into prominence, we have an exaggeration of the individual; theories of human rights levelling all organizations and legitimatizing anarchy; reformers whose type is that ancient righter of wrongs who said: "though I fear not God neither regard man, yet because *this widow troubleth me*, I will *avenge her*;" reformers who, acknowledging no need of being redeemed, unconsciously offer themselves as redeemers of man. On the other hand, if the idea of service to humanity becomes practically prominent, the inevitable peril is of overlooking the individual's personal and inalienable individuality, and of recognizing him, not as a free and Christ-like benefactor, but only as a slave or tool of society. For the Christian doctrine being set aside, the only philosophy which gives a basis for this law of service is either Pantheism, which recognizes conscious deity only in humanity, and the individual only as an atom in the mass, a specific and transitory development of the genus; or the Positive Philosophy, not rising even to the dignity of Pantheism, which engraves at its entrance that man must cease to claim to be the lowest of the angels, and be content with being the highest of the beasts — an inscription over the portal of this dreary philosophy parallel in significance, if thoughtfully read, to that which Dante read over the gate of Hell:

"All hope abandon ye who enter here."¹

Both of these philosophies destroy the significance of the

¹ *Lasciate ogni speranza voi ch' entrate.*

personality of the individual; the individual exists in and for the race; he is developed out of the race and exists, like the individual brute or vegetable, merely as the vehicle of perpetuating the race. The individual, therefore, can have no personal and inalienable rights, but is to be used or even sacrificed for the service of the race. Accordingly in Comte's scheme for the reorganization of society this principle is relentlessly carried out. The individual has no rights; all rights belong to society. The individual is the creature and tool of society. Society determines for him in childhood to what uses he is adapted; society educates him, not into a man, but into an artisan, not with reference to his individual development, but for his social uses; and society relentlessly uses him as a tool. Thus this philanthropy, which begins in great sounding words, exalting humanity as the object of worship and service, in its essential principle belittles the race, and in its practical application extinguishes the individual.

How grandly, in contrast, Christianity develops universal love, in its divine activity, and yet upholds the individual in his divine dignity. The Christian surrenders himself, without reserve, to God his Creator and Redeemer; and, in love to him, freely devotes himself to the service of his fellow men, a worker, together with God, in the sublime work of renovating the world; a worker, with God, in designs so vast, that the very conception of them ennobles; in enterprises so godlike that laboring in them lifts to a participation in the divine. He is no longer the tool of society, but its Christ-like benefactor. The very fact that he kneels in entire self-surrender to God, forbids abjectness to man. He will not kneel to man, but he will die for him.

3. Besides the efficiency of these schemes in developing the different phases of character, I must consider their efficacy in developing the natural powers of thought, action, and enjoyment.

Here we meet the objection that man cannot be developed by negation and suppression; and that self-denial, being a suppression of the soul's life, cannot develop it. But this

objection is already sufficiently answered ; for it has been shown that self-denial is not a negation, but the reverse side of a positive affection. Its power to develop is continually exemplified. It is commonly remarked, for instance, that an unusual proportion of missionaries, of both sexes, exhibit eminent powers. The reason is found in the efficacy of the discipline of Christian self-denial to invigorate and develop the soul.

And here is a mistake of the scholarly divine who has followed Unitarianism till he has found no more road ; and, recoiling from the inane of rationalism, has announced to the world his discovery. It is not true that the developing power is the centrifugal, which in self-assertion drives the man away from God, while the centripetal, which draws him to God, is antagonistic to development.¹ It is not true, that man, even in savage or infantile lack of development, is "scorched and shrivelled in the glory of God's presence." It is not true, that the church and the world are coördinate factors in salvation, "the one making the man, the other saving him ; one giving him a being to be saved, and the other putting salvation into his being." The church and the world are, as the scriptures represent, antagonistic, not coördinate. Each develops the natural powers ; but the development which Christianity effects in self-abnegation, is the normal, harmonious, and complete development of man.

Here, then, I must contrast the two types, of progress and of civilization, which the two are fitted, respectively, to produce.

(1) In the sphere of intellect, the one gives us rationalism and scepticism ; the other, faith and stability. The one begins with affirming that human reason is adequate to attain the knowledge of God, without revelation, and ends by declaring that it is inadequate to know anything, and that all religion must be, like that of Rabelais, "a great perhaps ;" the other begins with acknowledging the inadequacy of reason without revelation, and abides in the stability of true knowledge or unwavering faith, awed before the great mys-

¹ Dr. Bellows's *Suspense of Faith*, p. 21.

teries of existence; yet believing, and enriched, and ennobled, by the faith. The one asserts the right of private judgment, to the extent of rejecting all creeds and condemning institutions and ordinances, thus repudiating the wisdom of the past and stripping the novice to begin the elements of religious knowledge in the *puris naturalibus* of barbarism; the other receives the wisdom of the past, and thankfully accepts the helps of its creeds, its systems, and its institutions. The one claims a mental independence which fructifies in a perennial crop of crudity and self-conceit; and, in questioning old truths, mistakes vanity for originality, bravado for courage, and haste for progress; the other, looking to God's Word and Spirit for light, is content with fewer discoveries but more truth, with less novelty but more wisdom.

(2) In the sphere of social life, the one develops the outward activity, the other the inward resources. The one stimulates grasping and self-aggrandizement; the other, the spiritual life. The one is concerned with what a man gets; the other, with what he is. The one is adequate to make man develop a continent; the other, to develop himself and the continent. Hence the spirit of self-assertion, while it stimulates to indomitable activity, quickens inventions, and multiplies the instruments of action and the means of enjoyment, leaves the man restless and unsatisfied: it builds the house, but cannot create a home; it fills the house with "all the modern improvements," but not with domestic bliss; it multiplies facilities for business, and makes the man a Sisyphus in conducting it. Let me present Paul and Napoleon as examples of these two types of development. Look at them in their years of imprisonment; when, thrown wholly on themselves, they disclosed what they really were. Napoleon was querulous and morose, unhappy and weak. Deprived of the objects of his ambition, his soul could not stand alone, but sunk like a rank weed, which, when its support is removed, falls and trails in the dirt. Paul's imprisonment interrupted plans of action as vast as Napoleon's and as earnestly prosecuted; it was longer than the emperor's, and incomparably more severe. Immured within a prison, en-

during the discomforts of a sea-voyage, in a crowded ship; or, in Rome, with one hand chained, day and night, to a soldier; how self-poised and firm, how full of grandeur and dignity, how serene, and often triumphant! who can read his letters and not see the grandeur of his soul?

(3) In the sphere of political life, the one insists on freedom, the other on justice, mercy, and reverence for God.

The love of personal freedom is a natural feeling, consistent with selfishness. It is stronger in the savage than in the civilized man. A political system built on this is a system of pure self-assertion. It is consistent with it that those who boast their own love of liberty should hold slaves, or that the government should be an oligarchy of the few tyrannizing over the many. But Christianity lays at the foundation of the political system the sentiment of justice. The former, in the spirit of self-assertion, teaches me to insist on my personal freedom; the latter, in the spirit of self-renunciation, on duty and right. The former gives us the shallow and dangerous watchword of the French Revolution, "liberty, equality, fraternity;" the latter gives us the maxim of inspiration, "justice, mercy, and humility, or reverence before God." The former understands "the rights of man" to mean *my* rights and *your* duties; the latter recognizes the doctrine as equally including *your* rights and *my* duties.

Hence two opposite theories of human rights, both equally opposed to the divine right of kings,—a theory which, though it may, as in the British Constitution, secure the liberty of the subject, yet recognizes every right as a privilege granted by the sovereign, and thus asserts his absolute supremacy,—yet both as much opposed to each other. The Christian doctrine of human rights agrees with the British Constitution in recognizing the rights of the citizen as privileges, but privileges not granted to a few or to a class by the sovereign, but granted and guaranteed to all men by God, to be exercised in reverent allegiance to him, and in submission to the government which he has ordained. This foundation of human rights is explicitly stated in the Amer-

ican Declaration of Independence. The theory of the French Revolution, on the contrary, does not recognize human rights as grants from any superior, but as inherent in the individual in his natural liberty or wildness, and having neither authority nor guaranty above the man himself. Some of these rights are surrendered to the government in the fiction of the social contract, and this is the sole foundation of governmental authority. Thus absolutely the highest source of law and authority is the will of the people. Liberty thus founded is necessarily atheistic in principle and ungodly in practice. It engenders fever rather than growth, revolutions and convulsions, rather than the steady uplifting of the people by their actual improvement in intelligence, character and capacity. It produces convulsive alternations between despotism and anarchy, instead of real progress. By teaching that the supreme authority of government is the consent of the governed, and that the will of the people is the highest law, it first engenders a defiant recklessness of God, and then undermines the authority of government itself; beginning with making human law higher than God's, and ending in making it subject to the caprice of the mob, and suspending its enforcement on the varying breath of public sentiment. It extinguishes reverence, and causes the very idea of loyalty to disappear from the mind. It begets disobedience to parents, insubordination to law, and contempt towards superiors in age, wisdom, or goodness. It begets a hard, defiant, swaggering character, and makes the very boys exhibit the irreverence of a Mephistopheles, though without his culture and refinement, the recklessness of a Hotspur, though without his chivalrousness.

Thus contrasting the results, we see that only the Christian doctrine of self-renunciation is efficient to secure the healthy development either of the individual or the race.

Brethren of the Society of Inquiry, I have shown you the grounds, the principle, and the practical efficacy of the Christian law of self-renunciation. Have your souls faltered before the mysterious fact that under the government

of God it costs sorrow and sacrifice to do good? To explain it we now feel no need of resorting to the hypothesis that no God governs the world; or if any, the God of the iron foot, who crushes living souls beneath his bloody tread as recklessly as he splits the oaks with his thunderbolts, or scatters the rose leaves with his winds. No. Our doctrine discloses a more profound philosophy. God exercises his children in self-denial, that they may become strong in Christ-like love; he is educating them by sacrificial toil to possess a Christ-like character and glory, to be capable of Christ-like achievements of mercy.

The law which calls you to self-sacrifice is severe, not exempting life, if its sacrifice is needed; it is inexorable, but it is not arbitrary. Only in it can the essential character of Christianity find expression; only by it can you realize the highest possibilities of your being. Do you complain of the hard requirement? But were it abated, it would only be so much abated from the divine excellence of Christianity, so much abated from the God-like character to which you are called, so much detracted from the divine beauty and power of love. It would unsettle the two great commandments, stain the great words of revelation, "God is Love," eviscerate redemption of its significance, change the character of Christ's kingdom, dim the glory of heaven, and let in night on the eternal day.

Go forth, then, serene but earnest, to your Master's work, rejoicing that he has counted you faithful, putting you into the ministry, thankful if you are counted worthy to suffer for his name.

ARTICLE V.

REVIEW OF PALFREY'S HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND.¹

BY REV. RALPH EMERSON, D. D., FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY, ANDOVER, MASS.

MANY will unite with us in the belief that any good history of New England is better for the great purposes of Christian education than any other uninspired literature. By Christian education we mean, not simply the acquisition of knowledge, however diversified and important, nor simply the right training of the intellect, but also and chiefly the right training of the heart and the shaping of the grand principles and purposes of life; in a word, it is such a training as is best fitted to form immortal minds for all the purposes for which God has made them. If one is to form himself for splendid military achievements, let him adopt, like Charles XII. of Sweden, the life of Alexander as his favorite book. But if he is to aim at a crown that will never fade, a kingdom that cannot be shaken, let him first of all select the only book of infallible instruction on the nature of that kingdom and the way to secure it, and next, the book which gives the best account of the most earnest, protracted, successful attempts ever made to emulate, not an Alexander or a Caesar, but those higher characters whose names are enrolled in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, who out of weakness were made strong, subdued kingdoms, turned to flight the armies of the aliens, counted not their lives dear unto themselves; of whom the world was not worthy.

And where, among uninspired annals, shall we find this best book for the purpose? Where, but in the history of

¹ History of New England. By John Gorham Palfrey. Vols. I. and II., pp. 636 and 642. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.

the early settlement of this country by the Puritans? They, of all men since the days of the Apostles, both professedly and really took the Bible without note or comment for their guide, their law, and the charter of their hopes.

It has been slanderously said of them that they instituted a theocracy. None but God himself could institute a theocracy. But while the Puritan immigrants never pretended that God ruled them by miraculous indications of his will, they did believe in the guidance of his Providence and Spirit to those who properly sought it; and they did (the most formally in the New Haven Colony) avouch the laws which God had already given in his word as their supreme guide, to be applied wherever applicable in the letter and everywhere in their spirit. And this it is — adopted and carried out so conscientiously and so long by the state, the church, the family, the individual — precisely this, that made the Puritans what they were, and their early descendants what they became.

And be it so, that they made some mistakes in applying God's laws; it was a thousand times better than to have no *higher law*. The mistakes were as nothing. And even these few mistakes now serve as warnings. It was the very experiment needed. The world had never seen the like. And for it God had reserved this vast continent, away across the wide Atlantic; and for planting it with choice seed he "sifted three kingdoms."

The experiment came at the right time. Literature, commerce, enterprise, had been roused. Constantine, thirteen centuries before, had combined church and state; and this dark and ever darkening combination of heathen and Jewish polity had for all time wrought out its warning results; results far better yet to be understood by both church and state.

But for these high purposes of Christian training we must have a just and not a false or distorted history. Yet we grieve to say, that perhaps of no other people on earth has there been more of distorted history, — absolute caricature. Now it is in the shape of low ridicule; anon it is a libel on

their motives for emigration; and then a malignant falsification of the facts; and this from the period of the base tampering with the text of Clarendon, the historian of the rebellion in England, down to our own day.

Judge, then, of our joy over every new history of the right stamp pertaining to this people. It is even greater than our bitter grief over the abortive or misguided attempts to portray those eventful scenes and rare characters. For the one, like the munition of rocks, shall stand the earthquake and the fire; the other, like the house upon the sand, will disappear at the first inundation. And in these times of research, bringing out from the treasuries things new and old, the waters shall soon overflow the hiding-places of the prevaricators. How marvellously, for instance, has the unveiling of the corruptions of the text of Clarendon, about one age ago, reversed the moral estimate of the reading world in regard to Cromwell. No longer detested as a hypocrite, bigot, fanatic, and ambitious usurper, "damned to everlasting fame," he is now lauded by multitudes as among the truest of patriots as well as the greatest of generals.

The lessons of experience cannot easily be overestimated. They may be perverted, or imperfectly taught, and then they may only "lead to bewilder." Or they may be relied on to accomplish by their own force what nothing but the Almighty grace of the divine Spirit can effect, the renovation of the heart of sinful man. But as *a means* to this most exalted end, and as a moral cause to all other high ends in human society, where is the man that has exaggerated their importance?

The teachings of experience are alike important to man in every relation of life. From the necessity of the case, human society at its commencement, was destitute of this guide; and the speedy consequence was a total wreck. Notwithstanding the tremendous admonitions of her Creator, the woman, *being deceived*, was in the transgression. If, in addition to this warning, her eye had been directed to the fatal lapse of some other being like herself, and to the executed penalty, she might not have been deceived into the

belief that she should not surely die, and so she might not have fallen. But from the hour when the curse was actually pronounced on the three offenders, sad experience has been accumulating its refutations of that first lie in Eden, and all its subsequent repetitions. And, although our race are still sinners, yet the accumulating evidence that the way of transgressors is hard, has an increasing power as a means of reformation. Knowing the terrors of the Lord we persuade men.

And so with nations. It has not been utterly in vain that the flood came and destroyed all the giants in sin by whom the earth was so early filled with violence; not utterly in vain the dispersion of the rebels at Babel, the destruction of Sodom, the drowning of Pharaoh and his hosts, the calamities brought by their sins on God's ancient people, the rise and ruin of the four kingdoms of antiquity; nor, in a word, is it in vain, nor is it to be in vain, that one form after another of national sins has risen, and all have been followed by the curse they naturally bring. Neither is it in vain that one form after another of religious error, has sprung up, flourished like the green bay tree, and passed away. Had Mohammed never blasted the earth like the sirocco of his own deserts, the Mohammedanism of our own land and age might now have been in full career towards universal domination over the lives and consciences of men. Had French atheism never had its bloody day, not simply Paris, but every capital in Christendom might now have been on the eve of a Reign of Terror. The peril might have lurked just where many a peril is now doubtless lurking to all that is precious in this world and the future—in that wily pantheism which, like the atheism of Voltaire and the Illuminati, sneers at everything Puritan, whether of doctrine, or worship, or practice, as "behind the age," and which is promising mountains of bliss to the nations, in a freedom from the Sabbath and all religious superstitions.

Or, again, if religious persecution had come only from infidels and the heathen, and neither Rome nor any other Christian power had ever lighted a fagot, what should we

now have been left to expect? Provided Austria or any other secular power shall again place the Pope in a condition to shed the blood of non-conformists, what torrents of blood might not be expected, had not experience already taught the futility and wickedness of such a course? If religious persecution is about the very worst thing in the universe, it is, at the same time, about the most plausible, aside from experience. For shall we be commended for defending ourselves with fire and sword against pirates and all who kill the body, and shall we not lift a weapon against those who would destroy both soul and body in hell? So men reasoned for a thousand years. The Puritans and some of the Dutch Protestants well-nigh learned a better logic — not persecution, but toleration — from the things that they suffered.

Nor is human experience to be consulted merely for the correction of evils. Its lessons of positive utility are alike important. They show us the best forms of civil and religious polity, the best doctrines to be taught, the best rewards and punishments to be employed in the family and the state, the best customs (as of holy days) and how to observe them, — in a word, the best education.

But how are these lessons to be gained? How, except by first having the experience itself correctly given? Erroneously reported, it is worse than nothing; a lie instead of the truth; a traitor instead of a safe guide.

Again, then, do we say we exult over any good history of important transactions, and above all over a good history of such a people as the New England Puritans; a history fraught with important experiences beyond that of any other people since the dispersion of the Jewish nation.

Has, then, Dr. Palfrey here given us such a history? Joyfully and emphatically we answer *yes*; so far as it extends. It covers, as yet, but the first forty-seven years, but this is by far the most important period, because the forming period. Dr. Palfrey is indeed a Unitarian, and has ever dwelt in the very centre of American Unitarianism, and has been promoted to the highest stations in the gift of his denomination, first

as a clergyman in Boston, and then as professor at Cambridge. But notwithstanding his position and his creed, he has here given us not only a most candid and truthful history of our forefathers, but one written throughout in the most unaffected good will. He is an admirer and lover of the Puritans, though he occasionally intimates his dissent from their views. Candor, a prime attribute of any historian, is the leading trait of this work. And while we deeply regret that this lineal descendant of some of the first settlers of Plymouth, and also of Massachusetts, is not of the like precious faith with them, we can yet even doubly rejoice that such a work has come from *him*; for it will do *us* quite as much good, and may do much more good among such as differ in faith or practice from those holy men. They will be more likely both to read and believe the narrative. Its statements can now be imputed neither to prejudice nor sectarian pride.

And no more, we proceed to remark, can our author's statements be imputed to ignorance. In the public and private libraries of Cambridge, Boston, and the vicinity, he has enjoyed the best facilities for such a work, which our country affords; and he has also travelled and resided in Europe for the same end, and has even gained some new light there, from manuscripts, on our early history.

The style also is good, allowing us to think only of the matter, without compelling us to stop and exclaim: How splendid, how powerful, how poetic,—or, How obscure, how transcendental, how mystified, how barbarous! Of course the author takes care of his style, but he *seems* to care no more for it than the sleeping infant for the manner of its breathing, or the serene lake for its transparency. We think it quite as good as Prescott's, because equally pure, and clear, and concise, and even more natural; and, for history, though not for oratory, better than that of Scott or Macaulay. Whether his style is chiefly the result of care, or chiefly of correct early taste fostered by classic studies and classic intercourse, we presume it now costs him vastly less labor than the transcendentalists bestow in burying so deep what-

ever thoughts they may have. And yet he is at an equal remove from those careless writers who commit a solecism on every page, or worse yet, those who affect carelessness, or delight in odd and obsolete expressions, like *either* in the sense of *each*.

We rejoice in being able to speak thus favorably of the work, on so many important points; and we should have rejoiced still more to see the inward, spiritual life of the Puritans as distinctly, if not as extensively, set forth as their political and social life; we mean their religious experience. We should have liked, much, to see just how they felt, and what they thought, in view of God, sin, holiness, duty, death, the judgment, salvation, and condemnation. And all this, not, to be sure, by any labored description of the author, but chiefly, as his manner is, by quotations from their own writings. And nothing would be easier than to collect such religious experiences from the writings of these men. From some other classes, the task would be more difficult; but the Puritans tell us, freely, how they felt under conviction of sin, amid the fervors of first love and hope, in hours of despondency or bereavement, on returning from backsliding, in anxiety for the salvation of their friends and of the whole world, and when descending to the grave. If, for instance, we would know how their religion sustained them in perils of the sea, we have Bradford's wonderful account of himself during his perilous passage from England to Holland, which, with characteristic modesty, he gives as though of another.

And now, what if some do not believe in such experience, and even feel nothing but disgust at the rehearsal; shall their unbelief exclude the whole from history? or throw it into the shade? Much rather, especially in our incredulous age, let it exclude the whole of witchcraft, if either. And be it so, that their experience *was* but an idle fancy (we shudder at the horrid words); even supposing that all was delusion and fanaticism; it was yet a great moral cause in history, a fundamental cause, that has turned the world upside down — just as it had often done before. This belief in the Puritan

bosom was real, and the feeling real, whatever the ground for it; and the result, one of the most important and cumulative which human society has ever experienced. If the external life of the Puritan, the part he acted in the world, is important to be known, no less so is his internal life, which was the source and support of the external. If we would know what the Puritan was, it is equally important to know what made him such. This is, alike, the voice of the philosopher and the theologian; just as we would know what has made the Mohammedan what he is, and Mohammedan society what it is; and so of the papist, and papal society.

But as we would here have an enlargement of the work (which we hope Dr. Palfrey will readily give, in another edition), so, on the other hand, would we cheerfully submit to a curtailment of the history pertaining to that portion of the Puritans that remained in England; submit, we say, for it is all interesting enough; though much less of it would, perhaps, have sufficiently shown the connection between the two portions; and so of the very minute facts in the discussions of the united colonies with each other, a more general statement would have sufficed. This last remark is particularly applicable to the second volume, where the reader cannot feel so deep an interest in minute details, as in the earlier transactions. The contention between Massachusetts and Connecticut, about levying duties on goods passing up the river to Springfield, is an instance.

The accuracy of some small things may be questioned, especially in the early part of the first volume. But what properly constitutes the history, we think as remarkable for its accuracy as its candor. To a greater extent than any other historian we can name, Dr. Palfrey interweaves, in his narrative, the very language of his authorities, especially where they belong to the founders of New England; thus giving us, at once, a visible proof of his accuracy, and often almost a sight of those venerable men—such being the godly simplicity with which they wrote, and such the skill with which he has gracefully combined their words and sentences with his own. An admirable passage of this kind gives us,

mostly in the words of Gov. Bradford, an account of the motives which induced the pilgrims to leave Holland for this country. In what we retain, the words of Bradford are put in half-quotations.

"There can be," says our author, "no more generous ambition than is disclosed in these affecting words. Unenterprising villagers at first, habituated at length to a new home, and able to earn a decent living by humble drudgery, some of them now sinking into age, they turn their thoughts to posterity. With a patriotic yearning, they desire to extend the dominion of the native country which refuses to give them a peaceable home on its broad lands. And, through the hardships of a long voyage and an unknown continent, they propose to be missionaries to the heathen."

"The project occasioned much discussion. The cost of the voyage would exceed any means in their possession. — Arrived at its end, they would 'be liable to famine and nakedness, and the want, in a manner, of all things, with sore sicknesses.' Appalling reports had reached them, of the ferocity and treachery of the savage people; their hard experience, in the removal ten years before, was not forgotten; and the ill success of the earlier attempts at settlement, in Maine and in Virginia, was a heavy discouragement."

"On the other hand, they considered 'that all great and honorable actions were accompanied with great difficulties, and must be both enterprised and overcome with answerable courages. — True it was, that such attempts were not to be made and undertaken but upon good ground and reason, not rashly or lightly, as many have done, for curiosity or hope of gain. But their condition was not ordinary. Their ends were good and honorable; their calling lawful and urgent. And therefore they might expect the blessing of God in their proceeding. Yea, though they should lose their lives in this action, yet they might have comfort in the same, and their endeavors would be honorable.' It is a genuine and trustworthy heroism which can reason thus. They pondered, debated, fasted, and prayed, and came to the conclusion to remove."

Such were the motives which induced these good men first to leave their own country and then that of their temporary sojourn, for their final residence. Our author has much more, to the same effect, in divers passages, in regard to the Plymouth settlers and those of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Haven. The motives of all were substantially alike ; and more emphatically in regard to the great matters of religious freedom for themselves, and the spread of Christian civilization among the natives. And yet such a man as our own Prescott, in his history of the Spanish conquests in America, has suffered himself to draw a parallel in favor of the Spanish conquerors, to the disparagement of the Puritans. Those Romanists, according to Mr. Prescott, came to spread Christianity, the Bible, and literature generally ; but these Protestants came—for what? to get a living for themselves and their children! to get rich! Precisely the contrary, especially as regards the chief motives of the Puritans. This our author, without alluding to Mr. Prescott, has shown, and might have shown still more abundantly, from the most trustworthy sources. Their private letters, their public memorials, nay their very charters from the king, carefully specify the spread of Christianity among the heathen, as a very prominent motive for their coming to this country. And their whole subsequent conduct bears the most ample testimony to their sincerity, and perseverance, and success, in their declared purpose.— True, indeed, the spread of the Roman Catholic forms of worship among the Indians, was an incessant object of pursuit by the sons of Loyola and St. Francis, as they accompanied the Spanish armies; and their success, aided by the Spanish arms, was unquestionable. But, while Elliot early translated the whole Bible into the Indian language, and he and his coadjutors assiduously taught the natives to read and understand it, and teach it to their countrymen, where are the proofs of anything like it in the Catholic priests? But our object in this brief digression is, not to inculcate the Spaniards, but to exculpate the memory of our ancestors, so strangely and unjustly assailed. If worldly advantages had been their chief object, how could they have

resisted the splendid allurements simultaneously spread before them for emigration to the Hudson, on the one hand, and to the Orinoco on the other? Speaking of the large offers of the Dutch to them, Winslow says: "they would freely have transported us and furnished every family with cattle," etc. These "proposals were perseveringly renewed," and must have come with peculiar power to the poor emigrants in Holland, who possessed not the means for their own outfit and removal. And the chivalric Sir Walter Raleigh, who had sailed up the Orinoco some twenty years before, had given a glowing description of Guiana, to which some of these Puritans were even disposed to emigrate. "We passed," says Sir Walter, as quoted by Dr. Palfrey, "the most beautiful country that mine eyes ever beheld. — I never saw a more beautiful country, nor more lively prospects. — There is no country which yieldeth more pleasures to the inhabitants. — For health, good air, pleasure, and riches, I am resolved it cannot be equalled by any region, either in the east or west."

But these hardy and conscientious lovers of civil and religious freedom preferred a more independent situation away from the Dutch, and the vicinity of the Spaniards, and from a tropical climate.

Such were the men, and such the motives for the perils before them. From the love of adventure, or the love of gain, others had before attempted settlements on our inhospitable shores; but neither the romance nor the prospect of gain enabled them long to confront the actual perils and privations. They lacked the one thing needful, the stern self-denial and indomitable perseverance that spring from the unshaken faith in God, and the pure and far-reaching love to their posterity and to the whole world, which glowed in the breasts of the Puritans. This broad distinction between the two classes of adventurers to our shores, was soon visible even to the mere worldly merchants of London, who loaned them money, and to the Episcopal adversaries of the Puritans, divers of whom had a pecuniary interest in the settlement of New England. "Neither the Virginia company, nor the London adventurers

as a body, nor especially the Council for New England, would have preferred to employ Separatists in founding a colony, and giving value to their land. But the option was not theirs. At the moment, no other description of persons was disposed to confront the anticipated hardships, and none could be relied upon like them to carry the business through. This was well understood on both sides to be the motive for the engagement that was made." (I. 216.)

If the above representations are just, it is simply preposterous to impute worldly motives to the Plymouth settlers as the chief cause of their removal to this country. And equally preposterous it is to impute such motives to the original settlers of Massachusetts Bay. These, unlike the weary and impoverished, yet still strong-hearted Pilgrims in Holland, came, some ten years later, directly from England, where most of the leading minds were in the enjoyment of all that heart could wish, — wealth, reputation, office, benefices, powerful friends and relatives, — all, we say, except the freedom to worship God, and preach his gospel according to what they believed the dictates of his word. It was for this freedom, and to plant the gospel here, and not from any worldly motive whatever, that they bade farewell to their dear Old England. And the same is equally true of the emigrants to New Haven, several of whom were even more affluent while in England. And of the party generally, our author says: "The Puritanism of the first forty years of the seventeenth century was not tainted with degrading or ungraceful associations of any sort. The rank, the wealth, the chivalry, the genius, the learning, the accomplishments, the social refinements and elegance of the time, were largely represented in their ranks. Not to speak of Scotland, where soon Puritanism had few opponents in the class of the high-born and the educated, the severity of Elizabeth scarcely restrained, in her latter days, its predominance among the most exalted orders of her subjects." (I. 279.)

On the character of the clergy in the reign of Elizabeth the following will be read with much interest by all who wish more perfectly to understand the moral and religious

state of the church of England when the Puritans left it, and when the best of her clergy were already displaced by the Act of Uniformity. The passage has also a special interest in being just brought forth into the light by the researches of Dr. Palfrey, and embraces the period when the early settlers of New England were just coming upon the stage of life.

"In Dr. Williams's Library, in Red-Cross Street, London, I fell upon a curious collection, in three manuscript volumes, of old letters and various other pieces. Among them are two papers entitled, respectively, 'Lamentable Estate of the Ministers in Staffordshire,' and, 'View of the State of the Churches in Cornwall.' The former is without date, but I believe there is no hesitation about referring it to the latter half of the reign of Elizabeth. It consists of a full list of Staffordshire parishes, with the names and character of their ministers attached. It closes with this summary: 'So that there be one hundred and eighteen congregations served by laymen; by scandalous, forty.' 'Lewd,' 'a bad liver,' 'of scandalous life,' 'very ignorant,' 'drunkard,' 'a common drunkard,' 'a gamester,' are entries continually occurring against the clerical names. One minister is a 'weaver,' having been a gentleman's household servant many years; 'one is very famous for his skill in gaming, and especially in bowling.' The Cornwall record, which bears the date of 1586, has such descriptions of the clergymen named in it as these: 'a man careless of his calling,' 'a very lewd man,' 'a dicer,' 'a very lewd fellow,' 'a pot companion,' 'a good carder and dicer, both night and day,' 'a common ale-house haunter, and gamester,' 'his conversation is most in hounds,' 'he was late a serving-man.' One is qualified as 'a common dicer, and burned in the hand for felony, and full of all iniquity;' one is 'the best wrestler in Cornwall;' another, 'a very bad man.' Very few are favorably represented. There is also a petition of the same period, from the people of Cornwall to the Parliament 'gathered together by the Queen's Majesty's appointment, to look to the wants, to behold the miseries, the ruins, decays, and dissolutions of the

church of God, and Commonwealth of the Realm of England.' The petitioners say: 'We have about eightscore churches, the greatest part of which places is supplied by men who, through their ignorance and negligence, are guilty of the sin of sins, — of the sin of soul-murder. Some are fornicators, some adulterers, some felons, bearing in their hands the marks for the same offence, . . . some drunkards, some quarrellers, some spotted with whoredom, and some with more loathsome and abominable crimes than these.'

"Such representations confirm the complaints which reach us from that time, through various channels, of the wretched provision which remained for the service of the churches, when hundreds of exemplary clergymen were displaced by the Act of Uniformity. According to Neal, a 'survey,' laid at this time before Parliament, represented that, 'after twenty-eight years' establishment of the church of England, there were only two thousand preachers to serve near ten thousand parish churches.' " (I. 124, 125.)

Let us now look at the character of the men who were compelled to give place to such men as these. The first clergymen who came to New England were among the best the world has ever seen, whether for learning, piety, self-denial, courage, sound judgment, or pastoral labor. Most of them were educated at Cambridge in England, and had distinguished themselves as preachers and pastors in the church of England till compelled to flee their country, or else to practise conformity to rites which they could no longer conscientiously observe. A considerable number of them were from Emanuel College; but whether their special illumination was derived from the College, or from other luminaries in more private spheres in that region, we cannot say. A large portion of the early emigrants, including the Plymouth settlers, were from the east of England, and not far from the University. The whole number of the English, old and young, in Massachusetts, toward the close of 1632, is said to have been about two thousand. Speaking of the year 1633, Dr. Palfrey says: "Several parties of colonists now arrived at Boston, in one of which came John Haynes, an

opulent landholder of the county of Essex, and three famous divines, Thomas Hooker, Samuel Stone, and John Cotton. They were men of eminent capacity and sterling character, fit to be concerned in the founding a state. In all its generations of worth and refinement, Boston has never seen an assembly more illustrious for generous qualities, or for manly culture, than when the magistrates of the young colony welcomed Cotton and his fellow voyagers at Winthrop's table." (I. 367.)

Cotton came from Boston in England, five miles from the eastern coast, a city of twice the commercial importance of London in the thirteenth century. "Its name was derived from its ancient church of St. Botolph, perhaps the most stately parish church in England, a cathedral in size and beauty. It was from this superb temple that John Cotton came to preach the gospel within the mud walls and under the thatched roof of the meetinghouse in a rude New England hamlet. He was rector of St. Botolph's for nearly twenty years before Winthrop's emigration to America. The son of a barrister in easy circumstances, he had been successively an undergraduate at Trinity College, and a Fellow and Tutor at Emanuel College, in the University of Cambridge, where he had acquired a distinguished reputation for ability and learning. In Boston, his professional labors had been of astonishing amount, and the sanctity and mingled force and amiableness of his character had won for him a vast influence. At the departure of Winthrop's company, he made a journey to take leave of them at Southampton. The Lord Keeper, Williams, his diocesan, was his personal friend, and desired to deal gently with his non-conformity. But the Archbishop was not to be eluded. The dogs of the High Commission Court were set upon Cotton, and with difficulty he escaped to London, where for a time he was concealed by John Davenport, then vicar of St. Stephen's, and by other friends. His design to get out of the kingdom was suspected, and pursuivants were sent to arrest him and Hooker at the Isle of Wight, where it was supposed he would embark. But they went on board in the

Downs, and, avoiding discovery, arrived at their destination." (I. 368—9.)

As an instance of the absurd things occasionally alleged in our day about the Puritan emigrants, we may here just notice the affirmation, sometimes met with, that "they were not driven from England by the sword of persecution. No one wished them gone." Ah! to be sure;—and true it is, indeed, to the letter! Nor is this half the truth. Prelacy would not even suffer them to go. Like a spectre she flitted along the desolate shores of Lincolnshire, to interpose with her naked sword, at midnight, between the boat of the emigrant ship clandestinely hovering on the coast, and the fugitives whose presence was so much desired at her tribunals. No, nor did she drive away the hapless wives and children of Brewster's party, who were apprehended by her light-horsemen, while waiting for the next boat, to follow such of their husbands and sons as had already been carried on board the Dutch ship. Neither did she drive away the men who had escaped on board, and were carried off to Holland by the affrighted Dutchman, without their baggage, or even a change of raiment; far, far more gladly would she have seized them than the women whom she hurried to prison for the crime of attempting to follow them. Yes, it was literally in this full and strong sense (if in any) that Mother Church is to be exculpated from the charge of expelling the pilgrims in 1608, and Cotton and his friends in 1633.

We may remark, in passing, that we are sorry that the picturesque and thrilling account of the escape to Holland has not been transferred from Bradford to the pages of the work before us; and also the account of the sore perplexity of the authorities as to what they should do with the wives and children they had detained. To retain them in custody they found would be as expensive as it would be ungallant and cruel. Neither could they dismiss them to their homes, for no longer had they any homes to go to, nor means for subsistence. In a word, they had begun to experience the inconvenience which Sir Walter Raleigh had predicted

nearly thirty years before, while discussing the bill for the banishment of the Brownists, "who, he then feared, were nearly twenty thousand; and when they should be gone, who should maintain their wives and children?"

Another very important topic, on which Dr. Palfrey amply vindicates the character of the Puritan settlers, is the charge of religious persecution. No charge has been more frequently, or more virulently, or more ignorantly urged against them.

Suppose, however, that the charge is perfectly just, so far as the mere fact of persecution is involved, — what then? Are these Puritan emigrants sinners above all others of their day, for doing such things? or just as bad as the Inquisition or the Star-Chamber? Suppose they *were* real persecutors in an age when, for more than a thousand years, all sects had verily believed it not only right, but a bounden duty forcibly to suppress fatal error? what more does this prove than that they were not then so far in advance of all their contemporaries as we now are? or as the leaders in the Dutch Republic under William of Orange, had for a while become? or that the honor of completely establishing the true principles of religious freedom was not quite achieved by them?

But in any proper sense of the term, the Puritan settlers of New England were *not* persecutors. It was not their spirit nor habit. It has been said that they learned persecution of their persecutors. Just the contrary. As before remarked, they rather learned forbearance and kindness from the things they suffered. Even Roger Williams himself being judge, they deserved this meed of praise. He ever remembered with gratitude their forbearance and leniency toward himself, — though, by the way, he was not, as has been so often imagined, banished from Massachusetts for religious but for political offences. He had not even become a Baptist at the time of his banishment.

True, the Puritans, unlike some others, cared enough for their religion to defend it at any cost; but it was their most prayerful study to defend it only by such means as God and reason would approve. And they had, both by charter and

common sense, a right to exclude from their possessions whomsoever they would; just as a householder may determine who shall be the inmates of his home. And had they not, in good time, exercised the right, by excluding Episcopalians, they might well fear they should, ere long, have a bishop among them, to whom they would be required to bow, and their hard-earned liberty would all be lost. It is one thing to send away unwelcome strangers, and quite another thing to drive away the home-born from their birthright, as the pilgrims were driven from England. Says Dr. Palfrey: "where it is strictly true that two sets of people cannot live, with security, in each other's presence, it is an idle casuistry which condemns the earlier comer and the strongest possessor for insisting on the unshared occupation of his residence. — It is preposterous to maintain that, in the supposed circumstances, the right to exclude is not his, or that its exercise is not his bounden duty. And the right becomes of yet more value, and the duty more imperative and inevitable, when the good in question is one of such vast worth as religious freedom, to be protected by the possessor, not only for himself, but for the myriads, living and to be born, of whom he assumes to be the pioneer and champion." (I. 300, 301.)

What our fathers chiefly feared was the repetition, among themselves, of the revolting scenes of Munster: an outrage, alike, against religion, civil laws, and common decency. And this they had reason to fear, as the event soon proved, by the introduction of Quakers from England, where (so totally unlike their since civilized and very orderly descendants) they were now raving, alike, against the ordinances of the gospel and the forms of civil government. And with these were coupled the Anabaptists, who, it was feared, were not quite cured of the disorganizing propensities shown by the sect, at their origin, in Germany. It was against these two sects, especially, that the exclusive laws were framed. And although the language was, of course, applicable to citizens as well as strangers, they were intended, rather, against foreign fanatics than quiet citizens at home, whose only offence was religious heresy. And accordingly Dunster, the first president of Har-

vard college, who was a disbeliever in infant baptism, and Chauncy his successor, who thought immersion essential, remained unmolested, as did also William Witter, an individual in Lynn, and probably other Baptists. Indeed, we doubt whether even one citizen suffered under these laws, merely for religious heresy. From the first heresiarch that troubled Massachusetts, the strong-minded and seemingly devout antinomian, Ann Hutchinson, down to the last Quaker that was there either hung or flogged, there were few, if any, who were not guilty of civil offences. And even Roger Williams, who had been personally exiled from Massachusetts as a disturber, when he had learned a better wisdom by attempting, himself, to govern the wayward spirits who had followed him to Providence, even he came to abhor "such an infinite liberty of conscience," and to speak of the Quakers as "insufferably proud and contemptuous unto all their superiors," and "therefore that a due and moderate restraint and punishment of their incivilities, though pretending conscience, is so far from persecution, properly so called, that it is a duty and command of God unto all mankind." (I. 424.)

We have dwelt the longer on this charge of exclusiveness in the Puritans, because of the great and wide-spread importance given to it, and the very false construction often put upon the facts. We will only add, by way of further statement, that among the practical errors for which Williams was removed from the colony, was that of having "taught, publicly, that a magistrate ought not to tender an oath to an unregenerate person; for that they thereby have communion with a wicked man in the worship of God, and cause him to take the name of God in vain." (I. 410.) But who, save the Searcher of hearts, could decide for certainty, for any one, that he had met with the saving change, and so dare to administer the oath? But this politico-religious doctrine, with all its embarrassments, shake though it might the very pillars of the temple of justice, and consequently even of civil government, Williams felt himself conscientiously bound to inculcate everywhere. And for inculcating this and other strange and noxious tenets, the Puritans felt themselves just

as conscientiously bound effectually to admonish him to leave their borders. And, by the special advice of Gov. Winthrop, he left the bleaker coast of Salem for the fairer regions of the Narragansetts, where he became the founder of a new state.

Williams was a most singular man — one of the rarest compounds of worth and waywardness the world ever saw: having too much of the partisanship of a John Randolph to be either quiet, or peaceful, or happy, in a subordinate capacity, anywhere; and yet, unlike that singular politician, possessing not a little of the practical tact of his own good friend Winthrop, when placed at the head of affairs and with a heavy responsibility upon him. Dr. Palfrey's spirited sketch of his character will be read with deep interest; as will also his more extended sketch of Winthrop, in the second volume — one of the most beautiful portraits of a Christian statesman that was ever drawn. Though in different volumes, the reader will be paid for the trouble of reading them in immediate connection. These men were, in most things, perfect antipodes: one, the very type of order and practical wisdom, the other, the author of confusion and all impracticable schemes, while in a subordinate relation. How two such men could comfortably live together, is not, indeed, the question, for they could not; but how could they possibly continue for life, amid all the scenes they passed through, to esteem and love each other as they did,—this is the question and one full of interest for the rare character of the times as well as of the men. They must have been a study for each other, as they are now for the Christian philosopher. To say that both were most truly conscientious men, is but half the solution. They must, also, have appreciated highly each other's conscientious regard to duty — a habit as rare as it is precious, and one which, with our views of religious liberty, will hush the religious world to universal and perpetual peace, when it shall, itself, become universal and perpetual, as it one day will. Then there will be none to hurt or destroy, however various the forms of worship they may still observe.

And as with Winthrop, so with many others who were impelled by conscience to unite in the expulsion of Wil-

liams. It did not destroy their friendship for him, nor his for them.

The task thrown upon Williams, after his retirement from organized society, was a hard one : that of first learning to govern himself ; and then to govern the ludicrously wayward assemblages that gathered themselves in his vicinity — Baptists, Quakers, Ann Hutchinson's antinomians, and such practical antinomians as thieves and sharpers ; to say nothing of such ambitious spirits as Gorton. A part were lawless upon principle ; and a part for the want of principle. It was a harder task than the founding of Rome, where the banditti were, at least, free from religious fanatics, that worst of all classes to govern. Williams was, perhaps, the best fitted of all men to subjugate this latter class, being himself "within drawing distance." Who could, so hopefully, attempt to curb that "infinite liberty of conscience?" As happy for his fame as for the now "gallant little state" that he founded, that he was called to the task.

But Dr. Palfrey, like others, thinks this drainage a relief to the confederated colonies. "The plantations about Narragansett Bay were, as yet, incapable of a settled government. — They served the confederacy a useful purpose. In the existing ferment of opinion in the parent country, it was to be expected that, among the emigrants to New England, there would be persons affected with all sorts of eccentric humors ; and it was beneficial to the other plantations that there should be a place where such persons might conveniently collect, and gradually become quiet and wise by making their experiments where they would do little harm, except to one another. Williams, Coddington, and some of their associates, possessed qualities worthy of high esteem ; but it is doing them no injustice to say, that to build solid commonwealths was not their vocation ; and that, if the New England settlements had all been Providence Plantations, New England would have proved a failure." (II. 343.)

Another topic of loud complaint against our Puritans, is their supposed treatment of the Indians. But here, again, the vindication is ample. So far as appears, they system-

atically and uniformly treated the natives, not only with perfect justice, but with kindness ; and that, both for this life and the future. Other persons and small communities, on our coast, were guilty of enormities, which involved the Puritans in the terrible vengeance of the ignorant natives, and finally led to the Pequot war. Many, with only a partial knowledge of the facts, have imputed blame, where only praise was due. Some newspaper writers of the present day, seem also to take it for granted that the Indians were always treated by the early settlers, as they are now treated by the pioneers on our frontier.

But as one great motive with the Puritan immigrants was to spread Christian civilization on this continent, we might well expect a just and humane treatment from them towards the savages, both as the natural prompting of the same Christian kindness, and as a means of accomplishing the pure and exalted purpose. And such were the facts. Instead of wresting from them their lands without remuneration, they were careful to seek out and fully to pay the proper claimants, wherever the depopulating pestilence had left any ; and, in some cases, they paid several successive claimants, in order to avoid the very appearance of evil. The most exemplary punishment, also, was inflicted on individuals whenever detected in injuring the natives ; and Sir Richard Saltonstall was ordered "to give sagamore John a hogshead of corn for the hurt his cattle did him in his corn." The utmost kindness was also shown, by Winslow and others, in nursing the Indians when deserted by their own people and perishing by small-pox or other diseases.

Nor was this just and kind treatment lost upon the Indians. Thomas Wiggin, who did not belong to either of the Puritan settlements, but had been superintendent of a plantation on the Piscataqua, wrote thus, in 1632, respecting the English in Massachusetts : " I have observed the planters there, by their loving, just, and kind dealing with the Indians, have gotten their love and respect, and drawn them to an outward conformity to the English ; so that the Indians repair to the English governor there, and his deputies, for justice." (I. 362.)

An equally honorable and disinterested testimony is borne by Isaac De Rasieus, the second in authority to the Dutch governor of Fort Amsterdam, now New York, who visited the Plymouth colony in 1627. The English, he writes, "have made stringent laws and ordinances upon the subject of fornication and adultery, which laws they maintain and enforce very strictly indeed, even among the tribes which live amongst them. They speak very angrily when they hear, from the savages, that we should live so barbarously, in these respects, and without punishment.— The tribes in their neighborhood are better conducted than ours, because the English give them the example of better ordinances and a better life : and who also, to a certain degree, give them laws, by means of the respect they have, from the very first, established amongst them." (I. 227, 228.)

Nor was this kindness without its reflex benefits to the benefactors. "Massasoit, in destitution and filth, apparently at the point of death, was relieved, and at length restored to health, under the treatment of Winslow, who condescended to the most humble offices of nurse and cook. In the overflow of his gratitude, the savage revealed the existence of a plot, among the tribes scattered over the country, from Boston Bay to Martha's Vineyard, for the extirpation of the whites. The provocation was, he said, the outrages committed, by Weston's people, at Wessagusset; but the meditated destruction would include the colonists at Plymouth, because of the apprehension that they would attempt to protect or avenge their countrymen." (I. 201.) Thus an act of special kindness to a friendly chief, led to the disclosure of a combination which would probably have proved fatal to the feeble colony.

In consequence of this disclosure, was shed the first Indian blood by the Puritan settlers ; and it was on hearing the news, that Robinson, in the genuine spirit of Puritanism, wrote to them : "O how happy a thing had it been, if you had converted some before you had killed any !" And what Christian heart would not utter the same regret ? But probably neither Robinson, nor any other well-balanced and well-in-

formed mind, would intend, by it, to cast any censure on the Puritans for the part they felt impelled thus to take, for their own preservation.

Dr. Palfrey though ever ready to do justice to the character of the Indians, is no such admirer of the savage state in general, or the Indian character in particular, as to praise them in any way to the unjust disparagement of the Puritans, at whose hands they received such invaluable favors, but, it must also be confessed, such severe retribution for their wanton aggressions. And he justifies even that most terrible retribution, the fatal catastrophe of the Pequot war in 1637 — a justification, in the circumstances, seemingly complete if war is ever justifiable in its aggressive form, as it doubtless is when, as in this case, it is defensive in its nature.

Dr. Palfrey quotes the following from a writer by no means prejudiced in favor of the Puritans: "An aboriginal coalition, first suggested by the Pequot chief, and afterwards carried into such terrible effect by King Philip, at this early period might have resulted in the extermination of the English, and some solitary ship, afterwards touching at Massachusetts Bay, would have beheld the stillness of the wilderness where was expected the busy hum of life, and have carried home the startling news that Transatlantic Puritanism had disappeared."

"Such," says our author, "is the just reflection of a recent writer. If I do not often refer to his interesting work (*The Puritan Commonwealth*), it is not for the want of a thorough acquaintance with it. It is one of the marvels of our time. But for its references to later events, it might have been written by a chaplain of James the Second. Its key note is sounded in its first sentence: When 'King Charles the Martyr,' etc. The Indians, according to this writer, were 'a race proverbial for fidelity in keeping their treaties,' etc., and for this characteristic of theirs he refers to Hutchinson, where Hutchinson had written, 'Indian fidelity is proverbial in New England, as *Punic was at Rome.*' " (I. 470.)

By omitting what we have here put in italics, the sense of the passage is completely reversed, as the reader of Ro-

man history well knows. It is proper, however, to remark, as does Dr. Palfrey, that the work containing this and other errors, to which he refers, is posthumous, and perhaps its author would have corrected some or all of its errors, had it been published under his own eye. Still the errors are none the less injurious, and ought, in such a work, to have been corrected in notes by the editor, if he knew enough. It was a duty due alike to the subjects and the reader of the history.

In the work before us, the missionary efforts of our fathers among the Indians are very properly stated, though with hardly the particularity which their importance demands. We presume the author will give us more of the details in the sequel. In 1644, the General Court of Massachusetts ordered "that the county courts should take care that the Indians in their several shires should be civilized, and that they should have power to have them instructed in the knowledge and worship of God." And in 1646, the Court "ordered that two ministers should be chosen by the elders of the churches, every year, to be sent, with the consent of their churches, to make known the heavenly counsel of God among the Indians, in most familiar manner, by the help of some able interpreter." Upon this Dr. Palfrey remarks, that "the General Court of Massachusetts was thus the first missionary society in the history of Protestant Christendom." (II. 189.)

The first of the two volumes under review, brings down the history of New England to 1643, the year when our sagacious ancestors formed that remarkable type of our present Federal Union, "The United Colonies of New England." By one of their twelve articles of confederation, these four Puritan colonies bind themselves together in a "firm and perpetual league of friendship and amity for offence and defence, mutual advice and succor, upon all just occasions, both for preserving and propagating the truth and liberties of the Gospel, and for their own mutual safety and welfare." (I. 630.) By the sixth article provision was made for the appointment of a board to manage the business of the confederacy, to consist of two church members from each colony, with power to "determine all affairs of war or

peace." Various other important provisions are contained in the articles for the united administration of such affairs, both civil and military, as could advantageously be committed by the colonies to this already *quasi* independent nation. Asserting as it did the prerogatives of peace and war, and the levying of revenue, the union might well be suspected, by its enemies, of aiming at ultimate independence. And indeed many things before done, especially by Massachusetts, seemed but too obviously intended to meet some future contingency of self-defence against the mother country. But at this time England was too much busied with commotions at home to take any well-considered and efficient measures for counteracting these tendencies in her colonies.

None but the four Puritan colonies were embraced in this union. "The settlements of Gorges, and the plantations about Narragansett Bay, were denied admission to the Confederacy; the former, says Winthrop, 'because they ran a different course from us, both in their ministry and civil administration.' Neither had yet been able to institute a government such as could be relied on for the fulfilment of the stipulations mutually made by the four Colonies."

At the commencement of this Article we stated our views of the importance of the early history of New England as a means for training men for the various duties of a Christian life; nor can we now tell, in reflecting on the very important portion to which we have been attending, whether its lessons are the more weighty and numerous for men in public or in private life,—nor whether to clergymen or to laymen.

The grand moral for all, whether in public or private life, is this: that true godliness in heart and life, is the first requisite for prosperity and usefulness. And now, if all this be meant by the *virtue* which politicians declaim about, we should rejoice to hear them say it fully and clearly, though, perhaps, some of them would be able to give but a poor illustration of it, even in language.

What if the following were to be posted up as a curiosity in the Capitol at Washington? Speaking of Plymouth

Colony, Dr. Palfrey says: "In the thirteenth year of the settlement, a penal provision had to be adopted, to protect the public weal against the prevailing absence of ambition for public office; and 'it was enacted, by public consent of the freemen of this society of New Plymouth, that if now or hereafter any one were elected to the office of Governor, and would not stand to the election, nor hold and execute the office of his year, that then he be amerced in twenty pounds sterling fine. It was further ordered and decreed, that if any were elected to the office of council, and refused to hold the place, that then he be amerced in ten pounds sterling fine, and in case refused to be paid, to be forthwith levied.' At his urgent request, Bradford was now for the first time excused from the office of Governor, and Edward Winslow was chosen his successor, Bradford taking his place as one of the Assistants." (I. 341.)

Another lesson, alike honorable to the genuine and unambitious patriotism and integrity of the Puritans, and admonitory to the times that be, might be derived from the account in the early history of Massachusetts, when Gov. Winthrop, at the close of the gubernatorial year, was unexpectedly, if not uncivilly pressed by some extra-vigilants, to give an account of his pecuniary stewardship. Like the truly great man he was, and equally free from pettishness and scorn and fear, he quietly gave the account, when, behold, he had disbursed, for the public service, about a thousand pounds more than he had received, but of which he was going to say nothing if he had not been thus called to account. Now, however, that his posterity might not be ashamed of him, he required that a notice of the result should accompany the record of the investigation.

As an "all-important consequence of the meeting of the Long Parliament," in 1640, which led the way to the Commonwealth, Dr. Palfrey remarks that it put a final stop to emigration to this country. Winthrop remarks: "The Parliament of England setting upon a general reformation both of church and state, the Earl of Strafford being beheaded, and the Archbishop, our great enemy, and many others of the

great officers and judges, bishops and others, imprisoned and called to account, this caused all men to stay in England, in expectation of a new world." Dr. Palfrey adds: "At the end of ten years from Winthrop's arrival, about twenty-one thousand Englishmen, or four thousand families, including the few hundreds who were here before him, had come over, in three hundred vessels, at a cost of two hundred thousand pounds sterling. During the century and a quarter that passed between that time and the publication of the first volume of Hutchinson's History, it is believed that 'more had gone from hence to England, than had come from thence hither;' nor did anything that can be called an immigration occur again till after Boston was two hundred years old," in 1830. (pp. 584, 585.) Of course it is chiefly from these twenty-one thousand that have, since 1640, sprung up in New England and elsewhere, so many as the stars of heaven for multitude — "the Universal Yankee Nation" — and mostly bearing the general stamp (however distorted in too many cases) of their enterprising and religious progenitors. Probably the like fecundity and the like similarity in character and language is not elsewhere to be found in the modern annals of emigration.

Dr. Palfrey says, in the preface to his first volume: "I am to tell the early history of a vast tribe of men, numbering at the present time, it is likely, some seven or eight millions." And he thinks our present white population may be divided pretty accurately into three equal parts; one belonging to the New England stock; one the posterity of English who settled in other Atlantic colonies; and one the Irish, Scotch, French, Spanish, German, and other immigrants, and their descendants. And he presumes there is one third part of our whole nation, "of whom no individual could peruse this volume without reading the history of his own progenitors." This our author thinks is about as near the truth as we can come in so complicated a problem; and so do we. But it must be obvious, on a little reflection, that many who are "of the New England stock," *i. e.*, descendants of English emigrants to New England, are at the same time descend-

ants of Scotch, French, or Irish immigrants, or even of all four classes. We know a boy in Massachusetts who has Italian, French, Dutch, Irish, and American blood in his veins, though two of the tinctures were imparted in Europe. We presume all the descendants of the Scotch-Irish who settled Londonderry, N. H., are now also descendants of the English immigrants; and that the like will be the fact with the New York Dutchmen, within the lapse of three generations; and with the Pennsylvania Dutchmen in twice that time. And if our Irish are more clannish, and may not amalgamate quite so soon with the other races, we may yet believe that, among the millions in the free states who may be pondering our author's pages, five generations hence, scarcely an individual from either of the old stocks will be found who will not here be reading the history of a portion of his own progenitors—such is the increasing rapidity with which the Puritan race are now pervading the whole North, and who may soon be pervading the South of our land, and thus conspiring the more rapidly to make it the most homogeneous and enlightened and religious of all the great nations of Christendom. Every such book as this must add a fresh impetus towards so grand an event.

ARTICLE VI.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

CAPITO AND BUCKER, the Reformers of Strasburg, delineated from their manuscript letters, their printed works, and other contemporary authorities. By J. W. Baum, Professor in the Protestant Seminary of Strasburg. Elberfeld, 1860.¹

THE free city of Strasburg, situated on that part of the Rhine which had long been the centre of religious influence, acted a most important part in the great religious revolution of the sixteenth century. Its political importance, and its close connection with Switzerland, France, and Holland, gave

¹ Capito und Butzer, Strassburgs Reformatoren, nach ihrem handschriftlichen Briefschätze, ihren gedruckten Schriften und anderen gleichzeitigen Quellen, dargestellt von J. W. Baum.

the more weight to its example. From the beginning it took a prompt, decided, and yet moderate, course of action, which it has continued to maintain for more than three centuries. Though it is no longer the standard-bearer of the free cities of Germany, but holds a humiliating position as an unimportant city of the French Empire, its German character and native language being barely tolerated, it has not yet lost its significance in the literary world. In its seminary and among its clergy there are, and always have been, men known throughout Christendom for their eminent scholarship. At the head of the list of great men that gave distinction to this ancient city, at the time of the Reformation, stand the names of Capito and Bucer. Of the laity, there were several noble and independent characters, who, as magistrates and statesmen, were worthy coadjutors of the reformers. Such men were Pfarrer, Kniebs, and Herlin. But, towering above all the rest, was Jacob Sturm, the lustre of whose character outlives the period to which he belonged. To these men, both of the clergy and laity, all Protestant Europe is indebted for their invaluable service in the cause of learning and religion.

Capito descended from a respectable burgher family of Hagenau, then the first of the ten free towns of Alsace. He was born in 1478. His father, who was averse to the priests and monks of his day, on account of their loose morals, designed his son for the medical profession, and sent him, accordingly, to Pfortzheim, the residence of Reuchlin, to prepare for the university. Why he did not send him to Dringenberg, who, at Schlettstadt, near by, kept one of the best Latin schools of that day, is not known. The school at Pfortzheim, at that time, seems to have felt but slightly the influence of Reuchlin. Students still led a strolling life, like gypsies. Only the teachers possessed books; and the most they did by way of instruction was to dictate lessons from these for their pupils. Possibly Simler, afterwards the teacher of Melancthon, gave instructions to Capito. Certainly the latter made rapid progress; for he soon proceeded to the university of Freiburg to study medicine, and received his degree in 1498, in his twentieth year. When we consider what the state of medical science then was, how little knowledge there was, how much quackery and mysticism, we cannot wonder that a youth of Capito's clear, conscientious, and contemplative mind, should turn to other studies. Attracted to the study of law by such men as Xasius of Freiburg, Peutingen of Augsburg, and Pirkheimer of Nuremberg, the three great lights of jurisprudence in the south of Germany, he studied the legal science under the first of these, and took his degree accordingly. There were, at that time, in most places, associations of men for the promotion of ancient learning, following the lead of Reuchlin, Erasmus, and others. To one of these did Capito belong; and he made such progress that he was early made dean of the faculty of arts. These young men became eminent at a later period, some as champions, and others as enemies of reform. One of them was Zell, who, after being teacher at Freiburg, became the father of the Reformation in Strasburg. Another

was Eck, afterwards the celebrated polemic theologian of Ingoldstadt, and the opponent of Luther. A third was Jacob Sturm, who, after studying theology, became a distinguished jurist, and one of the greatest and best men of Strasburg. A fourth was Faber, afterwards bishop of Constance, and the mischievous but influential adviser of Ferdinand. Another was the distinguished poet, Urban Rhegius, who finally espoused most heartily the cause of the Reformation in Augsburg and in Celle. Capito, a short time after he was made dean, was, in 1511, made licenciate in theology, and began to give lectures in that department in the university. At this time, he became acquainted with the scholastic theologians, and with the Church Fathers, the latter of which, together with the study of the Greek Testament, led him to sounder views of theology.

Hardly a year had passed before the bishop of Spire, wishing a chaplain for a college of nobles of the Benedictine order, appointed Capito to this place. Soon after his settlement here, he was visited by a person of meagre form, almost concealed in a monk's hood, who turned out to be Pellican, an old friend of his from Basle, who came thither to attend a meeting of his order. In confidential intercourse, it was, for the first time, ascertained that both rejected the church doctrine of transubstantiation. This meeting took place five years before Luther published his Theses, and a week before he was made doctor of theology, and took the oath to teach according to the scriptures. In the next year, 1513, Capito, who, as a jurist, had been often employed in managing the affairs of the wealthy canons—the sons of nobles—under his spiritual charge, was called to sit in a council of theologians and jurists, to decide upon the celebrated case of Reuchlin, who was accused of heresy by Hogstraten, for studying the Rabbinical writings in Hebrew. In this contest between learning and ignorance, Capito, himself a linguist and a good Hebraist, was, of course, on the right side; and he contributed his share towards the final decision enjoining perpetual silence upon the accuser and the payment of the costs of the trial.

At this time there was, at Basle, a bishop by the name of Utenheim, who, in attempting to reform certain abuses in the church, was opposed by his clergy. He was supported, however, in his endeavors to enlighten the people by the influence of Frobenius, the learned and celebrated printer of Basle, and of Erasmus, then engaged in that place in preparing his edition and Latin version of the Greek Testament. In looking around for a suitable person to instruct his clergy, he fixed upon Capito, and at once appointed him preacher in the cathedral. Thus, after three years' residence in Bruchsal, in the service of the bishop of Spire, he removed to Basle, and formed an intimacy with Erasmus, whom he aided in the preparation of his version of the Greek Testament, especially in respect to the names and words borrowed from the Hebrew. Erasmus said that he had merely made a beginning in removing ignorance and superstition by opening the scriptures; that others must complete the work which he had begun; and called upon Capito in particular, who was familiar with both Hebrew and Greek,

and who was, moreover, young and full of vigor and zeal, to devote himself to this service. Capito accordingly determined to undertake to do for the Old Testament what Erasmus had done for the New. As the Hebrew was little known, he prepared a Hebrew grammar, which passed through many editions, and served as a model for later works. He next edited the first Hebrew psalter ever printed in Germany, to which he appended an abridgment of his grammar. "Be not frightened," he says to students of the Bible, "with the difficulty of learning the language. With the helps here furnished all the obstacles can be overcome. Diligence and perseverance can remove mountains. Only have courage, and the result will exceed all your expectation. He who applies himself to the work in earnest, will learn to read the words in two days, and in six months he will be able, without a teacher, to read the text, with the aid of a literal Latin version. Who would not be willing to exert himself to the utmost to secure such an enjoyment?" The reader will not fail to observe in this ardent love of the Hebrew scriptures a striking resemblance between Capito and the chief promoter of Hebrew learning in this country.

Here in Basle, as early as 1515, he formed an acquaintance with Zuingli, between whom and himself there was not only a great intimacy, but a striking correspondence in their religious views. "Before Luther appeared," says he, in a letter to Bullinger, "Zwingli and I, while he was yet in Einsiedeln, spoke together of the necessity of overthrowing the Pope." Two or three years later, Capito caused the first collection of Luther's writings to be published in Basle, with a preface remarkable for its just sentiments in respect to the Reformation. He dissuaded Erasmus from writing against Luther at that time. He encouraged Luther, by saying to him, in a letter written in 1519, that the Bishop of Basle and other powerful friends offered to aid and protect him if he was in danger.

After producing a very discernible effect upon the young men both in the church and in the university at Basle, and training his favorite pupil, Caspar Hedio, to be his successor, he was, by the influence of Von Hutten and other friends at the court of Albert, the young and liberal Archbishop of Mayence, invited to the important post of preacher in the cathedral of that city. He accepted the appointment, not without hesitancy. Hedio said, in a letter to Zuingli: "The people are enraged against the priests that they were willing to part with a man of such solid learning and apostolical character. The men of Mayence will receive him with open arms. The cardinal has offered him the most flattering conditions, thereby showing that he is unwilling to be without the services of such a teacher." Capito was made councillor, and, soon after, chancellor of the archbishop. The clergy of Mayence, who did not sympathize with the primate in his ambition to be a Maecenas, early manifested their opposition to his favorite. Albert, however, not only protected him, but took him as his companion to the coronation of the young Emperor, Charles V., and even appointed Hedio, meanwhile, to supply the place of Capito.

It was at this time that Mosellanus, the youthful and accomplished professor of Greek at Leipsic, wrote a remarkable letter to him to induce him to accept a place in the same university. "You may learn how favorably disposed our prince (George of Saxony) is to classical learning," he then remarks, "from the fact that he has spoken of you a dozen times lately in the most flattering terms, and has commissioned his minister, Pflugh, to inquire how you are situated where you are." The wishes of Capito's Leipsic admirers were not fulfilled.

The undecided course which the archbishop pursued in respect to Luther was owing, in great measure, to the influence of Capito over him at this time. They both occupied an intermediate ground between Erasmus and Luther, Albert leaning more towards Erasmus, and Capito, more towards Luther. They often discussed these questions together, and mutually kept each other from entertaining extreme views. Capito, as chancellor, must, of course, appear to be neutral; and Albert, the friend of moderate reform, and the patron of such men as Von Hutten and Capito, must resist the extreme measures of the violent Catholic party. The archbishop and Capito resided, at this time, chiefly at Halle, near the scene of the Reformation. The singular correspondence between them and Luther, now at Wartburg; Capito's visit to the Saxon court and Wittenberg, for the express purpose of mediation, and numerous letters that passed between him and Melancthon, Justas Jonas, and several others, on the subject of a more moderate style of reform, all fall within this period, and give, not only an intense interest, but a high historical value, to this part of Capito's biography. But he found himself in a place where two seas met, and was in danger of going down. In such a crisis no mediator could be successful. Besides, his convictions were so strongly on the side of Luther, that he could no longer endure to be at the court of his unwilling opponent. Though Albert left nothing untried to retain him, and even proposed to raise him to the condition of a nobleman, he determined, after visiting Wittenberg a second time, and coming to a clear understanding with Luther, to accept the appointment of provost of Saint Thomas church, in Strasburg, where the Reformation had already a peaceful beginning.

If we were to follow the plan of the author, we should introduce the name of Bucer at this point, and bring his history down to the time when he and Capito became joint reformers of Strasburg; but it has seemed to us better to present a pretty full outline of the early life of the one, with a very slight indication of that of the other, than to attempt to abridge both and to bring them within the compass of a brief notice.

Martin Bucer was born in Schlettstadt, a little south of Strasburg. He had the good fortune to be instructed in Dringenberg's celebrated Latin school in that place till he was fifteen years old. The next fifteen years were years of bondage, spent mostly in a Dominican monastery in Heidelberg. It is true, he was at the same time a student in the university in that place. But it must be remembered, that, while the court favored the inno-

vations of Agricola and Reuchlin, in favor of classical and sacred learning, the Dominicans were the sworn enemies of these men; and that the controversy between the two parties was raging at this time. The publication of the Greek Testament by Erasmus, and the *Epistolæ Virorum Obscurorum*, added fuel to the fire. Bucer's sympathies were wholly with the innovators, as the friends of learning were called, but his connections were with the "obscure men." Not only did he diligently pursue his classical studies in these critical circumstances, but he even read and relished everything which proceeded from Luther's pen. He was, of course, present when the latter, in 1518, held his celebrated disputation in Heidelberg, and had several private interviews with him, inviting him to his lodgings. He already took rank among the first men of the university in learning. He possessed a classical and biblical library superior to that of any of the professors. He was, at this time, a correspondent with Rhenanus, the classical teacher at Basle, and, through him, made the acquaintance of Capito, Oecolampadius, and the bookseller, Frobenius. Among his personal friends, at this time, were Francis von Sickingen, von Hutten, Luther, Spalatin, and most of the classical scholars of the south of Germany. Having resolved to leave the Dominican order, he made a journey to Strasburg, where Zell had already introduced the doctrines of the Reformation; and, instead of returning to Heidelberg, resorted to Spire, where he lay concealed just before the time the celebrated Diet of Worms was held. Von Hutten and Von Sickingen resolved to aid and protect him. They consulted with Capito, now in Worms with the archbishop, Albert, about the best means of protection. It was agreed that, through a friend in power in the church, application should be made to the court at Rome for a dispensation from his vow; and this measure succeeded beyond their expectation. Bucer now resorted to Ebernburg, the rocky fortress of the chivalrous Von Sickingen. It appeared more like a college than like the home of the bravest of the German knights. There, in the long winter evenings, sat the knight in his easy-chair, with his gouty leg bolstered up and turned towards the fire. Messengers brought the news from the diet now in session at Worms, or from friends in Wittenberg, Basle, Strasburg, Spire, or Mayence. By him sat, in elegant *negligé*, the anxious, fiery Von Hutten, with his sharp eye and quick tongue. Next were the pensive enthusiast, Oecolampadius; Caspar Aquila, just escaped from prison; the small, thoughtful and decided Schwebel, the friend of Reuchlin; and finally, Bucer, with his sharp features and piercing eye, now thirty years of age. Such was the place of refuge which was offered to the persecuted reformers of learning and religion. It was at this time that, at the instance of the wily Glapion Bucer was sent by Von Sickingen and Von Hutten to meet Luther at Oppenheim, as he was approaching Worms, to propose a conference. He was soon after appointed chaplain of the Count Palatinate Frederic, and accepted the offer, in the hope of effecting at his court what Capito had done at the court of the Archbishop of Mayence; but he was disappointed

in the character of his patron, who gave himself up to a dissolute life, and, consequently, he retired from his service at the end of one year, and accepted the invitation of Von Sickingen to be settled at Landstuhl, adjoining his castle. He remained with this ornament of the German knighthood till the feud, which broke out between him and the Archbishop of Triers, rendered it expedient for Bucer to go elsewhere. The remaining few months before his final settlement in Strasburg, he was preacher in Weissenburg. The discourses here delivered were published, and are among the best of his productions.

The author next enters upon the history of the reformation of Strasburg, under the labors of its two chief reformers, Capito and Bucer. The subject now assumes new importance and awakens a new interest. Here are united in a common work two men remarkable for their great talents, extensive learning, and singular piety and excellence of character,—men whose influence must be felt, not only in Strasburg, but in all Germany and all Europe. The theatre of their action is as remarkable as the men themselves. Strasburg was a free city, nearly independent both in state and church, no prince having absolute authority over them in the one, nor bishop in the other. In most other parts of Germany the fate of the Reformation depended very much on the will of the civil or ecclesiastical ruler. The Elector of Saxony supported the Reformation; Duke George excluded it from his dominions. The government of Strasburg was in the hands of the burghers, having in all its numerous branches two burghers to one nobleman. It was essentially republican. The reformers here had a fair field, that of presenting their doctrines directly to the people, with whom the decision of the question ultimately lay. The consequence was, that the civil authorities, representing the popular will, listened to the wisdom and eloquence of their two new religious teachers, rather than to the clamors of ignorant monks and worldly-minded priests.

As Strasburg was situated between Switzerland and Germany, so were its theologians mediators between the extreme views of the German and Swiss reformers. Though they could not turn Luther from his intolerant dogmatism in regard to the Eucharist, and his unjust policy in excluding the Reformed Church from rights secured to those who adopted the Augsburg confession, they did much for the pacification of contending parties in Switzerland and those who fraternized with them, whether in Germany or England.

In the storm which drew near between the prince bishop of Strasburg, the clergy and monks of his party, and some of the council and burghers, on the one side, and Zell, Capito, Bucer, and Hedio, the wisest and ablest men of the council, and a strong party among the people, on the other, soon showed clearly on which side the intellectual strength and moral worth of the clergy and laity were, and on which side was the resort to mean tricks, to threats and violence. While the priests took harlots into their houses and lived with them openly, as was publicly admitted, without ecclesiastical

censure, except as the evangelical party brought it on, by proclaiming the indecency of it, these ministers who took lawful wives, five in number, were excommunicated by the bishop. This opened the eyes of the people to the corrupt and pharisaical character of the priesthood; and the skilful leaders of the Protestant party did not fail to make a clear exhibition of the matter in its whole extent, both in their public discourses and in print, and thereby to make a powerful impression on men of candid minds, both at home and abroad. In those transactions that related to the government, whether civil or ecclesiastical, the great experience and skill of Capito, as a minister of state, were turned to a good account. In order to introduce solid learning and religious intelligence into this thrifty city, Bucer was early appointed lecturer (professor) on the New Testament. Not long after, Capito was appointed Hebrew professor and lecturer on the Old Testament, and Hedio was added as instructor in church history. Then followed a professor of classical literature, and another of mathematics. Thus, the University of Strasburg, which was founded in 1524, and which, after being nursed to vigor and strength by the all-powerful Jacob Sturm, has, for centuries, produced so many great scholars, was a child of the Reformation.

Not only the near vicinity of Switzerland, but the republican spirit common to those cantons and to Strasburg, attracted the theologians of that city to the leaders of the Swiss Reformation, quite as much as their former connections with Wittenberg did to Luther, by whom the principles of monarchy were rigidly maintained. Hence the refugees driven from Switzerland and the south of Germany by Austrian violence and bloodshed found protection and support in Strasburg. Thither Lambert of Avignon, afterwards reformer in Hesse, and the fiery Farel, the reformer of Neuchâtel, and many other persecuted preachers fled for safety. One hundred and fifty persons, driven from home by Austrian soldiers, arrived there in one day. Nobly did that free city espouse their cause, provide for their support, and put forth its diplomatic influence in their favor; and not even the threats of Ferdinand of Austria, and of the princes and bishops combined with him, including the bishop of Strasburg, could move its heroic council and brave citizens from their settled purpose. Indeed, there was no city in Germany where the leading citizens were so enthusiastic for the Reformation, so generous towards the friends of truth, who from all quarters sought their hospitality, or so bold and decided in maintaining in church and state whatever they believed the Bible taught.

The reformation of the city of Strasburg was, in its first stage, completed near the end of the year 1524. After the accomplishment of this great work, and the establishment of the university in the earlier part of the same year, *one of the earliest acts of the city government was to set the first example for all the civilized world of establishing public free schools.* On the 8th of February, 1525, Capito and Bucer, after consulting with the rest of the clergy, particularly with Zell, the pioneer of reform, and with the leading men of the government, especially with Sturm, the most zealous

of all in promoting education, laid before the City Council the following plan of public schools, namely: "That three or four of the members of the council be appointed as a school committee, who should associate with them two of the clergy that were experienced in such matters, to aid in carrying out the plan. The school board, thus constituted, were to appoint and dismiss teachers, fix their compensation, confer with the teachers about the arrangement of the schools, the branches of knowledge to be taught, and the books to be used; visit the schools, either as a whole committee or as individuals, once every month, and exercise a supervision over the schools, the teachers, and the school-houses. They should, under the direction of the council, build school-houses for boys and for girls, and select upright and pious teachers, always appointing a male teacher for the boys, and a female teacher for the girls. In these schools, all the pupils were to learn to read and write their native language. The four Latin schools, which had fallen into decay, were to be revived and provided with four preceptors and four assistants, learned and pious men, who should teach the three languages (Latin, Greek, and Hebrew), and whatever else conduces to piety, or qualifies men for the duties of life." This is a most remarkable fact, and worthy to be remembered in history. One would sooner expect to find such a document two or three centuries later among the Massachusetts school laws. It is now published, we believe, for the first time from the original manuscript. After a delay of seven months, the plan was so far carried into execution, with Hedio's assistance, as to establish two German schools, and to reform the Latin schools. Four years later, the whole system was put into operation. The schools were supported by funds derived from the monasteries.

It is remarkable that in so many respects the Strasburg reformers anticipated the enlightened, liberal sentiments of modern times. In this respect they stood alone, midway between the intolerance of the Lutherans, and the wild anarchy of the enthusiasts. Even Zuingli was not mild and tolerant enough for Capito and Bucer. In the general uprising which resulted in the Peasants' War, there was the same struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed as is witnessed now on the continent of Europe. The peasants were treated like cattle. They were driven to desperation, and then they committed excesses. The Strasburg theologians were the only influential men who publicly took the ground which is generally taken now, both in respect to the people's rights and the proper way of securing them. While they remonstrated in a decided but friendly manner against the disorders of the insurgents, they prevented the magistrates of Strasburg from resorting to bloodshed, and made that influential city stand out in singular contrast to the places which were scenes of murderous slaughter all around them. With the Anabaptist leaders they pursued a similar course, "remitting theological errors to God," and punishing only overt acts of violence and wrong. They carefully distinguished between civil and religious matters, maintaining that inward offences cannot be corrected by fines and

penalties. "There are diseases of the mind which cannot be cured in a moment. These are sometimes found in men who sincerely confess Christ, and are to be regarded as the children of God." Although they were the personal friends both of Erasmus and Luther, and admired their great talents, and acknowledged their distinguished service in behalf of religion, they swore allegiance to but one master; and by claiming the right and maintaining the duty of all men to think for themselves in matters of conscience, they gave mortal offence to both. They were pronounced heretics, and suffered bitter persecution, both from Catholics and Lutherans, for asserting the doctrine of religious liberty. The documents that are brought to light on this point are among the most interesting and important of any to be found in the volume. Strasburg was the headquarters of religious liberty in those days; and of the many statements made on the subject by the Strasburg preachers, and especially by Capito, there are few in which we should wish to see a word altered. Referring to the endless disputes about the Eucharist kept up by the Wirtemberg theologians, Capito observes: "Posterity will smile at the contentious spirit with which we quarrel over the symbol of Christian love." "There are some," he elsewhere says, "whose love is so great that they will accept nothing which did not originate with themselves."

These two pillars of the Strasburg reformation, aided by Zell, the pioneer, Hedio, the popular lecturer and preacher, and by Fagius, the great Hebraist, who became the successor of Capito, carried forward their work steadily for a long series of years, teaching in the university, preaching in the pulpits, counselling and supporting the distinguished refugees with whom their houses were sometimes filled, publishing books and tracts of superior excellence and point, attending disputations with the Catholics far and near, and colloquies with the Lutherans, corresponding with all the scholars, particularly in the south of Germany and Switzerland, and at the same time wisely and prudently guiding affairs at home in concert with the City Council and magistrates. Capito took the charge of the Old Testament literature; Bucer of the New. Capito, in connection with Sturm, negotiated with bishops, statesmen, and princes; Bucer adjusted matters with the Saxon and Swiss theologians, scholars, and pastors. Capito smoothed the asperities of controversy, and labored to remove prejudices alike from Catholics and Anabaptists, from Lutherans and Zuinglians; Bucer, the clear logician and ready debater, drafted the controversial papers, and took the lead in all public discussions. Capito had a clear head, with a soft and yielding heart, that made him love the piety even of a heretic, and wait long before he broke with one in whom there were any seeds of good; Bucer was an adroit negotiator between theological parties, seeing in opposite formulas of doctrine, with microscopic minuteness, points of agreement from which, if either Luther or Zuingli could see with his eyes, a compromise might be effected without the surrender of Christian principle. Both were men of great learning, acumen, and candor, and

deserve, on account of their moderation, wisdom, and efficiency, to be placed with Bullinger at the head of the secondary reformers, — Luther and Melancthon, Zuingli and Calvin constituting the primary.

After eighteen years of successful labor at Strasburg, Capito was in 1541 suddenly carried off with the plague, to which about one hundred and fifty in that city fell victims every week. Among these were Zuingli's son, who was a student at the university, several of the most promising young men associated with him, and Bucer's wife and three of his children.

Luther's persistence in refusing to unite with the Swiss for a common defence against the Emperor and the Catholic princes led to the disaster at Mühlburg, where the Protestant army was prostrated. Strasburg was next threatened, and all that could be effected in its favor by the great skill and unwearied efforts of Sturm and his noble associates, was to save the Protestant cause in the city by dismissing Bucer and Fagius. This took place in 1549, and Bucer, after twenty-six years of public service as a professor and preacher in Strasburg, left it in haste in a small boat, and went by way of Calais, in company with Fagius, to join Peter Martyr and other friends in England, to which country they were invited, with flattering prospects, by Cranmer. Here Bucer remained to his death, in 1551, about a year after his appointment as Professor in the University of Cambridge.

ABELARD AND HELOISE. A historical Essay. By Dr. G. Schuster. Hamburg, 1860.¹

The above-named instructive and pleasant essay forms a pamphlet of about seventy pages. The author has studied his subject carefully, both in the original sources and in the modern works relating to it; and the result is a very clear narrative, and an uncommonly judicious estimate of Abelard's character, talents, and system of doctrine. While most other writers give us either many strokes of the pencil and a confused image, or a critical investigation with a one-sided view, too highly laudatory for the most part, Schuster makes every dash of the pencil contribute to a complete picture, and, in our view, comes to a sober and just conclusion. After a brief introduction, comes the biography, constituting the greater part of the essay. A critical estimate of Abelard's character and of his philosophy forms the close of the volume. We turn to this last part, not only on account of its superior theological and philosophical interest, but on account of the length which any satisfactory view of his life would give to our notice.

It is rarely the case that an individual has a remarkable fortune without having contributed something towards it himself. So far as the events of one's life turn upon one's own character and conduct, the historian may safely infer the latter from the former. The external relations of Abelard

¹ Abelard und Heloise. Ein kirchenhistorischer Versuch, von Dr. Gustav Schuster.

are so clearly marked, and they are in their character so closely connected with his opinions and intellectual pursuits, that it is not difficult to draw from them the characteristic features of his mind. From the manner of his coming before the public, and from the effect thereby produced upon his opponents, we can see that he was no ordinary man. But it was not in unbending force of will, as with St. Bernard, nor in depth of feeling, as with Augustine; it was rather in the acuteness, strength, and activity of his intellect, in dialectical skill and learning, that he exceeded all the other men of his age. That in a life full of disquiet and suffering of a most depressing nature, he should have written so many philosophical treatises, and discoursed so much on philosophical subjects before large, intellectual audiences, proves, at least, that he had a passion for these pursuits. Whatever doubts may be entertained of the profoundness of his philosophy, there can be but one opinion about his passionate desire and unwearied efforts for definiteness, distinctness, and perfect clearness of thought. The results of his speculations and keen insight into the nature of things are felt to the present day, even by those who controvert his positions. That he was too much influenced by a love of distinction cannot be denied. There was in all his early controversies a proud reliance upon his own superior learning and logical power. It was pride of character that led him to conceal Heloise in a convent, and to keep his marriage private. Possibly he thought of the hinderance which a knowledge of the facts would present to his promotion in the church and in the schools. At a time when the control of his sensual passions would have been an honor to him, he yielded to them, not only without much attempt to resist them, but with a cool calculation, that is a drawback upon his character for perfect virtue. His earliest love was far enough from being Platonic; and in later years, if we compare his affection with that of Heloise, we shall find the latter much the purer and deeper. In his letters to her there is often a calculating and almost selfish spirit, while hers breathe a warm and excessive spirit of devotion to him. That Abelard's regard for himself was sufficiently strong appears from the manner in which he speaks of his opponents in his *Historia Calamitatum*. He is amazingly acute to notice all their faults, but fails to perceive that from their point of view much of their opposition to him was an ecclesiastical duty. It was the manner of their proceeding which was most objectionable.

Abelard cannot properly be styled a reformer. For such a character, his course was too unsteady, and his mind too one-sided. At times he was very bold, and then again he was compliant and weak. Now he is urgent and impatient for change and improvement; now he professes entire submission to his ecclesiastical superiors and to the existing order of things. He had the courage to open a new path, regardless of consequences; but he wanted the firmness and tenacity of purpose to carry the work through to the end. He had sometimes too much, and sometimes too little confidence. He acted too much as an individual, and with too little reference to a general popular

movement, for a reformer. Although he had an ideal aim, it was one that terminated with himself; it did not reach to the general mind. He did not act from the consciousness that he was the representative of a great and wide-spread public interest. Hence, he had neither the enthusiasm nor the influence of a hero. He yielded often where he was right, and was as often haughty and independent where he was wrong, at least in form. There are inconsistencies in every man's life; and Abelard deserves not to be reproached for what is common to man. Only he wants that peculiar distinction which entitles one to the rank of a reformer. No man is a reformer who has not such a hold both upon the old and the new, such a union of enthusiasm, intellect, and will; such a linking together of the individual and the general mind, as to be able to carry out his principles by means of this comprehensiveness of his mind.

It remains to give an account of the fundamental principles, philosophical and theological, laid down by Abelard in his works. The *Institutio in Theologiam*, the work that was censured at the synod of Soissons, is a treatise on the nature of God, on the Trinity, and the person and character of Christ. In the introduction, he professes a willingness to erase or change whatever any one shall show, from reason or scripture, to be erroneous or heretical. He then presents the doctrines taught by the Church Fathers and by the councils, and vindicates the right to employ the reason in matters of faith. He mistakes, however, when he supposes that his metaphysical view of the doctrine of the Trinity is in agreement with that of the church. Passing through the alembic of his dialectics, it comes out rather as Sabellianism in a new form. Sabellius regarded the Father, Son, and Spirit as only different forms of the revelation of the divine Unity, appearing in the history of the world as a Trinity. The representation of Abelard, that the Father was the power, the Son the wisdom, and the Spirit the goodness of God, aside from its being an unfounded assertion, was essentially nothing but a trinity of manifestation. His figure of a seal, in which the material represented the Father, the form of the seal, the Son, and the impression, the Spirit, is an ingenious, but useless invention. In opposition to the doctrine of the Greek church, he explains the procession of the Spirit as being both from the Father and the Son. At the close of the treatise, he maintains that the heathen comprehended the nature of God, and were, in consequence of the Christian character of their views, to be regarded in some sort as Christians. It was Erasmus, who, with a similar feeling, centuries afterwards, said he could hardly keep from saying, *O sancte Socrate, ora pro nobis*.

The *Theologia Christiana*, in five books, treats of nearly the same topics, but with greater copiousness and distinctness. In it the heathen are regarded still more nearly as Christians, and Judaism thrown comparatively into the background. In respect to miracles, he takes the position of supernaturalism. He places faith, in its essential nature, in the sensibilities, in a trustful surrender to God; but only that faith is genuine which rests

upon rational convictions. Religious feeling furnishes the materials for religious knowledge; and this latter is a higher state of religion than the believing reception of doctrines without inquiry. The drift of the whole discussion shows that the intellectual apprehension of religious truth had, after all, chief weight with him.

The work entitled *Sic et Non* is a collection of antinomies, or opposite views, on more than a hundred and fifty moral, doctrinal, exegetical, and historical subjects. Authorities, Christian and pagan, are brought forward to support both sides of each question, leaving it as a plain inference, that where the views of the church writers are so discordant, each one is at liberty to follow the guidance of his own reason.

The *Scito te Ipsum* is an ethical treatise, in which the doctrine of accountability plays the chief part. Principal stress is laid upon the account which one is to render to himself, to his own sense of right, or conscience. Sin, according to Abelard, consists in doing that which, in our own view, we ought, out of love to God, to omit. Original sin is hereby denied as to its guilt if not as to its penalty, and the will is pronounced to be capable of good as well as evil.

In his Commentary on the Romans, Abelard adopts the method of a literal interpretation. Tholuck, in his parallel between Abelard and Thomas Aquinas as interpreters, has shown that the former is more philosophical, dwelling more on the explanation of single words, and abounding in quotations from other interpreters, and that the latter is more philosophical, giving the doctrinal connection of the ideas.

It may be said, in general, that, while Anselm, following Augustine and the church, adopted the principle *credo ut intelligam*, Abelard chose the opposite, *intelligo ut credam*. If the intellectual view be first and chief, then Augustine's position in regard to the obscuration of the human intellect cannot be accepted without great limitation. Hence the doctrine that morality depends, not on the teachings of the church, but on the natural intelligence and feelings of the individual, and that salvation may be found not only out of the church, but among the heathen. In this way morality, in the end, is founded, not on objective truth, but on subjective feelings and views. If one is to understand in order to believe, then the doctrine of the church is either to be comprehended and logically justified by each individual, or it is to be remodelled. The attempt to pursue the former course produced the *Introductio in Theologiam*, and the *Theologia Christiana*; the desire to pursue the latter led to the composition of the *Scito te Ipsum* and the *Sic et Non*. Thus we see two opposite tendencies in Abelard's mind; the one in subjection to the church, the other in opposition to it.

The most purely philosophical work of Abelard is that known as his *Dialectics*. It is a treatise on logic, the subject most of all to his taste, and best suited to his talents. It is on account of his dialectical skill that he has received the appellation of the Descartes of the twelfth century. The application of dialectics to theology gave him his fame as a philosopher, but

at the same time involved him in some theological errors, and caused no small part of his miseries.

Such, in substance, are the views of Abelard's character, theological tenets, and literary productions presented in this little essay.

PHILIP MELANCHTHON'S SCHOLA PRIVATA, a historical tribute to the memory of the Preceptor Germaniae. By Dr. S. Koch. Gotha, 1859.¹

Melanchthon died April 19, 1560. Consequently the third centennial celebration of his death was observed last April. Such occasions always bring to light much new historical matter relating to the individual and his times. The year 1846 was very productive in bringing out new facts concerning the life of Luther; and the year 1859 was scarcely less prolific in curious information respecting the life and family of Schiller. Of the many public addresses and historical essays which appeared at the late celebration in honor of Melanchthon, few are more attractive or interesting to the historian than this little Essay on the history of his Schola Privata. It is the first account ever given of it. For more than two centuries the blind zealotism of the Lutheran theologians in following the creed of Luther to the letter, and in avoiding and warning others to avoid, the crypto-Calvinism of Melanchthon, left the merits of the latter to fall almost into forgetfulness. His life by Camerarius in 1566, Melchior Adam's notices of him in 1610, and Strobel's account of his merits as a biblical scholar, in 1773, are all the works of importance which appeared on this subject, till the elaborate edition of his works by Bretschneider, which began to appear in 1834. In 1841, Galle published a work on the characteristics of Melanchthon as a theologian; and in 1841, Matthes wrote the best biography of Melanchthon that has yet appeared, though it falls far short of doing justice to the subject. It is to be hoped that Professor E. Schmidt, of Strassburg, will, in his forthcoming biography of the Preceptor of Germany, more completely satisfy the wants of the present age.

As Melanchthon was a University professor, it is very natural to inquire what induced him to give private instruction in his house. We find one motive in his pecuniary necessities. His salary at Wittenberg, the first eighteen years, from 1518 to 1536, was but one hundred gulden, and the time of his school fell within this period, probably from 1529 to 1529. For his public lectures he would not take any fees. He was, moreover, extremely liberal and hospitable. Another motive is found in his fondness for private teaching, which he had practised as a mere youth before coming to Wittenberg. He gave lessons when but fourteen years of age to two sons of a nobleman; and at the age of seventeen, he gave public lectures and private lessons "with great applause." He was by nature and inclination a

¹ Philipp Melanchthon's Schola Privata. Ein historischer Beitrag zum Ehrengedächtniss des Preceptor Germaniae von Dr. Ludwig Koch.

teacher, and found no greater pleasure than in this occupation. We may mention as a third motive his conviction that, in the general barbarism of the schools at that time, nothing could contribute more to theological science than a thorough preparatory course in the Latin and Greek languages. Without a knowledge of these, he said it was impossible to understand antiquity. To attempt the critical study of the Bible without their aid, is like the attempt to fly without wings and feathers. He closes an eloquent paragraph on the subject with the words, *atque hoc est, cur domi, cur publice Latina et Graeca doceam*.

Among the multitudes that thronged his lecture-room, there were many who were not duly prepared by previous study, or had only the miserable training given by ignorant monks in the cloisters. There was then no gymnasium or preparatory school at Wittenberg, and so there was a necessity for a private arrangement by which the wants of these young men might be met. This was the immediate cause of the establishment of Melanchthon's private school. Another circumstance tending to the same result was the request of many of Melanchthon's friends that he would take their sons under his special charge. He had applied in vain to the Elector for the establishment of a grammar school. He complained that other professors were deterred from giving private instruction, partly by the labor to which it would subject them, and partly because they thought it beneath their dignity. He said he regarded such labors, in the present circumstances, as a public necessity. "It would be a shame," he adds, "if there were no teacher here to whom young persons from abroad could be committed for instruction."

From what has been said, it is easy to infer that the study of the Greek and Roman classics would hold the chief place in Melanchthon's school. His first aim was to make his pupils familiarly acquainted with the grammatical structure of both languages. Very early the Latin was used in giving instruction. Terence was the first author studied, and ten lines from him were committed to memory every day. This method was continued till the whole of that author was learned by heart. The pieces thus committed to memory were frequently acted by the pupils, under Melanchthon's direction. The Greek authors were always translated into Latin, instead of German. Indeed all scholars in that age learned to use the Latin tongue for all literary purposes. In the study of prosody, he constantly employed his pupils in writing verses. He gave them familiar examples of verses made by himself on Christian and biblical subjects, of which many have been preserved. He directed his pupils, in their private devotions, to read a chapter from the Latin Vulgate every day; and on Sundays to read his *Loci*. There were certain honors and distinctions in the household and at table which were conferred upon the author of the best Latin verses or compositions. In a letter to Camerarius, he says: "It is a law with us, that whenever there is an assembly (*comitia*) of the pupils, each one must present a Latin composition. The one who has written the best verses has the

honor of presiding at the table, — is made *rex poeticus in convivio*. It changed that Ballerodus was present with us one day, and *eleganti carmine ποιεῖσθαι* meruit; nec puduit eum nobiscum ac cum pueris collusitare. The following lines to be repeated in saying grace at table, are a favorable specimen of Melanchthon's familiar compositions written for his own use, and for that of his pupils:

His epulis donisque tuis benedicito, Christe,
 Ut foveant jussu corpora fessa tuo.
 Non alit in fragil panis modo corpore vitam,
 Sermo tuus vitæ tempora longa facit.

The dramatic performances of the *Schola Privata* were public exhibitions. Melanchthon carefully selected moral pieces from Terence, Plautus, Seneca, and Euripides (in a Latin translation), wrote the prologues himself, bespeaking the favor of the audience, calling attention to the moral of the pieces and sometimes apologizing for using pagan dramas for his purpose. Ten of these prologues have been preserved.

PLATO'S IDEA OF THE SPIRIT AS PERSONAL, and his views of education, instruction, and scientific culture. By Dr. C. R. Volquardsen. pp. 192. Berlin: 1860.¹

Rarely have we fallen in with a book which comprises so much matter within so small a compass. Not only does it represent the latest stage of learning in respect to Plato; but it is an original production, founded on fresh investigations, carefully conducted. While it gives glimpses of Plato's whole system of philosophy, it treats directly of the most important, and, to the theologian and moralist, most interesting part of his system — that which relates to the moral nature of man and the proper development of it by education and culture. Moral qualities belong only to a person. Neither God nor man, as impersonal, as the spirit of the whole universe, or any part of that spirit, could will, or choose, or have any moral character at all. Hence the term person (personal spirit) in the title is designed to indicate all that we have just said, as distinguished from the pantheistic interpretation of Plato. Some recent writers, and among them Schwegler and Zeller, who have written with much learning and ability, have at least left it doubtful whether Plato believed in a personal God; and, of course, left it as uncertain whether the distinction between good and evil is essential and eternal. If there is no personal God, then there is no moral law. Even if men think there is an objective moral law, out of themselves, they are mistaken; for moral law cannot come from a purely physical cause, or from any abstract principles not belonging to a moral being or person.

¹ Platon's Idee des persönlichen Geistes und seine Lehre über Erziehung Schulunterricht und wissenschaftliche Bildung.

The author starts, and we think rightly, with the assertion that Plato founds his philosophy on this very distinction. Like Socrates, his teacher, he directs his attention, first of all, to man ; and makes his moral constitution and the nature of virtue, a point of inquiry first in importance, and first in the order of time. Modern philosophy has shown that the perceptions of sense and intuitions of reason are reciprocally dependent on each other, and neither can be said, logically, to precede the other. If this be so, we may begin our psychological inquiries as well with the one as with the other. Besides, in laying the corner-stone of philosophy, it is quite as important to begin with what we know *certainly*, as to begin with what comes first in our experience. Descartes began with the most certain of all knowledge: "I think;" including two things — the existence of the thinking subject, and the act of thinking. Plato began with intuitive ideas ; and of these, he placed moral ideas first. I perceive an act as right or wrong. This is certain and immediate knowledge. It is ultimate. I cannot go back of it, and perceive something else which will explain it. This distinction springs immediately from the constitution of the mind, and is as true and certain as any axiom in geometry. I can no more doubt that wanton cruelty or injustice is wrong, than I can that two and two make four. If I can put confidence in my reason, in any other of its acts, I can in this act ; for they all stand on the same foundation. If there is any objective truth, there is also an objective law of right ; a law that is prior to, and independent of, my existence, or thought. It is an eternal and immutable law. This idea of the good and the right, the beautiful and the true, is the key-stone to Plato's system of ideas, as uncreated and prior to all external things or sensible objects. Now if it can be shown, that these eternal ideas were not spiritual entities separate from the being and nature of God, but that they reside in the divine mind, it will follow that the idea of right and wrong is in the divine mind ; and consequently, that he is not only a person, but a being of positive moral attributes. That point being made out, the moral nature of man has the highest dignity and importance ; for it leads him directly to the moral character of God, and makes that the standard of human virtue, and likeness to him the chief end of man. From this luminous point of view, the education and training we need is clearly seen.

We are now prepared to understand and appreciate the topics first discussed by the author, and the order of their arrangement. In the first seven sections he treats of the good as the aim of human existence ; a knowledge of it as the beginning of true philosophy ; the personality of the Creator ; the nature of moral freedom in man ; the idea of sin ; the unity of the human soul ; its immortality. From this series of topics, the transition to an exalted and complete theory of education, is easy and natural. We hardly know which most to admire, the exquisite taste, judgment, and skill with which this inquiry is conducted by the author, or the inherent beauty and excellence of the moral system of Plato, as here expounded. We will now confine our attention to the latter.

On the state of infancy, discussed in the first section of the part of the work which treats of Plato's views of education, it is remarked that the whole man is in the child : the reason and the moral nature, no less than the appetites and passions. Therefore the whole mind, though as yet undeveloped, must be regarded in the first steps of education. The intellect is weak, and the animal nature predominates. The place of the former in repressing the latter must, therefore, be supplied, so far as is necessary, by the intellect of the parent. The moral powers, though feeble, are very susceptible to impression ; and it is by no means indifferent what the young child sees or hears. It should see nothing but order and virtue in others ; and be trained to observe the rules of both. It, moreover, comes into the world with natural defects, transmitted from the parents : a diseased state, caused by them, or by uncontrollable circumstances, for which it is not personally accountable. To heal these, requires no less care than to heal the diseases of the body. Next follow excellent dietetic rules, as much needed now as they were in Plato's time. After adding that infancy should be surrounded by and educated in an atmosphere of love, the writer advances to the school-going period of childhood.

The first and the last thing to be done, in education and in life, is to bring the rational and moral nature of man to the largest practicable participation in the good and the true. All the studies as well as habits of childhood should be made conducive to this end. The child is not able to judge of principles ; he sees and knows things only in the concrete. The beautiful and the good, as such, he does not perceive ; he only perceives beautiful things and good acts. Visible and sensible things, examples, moral tales, and pictures of the imagination, affect him most. The natural characteristics of his mind are shyness, a sense of shame, submission, a desire to please, a love of imitation, and a facility to acquire. Simple stories and poetical recitals of the deeds of great and good men, are specially adapted to affect the minds of the young, and to impress upon them the lessons of virtue and the maxims of wisdom and truth. In this should be given a true picture of God's government in the life and history of men. The mythical stories of the Greeks are highly objectionable in this respect, abounding as they do in the vices both of the gods and of men. Why should so many bad examples be placed before the susceptible minds of the young ? As God is the source of all that is good, and as evil comes from him only by way of punishment, it perverts the moral sense, is contradictory and false, to represent divine beings as having committed crimes. Such representations destroy the idea of Divinity, which is perfect, free from evil, and incapable of appearing in such various and faulty human forms.

It is not enough to say that evil things are in the world, and that, as the child must know them, he may as well know them first as last. With his weak and imperfect nature, the less evil he sees and knows, the better, till his character is formed and his principles fixed. The matter brought before him, whether in romance or history, should be carefully selected, leaving

out all impurities and vice, except where they appear as objects of aversion and receive due punishment.

In respect to belles lettres studies, Plato suggests a similar caution. As the child drinks in whatever is offered him, and as the poets present men and manners as they are, and not as they should be, it would be premature and unsafe for him to read the poets indiscriminately. The poet and the educator of youth have very different objects in view: the one, to amuse and please, without reference to morality; the other, to create a love for the good in morals, and thus lay the foundation of character.

Musical instruction is of the highest importance; for melody, harmony, and rhythm, which are here combined, flow from a corresponding state of the mind, and tend to reproduce it when repeated. Springing from the very depths of the soul, it acts powerfully upon it in turn, and goes far to fix the character of its feelings. A revolution in music is at the same time a social and moral revolution. It penetrates the mind, operates secretly there, forms its tone of feeling, appears in outward acts, influences social intercourse, and finally affects the public manners, and the laws and institutions of the state. But music would lose its proper effect if it were the sole object of attention. It is to be balanced by other and different studies and exercises. A strong and vigorous mind may be rendered effeminate and soft, over-sensitive and passionate by exclusive musical culture. Other and opposite qualities of the mind need to be cultivated at the same time. To this end serves the gymnastic art. It produces power, courage, and enterprise. It is salutary as inuring one to self-denial, hardship and toil. Athletic exercises would lead to the other extreme, if separated from music and other kindred studies. The sole aim of developing strength of muscle and skill of movement would tend to blunt the sensibilities, stupefy the intellect, and produce an over-bearing spirit, a foolish independence and self-will, and a propensity to deeds of violence. Hence the necessity of the regular alternation of musical and athletic exercises. The object of both is the same, the complete and beautiful development of the whole man,—an object which the teacher of youth must never lose sight of. These views of Plato, founded on much experience and observation, will not be without interest at the present time, when so much public attention is beginning to be given to the same subject.

The next two topics are on manners and the social virtues, which we must pass over in silence. After these come the acquisition of knowledge, mental discipline, and practical education. As all the above includes only so much knowledge and discipline as are acquired in the schools before the pupils have arrived at the age of eighteen, and as the Greeks were not in advance of us, but rather behind us in this part of school education, we barely notice these topics for the sake of the connection, and pass to others offering more that is peculiar and characteristic.

From eighteen to twenty the Athenian youth were employed in military and other similar exercises, inasmuch as they then became citizens, and were, as such, to prepare themselves for the arts and duties of war and

peace. The philosophical ground offered for such an interruption of study is, that, at this particular period of life, there is a peculiar state of mind, a boldness and recklessness of spirit, a daring and love of adventure, which render severe physical tasks salutary, giving an outlet to an exuberance of animal feeling and muscular energy, which might prove perilous if too closely pent up. The mind is then not sufficiently mature, in ordinary cases, for grappling patiently with philosophical problems. Consequently two years may be spent in severe bodily discipline without any real sacrifice of the intellectual character. During this period of military gymnastics, the mind begins to think for itself, to form independent opinions, and to show some appetences and capacities for a particular calling.

Now commences a period of ten years, from the age of twenty to that of thirty, which is devoted to science as preparatory to the highest philosophy. Knowledge must be rendered surer in its foundations and wider in its extent. Mathematics, natural philosophy, and history are now to be studied fundamentally. In each of these three departments of knowledge it is necessary to have a teacher occupied exclusively with his own science. (Here Plato draws a true picture of the effect of mathematical reasoning upon the mental habits, just as it is given in modern times.) All the sciences studied during this period must be thoroughly systematized, and their relations to each other so exactly ascertained that they shall together constitute a larger system. The teacher will easily discover which of his pupils display great logical power and thereby prove their adaptedness for the higher philosophy. Some will show a quenchless thirst for knowledge. Running through all time and space, the inquisitive mind will leap over the barriers of the finite and inquire after that which is unseen and everduring. It will be powerfully affected, when it sees one, like Socrates, looking upward above all that is visible and finite, striving for the good that is unseen, and suffering death for it. It will be no harm to one, if, during these ten years, he have some civil employment, or travel abroad.

By this time, having arrived at about thirty years of age, one is prepared to enter upon the study of speculative philosophy. Here commences the great struggle of the original thinker in encountering a world of difficulties and doubts. It is a Herculean task for one to muster all his knowledge, received on independent evidence, and to remove from it every form of contradiction. The philosopher learns to be patient, to be neither polemical nor dogmatical, to love nothing but truth, and hate nothing but falsehood. All knowledge must be reduced to unity. The circle of sciences must constitute a complete cosmos. Philosophy must become the science of sciences. It is concerned with such questions as these: What is time? What is space? What is matter? What is mind? What is the first cause of all things? How does the finite come from the infinite; the many from the one? How is the divine reason related to the human; the infinite and uncreated excellence to the imperfect virtue of men? What is the foundation of morality and government; and for what end was the world created, and does man exist?

We are not through with the system of education yet. There is still to

come the practical school of life from thirty-five to fifty; and after that the philosophical life of man from the age of fifty onward. All the knowledge previously gained is to fit men for action. Much of its use will be lost, if it be not applied to improve society and to regulate the state. After retiring from active life, the philosopher may still contribute to theoretical knowledge, and serve the state by publishing his maturest, last and best thoughts, bringing down pure and immutable ideas and eternal principles to the apprehension of those who rule society.

Turning to another world, he perceives that on earth all knowledge and virtue are imperfect, that both are in a process of growth without having reached their full measure. It is not given him in this life to gaze directly upon the pure world of "ideas." How much we shall know in the life to come depends upon the will and goodness of God. What the philosopher desires is first to be purified and then released from life and received into the world of spirits. We lay down this book not without emotion, repeating the words of one of the Christian Fathers, *Plato fere christianus*.

AESTHETICS; the idea of the beautiful and its realization in nature, mind and art. By M. Carriere. Two volumes. Leipsic, 1859.¹

It will be most convenient to notice this work by comparing it with that of Vischer on the same subject whose theory was presented in a former number of this Journal. Both are experienced academic lecturers on the fine arts. Both are well versed in philosophy as a mental science, and in the history of philosophical systems, ancient and modern. Both are familiar with the works of art, and are evidently good judges in matters of taste. Both are advocates of what is somewhat vaguely called the spiritual theory of beauty. Here the points of resemblance cease. Carriere seems to have the most aesthetic feeling; Vischer the most metaphysical power. Carriere has renounced Hegel and is more in sympathy with the modern Munich school of philosophy; Vischer adheres to Hegel and the old Berlin school. Carriere professes to begin with the facts of experience in the domain of the beautiful, and make the results constitute his theory; Vischer begins in the depths of the Hegelian philosophy and emerges to the light as he approaches nature and art. Carriere is much more speculative and less inductive than he claims to be; Vischer is much more sound and practical in all the details of his subject than would be expected from his point of departure. Carriere is always more or less mystical; Vischer is always a rationalist in philosophy and art. And yet these two writers agree wonderfully in all the practical applications of their theories.

According to both, beauty exists only where there is the union of the spiritual and the corporeal, of mind and matter; and perfect beauty is limited to those cases where they exist in equipoise and harmony, where,

¹ Aesthetik. Die Idee des Schönen und ihre Verwirklichung durch Natur, Geist und Kunst, von Moriz Carriere.

to use their own expressions, they perfectly inter-penetrate each other, where idea and form are perfectly blended and united. Beauty is the indirect aim of the creation, and utility its direct aim. Beauty appears only in certain individuals of a class, and in those individuals only for a transient period. By mind or spirit, both mean the organizing principle of nature, that which produces order where there would otherwise be chaos. With the one, it is the abstract impersonal divinity; with the other, it is the personal God who is also the soul of the universe. With the one, beauty comes from an abstract law, as a formative principle in matter; with the other, it comes from a personal divinity, essentially present in matter. The English or American advocate of the spiritual theory of beauty would say that beauty comes from the designing mind of the Almighty, from the impress of his conceptions upon matter, whether you refer the divine agency to what are called the laws of matter and the laws of life, or to an immediate and continuous influence. Carriere observes that the feeling of beauty presupposes objects of beauty in the world of matter and of mind, which in all their variety have a unity in God, and find a harmony in his laws under which they all exist. Nature is an inexhaustible source of enjoyment to man, and the enjoyment of the beautiful generally begins in nature rather than in art. In the human eye, with its waving lines, arched roof, and transparent colors, through which the mind flashes, every one, who is at all sensible to beauty, perceives that here the ideal and the real are united; that matter and spirit are blended; that the spirit is in the form or appearance, and that the form swims like an islet in the spirit. Beauty extends far beyond organized matter. Mind appears in inorganic forms so far as they have order and proportion, and are removed from chaos. Wherever, in matter, a divine plan or thought is manifested, there is the possibility of beauty. Here unity and variety may exist in harmony with each other. Matter without mind never would possess an artistic unity. Beauty is the beaming of divinity through matter. Though it is on the surface of objects, that surface must represent the inward nature of the object; must be the legitimate expression of an inward principle. In nature, beauty appears to be only an incidental result, appearing only at certain points, and for a limited time, when all things favor the perfect representation of the formative idea; whereas in art beauty is the direct and only aim, and is both all-pervading and permanent. Nature is in motion; its beautiful forms change every hour by means of a chemical or vital process. Art is stationary and fixed. Its flowers do not wither and fade like those of nature. A child passes out of the state of childhood; his portrait remains in perpetual childhood. Art removes the imperfections of nature; but it cannot catch all its graces. The one is more uniformly expressive of some kind and degree of beauty; the other, as in the blooming face of youth or in a delicate flower, has some exquisite beauties which art cannot fully represent. In art, beauty exhausts itself in a few forms; in nature, what is wanting in one individual is made up in others, and re-

peated in a thousand forms. There is no end to the individual beautiful things of nature. All the works of high art can easily be numbered. Art seizes upon the moment of perfect bloom and perpetuates the form. Nature produces only for speedy decay, but is ever reproducing. If a portrait outlives individuals and generations, the race outlives the portrait. Instead, therefore, of setting up the claims of the one for superiority over the other, we should regard each as the complement of the other. The whole universe is, no doubt, when taken together, an object of beauty to God as a single work of art is to us. The parts of the universe are beautiful to us whenever our fortunate point of view gives a completeness to that part, as in a landscape that has both unity and variety. Because the whole universe is an organism, its parts contain many minor organisms, more or less analogous to the whole.

These views of beauty, abridged and condensed from the author, somewhat at the expense of their connection, may serve to illustrate the character of his mind, and the spirit of the book. What he says on the next general topic, the imagination, is equally characteristic. The beautiful, he says, in substance, — for we do not give his words — is the joint result of the action of external objects and of the mind. It does not exist perfect and complete in the outward world, but is in part produced by our own sensibilities. It is the fusion, the inter-penetration of the ideal and the real, of the outer and the inner world. Our minds must always be *productive* in the enjoyment of the beautiful. Nature follows its own objects, and if, in the meantime, it also awakens in us the feeling of the beautiful, it is a fortunate accident, inasmuch as we have an impressive view of a thing at the moment of its highest bloom, or from a favorable point of observation. The wind may strip the flowers from their stems; the clouds of a glorious sunset may change in a few moments, or approaching night may close the scene. But there arises afterwards in the mind a longing after the beauty that has departed, and after beauty as such, and the harmony and repose which it gives. Thus the momentary delight that was felt creates a permanent want. The power which satisfies this want by creations of its own more or less dependent on reminiscences of the past, is the imagination. This faculty unites the subjective and the objective whenever it sees in the phenomena the law, in the form of a thing, its spirit or life, and when it clothes the conception in sensible forms, and employs the finite to reveal the infinite. It first gives birth to the artistic idea as a whole which it afterwards elaborates, instead of proceeding, as the understanding does, from the parts to the whole. The conception of a great work of art is always a revelation from within, not a patchwork of things coming from without. The ideal, the divine types and patterns of things, to speak with Plato, are to the imagination what principles and laws are to the understanding. It is the office of the imagination to have an inward intuitive view of the ideal in some of its myriad forms, and give expression to it in some material substance. As a faculty of the mind, it is sponta-

neous and free in its action, and yet it cannot arbitrarily wander from truth or nature without degenerating. The true imagination sees in nature traces of divine thought, and forms for itself those images only which correspond to their original types. The external world excites the imagination and furnishes the elements of its conceptions. While the understanding seeks for universal abstract principles, the imagination seeks for divine thought where it clothes itself in material forms. It gives itself up to a passive contemplation of nature, as it were taking a daguerreotype of it upon the polished surface of the soul. In this attitude it remains entranced till it is perfectly in harmony and sympathy with the scene, and thus acquires the power of producing similiar pictures and similar tones of feeling when yielding to its own reveries. It has a two-fold power, the one conscious and voluntary; the other involuntary. The ideas and images that rise unbidden, from a source and by a process which we do not understand, are usually those which bear most distinctly the stamp of genius. In our sleep, the imagination is active instead of the perceptive and the reflective faculties. The mind itself is at the same time dramatist, actor and spectator. Out of itself it spins its web; it creates persons, situations, and sentiments, and a language suited to each. This is the special prerogative of the imagination. In our wakeful hours it still dreams, but with a closer observance of the laws of nature. There is but a narrow line separating the imagination of the poet from that of a delirious person. The reverie of the one is known to be but a reverie; that of the other is taken for a reality. Man is by nature an idealist. This is apparent especially in the period of childhood, when the imaginary is so blended with everything real.

No mechanical operation of the mind, no conscious act of mere combination, can produce a work of art. The world, in all its beautiful types, steals secretly into the mind of the poet, and there awaits the moment of inspiration, which shall put it forth in the form of a new creation. The time of the spiritual conception is one in which the mind, trembling with sensibility, feels an elevation of which it can give no distinct account, sees things in a new and yet well-known light, and experiences a fulness of aesthetical felicity without dwelling, in thought, particularly on any individual object. This state of mind does not come at one's bidding; but comes spontaneously, if it come at all. In this state, the imagination is withdrawn from the outward world. It is, itself, the source of an inner world, which it produces best when it is in a sort of ecstasy. This poetic inspiration is the more necessary because the mind does not copy from nature, in its ideal creations; but rather produces the original generic types, after which nature is formed. But the inspiration is not a miraculous agency from without, nor a blind pantheistic power working within; but one from our own inmost soul, that has the ground of its being and its life in God. It is the feeling of an all-controlling spirit in the depth of our souls, a flashing of divine ideas in and through our own consciousness, a seizing, as it were, of the thoughts of Divinity by the unique power of the creative imagination. While true genius is highly subjective,

forming creations peculiar to itself, it is equally objective, making its creations conformable to eternal principles, all of which centre in God. Thus images are shadowed forth dimly in the visible world; but they start up most perfectly in a rational soul that is highly gifted in its moments of inspiration.

This explanation of the poet's frenzy, shows how perfectly the author agrees with Vischer in respect to the process of artistic creations; and, at the same time, how he differs from him in respect to the origin or cause of the inspiration. It is what is held in common by the two, and, in part, by Ruskin also, that is most valuable. All these writers represent a new age in art, in which mechanical explanations are no longer satisfactory, an age to whose spirit lord Jeffrey was a total stranger. But Carriere and Vischer have written a complete system of aesthetics, in which, after a general view of the nature and work of the imagination and of the principles of taste, all the fine arts are represented in their order. What characterizes both writers, is the care they have taken to bring their views into harmony with the known opinions of the great artists of all ages. We thus have the common sentiment of the artists themselves, instead of the idiosyncracies and dogmatism of an individual. In criticism, these two German writers agree with the best things said by Ruskin, while they are mostly free from his singular aberrations. We have not space to enter upon the more practical part of the work before us, to which the second volume is wholly devoted. The subjects treated are the following: 1. architecture; 2. sculpture; 3. painting; 4. music; 5. poetry—epic, lyric, and dramatic. It is not the author's object to give technical rules for the instruction of artists, but to discuss aesthetical principles, such as need to be understood by all who would enjoy works of art. He gives the philosophy of the subject, instead of arbitrary and oracular judgments. He is, for this reason, much more interesting and instructive than Ruskin, while he is also more comprehensive and systematic. The latter chooses special topics, according to his own tastes or fancy. He somewhat oddly associates painting and architecture, which are less connected than either of them is with sculpture. Architecture relates to inorganic matter and its laws, is massive, and expresses only the general spirit of a people or age. Painting is chiefly concerned with the feelings and passions of men in their relations to each other and to nature. Statuary lies between the two, representing, with more uniformity, what is general and permanent in human nature, apart from its external relations, and with little either of transient feeling, or of accidental accompaniment. Even within these limits, Ruskin attaches himself, passionately, to a particular school; and against all others, no matter how pure or high they may be, he carries on a war with tomahawk and scalping-knife. Carriere is free from these peculiarities. With the exception of his Platonic or mystical tendencies, and his occasional antagonism to the cold abstractions of deism and of the Hegelian pantheism, he is a writer of genial spirit, of a pure and delicate taste, of sound judgment, and of comprehensive catholic views. The

reader who has experienced alternate admiration and indignation, in the perusal of the books proceeding from Ruskin's powerful, bold, and dashing pen, will, in passing to the masterly and comparatively sober, and yet lively and fascinating works of Vischer and Carriere, have sensations like those who, after living through the tumult of an exciting revolution, find quiet and order, and gentle excitement under a settled government.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PHILOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES. By Dr. B. Schmitz. One Vol. 8vo. 1859. Supplement to the same, 1860.¹

The title sufficiently indicates the peculiarly German character of this work. In the German universities, where students select their own courses of study and pursue them in their own way, it has long been customary for professors in the different departments to give a preparatory course of instruction, in which their own particular branch of science is defined, its nature unfolded, the order of its parts arranged, the method of pursuing it described, and all the aids for studying the whole subject specified. The publication of such lectures, or the preparation of books founded on them, furnishes no insignificant part of the literature of every important subject of academic instruction. The study of language has, of late, been carried so far that it is quite necessary that there should be such guides for the student. In classical philology there is an abundant supply of them; and in the encyclopedias of theological study, that portion which relates to sacred philology and interpretation is by no means inconsiderable. But the modern languages have generally been studied either in so incidental or so purely practical a way as to furnish but little material for a solid and learned book on the subject. The writers of books for learning these languages have not always been men either of great talents or erudition. They have, for the most part, been private teachers or literary adventurers. Of late years there has been a great and salutary change in this respect. The careful research which was once limited almost exclusively to the ancient languages was first extended to the Teutonic and Romanic languages of the Middle Ages, and is now beginning to be applied to all the modern languages and dialects which have grown out of them. Even the comparative study of the Indo-European family of languages has already borne some good fruits in producing a more rational treatment of the etymology of living languages.

The design of the author in preparing his "Encyclopedia" is to foster and increase this spirit of improvement, to point out the way for making further progress, and to specify all the books of merit that have appeared on the subject. His aim is both theoretical and practical. It is nothing less than to arrange and reduce to order the confused mass of materials

¹ Encyclopädie des philologischen Studiums der neueren Sprachen, von Dr. Bernh. Schmitz, 1859. Erstes Supplement, 1860.

already existing; to furnish a clear view of the subject in its whole extent and in its several parts; to examine and criticise the current methods of instruction and study, and to furnish a guide which shall meet all the wants of the teacher.

The author divides his work into four parts. 1. *The study of language in general*, embracing the nature and extent of the science of language with special reference to the study of the modern languages; the philosophy, classification, and history of languages, with an account of the works which treat of these topics; the origin and history of writing, printing, etc., and the books written on the subject; the Greek, Latin, Celtic, German, and Romanic languages; outline of the history of literature, giving the names of the principal writers, being very brief on the literature of Greece, Rome, and the Middle Ages, but more extended on that of the last four centuries. These, of course, are preliminary topics, and, with one or two exceptions, are well chosen. 2. *A literary introduction to the study of the modern languages*, including preliminary observations, an account of grammars, lexicons, books of exercises, history of the languages, history of the literature, chrestomathies, and critical reviews and essays. 3. *Method of studying the modern languages*. 4. *Method of teaching the modern languages*.

In this last chapter is discussed, somewhat at large, the importance of the modern languages in a system of academic study. The subject is a complex one, and cannot be disposed of from a single point of view. The author justly remarks, that the place which they should occupy in schools is by no means a settled question. Not only will every new generation of teachers examine this point for themselves, but the constantly changing state of literature and science and of the relations of nations to each other renders a frequent review of the subject necessary. He gives his views in a series of propositions as follows:—

1. *A language is studied in order that the knowledge of it thus acquired may be retained and used.*

2. *As the Romans, in the best period of their literary culture, found it necessary to understand two languages (bilingues Romani), so, at the present day, must every well-educated man understand the three leading languages of the civilized world, the German, the French, and the English.* If we consider modern Europe under the various points of view presented by its politics, science, art, industry, commerce, and social intercourse, we shall find that it has three spoken languages which outweigh in importance all the others, and which deserve to be called the three great powers among its living languages. Not only is the study of the French and the English on the increase in Germany, but in France and England more and more attention is given to the study of German. The literature of each of these three nations is fast becoming the common property of all. We admit the importance of the ancient languages for all higher culture, and adopt the words of Mager, that “the knowledge of our native tongue enables us to

understand what is national; the knowledge of other modern languages, what is European; and the knowledge of the ancient languages, together with the modern, what is cosmopolitan."

3. *The ancient languages are learned for the same reason as the modern, namely, that they may be retained and used.* We use a language when we have intercourse with the people that speaks through it. We have intercourse with the people of Greece and Rome when we read the Greek and Roman authors, just as we do with the people of France and England when we read French and English works. In books we have the best things which a nation has spoken or produced,—those which most truly reveal *its own spirit*; and it is this with which we wish to hold converse. It has often been said that living languages, in distinction from the dead, are learned for purposes of social intercourse. But, even if enough knowledge of these languages were acquired in our schools to accomplish this end, how many, I would ask, of our scholars have much occasion in all their lives to speak either of them? But comparatively few hold much personal intercourse with the French or the English. It is surely not necessary to practise speaking a foreign language from childhood, merely because one may fall in with a foreigner in some of his railroad travels. The general purpose, then, for which cultivated persons study French or English can be no other than that they may be able to hold intercourse with the people who use it, through the medium of their literary productions. Whether the nation whose works I study passed away centuries ago, or still exists, is, if I hold no personal intercourse with it, of little importance to me. In literary society we need a knowledge of languages, it is true; but the Latin is quite as frequently referred to in literary circles as the French. In such instances, both are virtually dead languages.

4. *The true maxim is not "the more languages the better, but the fewer the better."* Just as truly as the study of language is fundamental in education, furnishing, as it does, the means of understanding all the forms and modes of human thought, so truly is it an error to suppose that such culture is in the ratio of the number of languages studied. *The discipline and culture acquired by the study of language are rather in proportion to the thoroughness with which it is pursued.* Laying out of the account the case of the scholar whose aim is to make the comparison of languages a special study, it is better for one to possess a thorough mastery of one language than to have a superficial knowledge of two, three, or more languages. Though it is true that no translation completely represents the original, it is no less true that a good translation gives a better understanding of it than the reading of it without a competent knowledge of its genius and the subtleties of its idiomatic forms. Men, moreover, have something else to do in the world besides learning languages. For most men, even of studious habits, it is better to limit themselves to one or two modern languages besides their own than to attempt the study of many, which can lead to nothing but superficiality. With persons of remarkable tastes it may be otherwise. There

has been much just complaint of the dissipating effect produced in the minds of the young by an undue multiplicity of studies. This objection applies in its full force to a mere smattering of many languages. Let whatever is studied be pursued to some purpose.

5. *If instruction in foreign languages is to produce mental discipline, it must not be begun too early, nor carried on in such a manner as to pass too quickly from one language to another.* Children are usually put to the grammatical study of these modern languages quite too early, and then hurried away from the elements of one language to those of another. How much better would it be, where it is not learned by use, to wait before learning it from books till they come to have some comprehension of things, till they understand their own thoughts and know how to express them in their own language! It is to no purpose to say that a child ten or twelve years old can be instructed in three languages. It can be made to repeat the words; but it cannot, by such treatment, be made to understand any language, not even its own. The author goes so far as to contend that it is a misfortune when a child grows up speaking two or three languages; he affirms that such a child has no mother tongue; no natural, healthful, intellectual life. It is at home in nothing. The natural development of the mind of a child from ideas awakened by the objects around him, and from thoughts and emotions within him, all cast in the clear and simple mould of his native language, is disturbed when it is turned out of this course and put under an artificial, hot-bed culture. While it is necessary that a child have time to grow into the knowledge of his mother tongue without interruption, it is also necessary that a second language, to be acquired by study, should be learned gradually; and that time be allowed for it to be firmly rooted in the mind. Four years is little time enough for this purpose, in the schools, if other studies are carried on at the same time. If the French cannot be commenced with safety before a child is ten years old, a second foreign language should not be introduced till he is fourteen.

6. *The first instruction in a modern language should be vigorous and consecutive.* Two lessons in a week looks well enough on paper. It makes a pleasing variety on a programme. But, by this method, a young pupil no sooner begins to feel an interest in the subject than he is hurried away to other studies, and returns to it after several days with a distracted mind, and with diminished interest. A daily lesson is not too much for any language, at the beginning. While the study possesses novelty, it should be briskly pursued, till its first difficulties are overcome. Afterwards, the frequency of lessons may, if necessary, be somewhat diminished. But it is quite impossible to excite any enthusiasm in the mind of a child, if several days intervene between the earliest lessons.

Whether we agree with the author or not, it must be admitted that he grapples with his subject vigorously, and utters his sentiments like a man that has both knowledge and experience. We must not forget to mention one drawback in the book for those who are not Germans; and that is, that,

in the second part, containing an account of the literary helps to the study of modern languages, the books relating to the French and English languages only are given, those relating to the German not being supposed necessary.

THE LABORING CLASSES AND COMMUNISTS IN GREECE AND ROME, from original sources. By W. Drumann, pp. 364. Königsberg, 1860.¹

This veteran scholar and historian, author of the elaborate historical work on Pompeius, Caesar, Cicero, and their contemporaries, and other books of sterling value, says in his preface to this work: "Whether it was expedient for me, in my advanced age, to write another book, must be left to the judgment of those who read it." We feel quite sure not only that those who are acquainted with his other works will read this, but that they will recognize here as there the original investigator and the profound scholar. The title of the book should have been, *The Laboring Classes among the Greeks and Romans*; for the communists are very properly disposed of in a few pages. The first half of the work is devoted to the laborers of Greece; the second, to those of Rome. After a few paragraphs on the subject in the times of Homer, the author enters upon the historical period, and shows at considerable length the degradation of labor among the Greeks, giving a picture that would answer very well for the slave states of our own country. He then considers the condition and character of the various classes of laborers whose occupations were regarded as not liberal. These were mechanics, manufacturers, merchants, artists, writers and orators who received pay, sophists, sycophants, actors, physicians, athletes, and mercenary soldiers.

Mechanics were regarded with little or no respect, because they were supposed to be without bodily or mental culture, and without the necessary leisure to attend to public affairs. They were not entitled to all the rights of citizenship, but were an inferior, and sometimes a servile, class.

Manufacturers, even when they employed slaves to do the work, were regarded as having an ignoble calling. The number of slaves employed by such was very great. The twenty thousand slaves who fled to the Spartans, when the Peloponnesian war raged in Attica, were mostly operatives in factories.

Athens was favorably situated for commerce; but this business was mostly in the hands of foreigners, and the imports greatly exceeded the exports. Merchants were not respected, not even importers, or wealthy men who furnished the capital for others, much less the retail merchants and shopkeepers. Such men rarely participated in public affairs. Plato says: "This business should be put into the hands of the weak, and those who are unfit for other occupations."

¹ *Die Arbeiter und Communisten in Griechenland und Rom, nach den Quellen, von. W. Drumann.*

Adepts in the fine arts fared but little better in respect to the esteem in which they were held. Though music was highly cultivated after the time of the Persian wars, and musicians and music teachers were well paid, still the profession was little regarded.

Painters, who received pay for their pictures, were no more honored than musicians. Both were well patronized, and could easily accumulate wealth, but that was all.

Sculptors were put in the same category. They were employed and richly rewarded; but the proud Athenian citizen, who participated in the affairs of state, looked upon them as inferiors, — as but the necessary means of their own luxury.

Teachers by profession were mere employés. There were no public schools, and the youth were consequently instructed by private teachers, each teaching his own art separately. The Sophists were no exceptions. They taught for money; and that was enough to fix a stigma even upon the best of them.

If an orator prepared a plea to be delivered by a client, or pleaded for him, and received a fee, he was looked upon with disfavor, and was liable to be reproached for it.

Actors were less despised in Greece than in Rome.

The occupation of the sycophant, or paid informer, was justly despised.

Physicians were sometimes employed by cities, and were then well paid. The people were less munificent, and it was often necessary for the physician to take pupils to increase his income. He was accordingly reckoned as belonging to the laboring classes.

Athletes, though greatly patronized in Greece, generally belonged to the lower classes. As a profession they were held in no esteem.

The citizen who took up arms in defence of his country was sure to be honored; but the mercenary, who made war a trade, held a low place in the public estimation.

From all the above statements, — and we have only touched upon this single point, — it appears that labor was not duly honored in Greece. A true and lasting civilization can never spring from such a state of society. Nothing but conquest and plunder can support a state in which industry is so dishonored.

The book before us, being made up mostly of facts, briefly stated, with references to authorities at the foot of the page for every statement, does not admit either of abridgment or of illustration by examples. We will not allude to the second part, which relates to Rome, except to remark that its topics are more numerous than those of the first, and that they occupy a larger portion of the work. The classical scholar cannot fail to be interested in a book containing such a collection of facts, which is the result of a careful and long continued study of the Greek and Roman classics on the part of the venerable author.

FREE BIBLICAL THEOLOGY AND ITS OPPONENTS; an illustration of the modern systems of theology with particular reference to the Swiss Church. By Dr. A. N. Böhner, pp. 131. Zürich, 1859.¹

The author of the pamphlet above named is one of those theologians who is not alarmed at the scepticism of the last or of the present generation of philosophers and critics. In his view, it is only necessary to put their systems side by side with Christianity, and to subject them all to an equally close scrutiny, and the solidity and superiority of the latter will become strikingly evident to every unsophisticated mind. Many plausible things can be said against the truth: many deductions may be drawn from our partial knowledge of it, which will perplex some minds. But truth, after all, cannot be talked down, nor reasoned down.

The various theories of modern scepticism in Germany are analyzed and classified by the author, and then the fundamental principle of each is examined with a boldness and power that remind one of the manner of the Reformers. He first shows the absurdity of materialism, recently proclaimed in Switzerland by certain young teachers as something new, which maintains that "a thinking being can spring from unthinking matter," or, as our author expresses it, "a living child from a dead mother." Pantheism, in all its forms, he says elsewhere, is essentially at variance with our moral consciousness; and would, if universally accepted, lead to the dissolution of society. The existence of society, of virtue, law, and government, depends on the reality of moral distinctions, which pantheism makes only a cloud of mist. Rationalism teaches that the revelation of God is to be sought only in the human reason. Speculatively, this theory has no solid foundation; and practically, history is one grand demonstration of its falsehood. Symbolism, which petrifies Christianity in creeds, and subjects the mind to human authorities, is so opposed to a free and spiritual Christianity that it cannot stand the test of time. A free biblical theology embraces all that is true in other systems. Its first principle, than which nothing can be more certain in philosophy, is that something actually exists and has always existed; and that this something is neither the thinking subject, nor the outward world, but the Infinite Being who is the author of both. Admitting that the character of this First Cause is, in some measure, made known in the human reason, in the laws of nature, and in the course of history, still, it is maintained, that the true and grand revelation is made by the Spirit of God through the medium of Christianity. The writer, in successive chapters, compares each point of his theory with those of the opposing theories; and believes that every sound and unprejudiced mind will perceive that both the authority of reason and the evidence of facts will be on the side of the theology of the Bible. Without agreeing with him in all his expositions of Christianity, we must say that they are in the main just, and that his defence of the Christian religion is strong and manly, and his

¹ Die freiforschende Bibeltheologie und ihre Gegner.

assault upon the theories of recent sceptics are as destructive as they are brief and pithy.

LIVES AND SELECT WRITINGS OF THE FATHERS AND FOUNDERS OF THE REFORMED CHURCH. Supplementary volume, Part First. Life of John A Lasco, by P. Bartels, of Leo Judae, by C. Pestalozzi, of Francis Lambert of Avignon, by F. W. Hassencamp; and of William Farel and Peter Viret, by Dr. E. Schmidt. 1860.¹

The men whose lives are here represented may properly be styled reformers of the third rank. Their names are so often mentioned, and the part they acted so often referred to, in the lives of the chief reformers, and in the history of the times, that every reader desires to know more of them. Besides, the principal figures are more distinctly marked when viewed, not only from their own place, but from other points of observation also. It is one thing to be with Luther, with Zuingli, with Calvin, and, occasionally, to meet with Melancthon, with Bullinger, and with Beza; and quite another thing to be companions of the latter, and from their position to contemplate the acts of the former. In like manner, we gain new light when we look upon the same scenes from still other points of view. We cordially welcome, therefore, these supplementary additions. The editors have shown excellent judgment in putting this third class of men in groups in a single volume. Viewed in connection with the great reformers, they add to the interest of the whole.

In the brief but excellent biography of a Lasco, we are first introduced to a young Polish noble, brought up in splendor near the throne, and early entering upon a diplomatic career. Again, we behold him the friend and patron of Erasmus, living in the same house with him in Louvain and supporting his table. Now he is in Germany, now in Italy, and then again in Poland. The king offers him high preferment in the church. This young man of fortune, while studying in Switzerland, had made the acquaintance of Zuingli and of other reformers, and had imbibed their doctrines, and could not consent to compromise his conscience for any earthly prospects. He leaves his country and his powerful friends, where he cannot conscientiously act the part that is expected of him, and he becomes an humble pastor and leads first a private life, and is finally made pastor and superintendent in Embden, in East Friesland. There he becomes the head of the Protestants, supported by the Duchess Anne of Guelders and beloved by the majority of the people; but opposed by the Catholic party there, by the powerful court of Brabant at Antwerp, and by the imperial government. Vexed and threatened by the last two during the odious and oppressive period of "the Interim," and invited to England by Cranmer on

¹ *Leben und ausgewählte Schriften der Väter und Begründer der Reformirten Kirche.* IX (Supplement) Theil. I. Hälfte. Johannes a Lasco, Leo Judä, Franciscus Lambert, Wilhelm Farel und Peter Viret.

the accession of Edward VI. to the throne, he settled in London as the pastor of the foreign church, composed of refugees from Germany, the Netherlands, and France. Here he remained and exerted a wide-spread influence, till the death of the prince and the accession of Mary made it necessary for him and his church to flee. The history of that flight, first to Denmark, then to the north of Germany, and the cruelties shown them by the intolerance of the extreme Lutherans, his return to Emden, their settlement in Frankfort, and his final call to Poland to reform the church of his native country, make up the remaining part of the narrative. In the midst of his toils he was suddenly overtaken by death, and thus closed his laborious and troubled life, in which, with singular purity and integrity, he sacrificed all things for Christ. The author, a resident of East Friesland, has left nothing to be desired in that part of the biography which relates to a Lasco's residence there. Of the youth and of the last days of the Polish reformer, spent in his native country, only meagre accounts are given. Of the intermediate time, passed in England and Frankfort, the narrative is sufficiently full.

The biographical sketch of Leo Judae, by Pestalozzi, gives evidence of no less original research than the life of Bullinger, by the same author, noticed in a previous number. A school acquaintance and friend of Zuingli, his successor at Einsindel, his assistant and associate at Zurich, a scholar and translator of various works of Erasmus, Luther, and Zuingli, this man "of small stature, of marked features, glowing countenance, and shrill, musical voice," was as modest as he was acute and learned, and chose to act a second part rather than to take the lead himself. He put forward his friend, Bullinger, twenty years younger than himself, to be Zuingli's successor, on the death of the latter, rather than accept the place himself. In this he acted wisely, partly because he was not born for control, and partly because he had doubts in respect to a resort to civil authority in matters of religion, — views far in advance of his age, and in which he would have found as many enemies then as he would find friends now.

In passing to the life of Lambert of Avignon, the reader finds himself in a new atmosphere, almost as much as if he had crossed the boundary of the empire and entered the territory of France. Lambert is thoroughly French in his character, — ardent, animated, rhetorical, and occasionally a little headlong.

Of the nine volumes of the lives and select writings of the fathers and founders of the Reformed Church, only two and a half remain to be executed. These are the lives of Calvin, of Beza, and sketches of less distinguished men, to be comprised in the second half of the supplementary volume. But little new matter can be expected in the volumes yet to be written, as we have a very elaborate life of Calvin by Henry, and the beginning of one of Beza by Baum. Of the volumes which have already appeared, those on Peter Martyr, Bullinger, and on Capito and Bucer, furnish the most new information.

The success of the "Lives and Select Writings of the Fathers and Founders of the Reformed Church" (see p. 239 above), now nearly completed, has been so great that the publisher has determined to issue a similar series, in eight volumes, of the Lives and Select Writings of the Fathers and Founders of the *Lutheran Church*. The first two volumes will contain the life of Luther, by K. F. T. Schneider; the third volume, the life of Melancthon, by C. Schmidt; the fourth, the life of Bugenhagen, by Professor Voigt; the fifth, the life of Osiander, by Superintendent Schnerdt; the sixth, the life of Brenz, by Hartmann; the seventh, the life of Urban Regius, by Ulhorn; the eighth, or supplementary volume, the lives of Speratus, Justus Jonas, Spingler, Amsdorf, Paul Eber, Chemnitz, and Chytraeus, by different hands. The life of Melancthon will open the series, and is probably published before this time.

THE PROPHETS AND THEIR PREDICTIONS.¹

This is an apologetical and hermeneutical essay, by Tholuck. It is just what would be expected of its author, learned and evangelical, with here and there a weak, mystical paragraph. Neither the biblical critic nor the theologian can afford to dispense with it. Besides its intrinsic value, it has the merit of representing, incidentally, the present state of learning in respect to the interpretation of prophecy.

C. W. TACK'S HISTORY OF THE SCHOOLS OF BRUNSWICK.²

Of this work, with a history of the schools of Brunswick from their origin, only the first part, extending to the Reformation, has yet appeared. Although relating to a very special subject, it is a work of interest and value to the theologian, on account of the rare information which it gives in regard to the connection of the church and the schools in the Middle Ages. This little volume presents, not vague general statements, but an exact and detailed account of the schools from original authorities.

WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS.

The history of the Netherlands during the sixteenth century is, at present, attracting much attention. A somewhat new light is thrown upon the subject by the publication of a great mass of documents unknown to former historians. The most important contributions of this kind are comprised in the three following works:—1. Van Prinsterer's *Archives on Correspondence inédite de la Maison d'Orange—Nassau*. The first series is rendered particularly attractive by the confidential letters of the various members of the family of Orange. The third and fourth volumes of the second series appeared in 1859, and relate to the period between 1625 and

¹ Die Propheten und ihre Weissagungen.

² Geschichte der Schulen zu Braunschweig.

1650. A fifth volume is nearly ready for the press. 2. Correspondence de Philippe II. sur les Affaires des Pays-bas, par M. Gachard. The first volume of this valuable collection of letters appeared in 1845; the second in 1854; the third in 1859. This last volume contains much that would have been of great use to Motley, both by supplying deficiencies and correcting errors. 3. Histoire du Regne de Charles-Quint en Belgique par Alex. Henne, in ten octavo volumes, 1858-1859. The distinguished author spent fourteen years in the preparation of this work. In the French translation of Motley's history, just published in Brussels, the new matter above referred to is inserted in notes by the translators. Motley, by the way, has a very decided opponent in Von Koch, who, besides reviewing his history with critical severity in the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, has just published a volume,¹ in which he professes to prove from documentary evidence the very opposite of Motley's leading views of the character of the revolution. He justifies Philip II., on legal grounds, in his determination to subdue the rebellion; and attributes the disturbances in the Netherlands, not to the patriotic sentiments of the people, but to the treacherous conduct of the Prince of Orange and others of the nobility. This looks very much like a love of paradox. Yet the author, who thus attempts to reverse the decision of three centuries, is a very able historian, and has written with an earnestness that is indicative of strong personal conviction. The stringent and vigorous assault will hardly be allowed to pass without notice.

TISCHENDORF'S NOTITIA, ETC.²

THIS exceedingly interesting *brochure* of Tischendorf contains a full account of his last journey to the East in search of MSS. during the year 1859, and its wonderful success. As the fruit of his labors and adventures, he has placed in the Imperial Library of St. Petersburg more than one hundred MSS. of the rarest and choicest kind. He gives the following enumeration, to wit: 1, twelve Palimpsests; 2, twenty uncial Greek; 3, twenty-two cursive Greek; 4, nine Syriac; 5, eleven Coptic; 6, seven Arabic, with some fragments of Turkish; 7, nine Hebrew of the most ancient and rare Rabbinic recensions; 8, two Samaritan; 9, three Slavonian; 10, eleven Abyssinian; 11, five Armenian; 12, two of papyrus, with a Greek astrolabe.

The most important of these MSS. are described, and specimens of them given. We have also a clear engraving and minute description of the Greek astrolabe. Among the most curious of the Greek MSS. is a volume

¹ Untersuchungen über die Empörung und den Abfall der Niederlande von Spanien von Matthias von Koch. pp. 119. Leipzig, 1860.

² Notitia editionis Codicis Sinaitici cum Catalogo Codicum et Scholia Originis. etc. etc. Edidit A. J. C. Tischendorf, Theol. et Phil. Dr. etc. etc. Lipsiae, J. A. Brockhaus, 1860. pp. 124, 4to.

of the Scholia of Origen on the Book of Proverbs. This is printed entire in the volume before us.

But the gem of the whole collection is the splendid MS. of the entire Greek Bible and the Apocryphal books, from the Convent of St. Catharine in Mount Sinai. This he regards not only as the most complete, but absolutely the oldest of all the existing Greek MSS. of the entire New Testament, and the reasons which he gives for this opinion are, to say the least, exceedingly plausible, and very hard to be refuted. The fac-simile which he gives from the last chapter of Luke shows the MS. to be clearly and beautifully written, in the uncial letter, similar to that of the celebrated Alexandrian in the British Museum, with four columns to the page. This is the volume on which so much of the interest of Biblical scholars has been concentrated during the last year. It is now in the course of publication in St. Petersburg, at the expense of the emperor of Russia. It will appear in three folio volumes, of which the first two will contain the Old Testament, and the third the New, together with the epistle of Barnabas, and the fragments of the Shepherd of Hermas. There will also be a fourth volume containing dissertations on the history of the MS., the incidents of its recent discovery, its extreme antiquity, and its great importance in textual criticism, a palaeographic commentary on its various readings and corrections, and twenty plates of photographic fac-similes of its most important passages.

The whole will be printed with new type prepared expressly for this work under the direct superintendence of Prof. T. It will be published at St. Petersburg in 1862, in commemoration of the thousandth or millennial anniversary of the Russian monarchy, and all the copies of the first edition, three hundred in number, will be taken by the Czar to be distributed by him as appropriate presents for that occasion.

But there will be afterwards another edition suited to the more humble needs of scholars and ministers. This will be published at Leipsic with suitable type, and will contain the New Testament with Barnabas and Hermas, and all that is requisite for critical investigation. But for the present year there is this preliminary volume, containing specimens of the MS. sufficient to test its critical value, and also the general result of the author's late expeditions and discoveries in the regions of Greek and Oriental MSS. of the Bible. There is something very queer about all this, but exceedingly characteristic of Herr Tischendorf and his works. We do not question the reality or the importance of his discoveries, but it is singular that wherever he goes the oldest MSS., buried for ages, and hidden from all human eyes, most readily turn themselves out of their hiding-places for his inspection. We patiently await the pleasure of Herr T. and the Czar, and will be thankful for all we can get from them. Is there not to be at length a resurrection to life of the old dead Greek Church? And are not these and many other recent events contributing to an end so desirable? She never in theory departed from the Gospel so far as the Latin Church, and certainly still retains in her theology many principles of spiritual vitality.

MEMOIR OF DR. ISAAC ANDERSON.¹

Dr. Anderson was born in Rockbridge County, Virginia, March 26, 1780. He received his academical education at what is now called Washington College, and what was then known as Liberty Hall Academy. Here Dr. Archibald Alexander, Dr. Baxter of Virginia, Dr. John Holt Rice, and Dr. Conrad Speece, were trained academically. He pursued his theological studies, in part, with Rev. Gideon Blackburn, D. D. In 1802, he was ordained pastor of Washington church in Knox County, Tennessee. In 1812, he was installed pastor of New Providence church, Maryville, Tenn. "For a period of fifteen years, there was a revival [of religion] in his congregation every fall or winter." "He has been considered as the first to establish what is called the 'anxious seat'" (Memoir, p. 119). "The late Dr. Allan, of Huntsville, Alabama, after hearing him on a certain occasion, said: 'I have been in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, and have heard their greatest speakers: I have been in Liverpool, London, and Manchester, and have listened to the preaching of their most distinguished men, but that man (pointing to Dr. Anderson) is the greatest man I ever heard'" (Memoir, p. 124).

This athletic preacher took a strong hold of whatever he touched at all. For instance, he was so thoroughly aroused in favor of the Temperance reform, that one of his theological opponents, — Rev. Daniel Baker, — wrote of him in 1843: "Among other things, he has abolished the use of wine at the Sacrament, and uses raisin-water."

According to the present Memoir, Dr. Anderson was a severe and indefatigable student, and particularly noted for his untiring beneficence. He performed a great amount of missionary labor in the western country. He was peculiarly beloved and trusted by the Indians. Through life he was eminent for his self-denial, especially for his pecuniary sacrifices in the cause of learning and religion. In 1819 he visited the Theological Seminary at Princeton, "hoping to induce some of the young men who were about to enter the ministry, to come to East Tennessee. Quite a number of them, at his request, met him in his room at the hotel." After a lengthened description of the country for which he asked their services, he "put the question plainly: 'Will not some of you go with me, and help me to preach the gospel there?' The first question asked, in reply to this was: 'What salary do they pay their ministers?' Such a question addressed to *such* a man as Dr. Anderson — a man who had toiled and labored without money and without price — whose own hands had ministered to his necessities, while preaching the Gospel — aroused his indignation, and he replied: 'Go *there* and ask such a question, and as ministers of the Gospel you are ruined" (p. 53).

¹ Memoir of Rev. Isaac Anderson, D. D., late President of Maryville College, and Professor of Didactic Theology. By Rev. John J. Robinson. Published for the author by J. Addison Rayl, Knoxville, Tenn., 1860, pp. 300. 12mo.

This was the true ring of the metal of the man. His failure to secure pastors of the churches in East Tennessee, induced him to lay there the foundations of a Theological School. He collected in 1819-20 a class of five, one of whom was Rev. Dr. E. N. Sawtelle, and this was the first class in what is now Maryville College. He established a boarding house, and sometimes provided for fifteen or twenty young students in that Charity Home. He solicited for it donations of food and clothing. "One day a letter came from the celebrated Dr. Emmons, inclosing seventy dollars; and stating, that he had understood he was engaged in educating young men for the ministry, and he had sent a few dollars to aid in the good work" (pp. 56, 95.)

Persevering through obstacles which would seem insurmountable to many, and relying on the unforeseen aids of Providence, this eloquent pleader effected, at last, the permanent establishment of his Seminary; and he was inaugurated its first Professor of Didactic Theology, September 25, 1822. For several years, he gave his instructions without a salary, and at the same time furnished gratuitous board to many indigent students. His course of theological discipline bore striking resemblance, in many respects, to that of Dr. Emmons. His Seminary was violently and virulently persecuted. It was called "the nest of Hopkinsians." He says: "The doctrines of President Edwards, of Dwight and Strong, and old Dr. [Samuel] Spring, and writers of this school, are the doctrines taught here."

Early in the morning of the seventeenth of March, 1856, Dr. Anderson's house was consumed by fire. He himself had a narrow escape from the flames. As the old man of seventy-five years was borne away from his falling edifice, he uttered not a word except this: "*My library is burned up.*" His biographer adds: "Not a book nor a manuscript was saved; not even a Bible." The loss of his Theological Lectures and Correspondence is to be more deeply regretted, than the loss of his books. These Lectures contained a vigorous defence of the Hopkinsian peculiarities.

This energetic pioneer had been employed as a teacher during a large part of a half-century, and was a theological instructor during nearly all of his last thirty-seven years. He died at Rockford, Tennessee, January 28, 1857.

THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL, with Quotations and References for the use of students. By William Fleming, D.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. From the second revised and enlarged London edition. With an Introduction, Chronology of the History of Philosophy brought down to 1860, Bibliographical Index, Synthetical Tables, and other additions. By Charles P. Krauth, D. D., Translator of "Tholuck on the Gospel of John." Philadelphia: Smith, English, & Co., No. 23 North Sixth street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1860. pp. 662.

For more than three years we have been familiar with the English

edition of this work, and have placed a higher estimate upon it than upon any similar work in our language. A twelvemonth before the present edition was announced by Smith, English, & Co., we recommended the Dictionary to an American Publishing House, as an admirable work for republication in our land. Every clergyman may study the volume with direct profit to himself, and with indirect, though great, advantage to his hearers. The enterprising publishers of this Vocabulary deserve the gratitude of our scholars for so rich an addition to our literature. Dr. Krauth has augmented the value of the original work by his additions to it. They have cost him severe labor, and deserve a careful examination.

HINTS ON THE FORMATION OF RELIGIOUS OPINIONS. Addressed especially to Young Men and Women of Christian Education. By Rev. Ray Palmer, D.D., Pastor of the First Congregational Church, Albany. New York: Sheldon and Company, 115 Nassau street. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1860. pp. 324. 12mo.

This volume contains much judicious thought and sound advice. It tends to discourage that superficial and frivolous habit of mind, which is now so generally favored among the rising generation. It recommends a more considerate method of inquiry than is fostered by our current theological literature. It merits an extensive and thoughtful perusal.

HISTORY OF LATIN CHRISTIANITY, including that of the Popes to the Pontificate of Nicolas V. By Henry Hart Milman, D. D., Dean of St. Paul's. In eight volumes: Vol. I. pp. 554, Vol. II. pp. 551. 12mo. New York: Sheldon and Company. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1860.

The English edition of this work was noticed in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, as early as Vol. XI. pp. 212, 643, and Vol. XIII. p. 466.

It is an admirable History. The learning of Dean Milman is extensive and accurate. His candor is unimpeachable. He possesses the sprightliness and the grace, which historians so often want. His present work is invaluable to our clergymen. The American edition of it is highly honorable to the American press. We intend to notice it hereafter, more fully.

A COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. By Joseph E. Worcester, L.L.D. Revised with important Additions. Boston: Swan, Brewer, and Tileston. Cleveland: Ingham and Bragg. 1860. pp. 608, 800.

For rapid use, this abridged and condensed form of Worcester's Dictionary, is more convenient than the unabridged and more imposing quarto. In both its forms, the Lexicon ought to be on the table of every clergyman. The present volume exhibits the usual caution and accuracy of Dr. Worcester, his nice discrimination, and delicate taste. It is not, of course, so rich and complete as the quarto Dictionary: but it *suggests* those phenomena of the language, which are more fully *explained* in the larger work.

A DISCOURSE COMMEMORATIVE OF FORTY YEARS IN THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY. By L. F. Dimmick, D. D.

This discourse merits a fuller notice than our limits will permit ; both on account of its intrinsic interest, and the author's high ministerial character, and important public relations.

Dr. Dimmick was born in Shaftsbury, Vt., in 1790 ; was graduated at Hamilton College in 1816, and at Andover Theological Seminary in 1819. In December of this year, he was ordained as pastor of the North Church in Newburyport, as the successor of Dr. Samuel Spring. He died on Wednesday, May 16, 1860, in the 70th year of his age ; having been struck down on the preceding Sabbath, while preaching, by what proved to be the last attack of organic disease of the heart. *Felix opportunitate mortis.*

With no sharp throbs of fiery pain,
No cold gradations of decay,
Death broke at once the vital chain,
And freed the soul the nearest way.

In respect to that well-tempered union of varied qualities which goes under the expressive name of *character*, and which is the slowly-ripened product of time, study, toil, discipline, and divine grace, Dr. Dimmick was a remarkable man. His influence in his parish, and throughout his locality, was strong and pervading. As a counsellor his advice was constantly sought by the churches. He was appointed a trustee of Andover Seminary in 1846, and down to the day of his death he was a most judicious and faithful guardian of its interests. Possessing more than the ordinary knowledge of the Hebrew and Greek scriptures, he took a deep interest in Biblical criticism, and did much to foster this important branch of theological education.

But his greatest work and honor was that of a minister of the word. And we close this brief notice, with an extract from the tribute paid to his memory, in the appropriate and consolatory discourse pronounced at his funeral, by the Rev. Professor Phelps : " Who now can refrain from thinking that his has indeed been a model ministry ? Forty years of unbroken labor ; his first sermon, and his last text preached to the same people ; revered as a teacher whose scholarly acquisitions always paid tribute to his piety ; trusted among his brethren, as a brother without guile ; a model to his juniors, as a preacher whose professional enthusiasm was too deep to be obtrusive, and yet seemed to be the whole of him ; beloved as a pastor, as none but a pastor who loves his people can be ; without an enemy, or if he possibly had one, with none who would not blush now to own it ; and, more than all, blessed by Christ as a chosen vessel unto Him, and at last translated from the very pulpit, which had been for so long a time as the Mount of God to him, to meet hundreds of the souls which had been given to his fidelity for Christ's sake, — Why should he not have enjoyed such a ministry ? "

PROF. SOPHOCLES' GLOSSARY OF LATER AND BYZANTINE GREEK.¹

This work is an honor to the literary industry of our country, both in respect to the accuracy and extent of learning which it exhibits, and the perfection of its mechanical execution in paper and typography. No book of the kind more beautiful has ever been issued from the American press, nor have we ever had a product of riper or more extensive Greek scholarship. It is a work also greatly needed; for in all the multitude of Greek grammars and lexicons, good and poor, with which we have been flooded, the ground which this glossary occupies no one among us has till now even professed to cover. Germany itself, so prolific in linguistic helps, has no one like this. The only existing works in this department of learning, which can claim any good degree of completeness, are the folios of DuCange and Suicer, both which are now two hundred years old, cumbersome, expensive, and to the great majority of scholars, to almost all, indeed, who are not within reach of large public libraries, quite inaccessible. Yet this branch of study is one of great interest at the present time, and helps like this glossary have long been earnestly desired. Many who have been longing for an intimate acquaintance with the New Testament apocryphal writers, the Greek Church fathers, the later Greek philosophers, the Byzantine historians, etc., have been greatly impeded and discouraged for want of an accessible and suitable glossary. This want is now supplied, and the earnestness with which, happily, the study of the New Testament Greek is now pursued, must lead to an enlarged investigation of the Greek language in the sources made accessible by this glossary. We hope a new edition will speedily be called for, that it will be enlarged by the addition of some few necessary words which we fail to find in this, and that it may be published, if in a less imposing, in a cheaper form, that it may come within the reach of ministers and scholars of limited means, who love to study the Greek Testament with all the thoroughness possible, and cannot afford to buy many or expensive books.

The introduction to this work, in which Mr. Sophocles gives a brief history of the Greek language in its later periods, with critical remarks on the grammar, pronunciation, etc., and progressive specimens of the language at different times, is replete with most valuable thought, and gives ample testimony to the profound learning, good sense, and excellent taste of the author. Will not this work also, as well as that of Tischendorf noticed above, do something towards awakening the Greek Church to some degree of literary activity?

¹ *Memoirs of the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences. New Series, Vol. VII. Cambridge and Boston: Welch, Bigelow, & Co., Printers to the University, 1860. 4to. pp. 624.*

ELLICOTT'S COMMENTARY ON GALATIANS.¹

We have on several occasions already expressed our very high appreciation of the value of Prof. Ellicott's Commentaries. This first instalment of an American edition of them we very gladly welcome. We have here a volume quite equal to the English edition in regard to paper, type, accuracy of printing, and general comeliness, and at about half the price. The Introductory Notice is designed to show who Prof. Ellicott is and what he is doing, and his purposes and characteristics as an author; and this it does in a few sober and simple words. It is sometimes said that two of a trade cannot agree; but Dean Alford, who has just completed a very successful commentary on the Greek New Testament, does not hesitate to give a most hearty recommendation of the work of his fellow laborer. He says they [Ellicott's volumes] "have set the first example, in this country [England] of a thorough and fearless examination of the grammatical and philological requirements of every word of the sacred text. I do not know of anything superior to them, in their own particular line, in Germany; and they add what, alas, is so seldom found in that country, profound reverence for the matter and subjects on which the author is laboring; nor is their value lessened by Mr. Ellicott's having confined himself for the most part to one department of a commentator's work,—the grammatical and philological. No student ought to be without them, nor ought he to spare himself in making them his own by continual study."

This expresses exactly our own opinion.

The *critical* part is devoted to the settling of the text, and this is admirably done, with a labor, skill, and conscientiousness unsurpassed. He says in his preface: "By a *grammatical* commentary, I mean one in which the principles of grammar are either exclusively or principally used to elucidate the meaning; by an *exegetical* commentary, one in which other considerations, such as the circumstances or known sentiments of the writer, etc., are also taken into the account." With these definitions he intends his commentary shall be *grammatical* as distinct from *exegetical*; yet wherever *exegesis* is absolutely necessary to develop the meaning, he applies it with the same tact and judgment which he shows in all the other parts of his work. We do not suppose it possible to write a just commentary on any document without the constant application of what Prof. Ellicott calls distinctively *exegesis*. The celebrated clause in the fourth article of our United States Constitution can be fully interpreted both *grammatically* and *lexically* without making it refer at all to fugitive slaves;

¹ A Commentary, critical and grammatical, on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, with a revised translation. By Charles J. Ellicott, B. D., Professor of Divinity Kings College, London, with an Introductory Notice by Calvin E. Stowe, D. D., Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Andover: Warren F. Draper, 1860. pp. 183. 8vo.

and it is only when we look *exegetically* at the history of the times and the debates in the convention, that we can prove it to have any reference to fugitive slaves. The Constitution was designedly and with great ingenuity so framed that it would be without superfluity and without defect at the expected and wished-for time when there would not be a slave in the whole land. Other writings, framed with less ingenuity, especially if remote in time and place, need for their interpretation the frequent application of the principles of exegesis.

SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE.¹

Dr. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible is designed to hold the same place in biblical studies, as his Dictionaries of Greek and Roman Antiquities, Biography, and Geography do in the classical. "It is a dictionary of the Bible, not of theology. It is intended to elucidate the antiquities, biography, geography, and natural history of the Old and New Testament, and the Apocrypha; but not to explain systems of theology, or discuss points of controversial divinity."² It is to contain a list of all the names occurring in the Bible, which is not the case with any other Bible Dictionary. The Articles which compose the work are contributed by more than fifty eminent scholars, several of them belonging to this country. Besides antiquities, biography, geography, etc., an account of each book of the Bible is given, sufficiently full, in ordinary cases, for an introduction. These accounts are more or less minute, according to the character of the Book, or the difficulties connected with it. They embrace the time and place of writing, the author, canonical authority, genuineness, source of materials, object, analysis, different views or theories entertained respecting some of the Books, as well as the consideration of objections to their genuineness in whole or in part. In this way a condensed view of the several books of the Bible, and the criticisms to which they have been subjected, are made readily accessible. Some of these accounts are quite full, as that on Genesis, Ecclesiastes, Hebrews, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Job. The Articles on Egypt, Canon, Chronology, Jehovah, Jerusalem, Jesus Christ, and Jordan are also full and thorough.

Within a few years past much new light has been shed upon the history, geography, antiquities, and languages of Bible lands. The excavation of buried cities and monuments, the deciphering of hieroglyphics, the investigations of missionaries and travellers, and the more extensive study of Oriental languages, have furnished new and rich materials for elucidating biblical subjects. These materials have been skilfully and successfully used

¹ Dictionary of the Bible, comprising its Antiquities, Biography, Geography, and Natural History. Edited by William Smith, LL. D., Editor of the Dictionaries of "Greek and Roman Antiquities," "Biography and Mythology," and "Geography." In two volumes, Vol. I. A to Juttah. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 8vo. pp. 1176.

² Preface.

in the present work, which could not have been written a quarter of a century ago. The work indicates a wide range of investigation, a thorough acquaintance with the subjects treated, as well as an appreciation of what the student of the Bible needs. It is more thorough and complete than any previous dictionary of the kind, and will add greatly to the interest and profit in studying the Bible, both for the student of theology, and for all others who may wish to avail themselves of the best facilities for that study.

A single instance will illustrate what progress has been made in biblical topography within the last thirty years. In Robinson's *Calmet*, published in 1832, prepared with great fidelity from the best materials then accessible, the Brook Kedron, after flowing by the east side of Jerusalem, is made to run nearly west, while its actual course is about south east.¹

It is but reasonable to expect that there will be a difference of opinion in regard to some of the views presented, both on the ground of the nature and great variety of the topics, and also on account of the diversity of writers. But there is through the work a general candor and fairness. There is an evident purpose to present facts rather than to establish theories. There is no straining to impart knowledge where none really exists. The dogmatic claims by which the authorship of a book of the Bible is attributed to a particular person, are not allowed. Sites of places claimed without sufficient authority to have been discovered, are frankly admitted to be yet unknown; Aenon and Emmaus are still to be discovered, much as has been said of their identification. Capernaum too is in doubt. Is it at Kahn Minyeh, where Dr. Robinson finds it, or three miles further north, at Tell Hûm, which Ritter and others claim to be its site? So, too, the sites of Chorazin and Bethsaida are admitted not to be definitely known. This candor on the part of the writers, here as elsewhere, in admitting the full extent of the doubt, is a praiseworthy feature, as it gives the student the facts instead of a partisan view of the subject.

But the Dictionary gives an account of two Bethsaidas, one west of the lake of Gennesaret toward the north, the other north-east of the lake, and east of the Jordan; the two were consequently but a few miles apart. There was supposed to be but one place of this name till the time of Reland, the latter part of the last century. The western one is not mentioned by Josephus, and the discovery by Reland that there were two places of the name, was supposed to relieve some inconsistencies in the statements of the Evangelists (Luke 9 : 10—17, and Mark 6 : 32—45), which were thought to exist on the assumption that there was but one Bethsaida. But were there two Bethsaidas? The difficulties are certainly very great if such was the case. Is it probable that the same name would be given to two places so near each other, both within the limits of Galilee (for in its widest sense Galilee extended beyond the Jordan)?² Is it to be supposed that Mark refers to one, and Luke to another, without a single qualifying word to deter-

¹ See Robinson's *Calmet*, Plan of Jerusalem, p. 556.

² Comp. *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*. Vol. II., p. 302, et seq.

mine which was meant? To which Bethsaida does our Lord send away his disciples after the miracle of feeding the five thousand? But the answer to this involves another question: On which side of the lake was the miracle wrought? If on the north-eastern, as has been of late generally supposed, then the disciples crossed over to the western Bethsaida; but if the miracle was on the western side, on the spot where an early Christian tradition places it (and certainly one who looks upon that spot feels how appropriate a place it was for so numerous an assemblage), then the disciples crossed to the eastern Bethsaida. If there were two Bethsaidas, did our Lord perform his "mighty works" in both? On which did he denounce woe?

It is evident, therefore, that however great may be the difficulties if there was but one Bethsaida, they are by no means obviated by assuming two.

The Article on Jerusalem, historical and topographical, is generally very satisfactory. Yet in the part relating to the topography of the city, written by James Fergusson, author of an "Essay on the Ancient Topography of Jerusalem," "Hand-book of Architecture," etc., there are, as it seems to us, some untenable positions. He places the City of David, and the Zion of the biblical period, on the east side of the city, on what is usually known as Mt. Moriah, or the Temple area; whereas these names have, with great unanimity, been appropriated to the southwestern hill of the city, known as Mt. Zion. He also finds the burial-place of the Saviour in the rock beneath the Mosque of Omar, which is in the Temple area; while the traditional site of the Holy Sepulchre is in a quite different part of the city. But no considerations which we have seen have been sufficient to establish the claims of either to be the place where the Lord lay. That place, we believe has been wisely hidden from our eyes. It is only by giving a forced construction to the direction of the walls of the city, that either of these localities, claimed as the burial-place of our Saviour, could have been without the walls at the time of the crucifixion. Mr. Fergusson places the Temple in the south-west part of the Temple area, instead of the more central position where the Mosque of Omar now stands, which is very generally regarded as the true site of the Temple. These views seem to us extreme, and ought not to have been made so prominent in a work designed for general use. They might with propriety have been stated in brief as the author's views, without so elaborate a defence of the theory entertained.

We are glad, however, to give a hearty approval of the work, though all the views may not harmonize with our own. Only one volume is yet published; the other is promised by the latter part of this year.

The community are under special obligations to Messrs. Little, Brown, and Company, for furnishing the work for less than one half the price in England. Though it contains the imprint of this Publishing House, it is the English edition imported.

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ARTICLE I.

THE CROSS IN NATURE AND NATURE IN THE CROSS.¹

BY REV. EDWARD HITCHCOCK, D. D., LL. D., PROFESSOR OF NATURAL THEOLOGY AND GEOLOGY IN AMHERST COLLEGE.

In the conclusion of some lectures, prepared by me a few years ago, on the bearings of geology upon religion, I remarked that I had found "something of the Cross in nature, and something of nature in the Cross." Perhaps, however, I did not attach a very definite meaning to this phrase, till my attention was called to it anew, of late, by the request of a missionary friend and former pupil (Rev. Charles Hartwell), now in China. I propose, in this Article, to state the results of this renewed examination; for I have found, and will attempt to show, that the statement, instead of being mere poetry and sentimentalism, is the exponent of a great and important truth.

I am aware that the doctrine of salvation by the cross is universally regarded as a matter of pure revelation. And so it undoubtedly is, as to the facts. But often, when revelation

¹ The following extract of a letter from Rev. Charles Hartwell to Edward Hitchcock, Jr., M. D., of East Hampton, dated Fuhchau, China, August 14, 1855, will show how definitely that missionary has stated the leading object of this Article: "Since reading your father's Article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* of

discloses some great truth, and gives us a clew to its relations, we may find important collateral evidence and illustration in nature. In some able works, such as Butler's *Analogy* and Harris's *Preadamite Earth*, we find some aspects of the mediatorial work, presented in the light which reason casts upon it. I would follow in the same path; and hope to show that, along the line of junction between natural and revealed religion, assisted by the light that comes from the Bible, we may discover, on the side of nature, profound principles, that form the basis on which the revealed facts of redemption rest; and thus obtain some insight into *the mystery which, from the beginning of the world, hath been hid in God.*

The position I now take on this subject, and shall endeavor to establish, is the following :

The original constitution, and natural and moral history of this world, show it to have been created, fitted up, and intended from the beginning, to be a theatre for the work of redemption.

Perhaps some explanatory suggestions may make this position better understood.

If professed Christians were inquired of, whether they see evidence, in the constitution and course of nature around them, and in the natural and moral history of the world, that it is in a fallen condition, that large class who reject most of the peculiar doctrines of the Bible as we understand them, would say that no such evidence exists; and many others, whose views are evangelical, would reply, that the laws and

last year (on *Special Divine Interpositions in Nature*), I have wished that he might be allowed the time and opportunity to write on the evidence geology furnishes that the earth was fitted up for a race of sinful beings to inhabit; in other words, make geology contribute its share to show that the great object for which this world was created, was for the carrying out of the scheme of Redemption. This, it seems to me, is a very interesting field of inquiry to the Christian, and would greatly enlist the feelings and thoughts of your father. If he has but time enough left to write one more Article, this seems to me to be such a subject as would be very appropriate for one's last work, before entering on the enjoyment of the blessed fruits of that redemption it cost our glorious Saviour so great a sacrifice to purchase." The larger part of this Article has been delivered as a lecture in Amherst College, in Dr. Beaman's Church, in Troy, New York; in Dr. Wilkes's Church in Montreal; in South Danvers, Massachusetts, before the Young Men's Christian Association; and at the Anniversary of the New Hampton Academy in New Hampshire.

operations of nature appear to be perfect, and that the sole difficulty lies in man's want of conformity to them; and therefore, aside from his perverseness, there is no proof of a lapsed condition. More, perhaps, would say, that great alterations took place, in nature, at the time of the apostasy in Eden, and that the evils now in the world were then first introduced. Now, the ground which I take is, that nature, irrespective of the Bible, furnishes abundant proof, in her constitution and history, of a fallen condition, such as the Bible describes; and moreover, that this condition did not commence in Eden; but the world, from the beginning, was created and fitted up for a fallen being. Yet so much mercy and benevolence is mixed with natural evils, as to afford strong hope that man may be recovered from his ruin. Hence the world, in its present state, is admirably adapted to be a theatre for a display of the work of redemption; and this seems to have been the grand object for which it was created with its present constitution and arrangements. I shall, in this Article, pursue only a single line of argument, to sustain these views; such a line as is suggested by the scientific history of the globe; leaving other, and perhaps more striking proofs, to some other opportunity, or some other person.

In considering this subject, I propose to inquire, first, what support my general proposition receives from science and history, irrespective of revelation; or rather, depending on revelation only for the facts of creation and redemption; and secondly, inquire whether the scriptures throw any light upon it.

In casting our eyes over the world's condition and history with reference to the work of redemption, we shall find it convenient to divide it into two portions: the one extending back to the time of man's creation; and the other embracing the long periods between that event and the beginning, when the earth was called into existence. The post-Adamic period first claims our attention.

To ancient philosophers, and to not a few acute modern reasoners, who sympathize but slightly with revelation, the post-Adamic state of things has seemed a strange enigma,

an inexplicable riddle. Let us see if we cannot, at least, take some steps towards its solution. We shall best approach the true explanation by one or two negative propositions.

First, this world is not in a state of retribution. Some heathen moralists regarded it as a condition of punishment consequent upon a preëxistent state of transgression. But it requires only a brief experience to be satisfied that evil is not distributed in accordance with such an hypothesis. It often falls the heaviest upon those most deserving, while the most wicked escape. Nor, on the other hand, can the blessings of life be regarded as rewards ; since the highest worldly prosperity is often given to the irreligious ; while not a few of the most humble and deserving find wave after wave of adversity rolling over them. Moreover, the idea of being punished for the sins of a preëxistent state is absurd ; for not an individual of the race has the slightest consciousness of any such previous existence.

Secondly, this world is not adapted to a perfectly sinless and happy being.

We may not know, certainly, what sort of a world Infinite Benevolence would prepare for a race wholly free from sin, whom he would make perfectly happy. But we may reasonably presume that it would be a condition in which prudence would secure an exemption from suffering. But how far from this is the present world ! I admit that a large proportion of the evils we suffer, are the result of our own improvidence, rashness, and moral obliquity. And some would fain persuade themselves that all the sufferings of this life have such an origin. But how certain that this is a partial and erroneous view !

Consider, for example, the climatic extremes and unhealthiness of large portions of the earth. If man pushes his residence far towards the poles, the terrible severity of the cold will overpower him ; or, if he plants himself beneath tropic skies, a vertical sun and the miasms of dense forests will expose him to the assaults of deadly disease. Indeed, in whatever latitude he may live, a multitude of fierce diseases lie in wait for him, which no human foresight can wholly guard

against. Unconsciously, also, he may receive fatal poison with his food ; or, the mechanical violence of the elements may crush him ; or, the lightning may smite him down ; or, the wild beast may devour him ; or, the poisonous serpent or insect may wound him fatally ; or, the floods may overwhelm, or the fire consume him.

Consider, too, the sterility of large portions of the earth. What wide swamps, and morasses, and sandy deserts, preclude successful cultivation ! What vast regions, at the north, are buried most of the year in ice and snow ; and, as a matter of fact, how large a proportion of those devoted to labor, can scarcely secure a precarious subsistence, although devoting all their energies to the single object of obtaining food and clothing. And how often has famine, from unpropitious seasons, mowed down its hecatombs.

Think, too, how cramped and clouded are the faculties of the mind, from causes over which prudence and virtue have no control. Vast as is the population of the globe, and the amount of talent that lies hid among its millions, how few are able to burst the fetters that hold them down ; and how incalculable is the waste of mind among all nations.

In such a world as this, there must be a great deal, both of physical and mental suffering, that is inevitable. And then, with what appalling circumstances is death usually attended. I can conceive of death, indeed, in a paradisaical state ; or, rather, of a change that shall be as great as death ; but it must be a transition pleasant to anticipation, and delightful to experience : not such death as meets us now, and haunts our imagination with direful images, and whose realization often exceeds the anticipation.

I could draw out a frightful picture of human suffering, and without going beyond the actual experience of multitudes, against which no sagacity or virtue of man could guard. I admit, indeed, that in the midst of all these evils, there is even a predominance of divine benevolence. But it is not unmixed benevolence. Clouds obscure its full-orbed splendors, such as pour in upon the inhabitants of heaven, and such as we should expect to witness, anywhere, in a

world fitted up for the abode of sinless beings, whom God designed to make perfectly happy. Men in all ages have felt that this world cannot be such a state; and hence not only poets but philosophers have described the earth's earlier condition as very different from the present; as, in fact, its golden age, which has degenerated into iron. And these traditions are confirmed by the inspired account of Eden.

These facts, then, force us to the conclusion, either that the world was not originally fitted up for a sinless and happy being; or that a change took place, in its very constitution, upon man's apostasy. Which of these views is most reasonable, I shall consider in another place.

I now turn to the affirmative side of the argument, and maintain, in the third place, that this world is wisely adapted to a fallen being, for whom there may be recovering mercy in store, and who needs moral discipline.

Let us look at some of the salutary lessons which a fallen being may learn from the constitution and course of nature, and the no less inflexible laws of human society.

These teach him, first, that punishment follows the violation of law, both in God's natural and moral government; though it is not full retributive justice, but rather a premonition of what future, final retribution will be. If he do violence to the laws of gravity, or of heat, to the laws of health, of civil government, or of morality, the penalty, more or less severe, is almost sure to visit him. It may be long delayed, in some cases; but it overtakes him, at last. Often it seems far greater than the offence deserves, or than the pleasure and advantage gained. And when it does come, it seizes the man with sudden violence, though long impunity had followed the offence. Nor will he escape, though, at the time of breaking the law, he had no distinct idea of the penalty; nor, though he can allege the thoughtlessness of youth, or the strength of temptation, in extenuation. Sometimes, too, he finds that repentance and reformation avail not to arrest the consequences; and sometimes they are as great as can be inflicted; that is, life is sacrificed.

These are solemn facts, to every thoughtful mind. For,

if God's government in this world admits of punishment, and such punishments, as a part of its ordinary operation, how very probable that the same system may extend into another world. Now every man's conscience, at all enlightened, aside from revelation, tells him that he has, in ten thousand ways, violated the moral laws which natural religion makes known to him. He may, therefore, meet the penalty on the other side of the grave. And there, too, as sometimes in this world, it may follow him through the whole course of his being. How earnestly, then, will he put the inquiry, whether pardon be possible ; or are the divine laws inflexible ? Repentance and reformation, in this world, do not always secure pardon, or release from the penalty ; it may be so in another world.

Such considerations are eminently adapted to make sinful man feel his guilt and his danger. But they have the effect, also, of leading him to examine the whole history of providence, to see if no indications of mercy can be found. And, in fact, he meets them on every hand. True, there are indications of divine displeasure, and alarming premonitions of future retribution. But then how thickly strown is almost every man's path with blessings, such as infinite benevolence alone could confer. How many alleviations are provided even for those evils which look almost like penal inflictions. God's dealings seem like those of a kind earthly parent, who, though obliged to assume a stern aspect towards his wayward child, still labors to alleviate his sufferings as much as is possibly consistent with the ends of discipline. What manifold means of enjoyment, physical, intellectual, and moral, has God placed within the reach of nearly all. How much more numerous are the objects of sense that give pleasure, than those which give pain ! How rich and varied are the enjoyments that spring from our social natures ! How delightful are the researches of science and literature. And how pure and elevated the happiness springing from virtuous affections and benevolent actions. Why should God have so filled the world with proofs of his benevolence, if after all he could, on no conditions, remit the penalty of his violated

law? Does not the whole course of his providence look as if there might be mercy in store for man? How can we but hope that there may be, in the midst of so many tokens of divine mercy. But oh for a messenger from heaven, to come and relieve our doubts, and tell us how reconciliation and salvation may be secured, if possible at all.

Thus might the constitution and course of nature lead a man to reason, without a revelation; and the state of feeling thus induced, is exactly such as prepares him to receive the Gospel. But there is another essential point, which the present system of nature tends to secure for a fallen being. He must have a thorough discipline of heart and life, or he will never be prepared for a higher and a sinless state; nor, indeed, for elevated usefulness and enjoyment on earth. But the mixed state of things here, is exactly the school of discipline which he needs. There is no vicious affection, or habit, which this discipline does not tend to eradicate; and no virtue which it does not cultivate, prune, and strengthen. How does the uncertainty of success in great enterprises arouse men to the most untiring industry and indomitable energy. Disappointment curbs the proud spirit, and leads to the exercise of caution and humility. Bereavement weakens man's inordinate grasp upon this world, and lifts the eye of faith and hope to another, while the soul meekly bows to the divine will. The success which usually attends well-directed efforts, inspires the soul with courage and perseverance. The downfall of the wicked around us, gives strength to our own virtue, to maintain its balance. Temptations, manfully resisted, do the same. To struggle with poverty, blighted hope, and the hostility of enemies, gives strength and resolution, curbs unreasonable expectations, and leads to a trust in God. To exercise virtuous and holy affections, and perform beneficent and noble actions, gives sweet and holy peace, which will stimulate to further gratification, of analogous character. The fear of death will act as a constant restraining power upon the evil propensities, and quicken the soul to do, with its might, what the hands find to do.

But why should I enlarge? I could, by appealing to reve-

lation, summon a host of witnesses, who have passed into eternity, and whose exalted condition there is the fruit of the thorough discipline of these earthly scenes. They would tell us, in glowing language, how eminently fitted was their earthly probation to give them the spirit, and make them love the employments, of heaven.

In all these respects, then, how obvious that this world was intended to meet the wants, and form the character, of a fallen being : of one who had sinned, and needed to have his fears of coming judgment awakened, and his hope of mercy encouraged, and his whole character transformed. Place such a being in a world adapted only for the holy and the happy, and his probation must prove a failure. But now there may be hope.

We may now advance a step further in our argument, and say, in the fourth place, that such a world as this is exactly the place for an exhibition of the work of redemption. Or we may regard this principle as the conclusion to which our reasoning has conducted us.

But here it is desirable that we fix upon the meaning of the term redemption. I understand by it, the whole process and means by which a lost and sinful being is restored to the divine favor, and prepared for a state of endless holiness and happiness.

Now we have seen how wisely arranged are the present constitution and course of nature to act upon the lost and sinful soul, both to excite its fears and its hopes, and also to subject it to the transforming discipline needful to overcome the giant power of depravity, and give it a relish for the employments and enjoyments of heaven. So far as the means of redemption are concerned, then, all seems clear and sufficient. But two most important questions remain unanswered, and, to unaided human powers, unanswerable. The first is : Can God, and if so, how can he, dispense with the penalty of his law, and pardon the transgressor ? The second is : By what power shall the sinner's heart be changed, if all means fail, as experience shows that they do ? The answer to these questions brings out the grand peculiarity of the

gospel : I mean, the incarnation and vicarious sacrifice of the Son of God. That work gives a triumphant answer to both these inquiries. It shows how God can be just, while he justifies the believer in Jesus ; and it secures the agency of the Holy Spirit for the renewal and sanctification of the heart.

See, now, how exactly this doctrine of reconciliation and forgiveness through atoning blood, meets the case of the lost and inquiring sinner. The analogies of nature had awakened his fears of future punishment, while other analogies had led him to some gleams of hope that God might have mercy in store. But there nature left him in painful uncertainty whether these intimations were anything more than the suggestions of disordered imagination. How sweet, then, the voice which revelation utters : *the Son of Man is come to save that which was lost. He was wounded for our transgressions ; he was bruised for our iniquities ; the chastisement of our peace was upon him ; and with his stripes we are healed. God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.* To holy and happy beings, such language would seem passing strange ; but to the lost and inquiring soul, they are the very music of heaven. They scatter his doubts and fears ; they show what depths of wisdom and mercy there are in the divine nature ; they disclose a plan of recovering mercy wonderful and grand beyond human conception ; and, accepting the offers of mercy, the heart is *filled with joy unspeakable and full of glory.* Oh, how could a world be better adapted than ours, to be a theatre for the work of redemption ! How wisely and mercifully are nature's laws and operations arranged to prepare the human mind to receive the news of blood-bought mercy ; and how illustriously are God's law and honor maintained before the universe, while mercy's arms are thrown wide open ; so that we may exultingly say : *mercy and truth are met together ; righteousness and peace have kissed each other.*

I am aware that able writers have adduced strong objections against this reasoning to prove the world in a fallen state. The first objection is, that wise and perfect laws con-

trol the present system of nature, whose normal operation produces happiness. That such laws exist, and that the leading object of their ordination and arrangement is beneficial, I am not disposed to doubt. But it is no less true, that evil is incidental to the operation of every one of these laws; nor can the most consummate prudence and the keenest foresight always avoid it, with such natures as we possess. Why is this, I ask? For such an exposure to suffering is not consistent with our ideas of a paradisaical or heavenly state. The supposition that man is in a fallen state, and needs the discipline of evil, explains the matter as no other supposition can; while the fact that everything is under the control of wise and beneficent laws, shows the divine wisdom and benevolence, and that the incidental evil is not a penal infliction, nor the world in a state of retribution.

A second objection to this reasoning is, that many of the natural evils of this world are, upon the whole, beneficial to individuals and communities. Not only do I admit this, but should state the case more strongly, and say, that every natural evil was intended for the good of men. But they could not be for the good of unfallen, sinless beings, such as once inhabited paradise, and will hereafter dwell in heaven; hence I infer that they were intended for a fallen and not a holy race. That the necessary means of man's discipline should be made promotive of his happiness, is a striking indication of wonderful wisdom and benevolence in the Deity, and shows that the heart of God yearns over man, even though compelled to subject him to severe discipline; but it does not show that such arrangements are adapted to an unfallen race.

On this subject, we have an instructive example in the scriptures, confirmatory of the position which we take. The ground is represented as cursed on account of man's apostasy, so as to bring forth thorns and thistles, and compel him, in sorrow and the sweat of his face, to eat bread. This is a graphic description of that severe toil to which man, ever since the apostasy, has been subject. Yet every reasonable man regards it as a great blessing to the race, with its fallen nature, though it would not have been so in Eden, where the

keeping and dressing of the garden was without sweat and sorrow. We are certain, then, that severe toil was one of the inflictions upon the race for their apostasy, and yet God has so ordered it, that it is a blessing. Death too, which is another consequence of the fall, according to the Bible, has many blessings in it, in such a world as ours, though to individuals it is usually the climax of all mortal evils. Indeed, what natural evil is there, that has not many salutary influences and accompaniments; and since we are sure that toil and death are the results of the apostasy, is it not a fair presumption, that all other natural evils have the same origin, and consequently prove such a lapsed condition of the race; while, at the same time, they indicate the wonderful benevolence of the Deity, who alone knew how thus to connect blessings with severe discipline.

A third objection to the position that natural evils prove a fallen condition of the world, is that many of them could not be prevented. How could animals, with a nervous system, escape suffering and death, in a world that was governed by the laws of gravity, electricity, and chemistry? and especially when whole races exist with organs prepared expressly to seize and destroy other animals?

I freely admit that pain, sickness, and death are inseparable from the present system of things, and with such natures as animals possess. But the question is: why God ordained such a system? Will it be said, it is because it is the best possible system? So it is, for fallen beings; but not for the innocent and holy. Will it be said, that God could not form any system that shall exclude evil? Is it, indeed, certain that the present laws of nature are independent of the Divine will? More probably they originated in the divine will. At least, it is certain that if the laws of nature do lie beyond the divine control, the constitution of animals does not; and it might have been so modified as to prevent all the evils of which we are speaking, and that without any miracle. Why this has not been done, is the question; and the most reasonable answer is: Because their present constitution is far better for a fallen being. It will be different in heaven, and

there, doubtless, such modifications will be made, either in the nature of things, or in the constitution of its inhabitants, as will exclude evil of every kind.

Fourthly, it is objected to my reasoning, that most probably the same general laws prevail throughout the material universe, and the same kinds and forms of matter occur, at least to a great extent. Hence if these laws and arrangements show this world to be in a fallen condition, they show the whole universe to be in the same state. Does this seem probable, either from scripture or reason?

I admit the premises, in this objection, but not the conclusion. It does seem probable that the mechanical, optical, electrical, and chemical laws, that control matter on earth, extend through the universe. But organic laws, that is, such as control the structure and form of animals and plants, may be entirely unlike, in different worlds; and this, as we have seen, is all that is necessary to exclude the natural evils of the present world. How easy, for infinite wisdom, to give to created beings such a material organization, that the intense heat of the sun, or the intense cold of Neptune, or any other extreme that would be fatal to such organic beings as now inhabit the earth, should be only a means of happiness! If, then, the elementary forms and combinations of matter are essentially the same, in all worlds, it does not follow that they are all in a fallen condition. The Bible, indeed, teaches us, in the history of the fallen angels, that there have been extra-terrestrial apostasies. But in regard to any particular world, we need to know (what we never can, without a revelation) whether the organization of its inhabitants be such as to admit, or exclude, the incidental evils that prevail on this planet, before we can infer that it is in a fallen or unfallen state. Heaven or hell may depend, essentially, on this fact alone.

Finally, it is said that when God had finished the creation *he saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good*; while, by the supposition which I make, much is very bad.

In this inspired declaration I can cordially join. For such

a world as this — for the discipline of a fallen being, and his restoration to the favor of God, everything in nature is good, very good. There is, as we have endeavored to show, a marvellous adaptation of everything above us and around us, to man's nature, condition, and rescue. Divine benevolence manifests itself, everywhere, in nature's laws and operations; yet there are also indications that something is wrong : not on God's part, but, as we know there is, on man's part. It does not seem to be retributive justice, at work ; but rather mercy, reluctantly subjecting the race to needful discipline, and mingling so much of kindness with the inflictions as to inspire a hope, in the sinful breast, of complete restoration to the divine favor and final deliverance from evil. Surely such a system is good, only good, supremely good. In heaven there will be the good without the evil.

Having thus considered the present state of the world with reference to the work of redemption, we will now turn to the pre-Adamic state of the globe, with the same inquiries. It is customary, indeed, to regard man's creation as only a few hours subsequent to that of the globe itself. But so distinctly does science inform us that, previous to man, the matter of our world must have existed through an immense period, that we must regard the question of its great antiquity as settled. Such a view is certainly not in opposition to Genesis, which declares the earth itself to have been created, not at any definite time, but *in the beginning* ; and the admission of a vast interval between that beginning and man's creation, during which several systems of life flourished and passed away, is far more favorable to religion, than the more common view, which identifies the age of the world with that of man. Indeed, were this last opinion taught distinctly in the Bible, I should despair of ever reconciling it with the facts of science. Assuming, then, with Augustine, Martin Luther, Dr. Chalmers, Dr. J. Pye Smith, Dr. Harris, Hugh Miller, Dr. Buckland, Dr. Siliman, and a multitude of other theologians, philologists, and philosophers, a long pre-Adamic existence of the globe, the question arises, whether it was a paradisaical state, or did the same system of nature which now exists, reach backwards to

the beginning. As already observed, the general interpretation of the Mosaic record is, that neither physical nor moral evil was in the world till man's apostasy. The latter part of this statement I do not question; in other words, sin was introduced by that event; for, previously, no being capable of sin had inhabited the globe. But I have been forced to the conclusion, both from science and revelation, that such was not the case with physical evil. The position I take is this:

Physical evil was not first introduced into the world after man's apostasy; but ever since animals have existed on the globe, they have been subject to suffering and death, which appear to have been ever inherent in organic existences, on this globe, and a part of God's original plan. I will now call up the witnesses, who will testify to the truth of this statement.

I make my first appeal to physiology. This science informs us that all animals possess a most delicate and complicated nervous system, whose objects are to give common as well as special sensibility; to produce what we call, in the higher classes of animals, touch and taste, smelling, audition, and vision. The direct object of this system is to furnish the animal with a knowledge of objects around him, and with enjoyment. But, incidentally, it is a source of much suffering. The sense of smell may introduce miasms into the body, productive of painful and fatal disease. Poisons and other injurious substances may enter through the sense of taste. Distressing and unwelcome sounds may find their way through the ear, and harrowing and disgusting sights through the eye. And as a matter of fact, and in spite of every precaution which prudence and virtue may take, intense suffering is no uncommon occurrence; and no human being escapes; nor, so far as we know, any of the inferior tribes. Suffering is not the object of any of the contrivances around us; but it is so certain, as an incidental effect, that we may, without error, look upon it as a law of nature.

But the greatest of all evils, I mean death, is the direct object of many contrivances in nature, and a law imposed on all organic beings, vegetable and animal, from which there is no escape. Large tribes of the inferior races have organs and

instincts provided for the express purpose of seizing and devouring other tribes ; and who will doubt that a fate which awaits all indiscriminately, is the result of a law imposed by the Author of nature. It is not difficult, indeed, to conceive that animal organization might have been so contrived as to ensure an indefinite continuance of life. But it is, in fact, so contrived as to ensure the destruction of the system, even though no disease assail it. After a certain period, varying in different species, the vessels become choked with excrementitious matter, the functions diminish in power, and the vital energies gradually give way to disorganizing chemical agencies. The law of decay is, in fact, as certain in its operation as the law of gravity, and apparently just as much a part of the Divine plan of the world.

It will be said, however, that natural no more than moral evil was of divine ordination ; but was consequent upon man's transgression. All nature, animate and inanimate, then experienced a change. Arctic cold and tropical heat succeeded to the ever vernal climate of Eden. Disease, from a thousand lurking places, seized upon its unsuspecting victims. Herbivorous animals were changed into carnivorous, and furious war began among the tribes of earth. Death rushed forth with his bloody commission, and began the dreadful work, which he has never ceased. In short, Pandora's box flew open, and woes unnumbered were let loose upon a guilty world.

Is it so ? Did all the physical evils of earth thus begin ? Sin was, indeed, as I believe, their procuring cause ; but the question we are now considering, is : *when* were they first introduced ? Let us call up another witness, who, though he may not quite settle the question, will afford a strong presumption that the epoch was pre-Adamic. I appeal to Comparative Anatomy.

The question I put is : How can a harmless herbivorous animal be converted into one carnivorous and cruel : a camel, for instance, into a tiger ? In no way, this science replies, but by a new creation. For it is not the disposition of the animal, simply, that must be changed. That depends, appa-

rently, upon its anatomical structure. If it have a certain kind of teeth, and other correspondent organs, it will be harmless and herbivorous; but if another sort of teeth, it will be carnivorous, and, as we say, cruel. In short, in order to change a camel into a tiger, you must give him a new kind of teeth, a new sort of digestive organs; different extremities for pursuing and seizing its prey; different senses for discovering and tracking its victims; different muscles, at least in many parts of its frame; and different instincts. In short, it must be an entirely new creation.

Now, does the Bible give us a hint of any such entire metamorphosis, at the time of man's apostasy, in the animal kingdom, or in the vegetable kingdom? for, if the one was changed, the other must have been also? In other words, does it give us to understand that there was an entirely new creation of all organic life, upon man's transgression? It is not even intimated, as it seems to me, in the inspired record; and I trust I can show that the reverse is clearly taught.

But let us bring in another witness: one whose chief business is with the pre-Adamic history of our globe. I refer to Geology. This science testifies unequivocally, and appeals to a great multitude of facts to show, that the laws of nature on this globe were the same, during the vast periods that preceded man's existence, as since that epoch. I mean the laws of chemistry, of meteorology, of electricity, magnetism, galvanism, of light and heat, and consequently those of geological change. Hence the condition of the air, the waters, and the dry land, has been essentially as it now is, in its general features, though the temperature and relative amount of land and water have greatly varied. The laws of organic life, too, have been essentially the same as now, ever since animals and plants have occupied the globe. All the great classes of animals and plants have had their representatives in all the formations, which extend through ten or twelve miles, in thickness, of rock. All these races were formed on the same general plan of organization; so that they can be arranged into groups, along with existing species. In all periods, carnivorous races have existed,

to act as nature's police, and keep down an excess of population. The anatomical structure, both of animals and plants, has been essentially identical, through all past periods and the present period. Animals have had, always, a nervous system, a circulatory system, an osseous, or testaceous, or crustaceous system, and organs for respiration and for digestion. The food, too, has always been either vegetable or animal, as at present.

Death, likewise, has ever been the same unsparing conqueror over all the systems of life that have occupied the globe. At least five or six of these systems, essentially independent of one another, are found to have lived and died before the present races appeared. Suffering must ever have attended their dissolution, as it now does ; and the same system of reproduction has filled up the gaps which death has made. In short, the same mixed system of suffering and enjoyment that now exists, has ever prevailed, from the dawn of organic existence. Not less than thirty thousand species of animals and plants, disinterred from the rocks, attest the truth of these statements and settle the question, beyond all cavil, as to the existence of physical evil among all the pre-Adamic races upon the earth. It is one of the most certain and best established of all the conclusions of geology.

Such is the testimony of science and experience, in support of the two chronological branches of my general proposition, that this world was created and fitted up for the express purpose of displaying the work of redemption. But the inquiry will arise, in every Christian's mind, whether revelation gives us any information on the same subject, either in its favor, or against it. Even hints, from an authority so much higher than science or history, are of great importance. And I do not suppose that we ought to expect much direct and formal information, on such subjects, in the scriptures ; for though important, they relate specially to the philosophy of religion ; and the grand object of revelation is to communicate those practical truths that bear directly upon human salvation. Nevertheless, if I do not greatly mistake, the Bible is not silent concerning the points we are discuss-

sing. Let us look at the question last considered, in relation to the period when physical evil was first introduced upon the globe.

Recollect that the point to be settled is, whether physical evils, such as suffering and death, were in the world previous to man's apostasy; in other words: were the general condition of things in nature, and the structures and habits of animals, essentially the same before as since man's apostasy? We obtain a presumption that such was the fact in respect to death, from the nature of the threatening made to man if he should transgress.

No reasonable ruler could affix a penalty to his laws, whose nature his subjects had no means of knowing. Much less would the righteous Ruler of the Universe do it. When, therefore, God threatened death to Adam, if he ate of the forbidden fruit, it would seem reasonable to suppose that he must have had before him examples of what he must expect. If death reigned from the beginning among the inferior animals, as science affirms, such examples would be within his knowledge. In these circumstances God would say to him, you are now exempt from that mysterious and appalling change through which all other animals pass, and as long as you observe my laws you will escape this evil. But eat the forbidden fruit and you too shall die.

But Genesis affords us a more direct evidence that before man's transgression death was a general law of organic nature. For a system of reproduction implies a correspondent system of death. In other words, where there is an indefinite multiplication of individuals, there must be a correspondent decrease to prevent the world from being overstocked. Now it is stated that the plants that were created, had seeds in themselves, — a clear proof that the same system of growth and decay existed in vegetable nature then as now. Man, also, and all the inferior animals, were commanded to be fruitful, and to multiply. Is it not clear, then, that the system had death in it before the fall, and that even man would not have been excepted, but by special divine power?

Consider, too, the fact of Adam's naming the animals, which he did before the apostasy. The sacred writer evidently means that he gave them the names which they bore after the transgression. But if such a change took place after that event in their natures, as some suppose, it must, as we have seen, have been equivalent to a new creation, and their old names would no longer answer. How absurd the idea that names were given to races that were soon to be transmuted to other animals; and how strange that no intimation is given of such transmutation, if it took place.

The history of the Garden of Eden, also, leaves the conviction on the mind that the physical condition of the world in general was the same before as after the fall. That Garden is represented as a spot selected and fitted up expressly for man's residence while innocent. *And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden, and there he put man whom he had formed.* After his transgression he was driven out of this garden, and cherubim and a flaming sword prevented his return. After his exclusion, he was compelled, in the sweat of his brow, to till the ground, and there he met with the thorns and the thistles, which were a part of his punishment,—not probably because they now sprung up where they did not grow before,—but because he was excluded from Eden, and the rest of the world had been cursed from the beginning for his sake; that is, adapted to him as a fallen being. For it is a curious fact that, as already suggested, some of the things, that seem at first view to have been punishments, and would have been so in Eden, are, in truth, in his fallen condition, great blessings. Such is the necessity of labor,—the fatigue attending it; and even the thorns and thistles become so, by stimulating his industry and ingenuity. How much more probable such a view, than that which regards these circumstances as punishments merely. In Eden they would have been such, and his exclusion from thence was a punishment. But after he had sinned, the world, as it now is, was much better adapted to his character. In Eden he never could have been recovered from his ruin; but by means of the discipline of the present world he may be.

One other circumstance mentioned in Genesis, shows us that no very great change in the physical constitution of man took place when he fell. The same materials served him for food in Eden as after his expulsion, except that it was exclusively vegetable while in a state of innocence, with the addition of animal products afterwards. This fact shows that the structure and functions of his body have ever been essentially the same, except the addition of disease as the consequence of sin.

Let us now inquire whether the scriptures afford any corroboration of the general proposition that this world was created, fitted up, and intended, to be the theatre of redemption.

Look first at Colossians 1:16. Here it is distinctly asserted that all things were *made by Christ and for Christ*. In the adjoining verses this sentiment is amplified and repeated with strong emphasis. Parallel passages, also, occur in other parts of scripture. John says, *without him was not any thing made that was made*. In other passages, God is said to have created all things by Jesus Christ. Here is no contradiction, if we only admit that Christ, as God, created the universe. What other meaning can we affix to the words *all things were created by him and for him*? To the second person of the Godhead was this work committed, because he was to use the world after its creation for the theatre of his incarnation and propitiatory sacrifice; and, therefore, it was proper that he should make just such a world as was best adapted for such a display. Is not this a fair literal meaning of this text? And does it not teach, directly and naturally, just what is contained in my proposition? How strange that some interpreters of the Bible should endeavor to make the creation here spoken of, figurative, in defiance of all just rules of exegesis; and thus strike out of the Bible one of the noblest truths which it contains! Is it not because they have had no idea that the material universe could be a part of the work of redemption?

In Ephesians the apostle teaches essentially the same

great truth ; and carries back the work of redemption, not merely to the time of creation, but into the councils of eternity. *Unto me, says he, who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ : And to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ : To the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known by the church, the manifold wisdom of God. According to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord.* How does the apostle in this passage seem to labor for expressions strong enough, and comprehensive enough, to bring out the great thoughts which revelation has poured into his mind ! He was amazed that one so insignificant as himself, should be allowed to develop spiritual riches that were unsearchable — even the infinite riches of Jesus Christ. He was permitted to make known to men that great mystery of redemption, which from eternity had been hid in the divine Mind. Even the creation of the universe had been accomplished by Christ, as a part of his work ; and the object of the whole was to exhibit, through the church, the manifold wisdom of God, to the exalted inhabitants of heaven. And all this was according to God's eternal purpose, not the result of any exigency. In fact, the apostle was employed in developing the counsels of eternity ; in bringing before the world the loftiest and most wonderful plan which the created universe had ever known. What an honor ! What a privilege !

I would call attention to another passage of Paul, which seems to me to teach what I have endeavored to prove from science, that all nature sympathizes, and always has sympathized deeply, with man in his fallen condition ; and, as a consequence, has been subjected to frailty, straitness, and suffering. *I reckon (says he, in Romans) that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us. For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God.*

For the creature was made subject to vanity not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope. Because the creature itself, also, shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body.

This passage, I well know, has long been regarded by commentators as obscure and uncertain in its meaning — a real *locus vexatissimus*. The chief difficulty lies in fixing the meaning of the word *κτίσις*, which is translated *creature*, in verses 19, 20, and 21, and *creation*, in verse 22. As many as twelve different significations have been proposed for it in this passage.

One regards it as designating *angels*.

A second, the souls, or animating principles of the planets.

A third limits it to Adam and Eve.

A fourth, to the souls of believers, in distinction from their bodies.

A fifth, to the bodies of believers, in distinction from their souls.

A sixth, to Christians in general.

A seventh, to Christians in particular; that is, either Jewish or Gentile Christians.

An eighth, to unconverted men in general.

A ninth, to unconverted men in particular; that is, unconverted Jews or heathen.

A tenth, to the rational creation, or men in general.

An eleventh, to the material creation, animate and inanimate, exclusive of rational beings.

A twelfth, to the whole creation, animate and inanimate.

Now, every Greek scholar knows that no word in that language has less ambiguity of meaning, and fewer anomalous senses, than *κτίσις*. Almost universally it confessedly means the creation, or sometimes the act of creating. It is once or twice used, in scripture, to designate Christians; but the epi-

thet *καὶ* is always prefixed. In order to make it embrace the various objects enumerated above, resort is had to the very convenient, but absurd principle of interpretation, that, since it is a generic term, including the whole creation, it must embrace, and may designate, each particular object in the universe.

To show the absurdity of most of the above interpretations of this word, it would seem that we need only appeal to men's common sense; and I have no intention of entering upon their formal refutation. The two last but one have been adopted by many commentators. But probably a majority of the ablest, with Martin Luther, Koppe, Grotius, Flatt, and Tholuck at their head, adopt the literal sense, and suppose the whole terrestrial creation to be embraced; which, by a not unusual figure, is represented as suffering and complaining, as well as hoping for deliverance. And if it be admitted, as I have attempted to show, that all nature is in a depressed and suffering condition, in consequence of human apostasy, how appropriately and expressively is it described by this language thus interpreted! How properly might all things be represented as anxiously waiting for the manifestation or glorification of the children of God; because that would bring deliverance to all. How proper to say, that the creation was not made subject voluntarily to, a frail and suffering condition; but by him who put it into such a state of subjection as admitted a hope of deliverance from its bondage, even into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. Most true is it, that all creation has sighed together, and been in anguish, up to the present time. Even Christians, who have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within themselves and wait for their adoption as children, looking for the hour when their bodies shall be redeemed from the power of frailty and death.

But I will make no further appeal to the scriptures. Yet if a desire to maintain my position has not blinded my judgment, I cannot doubt that I have shown an agreement between the teachings of science and revelation on this subject. Nor, to accomplish this, was it necessary to put a forced or

unusual meaning upon scriptural language. Its unsophisticated tones do seem to be in beautiful harmony with the deductions of science, in showing redemption to be the great object of the creation, arrangement, and providential government of this world.

The conclusions to which we are brought, by the course of reasoning that has now been presented, will be best exhibited in the form of inferences.

1. First, we derive from the subject a presumption (waving any supposed positive declarations of scripture) that natural evils, to which all creatures on earth are now exposed, and the analogous ones to which the inferior animals have been subject, in all past periods, have a connection with man's apostasy. Not all of them, indeed, as cause and effect, in the usual sense of that phrase. Yet it seems most probable that a prospective view of human transgression formed the reason, in the divine mind, for creating and fitting up such a world as ours ; that is, a world adapted to the character and wants of a fallen being. He might have made it, as is generally supposed he did, so as to suit the nature of perfectly holy beings, and then have altered it when man had sinned. But the testimony, both of science and revelation, seems to be, that no such change has taken place. It is a plausible supposition, therefore, that because the earth would ultimately be the seat of sin, God made it, at first, a world of suffering to sensitive natures. In this way alone, would unity be given to the divine plan. For either in the nature of things, or by inflexible decree, it is probable that sin and death are inseparable ; and that mortal and immortal natures cannot coëxist in the same natural constitution.

It may be thought difficult to reconcile, with infinite benevolence, the suffering and death of so many animals, that preceded man's existence, if we regard it all as occasioned by his sin. But is it any easier to see how their present sufferings, brought on them by man's wickedness, is consistent with the divine goodness? The fact that they suffer at all, not the time when, is the grand difficulty. But let it be remembered, that suffering is not necessarily punishment. Can

it not be shown that animal existence, in this world, is decidedly a blessing, in spite of their sufferings; and if so, was it not consistent with divine benevolence to bestow it? Besides, can we say certainly that no compensation awaits animals? Are we sure that they will not exist hereafter? A wise man will hesitate long before he answers in the affirmative.

Sympathizing with the views expressed in this first inference, I am prepared to fall in with the current opinion among evangelical Christians, that Adam's transgression was the occasion of all the suffering and death that have ever reigned on this globe. I go, in fact, beyond the common opinion, because I include pre-Adamic as well as post-Adamic evil in the same category. It is what might, perhaps not inappropriately, be called geological supralapsarianism.

2. *Secondly, the subject shows us that, in the original plan of creation in the divine mind, all things were so ordered as to make this world a theatre for the work of redemption.*

I apprehend that a very common idea of this work is, that it was rather an after-thought, on the part of God: that after placing man in the probation of Eden, he waited to see whether he would obey, before he determined what to do if he should not. These anthropomorphic views are very common with unthinking minds; and the Bible accommodates its language, sometimes, to human frailty: as when it represents God as under the influence of human feelings and passions. But we are allowed to enucleate the true philosophic meaning out of such popular illustrations. And in respect to redemption, how absurd to suppose that God, who foreknew that man would fall, should not, in eternity, have provided for such an event! How improbable that he should have fitted up this whole world for a holy race, when he knew that they would all be unholy, save the first pair temporarily. How much more likely, that the Lord God *should plant a garden eastward, in Eden*, and there put man, as we know he did, while he suffered thorns and thistles — fit symbols of the various evils of life — to grow everywhere else, as they ever had done.

The sacred writers seem more disposed than modern theologians to refer the scheme of redemption to God's eternal purpose. When they speak of Christ as suffering, it is, with them, *according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God*. When they refer to the plan of redemption, it is to *the mystery which, from the beginning of the world, hath been hid in God, whose manifold wisdom is shown hereby, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord*. How much nobler are such views than those which are limited to the works of Christ during his incarnation. The latter may be all that is necessary in the beginning of the Christian life; but the mature Christian will not be satisfied till he has traced back the history of redemption through all past time and past eternity, to its origination in the divine purpose.

3. *Thirdly, the subject shows us that the exhibition of the divine glory in the work of redemption, was the grand object for which this world was created.*

All will admit that the illustration of the divine glory was the great object of creation. But if most men were asked in what way this glory is most strikingly manifested, they would point you to the wisdom, power, and benevolence, which nature's works present, without reference to redemption. Nor would I disregard these displays. But after all, if it be admitted that the constitution of nature and its history from the beginning, show that everything has been developed, arranged, and carried on, to aid a fallen being in his restoration to holiness, forgiveness, and happiness, every other object must be regarded as subordinate to this; and redemption be looked upon as the great fact of nature, as it is of revelation. In what way can the divine glory be more illustriously displayed, than by lavishing the riches of infinite wisdom and benevolence to adapt a world for the residence of fallen man, and for the exhibition of incarnate love?

If these things are so, am I not sustained and justified in the assertion, that I had found "something of the Cross in nature, and something of nature in the Cross? Indeed, might I not have used stronger language, and have said, that

I had found *much* of the Cross in nature? For we find it everywhere impressed upon her constitution and history; daguerreotyped, as it were, into the very framework of our world; and needing only the application of fair reasoning, to bring out the picture and fix it upon the plate.

4. *In the fourth place, we learn from the subject, that a full and complete history of redemption includes pre-Adamic history.*

I do not refer to what took place in the councils of eternity in respect to the mission of the Son of God; but to the fitting up of this world, during the long periods that preceded man's existence, so that it should be best adapted to the restoration of a fallen being. The eminent American divine (Jonathan Edwards), who has written "The History of Redemption," makes the work of Christ on earth to commence immediately after the fall of man. In his day science had not demonstrated the existence of a long pre-Adamic period; and yet, with a sagacity peculiar to gifted minds, he makes a statement almost equivalent to the position which science enables us now to take, and which I have made the fundamental principle of this Article. "As to this lower world," says Edwards: "It was doubtless created to be a stage, upon which this great and wonderful work of redemption should be transacted; and therefore, as might be shown in many respects, this world is wisely fitted in its formation, for such a state of man as he is in since the fall, under a possibility of redemption" (Hist. of Red. p. 17. Tract Soc. Ed.). A knowledge of the state of things during the long pre-Adamic state of the globe, enables us to add, or rather to prefix, an interesting chapter to the history of redemption. It shows us that the vast and oft-times repeated population of the globe before man, was all subjected to suffering and death, because man, when he should appear, would fall from rectitude; and thus it shows that the world from its commencement, was adapted, even in its physical constitution, to a lost and sinful being. It exalts our conceptions of the extent and grandeur of the work of redemption, to show how everything was conspiring on the globe,

during the immeasurable periods of its early history, to make it such a place as man's character and wants demanded, and God's glory in the incarnation be best displayed before the universe. The unity of the world, in a religious respect, has thus been preserved from the beginning, and the feature in it that has ever been most prominent, in its adaptation to the work of redemption.

5. *In the fifth place, this subject shows that the existence of so much confusion, trial, and suffering in this world, illustrates, instead of disproving, divine benevolence.*

Many an honest mind, when it sees so much of inevitable suffering everywhere, — so much of unavoidable ignorance, — such inequality in the gifts of Providence, — such terrible disappointments of the most innocent and best laid plans, — and so much of mortal anxiety and distress from disordered nerves, — many an honest mind, I say, surrounded by such scenes, is thrown into a state of painful doubt whether there be a wise and benevolent ruler of the universe. The question presses upon us: Why should omnipotent goodness permit these manifold evils to prevail, when they might so easily be prevented? Behold in this subject a solution of this enigma. God has made this world such as it is, because infinite wisdom shows that its present condition is better adapted than any other, to man's character, and affords the only hope that he may be restored to holiness and happiness. No other state of things would give any such hope. Hence the evils of life are a fine illustration of divine benevolence. If man's nature had not become disordered by sin, God would have provided a very different state of things; but as he now is, any less of trial and suffering would have been fatal to his highest good. The disease is desperate and calls for strong remedies. How illustriously, then, does God's benevolence shine from out of the depths of all mortal evils! They are a part of the grand work of redemption; and for them all, the sufferer may hereafter bless divine wisdom and benevolence. But had an unwise kindness placed man, as he is by nature, in a paradisaical state, eternal destruction would have been his certain lot.

6. *In the sixth place, in the light of this discussion, how imperative the duty, and exalted the privilege, of persuading the whole human family to participate in the blessings of redemption.*

This duty has been usually based upon the positive command of Christ, as the chief motive. But if the views we have taken be admitted, we may bring in additionally the voice of all nature. The whole creation, groaning and travailling in pain until now, is waiting anxiously for the manifestation of the sons of God, because not till then will it be delivered from its fettered and suffering condition. Subjected unwillingly to a frail and dying state, it must remain so till the gospel has been preached to every creature. For this end was the world created by Christ and for Christ; and, therefore, should every renewed soul feel that it is a great privilege to make known everywhere that salvation which he purchased at an infinite sacrifice.

Every enterprise in which we embark, rises in our estimation in proportion to the number and exalted rank and character of those who coöperate with us or cheer us on by their approbation. Tested by such a rule, what cause can compare in dignity and importance with that of spreading the gospel; and what office can be more honorable, or desirable, than those who have devoted their life to this service. For in the scriptures they find the Infinite God,—the Father, the Son, and the Spirit,—not only commanding and urging them onward in their work, but *coöperating* and making their labors successful; and they find nature conspiring with revelation in showing the world itself to have been created and fitted up, as it is, for the express purpose of carrying forward and consummating the work of redemption. It is, therefore, the grandest and the noblest enterprise in which any created being can engage. All others pursued by men are insignificant in comparison with this; and the most humble servant of God, who preaches the gospel, even with a feeble, a stammering tongue, and perhaps amid ridicule, contempt, and persecution, moves in a sphere far more sublime and glorious than the proudest military conqueror, the mightiest civil ruler, or the most profound philosopher.

7. *Finally, what a day will that be when the work of redemption shall be completed, and this poor fallen world shall be succeeded by the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness.*

Then cometh the end, when Christ shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also, himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all. The mediatorial work will then be finished; the redeemed be all gathered in; the awards of eternity promulgated from the judgment-seat; and the last enemy conquered; then may the delegated power of Christ, as Redeemer, be given up, and God alone, though still as Father, Son, and Spirit, occupy the throne; no longer working in their three-fold manifestation for human salvation, but rejoicing over the multitude, which no man can number, redeemed among men, and safe in the arms of eternal love. The Creation now freed from its fetters and its curse, may spring forth into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. It is no longer necessary that it should groan and travail in pain, because the ransomed are all gathered in. Purified by the fires of the last day, and smiling in its renovated dress,—more lovely than the robe which Eden wore,—it has become a fit abode for the righteous and the happy.

Then, too, will the redeemed take up the retrospect of the world's history. And it will be found that all which is worth remembering is embraced in the history of redemption. Indeed, what event in the scientific, the political, the social, or the military annals of the globe, will not be found to have been connected with the progress of redemption? The earliest record, which the geologist finds registered in the earth's foundations, nay, even the act of creation itself, will be seen to point significantly to the cross. The sacrifice there made will, indeed, present itself as the most striking fact earth has ever witnessed, and to which all others have reference. Oh, how delightful the privilege of tracing out the entire history. As new developments open before the glorious company of

the redeemed, how will they ever and anon pause in their investigations, and with a loud voice exclaim: *Worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power and riches and wisdom and strength, and honor and glory and blessing. — Blessing and honor and glory and power be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever.*

ARTICLE II.

THE NECESSITY OF THE ATONEMENT.

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THE scriptures plainly teach the necessity of the sufferings and death of Christ: "the Son of Man *must* suffer many things, and be rejected of the elders and of the chief priests and scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again" (Mark 8: 31). "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so *must* the Son of Man be lifted up; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life" (Jn. 3: 14, 15). "Thus it is written, and thus it *behooved* Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead the third day" (Lk. 24: 46). "And Paul, as his manner was, went in unto them, and three sabbath days reasoned with them out of the scriptures, opening and alleging that Christ *must needs* have suffered, and risen again from the dead" (Acts 17: 2, 3).

These, and many other passages, clearly teach that the passion of our Lord was necessary; and the inquiry naturally arises: What is the ground of this necessity? Why was it needful that Christ should suffer and die? If it be said, that "the scriptures might not be broken — that the Old-Testament prophecies respecting the Messiah might be fulfilled," then we ask: Whence the necessity for these prophecies, un-

less there was a prior necessity for the thing predicted? Why did God before show, "by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer," unless his sufferings were foreseen to be necessary? If, again, it be said that the necessity for Christ's passion was in "the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God," then our inquiry is only carried back another step: Why was it necessary that God should, beforehand, determine to deliver up his only-begotten Son, to suffering and to death? Whence the necessity for a divine purpose that should include the humiliation and mortal agonies of the "Word," that "was in the beginning with God?" If, from this point, we step back upon the fatalist's ground, and recognize an absolute necessity, higher than God, binding his will and all its issues, with the chain of an inexorable destiny, then our inquiry is at an end: Christ's death was necessary in the same sense, and for the same reason, that all things are necessary. But if we regard the divine will as free, and all its purposes as spontaneous and self-determined, then the way is still open to pursue our inquiry touching the ground of the necessity for the Saviour's passion. And the inquiry now becomes teleological. God had some definite end in view when he freely purposed, predicted, and effected, the death of Christ; and he purposed, predicted, and effected it, because it was a necessary means to that end. What was that end? It was — we suppose all will agree in saying — proximately, the salvation of sinful men, and ultimately the promotion of his own glory, through the salvation of sinful men. If the atonement was necessary at all, it was necessary as the means of recovering men from a state of sinful alienation from God. The fact that the whole human race is, by nature, thus alienated, we assume, as indisputable. And it is with reference to the reconciliation of sinners with God, and their final salvation, that the scriptures affirm a necessity for the sufferings and death of Christ.

But why was an atonement necessary — this is the form our inquiry now assumes — in order that men might be reconciled and saved? Is it suggested that we are here entering a region of useless and unsafe speculation, and that

it were better to be content with the revealed fact, and not perplex ourselves about the reasons for it? But since this divinely revealed fact, that an atonement was necessary, in order to human salvation, appeals to that divinely implanted instinct within us, which ever prompts us to go back of facts and search for hidden reasons and underlying principles, and without which there would be nothing worthy of the name of science or philosophy, it cannot be improper for us to inquire why Christ "must needs suffer," provided our investigations are conducted with an humble and reverent spirit. Moreover, such an inquiry will tend to give definiteness and value to our views of the *nature* of the atonement. We miss much of the real significance of the fact that Christ died to save sinners, until we discern the true ground or reason for the necessity of his death.

There are three different theories concerning the necessity of the Atonement, which, for convenience, may be designated as "The Moral-influence theory," "The Satisfaction theory," and "The Governmental theory."

It is proposed to examine the respective claims of these three theories, in order.

I. *The Moral-influence Theory.*

The two essential points in this theory are: *first*, that repentance and spiritual renewal on the part of sinners, constitute the only necessary and actual ground of their pardon and salvation; and, *secondly*, that the death of Christ was necessary to furnish and bring to bear effectually, on sinful men, those moral influences which were needful to lead them to repentance and effect in them a thorough renovation of character.¹

This, for substance, was the theory advocated by Abelard in the twelfth century;² and by Socinus in the sixteenth

¹ It may, perhaps, be thought by some that the advocates of this theory wholly deny the doctrine of the Atonement, and should have been passed by in this discussion. But as they generally claim to hold to *an* Atonement, and apply this term to the work of Christ in saving men, and affirm that work to have been necessary to human salvation, we prefer to devote a brief space to a consideration of their theory.

² Neander's Ch. Hist., Torrey's Trans. Vol. IV., p. 502.

century,¹ and has been held by the great body of modern Unitarians, although some of them admit that the death of Christ may have been necessary for some unknown purpose, besides that of exerting upon men renovating influences.²

This theory is manifestly correct in affirming the necessity of repentance and true holiness, as an indispensable condition of forgiveness and salvation. All Christians agree on this point. The scriptures are too explicit here to leave any possible room for diversity of opinion. Men must repent or perish; be born again or be excluded from the kingdom of heaven.

This theory is unquestionably right in affirming that pardon and eternal life are pledged to all who do sincerely repent and turn to God, and "walk in newness of life." When the prophet proclaims: "Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts; and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him, and to our God for he will abundantly pardon" (Isa. 55:7), the apostle responds: "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: But in every nation, he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him" (Acts 10:34, 35).

This theory is right also, beyond dispute, in affirming the

¹ Hagenbach Hist. Doctrines, Vol. II., p. 341.

² "We have no desire to conceal the fact that a difference of opinion exists among us in regard to an interesting part of Christ's mediation; I mean in regard to the precise influence of his death on our forgiveness. Many suppose that this event contributes to our pardon, as it was the principal means of confirming his religion, and of giving it power over the mind; in other words, that it procures forgiveness by leading to that repentance and virtue which is the great and only condition on which forgiveness is bestowed. Many of us are dissatisfied with this explanation, and think that the scriptures ascribe the remission of sins to Christ's death, with an emphasis so peculiar that we ought to consider this event as having a special influence in removing punishment, though the scriptures may not reveal the way in which it contributes to this end" (Channing's Works, Vol. III., p. 88). "His [Christ's] death stands forth as no other event does in the world's history, and exerts a power that nothing else has. That power is spiritual and for *man*. We say not there can be no other power then; but if there be, it is not for us to define" (Rev. E. B. Hall, D. D., Relig. Mag. Vol. XV., p. 256).

life and death of Christ to be preëminently the source of those moral influences which lead men to forsake their sins, and to "put on the new man, which, after God, is created in righteousness and true holiness." By his clearer and fuller manifestation of God; by his lucid enunciation of the most profound spiritual truths; by his restoration to the race of the last ideal of humanity; by the sublime and melting spectacle of his final sufferings in Gethsemane, and on Calvary, he became emphatically "the power of God unto salvation." There are no motives so mighty and subduing, as those drawn from the work of him "who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people zealous of good works."

But while this "moral-influence theory" thus includes important elements of truth, it seems to us radically defective, both on philosophical and scriptural grounds.

(a) It virtually denies that there is any real and universal necessity for the work of Christ. If men would repent under other moral influences than those introduced by Christ, then, according to this theory, his work were unnecessary. And can it be proved, or justly assumed, that no sinner ever did, or ever will become truly penitent, except through the moral influences emanating from the life and sufferings of Jesus? The advocates of this theory would probably be the last to consign the whole heathen world to perdition, rejecting the belief, or hope, common to nearly all Christians, that some who never heard the name of Christ, nor felt the influence of a single motive, drawn from his teachings or example, or death, will be spiritually renewed and saved. For all such, if such there be, Christ's work was, of course, in no sense necessary. They are not indebted to it, in any way, for their salvation, and will be unable to join, at last, in that "new song," saying: "Thou art worthy, for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God, by thy blood, out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation."

(b) This theory detracts from the real moral power of the atonement, by making its designed efficacy and value to consist exclusively in its moral power. Whatever is confessedly

done, or endured, solely to impress or influence us, becomes, for that very reason, comparatively uninfluential. We are not readily moved by that which we know has no end but to move us. Sufferings endured only to furnish us with an example of patience and fortitude, have less power to inspire us with a spirit of patient and heroic endurance, than sufferings necessarily involved in securing some end, connected with interests higher than our own. Moreover, this theory, by denying that there is a necessity for any other ground of forgiveness than repentance, tends to enfeeble men's ideas of the evil of sin and the sacredness of law ; and consequently of the riches of divine love and justice, so marvellously blended in the cross ; and thus it robs the atoning work of Christ of not a little of that power over the conscience and heart which, we conceive, really belongs to it.

It might seem invidious, in confirmation of these remarks, to appeal to facts ; but we cannot suppress the conviction that such an appeal would furnish evidence that this theory, which makes the sole value of the atonement to consist in its renovating, life-giving power, does not actually render that doctrine as influential for good as a different theory does.

(c) According to this theory, the work of Christ has no *peculiar* efficacy as a means of human salvation. It saves men only in the same sense that everything does, which exerts upon them any good moral influence. *In kind*, its saving efficacy is the same as that of every act of true self-denial or self-sacrifice for the sake of others. Christ is only a saviour, not *the* Saviour. His claims to that title are not exclusive. He merely stands at the head of a great company of the wise and good of all ages, who, by their unselfish labors, and holy example, and self-immolation, have won men from the downward path of sin to the upward path of virtue. But can any candid reader of the scriptures fail to receive the impression, clear and strong, that the salvation of sinners is a work in which Christ has no rival ? that what he did and suffered had an efficacy altogether peculiar ? that he alone, properly bears the name *Saviour*, — *Jesus*, because he alone saves his people from their sins ? (Matt. 1 : 21.)

(d) This theory does not satisfy the awakened moral judgment of men. Feeble and inadequate convictions of sin may allow the sinner to rest content with his own real or supposed penitence, and his new right purposes and endeavors. But let his conscience be quickened and made sensitive; let him have a deep sense of the "exceeding sinfulness of sin," as committed against a holy God, and in violation of his righteous law; and then, when his penitence is deepest, and his purposes of amendment strongest, will he be the least satisfied with these, as a ground of pardon and of reconciliation with God; and will most earnestly demand something more, something out of himself, and wholly beyond his power to supply. This sense of sin, reaching forth after an objective atonement or ground of justification, and demanding something besides repentance, to honor the violated law and satisfy the lawgiver, is a reality, as the experience of untold multitudes will attest; is one of the profoundest realities in the experience of, we venture to say, the great majority of those who begin a truly religious life; and is a protest of their moral nature against the theory, that the only necessity and design of Christ's atonement was to induce men to repent, and exchange an ungodly for a godly life.

(e) This theory offers no facile and satisfactory explanation of numerous passages of scripture which connect the salvation of men with the work of Christ:

1. Those passages which explicitly affirm the impossibility of salvation except by Christ: "Neither is there salvation in any other; for there is none other name under heaven, given among men, whereby we must (*δεῖ*) be saved" (Acts 4:12). "For other foundation can no man lay, than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. 3:11). By these texts, the possibility of being saved, except by Christ, is most clearly and decidedly excluded. If, then, Christ saves only by the moral influence of his life and death, he can save none who have no knowledge of him; and hence the countless millions who never hear of Christ will, without exception, perish. The advocates of this theory, then, are obliged to put an unnatural and forced construction upon passages like the above, or else believe, what many of them certainly do not believe,

that not one of the human race, who is wholly ignorant of Christ, will ever repent and be saved.

2. Those passages which ascribe to Christ's death a retrospective efficacy : " Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for *the remission of sins that are past*" (Rom. 3: 25). Olshausen says the words *ἀμαρτήματα προγεγονότα* " can only mean the sins of the world before Christ's coming." ¹ Stuart adopts the same interpretation, and says : " The parallel of this remarkable and most cheering and animating sentiment is to be found in Heb. 9: 15. It is implied in other passages of the N. T. not unfrequently." ² But how can the moral influence of Christ's death be retrospective, or in any conceivable way tend to secure the remission of sins committed ages before his advent ? The above interpretation of these passages, which certainly seems to be the true one, is utterly inconsistent with the moral-influence theory of the atonement.

3. Those passages which imply that Christ died for all mankind : " Because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead " (2 Cor. 5: 14). " Who gave himself, a ransom for all, to be testified in due time " (1 Tim. 2: 6). " That he, by the grace of God, should taste death for every man " (Heb. 2: 9). " And he is the propitiation for our sins ; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world " (1 Jn. 2: 2). How could language express the universality of the atonement, more clearly and strongly ? It is impossible, by any just rules of exegesis, to exclude from such passages their natural and obvious meaning, that Christ died for the whole human race. But how can this be, if the whole efficacy of his death consists in its moral influence ? That influence certainly does not, and was not designed to, reach all men. There is no sense in which, according to this theory, Christ is a " propitiation for the sins of the whole world ;" or " tasted death for every man." If he died for all, then must his death have a value other than that which consists in its power to lead men to repentance.

¹ Com. in loco.

² Com. in loco.

4. Those passages which clearly teach that the sufferings and death of Christ were, in some sense, vicarious or substitutionary: "Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for (ὁπέρ) the unjust, that he might bring us to God" (1 Pet. 3:18). "I delivered unto you, first of all, that which I also received, how that Christ died for (ὁπέρ) our sins" (1 Cor. 15:3). "Who gave himself for (ὁπέρ) our sins" (Gal. 1:4). "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for (ὁπέρ) us" (Gal 3:13). "Who gave himself a ransom for (ὁπέρ) all" (1 Tim. 2:6). "While we were yet sinners, Christ died for (ὁπέρ) us" (Rom. 5:6). "Who, his own self, *bare our sins* in his own body on the tree" (1 Pet. 2:24). "He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed" (Isa. 51:5). It is not easy to conceive how language could, more distinctly and unequivocally, express the idea that, in some sense, Christ was a substitute for sinners — suffered in their stead. But the idea of substitution must be eradicated from these and kindred passages, before they can be made to favor the idea that Christ died only to exert upon men a good moral influence, fitted to lead them to repentance.

5. Those passages which represent the death of Christ as a sacrifice or propitiatory offering: "As Christ also hath loved us, and given himself for us, an offering (προσφοράν) and a sacrifice (θυσίαν) to God" (Eph. 5:2). "When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin" (עֹלָה). "And he is the propitiation (ἱλασμός) for our sins, and not for ours only, but also *for the sins* of the whole world" (1 Jn. 2:2). "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation (ἱλαστήριον),¹ through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past" (Rom. 3:25). The sacrificial idea cannot be excluded from these passages; and no figurative interpretation can be put upon them, which does not yet clearly imply that the death of Christ had an efficacy objective

¹ "As sin offering," De Wette. "Expiatory sacrifice," Tholuck.

and God-ward. Neither a literal nor a figurative sacrifice, or sin-offering, suggests the idea of subjective moral influence. Such terms as "sacrifice," "propitiation," "sin-offering," seem wholly foreign to the theory under review; and their use by the sacred writers is inexplicable, if this be the true theory of the atonement. More inapposite terms could scarcely be found, to denote that the sole efficacy of Christ's death consists in the good moral influence which it exerts upon men in turning them away from their iniquities.

II. *The Satisfaction Theory.*

The question is: Why was the atonement necessary to secure the pardon and salvation of sinners? According to the theory we are now to consider, it was necessary to satisfy, appease, or conciliate the distributive justice of God. Other important ends, it is conceded, are answered by the atonement: it has a governmental value, honoring the divine law, and sustaining the divine authority. It meets a demand of the human conscience, bringing peace to the guilty; and it furnishes the most powerful motives to induce men to turn from sin to holiness. But, according to this theory, these are secondary and incidental ends. The prime design of the atonement was to afford satisfaction to divine justice, or the "ethical nature" of God. Sin awakens the divine anger, which demands the punishment of the sinner; but is satisfied with the substituted punishment of Christ, and permits the divine mercy to save the sinner from his deserved doom.

The germs of this theory are found in the writings of Augustine, and several of the early Fathers. The view of the atonement, however, that prevailed for several centuries, coming into prominence during the third and fourth, seems to have been, that it was necessary to satisfy Satan, rather than God; was a price paid to redeem, or buy off, sinners from the just claims which Satan had upon them in consequence of their sins.¹

¹ "In Irenaeus, the sufferings of Christ are represented as having a necessary connection with the rightful deliverance of man from the power of Satan. The

But as Manichaeism disappeared, and a more rational view of demoniacal agency began to prevail, a new theory of the Atonement became indispensable, and was gradually developed. Christ's death came to be regarded as a satisfaction, not to Satan, but to God himself. Anselm of Canterbury was one of the first and ablest advocates of the new theory; although in his hands it did not assume the precise form in which it was subsequently, and is still, held. It has, indeed, been denied that Anselm held the modern doctrine that Christ's sufferings were an expiatory sacrifice substituted for the punishment of sinners to satisfy divine justice.¹

Still there can be little doubt that between the satisfaction theory which has extensively prevailed in the church during the last five or six centuries, and the theory of the Archbishop of Canterbury, there is a close genealogical connection. The general idea of satisfaction rendered to God's violated honor, by the whole work of Christ, was gradually reduced to a more specific idea of satisfaction to God's distributive justice by the penal sufferings of Christ substituted for those of sinners. Those who hold this theory differ on some of the minor points involved, but agree in regard to its main features which are: (1) Sin is inherently hateful and ill-deserv-

divine justice is here displayed in allowing even Satan to have his due. Of satisfaction done by the sufferings of Christ to the divine justice, as yet not the slightest mention is to be found" (Neander's Ch. Hist. Vol. I., p. 642). "This theory was first adopted by the Grecian Church, and especially by Origen (Com. in Matt. XX., et alibi), through whose influence it became prevalent and was adopted at length by Basilus, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzen, Nestorius, and others. From the Greeks it was communicated to the Latins, among whom it was distinctly held by Ambrosius, and afterwards by Augustine, through whose influence it was rendered almost universal in the Latin Church" (Knapp's theology, p. 401). See also, Hagenback's Hist. Doctrines, Vol. II., pp. 192-3.

¹ "The idea of a punishment by which satisfaction is made, and which is suffered in the room of another, does not occur in the scheme of Anselm." Bauer, quoted by Hagenback (Hist. Doct. Vol. II., p. 38). Far from Anselm was the idea of a satisfaction by suffering, or an expiation by assuming the punishment of mankind; for the satisfaction which Christ afforded by what he did was certainly according to Anselm's doctrine, to be the restoration of God's honor, violated by sin, and by just this satisfaction afforded to God for mankind, was the remission of punishment to be made possible" (Neander's Ch. Hist. Vol. IV., p. 500).

ing: (2) God, as a being of perfect holiness, necessarily hates all sin, as such: (3) God by a constitutional necessity of his nature is inexorably obligated to manifest his hatred of sin by inflicting the punishment which it deserves: (4) This deserved and inflicted punishment satisfies and this alone can satisfy the divine hatred of sin, or distributive justice: (5) By bearing this deserved punishment in the place of sinners, Christ gave the required satisfaction to the divine justice, and thereby laid the ground for the pardon and salvation of them that believe. This theory certainly has much to commend it to our belief. By its profounder views of sin, and of the divine holiness; and its juster interpretation of many passages of scripture, it possesses decided advantages over the theory which resolves the whole efficacy of the Atonement into a moral power to lead men to forsake sin, and turn to God. It is evidently right in affirming that sin is intrinsically hateful and ill-deserving; that it is an evil *per se*, and not merely on account of its tendencies, and consequences. This we hold to be a fundamental point in all our ethical and theological inquiries. The doctrine that sin is only a relative and not an essential and intrinsic evil, does not, in our view, accord either with the facts of consciousness, or the teachings of the Bible, and is calculated to vitiate our reasoning on many important topics.

Again, this theory is undeniably right in affirming that God necessarily hates sin. He can neither love, nor be indifferent to what is, in its own nature, hateful. The emotions of a perfect being must perfectly correspond to the true qualities of things. It is not optional with him whether or not, to feel complacency in what is pure and lovely, or displacency in what is impure and hateful. Even if sin were only a relative evil, God would necessarily hate it as such. As he must be pleased with what tends to promote the highest welfare of his creatures, so must he be displeased with what tends to interfere with their highest welfare. He must, therefore, hate sin with a double hatred; hate it on account of its intrinsic hatefulness, and on account of its evil tendencies. On two of its fundamental points, then, we cor-

dially accept the theory now under notice. But when we come to its third point, we are unable to yield our assent; and here we will commence the statement of our objections to this theory of the Atonement:

1. It rests upon the false assumption that God is, by a constitutional necessity, obligated to *express* his hatred of sin, by the infliction of deserved punishment. We call this an *assumption*, because we do not find it anywhere proved or distinctly argued, but everywhere taken for granted. It is really a double assumption. It is assumed, *first*, that God must give expression to his hatred of sin; and, *secondly*, that he must do so in one particular way, viz., by the infliction of deserved punishment. We call it a *false* assumption, because we see no good reason for believing it to be true, but many weighty reasons for believing it not to be true. It is admitted that sin deserves punishment, but how does the simple desert of punishment necessitate its infliction? It is admitted that God must hate sin, but how does his necessary hatred of sin involve any necessity for its expression, and especially any necessity for its expression in the form of judicial punishment? Why may not the displacent emotion exist without having a penal expression? Why may it not be suppressed, if there appear any good and sufficient reason why it should be? How does its bare existence in the mind of God necessitate him to manifest it by inflicting the evil which sin that awakened it, merits? Against this assumption that there is, in the very nature of God's emotion of displeasure at sin, a necessity for its exercise in the actual infliction of deserved punishment, we bring forward the fact that there is not, in any of the other constitutional emotions of God, an inherent necessity for their exercise or expression towards the objects which awaken them. The commiserative emotion excited in the divine mind by human suffering, does not inexorably obligate God to relieve that suffering. Were it so, there would be no suffering unrelieved, neither in this world nor in the world to come. But there is suffering which God commiserates, but does not relieve. He suppresses the emotion which it awakens, for

wise and benevolent reasons, and permits his creatures to suffer, yea, causes them to suffer, often long and severely. Why may he not for similar reasons, lay a like restraint upon the judicial emotion awakened by human sinfulness? Is it said that the preëminence of this emotion over all others, creates a necessity for its expression which does not exist in their case? But has this emotion of displeasure at sin any such preëminence? Wherein does it consist? How shall we weigh one of the divine emotions against another, and say this is superior to that? If we were thus to estimate them, and arrange them according to their relative dignity or value, would not the affectionate and sympathetic emotions rank at least as high as the ethical or judicial emotion?

It is sometimes said that the latter is more fundamental and central in the divine nature than the others; that it is constitutional, while they are voluntary; so that we can say "God must hate sin, must be just;" but we cannot say, "God must be merciful, must show pity."¹

This statement manifestly proceeds upon an imperfect analysis, and a mistaken conception of the divine attributes. We hesitate not to deny that justice is any more a fundamental attribute, any more constitutional or involuntary,

¹ "This avenging justice belongs to God as a judge, and he can no more dispense with it than he can cease to be a judge, or deny himself; though at the same time he exercises it freely. It does not consist in the exercise of a gratuitous power, like mercy, by which whether it be exercised or not, injustice is done to no one. It is that attribute by which God gives to every one his due, and from the exercise of which, when proper objects are presented, he can no more abstain, than he can do what is unjust. This justice is the constant will of punishing sinners, which in God cannot be inefficient, as his majesty is supreme and his power infinite" (Turretin's Atonement, Trans. by Wilson. New York, 1859). "So long as he is holy *he must be just; he must repel sin*, which is the highest idea we can form of punishment" (Hodge's Essays and Reviews, p. 137). "For whatever else God may be, or may not be, he must be just. It is not optional with him to exercise this attribute, or not to exercise it, as it is in the instance of that class of attributes which are antithetic to it. We can say: "God may be merciful or not as he pleases," but we cannot say: "God may be just or not, as he pleases. It cannot be asserted that God is inexorably obligated to show pity; but it can be categorically affirmed that God is inexorably obligated to do justly" (Bib. Sacra, Vol. XVI., p. 738).

than are love, pity, and that whole "class of attributes which are antithetic to it." In all the moral attributes of God, there is a voluntary and an involuntary element. There is the constitutional retributive sentiment and impulse, as the basis of justice; and there is the constitutional benevolent sentiment and impulse as the basis of love and mercy; and the latter is just as essential and fundamental in the godhead, just as involuntary and indefeasible as the former. Both exist and must exist, where the correlated objects exist. We can just as easily conceive of God as being destitute of the one as of the other; as easily conceive of him as looking down upon sin without any displacent emotion, or any impulse to punish it, as conceive of him as looking down upon suffering without any benevolent emotion, or any impulse to relieve it. These two emotions, as involuntary and necessary, are upon a level in point of dignity and importance, being alike essential parts of an infinite nature. Neither is conditioned upon, nor limited by, the other. They may coëxist harmoniously in the same mind, and in respect to the same person, if he be both a sinner and a sufferer. The simultaneous expression or gratification of them both, in such a case may be impossible; and if the question then arise, which of the two shall be gratified, and which repressed, the answer must be sought elsewhere than in the nature of the emotions themselves. Neither has any such inherent superiority as to entitle it to indulgence at the expense of the other. The judicial emotion cannot rightfully stride forward to reach its own private ends, by trampling down compassion by sheer force; neither can compassion stride forward to reach its own private ends by trampling down justice by sheer force. These emotions can reach, and take effect on their objects, only through the consenting action of the will. But the divine will surely will not arbitrarily, or from blind partiality, gratify one of these emotional impulses and deny the other; nor is it necessitated to gratify either. It can for good reasons restrain and deny them both temporarily or permanently. As a matter of fact it does thus lay restraint upon the compassionate impulse, and will

continue to do so, as long as there is unrelieved suffering in the world, or a lost spirit in hell. And what God thus can do, and actually does, to one department of his emotional nature, there is every reason to believe he can do to every other department. Even if his judicial emotions were more intense than his benevolent emotions (of which we have not a shadow of evidence), this would be no proof that the former must be gratified rather than the latter. The mere strength or intensity of any involuntary feeling cannot justify, much less, necessitate its voluntary exercise and expression. Here, no more than elsewhere, does might make right. The justifying reason for all moral conduct is to be found elsewhere than in the mere strength of those constitutional impulses which prompt to it, whether those impulses be retributive or commiserative.

The foregoing argument against the assumption that there is in the very nature of God's emotional hatred of sin a necessity for its expression in the actual infliction of deserved punishment, is confirmed by an appeal to the operations of the human conscience.

There must be such a correspondence between the moral constitution of man and the moral constitution of God as to render it legitimate to reason from the one to the other. Now can we, indeed, know anything about the divine attributes, or have any conception of them, unless we reason from ourselves, from the finite to the infinite? The emotions of the human conscience towards sin must be the same *in kind* as those which sin awakens in the mind of God, else we are wholly ignorant what those emotions are. This judicial faculty must represent or interpret to us the judicial nature of God, else we know nothing about that nature. What, then, is the testimony of conscience to the point in hand? Do its displacent emotions towards sin involve a necessity for their gratification? We may examine these emotions with reference to the individual's own sins, or with reference to the sins of others. A man commits a sin. Its commission is attended or followed by an emotion of displacency towards the sin, and also by an emotion or sense

of personal ill-desert. The former emotion is in kind the same that God has towards it. The sin is displeasing to, and is condemned by, both God and the sinner's own conscience. Thus far all is clear. The action of conscience assures us that God hates the sin. But what does the sinner's sense of personal ill-desert signify? Clearly this, that God regards him as ill-deserving; and the more this feeling of ill-desert is intensified, the more clearly does it intimate the strength of the retributive sentiment in the divine mind toward him. And is not this the whole of the positive testimony of conscience in the case? Does it in any way, directly or indirectly, tell him that God must of necessity inflict upon him deserved punishment? It tells him that God *may* punish him, that it would be *right* for him to do so, and hence awakens the fear that he will. The disquietude and misery which it thus sometimes causes, and which the criminal sometimes vainly hopes to get rid of, by voluntarily surrendering himself to the penalty of the violated civil law, may be regarded as a premonition of coming punishment, or as a part of the punishment itself already inflicted. In either case, it only attests the fact, or certainty of punishment, but says nothing about God's being "inexorably obligated to inflict it," by the very nature of his constitutional hatred of it, and sense of its ill-desert.

Let us then examine the operations of conscience in regard to sin committed, not by the individual himself, but by others. A godly man, we will suppose, witnesses the commission of a heinous offence by a fellowman. He immediately experiences a strong emotion of displeasure at it. He abhors it, hates it with perfect hatred, and pronounces the author of it deserving of severe punishment. The retributive impulse awakened within him is strong. But is this a sufficient reason why he should indulge it? Does the very nature of the emotion alone obligate him to give it expression in penal form? *Must* he, as an individual, impelled by a burning sense of the criminal's ill-desert, execute justice upon him? *Must* he not rather repress and deny his emotional impulses, and leave it for some one who,

having the same emotional impulses, finds in his official capacity and relations as ruler, good and sufficient reasons to justify him in gratifying them, by inflicting the deserved punishment? Is it not evident that the mere existence of these involuntary judicial emotions of conscience involves no necessity for their voluntary indulgence and expression? and is not the inference legitimate that the mere existence of corresponding emotions in God involve no such necessity on his part? Our first objection, therefore, to the theory under review seems valid, viz.: that it rests on the false assumption that, because God necessarily hates sin on account of its inherent ill-desert, therefore he must necessarily punish it as it deserves.

2. Our second objection to this theory is, that logically it precludes the possibility of Christ's sufferings being substituted for the penalty due to sin. It is indeed sometimes claimed that this is the only theory of the Atonement that fully retains the idea of vicariousness, or substitution. On the contrary, we maintain that logically, the idea of vicariousness is, by this theory, rendered utterly impossible. God's organic hatred of sin, it is said, imperatively demands the implication of punishment. But what punishment? not punishment in general, but the precise punishment which the sin that awakened it deserves. And inflicted on whom? not anybody at random, but the identical sinner whose sin has rendered him deserving of it. It is his sin alone that has awakened God's judicial wrath; it is his punishment alone that that wrath necessarily demands, if it demand anything. Now to say that a substituted or vicarious punishment will satisfy this demand of divine wrath, is to say that that wrath can be satisfied with something which it does not imperatively demand; which is only another way of admitting that it does not imperatively demand the infliction of the punishment of the sin that excited it. If something else may take the place of that specific penalty which the displeasant emotion of God towards sin demands, then there is not in the emotion itself an immanent necessity for the infliction of that penalty; or if there is any such

necessity for its infliction, then the substitution of something else for it is out of the question. To say that there may be a substituted penalty, provided it be *strictly equivalent* to that whose place it takes, is to say nothing to the purpose. Equivalent, *i. e.*, equally efficacious — for what? Why of course to satisfy the divine displeasure. And if something else will satisfy that displeasure just as well as the deserved punishment itself, then it does not really demand that punishment, but only demands to be satisfied with something. But what evidence have we that a substituted penalty can, in any case, stand so correlated to the judicial emotion excited by sin, as to meet and satisfy it? We here appeal again to the testimony of the human conscience. What does the awakened conscience of the sinner demand? So far as it demands anything, it demands, not the punishment of another person, but of the sinner himself. The penal suffering of another person in his stead does not satisfy his own sense of ill-desert, for that was not what it demanded. It is sometimes said by the defenders of this theory that punishment is the correlate to guilt, just as a liquid is the correlate to thirst. But is the liquid drunk by one person a correlate to the thirst of another person? Does my neighbor's eager draught from the sparkling cup, tend in the least to assuage my burning appetite? Can there be a satisfactory vicarious drinking? So far then as this analogy holds between the cravings of conscience and the cravings of the bodily appetite, it disproves the efficacy or the possibility of vicarious punishment as an expiation of guilt. It can no more satisfy the sinner's judicial thirst to have another person punished for him, than it can satisfy his physical thirst to have another person drink for him. A vicarious endurance of penalty is not what the guilty conscience demands, any more than a vicarious drinking is what the parched lips and tongue demand. The demand of conscience is just as clear and definite in regard to the *person* who shall suffer, as it is in regard to the *penalty* to be suffered; and if in regard to the latter it is inexorable and must be met, then for the same reason it is inexorable and must be met in regard to the for-

mer; if there can be no substitution in regard to the penalty to be inflicted; if nothing but the penalty will answer the purpose, then can there be no substitution in regard to the person on whom it shall be inflicted; nothing but its infliction on the sinner himself will answer the purpose.

If, then, what we have called the false assumption on which this theory of the Atonement rests, be not false but true, a logical deduction from it is, the absolute impossibility of a vicarious Atonement, and of course the absolute impossibility that, in any case, the deserved penalty should be remitted, or the sinner saved from the extremest rigor of its infliction.

3. But if it can be shown that the foregoing objection is not valid, and that a vicarious penalty is possible, then we object to this theory in the *third place*, that it leaves no room for a literal and true pardon of sin.

Pardon is the gracious remission of deserved penalty. But, according to this theory, the penalty is not, and in no case can be, remitted; it is, and must be, in every instance of sin, endured to the last jot or tittle, either by the sinner, in his own person, or in the person of his substitute. In the case of the elect, they have suffered the full penalty in the person of Christ, their surety or substitute. And by this vicarious punishment; all the claims of justice on them are as fully canceled as if it had not been vicarious. "It leaves nothing unsatisfied, either in God's moral nature or man's moral sense." Their debt is wholly paid; their sin is thoroughly expiated; and of course there can be, for them, only a nominal pardon. How can a debt that is already paid, or a sin that is already punished, be said (except figuratively) to be *forgiven*? Or how can God, who has already exacted punishment for a sin, to his entire satisfaction, be said to forgive it? There is no longer any penalty due to the sin, and of course there is none to remit. The non-infliction of penalty in such a case is, in no proper sense of the word, pardon. It is an act of justice, not of grace. The believer can boldly claim it as a right, and need not humbly sue for it as a gracious favor. In attempting to obviate this objection, by showing that the pay-

ment of a penal debt by a surety does not, like the similar payment of a pecuniary debt, set at liberty the debtor, Turretine is compelled to admit that the suffering of Christ was not the precise penalty of the law : was a vicarious *suffering*, not a vicarious *penalty*.¹ But many do not shrink from accepting the conclusion to which their premises logically conduct them : that exemption from punishment, in his own person is the believer's right, and may, in justice, be claimed by him as such. We occasionally meet with language, like the following from President Edwards: "The justice of God, that required man's damnation, and seemed inconsistent with his salvation, now as much requires the salvation of those that believe in Christ, as ever before it required their damnation. Salvation is an absolute debt, to the believer, from God ; so that he may, in justice, demand it, on account of what his Surety has done. For Christ has satisfied his justice fully for his sin ; so that it is but a thing that may be challenged, that God should release the believer from punishment ; it is but a piece of justice that the creditor should release the debtor, when he has fully paid the debt."² If such language is to be regarded as only a strong figurative expression of the author's conviction of the security of the believer and the certainty of his salvation in virtue of Christ's work in his behalf, very well ; but if it is to be taken in its literal sense (and if used by an advocate of this theory, it should be understood literally), then does it admit that there is no such thing, under the divine government, as the proper pardon of sin, or remission of penalty ; and that the believer's exemption from punishment is not due, directly, to an act of divine sovereign grace, but to a mere act of divine justice ; and is only what he can, and should, unhindered by a "false humility," demand as his right.

¹ Wilson's Trans. p. 17.

² Works, N. Y. Ed. Vol. IV., p. 150. While President Edwards the elder adopted in general the views and the language of the advocates of the satisfaction theory of the Atonement, his statements on the subject are not always self-consistent ; and he elucidated principles and made distinctions which, in the minds of his distinguished son and other eminent disciples and successors, became the germs of a different theory.

4. The last objection we will here urge against this theory is, that it leads, by a logical necessity, either to the doctrine of a limited atonement, on the one hand ; or, to the doctrine of universal salvation, on the other.

They, and only they, for whom Christ endured the penalty due to their sins, and satisfied the distributive justice of God, will be saved. If Christ bore the literal penalty for all men, then all men are exempt from obligation to bear it themselves. If God's holy wrath against the sins of all men is perfectly pacified and satisfied, then has he no longer any wrath to visit upon any of the race ; and, of course, will exclude none from salvation, and subject none to eternal punishment. Is it said, that though the atonement be made for all, yet God "is at perfect liberty to apply it to whom he pleases, or not to *apply* it at all?" But so far as the atonement relates to God, and the satisfaction of his judicial wrath, *it is applied when made* : the very making of it is its application. God, by it, inflicts the punishment which satisfies his emotional justice ; and when he has once, to his entire satisfaction, punished a sin, surely he cannot, in virtue of his mere sovereignty, demand a duplicate punishment of that same sin. To punish twice for the same offence, is not the prerogative of a righteous sovereign, but the arbitrary and unjust exercise of power which characterizes the tyrant. It follows then, inevitably, that if Christ literally bore the penalty, and satisfied the divine distributive justice, for all men, all men will be saved ; if the atonement, in this sense, was universal, there is no way of logically avoiding the conclusion, that salvation will be universal. On the other hand, if only a certain part of mankind, the elect, will actually be saved, then the inference is as logical and irresistible, that the atonement is not general, but limited ; that Christ bore the penalty, and satisfied the retributive justice of God, not for the whole, but only for a definite number of the race.

Thus this theory, consistently held, necessitates a belief either in the doctrine of universal salvation, or the doctrine of a limited atonement. Some of its ablest expounders frankly admit this. Thus Symington says : "the Supreme

Being gives to every one his due. This principle cannot be violated, in a single instance. He cannot, according to this, either remit sin without satisfaction, or punish sin where satisfaction for it has been received. The one is as inconsistent with equity as the other. If the punishment for sin has been borne, the remission of the offence follows of course. The principles of rectitude suppose this ; nay, peremptorily demand it ; justice could not be satisfied without it. Agreeably to this reasoning it follows, that the death of Christ being a legal satisfaction for sin, all for whom he died must enjoy the remission of their offences. It is as much at variance with strict justice, or equity, that any for whom Christ has given satisfaction should continue under condemnation, as that they should have been delivered from guilt without a satisfaction being given for them at all. But it is admitted that all are not delivered from the punishment of sin ; that there are many who perish in final condemnation. We are, therefore, compelled to infer that for such, no satisfaction has been given to the claims of infinite justice — no atonement has been made. If this is denied, the monstrous impossibility must be maintained, that the infallible judge refuses to remit the punishment of some for whose offences he has received a full compensation ; that he finally condemns some, the price of whose deliverance from condemnation has been paid to him ; that, with regard to the sins of some of mankind, he seeks satisfaction in their personal punishment, after having obtained satisfaction for them in the sufferings of Christ : that is to say, that an infinitely righteous God takes double payment for the same debt, double satisfaction for the same offence — first, from the surety, and then, from those for whom the surety stood bound. It is needless to add, that these conclusions are revolting to every right feeling of equity, and must be totally inapplicable to the procedure of him who “*loveth righteousness and hateth wickedness.*”¹ We see no possible way, while rejecting the unscriptural doctrine of universal salvation and holding to the scriptural

¹ Symington on the Atonement, p. 190. N. Y. Ed. 1858. .

doctrine of a universal atonement by Christ, to avoid Mr. Symington's "revolting conclusions," except by rejecting, as false, his premises, that sin cannot be remitted without satisfaction to the retributive justice of God, and that Christ rendered such satisfaction by enduring the literal penalty due to sin.

To our minds, therefore, this satisfaction-theory of the atonement, while it includes many valuable elements of truth, is quite unsatisfactory.

III. *The Governmental Theory.*

This theory places the necessity of the atonement of Christ in the exigencies of God's moral government; not in the demand of an involuntary organic emotion of retributive justice, common to God and man. The atonement was necessary for the same reason, precisely, that the penalty annexed to the divine law was necessary; it takes the place of that penalty, in respect to those who repent and are forgiven; answers the same end as would have been answered by the infliction of the penalty, viz. maintains the law and authority of God, and by maintaining that law and authority promotes those great interests for which moral government exists. Hugo Grotius was, probably, the first man who distinctly stated and defended the fundamental principles of this theory. His design was to defend the satisfaction-theory against the Socinians, his work being entitled "*Defensio fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi.*" The result, however, was, that he actually rejected the foundation-principle of that theory, and argued that the satisfaction of Christ was rendered, not to the distributive, but to the governmental, justice of God.¹ But Grotius does not seem to have proceeded in this line of argument any further than he was compelled to by the force of Socinian objections against the common doctrine of the church. He did not develop a complete and consistent governmental theory of the atonement; nor, after him, does

¹ Hagenback, Vol. II., p. 342. Also Bauer on the Grotian Theory of the Atonement (*Bib. Sacra*, Vol. IX., p. 259).

there appear to have been any material progress made towards the full development of such a theory, for more than a century and a half. The Catholic view on the one hand, or the Socinian view on the other, generally prevailed. It was reserved for certain New England divines of the last century, first clearly to state and defend, as a whole, what has been variously called the new-school theory, the Edwardean theory, the Hopkinsian theory, the consistent theory; or, more commonly and appropriately, the governmental theory. To Dr. Jonathan Edwards, more than to any other man, belongs the honor of giving to the world this new theory of the atonement. His three celebrated sermons on the subject, published in 1785, which marked an era in the history of this doctrine, contain, perhaps, the most thorough exposition and defence of that theory which has yet been made. The elder Edwards, and his intimate friends Bellamy and Hopkins, by their suggestive discussion of the subject, while retaining the general features of the old view, yet contributed not a little to the development of the new view. They furnished the premises from which the younger Edwards reasoned to his conclusion. Among those eminent divines who early accepted the governmental theory, and helped give it currency, were Smalley, Moxey, Burge, Dwight, Griffin, Emmons, and Spring; who, though differing on minor points, were yet agreed in holding and advocating the essential principles on which the theory rests. It now holds a recognized place in that doctrinal system which is distinctively called "New England theology." It is "extensively advocated by American and English divines, often practically believed where it is not theoretically acknowledged, and promising to become the prevailing faith of evangelical thinkers." According to this theory, the atonement was necessary in order to vindicate and sustain the divine law, and thus enable God, *as a wise and benevolent Ruler*, to remit the penalty due to sin, and save sinners, on condition of their repentance and faith. Some of the principles involved in this general statement are: (1) That God is a wise and benevolent ruler. (2) That, as such, he must vindicate and maintain the authority of his law.

(3) That the annexed penalty is for the purpose of vindicating and maintaining his law. (4) That the sufferings of Christ were not, literally and strictly, the penalty of the law, but a substitute for it, and an equivalent, i. e. had the same efficacy in respect to the divine law and government that the penalty was designed to have, and would have if inflicted, in cases where it is remitted. (5) That the atonement renders the salvation of all men possible: removing those obstacles which law and justice interposed, and leaving nothing but impenitence and unbelief to hinder any from being forgiven and saved. (6) That the atonement does not *obligate* God, in the exercise of *justice*, to save any; but *enables* him, that is, *makes it safe and consistent for him*, in the exercise of *sovereign grace*, to save the penitent and believing.

Among the general arguments urged in support of this theory, the following may here be mentioned :

1. *It is scriptural.* We do not mean that it is, anywhere, formally stated, in the inspired writings; for this is not true of any theory of the atonement. Revelation, like nature, gives us facts, not theories. But a theory may be called scriptural, when it harmonizes with all the statements, and includes all the facts, of scripture. Such, we fully believe, is the case with this governmental theory of the atonement. It harmonizes with all those passages which ascribe to the work of Christ a *peculiar* moral efficacy. It goes along with the sacred writers in all they say respecting the power of the cross to constrain men to repent and turn to God. It even claims to invest the cross with a moral power superior to that ascribed to it by those who affirm that the scriptures make its *whole* value and efficacy to consist in this. On the other hand, it harmonizes with all those passages which teach that the atonement related to God as well as to man; those that teach that it was vicarious, that Christ suffered for, or in the stead of, sinners; those that teach that it was to disclose or manifest the righteousness of God, while remitting sins; those that teach that the *blood* or *death* of Christ was preëminently that which secured pardon and salvation for men; those that teach that it originated in the love of God, and was the ful-

lest expression of that love ; those that represent the actual pardon of penitents, on account of the atonement, to be an act of free, sovereign grace ; those that teach the universality of the atonement, i. e., that Christ died for all men, and brought salvation within the reach of all ; those that speak of Christ's bearing our sins and being made a curse for us ; and those that speak of Christ's death as a propitiation for sin. These last two classes we place last on the list for the purpose of offering a few remarks upon them, in justification of the assertion that the governmental theory harmonizes perfectly with their true meaning ; for these are the only classes of texts which, with any shadow of plausibility, can be urged against the theory. The passages to which we especially refer, as constituting one of these classes, are such as the following : " The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all " (Isa. 53 : 6). " He bare the sin of many " (Isa. 53 : 12). " Who, his own self, bare our sins, in his own body, on the tree " (1 Pet. 2 : 24). " For he hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him " (2 Cor. 5 : 21). " Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us " (Gal. 3 : 13). To these inspired statements do the advocates of the satisfaction-theory appeal, to prove that Christ did endure the literal penalty of the law for those who are actually redeemed ; and hence to disprove one of the fundamental principles of the governmental theory.

Without entering into exegetical detail, it will be sufficient to our purpose to observe, in regard to this class of texts :

(a) They cannot be interpreted literally. Our sins were not so transferred to Christ that he literally bore them. Christ was not literally " made to be *sin*," much less, made to be a sinner. Neither was he literally " made a *curse*," much less, *accursed*. The boldest literalist has never yet gone so far as to insist that the scriptures teach that Christ was actually changed, from a human and divine person, into "*sin*," and into "a *curse*." Some have, indeed, held that these passages teach that our sins were literally laid upon Christ, or so transferred to him, that they became his, and made him

a sinner.¹ This literal interpretation, however, is almost universally rejected, as shocking to our moral sense and contrary to the plain declarations of the Bible, that Christ was "without sin," "holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners."

(b) Since we must interpret these passages other than literally, there is nothing to forbid an interpretation of them accordant with the theory that Christ did not endure the exact and literal penalty of the law. If we may say, that the expression "bear our sins" means "endured the penalty due to our sins," then may we as well say that it means "endured sufferings in the place of the penalty due to our sins." If we may say that in the phrase "made to be sin for us," sin means not *sin*, nor *sinner*, but one who endures the punishment due to sin, then may we as well, yea, with far better exegetical reason, regard '*sin*,' as employed according to Hebrew usage, in the sense of a *sin-offering*, which is not penalty, but a substitute for penalty. And if we may say that in the phrase "made a curse for us," curse means not *curse*, but *one cursed*, or *punished*, then may we as well say, that it means one who suffered, as if he were guilty and accursed, according to the saying, "Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree;" which is only saying that Christ was subjected to the ignominious death of crucifixion, endured what is regarded as the highest curse of human laws, in order that he might redeem us from the more terrible curse of the divine law.²

¹ "Christ is as really the transgressor as the man that did commit it (sin) was, before he took it upon him." "Some have been ready to conceive that the word 'iniquity,' in the text (Isa. 53 : 5, 6), is spoken figuratively; 'iniquity,' that is, the punishment of it, was laid upon him; but see how careful the Spirit of God is, to take away all suspicion of a figure in the text; there are 'iniquity, transgression and sin,' — three words, and all spoken to the same purpose, to confirm it." (Dr. Crisp's Ser. Vol. I., p. 430). "And this, no doubt, all the prophets did foresee in spirit, — that Christ should become the greatest transgressor, murderer, adulterer, thief, rebel, blasphemer, that ever was or could be in the world." "If thou wilt deny him to be a sinner and accursed, deny also that he was crucified, and was dead." "But if it be not absurd to confess and believe that Christ was crucified between two thieves, then it is not absurd to say that he was accursed, and of all sinners the greatest" (Luther, Com. on Gal. 3 : 13).

² "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for

It is not denied that the foregoing passages, if taken by themselves, are susceptible of an interpretation in harmony with the theory that Christ endured the literal and exact penalty due to the sins of those for whom he died ; but it is claimed that they are susceptible, on sound exegetical principles, of a different interpretation ; while our confident belief is, that other scriptural representations and the very nature of the case, necessitate a very different interpretation.

The other class of texts above referred to, as those which are often cited as inconsistent with the governmental theory, are such as these : “ And he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world ” (1 Jn. 2 : 2). “ He loved us and sent his son to be the propitiation for our sins ” (1 Jn. 4 : 10). “ Whom God had set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood for the remission of sins that are past ” (Rom. 3 : 25). “ A propitiation,” it is said, cannot be a mere governmental expedient, since it refers directly and exclusively to God himself,—to his very nature, not to his government, and by satisfying his distributive justice renders him placable or propitious. But what is meant by rendering God placable or propitious ? Is not God always placable, or propitious towards sinners in the sense of always regarding them with emotions of kindness and love ? Is not the Atonement itself a product and proof of his love for sinful men ? This is generally conceded by the advocates of the satisfaction theory. “ The infinite pity of God,” they say, “ is yearning with a fathomless desire to save the transgressor, even before an atonement is made.” In his *feelings*, then, God is already *propitious* towards sinners. All that is needful is that his propitious feelings be exercised or expressed in propitious *acts*. And if the Atonement enables God consistently to act according to his desire to save transgressors, then may it

us. The law denounced a punishment. This was its curse. Christ delivers us from that punishment by being made a curse ; that is, by suffering an evil which, so far as the ends of the divine government are concerned, was equivalent to the execution of the curse of the law upon transgressors ” (Dr. Woods's Works, Vol. IV., p. 72).

truly be called a "*propitiation*," and be said to propitiate God, since it renders him not only *emotionally* but *actually* propitious. And this is just what, according to the governmental theory, the atonement does. It renders it consistent for God, as the supreme Ruler, to manifest his love in actually saving men from their deserved doom. In the words of one who usually argues against this theory, "it is never regarded as necessary to *produce* in God love towards men, but as necessary to his love being *manifested*. It is not looked upon as that which *renders* God placable, but as that which renders the *exercise* of his placability consistent with the other perfections of his nature. It does not *procure* the divine favor, but *makes way* for this favor being shown in the pardon of sin."¹ And whatever does thus "make way" for the manifestation of divine love, and the exercise of the divine placability, in the actual pardon of sin, is, in the scriptural sense, a "*propitiation*," being that which renders God practically propitious. And such a "*propitiation*," we most fully believe, Christ was, according to the above declarations of Paul and John.

This theory of the atonement, then, we regard as not only in no respect unscriptural, but as, in all respects, eminently scriptural, including and harmonizing all the inspired statements relating to the subject.

2. This governmental theory accords with, and is founded upon, just and consistent views of the divine character. This, of course, must be true of every scriptural and correct doctrine or theory. One strong objection to the two theories of the atonement which we have previously examined, and that lies against them both, is, that they are based upon defective or false views of the character of God. The "*moral-influence theory*" exalts the sympathetic and benevolent emotions of God to the supreme place; while the "*satisfaction theory*" gives the same place to the retributive emotions. The former makes the exercise of emotional justice conditioned upon, and limited by, emotional love;

¹ Symington on the Atonement, p. 21.

the latter makes the exercise of emotional love conditioned upon, and limited by, emotional justice. The one says: "God is merciful, and therefore can forgive sin on the simple condition of repentance;" the other says: "God is just, and therefore cannot forgive even the penitent, except on condition that his own justice be satisfied by the infliction of the deserved penalty." The one says: "because God loves the sinner, he *must* save him;" the other says: "because God hates sin, he *must* punish it." Both agree in making the mere existence of involuntary emotions a justifying and even necessitating reason for their full expression; and in this point of agreement, they are both alike in error. As we have already shown, in another part of this Article, there is not, in the nature of any involuntary emotion in the divine mind, a necessity for its voluntary manifestation. There *may be* such a necessity, but it exists elsewhere than in the inherent nature of the emotion itself, independently of any other consideration. According to the views of many eminent divines on this subject, that principle or attribute of God which is central and controlling, is voluntary benevolence or love. This comprises all his moral perfections. "God is love." Voluntary justice, mercy, grace, pity, and forbearance are only different modifications of this comprehensive excellence. These are to love, what the various colors of the spectrum are to pure light.¹ This benevolent love is the spring of all the divine actions. It presides over all organic emotions or constitutional impulses, and decides which must be expressed in action, and which must be repressed. If the

¹ "The *goodness* of God comprehends all his attributes. All the acts of God are nothing else but the effluxes of his goodness, distinguished by several names, according to the objects it is exercised about; as the sea, though it be one mass of water, yet we distinguish it by several names, according to the shores it washes and beats upon, as the British and German ocean, though all be but one sea" (Charnock, "Attributes of God," Vol. II., p. 258). Making goodness synonymous with benevolence, or love, the above statement indicates a correct analysis of the divine character. "The attributes of God are not so many distinct qualities, but one perfection of excellence, diversified, in our conceptions, by the diversity of the objects towards which it is manifested" (Dr. Hodge's *Essays and Reviews*, p. 137). This is a felicitous statement of the truth provided that love or benevolence be that "one perfection of excellence."

question arise : " Shall sinners be saved ? " it is not enough to refer it to the commiserative emotions, on the one hand, nor to the retributive emotions, on the other ; but it must be referred to love, whose decision will be determined by a wise regard to the highest good of the universe, including of course the highest good of the Creator himself. If love says that, on condition sinners repent, the commiserative emotions can be indulged, without endangering the highest good, then penitent sinners may be saved, and the retributive emotions must be denied. If love says, the highest good requires that the retributive emotions be indulged by the infliction of the literal and exact penalty due to sin, then sinners cannot be saved, and the commiserative emotions must be denied. If love says that, by the vicarious sufferings of Christ, the highest good can be secured without inflicting the penalty on those who repent, it being inflicted on those who will not repent, then penitent sinners can be saved, both the retributive and commiserative emotions being partially gratified, and partially denied.

This view of God, which makes benevolence the all-comprehensive excellence of his character ; which resolves all other moral attributes into this ; which represents the infinite One as actuated never by blind constitutional impulses, but always by wise and benevolent considerations ; which makes divine mercy more than a mere amiable weakness, and divine justice more than mere unamiable sternness, — this view of God is commended to us both by reason and revelation : by a sound philosophy, and an appeal to the infallible word. And the fact that the governmental theory of the atonement fully accords with this philosophical and scriptural view of the divine character as no other theory does, furnishes to our minds a strong argument in favor of it.

3. This theory harmonizes perfectly with just views of the nature and design of moral law and government.

Moral government is the government of moral beings by means of moral law. Moral law consists of two equally essential parts : (a) an authoritative rule of action for those who are the subjects of it ; and (b) appropriate sanctions

to enforce the same. What is the ultimate end or design of such a law? It must embody or express some intelligent purpose of the lawgiver, or moral governor. And if he be a perfect moral governor, it must embody a benevolent purpose; that is, a purpose to promote thereby the highest good of the universe, including the highest good of both the governor and the governed. If the moral law of God did not spring from and embody such a benevolent purpose, it must spring from and embody, either a purpose that is malevolent, or a purpose that is indifferent, being neither benevolent nor malevolent. But in this case a malevolent purpose is out of the question; but not more so than is an indifferent purpose; for an intelligent moral purpose that is, in this sense, indifferent, is in the nature of things an impossibility. In establishing over his intelligent creatures, then, his moral government, by the promulgation of his law, God was actuated by a benevolent purpose, and had in view a benevolent end, viz. the highest general good. And this benevolent purpose determined both parts of the law, the preceptive and the confirmative. What, then, must be the nature of these two essential parts of the moral law, respectively, in order that they may fulfil the benevolent purpose from which they spring, or answer the benevolent end for which they are designed? The *preceptive part* must: (a) recognize the essential and immutable distinction between the morally *right* and the morally *wrong*; for, precepts based on mere expediency, could not be authoritative, and therefore could not tend to secure the great end of moral law; and (b) require of all creatures perfect holiness, forbidding all sin; because perfect holiness is inherently right and excellent; and, being inherently right and excellent, is indispensable to the highest good; and because sin is inherently wrong and evil, and being inherently wrong and evil, tends to interfere with the highest good of the universe; and (c) express the lawgiver's preference of the things required, to those forbidden; not merely his recognition of an essential difference between holiness and sin, but his intelligent preference, based on that essential difference.

A law that thus requires perfect holiness, because God chooses it on account of its own intrinsic excellence, is a law that, so far as respects its preceptive part, is fitted to promote the highest good of the universe ; and is promulgated by God because of its adaptation to that end.

The *confirmative* part of a moral law (that is, its *sanctions*) is twofold : a promised reward, and a threatened punishment. In the case of the divine law, the promised reward is eternal life. Its language is : " this do, and thou shalt live." Perfect, sinless obedience, from the beginning, would ensure eternal life to every subject of that law. This eternal life, being the strongest motive which any promise could present to secure obedience, is made a part of the law, because it tends to enforce its precepts, and so helps adapt the law to answer the great benevolent end of moral government. Could any other motive, in the form of a reward more efficient, be found, it might be substituted for this, and be made the promissory sanction of the law. All that is necessary is, that that sanction of this kind be employed which will best enforce the law, and make it subserve the highest good. The penal sanction, or threatened punishment, must have the same benevolent design with the promissory sanction, and with the preceptive part of the law itself. To answer this benevolent design, the penalty must be : (a) suffering ; (b) suffering to be inflicted by the lawgiver ; (c) suffering to be inflicted, by the lawgiver, upon the violator of law, and for the violation of law ; (d) suffering to be inflicted, by the lawgiver, upon the sinner, proportioned to the degree of his sinfulness ; (e) suffering to be thus inflicted, by the lawgiver, as an expression of his hatred of sin and estimate of its intrinsic ill desert. Such a penalty is an essential part of the moral law ; and, without it, law would be, not *law*, but mere unauthoritative *advice*. It is just as important as the precept itself ; just as necessary as moral government is ; unless there can be found a substitute which will be equally efficacious as a sanction of law. For the sole function of penalty is that of a legal sanction. Its sole value is its efficacy to enforce the law and maintain its authority, and so ultimately help pro-

mote the great benevolent ends of moral government.¹ The moral law, then, is benevolent, both in its precepts and its sanctions, as a whole; it sprung from a benevolent purpose, and had a benevolent design.

Now the governmental theory of an atonement is commended to our belief by its perfect harmony with this view of the nature and design of moral law, and government. According to this theory, the atonement was necessary for the same reason that penalty was necessary. It is a substitute for the penalty of the law, which is remitted in the case of all who repent and turn to God. It takes the place of the penal sanction, and answers the same end which that sanction was designed to answer; that is, is equally expressive of God's regard for his law and his sense of the intrinsic demerit of sin, and so has the same efficacy to maintain his moral government and help secure the great object for which that government was established. This theory, we maintain, harmonizes as no other theory on the subject does, with all our just conceptions of moral law and government. It harmonizes with a just conception of the *origin* and *end* of law as emanating from a divine purpose to promote, by means of it, the highest good of the universe. It harmonizes with a just conception of the law as a *rule of action*, recognizing its claims as immutable, and as based on an immutable distinction between right and wrong, sin and holiness. It harmonizes with a just conception of *penalty*, as a legal sanction, designed to sustain the authority of the law, and therefore not remissible on the ground of mere repentance;

¹ "But in order to a moral law there must be a penalty; otherwise it would be mere advice, but no law. In order to support the authority and vigor of this law, the penalty must be inflicted on transgressors." "This (the infliction of the penalty in case no atonement were made), I suppose would have been necessary to maintain the authority of the divine law" (Younger Edwards, Vol. II., pp. 14, 15). "The sole end of the penalty then was to support the authority of the law, and to discover as much of God as such an expedient for such a purpose could reveal" (Dr. Griffin's Treatise on the Atonement, Chap. II). "The end aimed at in punishment is manifestly to display the moral character of God, to express his mind as to the goodness of his law, and the evil of sin, to support his government, and secure the highest welfare of his kingdom" (Dr. Woods's Works, Vol. II., p. 468).

but remissible on the ground that a substitute has been provided equally efficacious in sustaining the authority of law. It, further, harmonizes with a just conception of penalty as something which cannot justly be inflicted except for the very sin, and on the very sinner, that deserves it; nor be inflicted twice for the same offence. It harmonizes with a just conception of the *demands* of law, as being the demands, not of some abstract, independent, and impersonal thing, that works by an inherent necessity, and is inexorable in its exaction of punishment; but of a wise and benevolent lawgiver, who is above the law, who can remit his just demand for punishment, provided a substitute for that punishment can be found which shall fully maintain all the sanctities of the law, and so enable him, through it, to secure the highest good of the universe, the very object he had in view in promulgating the law and in annexing to it a penalty. A theory which thus harmonizes, better than any other, with our fundamental ideas of moral law and government, is by that very fact strongly commended to our acceptance.

4. This theory duly recognizes the distinction between a moral *being* and a moral *governor*.

A man can, consistently, do many things as a mere man, which he cannot, consistently, do as a ruler. Not his character alone, but his official position, must be taken into the account, before we can decide what he can or cannot, must or must not, do. A kind father, as a father, can forgive his son the crime of theft, but cannot punish him for it, i. e. inflict the penalty of civil law; but as a ruler he cannot consult merely his parental sympathies, but must punish his son if the public good require him to do so. As father he can forgive, but cannot punish; as ruler he can punish, but cannot forgive, unless the welfare of the state will permit.

So God, as a holy being merely, could do some things which he cannot do as supreme Ruler; and can do some things as supreme Ruler, nay is obliged to do some things which, as a merely holy being, he would not be obliged to do, nor could rightfully do. To forgive may be consistent with his paternal feelings, but not with his official position; to

punish may be consistent with his official position, but not with his paternal feelings. When, therefore, the question before us relates to the pardon or punishment of men, it is not enough to say that God is kind and compassionate, and therefore will not rigidly inflict the penalty due to their sins, nor to say that he is holy and just, and therefore must inflict the penalty. We have to consider not only the fact that he is compassionate, and the fact that he is holy, but also the fact that he is the Ruler of the universe, and as such will forgive or punish, as the highest interests of that universe require or forbid.

This theory of the atonement fully recognizes this distinction between a moral being and a moral governor, and therefore rejects the idea that, because God is good, and loves sinners, he must for that reason alone forgive and save them, on the simple condition of repentance; and rejects, also, the idea that, because God hates sin, he must, for that reason alone, inflict the punishment it deserves. It finds the necessity of punishment, and so of the atonement, not in the simple fact that God is a just and holy being; but in the fact that he is a just and holy sovereign; not in the inherent demands of his own moral nature, but in the demands of his moral government.¹

This Article has already extended too far to permit us to present other arguments, which might be brought forward in favor of the governmental theory of the atonement. We will, in conclusion, barely advert to a few objections which have been urged against this theory, though most of these have been anticipated in the course of the discussion.

1. It is said that this theory contradicts our conception of God, as a being absolutely independent and self-sufficient, the reasons of whose acts are not without, but within, himself; that it subordinates God to the creature, and makes the good of the creature the end that determines his actions.

¹ "Poenas infligere, aut a poenis aliquem liberare, quem punire possis, quod justificare vocat scriptura, non est nisi rectoris, qua talis, primo et per se, ut puta in familias patris, in republica regis, in universo Dei. Unde sequitur, omnino his Deum considerandum ut rectorem" (Grotius De Satisf. Cap. II., § I., p. 34). "At jus puniendi non punientis causa, existit, sed causa communitatis alicujus" (Ibd. Cap. II., § IX., p. 41).

This objection is founded wholly on a misapprehension. The advocates of this theory fully hold that the ultimate reasons of God's actions are within himself: "that for him and through him and to him are all things." When they affirm that the highest good of the universe is the end God has in view in establishing and administering his moral government, they do not deny that he acts from reasons within himself, any more than *they* deny this, who say that he punishes sin because it is sin and deserves punishment. In both cases there is something objective in view. If, when he is supposed to act from the promptings of retributive justice in punishing sin as it deserves, the ultimate reason is subjective; why is it not subjective, also, when he is supposed to act from the promptings of benevolence in promoting the highest good of the universe? Furthermore, by "the highest good of the universe," is not meant the highest good of creatures merely, but the highest good of the Creator also. And surely it does not conflict with any just view of the independence and self-sufficiency of God to suppose that, while in the exercise of the highest conceivable benevolence, he regards his own highest good according to its real value, he also regards the good of his creatures according to its real value. That his own glory is the chief end of God in all that he does, is readily conceded; but this does not forbid that the welfare of his creatures may be a subordinate end; in securing his own glory, he may necessarily have to regard the welfare of his creatures; his glory may, in part, consist in the promotion of their welfare. It is, therefore, only by misapprehending the governmental theory of the atonement, that any one can be led to allege that it fails to exalt God as the beginning and end of all things.

2. It is objected to this theory that it denies the justice of God, by resolving it into benevolence. As well might it be objected that the philosopher denies the existence of the various colors of the rainbow, when he affirms that they are only modifications of pure light. But what is justice? In the concrete, it is the actual infliction of deserved punishment, and the actual bestowment of merited reward. But

this theory certainly does not deny that God never rewards and punishes any of his creatures as they deserve. As an attribute of a moral being, justice includes a retributive sentiment which is constitutional, and a voluntary disposition to render to all according to their desert. But this theory certainly does not deny that God has such an involuntary sentiment, and such a voluntary disposition. On the contrary, it ascribes to him justice in this sense as fully as any other theory does. It affirms that God is disposed to treat his creatures as they deserve; but that, inasmuch as this disposition is voluntary, its expression is regulated by benevolent considerations, or by a regard to the highest good of the universe: if that highest good demand its expression, in the literal infliction of punishment, then it is expressed in that way; but if that highest good demand its suppression, or its expression in some other way, e. g. by an atonement, then it may be suppressed, or expressed in that way; but this, surely, is no denial of the divine justice.

3. It is objected to this theory, that it represents the justice of God as forever unsatisfied. And what if it be so? May not justice go unsatisfied, as well as any other attribute of God? He who supposes that God is, in every sense, and in respect to his whole being, perfectly satisfied with everything in the universe; that is, feels perfect complacency in everything, is one with whom it were idle to argue. But in what sense does this theory deny that divine justice is satisfied? It denies that it is satisfied in any such sense that it would be unjust in God to inflict the penalty, due to sin, on those for whom an atonement has been made. But it affirms that divine justice is satisfied in the sense that it interposes no obstacle to the salvation of all men. Seeing the same good end answered by the atonement, which would have been answered by the infliction of the penalty, it no longer demands the punishment of those who trust in the atonement, and is satisfied not to demand their punishment. "Divine justice is not a blind principle, aiming at no end; much less a malevolent principle, aiming at a bad end, and delighting to inflict needless pain." "If the ends to be an-

swered by punishment absolutely require that sinners, in their own persons, should suffer a great and endless misery, justice will be satisfied with nothing short of that. If the important ends which justice aims at, can be accomplished by a small punishment, it is satisfied with a small punishment. And if all the ends of punishment are perfectly and safely accomplished in another way, that is, by the sufferings of a substitute; then justice is satisfied with that, and as well satisfied as it could be by the merited punishment of sinners themselves. In this last case it is satisfied, not by the execution of the penalty of the law upon sinners, but by something else of as much value, something which answers all the ends aimed at as well."¹ In this sense, then, is divine justice satisfied, viz. that *a just God* is satisfied to secure the ends of justice by atonement rather than by the execution of the penalty on penitent sinners.

4. It is objected to this theory, that if, as it claims, the highest good be the end of punishment, then should the innocent be punished instead of the guilty, if that good could be better promoted thereby.

It is enough to reply, that the supposition can never be a reality. The punishment of the innocent never could promote the highest good, because it would be injustice; and injustice cannot even consist with the highest good, much less promote it. It is because punishment is inflicted only on the guilty and for their guilt, that it sustains law, and so has any efficacy whatever to promote the welfare of the universe. This objection, we cannot refrain from adding, comes with ill grace from those who insist that the innocent may be punished instead of the guilty, and that the chief value of the atonement is derived from the fact that an innocent person actually was punished instead of the guilty; that Christ literally endured the penalty due to sinners.

The theory of the atonement which we have advocated, was elaborated by those holy and eminent men of God who, in the last century, under the stimulating influence of that

¹ Dr. Woods's Works, Vol. II., p. 469.

prince of divines, the Elder Edwards, and, in conjunction with him, made those invaluable "improvements in theology," which became new and impregnable bulwarks around the beleaguered citadel of our faith. Distant be the day when the New England churches shall abandon these strong defences to the enemy, and retreat again within the old, and not a little shattered, fortifications.

ARTICLE III.

EPISTOLA AD RUSTICUM APOLOGETICA.

BY REV. LEONARD WITHINGTON, D. D., NEWBURYPORT, MASS.

"They feared as they entered into the cloud." — Luke ix. 34.

You ask, my dear Rusticus, how the preacher's life appears in retrospection. You are curious to know, how the creed we have chosen in youth is sanctioned by the aged memory that reviews it; you have mentioned it rather as an unhappiness that the ministers of the gospel are obliged to adopt their principles before they have been tried by experience; and that, in youth, they must take the vast responsibility of forming the systems which they may be compelled to disapprove when enlightened by age. You put the question to me, and ask me, how the two views harmonize: the view, with which I began the work of a minister; and the view with which I close it? You put to me a difficult question; but you shall be gratified. I will attempt to answer. I shall suppose myself to be asked three questions:

- I. Why are you a Christian?
- II. Why are you a Calvinist?
- III. Why are you a moderate Calvinist?

As to the first question, I confess I cannot answer, with the

Rev. John Clarke, of Boston, "Not because I was born in a Christian country and educated in Christian principles; not because I find the illustrious Bacon, Boyle, Locke, Clarke, and Newton among the professors and defenders of Christianity; nor merely because the system itself is so calculated to mend and exalt human nature; but because the evidence accompanying the gospel has convinced me of its truth."¹ It is not the accompanying evidence that convinces me, so much as the intrinsic light of the gospel itself. Nor can I say that my being born in a Christian country has had no weight, or being educated in Christian principles. I look back with the deepest affection on the influence of Christianity which lay around the sunlight of my infancy. It made an impression on my heart which I do not wish to efface. Nor am I sure that it is not a legitimate argument. We judge of the divinity of the flower by its fragrance and beauty.

The gospel, to me, has been its own witness. The sun, when he arises, discharges two offices: first, to show his own glorious existence; and then, to enlighten and fertilize the world. So I see the proof of the gospel in its nature and use. The nature of the medicine is seen in its healing power. Certain passages of scripture have made a great impression on me, particularly Rom. 8: 22, 23, *For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain, together, until now; and not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body.* By "the whole creation," I suppose is meant the intellectual creation, i. e., mankind; and by "the redemption of our body," I suppose is meant the complete recovery of our own race from sin and sorrow at the final resurrection—the raising of the body being the last triumph of the gospel. Supposing this meaning, what an argument for the truths of the gospel! The world is groaning, and has been so, since the dawn of creation. What is the matter? What is the cause? Just the evil that the gospel came to cure. Sin, in some of its forms;

¹ Answer to the question, Why are you a Christian? by Rev. John Clarke, D. D., Boston.

war, slavery, oppression, selfishness, cruelty, injustice, want of pity, want of love, want of devotion, want of religion. Thus we may ask two questions: Is it sin that afflicts the world? and: Will the provisions of the gospel cure its evils? Both these questions I must answer in the affirmative; and there flashes on my soul a perception that the gospel is true. The impression is irresistible.

The same impression is made when, in view of life and death, I consider the wants of my own heart. The deepest conviction rests on a moral induction, though I neither despise nor neglect the historical proofs. They are auxiliaries.

II. But, secondly: Why are you a Calvinist?

I here suppose that I am a Calvinist, a real one. My reason for this conclusion is an impression that, substantially speaking, amid all the vagaries of religious speculation, but four or five consistent systems have ever been offered to the world; that, as in the ground, according to the seed-germ you drop into it, the tree will grow up a chestnut, an oak, or an elm; so, according to the germinating principle you receive into your mind, you must, if an earnest and consistent man, become a Calvinist, or an Arminian, or a Universalist, or a Unitarian. There are not many new heresies in the world, and certainly no new gospel. Now, I received, very early in life, a centre-thought, which, while I hope it did not hamper free investigation, determined all my future opinions. The result of all my speculations was in the first postulate.

In the year 1816 I was settled over a small congregation in Massachusetts. As it was expected that I should state my religious opinions, I threw into the council the following confession of my faith:

"I submit the following as a summary view of the principles of my creed: I believe in the existence of one God, the creator of all things, possessed of every possible excellence, upholding all things by his power, swaying the universe by the most righteous government; holy, wise, and just in all his dealings with created intelligences, and to the manifestation of whose glory all things will ultimately conduce. I believe that this holy and beneficent God has made a com-

munication of his mind and will to man, in the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments; and that when the apostle says that *all scripture is given by inspiration*, his language is prospective as well as retrospective, and establishes the plenary inspiration of the books contained in our common Bibles. These books contain the only infallible rules of faith and practice. I believe that Jesus Christ took upon himself the nature of man, and died a propitiation for our sins; that before his incarnation he was *God over all, blessed forever*; and that, since his resurrection, *all power is committed into his hands, whether in heaven or in earth*, and that he is now the King and Head of the church, and that he will one day come to judge the world. I believe that the Holy Spirit is the sanctifier of all the saints, the originating source of whatever may be called, evangelically, good in the heart of man. I believe that when our Saviour says, *That which is born of the flesh is flesh*, and when the apostle declares that *the carnal mind is enmity against God*, they have reference to one and the same thing, and jointly assert the original and total corruption of human nature in consequence of the apostasy of our first father Adam; so that all men are born *children of wrath*, and none can be saved without repentance, faith, sanctification and pardon. I believe that when Jesus Christ says, *Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God*, and when the apostle says, *If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature*, these words are to be understood in their most obvious sense, and teach us that an ESSENTIAL CHANGE, by the Spirit of God, in the heart of man, is absolutely necessary to make him a real follower of Jesus Christ. I believe that all who are admitted into the spiritual kingdom of Christ are justified by faith alone; but it is a faith that *works by love*, and love is the fulfilling of the law, and faith is the gift of God. I believe that when our Saviour says that *the Son of man goeth as it is written of him, but woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed*, he alludes to the truth that God foreknows and foreordains all things; but shows us, at the same time, that there is nothing in this doctrine which should alter our most simple ideas of approbation and blame, as

applicable to human actions. I believe that when one apostle says that *believers are kept by the power of God, through faith, unto salvation*, and when another apostle declares that *it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, if they should fall away, to renew them again to repentance* — if they taught the doctrine of the final perseverance of the saints, they taught it in such a manner as not, in the least degree, to diminish caution, humility, diligence, and self-distrust in real Christians. I believe that the righteous will be eternally happy, and the wicked eternally miserable, in the world to come; and by the righteous, I understand those that have believed in Jesus with a saving faith; and by the wicked, those who have not. I believe, mainly, in those doctrines which are embodied in the SHORTER CATECHISM of the Westminster divines."

Such was my creed then. Perhaps you will ask how I regard it after forty years' review. I must say that, if innovation is the sole proof of progression in religious wisdom, I must blush and confess that it is my creed now. I am twice a child in religion.

But why are you a Calvinist? Not because I bow, with supreme veneration, to the doctrine of Calvin, though I have a great respect for that wonderful man; nor because I follow, or wish to follow, the dictates of a sect or party; but simply because, with my veneration for the Bible, I cannot distinguish between the system of Paul and Calvin, so far as the pillars and fundamentals are concerned. The distinguishing features of Calvinism are the famous five points growing out of one — the sovereignty of God. God has boundless powers, boundless knowledge, boundless goodness. He knows the future as well as the past, and I must conclude, from his perfections, that he *foreordains whatsoever comes to pass*. So nature, reasoning from the perfections of God, teaches. But the Bible, before its language is twisted by an explanation, teaches the same sublime and awful truth: *For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born*

among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified. What shall we, then, say to these things? (Rom. 8: 29, 30, 31.) So, in the next chapter: *He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So, then, it is not of him that willeth, but of the Lord that sheweth mercy* (Rom. 9: 15, 16). Thus we have the testimony of revelation to a truth which reason feels, beforehand, obliged to deduce from the perfections of God. And from this primal truth come others, which constitute and support the peculiarities of the system which has received the name Calvinistic, though it existed long before Calvin was in his cradle. Particular redemption, irresistible grace, the servitude of the will, the perseverance of the saints, all are branches of the same trunk, emanations from the same first principle.¹

Then these truths seem to have done the most good in the world: embraced by the church in the fervor of her first foundation and the fervor of her reform. The deepest Christians (so it seems to me) have loved them most; and they seem to have made the deepest Christians. If you ask, then, why am I a Calvinist? I answer, not because Calvin taught these doctrines, nor solely because I received these principles in my early education, but because I cannot distinguish between this system, in its outline, and that of Paul, the great apostle to the Gentiles, the great expounder of doctrinal truth.

¹ The five points of Calvinism are, as manifested in the "Quinquarticular Controversy," as it was called, the bondage of the will, particular redemption, irresistible grace, unconditional election, and the perseverance of the saints. I have said that this system never lies in the objector's mind as it does in that of him who accepts it; and this remark is particularly illustrated in the third article in the foregoing list, namely, irresistible grace. Let any one consider the meaning of two words of Augustine, and see what a new world of conception they open on the mind — *VICTRIX DELECTATIO*. These two words are a key to open the cabinet, which no one ever has opened who does not believe the doctrine —

"'T was the same love that spread the feast
That sweetly forced us in."

We may say the same of the decrees of God. See how the doctrine is mitigated and modified by Dr. Griffin, in his Park-street Lectures.

It enables me to be an honest interpreter of the Bible. I take the whole; I cover up nothing; I shrink from nothing. When my Saviour utters a hard saying, I do not *go back and walk with him no more*.

Another reason for being a Calvinist is, that it seems to me to mark a more ample sweep of mind to be a Calvinist, than to embrace the other systems, more negative in their character and less comprehensive in their design. There are two elements in this theology, of which the basis is man and God. Both of them exist and coëxist, and must be recognized in our religious convictions. We must reason from God to man, and from man to God. God is not a sleeping energy, nor is man an irresponsible subject. But if the scripture has deduced certain conclusions from God's perfection, I must admit them, or question scripture and deny some of the fundamental laws of my being. I believe, therefore, that God, in being perfect, foreknows all things, and that it is impossible to separate his foreknowledge from his EVERLASTING DECREES.

But man, too, exists, and is a sinner; and it is impossible for him to be a sinner without having violated some human obligation. The violation of obligation is the very idea of sin: *I had not known sin, but by the law; for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet* (Rom. 7:7). I must, therefore, explain and deduce, from the scripture, the responsibilities of man and the adaptedness of the divine law to his condition. Now, I must enforce this obligation and the reason for it, unhampered by any other impediment which may meet me from any other source. I must show that the law of God, in its high demand, is reasonable and just.

There is still another reason why I am a Calvinist: I have attended seriously to the objections, and am confirmed in my faith by some of the strongest objections brought against the system. To me, the objections are new proofs and confirmations; for I think I see how they arise and where they fail. Let us take an example. The objector always mistakes the system. He imputes to it a rigor which it disclaims.

IT NEVER LIES IN HIS MIND AS IT DOES IN THE MIND OF HIM THAT RECEIVES IT. Thus the decrees of God are always supposed, by those that reject them, to be executed by a physical power, and imply an anti-moral necessity. The necessity asserted, or the future certainty, or whatever you please to call it, always degenerates, in his view, into a fatal, material law. Sin is so cogent that it ceases to be sin. The sinner's inability becomes a cruel misfortune. Now, the Calvinist holds no such doctrine. He says the sinner's inability is wholly owing to sin, and that "God executes his decrees in the works of creation and providence,"—creation in the natural world, providence in the moral. Second causes are not removed—not even disturbed; they are the very means through which God exerts his power. So the Presbyterian church say, in their constitution: "God, from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creature, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established" (Constit. of Presb. Ch. p. 15, Phila. Ed. 1827). And Augustine asks, *Si non sit liberum arbitrium, quomodo damnabitur mundus? Si non sit gratia, quomodo servabitur?*—If man is not free, how can the world be condemned?—If there is no place for sovereign grace, how can it be saved? And Calvin says (Inst. lib. i. c. 16, sect. 9), "*Quod statuit Deus, sic necesse est evinire ut tamen, neque præcisae neque suapte natura necessarium sit.*"—What God decrees, must happen, and yet not by a strict necessity; for it is not necessary in its own nature. Our catechism says that "God doth persuade and enable us to embrace Christ freely offered to us in the gospel;" and a still higher authority, with a still briefer comprehension, has exhorted us to *work out our own salvation, with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in us both to will and to do.*

Perhaps I ought to confess, also, that I have always rather inclined to the human side of these opposites, for this reason: I better comprehend the duties of man than the operations

of God. I have always inclined to the finite side of the question.

I am aware, also, that it may be said by the objector that these two elements cannot be embraced by the same mind; they are destructive of each other. I can only reply that I cannot do otherwise than embrace them both.

The doctrine of the Trinity is not a part of Calvinism, distinctively so called; yet all Calvinists are Trinitarians. I have never felt any of the objection to this mystery; I have always received it without much mental conflict. Indeed, I receive the doctrine of the Trinity partly *because* it presents a clearer conception of God. Let me explain: As, in conceiving a material object, an apple or a stone, I am compelled to regard it as a substance holding certain qualities; although this central substratum is the darkest conception that ever meets the mind, yet we cannot conceive of the quality without presupposing this centre in which they meet; so, in forming a conception of God, *how* the persons are united in one Godhead is a very dark conception; yet, when we assume this, and pass to the *manifestation*, our idea of God, in his relation to mankind, becomes more positive and more clear, by viewing him in his trifold personality. I adore my Creator, I love my Redeemer, I feel the influence of the Holy Spirit. Yes, I do not hesitate to say (it is no paradox) that God, in his manifestation, can only become clear to man through the belief in a Trinity; and hence, historically, we find that those who deny the Trinity, lose the personality of God, and are fast becoming pantheists.

III. But, thirdly, you may ask the question: Why are you a moderate Calvinist?

Some say that this is an impossibility. They ask: What is moderate Calvinism? It stands on the side of a declivity, and must slip down to something softer and better. Dr. Channing says: "If the stern reformer of Geneva could lift up his head and hear the mitigated tone in which some of his professed followers dispense his fearful doctrines, we fear he could not lie down in peace until he had poured out his displeasure on their cowardice and degeneracy. He would tell

them, with a frown, that *moderate Calvinism* was a solecism, a contradiction in terms; and would bid them, in scorn, join their real friend Arminius. Such is the power of public opinion that naked, undisguised Calvinism is not very fond of showing itself; and many, of consequence, know imperfectly what it means." Yet notwithstanding this blast of condemnation, moderate Calvinism always has existed in the church, and I trust always will.

But you may ask: What is moderate Calvinism? Now, moderate Calvinism consists, not in denying any one of the great doctrines, but in mixing them with other truths equally obvious and equally important. A moderate Calvinist is not a man of one idea. He is willing to take all the elements of our moral being into his comprehensive creed. He knows the magnitude of these speculations and the weakness of our moral powers; and therefore he does not make *all* the deductions from such high declarations which a rigid logic would seem to demand. He knows the greatness of God and the weakness of man. He knows how inadequate the human mind is to grasp the vast conception of the plans and purposes of God. He often says, this great doctrine may be true, but, then, I see it through a glass, darkly. I must reason from it just as God does, and apply it with all the limitation sanctioned in his word. When he reasons from God down to man, the divine perfections seem to necessitate the reception of the doctrine of an absolute and absorbing predestination. It is an ocean; it swallows up everything. But that truth does *not* stand alone. When he reasons from man up to God, the freedom and responsibility of the creature seems to be necessary to our simplest conception of duty and religion. Here, then, is another truth standing on its own basis, and one of the eternal pillars of religion. And this truth is taught and assumed, in the Bible, as clearly and as often as the other. God is sovereign; man is free. God sees no contingency; man meets scarcely anything else. God foreordains; man is capable of good and evil. God works in us; and yet the gospel gate is wide open. Now, I must mingle these truths just as they are mingled in the

Bible, and I have no right to make the one weaken the other. The one class of truths are as necessary to the fulness of the gospel as the other. I have no right to strike a single quantity from this celestial equation. I must let it stand just as it is. I must leave the compound with all its perplexities and DIVINE CONTRADICTIONS. The different notes are the harmony of the whole tune; and, although this mixture is a delicate one, and even good men may differ in the degree of prominence they give to each of the parts, yet I must do as well as I can. I must see that these opposing powers form the harmony of the whole system; and this is, as I conceive, moderate Calvinism. It tells the whole truth; it reads the whole Bible. It is not afraid of earth-born antagonisms; it aims to be *filled with all the fulness of God*.

All this may be illustrated by what takes place in the natural world. We find that through the whole system of our sun and planets there prevails the law of attraction, by which all things are drawn to one common centre; and you might ask: Why do they not rush to one consolidated union? There is another law, by which they are repelled. And these two laws act in opposition to each other; and that opposition is the harmony of the whole. So in the spiritual world: two pillars support the fabric, of which, if either be removed, the roof falls — God and necessity; moral subjects and freedom. Nay, the law of antagonism reigns throughout all nature: "All nature's difference keeps all nature's peace."

The moderate Calvinist is the more confirmed in his views, inasmuch as he finds his system injured, as either of the parts assume an inordinate proportion. I have no hesitation in saying that the worst error that ever infested the church is a distorted orthodoxy, a caricature of truth, a tree with its branches without its roots; predestination without free agency; a divine will without a divine reason; a physical necessity controlling a moral being; faith without works; action without motive; sin without law, or a gospel that annihilates the law; an Antinomian gospel;¹ a God whose only

¹ I ought to say, however, that the danger of leaning to this side of the question is greatly mitigated by the utter impossibility of benumbing, or destroy-

attribute is irresistible power; a God whose will makes all things right, whose only righteousness is his will. All this is horrible, and the more horrible for its partial resemblance to divine truth. Such a rock I have always aimed to shun.

Calvin has one fault: he makes sovereignty too absorbing. He was pressed to it by the reaction of the age. I have endeavored to preach a simpler gospel. I deny nothing in the old forms; I believe *all*.¹ I have only made a different mixture. I have tried to give my hearers an ampler whole: God is sovereign; man is free. He works in us to will and to do; and when we will well, we do his work.

On the question of original or inherited sin, I have always been a moderate Calvinist, seeking to utter no more than the Bible allowed me to know. On this sensitive point, which always must come up in ordaining-councils, and when candidates are examined for the ministry, and on which some good men concentrate all their wisdom, you might see me sitting a patient listener, silent as Ignorance herself should be, with my longest finger over one eye and my thumb folded over the other, waiting the result, which was always similar, and having one consolation, that the process must finally end. It has always seemed to me that Paul, in the 5th of Romans (which is the seat of this doctrine) is very clear as to the *effect* of Adam's transgression, and says very little as to the *mode* of the transmission. It seems to me he is arguing, in this chapter, against a favorite tenet of the Jews, that the gospel was for them, not so free for the Gentiles; they were the children of Abraham, and heirs of the promise; and yet they were obliged to confess, from their own authoritative record,

ing those instinctive feelings of liberty and responsibility which are engrained in the nature of man, and ever operate, whatever be his speculative notions. Dr. Twiss, Dr. Gill, and others of that class, did not injure practical piety so much as their creed would seem to threaten; for the same reason that Don Quixote's senses were always correcting his imagination, he was always at last compelled to find an inn where he imagined a castle.

¹ That is, I do not remember a principle, or technic term in the old Calvinist writers, in which one might not detect the reality which they were aiming to express. Whether the expression was the best possible, is another question. They have been accused of suffering their thoughts to evaporate in mere technics. It is not so, or only so to the reader who chooses to continue uninitiated.

that all men were the children of Adam. Now the apostle adroitly seizes this concession, and proves to them that the gospel was for all, because all needed it; and that men were just as certainly sinners as they were the descendants of Adam. His object is to teach the universality of sin, as the foundation of an universal offer of the benefits of redemption. The mode of connection or transmission he does not stay to discuss. The broad fact is enough for his purpose. I have been very cautious of adding to his words. I have not chosen to make a paradox where he has only left a mystery. I suppose that the connection between my sinful bias and Adam's first transgression is wholly owing to the sovereign appointment of God; if so, it is highly improper to adduce the original endowments of Adam as a solution of the obligations of man, ACCORDING TO OUR NATURAL APPREHENSIONS OF JUSTICE. From the very nature of the case, you cannot make a mystery an explanation of itself. All the formulas about Adam being our federal head, our representative, our sinning in him, and falling with him in his first transgression, of his sin being imputed to us, etc., may be reduced to one, viz., that for certain unrevealed reasons, God willed that man should be born with just such propensities as he is born with. All these forms of expression resolve themselves into sovereignty. We must bow to his sovereign will. It is right, because the Lord hath done it. The fault of the high Calvinist was, he sought an explanation where God intended none. His speculations always play between a mystery and an exponent. Sin, from its very nature, is the violation of an obligation; and in order to know the nature of sin, we wish to know the nature of those obligations it violates. Now, I cannot see that Paul intends our union with Adam as such an explanation. You cannot make a mystery an explanation. What was given to try our faith, was never intended to satisfy our reason.

If, then, you ask me, my dear Rusticus, how these sentiments appear on review, after the lapse of half a century, to a man who has one foot in the grave, and the eternal world just before him, I sigh and say, Alas! I see much to lament

in my defective spirit, my want of zeal and a want of vitality to the orthodoxy I embraced; when the truth was constantly seen, the impression was too feeble, and my preaching was the stammering of a child. But the creed I threw into the council at twenty-seven years of age, is my creed now that I am beyond threescore and ten. I have been, always, a **MODERATE CALVINIST**. This is not boasting, for some will say, it is a miserable confession; a man ought to be more progressive. Why should he ride at anchor all his life, when he ought to be sailing? I can only reply, that I am ready to pull up my anchor when I know whither I am going, and am assured of profitable discoveries.

One reason of my cleaving to Calvinism is, that when you have slain the body of it, you cannot exorcise the ghost. It will remain, and will haunt you, and you cannot think its residuum into non-existence. As it is with regard to the substratum of matter, denied or reduced to a minimum by certain metaphysicians, you cannot think of qualities without thinking of a primitive in which they inhere; so it is with the hypostasis of this system: it will not down at your bidding; it will haunt your speculations when you deny it. The strongest opponents of the system have felt its power even when denying it. The invisible chain of necessity was around Erasmus, Episcopus, Whitby, and all the vigorous minds who have striven to break its material form. Priestley himself ran away from Calvinism, and fell into the chains of a stronger necessity.

I must add, however, that in my religious investigations I have never been under the play of polemic antagonisms. I have never been fond of pursuing truth in that way. My battles have been with my own objections. My issues have been, almost all of them, mental. I have been my own opponent and my own convert, and have never, for a moment, dreamed that I was born to stand sentinel over the orthodoxy of the church. I have cheerfully devolved this duty on those of my brethren who selected this mission because they felt themselves born for it. I have always had enough to do to get rid of my own heresies. I have found the path of truth

so dark and difficult, that I have not wondered if some have missed it.

As I draw near to the eternal world, I must confess I feel an increasing, perhaps I should say an alarming, indifference to the niceties of mere speculation. The spirit of the gospel is all : a spontaneous, an all-absorbing love, is the best light when we tread the dark passage. O, blessed Redeemer, beam on my dying hour with thy light, and I can adjourn all my speculative difficulties to the world where I shall *know even as I am known*.

ARTICLE IV.

SPECULATION AND THE BIBLE.

BY REV. JAMES W. M'LANE, D. D., BROOKLYN, N. Y.

THERE is much bold adventure, at present, in some departments of intellectual effort. A draft is frequently made upon the belief of the Christian, which he cannot honor. A possibility is pushed into the place of certainty. A mere *perhaps* has given to it all the importance of an undoubted fact. In many of our popular lectures, and in much of the current literature of our day, there is a departure from that which should be regarded as the legitimate domain of the scholar ; a divergence from the course of a safe and salutary exercise of human reason ; a non-observance of that "temperance over appetite," which, as Milton intimates, should be regarded by us in the pursuit of knowledge. There are boundaries in the domain of truth which must be recognized ; lines, where certainty to us must, in the nature of the case, cease, and where mystery must begin ; limits, we may add, within which man has his safety, his intellectual freedom, and his moral elevation. When he goes beyond these, and draws

upon his imagination for his facts, and affects to feel "at home where angels bashful look," he is no longer free. His reason is in bondage. His mind is warped and fettered by its own action. The attempt to convert what is speculative or visionary into important truth, reacts with injurious influence upon him. The cravings of a man's intellectual nature, which draw him in this direction, require restraint just as really as those of any other passion or appetite. Hence the great English lexicographer was wont to pray that his mind might be kept free from the disturbing influence of "things vainly curious."

There is danger, indeed, from the opposite extreme. Men may be affected by a lethargy that is *unthinking*, as well as by an activity that is unscrupulous. In our search for truth, we have to sail between Scylla and Charybdis; and we may be just as really perilled by *not doing* as we are by over-doing. The sunken rock may sometimes be even more dangerous than that which rises above the surface. No stirring, wholesome influence, at least, can come from any blind worship of the past; from the action of those who turn their back to the future, and reject all free and manly thought on subjects of legitimate inquiry, and who, through fear of going too fast or too far, are unwilling to move at all. Such men insist upon a blind, implicit faith, and would tie us down in bondage to the past, and have us look upon the fossil remains of man's wisdom found in the strata of "the dark ages," as of equal authority with God's own imperishable truth. But while we have no sympathy with any such senseless homage to fallible human authority, we have still less with that proud, defiant *rationalism* which exalts reason above revelation, or with that *philosophy* which builds its house on the sand, converts hypotheses into facts, and turns the Mosaic narrative into a "myth," and the miracles of the Bible into a "burden," that the truth has to endure, not the argument of omnipotence by which it is triumphantly established. As much as we dislike the stagnation of a *Dead Sea* in the moral world, we dread even more the influence of these cold, dreary, and barren summits of intellectual pride and boastful human

reason. We cannot, indeed, find the golden age of this world in the centuries of ignorance and oppression, nor can we suppose that we shall enter upon its elevations in adopting many of the conclusions of modern speculation. Our hope for man is neither in the wisdom of the past, nor in the inspiration of the present. We can see nothing indicative of progress in any blind homage to human authority, or in any apotheosis of human reason. Advancement lies in avoiding both these extremes; in opening the Bible, and in opening also the field of nature; in encouraging free and full inquiry, and in guarding, most carefully, the enthusiasm awakened in the pursuit of truth, by those great considerations which a proper prudence will ever throw around such action.

There is spread out before man, in this world, a wide and rich domain for intellectual effort, in which "every power may find sweet employ." But it must be remembered that there are metes and bounds in this work which must be recognized; certain termini, which limit all mental effort—at which, therefore, men must consent to stop in their speculations. One of these boundary lines is the *limited grasp of the human intellect*. Man soon reaches what is ultimate to him. He cannot escape from himself, or fly without wings. However philosophy may boast of her powers, the fact of this limitation meets her at every step. A seraph has his mysteries. Man finds his. He soon comes to a point where his knowledge ceases, to depths which he cannot fathom, to heights he cannot climb. The difficulty is in himself, in the constitution of his own mind, in his limited understanding. Many things are thus hidden from his view. Vast fields of truth are fenced off from him by barriers which he can neither scale nor remove. He may, indeed, affect to see all, to "look through the universe, and into regions beyond;" but a higher wisdom will teach him that he can know only in part.

Another great fact which should underlie all human inquiry is *the entire, absolute truth of the Bible*. Here there should be no possible doubt, not a moment's hesitation. Beginning with this, others of great importance will follow from it. This assumed, the Bible will be regarded as con-

sistent with itself in all its parts, and as a unit in all its teachings. For, if God is the author of the book, then its harmony must, of necessity, be complete. There can be in it no clashing of sentiment whatever. Its light may and does differ *in degree*, in different portions of it. There is in it the dawn, the sunrise, and the noontide of its glory. But the light all comes from the same orb, and the difference is owing to the position of man, not to the source whence the light comes. There is no contradiction, no collision, in the Bible. We should just as soon think of finding it in nature as in God's word; just as soon expect to find contradiction among the stars; to see Mazzeroth coming forth, in his season, against Orion. The idea is utterly impossible upon any Christian postulate respecting the scriptures. It should, therefore, be regarded and treated by the friends of truth as a great weakness in any one, and as utterly unworthy of any manly intellect. The supposition ought to be as offensive to Christian sentiment and feeling as the suggestion, that God can be false, or that he can deceive.

A third great landmark in all human inquiry is the fact that *the testimony of the Bible is the highest that we can have of the truth of anything*. It is the testimony of him who is omniscient, and who can neither deceive nor be deceived. Our business, therefore, is simply to ascertain what the Bible does teach. When we have found this, we have found *the truth*. There is, and can be, no clearer light, no higher evidence, no greater certainty. To look for any such thing, is to look for that which can be added to what is infinite. When God speaks, the question is settled. The testimony is complete, the truth is known. Here, then, we reach the ultimate; and here, therefore, men must stop, and be satisfied. Action beyond this is weakness, is arrogant presumption. Men sink in any attempt to rise higher. They put out the light in their efforts to kindle it into a brighter flame.

There is yet another conservative element of influence, which should be thrown around all human inquiry, namely, the fact that *the Bible and Nature agree perfectly in their*

teaching. The only difference is in the *degree* of light, and in the *extent* of the illumination. In the one, the light comes to us directly from God, and is full and clear; in the other, it also comes from him, but is *reflected* to us from his works, and, consequently, is less clear and abundant. Nature, when compared with the Bible, is like the outer bow which spans the bosom of the cloud, where the colors, though less distinct and beautiful, are yet essentially the same with those of the inner and more perfect glory. The harmony, therefore, between the greater and lesser light, in which God has revealed himself to us, is complete. The agreement is perfect. Hence it follows that science, which is simply a general collection of the facts or principles in a particular department of nature, can never contradict the Bible, and that the Bible, when rightly interpreted, can never be arrayed against science. Both are from God; and, therefore, there can be no antagonism between them. If there seems to be collision, then one of two things must be true: either the facts are not as they are stated, or the Bible is not rightly understood in its language relative to those facts. If, for example, geology can demonstrate that the flood was *not* universal, then the language of Moses, which, as generally understood, asserts that universality, must have a *limited sense* given to it. God's word and works must harmonize. There can be no discrepancy between them. The divine perfections make it impossible.

We have tarried thus long on the threshold of our subject, because these great conservative facts are not recognized in much of the speculations of the present day. It will be said, we know, that the Bible was not given to teach natural science; that its object is not to explain to us the mechanism of the universe, or to make known even the structure of our globe. Its great object, we admit, is a spiritual one — is to reveal to man the grace of God through a Redeemer. But, while this is its chief end, yet in effecting this, the Bible must necessarily touch upon many things collateral with it — upon all that have any bearing or influence, friendly or adverse, upon the accomplishment of its own

great purpose. It must reveal God to us in his true relation to man, and to all around him. It must therefore speak, as it does, of the heavens and the earth, and of God as the Creator of all things, as the Being who spoke and it was done. It must have much to say about *his works*, must point to them as showing his eternal power and Godhead, and as evincing, by a necessity of logic, that design so manifest, that mechanism so complete, and that harmonies so universal, must have their origin in a Being of infinite intelligence. Constituted as man is, made to trace back effects to their cause, to look for a doer in what is done, the Bible must meet this demand of man's intellectual and moral nature. The first chapters of Genesis, therefore, are a necessity in the revelation of God's grace to man. They are essential to its main object. The Bible would not have been complete without them. Aside from this portion of the sacred volume, we would have had an effect without its cause, a world without its maker, a shadow from nothing, an unfolding apocalypse from no beginning.

We may say in this connection that, if there is any part of the Bible further removed from the deductions of human reason, or more fully a matter of pure revelation than another, it is these first chapters of the Pentateuch. What could any man know, or reason out for himself, about the beginning of this world? Where was he when the heavens were stretched out, and when the foundations of the earth were laid? Aside from revelation, what could any one know with certainty here? Where in the height above or in the depth below is it to be found? Who has ever ascended so high as to bring it down, or descended so far as to bring it up? Man might, indeed, have inferred the existence of the Creator from the evidence of design everywhere apparent in his works. But the scriptural idea of creation could never have been reasoned out by him. It is entirely above his reach. If there is, therefore, in all the Bible, a place where the sacred writer was simply an amanuensis; a place where the thought and the expression of it are both from God, and where, consequently, men

should feel that the ground on which they stand is holy, — it is here on the threshold of the Bible, where everything is so full of mystery and of miracle, and where man could know nothing except it was given to him from above. And yet, strange as it may seem, it is here that men have speculated most, and made demands upon the friends of the Bible, which many at least cannot in anywise concede. . To some of these we shall presently advert.

It is not strange that these speculations have awakened fears in the minds of good men. The Christian has a deep interest in the Bible. He cannot consent to have any part of it treated as an oriental myth, or twisted in its interpretation to suit the theories or opinions of men. It is God's word. The whole of it is from him. While it is human in the hand that wrote it, and in the dress it wears, yet in *that hand*, and in *that dress*, no less than in the priceless truth thus conveyed to us, it has *the mark* of God upon it. It is his truth — his in its sentiments and in its language, his in its whole being and character. The Christian cannot let it go. He has an eternal interest in it. And he has an interest in science also. He does not regard it as "a foe to grace," though it has often been pressed into the ranks of the enemy. But this was *forced* work. Science is from God, and cannot, therefore, be in conflict with his word. The naturalist and the student of the Bible worship, indeed, in different parts of the great temple of truth; but they have substantially the same object before them. Both are seeking for truth. The one searches for it in the things which are made; the other, in the clearer light of inspiration. The former sees it in the outer court, the latter finds it in the inner sanctuary; both may, therefore, exult together in the vision and the glory.

The Christian, we know, is sometimes regarded as living in a very small enclosure. Some seem to look upon him as precluded from free inquiry, as cramped and fettered by his faith, and as unwilling, therefore, to allow science to have any influence over him in the interpretation of the Bible. But, whatever reason there may be in certain cases for such

an opinion, there is, as it seems to us, often just as little expansion in the other direction. If we are not greatly mistaken, the naturalist is quite as much wedded to his theory as the student of the Bible is to his exegesis. He is just as much disposed to live wholly within his domain, and to exclude all biblical influence from his conclusions. Indeed, there seems often in scientific men a determination to reason about facts in nature just as if there was no greater light, and to form their conclusions without the slightest recognition of the testimony of the Bible on the subject. There is an entire rejection of all counsel or influence from that quarter. The Christian has therefore, as it seems to us, the most reason for complaint here. The greater light, in this case, is excluded. It is just as if a man were to examine some piece of intricate mechanism by moonlight, and to form his opinion about it without once looking at it in the daytime, or allowing that illumination to affect his judgment in the matter. The man who sees things only in the light of nature, and who forms conclusions about them which rest only on probability, and which would be set aside at once if the Bible were allowed to speak, is certainly not a *free man* in the wide domain of truth. And he who, "in weighing probabilities, will not permit the moral influence of his decision to affect his judgment in the case," sets aside a law of the moral world, and unhinges one of its great fundamental principles. We can see no freedom, and no philosophy, in adopting any conclusion which rests only on a possible peradventure, and which contradicts the plain and obvious meaning of the Bible. There is no intellectual elevation, and no wisdom in such action. The Christian is willing to meet the man of science on *fair and equal* ground. He is willing to look at *his facts*, his various formations, his stratified rocks, his fossil remains, and to allow them to affect his mind in explaining the Bible. But the Christian has *his facts* also, which must be taken into the account in the explanation of natural phenomena. He has as clear and positive a testimony respecting the order of creation, in the Bible, as the naturalist has in the rocks. And while he

ought not to adopt hastily a meaning given to the words of inspiration, which is seemingly in conflict with the deductions of science, he has a right to claim from the student of nature an equal, if not greater, reluctance to draw any conclusion from his facts which is contrary to the obvious teaching of the Book of God. Wisdom will ever be cautious here.

It should be borne in mind that there is a vast difference between *fact and speculation*, between truth and the mode of explaining its why and wherefore. It is a fact that the earth moves, that man breathes, that fire burns; but the explanation of these facts is theory, is the opinion of a fallible human judgment, and may or may not be the true one. And hence we contend that sound philosophy will not allow any one to explain natural phenomena in a way which plainly contradicts the statements of inspiration. A human hypothesis can never, in any right-thinking mind, be arrayed against the evident meaning of the divine record. Here is the trouble in the domain of nature. We admit the facts stated by the naturalist. We recognize with him the torn and shattered appearance of our globe, its different strata, and the varied testimony in "the museum of the rocks." Our difficulty is not with the facts in this case, but with *the mode* of explaining them. The superstructure is broader than the foundation. The conclusion drawn demands a much wider basis of *facts* than has yet been constructed. What we complain of, therefore, is, that men judge here before the time; that they hasten to conclusions before they have gathered up and considered all the facts which bear upon them. They reason and theorize here, just as if the whole field of this vast subject had been thoroughly explored by them; just as if they actually had in their grasp all that was concerned in producing the phenomena which they would explain. But the fact is, they are as yet only on the threshold of investigation here; are at work only in a little corner of this immense field, and have as yet only dug through the crust of the earth here and there. And what is stranger still is, that in their speculations they have virtually

excluded from their basis of calculation the presence of *any divine power*, and seek to bring all things into their present state and position through the operation of natural causes. They take for granted that *the same laws* of formation existed in the beginning which operate now, and that things were produced then as they are at present. The exertion of any direct omnipotence is not taken into the account. All miracle is excluded; and phenomena, which owe their existence to the fiat of God, are explained upon principles which remove them from any connection with the word of his power, and bring them down into line with a uniform, natural causation. But miracle pervades the whole framework of our globe. God spake, and it came into being. To set aside this fact, to adopt a theory which does not recognize the presence of this power in giving existence and form to things, and to attempt to explain the structure of the earth as one would the growth of a plant or the formation of a hailstone, is, in our judgment, far aside from any principle of sound philosophy. We go further, and say, with a master in scientific attainments, that we deem it "presumption in man to theorize where everything is recorded as a matter of fact, and where the mode and the order of creation are ascribed to the will of God as their immediate cause." Just as well might we enter the field, covered with the omnipotent mercy of Jesus, and undertake to account for the results which followed his bidding, upon natural principles. It is surely some proof of the justice of these remarks, that the men who indulge in such speculations are not agreed among themselves as to how the phenomena in question are to be explained. One has this theory, and another that. Proof enough is it that they want *more facts* upon which to plant the fulcrum of their lever, before they attempt to pry up this world into the light in which it was when spoken into existence. Here is the trouble. Speculative men are "impatient to doubt," are unwilling to wait, and, as one of their own number confesses, are prone to make "hasty generalizations, founded on *mere negative evidence*." Hence the demands that are now made

upon the Bible and upon the faith of the Christian. They all come from *the theories* started by men to explain the facts of science, and are advocated aside from any direct recognition of Omnipotence in producing the phenomena of our globe. To some of these demands we will now call attention. It is not strange that they have excited alarm in many minds, and that they are sternly opposed. There is reason, we think, for such opposition. We are willing, indeed, to have "the torch of history and of science held up to the Bible;" but let it be *the torch* of history and of science, and not some deceptive light of man's kindling.

Some, in order to harmonize the Bible with the discoveries of geology, maintain that the first chapters of Genesis are not to be considered as a *true historical narrative* of the creation. They tell us that this part of the sacred record is a *mythic poem*, a *vision*, a *pictorial representation*, which has in it, indeed, the idea that all things were created by Jehovah, but that all else is mere shading and embellishment; and that the narrative, therefore, is not to be received as an exact historical statement of what took place in the creation of the world; that it is true as *poetry*, but not as *prose*. They would have us believe that Moses gathered up this account of the creation from *tradition*, from the myths and fables of the Orient, the drift-wood that had floated down through the centuries, and had lodged somewhere in Egypt, or in the wilderness, where the great Hebrew lawgiver found it, and from it constructed his narrative. The inspiration of Moses, therefore, was, as they assert, not that of suggestion, but simply that of superintendence. He took what he found in the drag-net of time — the myths and fables respecting the creation, the fall of man, and the deluge, which tradition threw in his way — and "winnowed out the chaff," and preserved the wheat. Thus they make a highway for geology through this part of the Bible, and thus they would produce harmony between them. They profess, indeed, to believe in the inspiration of the Mosaic narrative, and some of them even tell us that these traditions, from which Moses derived his information, were inspired, and yet they affirm that from

this inspiration he "winnowed out the chaff." It is useless to ask what ground there is for all this. There is none. The theory is itself a myth, a vision. It is of no possible benefit as a theory, and when put forth as a fact, as it has been, we regard it as positively mischievous. It fails utterly to solve the difficulty, and does injury to the truth in the vain attempt. It tends to lower the Bible in the estimation of men, and is calculated to undermine all confidence in its specific statements. It turns the prose of Moses into mythic poetry, in order to make it true, and strips the whole narrative of all meaning, except that which is symbolized to us in the flowing oriental costume in which it is arrayed. Such a theory mocks all our convictions. The first chapters of Genesis are simple but sublime prose. "The whole," says Dr. Pye Smith, "is in the style of plain narrative, evidently intended to be understood as a simple, straightforward, unadorned history;" and, he adds: "it would be indicative of a deplorable want of taste for the beauty of language, to put a patch of poetic diction upon this face of natural simplicity." The reasoning that would turn it into allegory and patchwork, is certainly in strange and painful conflict with the assertion of an inspired apostle, that Moses wrote as he was moved by the Holy Ghost.

Another demand made in modern speculation respects *the antiquity of the earth*. The Bible does not, indeed, fix this point with any great degree of exactness, and yet it furnishes certain data which do not allow us to give to the earth a very great longevity. The universal impression which its teaching has made on this subject is, that this world has not existed *very many* thousand years. But very unlike this is the teaching now in the speculations of men. In this, the earth has existed, in one form or another, for millions of years. Long ere man was created, it passed through successive "dynasties of gigantic vegetable and animal life," and was "rolling down through gulfs and fiery cataclysms," undergoing great changes, and being revolutionized under each separate dynasty. At first there is "*coelum undique et undique pontus*;" no land appears; and for thousands of ages fish of peculiar

form and size swim through those pre-Adamic waters, and prey upon each other. Ages roll on, and these fish cease to exist, and their remains are embedded in the mud and sand at the bottom of the ocean, which harden into rocks, and gradually rise and become the dry land. Then a new era begins, and an immense vegetation covers the land, and the fern grows up like trees. Again the ages roll on, and this vegetable kingdom dies, disappears; and the dry land sinks, and the sea sweeps over it; and in that sea strange forms appear; huge reptiles, terrible monsters, more hideous than those of fabulous memory. These have their day, and then the period of reptiles ceases, and what was above the waters again sinks, and the land becomes sea, and the sea dry land. Thus elevations and submersions succeed each other; and thus the treadles in this geologic loom go up and down for millions of years, until at length the web is woven, and the earth becomes a fit habitation for man. *Tantæ molis erat terrarum condere orbem!*

But while many geologists demand a kind of "geologic eternity" for the production of the phenomena found in the earth, they are by no means agreed as to *where*, in the Mosaic narrative, the chasm occurs for the introduction of their immense time-drafts. Some, with Chalmers, find the opening between the first and second verses of Genesis; while Hugh Miller and others see none there, and convert the six days of creation into so many periods of immense length. When asked for the proof of such periods, they point us to "the testimony of the rocks," to what they are, and to what they contain. These are their chronometer. They measure the thickness of the rocks, and, judging from laws now existing, they tell us how long these rocks must have been in forming. They examine the organic remains found in the rocks, and, in the same way, they make out a similar draft upon time. The rocks are their chronicle, their proof. But there is in all this reasoning a postulate which is not granted, and which requires demonstration. We admit the facts stated: the thickness of the rocks, and the fossil remains found in them. But the conclusion drawn from these facts we cannot

receive. There is a hiatus in the reasoning, which must first be filled up. The proof would be conclusive if *the same causes* operated in the beginning that operate now in the formation of such things; but until this is proved, the whole argument rests on *mere conjecture*. If rocks were formed at first as they are formed now, then their size would be a true chronometer. But if they were not thus formed, if they then came into being at the bidding of God, then this measurement determines nothing. It now requires some twenty-one years or more for the human frame to attain its full growth and development; but how long was the body of Adam in coming to maturity? The great mistake in all this speculation is the supposition that *the same causes* operated at first which operate now in the production of such phenomena — a supposition that is contrary to fact. Omnipotence was concerned in laying the foundations of the earth. The difficulty with the geologist, therefore — the reason why he wants so much time for these formations — is, that he does not take into the account the fiat of God. All things are based upon the action of natural causes. Hence their development runs through such unmeasured, creeping ages. This theory, therefore, virtually excludes God from the work of his hands; is an investiture of nature in the place of divine power. It sweeps away the reason given in the fourth commandment for the Sabbath, and leaves us absolutely without any account of the creation of this world as it now is. Reason and the Bible, therefore, alike oppose it. It is unlike him who speaks and it is done.

Another point which speculation now calls upon the Christian to give up is, that there was *any change or deterioration in nature, consequent upon the fall of man*. He alone, it seems, was affected by the transgression in Eden. There was no fall of nature with him, no change in this world in consequence of his act of disobedience. The idea of such a fall has, indeed, long been held by men; but they have all been mistaken; and Milton was dreaming when he represented the earth as feeling the wound, and nature as sighing, and through all her works as giving signs of woe that all was lost.

Such antiquated notions, it seems, can no longer be held. That darkness is past, and the true light now shines out from the earth upon this subject, showing that the order of things was not changed by the incoming of sin; that nature was not affected by man's disobedience. There was no backward movement. From the beginning, the work of preparing the earth for the existence of man went steadily on. Nature continued to improve in form and feature until man sinned. Then its progress was arrested. It was then good, but not perfect; good for the end designed, but, as it is now, an imperfect thing. All this, we are told, science now demonstrates to be true. But this is mere assertion. There is no such demonstration. The depth saith, It is not in me; and the sea saith, It is not with me; neither is it found in the land of the living. It is all a mere theory, and weak even as such. How any one, with the Bible before him, can adopt such a conceit, is indeed a marvel. It is in direct antagonism to the statements of Moses and to the reasoning of Paul. It makes nothing of the curse upon the ground—nothing of its thorns and thistles, nothing of the wail of nature. He who can set aside the testimony of the Bible on this point, or construe it as a poetic embellishment, can easily free himself from all trouble or constraint from the scriptures, and turn any part of the book of God into an oriental myth.

Many geologists, however, who have searched further and seen more, do not receive this "progressive theory." It is disproved by facts. Instead of progress, they find, as they tell us, *increasing deformity, confusion, and derangement*, as they travel down, through the rock-chronicled centuries, towards the period of man's creation. They see such evidence of convulsion, such proof of "a general world-lapse," as compels them to admit the disturbing influence of sin upon our world. But they invert the order of occurrence. They put the effect before the cause. They make the ruin precede the fall of man, and the sequences of transgression a preparation for its appearance. They will have it that the framework of our globe was riven a thousand ages before the thunderbolt of

offended Majesty struck the earth ; that, for high moral considerations, the consequences of man's disobedience were made to anticipate his existence ; and, consequently, that all the disturbance and deformity found in nature and registered in the rocks are simply "the epic in stone of man's great history" before the time. Their theory therefore is, that nature was made to assume its present form and condition ; that fish, fowl, and beast, that tree, plant, and flower, were formed as they now are, in order to suit what would be in the future ; and that even the serpent, "whom the motherhood of nature," for this reason, refused to finish, "was thrown from her lap *without feet*, and doomed to creep upon the earth," a mean, abortive creature, cursed above all cattle, in order to be a type to man of the evil of sin, when created and when crushed by its influence. All was proleptical—was made to anticipate the fall of man, and his wants when in that condition. Nature was formed to suit that great forthcoming event. Through long, unmeasured periods before the existence of man, everything was converging into its present broken, disordered condition, in order to prepare a fit place for *man as a sinner*. A far-off country was fashioned for a future starving prodigal ; was filled with swine and with husks a thousand ages before that prodigal was born, that when born, and when a wanderer from his father's house, he might see in the character of that country, in its swine and in its husks, a full and fitting picture of himself, of his degradation and wretchedness. The difficulty, however, with this theory is in its *postulated inversion* of God's method of acting, and in its utter contravention of the great law of sequence in the whole economy of his providence. The lightning strikes the earth before there is anything in or upon the earth to call it down ; and the Creator gives existence to a pure and perfect creature in a torn and disordered world !

But there is yet, it seems, another step to be taken in this direction ; another and deeper eclipse of the truth, to which we must submit. Nature is not only in the same condition in which it was before the fall of man, but *suffering and*

death, we are told, were here, and had been for thousands of ages, before that event. The teaching that covers the earth with innocence and peace until man appears, and by transgression "darkens the whole face of nature," and thus introduces suffering and death, is all wrong. "The testimony of the rocks" sets it all aside as a dream, and proves that for uncounted ages before man's creation the present type of things existed in this world; that from the very beginning, almost, death reigned over all; that then, as now, the animals were savage in their disposition, and that the strong preyed upon the weak. The position is even taken that "organic life necessarily involves suffering and death." Such is the theory. It does not recognize the influence of sin in producing the present aspect of things. It sweeps away its curse from the ground, and all its disturbing force from the framework of the earth, and turns into hyperbole and embellishment the wail and lament of a bleeding, dying world. Nay, it makes the whole creation groan and travail in pain while in a condition which God pronounces *very good*, and over which the morning stars sing together, and all the sons of God shout for joy; a condition in which the savageness of the hyena and the ferocity of the shark are in full exercise, and in which the kid writhes in the grasp of the lion, and the lamb utters its piercing cry within the crushing coil of the anaconda. All this is good, yes, very good.

Such is not the teaching of the Bible. According to this book, nature in the beginning was perfect. All things were very good. Suffering and death were unknown until sin marred the work of God. The fall of man drew everything after it. He was at the head of creation here; had dominion over all. His act affected himself, his race, the whole world in which he existed. "The earth felt the wound." The ground was cursed on account of his transgression. Nature in him, and around him, fell in his fall; was changed; was subjected to vanity; was made to exhibit to man the evil he had brought upon himself; to reflect from its own disturbed, torn, and ruined condition, the deeper ruin wrought in him. This is the teaching of the

Bible, and here the church of God has hitherto planted her feet. Through long centuries of opposition she has contended that the condition of things in this world was affected by the incoming of sin into the domain of peace and purity ; and that the great objection to the *goodness* of the Creator, drawn from the existence here of suffering and death, is met by the fact that these things are *the consequence* of sin ; that they show its character, and help to check its baneful influence over man. But this new teaching sets aside this argument ; rejects what Moses asserts, what Paul affirms ; tears down and sweeps away this great breastwork, and leaves us in the open field, exposed to the enemy's fire, and compelled to defend the character of the Creator in a world declared by him to be very good, and yet full of suffering and death, of agony and blood. We can stand on no such ground. We turn away from it, as we would from the brink of a yawning chasm.

One step more and we reach the top of the ladder in this modern speculation, and look out upon a world as it was before sin entered it, and with *no unit* in the origin of its inhabitants, and with *no common blood* as the bond of their brotherhood. The unity of mankind is denied. Science, it is claimed, proves that we have all been mistaken in believing, with Moses and Paul, that God made of *one blood* all the nations of the earth. This antiquated idea has also to be given up. Diversity in form and complexion demonstrates plurality of origin ; shows that each distinct race now on the globe had in the beginning an Adam of its own ; that the African, the Asiatic, and the European, had each at first a parentage peculiar to himself. The theorizers here differ in their object. Some would thus overthrow the authority of the Bible, while others wish in this way to break down the brotherhood of man, in order to find in the inferiority of a portion of the *hurr an* family a reason for their enslavement.

We need not say that such teaching contradicts the plain and positive statements of the Bible. It subverts the doctrine of our common apostasy in Adam, and our common redemption in Christ. To put it forth as *truth*, to dignify

it with the name of science, is, in our judgment, a dishonor to the intellect and the heart of the country, and a direct assault upon the faith of Christendom. The reasoning here is exceedingly shallow. It looks only at the outward appearance, at the form and figure of flesh and blood; just as if these things constituted the whole man, or formed the peculiar elements of his being. The advocate of this theory takes what is common to man with the animal world, and reasons about him just as he would about a monkey or a horse. But, in considering this question of identity, we must look at the *spiritual* in man, as well as at the physical. It is "the *mind* that makes the man." Within, all men are alike. The spiritual is the same. All have understanding, memory, conscience. All think and feel and speak. The state of this inner man, this immortal inmate of the body, is everywhere the same. All are in a fallen condition. All are moved by the same hopes, are agitated by the same fears.

The diversity among men in form, figure, and complexion, no more proves a diversity of origin, than a difference in stature among the members of a family demonstrates that they have not all had the same parentage. There may be a great diversity in all these respects, and yet a unity of origin. Men may differ from each other in many particulars, and yet in all that separates them we may not have a single element of their higher nature. It is in that higher nature that we are to find their unity, not in the form and figure of the body. There is a *spirit* within. This is the man; and all who have this are men, and of the same household of being. Put this in any inclosure of flesh and blood, and you have man, immortal man, "with reason throned upon his brow." Yes, put that which thinks and feels and acts — put the human mind, into any body, black, white, or red, and you have a member of the human family, one for whom atoning blood has been shed. This is the bond. This constitutes the unity of mankind. And this is the brotherhood of earth, which scepticism and oppression are trying to break up. But before they can do this, Moses must be set aside, the statements of an inspired apostle must be dis-

proved, and the whole book of God be turned into an unmeaning fable.

Such is *the spirit* in much of modern speculation, and such the demand made by it upon our faith. If this spirit is not checked, it will certainly undermine the confidence of many in the Bible, and lead young minds, especially, into "a cold, dark, surging sea" of doubt. The danger from such speculation is in its warfare upon the plenary and verbal inspiration of the Sacred Record; an inspiration which, while it admits the peculiarities of each individual writer, and employs his memory, thought, taste, and feeling, has still running through all its words and statements an infallible divine guidance, which places it above the reach or possibility of mistake or error. The question, therefore is, whether we shall continue to stand upon the old ground of such inspiration, or shall betake ourselves to that which is *pictorial and symbolic*. This is the question of the age. The great battle-field is the threshold of the Bible, and the contest between young speculation and old theology is, whether the Mosaic narrative, the genesis of the earth and of man there given, is to be received as simple historic truth, or is to be construed into mythic poetry, into vision and allegory, and be regarded as a piece of patchwork from tradition. This is the issue that is now made, and the friends of the Bible should understand it, and gird themselves for the encounter. And, while we would cleave most firmly to the word of God, we would maintain our hold upon his works also. They are full of his goodness, of his wisdom, and of his creative power. His hand is in the deep places of the earth, and the strength of the hills is his also. The sea is his, and he made it, and his hand formed the dry land. We would, therefore, have the earth unbosom to man the treasures of his wisdom and power, and thus praise the Lord. We would have all his works so speak of him and of his word, as to magnify that word in our esteem, as he has magnified it, above all other manifestations of his name, and thus make us feel that we have in the Bible a sure word of prophecy, — the truth, and nothing but the truth, — a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God.

ARTICLE V.

EXPOSITION OF ZECHARIAH XIV.

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FROM the earliest ages of the church, commentators have widely differed on the question, whether a literal or a spiritual interpretation is to be given to those prophecies which relate to the establishment, perpetuity, and glory of the Messiah's kingdom on earth. It has been maintained by many, that the victory of Christ over his enemies, and his enthronement as King in Jerusalem, the burden of so many predictions, are to be regarded as literal verities, essential to the glory of his reign and the restoration of this earth to its true primeval blessedness. To explain these prophecies as referring to the spiritual dominion of Christ, and the enlargement and prosperity of the church, is, in their estimation, to detract from the honor of the Redeemer, and deprive the church of her chief and crowning glory.

We must not suppose that this literal interpretation of prophecy is confined to those only, whose distempered fancy delights to dwell on the regal splendors of the Messianic reign on earth. Some of the ablest writers, from the times of Irenaeus and Lactantius, have advocated the personal reign of Christ at Jerusalem, into which city, as the seat of his court and the metropolis of the world, kings are to bring their tribute, and the pious of all lands their votive offerings. Not a few have supposed that the earth itself, now cursed with comparative sterility, will be so renovated as even to surpass its fertility before the fall of man. Thus Irenaeus, in order to show that the promises and predictions of both the Old and New Testaments have respect to this glorious consummation, appeals to what certain presbyters related as having themselves heard from the apostle John, that Christ

himself, when speaking of his earthly and visible reign, said to his apostles: "The days will come when vines will grow, each bearing ten thousand branches, and on each branch there will be ten thousand twigs, and on each twig ten thousand clusters of grapes, and in each cluster ten thousand grapes, and each grape, when expressed, will yield twenty-five *μετρηται* of wine [i. e., about two hundred and nine gallons]. And when any one of the saints shall take hold of a cluster of grapes, another [cluster] will cry out: 'I am a better cluster; take me, and on my account give thanks unto the Lord' (Iren. cont. Haer. Lib. v. 33). According to this prediction, each grape-vine will produce wine to the amount of one hundred and eighty thousand billions of gallons. Irenaeus also, to the same point, cites a passage from Papias, who flourished A. D. 100, and who wrote a work entitled *Λογιων κυριακων Εξεγήσεις*, the purport of which is this: "In like manner a grain of wheat will produce ten thousand heads, and each head will bear ten thousand grains, and each grain will yield ten pounds of clear white flour; and other fruits will yield seeds and herbage in the same proportion."¹ Such was to be the fertility of the earth during this *chiliasm* of Christ's terrestrial reign.

In proof of Christ's personal reign at Jerusalem, no prediction is cited with more confidence than the fourteenth chapter of Zechariah. It is maintained that the battle between Jehovah and his enemies, with which the prophecy opens, will be as real and visible to the eye as that of Austerlitz or Solferino, and a thousand times more desperate and sanguinary. In this great conflict which is to take place at Jerusalem, according to the terms of the prophecy, the enemies of truth are to be at first successful. The city is to be taken, the houses plundered, the women ravished, and the captives, gathered in bands, to be led into hopeless exile and servitude. At this crisis, Messiah is to be revealed from heaven in great pomp and majesty (vs. 3, 4), and, placing himself at the head of his people, is to rout with tre-

¹ For both these citations the writer is indebted to Professor Stuart.

mendous slaughter the hosts of the enemy, fighting against them in person, "as when he fought in the day of battle," that is, in the battle of Joshua with the five kings, when Jehovah cast down great stones from heaven, so that more died with hailstones than were slain by the children of Israel with the sword (Josh. 10 : 10, 11). While the battle is thus raging, and the sword of Messiah is bathed in the blood of his enemies, mighty convulsions are to shake the land, rending asunder the Mount of Olives, on which the feet of Christ were first planted in his descent from the skies; before which dread phenomena the saints themselves, while flushed with so unexpected a victory, are to flee in dismay (ver. 5), as the people fled before the earthquake, in the days of Uzziah, king of Judah. At the time of this visible advent of Christ, and these convulsions of nature, the most eminent of the pious dead, the patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, and confessors of the past, are to come forth from their graves (ver. 5, end) and live again on earth, constituting the court and nobility of the Messianic empire then to commence at Jerusalem. Perennial streams (ver. 8) are to flow forth from the city in a twofold direction, the one stream eastward, into the "former sea" (*i. e.*, the Dead Sea); the other westward, into the "hinder sea" (*i. e.*, the Mediterranean); thus by navigable waters connecting Jerusalem, on the one hand, with Europe and America, and on the other with the great and opulent East, making it the commercial emporium of the world, into which as the royal city of the Messianic reign, kings are to bring their wealth, and all the families of the earth resort to keep the yearly feast of tabernacles (vs. 16—19).

To the eye of sense this is a beautiful and impressive picture. Few persons will acknowledge themselves to be wholly insensible to a theory of interpretation which enthrones Jesus of Nazareth, as monarch of the world, in the very city where he was rejected and put to a cruel and ignominious death. It is surely no ungrateful exposition of scripture which restores this earth to more than its primeval beauty and fruitfulness, making it almost spontaneously to yield,

in overflowing abundance, what has now, in stinted measure, to be obtained by patient and unremitted toil.

There are, however, insuperable difficulties in the way of this literal interpretation of the prophecy. Let it be granted that a physical convulsion of the kind here spoken of is to take place, and that Jerusalem is to become the imperial city of the Messianic empire and the commercial metropolis of the world, how is the prediction in verses sixteenth and seventeenth to be literally fulfilled? What must be the area of a city, within which all the families of the earth are to meet in yearly convocation, to keep a feast, which, of all the Jewish festivals, required space for its due observance, namely, the *feast of tabernacles* or *booths*, during which the people dwelt in booths of green boughs, erected upon the roofs and in the streets, in commemoration of the wanderings of the tribes in the wilderness? Palestine itself would not suffice for the resting-place of such countless numbers. Equally impossible would it be for the whole human family, from regions remote as well as near, to make a yearly pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and yet attend to the vocations from which they obtained their livelihood. The navies of the earth, increased a thousand-fold, would prove insufficient to transport such masses to Palestine; and even if the means of conveyance were adequate, confusion and disorder would necessarily result from the assemblage of such large and heterogeneous numbers, destructive of all orderly and intelligent worship.

Dr. Henderson seeks to avoid this objection to the literal fulfilment of the prediction, by making it a representative gathering of the families of the earth at Jerusalem. This, so far as the language of the prophecy is concerned, would be admissible. But a feature would thereby be introduced into this prophetic festival, for which no license can be drawn from any of the Mosaic festivals. We find no instance in which the national feasts were kept by representatives from various parts of the land, nor any provision in the Mosaic code for such an arrangement. As an additional objection to such an interpretation, it may be argued that the feast of tabernacles, of all others, would be least suited to

a representative celebration. Like our thanksgiving festival, between which and the feast of tabernacles there are striking points of resemblance, it was admirably adapted to bring whole families together before the Lord at Jerusalem; and although it was, perhaps, not so universally attended as the passover, especially in times of national declension from the worship of Jehovah, yet those who resorted to Jerusalem for its observance, went up in families (see John 7: 10), and not by representatives. Unless we find, therefore, as we surely do not, some divine intimation to the contrary, this feature of the Mosaic feast of tabernacles must be retained in the prophetic festival of Zechariah.

But a physical impossibility is not the only objection to this annual convocation of all the families of the earth at Jerusalem. Any interpretation which makes Jerusalem, or any other city or place, the chief and indispensable centre of worship, is plainly antagonistic to our Lord's declaration to the woman of Samaria, that in the Messianic times, worship was not to be exclusively confined to Mount Gerizim or Jerusalem, inasmuch as the worship of God was to be spiritual and universal, and not ceremonial and local. This utterance of Christ is the more pertinent to the question as to the ecclesiastical supremacy of Jerusalem in the time of the church's prosperity, from the fact that it was his manifest purpose to pronounce a general dispensation from all obligation, both then and thereafter, to resort to Jerusalem to render acceptable worship to God. Forms and ceremonies, apart from such as are required for orderly religious worship, were no longer to be substituted for that true spiritual devotion which has its seat in the renewed and sanctified heart. The Mount Zion of Judea, at the fiat of its King, from that moment, ceased to tower above other eminences as the sacred hill of God (Ps. 68: 15); and the mountain of the Lord's house, which was to be established in the tops of the mountains, and exalted above the hills, and into which all nations were to flow (Isa. 2: 2; Mic. 4: 1), was to be henceforth the spiritual Zion, the church of the living God, gathered from among men, according to the terms and promise of the new covenant (Heb. 12: 22—24).

Our Lord avowed to Pilate that his kingdom was not of this world (John 18:36); that is, it was not of human origin, had its seat in no regal city of the earth, was not supported by standing armies, nor graced with the appendages and ornaments of earthly royalty. It was spiritual and not temporal, heavenly and not earthly. This declaration of our Lord is at utter variance with his enthronement as a temporal sovereign at Jerusalem, and the personal homage to be annually rendered him by all the families of the earth in the city of his royal abode. The point upon which he insisted most strongly, in the days of his incarnation, was the spiritual nature of his mission, in opposition to the Jewish notion of a temporal Messiah. Paul, in express terms (Rom. 14:17), rebukes this erroneous conception, which, to some extent, was then prevalent in the church. He declares that "the kingdom of God is not meat and drink [that is, it does not consist in external forms, or the material objects of sense], but righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost," that is, its dominion is in the hearts of men.

It seems then incontrovertible, that a spiritual interpretation must be affixed to this yearly gathering of the families of the earth at Jerusalem. This furnishes conclusive proof that a spiritual significance is to be attached to the rest of the prophecy, unless we mingle the symbolical and literal, the figurative and plain, the spiritual and temporal, in defiance of all sound hermeneutical principles.

Another objection to the literal interpretation of this prophecy, so far at least as it is supposed to pertain to the personal advent of Christ to reign at Jerusalem, arises from what is called the *analogy of faith*. Ernesti well remarks, that "the analogy of scripture doctrine should be always before our eyes, so that the interpretation may be guided by it; i. e., that it may be so far guided by it, as that no explanation contrary to it should be adopted; and in obscure phrases, when the meaning may be doubtful, the sense may be accommodated to the analogy of scripture sentiment." Now, we venture to assert that a personal advent of Jesus Christ, such as is claimed to be taught in the prediction

before us, is not only revealed nowhere else in the Bible, but by implication, at least, is denied in various passages where his future coming is referred to. It is thought by some able scholars, that our Lord will revisit this earth prior to the day of final judgment—which Olshausen, Stier, Alford, and some other recent commentators, refer to *πάντα τὰ ἔθνη* as distinguished from the elect (*ἐκλεκτοί*), or covenanted servants of Christ, who, according to their eschatology, have been previously raised and judged, and are already in glory, and judging the world with him—and, surrounded by his chosen people, will celebrate the *marriage supper of the Lamb*, and confirm to his elect their promised inheritance. But the scriptures seem to us to furnish no evidence whatever, that there will be two future comings of Christ. One great and final Parousia is spoken of, and that is all. In a subordinate sense, he was to come for the destruction of Jerusalem, that event being symbolical of the final destruction of his enemies at the judgment of the last day. He is also said to come to his people at the hour of their death: “Be ye also ready; for in such an hour as ye think not, the Son of man cometh.” And again: “If I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you to myself, that where I am there ye may be also.” His spiritual presence is also promised to his people: “I will not leave you comfortless; I will come to you” (John 14:18). That this is the coming of Christ by his Spirit, is not only evident from the preceding context, but also from v. 23, where the promised coming of the Father and Son, in the nature of the case, must be a spiritual one. But no personal, visible advent is anywhere spoken of other than the great Parousia, when “He shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ” (2 Thess. 1:7, 8).

Numerous texts might be cited in proof that this is the sole as well as final coming of Christ. A reference to one passage will suffice for our present purpose. In Peter’s address to the people in Solomon’s porch, he speaks of Jesus

Christ in this wise: "Whom the heavens must receive until the times of restitution of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." It is strange that a text, which bears such unequivocal testimony to but one future coming of Christ, should have been seized upon by millenarians in proof of their views. Yet so it has been. By referring the "restitution of all things" to the millennium, or thousand years of Satan's confinement in the abyss, they make the commencement of this period the time of the *parousia* here spoken of. But this *restitution of all things* occupies a position in the history of human redemption far beyond the epoch designated as the millennium. It is the closing up of the series of providential economies and remedial agencies, which began with the disarrangement of the moral universe by sin. When, at the judgment of the great day — to which Jude says that the angels who kept not their first estate are reserved — Death and Hades shall have been cast into the lake of fire, and when Christ has reigned until he has put all enemies under his feet, he shall then deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father (1 Cor. 15: 24, 25). The redemptive work, for which he became incarnate, will have been completed; the breach which sin made upon the happiness of the moral universe, will have been repaired; the redeemed of the Lord will all have been gathered in, the holy angels confirmed in their obedience, and the wicked and fallen spirits consigned to their own place and to the full measure of their punishment. All things will be restored to their order and stability. The moral government of God will be vindicated, and no inroad of sin will ever again disturb the happiness of the blessed. To this final consummation the declaration of Peter refers. The heavens must receive and retain Christ until this time of final readjustment of things; that is, until the judgment of the great day. This great text, therefore, when properly interpreted, is decidedly opposed to any future advent of Christ prior to his appearance as Judge of mankind.

Equally silent, if not as directly antagonistic, are the scriptures in regard to the concomitants of Christ's advent to

reign at Jerusalem, such as the resurrection of the emihent dead, to live and reign with him during this millennium of his earthly glory. Aside from Zech. 14: 5, "And the Lord my God shall come, and all the saints with thee" (to which we shall refer more fully in the sequel), there is, so far as we know, but a single passage where the slightest allusion seems to be had to any such resurrection of the pious dead. They are uniformly represented as reposing in the grave, undisturbed by any of the events which affect the living, and awaiting their last change. Martha gave utterance to the common sentiment of the pious Jew, when, in reply to our Lord's declaration that her brother should rise again, she said, "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection, at the last day." Paul speaks more fully in his first epistle to the Thessalonians, than anywhere else, of the second coming of Christ, and of the final resurrection, yet makes not the slightest allusion to any such resurrection and reappearance of the saints on earth as is claimed by the Second Adventists. Indeed, the terms in which he speaks of the advent of Christ and its attending circumstances, are decidedly adverse to any such view.

The single passage to which allusion has been made as seeming to favor the reappearance of Christ and his saints on earth, is Rev. 20: 4, "And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them; and I saw the souls of them who were beheaded for the witness of Jesus and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hands; and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years." It cannot be denied that this is a clear prediction of the resurrection of a part, if not all, of the pious dead to an exalted station of glory with Jesus Christ; but it appears, when carefully examined, to refer to a very different state of things from that which millenarians profess to find in it.

Where is the locality of this martyr-reign? Not on earth, assuredly; for the subjects of this first resurrection (*ἡ ἀνάστασις ἡ πρώτη*, ver. 5) live and reign with Christ, not he with them. But where is Christ at this time? Has John

informed us, anywhere, that his dwelling is with men? No; but, on the contrary, throughout the whole apocalyptic vision, his abode is in heaven. Not the slightest intimation is given that he has descended to dwell again in visible form on earth. He appears (19: 11—21) as the great Captain of salvation, the Faithful and True, to make war upon the beast, the kings of the earth, and their armies; but to assume that this is a literal battle on earth between Christ and his enemies, is taking for granted the very question in dispute, and is at variance with the language of the passage, which is manifestly symbolical. No one would think of affixing a literal interpretation to the sword which proceeds from the mouth of the warrior upon the white horse, or to the iron rod with which he is to rule the nations, or to the wine-press of the fierceness and wrath of Almighty God, which he is to tread in this day of vengeance and recompense. Why, then, interpret literally his encounter with the beast and the kings of the earth? It seems to be a clear departure from the soundest principles of interpretation, in the midst of so much that is purely symbolical, to refer this to a literal descent of Messiah from heaven, to fight in person the great battle which is to end in the discomfiture of his enemies. It is in heaven, then, where Christ is, that this martyr-enthronement is to take place. How can this text, then, be advanced in proof that the re-appearance of Christ on earth, surrounded by the martyrs and confessors whom he has restored to life, is that which is predicted in this prophecy of Zechariah?

We are not unaware that many respectable commentators, who have no affinities with millenarianism, make this earth the seat of the martyr-reign, which they refer to the martyr-spirit that shall pervade and animate the church during the period of her millennial glory. The presence of Christ they also interpret as spiritual. But this hardly satisfies the demands of the passage, which seems, beyond all question, to refer to the actual vision and enjoyment of Christ, vouchsafed previous to the general resurrection to the most eminent of the pious dead.

In the consideration of Rev. 20: 4, we have thus far

proceeded on the assumption, that the thousand years of the martyr-reign synchronize with the thousand years in which Satan is bound and shut up in the abyss. But it seems to be susceptible of satisfactory proof, that the thousand years of Satan's confinement and the thousand years of the martyr-reign are by no means contemporaneous. This might be inferred from the order of the events and grammatical construction of the passage, apart from the light thrown upon this martyr-resurrection from other portions of scripture. The clauses are progressive. The binding, confinement, and loosing of the arch-enemy, and the enthronement of the martyrs, are all presented in natural order. There is no blending of events, no confusion in the vision, no retrogradation of the prophetic path once travelled over. The eye of the apocalypticist, purified by the Spirit of inspiration, gazes upon the far distant future, until his vision is overpowered with the dazzling glories of the heavenly world. His rapt spirit does not permit him to pause upon the events, which lie between these great mountain-ranges of prophecy. It is not until v. 7, that we find an expansion and more particular description of the great epochs, which are made to pass so rapidly before the eye of the reader.

We are further confirmed in our belief that two epochs are referred to, by the absence of the article in the *χίλια ἔτη* of v. 4. Had this *χίλια ἔτη* been identical with the *χίλια ἔτη* of v. 2, according to Greek usage, the article would have been prefixed, as it is in v. 3, and afterwards in vs. 5, 7. The *χίλια ἔτη* in v. 2, is introduced without the article; but when repeated, as it is in vs. 3, 7, it takes the article. In like manner, the *χίλια ἔτη* of v. 4, being a new and distinct era, rejects the article, but when repeated in v. 5, takes it, according to general usage. In v. 6, *χίλια ἔτη*, although referring to the *χίλια ἔτη* of v. 4, is without the article, being, as Bengel says, "*quasi elogio seorsum posito, as though a separate enunciation.*" The absence of the article in v. 4, authorizes us, therefore, to regard the *χίλια ἔτη* there spoken of as a distinct epoch from the thousand years of Satan's confinement in the bottomless abyss. We are aware that

in some editions the article is prefixed to *χάλια ἔτη* in v. 4 ; but the authorities, so far as we have been able to consult them, greatly preponderate in favor of its omission.

What, then, is the order of events here spoken of ? In the foreground are the binding of Satan and the spiritual renovation of the earth. This state of things is to continue a thousand years, at the expiration of which period, an awful and wide-spread apostasy takes place, the devil being "loosed for a little season." This epoch of iniquity is, however, to be brought to a speedy and final close, by the total overthrow of the enemies of truth, who, under the appellation of Gog and Magog, at the instigation of Satan, are to go up in countless numbers on the breadth of the earth, and compass the camp of the saints about, and the beloved city, and fire is to come down from God out of heaven and devour them (vs. 8, 9). In immediate sequence with this overthrow of the hosts of evil, follows the epoch of the martyr-reign, referred to in v. 5, as *the first resurrection*. There appears not the slightest reason for making this epoch synchronous with the one in which Satan is bound, except that they stand in such close proximity on the sacred page, and have each the duration of a thousand years.

What may be the nature of this martyr-resurrection and reign, must be with us little else than mere conjecture. It has an awful mystery, which should check all presumptuous speculation. As a portion of God's word, we have a right to approach it, however, in humble inquiry after truth. We will venture to suggest that it may refer to the preliminary or opening scenes of judgment, when the dead in Christ, as Paul declares (1 Thess. 4 : 16), shall rise first, and, together with the saints then alive upon the earth, be caught up to meet the Lord in the air, to sit on thrones with him, and thus to enjoy a kind of anticipatory triumph and foretaste of blessedness, which will be more fully and openly confirmed to them, when the Judge shall say : " Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world."

Whether all the pious dead will have part in this first resur-

rection, this antepast of glory and blessedness, we have no means of determining. The classes of saints referred to in this thousand years of the martyr-reign, without any violence of language, may be made to embrace the whole of the righteous dead. Nor can we readily believe that our Lord, to whom the most obscure of his saints are inexpressibly dear, will permit any of his people to remain in the grave with his enemies who are reserved to the second death. At the same time, when Paul (Phil. 3:11) speaks of his great desire to "attain unto the resurrection of the dead,"—by which expression he undoubtedly means this first resurrection, in reference to which John pronounces those to be blessed who have part in it (Rev. 20:6),—he cannot be supposed to mean that he is striving to be merely a Christian, but rather one of such eminent attainments and usefulness, that he may hope to share in a resurrection to glory and blessedness, appointed for them only whose love for Christ has been manifested by great labor and self-denial in his service.

But, however this may be, and whatever may be the nature of this triumphal enthronement of the martyrs and other eminent saints, one thing seems to be certain, that no valid argument can be drawn from it in favor of the theory of a personal reign of Christ on earth, and the resurrection of a portion of the pious dead to live and reign with him. It does not synchronize with the first millennium, for that precedes, while this follows the apostasy which ensues upon the loosing of Satan. It has characteristics which do not belong to the thousand years of Satan's confinement in the bottomless pit. That is a period of rest from the active opposition of the adversary; this, one of jubilant triumph and glory. That is to be followed by a wide-spread and awful apostasy and another encounter with the enemies of truth; this immediately precedes the general resurrection and the final judgment.

We claim, then, to have made no rash or unfounded assertion, that no scripture can be found, which justifies the literal interpretation of this prediction in Zechariah, that our Lord is to come and all the saints with him (ver. 5). On the con-

trary, we find that the scriptures are unanimous in making heaven the fixed abode of Christ, until he shall come to judge mankind at the last day. We must then adopt an exposition of this passage more harmonious with the teachings elsewhere of God's word. Scripture does not contradict itself; nor is a truth (especially one of such prominence as the personal advent of Christ to reign at Jerusalem) often left to the utterance of a single passage unsupported by other scriptures. Such an event might have been expected to have constituted one of the great burdens of prophecy, and not have been restricted to the one text we are now considering.

But what is true of this clause in v. 5, is true also of the whole prediction. The description of Jehovah's coming to take vengeance upon the enemies of his people, is indeed very remarkable. There is a particularity of incident and detail, which may well challenge from the reader the inquiry, whether the things predicted will not in reality take place in the latter days. But the language is not more minutely descriptive of Jehovah's advent, than that employed in Psalm xviii., to symbolize his appearance for the deliverance and protection of David in times of peril; or the wonders in heaven and in earth, predicted by Joel (2: 30, 31) as ushering in the great and terrible day of the Lord, which, according to Peter (Acts 2: 16—20), found their accomplishment on the day of Pentecost. The scriptures are full of metaphor and symbol, especially the great predictions which refer to the Messianic times; and it argues a very impaired spiritual vision in one who cannot, in general, discern the great truths which underlie these figurative utterances.

A literal exposition of this chapter in Zechariah being therefore out of the question, it would seem that no interpretation would be sought for other than one purely spiritual and symbolical. But, strange as it may appear, evangelical commentators, with scarcely an exception, have occupied a middle ground, giving to some portions of the chapter a spiritual, and to other portions a literal, interpretation. This is especially true of the more recent English expositors.

"The day of the Lord," in the first verse, they refer to the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans. The latter clause, "thy spoil is divided in the midst of thee," relates to the booty which fell to the invading army at the sack of the city, which, apart from what had been wasted, secreted, and destroyed by fire, was so great, that throughout Syria gold fell to half its real value. Verse second, according to this method of interpretation, refers to the assembling of the Roman armies, at the divine appointment, to beleaguer Jerusalem. Every clause of the verse contains a literal verity. The taking of the city, the plundering of the houses, the ravishment of the women—all are referred, by these expositors, to what actually took place at Jerusalem. The prediction that "half of the city should go forth into captivity," was fulfilled in the able-bodied men led away by Titus and sold as slaves; while the next clause, "the residue of the people shall not be cut off from the city," found its fulfilment in the poorer and feebler classes, who were suffered to remain after the city had been taken and sacked. In v. 3, the prophecy passes over a chasm of centuries, to the period, when the Roman power in like manner was to be broken by Jehovah.

Thus far the prophecy is regarded by these interpreters as of literal fulfilment. But in v. 4, it changes to metaphor and symbol, having reference, however, still to the events connected with the downfall of Jerusalem. The rending asunder of the Mount of Olives, denotes the removal of obstacles in the way of the safety of God's people at the time when, in obedience to our Saviour's direction (Matt. 24 : 16), they were leaving the city on its first investment by Titus. As in the days of Uzziah the people fled before the earthquake, so would the followers of Christ flee, in order to shun the calamities which were impending over Jerusalem. In v. 6, under the imagery of a murky day, is predicted the political debasement of the Jewish nation from their final subjugation and dispersion by the Romans. This, according to v. 7, is however to terminate in a bright and cloudless sun, at a time when the political renovation of

the tribes was least expected, "at evening time." Then will they return to the land of their fathers; Jerusalem will be rebuilt, and restored to more than its former magnificence. As a compensation for her wrongs during the centuries in which she lay "trodden down of the Gentiles," the nations shall pour their wealth into her; and within her walls, as the spiritual metropolis of the earth, shall be heaped up the votive offerings of a glad and grateful world. From the city, restored to more than its original splendor, living waters shall flow forth to refresh the nations, and thus shall be verified the declaration of Paul (Rom. 11 : 12): "If the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fulness?"

Such is the common explanation of this prophecy. That its true meaning is here evolved in part, we will not deny; but the principle of interpretation adopted in reaching these results is radically defective. The literal and spiritual, the plain and figurative, are mingled and blended, as seems best to suit the verbal demands of any passage, with but little regard to the general scope of the prophecy, or its harmony with other portions of God's word. We do not believe that the prediction refers to the downfall of Jerusalem and the dispersion and restoration of the Jews, only as these events are a part of God's providential economy in the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom and the subjugation of the world to his sceptre. We do not believe that the language of the prophecy is at one time literal, and at another symbolical; or that it fluctuates between events temporal and spiritual, without regard to a well-defined and orderly connection of thought. The prophecy is not made up of detached and disconnected predictions, but is one of singular unity, not only in its general scope, but also in the symbols employed to set it forth.

The great central truth, towards which all the minor and subordinate parts of the prophecy converge, is the universal extension of the Redeemer's kingdom, and the peace, happiness, and prosperity attendant thereon. A reference to the preceding chapters will show that the vision is of times far

more remote than those of the early days of the church, or the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans. The prediction opens with the startling announcement: "Behold! the day of the Lord cometh." What is this day of Jehovah? Is it a day of vengeance, or of salvation? a day of judgment and fiery indignation, or one of merciful visitation to his people? Who, in solving this question, does not recur at once to "the great and terrible day of the Lord," spoken of by Joel, and interpreted by Peter as beginning to receive its fulfilment on the day of Pentecost? Are we wrong, with our eye on such a parallel scripture, in referring this "day of the Lord" spoken of by Zechariah, to the abundant outpouring of the Holy Spirit, which in the latter days shall bless the church and the world? Is not that interpretation frigid and unwarranted, which, failing to discern this great key to the prediction, refers the "day of the Lord" to the capture of Jerusalem by Titus and the Roman army?

The day of the Lord cometh. The church is to triumph, but not without a desperate struggle. We hear the trumpet of war mustering her foes to battle. It is Jehovah himself (ver. 2) who gathers them together, that the question of supremacy between him and them may be fully and forever settled. The earth groans beneath their tread, as they march against the chosen of the Lord. Their onset upon the spiritual Jerusalem is fierce and terrible. The tide of battle, at first, turns in their favor. The city is taken, and the brutal soldiery indulge in every excess. Long lines of captives stand ready to take up their mournful march from the city, and the church seems on the very brink of ruin. But *JEHOVAH* (that is, the *MESSIAH* of the New Testament, whose glory John avers that Isaiah saw in his vision of Jehovah of Hosts) suddenly reveals himself as the Saviour and Avenger of his people. With his feet upon the Mount of Olives, in full view of Jerusalem, now almost reduced to a heap of ruins, he fights against those nations, "as in the day when he fought—the day of battle" (ver. 3). His presence is denoted by the usual convulsions and dread phenomena of nature, the earthquake, the darkness, and the storm. An awful plague (ver.

12) thins the ranks of his enemies, and a panic (ver. 13) from Jehovah falls upon them, under the influence of which, as when the Midianites fled before Gideon (Judges 7 : 22), and as when the hosts of Moab, Ammon, and Mount Seir melted away before Jehoshaphat and his army (2 Chron. 20 : 23), their hands are turned upon one another, and their power is completely broken and destroyed.

But God has designs of love and mercy, as well as of retribution and judgment. He spares a remnant of his enemies, and having caused streams of living waters to flow forth from the spiritual Jerusalem for their moral cleansing, numbers them among his own people, and ordains for them a part in the ordinances of his house. In this "day of the Lord," the whole earth is to be filled with the glory of his name ; the spiritual Jerusalem is to be enriched and adorned with the votive offerings of her sons and daughters ; "*holiness to the Lord*" is to be inscribed even upon the bells of the horses, and the most common utensils of labor are to be consecrated to the service of God.

Such is the brief outline of this great prophecy. It remains for us to consider, more in detail, the nature of the figurative costume in which it is clothed.

The word "Jerusalem," is employed in the scripture in a two-fold signification. It literally designates the capital city of Palestine, but is often used metaphorically for the church of God, both in the old and new dispensations. In several instances (Gal. 4 : 26 ; Heb. 12 : 22 ; Rev. 21 : 2) it denotes the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem. So frequently was Jerusalem employed, by the sacred writers, to designate the spiritual seat of God's worship, and so interwoven was it with all the aspirations of the pious Jew, that it became synonymous with the spiritual blessings and ordinances with which the devout man now invests the worship and services of the sanctuary. It was the chosen and honored abode of God's spiritual presence. There his people gained new strength and comfort, as they went up, from year to year, to lay their offerings upon the altar. As a place of sacred enjoyment, it was always uppermost in their

thought and affection. It was this spiritual enshrinement of Jerusalem in their souls, rather than mere local attachment and remembrance, which made the Hebrew captives, as they reclined beneath the willows which overhung the streams of Babylonia, exclaim : " If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning; if I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy."

There is, then, no violence done to language or to scripture analogy, in assuming that Jerusalem, in the prophecy before us, signifies the spiritual Jerusalem, the centre and seat of Christ's kingdom on earth. From this point of view let us examine the prediction in detail. The physical convulsion by which a mountain barrier is removed (ver. 4), and living waters caused to flow forth from Jerusalem to the stagnant waters of Lake Asphaltites, and to the western or Mediterranean sea, is symbolical of a great moral awakening of the church of Christ, whence shall issue streams of salvation to refresh and bless a dying world. The standing of our Lord with his feet upon the Mount of Olives, denotes his spiritual presence and power in effecting this moral renovation. It is not a literal but a spiritual theophany. The clause in ver. 5, " and the Lord my God shall come, and all the saints (literally, *the holy ones*) with thee," may be regarded as an interjected reference—suggested by the spiritual manifestation of Christ and the great moral changes and overturnings effected thereby—to his actual and final Parousia at the day of judgment; or the clause may be nothing more than an emphatic reiteration of the spiritual theophany spoken of in ver. 4. If the reference is to the coming of Christ to judgment, the *saints* or *holy ones* are the retinue spoken of in Jude ver. 14. If Christ's spiritual advent is that only which is meant, the presence and ministration of this convoy of "holy ones" must also be spiritual (Heb. 1 : 14). The nations assembled against Jerusalem symbolize the enemies of truth, whose united and persistent efforts to destroy the holy city, indicate the great opposition of an ungodly world to the kingdom of Christ, which oppo-

sition, aroused to the highest pitch by the tokens of Christ's presence in his church, and probably rendered rampant and presumptuous by the previous coldness and inactivity of God's people, is to be crushed out and followed by an acknowledgment of Jesus Christ as the rightful Lord of the earth.

With this interpretation the imagery of other portions of the prediction beautifully harmonizes. The annual visitation of all the families of the earth to this spiritual Jerusalem, is a figurative representation of the love and communion of the churches throughout the world, and their public acknowledgment of Jesus Christ as their Great Head. Nothing so tended to preserve the nationality of the tribes of Israel, as their presence at Jerusalem to celebrate the prescribed festivals. The distinction of tribe was, for the time, merged in the more general and highly prized appellation of "the Israel of God." Local prejudices and jealousies disappeared, as with united voice the priests and Levites, standing on the steps of the inner court, sang the songs of degrees; or the whole people, with shouts of joy and praise, brought water in a golden vessel from the fountain of Siloam, into the temple of their God. They were all sinners, obnoxious alike to divine justice, when the high-priest, having offered sacrifice for his own sins and the sins of the people, entered the holy of holies with burning incense and the blood of victims, to make atonement for the sins of the people. The feast of the passover reminded them of a national deliverance. Indeed, these feasts served as an indissoluble bond of union among the tribes, and made them feel and act as one people, having common religious ordinances and worship.

We should then naturally expect, that some such aid and incitement to union would be found in the worship and ordinances of the spiritual Israel. And thus it is. The feast of tabernacles is instituted in this spiritual Jerusalem, and a divine enactment makes it obligatory upon all the families of the earth, to present themselves before the Lord once a year for its observance. If any one should ask why this feast

alone is retained in the new dispensation, while all the other Jewish festivals have been superseded, the answer may be found in its great elemental idea of thanksgiving for past deliverances and mercies. But we must guard against affixing to the celebration of this feast any other than a spiritual signification. We have shown already the utter impossibility of an actual yearly gathering of all the families of the earth at Jerusalem. We now see how incompatible this would be with the spiritual features of this prediction. It would mar the whole picture, and introduce a most incongruous element, where everything is symmetrical and homogeneous. But as a spiritual feature, essential to the full and perfect development of the church in the days of her future triumph, the feast of tabernacles, as we have remarked (Comm. on John 7:2), in a form suited to the spirituality of Christian worship, will continue to be observed by God's people in all coming time. The thanksgiving festival, which has now become with us a national religious institution, is an exemplification of what, under modifications to suit the habits of different people, may become prevalent throughout the earth.

But the awful judgments which are to befall those families of the earth who come not up to this feast, compel us to seek in it some deeper and more spiritual significance than the mere institution of a national festival, even though suited to the spirituality of Christian worship, and adopted by all the nations of the earth. Something may be learned of its true import by its position in the prediction. It stands evidently in antithesis with the mustering of the hosts of evil against Jerusalem to destroy it. As this, according to our principle of interpretation, denotes the malignant and persistent opposition of the world to the kingdom of Christ, and the organized forms of evil which are arrayed against truth, we must seek for a corresponding spiritual sense, in the convocation of all the families of the earth at Jerusalem to keep the feast of tabernacles. The holy city is still to be the central object of regard; but not, as before, for the purpose of destruction, but of enlargement. From

all quarters of the world they are to come up to her sacred precincts, not in the spirit of enmity, but of fealty and love. They will seek as earnestly her welfare and peace, as before they sought to raze her to the ground. In every heart the spiritual Jerusalem will be enthroned as the city of the Great King. Thitherward will every pious aspiration be breathed forth. There shall praise wait for God and the vow be performed. Pilgrimages, not literal as in the days of monkish superstition, but in the spirit of purest self-consecration, shall be made to her shrines, and thus to all the members of Christ's family on earth, will "her walls become salvation and her gates praise."

This subordination of everything to the welfare of Zion, is still further set forth in the closing verses of the prediction. "Holiness to the Lord," is to be affixed to the "bells of the horses," and "upon every pot in Jerusalem and Judah." "The pots in the Lord's house shall be like the bowls before the altar." Every ornament and utensil of labor shall be consecrated to Christ, and there shall be no greater degree of holiness attached to one vessel employed in the service of the sanctuary than to another. All this shows that a spiritual sense is to be given to the celebration of the feast of tabernacles, of which idea these closing verses are but the expansion and emphatic reiteration.

As collateral proof that we are right in attaching a spiritual significancy to this prediction of Zechariah, let us refer to the mystic city of Ezekiel. This city, which is but the reproduction, on a grander and more imposing scale, of the Jerusalem of David and Solomon, has its temple, from under the threshold of which eastward, waters are said (47: 1—5) to issue forth, increasing gradually in depth, until they become a great river which cannot be forded. These waters flow eastward into the desert and into the sea (*i. e.*, the Dead sea), and possess the power of healing the waters of the sea, so that there shall be abundance of fish, as the fish of the great (*i. e.*, Mediterranean) sea (vers. 8—10). How close the resemblance of this feature of Ezekiel's city to the streams of living water which issue forth from the

spiritual Jerusalem in Zechariah! With what graphic force and beauty does this indicate the outgoings of life from the church to save and bless a lost world!

Turn we now for a moment to the New Jerusalem of the apocalyptic vision. This city is a symbolical representation of heaven, but not strictly heaven itself; for it is expressly said, that "John saw the holy city, the New Jerusalem coming down from God out of heaven [the Greek *ἐκ* denoting internal separation from], prepared as a bride adorned for her husband." A great voice was also heard out of heaven proclaiming: "The tabernacle of God is with men, and he shall dwell with them, and they shall be his people" (Rev. 21:2, 3). This city, before whose gorgeous splendors the most glorious creations of the human imagination fade away, has also its river of life; but, with a beautiful diversity of imagery and yet remarkable unity of sentiment, the healing property which belongs to the waters of Ezekiel and Zechariah, is here placed in the leaves of the "tree of life," which grows on either side of the river. These leaves are "for the healing of the nations." The inference from this is that the nations are yet diseased. Sin and death are still in the world. But such medicinal virtue resides in these leaves, that they cure of every spiritual malady. Can any one doubt that the healing leaves of John's tree of life, as well as the living waters of Ezekiel and Zechariah, refer to the spiritual influence which the church, in the days of her future prosperity, shall exert upon the world? If so, does it not follow, as a plain and incontrovertible inference, that the imagery in other parts of these predictions is expressive of spiritual truths, and not of literal verities?

But that we have not erred in our exposition of the living waters which are to flow forth from Jerusalem, we have still higher evidence. In the last great day of the feast — the same feast of tabernacles, for the observance of which all the families of the earth, according to Zechariah, are to come up to Jerusalem — our Lord proclaimed, in the hearing of the people: "If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink; he that believeth on me, as the scripture hath said,

out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water" (John 7:37, 38). The general sentiment of this great utterance is too plain to be mistaken. Transferred from figurative to plain language the averment is, that from him who comes to Christ, and partakes of the grace which he freely bestows, shall issue refreshing and life-giving influences, so that his fellow-men shall also be benefited by the gift within him. This abundant supply of the water of life, its free and unobstructed intercommunication among those who have drunk of it, and its outflowings for the salvation of the world, are declared by our Lord to be what *the scripture hath said*; that is, what has been predicted in the Old Testament scriptures of the Messianic times. In what scriptures do we find this prediction, if not in Zechariah, Ezekiel, and in such passages as Isa. 44:3; 58:11; where floods of waters are promised to him who is thirsty, making him "like a watered garden, and like a spring of water, whose waters fail not;" or, as Zechariah expresses it, "which are to flow alike in summer and in winter," that is, in perennial streams. To the same import is the prediction in Joel 3:18, where abundance of milk and refreshing streams of water, are promised blessings to the church in the latter days under the Messianic reign. This latter prophecy is the more remarkable, from the resemblance of language in the clause (ver. 18), "and a fountain shall come forth of the house of the Lord, and shall water the vale of Shittim," to that employed by Zechariah. By the "vale of Shittim" is meant, as most interpreters suppose, the valley through which the Kidron flows to the Dead sea. This was the course of the waters of Zechariah, which flowed eastward toward the former (*i. e.*, Dead) sea. In both prophecies, the restoration of an arid and unproductive soil to a well-watered and fruitful region, is the great elemental idea.

In the light, then, of this great declaration of our Lord, and of the scriptures of the Old Testament to which it unquestionably refers, can we hesitate to attach a spiritual significance to these prophetic waters of Zechariah? Is not this one of the scriptures which predict that rivers shall flow

from the belly of each believer? The explanation which John adds, to prevent any misapprehension of the import of our Lord's words, is very significant: "This spake he of the Spirit." It was the Spirit's influence which, under the imagery of living waters, was promised to all such as came to Jesus. Not simply the office work of the Spirit, drawing the soul to Christ from a state of impenitence and unbelief, but the permanent indwelling of the Spirit, transforming the inner man into the image of God, and filling the soul to overflowing with all the graces and fruits of holiness. The vigorous growth of these spiritual graces is set forth in the rapid increase of the prophetic waters of Ezekiel, which, in the short distance of four thousand cubits, from a small rivulet, were swollen to a large river which could not be forded.

How frigid and unscriptural, then, is the exposition which refers these living waters of Zechariah to natural rivers, which are to burst forth from the sides of Mount Zion at the rending of the Mount of Olives, beneath the feet of the Messiah! What a descent from the table-land of vision, where the eye gazes with unobstructed view upon the future glory and prosperity of the church, to the dense and murky atmosphere of the vale below, to make Jerusalem "the mother of us all," she "which is above and free," a commercial emporium of Judea, differing in no essential respect from any of the large and flourishing cities of our globe! What more derogatory to the true dignity and glory of our Redeemer than for him to leave his mediatorial throne at his Father's right hand, descend to earth, and fight his way to the crown of an earthly potentate at Jerusalem? There is something revolting in the bare enunciation of such a stoop from the heavenly to the earthly, from the spiritual to the material, which of itself should cause us to distrust any interpretation of God's word leading to such a visionary theory. It were a violence to our ideas of the calm repose of the pious dead, to make them revisit this earth, and take part again in its distracting cares and anxieties; but, in addition to this, to bring Christ down again from his heav-

only throne, to tread the streets of Jerusalem as a temporal prince, is too gross a conception to be for a moment entertained. An earthly crown has encircled the brow of a Nero and a Domitian, but a spiritual diadem is only his to wear, "on whose vesture and thigh is written the name KING OF KINGS AND LORD OF LORDS."

ARTICLE VI.

THE SALVATION OF INFANTS.

BY REV. ALVAN TOBET, DURHAM, NEW HAMPSHIRE.

THE controversies through which Christianity has been carried, were in many instances greatly useful in the development and application of the Christian doctrines, and especially in the correction of those errors which had become intertwined with them. The false philosophy which has often corrupted, and still oftener encumbered, the teachings of the scriptures, could not be so effectually removed in any other way as by the thorough sifting of discussion. It is indeed a process that shakes up truth and error in such confusion as may perplex observers not well skilled in distinguishing one from the other. The advocates of truth may be found defending some erroneous appendage, that should be thrown off as an excrescence, or mistaking some matter of fact supposed to be important, though really not material. But, in the result, truth comes out of the confusion, more beautiful and stronger for being freed from the incrustations of antiquated error, the monstrosities, contradictions, absurdities, which false philosophies have bound around it.

It is nearly a third of a century since a controversy arose, of not a little interest at the time, on the question, whether "the damnation of infants is a doctrine of the Calvinists." The parties were men of high standing and influence in their different spheres : Dr. Lyman Beecher, of Boston, and Prof.

Andrews Norton, of Cambridge. Dr. Beecher, in republishing a sermon first issued twenty years before, "On the Government of God," appended a note, indignantly denying the charge against Calvinists, of "believing and teaching that infants are damned, and that hell is doubtless paved with their bones." He declared that he had "never seen or heard of any book which contained such a sentiment, nor a man who believed or taught it." Prof. Norton replied to this note, maintaining the charge that "the monstrous doctrine" is found in Calvinistic writers of the highest authority, and is necessarily a part of the Calvinistic system.¹

It is not our intention to give an account of this controversy. But a careful reading of the successive Articles suggests some considerations which may be worth the attention of all who find themselves called to engage in such discussions, or to inquire into the opinions of former times.

1. There ought to be more care than is common with regard to the spirit of religious controversy. More of a respectful, kindly, and conciliatory manner towards an opponent than is usual with controversial writers, would abate nothing from their independence and manliness, or the strength of their arguments, while it would give them far greater influence with those from whom they differ and those who have not taken the side of either party. A clear, decided, strong expression of our opinions and our reasons, is only a just treatment of our subject and our readers. But boasting, taunts, sneers, or even ridicule, produce irritation, not conviction; and, if joined with weak arguments, they secure contempt rather than respect. Nor, if an argument appear entirely successful against an opponent, does an air of triumph and proud self-gratulation add anything to its force, but rather detracts from its dignity. A successful disputant, like a successful warrior, can afford to be magnanimous. Only so does he best consult his own honor.

¹ The Articles, which are of marked ability and research, may be found in the *Christian Examiner*, Vol. IV. for 1827, pp. 431—448; Vol. V. for 1828, pp. 229—263, 316—340, 506—542; and in the *Spirit of the Pilgrims*, Vol. I. for 1828, pp. 42—52, 78—95, 149—164.

Besides, it is often the fact that an argument which is conclusive on some one important point, leaves untouched other questions of substantial consequence in relation to the whole subject. And candor (without which no amount of ability or learning is worthy of confidence) requires that we do not over-estimate our success.

2. We should be very cautious in ascribing to others obnoxious opinions, which may seem to us natural and logical inferences from doctrines avowed. The modes of intellectual training, and the habits of thinking and reasoning, are so diverse, that inferences which to some minds are natural, logical, and inevitable, are not so to others. Few, if any, are always self-consistent, either in their belief or their practice. In some, inconsistency is much more obvious and frequent than in others. But inconsistency of reasoning is a more charitable supposition than a manifest contradiction of first principles. Only such opinions should be ascribed to writers of a past age as they have plainly authorized.

3. There is some modification of theological belief and methods of reasoning, with the progress of time. The Calvinism of Calvin and Turretin is not exactly the same as that of Jonathan Edwards and Joseph Bellamy. Still less is it the same as that of Timothy Dwight or Nathaniel Emmons, of Andrew Fuller or Thomas Chalmers, of Edward D. Griffin or Leonard Woods. How large a departure constitutes an essential change, is a question about which men will differ; and they will disagree very much according to their estimate of the points of doctrine concerned. There is room for honest difference in this matter. It cannot be said that the slightest departure from the statements of Calvin is an abandonment of Calvinism. And yet there are some principles so distinctive, that if they be given up, the system is abandoned. But if the depravity of man, in its entirety, depth, and strength, as never overcome by any human culture alone; if the supreme sovereignty of God in the bestowment of his Spirit and in the salvation of those whom he hath from the beginning chosen to eternal life; and if the wise, righteous, benevolent, eternal purposes of God in all events

and all worlds, providing and carrying out the plan of redemption by the blood of Christ, be fully maintained, can it with any reason be said that the essential or distinctive principles of Calvinism are forsaken? Even though there should be some explanations and methods of presenting the free agency of man not found in the writings of Calvin, and such as will better guard the sovereignty of God from the appearance of conflict with the first principles of truth and justice, still, are not all the essential principles of the system preserved?

Whatever may be the answer to this question, truth is of far greater importance than a name. And highly esteemed as the name of Calvin justly is, only the weakness and folly of bigotry can deter us from receiving truth which he did not find, and rejecting error which he held. No human name, however worthily honored, can be rightly made a shibboleth, which all men must "frame to pronounce alike," under penalty of being excluded from the company of the faithful.

A history of opinions held in former ages with regard to the future condition of infants, might doubtless be interesting and instructive. But the object of the present Article is, with only a glance at the past, to consider what we have reason to believe on the subject.

Very early in the history of Christianity, as a consequence of the natural connection in men's minds between outward signs and the inward experience signified by them, the doctrine of baptismal regeneration seems to have arisen, and, in agreement with it, the belief that the baptism of infants is necessary to their salvation. While some thought there might be an intermediate state for infants dying unbaptized, others, like Cyprian and afterwards Augustine, rejecting this idea as unscriptural, believed them to be consigned to eternal punishment for the sin of their nature. This continued to be the belief of the Romish church generally until the Reformation, except as it was modified by the doctrine of purgatory, which furnished a "*limbus infantum*."

The Reformers, rejecting purgatory, some of them reject-

ing also baptismal regeneration, retained the theory of depravity as a corruption of the essential nature, the very substance of the soul, by descent from Adam, and held generally that infants of believing parents are saved on account of the faith of their parents, but other infants cannot be saved. The Augustinian and Calvinistic doctrine of election or predestination was also held by Calvin's followers applicable to infants as to adults,—the doctrine that some are selected for salvation, and others are consigned to eternal death without any regard to their own agency and their personal character. Some, however, like Zuingli, rejected this belief in its relation to infants, or held that all infants who die are chosen to salvation. Others, like Watts and Ridgely, did not maintain it in all its extent and consequences, though they do not seem to have found methods of setting it aside which were quite satisfactory to their own minds. It is not unusual with writers of a later period to say, as Pelagius did long before, they “do not know what is done with infants,” or, as President Dickinson of the college at Princeton said, “it concerns us to leave them in the hands of that God whose tender mercies are over all his works.” Now, and for some generations past, theological writers who refer to the subject, very commonly express the hope, and many of them the full belief, that all infants who die are saved. This method of speaking is not peculiar to any class of theologians, and is scarcely more common with those of one school than another. And yet there are those who do not seem to think we have ground for a very decided belief on the subject.

The opinion has been expressed that half the human race die in their infancy. When we consider that a vastly greater proportion of such deaths occurs in barbarous and heathen lands than among civilized and Christian people, we shall not, perhaps, think the estimate too high. And this large class of our fellow-beings, whether half or less, are so interesting as to draw forth towards them the tenderest and strongest, as well as the most amiable, affections of our nature. The hearts which have bled at the death of infant children are so numerous in every community, that few

questions can be asked of more general and deeper interest than this: What is the evidence that those who die in their infancy have everlasting life? Is there proof sufficient to take away all reasonable doubt whether it is well with them? Or is the question one about which God has told us nothing clearly in the Bible, and we have no knowledge from other sources, so that, whatever favorable opinions we may form, we must hold them as the suggestion of our wishes, and not as our settled belief, on substantial and sufficient grounds?

Surely the consideration of this subject is something more than a matter of curious speculation. We ought to have reasons, if we can, that will satisfy our minds and give us rest in our belief with regard to it. But, as it is a fact well known, that, in times past, many theologians have not believed that all infants who die are saved, and, probably, some serious persons now have doubts and fears respecting their condition, we have reason to look at the grounds for apprehension, and try to find whether such apprehension can be removed.

What, then, is found in the character and condition of the human race, and in the Bible, to awaken doubt or fear about the well-being of those who depart from this life in that early stage of it in which there is no knowledge and no actual practice of good and evil?

There is, first, the great and terrible fact of human depravity. In all the history of the past, in all our observation of men, and in all our self-knowledge, as well as in the Bible, we have the truth coming before us continually, that men are prone to evil, that this tendency is not occasional and partial, but perpetual and universal; "for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God."

There are two principal theories of depravity as affecting the character and condition of infants, with many variations and qualifications. One is, that human nature is itself essentially evil previous to any moral action, and utterly incapable of any good unless it be changed. According to this theory, the salvation of any infant is impossible unless

he have a new nature given him, and also the pardon of that sin which lies in his nature.

The other theory is, that human nature is not of itself evil previous to moral action, but has a tendency or bias to evil, such as makes it certain that the child will sin, and he always does sin, as soon as he begins to act morally, unless prevented by the grace of God. According to this theory, it is not the nature itself that needs to be changed, but the tendency, bias, or inclination; and without this change the salvation of infants is impossible. There is also need of pardon wherever there is actual sin.

Whichever theory of depravity is held, the universal necessity of regeneration may be a second reason for doubt and fear with regard to the future condition of infants.

But these two objections to the belief of infant salvation are substantially the same. Their force consists in the supposition that God cannot, or does not, by his renewing power and grace, prepare the soul of the infant who dies, for the purity and blessedness of heaven. This ground of apprehension is as strong against the belief that any part of those who die in their infancy are saved, as it is against the belief that all are. If any are regenerated before they come to the period of intelligent and accountable moral action, regeneration so early is possible; and there is nothing in the condition and character of the infant to make it impossible for all dying in that early stage of life to be heirs of salvation.

But all have believed that some of these early dead are saved. At no period of the church has it been denied that the children of believing parents, if they die after being truly consecrated to God, have life eternal. The promise of God — “unto you and your children” — seemed to make this unquestionable. The severest creeds also speak of “elect infants;” and if such have been saved, there is nothing in the native depravity of the human race, and the necessity of regeneration, to make it impossible that all who die in their infancy may be. The difficulty on this ground is the same in all; and if it be overcome in some cases, it may be in

others. Whether it will be overcome in all cases remains a question to be answered.

There are some portions of the scriptures from which the inference has been drawn, that many who have died in their infancy were not saved. Such are the narratives of the destruction of the world by the deluge; of the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah; of the extermination of the Canaanitish nations; of God's destroying judgments visited upon families for the peculiar sins of the parents, as in the case of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram. It may, perhaps, be supposed that there is a confirmation of the inference from these narratives in the well-known declaration, that God will visit the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation; and also in the general principle, both of the Bible and of God's providential government, that children do suffer in consequence of the misdeeds of their parents.

To the apprehensions which may be suggested by these facts, it may be replied, that all they tell us about God's treatment of men in this world really decides nothing as to the condition of infants in another world. It does not go a single step beyond this life. The veil between this life and the future is not lifted. Infants die, and their death is often caused by the wickedness of their parents; is, indeed, a part of the punishment visited by God's providential and moral government on parents for their crimes. We all know that multitudes of infants die; some by violence, and some by disease; some from want, some from cruelty, and some from excessive but mistaken care; some overwhelmed with their parents in the same destruction, and others snatched from the arms of parental love. But their death, however it may come, does not reveal anything of their condition afterwards. Because it is in many instances the natural consequence of parental iniquity, and the terrible judgment of God upon it, we have no reason to infer that those infants must perish forever. They may be taken away from their parents, or cut off with them, as a judgment of God on those who gave them birth, and yet be saved from that everlasting destruction which they would have incurred

if they had lived in sin and died impenitent. The Old Testament gives us very little information about the life to come. It does not, like the New Testament, keep the unseen world constantly open before us. The judgments of God which it narrates are, almost wholly, those which in this life he visits on such as have been guilty of flagrant wickedness. Their children being involved with them is a part of their punishment. But, surely, we are not obliged to infer that their children will perish forever because they are so cut off, any more than we are obliged to infer that all children who die will perish forever because they die. In truth, the same event may be a terrible judgment to the parent, and the greatest mercy to the child.

Will it be said that the New Testament represents faith in Christ as the necessary condition of salvation; and therefore, as infants do not believe, they cannot be saved?

To this it has been well replied, that the scriptures speak to those who are competent to receive the truth by believing and obeying it. The Bible is not addressed to infants before they are capable of moral action; and it cannot be supposed that God demands the same conditions of them as of those who can know their duty and do it. It is required of a man according to that he hath, and not according to that he hath not. Our Lord plainly teaches that any other principle of government would be unjust. And can any course inconsistent with this principle be pursued in God's treatment of infants? Certainly they cannot be condemned for rejecting the gospel; for in fact they do not reject it. If they do not confess Christ because they cannot, neither do they, nor can they, deny him.

The doctrine of imputation may be, indeed, has been, supposed by those who hold it, especially if they believe it the only proper explanation of the essential facts and peculiar truths of the gospel, to have some bearing on the subject.

But if, according to this theory, the sin of Adam is reckoned to his posterity, so that they all, including infants, are exposed to eternal death on account of it; in like manner

the righteousness of Christ is reckoned to the elect, so that they all shall be saved on his account; and, for anything we know, all who die in their infancy may be "elect infants."

The question has been asked, if all infants are saved, what is the great and peculiar benefit of infant baptism?

Infant baptism is an ordinance of deep interest, and fraught with rich blessings to those, both parents and children, who have proper views of its meaning, and make a right use of it. But it is an ordinance of the church on earth, and sufficiently significant, as it brings to her and her children who live, precious blessings during their course of trial in the present life. On this account, doubtless, it affects their condition in the life to come. And is not this enough? Why should we look for anything more? How indeed can we suppose the baptism of an infant who dies to have any influence on its salvation, unless we retain with the ordinance, more or less distinctly, something of the old, absurd fiction of baptismal regeneration?

It has been suggested that an unquestioned belief of infant salvation will operate in some cases as a temptation to infanticide. And possibly, in rare circumstances of crime already committed and infamy certain to result from exposure, or of extreme suffering from poverty, such a belief may contribute to overcome natural affection, and so strengthen the power of the tempter, when he says to a wretched parent: It will be easy at once to make your infant happy forever and relieve yourself of sore trouble.

But if such a regard for consequences should have any influence on our belief or its avowal, on the other side an argument from the consequences may be brought, of much greater weight. The denial of infant salvation, on what are supposed to be the principles of Christianity, will prejudice the minds of many against the faith of the gospel, and operate on them as a strong temptation to infidelity. The apparent unreasonableness and cruelty of infant perdition makes it, if admitted to have a logical or real connection with the evangelical system of belief, a ready and effective weapon in the hands of those who oppose such a system.

They have seen this, and have not been slow to use the advantage thus given them. Nor does it seem possible to escape such damage to the true faith, unless it can be shown that we may reasonably believe they have a fair trial after they leave this world, or that they are saved. And since we are constrained to set aside the supposition of another state of trial after this life, as inconsistent with the general tenor of the scriptures and with some of their plainest teachings, we may have, before any careful consideration of the direct arguments, a reasonable inclination towards the belief of infant salvation.

What reasons now have we to believe that all infants who die are saved?

1. First, from all we know of God's justice, this belief is reasonable. His justice, so far as our knowledge goes, is more in favor of it than against it.

It may indeed be objected to our reasoning from the attributes of God, that they are matters so far above our comprehension as to make it impossible to bring them within the narrow limits of our understanding, or subject them to the forms of our logic. God is above us, unsearchable, past finding out. We should not be so presumptuous as to think that we can compass with our little minds the infinity of his being and perfections, or that we can fathom the reasons of his ways and the methods of his government.

Yet he himself addresses our capacity for knowledge of good and evil, and for judging between truth and error, between right and wrong, in relation to his treatment of men. He calls us to employ our thoughts, and send forth our inquiring and reasoning faculty vigorously and widely, with regard to the relations we sustain to him and his government. It is a great folly, a great sin to *think* that we are not made to think, and to argue that we have no capacity for argument, because our power of thought and argument is limited, and we can go no further than we have ground to stand on.

The principles of truth, which are elementary and self-evidencing, when presented to the mind, lie at the foundation of all our reasoning. It is only as we stand on these

principles that we can prove the existence of God, or, indeed, that we can prove anything. The belief of some things always carries along with it the belief of some other things. With the existence of God, the creator and governor of the world, proved or admitted, we have also the belief of his perfect, unchangeable goodness and justice. According to some philosophers and theologians, his justice proceeds from his benevolence, is prompted by it, and has no other aim but to maintain his goodness and give it full effect. According to others, both attributes are original or primary in him, justice no less than benevolence. According to all, both are coincident and consistent; and though one may be modified in its operation by the other, neither can have its strength weakened, its glory tarnished.

But what says the justice of God with regard to the subject before us? Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? Certainly he will. Can he destroy the righteous with the wicked? Surely not. And does not the supposition that God will turn over to everlasting destruction a large and most interesting portion of the human family, who have had no real and personal trial of their character, conflict with the clearest, most settled ideas, and the fullest knowledge we have from all sources of God's justice? Who will say it does not?

Perfect justice in a ruler must prompt him to bestow rewards and inflict punishments on his subjects exactly as they are deserved. To him who deserves much, must be given much; and to him who deserves little, must be given little. On the same principle, if there be any who have done neither good nor evil, to them neither good nor evil must be given.

It follows, of necessity, that if the infants of our race are not really sinners, they cannot, in strict justice, be subjected to punishment. Although they belong to a sinful race, and will sin when they shall be capable of moral action, to inflict punishment while they are not personally and truly sinners, would be to violate the principles of eternal truth and justice on which the throne of God stands.

It will be said by some that, though infants have not actually sinned, they are really sinners, because they have a sinful nature. By the hypothesis of imputation, or of the federal headship of Adam, in which he acted for all mankind (his offspring, or those who were really existing and acting in him when he sinned), many theologians have held that infants, before they begin to act, are truly sinners and justly exposed to eternal death.

With this view of the matter there will arise to many minds an uncomfortable feeling, an ugly apprehension of finding it exceedingly difficult, if not quite impossible, to repel the charge of regarding God as the author of sin. It looks as if the infant were made a sinner, without, in any sense, a choice or agency of his own, and made such even thousands of years previous to his own personal existence. The objector can say to such a view of the infant character and condition, apparently with unanswerable force, that by it God makes the child a sinner, and then holds him condemned to eternal death for being a sinner.

Still, it is interesting to know that able men who have held this opinion have thought they could find something in their views of God's justice favorable to the salvation of infants. Dr. Griffin, in his sermon on "Adam, our Federal Head," has these two paragraphs:

"On the whole, we must conclude that infants might justly be sent to hell. We do not come to this conclusion from reason, but from the revelation of God. Whatever our blinded reason may say about so mysterious a matter, we must bow in submission to the decision of God." This decision, he thinks, is given in the fifth chapter of Romans. Perhaps, at this time, the most competent students of the Bible may have a different opinion.

"Now, do not go away and say that I have preached that there are infants in hell of a span long. I am not sure that I have a right to offer or to form an opinion on this subject. It may be human weakness, but I cannot help hoping that all infants will be saved, notwithstanding what I am forced to say about the requisitions of justice. And I found this

hope on two considerations: First, the immediate object of punishment is to convince others that if they sin they must suffer; but infants cannot be impressed with this truth by the punishment of infants; and adults are sufficiently impressed by the punishment of adults. The punishment, therefore, does not seem to be so absolutely necessary as in other cases. Secondly, by appointing a day for the 'revelation of the righteous judgment of God,' he seems desirous to show creatures the reasonableness of his measures; and it now seems as if it would be easier to make this impression on creation if he did not make creatures and send them to hell before they knew their right hand from their left."

Dr. Griffin thus declares a hope that all infants will be saved, founded on the objects and reasonableness of God in the execution of his justice. But may we not find stronger ground for such a hope in the first principles of his justice?

The infinite One is so far above us that we must, if we would be wise, acknowledge ourselves unable to comprehend him and his works. It would, indeed, be the presumption of folly and the weakness of vanity for us to pretend that we can always explain, and so "justify the ways of God to men." But the unfathomable mysteries of his providential and moral government give us no warrant for ascribing to him a course of proceeding that appears contradictory to the first principles of all justice, human and divine. And this we seem to do, if we say that God has created men sinners, without any choice or action of their own, and then consigned such as die infants to everlasting death, with no opportunity nor possibility of change in their character and doom. Surely we should be cautious lest we charge God foolishly; and by no means should we justify those who would call him a "hard master, reaping where he has not sown, and gathering where he has not strewed." No reasoning can be more essentially erroneous and mischievous than that which perverts or sets aside the very idea of justice.

From all we know of God's justice, the only reasonable conclusion is, that infants who die before they have knowl-

edge of good and evil, are not condemned to perish forever. And since we are informed of only two conditions in the world to which we are hastening, we may hope and believe that they have everlasting life.

2. This belief is greatly strengthened by the love of God. Many theologians regard benevolence as the foundation attribute of his character, the fountain-spring of his moral nature. God is love; and we must suppose that his goodness, if it do not originally prompt, yet does always support and guide (may we not say control?) his justice. Certainly there can be no real conflict between these two essential qualities of his moral being.

The purpose of our argument does not require us to show that the destruction of infants would be unjust, though we think it has been shown. It is enough if we have no reason to believe the justice of God unavoidably requires such severity on all who belong to the sinful race. Then his benevolence, in conjunction with his justice, very strongly supports, if it do not perfectly establish, the belief, that they will be saved.

And how can the justice of God require the destruction of that part of the human family who have had no real and personal trial of their character, when it does not require the destruction of the whole? God's justice has allowed him to make provision for the salvation of all men,—all, certainly, who are competent to know and accept its terms,—so that even the chief of sinners may have eternal life, whoever will believe in Jesus Christ. Surely, then, it may allow that infants who die, however affected by the inheritance of depravity, shall, by the same provision, in some way have eternal life. And if justice do not forbid this great gift of God to the helpless and harmless heirs of our natural life and death, we must suppose that his benevolence will secure the boon to them. If they have done neither good nor evil, it cannot indeed be said that they deserve the blessedness of heaven, any more than they deserve the punishment of hell. Strictly, they deserve neither one nor the other. Reward, then, must be a gratuity, and punishment a severity, both

alike undeserved. And since the love of God has provided salvation for sinners who have been long and deeply guilty, if they turn to him whom they have offended, since his love calls them to turn with the offer of life eternal, must not the same love give life eternal to those who have not so offended, though they belong to the offending race? What other conclusion can be in any way consistent with all we know of God's love?

'The love which so shines out in all the exhibitions that God makes of himself by his works, and which in his word is declared to be the source, the moving spring of his plan of redemption, the love which gave his Son to be the propitiation for our sins, which moved Christ to come from heaven and die on the cross for us, — for the wilfully and perversely wicked, — we cannot suppose would leave the helpless offspring of humanity, who have not learned to know good and evil, in everlasting death. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." Has he not, then, so loved the world as to make provision that whosoever is not capable of actually committing sin, nor of believing in Christ, shall not perish, but have everlasting life? If we may reason at all from the attributes of God, it seems to be a fair conclusion that he has. It would be hard to find a case in which an argument from both the justice and the love of God, has greater force than with regard to the subject before us.¹

3. But this argument does not stand alone. It is very strongly supported by the teachings of the scriptures con-

¹ It is apparently the fact, that some time intervenes after the birth of a child before the commencement of its moral and accountable action. It is assumed in this Article that such appearance agrees with the reality. But some suppose that moral action begins at birth. To such, a portion of our reasoning may not seem to be conclusive. Still this supposition cannot diminish the force of the argument from the scriptures. And is not the strength of what has been said of the justice and the goodness of God, as bearing on the subject, diminished more in appearance than in truth? On the supposition that moral action begins at birth, it seems plain that the justice and the love of God must regard infants more favorably, as they must be less guilty, than any other portion of the human race.

cerning the kingdom of God. The work of Christ is represented to us in the New Testament as bringing good in some way to the whole world. It was prompted by God's love, and is in its object and provision, its reach of kindness and salvation, a real benefit to all the human race. Mark the language : God so loved the world (Jno. 3 : 16). God sent his Son that the world through him might be saved (3 : 17). Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world (1 : 29). Christ is called the Saviour of the world (4 : 42). And this has come to be, perhaps, the most common term by which he is known. It is said also that he should taste death for every man (Heb. 2 : 9); that he gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time (1 Tim. 2 : 6); that God is the Saviour of all men, specially of those that believe (4 : 10); and that Jesus Christ is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the whole world (1 Jno. 2 : 2). The two last passages quoted are worthy of special notice, because they make a distinction between those who believe and those who do not believe, expressly declaring that God is the Saviour of all men, and Christ the propitiation for the whole world. It is utterly inconsistent with the view of God's love and the provision he has made by Christ, both extending to the whole world, as they are set before us in these passages, to suppose that a large part of our race are not, and cannot be, blessed by the coming of Christ. The infant portion of mankind, it seems, must be within the arrangement made by the divine love and grace, if these sayings of the divine word are true. Why should it not be ?

Will it be said that, according to the view taken of the infant character, they are not really sinners, and, therefore, cannot be partakers of the atonement ? It is true that they do not need the pardon of sins which they have not committed, any more than the heathen need pardon for not believing the gospel, when they have not heard it. But they belong to a sinful race, and are liable and prone to sin. They need to be saved from their liability and proneness to sin, and from all the evils of their union with corrupted

human nature. And this salvation, with an immortality of blessedness, may be secured to them through Jesus Christ. His work of mediation and salvation is more than a bare expiation for actual sin. It reaches further, and more fully provides the grace of God for all our spiritual necessities than atonement or expiation alone can.

There is some analogy between the condition of very young children and the condition of those who have not heard the gospel. Supposing men to be penitent, in whose ears the glad tidings never sounded, may they not be saved on account of that redemption purchased by that Saviour of whom they have not heard? It has been by no means a strange opinion, among Christians of literary culture, that Socrates, the best and wisest of the Greek philosophers, was really a good man; that he manifested a truly Christian spirit; and that, if he had heard the gospel, he would have died for the faith of Christ with the same constancy and calmness in which he suffered for his integrity. If this opinion be correct, is he not saved through Christ, though he never on earth heard that glorious name?

The early history of New England relates that the missionary Mayhew, found an Indian woman who, having lost several children, was impressed with the thought that she might pray to the Great Spirit for the life of one recently given her. The child of her prayer lived; and the mother continued praying to the God who, she believed, had granted her request. Afterwards the gospel was preached to her, and at once she received it, saying: "This is the God to whom I prayed." Was she not in the way to be saved through Christ, before she heard of him?

The Old Testament saints, it has been frequently said, believed in a Saviour who was to come, and were saved through him. But where is the evidence that they generally had any clear and consistent ideas of a Saviour to come? The whole system of temple worship and sacrifices was, indeed, prophetic of "better things." But did they understand the prophecy? Did they see in the daily sacrifice, the burnt-offering, and the sin-offering, a type of the great

expiation which was to be made for the sins of the world by the Son of God? Were not those bloody rites, even to the most intelligent of them, unless, perhaps, in some rare exceptional cases, only a significant acknowledgment of their own guilt? "The prophets inquired and searched diligently concerning salvation, searching what or what manner of time the Spirit did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow; unto whom it was revealed that not unto themselves, but unto us, they did minister the things reported by them who have preached the gospel." When the prophets were so little informed, others must have had far less knowledge of the Saviour to come. Yet, if penitent, they were saved through redemption by Christ.

So, doubtless, those little children who have actually begun a life of sin, if they are penitent, are saved through Christ, though they may never have heard of him. If they have a capacity for sin, they have a capacity for repentance; and, being penitent, they are saved. The knowledge of a Saviour is not essential to the salvation of those from whom, in the providence of God, such knowledge is withheld. Every penitent, humbled soul is redeemed by Christ's blood, and blessed with life eternal.

And that large portion of the human family who die in the period of infancy, too early for them to have become actual sinners, must we not suppose the provision, through Christ, reaches them, so that "of such is the kingdom of God"? How otherwise does this provision answer to God's love for the *world*? How otherwise did he give his Son, that the *world* through him might be saved? How otherwise did Christ give himself a ransom for *all*? How, indeed, is he the Saviour of all men, and the Saviour of the world? It must be, according to the revelations of the gospel, that the whole world is benefited by the work of Christ; so benefited that salvation is provided and offered freely for all as God's gift, and that all shall have eternal life who do not choose the way to eternal death, and persist in their choice.

4. In the fifth chapter of Romans, more plainly than anywhere else, it is declared that the consequences of Adam's sin come upon all men, as descended from him. And there we find a direct comparison and contrast of the evil effects resulting from the transgression of Adam, and the good effects resulting from the work of Christ. The parts of the chapter most fully presenting this comparison are the 15th verse, and from the 18th to the 21st, inclusive. "But not as the offence, so also is the free gift; for if through the offence of one many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many." "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous. Moreover, the law entered that the offence might abound. But where sin abounded, grace did much more abound: That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord."

Can these declarations be understood as meaning less than that the evils which come to men unavoidably, from the disobedience of Adam, are fully counterbalanced by the good which is procured for them, so that they may receive it if they will, through Jesus Christ? The disastrous effects of Adam's sin on the whole family of man are declared; and the fact that the grace of God has provided, through Christ, a remedy equal to those disastrous effects, is also declared as plainly. So far, then, as the infant portion of the human family is exposed to perish in consequence of descent from Adam, eternal life is provided for them by the grace of God, through Jesus Christ. Otherwise, it does not seem to be true that, "as judgment came upon all men to condemnation, so the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life;" and that "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." Can it be, consistently with this comparison, that the work of Christ is more limited, in the extent of its reach

and its provided blessings, than the curse of sin introduced by the first transgressor?

5. "For of such is the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. 19: 14). Has this declaration the meaning which would be taken from it by a plain, unlearned reader? It looks like a direct, general, and authoritative statement, that infants are entitled to the blessings of the kingdom, and so a decisive proof that if they die they have everlasting life. Has it all this force?

The declaration is found in three different places: Matt. 19: 14; Mark 10: 14; Luke 18: 16. In Matt. it is, "of such is the kingdom of heaven;" in the other gospels, "of such is the kingdom of God." But the change of the last word makes no difference in the sense. No fault is to be found with the translation. The Greek words cannot, perhaps, be more exactly expressed than by the English words used for them. Indeed, they seem to be plain enough. Any man of good sense and ordinary information would probably find no difficulty in obtaining a natural and satisfactory sense from the passage, if it had not been suggested by the more learned, that there is some objection to taking the easiest and most obvious meaning as true.

The meaning which seems the most natural is, that such persons as the little children brought to Jesus, whom the disciples had forbidden to come, have part in the kingdom of heaven. Why should not this be taken for the true meaning?

It has been objected that the words, taken exactly, would mean that the kingdom of heaven is composed of infants, and so would exclude all others. But this is not their natural meaning as addressed by the Master to his disciples. They could not so misunderstand him, for they regarded themselves as having part in the kingdom of which he speaks.

The chief objection has been, that the meaning which seems the most natural conflicts with the teachings of the Bible in relation to depravity. For example: we all "were by nature the children of wrath;" "that which is born of the flesh is flesh;" "behold, I was shapen in iniquity;" "fool-

ishness is bound in the heart of a child;" "they are all under sin." These passages, and others like them, doubtless teach the native depravity of man. They teach that children are prone to sin. But unless they show that infants (for the children brought are called infants in Luke) are incapable of having part in the kingdom of heaven, and of so being saved from sin and death, they fail to show that the declaration, "of such is the kingdom of heaven," is not true of them as a fact.

Really our Lord, by these affecting words, makes no direct reference to the character of children. He does not say they are sinful, or prone to sin, or holy, before they are actually wicked. He only declares a very important fact concerning them, that they have a part in the kingdom which he came to establish; in other words, that his kingdom of salvation reaches to them with its blessings.

This implies that they have need of such salvation. The design and the operation of establishing his kingdom in the world, is to save men from sin and death, from sin and all its consequences. Of course, then, if his kingdom reaches to them, they have need, in some degree at least, of his salvation. Thus the declaration, taken in its obvious sense, supposes that they are, somehow and to some extent, involved in the evils of sin. So far is it from standing in opposition to the doctrine of native depravity.

An explanation that gives the passage a different meaning from the one most obvious, has been thought by some correct. It has been said that the Greek word translated "of such," *τοιούτων*, may mean "such-like." And so it has been supposed to be spoken of persons who are like little children—who are humble, confiding, teachable. With this idea of the meaning, it has been thought equivalent to the saying of our Lord on another occasion (Matt. 18:2,3), when he took a little child and set him in the midst of the disciples, and said to them: "Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." But this was spoken to the disciples expressly to rebuke their pride and teach them humility; because they had asked him:

Who shall be the greatest in the kingdom of heaven? And the words we are considering were uttered on a different occasion and for a different purpose—when little children were brought, to encourage their coming to him for his blessing. The two passages not having the same purpose, are not likely to have the same sense.

It is also a decisive objection to this way of taking the one before us, that, so understood, it has an occult meaning not naturally expressed by the words as they stand, and not to be regarded as true, unless there were stronger reasons for it than appear.

And is there not at least as great danger of doctrinal error from the supposition that an imitation of the naturally amiable traits of childhood is the way to have a part in the kingdom, as by the supposition that little children themselves have a part in it?

Let us now look at the reasons for the plain, common understanding of the words.

1. The fact of its being the plain, common way of understanding them, is a strong reason for it. There is no law of language more universal and unquestionable than this: the most obvious and natural meaning of a word or passage is to be taken, unless there be something in the connection or in the nature of the subject forbidding it. And there is nothing in this connection, or in the nature of the subject, showing that the natural and obvious meaning should not be taken.

2. A second rule of interpretation, very much like the first in its universality, is, that the meaning is to be preferred which best agrees with the grammatical connection of the passage. Now, the words before us are directly connected, in their grammatical construction, with the command: Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not. They give the reason for the command. The causative conjunction *for* (γάρ) unites the reason with the command, and does not allow between them so long a pause as a period. And so, by the grammatical construction, "of such" (τοιούτων) should refer directly to the children mentioned.

3. Another important rule of interpretation is, that in all doubtful cases, the sense is to be preferred which best agrees with the evident design of the writer or speaker. Here the manifest design of our Lord is to reprove and correct the error of the disciples, who opposed little children coming to him. And this design requires that *such* should refer personally to the children present. To suppose that other persons are meant, who have some likeness to children, does not by any means so well answer the purpose. It blunts the edge of the reproof. But when we hear the Master saying: "Of such little children as these, whom you would keep away from me, is the kingdom of God, the kingdom which I came to establish in the world," we see that the error of the disciples is corrected.

With these three reasons in favor of the meaning that would, at first view, be taken by the common reader, how can we refuse it, and prefer another sense, which does not seem to be naturally expressed by the words? There are no laws of language more universal and unquestionable than these. And they ought to be decisive.

There is also much greater force thus given to the lesson drawn from the example of these children, as related by Mark and Luke. It is a piece of additional instruction, and not merely an application of that which had been said before. The Great Teacher says, in effect: "You, and every one else, must also become like these very children, whom you would keep away from me, in order to receive the blessings of my kingdom."¹

¹ It must be admitted that many commentators, perhaps a majority of those who have the highest reputation, are against this way of understanding the passage. But, so far as we have observed, they do not show a careful and thorough examination of it. And there is good authority on this side. The words are frequently quoted by the best writers as having the meaning we find in them. Alford, one of the latest and best critics, takes them in this sense, and intimates no doubt of its correctness. "We can hardly read our Lord's solemn saying, without seeing that it reaches further than the mere then present occasion. It might one day become a question, whether the new Christian covenant of repentance and faith could take in the unconscious infant, as the old covenant did; whether, when Jesus was no longer on earth, little children might be brought to him, dedicated to his service, and made partakers of his blessing? Nay, in the pride of the human intellect, this question was sure one day to be raised: and

The question may be asked : Does the phrase "the kingdom of heaven," certainly include in its meaning eternal salvation ? This expression, or the similar synonymous one, "the kingdom of God," is used nearly a hundred times in the gospel histories. Generally the words are those of the Saviour himself. And it needs but a little candid attention to the manner of his using them, for any one to be satisfied that he so speaks of the blessings, present and eternal, brought to men by him. There are slight variations in the idea suggested of these blessings, from the circumstances in which he speaks. But the kingdom of God was that reign of truth and love and salvation which the Messiah came to establish. It came nigh when he was proclaimed. Of it he taught : "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God ;" and "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation ; neither shall they say, lo, here ! or lo, there ! for behold, the kingdom of God is within you." Of it he said to Pilate : "My kingdom is not of this world."

Will it be said that this kingdom has an outward form in the church, and the words of our Lord may be only an assurance of peculiar privileges to children brought to him as connected with his church ? But the privileges of the church are not limited to this life. The children brought to Christ while he was on earth, doubtless, had peculiar privileges secured to them, as connected with his church in this world, if they lived ; and so have those dedicated to him since ; but if they died in their infancy they had none, unless in the life to come. Those of them who died so early must have been saved, or it was a deception to say that they had part in the kingdom of God.

The exact meaning of this declaration would be met if some infants are saved, for example those who have been dedicated to God by their believing parents. But there is

our Lord furnishes the church, by anticipation, with an answer to it in all ages. Not only may the little children, infants, be brought to him, but, in order for us who are mature to come to him, we must cast away all that wherein our maturity has caused us to differ from them, and *become like them.*"

no intimation that the meaning should be so limited. And, so far as we can see, there is no distinction of character, before the knowledge of good and evil, which gives ground for such a difference. We may, therefore, naturally and reasonably, understand "of such" to mean, of these and all who are like them. And so of every infant who dies, the epitaph is true that Coleridge wrote for one :

"Ere sin could blight, or sorrow fade,
Death came, with friendly care,
The opening bud to heaven conveyed,
And bade it blossom there."

This, then, is the conclusion to which we are led by the kindly declaration of our Lord concerning little children: that the provision of grace establishing the kingdom of God reaches their condition, and so they all will have part in the salvation of the kingdom, unless as they advance from infancy they cut off themselves by sin, impenitence, and unbelief. Hence may be inferred the peculiar propriety of their being consecrated to God as heirs of his grace, unless those who are responsible for them, and should give them this consecration, are unbelievers, so that the act would be only mockery and a lie.

The sum of the whole matter is this: God made man upright, and placed him on trial, under law to live or die, as he should obey or disobey. He broke the law, and brought on himself its just condemnation. By its exact terms he would have been cut off without reprieve or remedy; for it has no promise, no provision for anything but obedience or death. Then he would have had no posterity.

But God's purpose of wisdom and goodness, from the beginning, was to give him, after he had fallen, and the sinful race of which he was the head, not only a fair but a merciful probation, in which they might have opportunity of being recovered from the power and the condemnation of sin, and blessed with everlasting life. His love prompted him to introduce a remedial system, a provision above the law

yet sustaining its righteousness and authority, so that he may save all the penitent who turn to him. He freely and truly offers salvation to all; and his revealed design is to save all who in fact repent.

It is indeed his arrangement, the plan of his supreme and sovereign wisdom, that all men, by their descent from Adam, enter upon this life with the disadvantage of a tendency to evil, which makes it certain that they will sin when they come to put forth moral action. But his plan also is, that they begin life with the advantage of being under a remedial system. The very existence of the race on earth, as descended from the first transgressor, is essentially connected with the remedial system, and dependent on it; and by its recovery from sin and death is possible to all, as certainly as God is fair in his offers and true in his promises. All those who have sinned would be saved by the remedy through Christ, if it were not that they choose the way of sin, and persist in their choice. This they do in the exercise and abuse of that moral freedom and personal agency with which he has endowed them, and which is the glory of their being. So they perish when they might be saved, because they will not choose life. And surely the wisdom and love which provided the remedial system adapted to the condition and equal to the wants of the race, do not leave out of it those who die before they know good and evil, and are actually sinners, whose very existence depended on its introduction. To suppose they do, is quite inconsistent with the arrangement by which, "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound," and with the Lord's saying, in relation to infants: "Of such is the kingdom of heaven."

ARTICLE VII.

THE GENEALOGY OF CHRIST.

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THERE is a class of commentators on the New Testament, but confined almost exclusively to modern times, who maintain that of the two genealogies of our Lord which are contained in the gospels of Matthew and Luke, the former only is on the side of Joseph, his father according to the law, and that the latter is on the side of Mary his mother. These hold the establishment of the latter genealogy as that of Mary to be of great importance, in order, according to their view of the case, to show that our Lord was "of the seed of David according to the flesh," a character which by the prophecies must belong to the Messiah. The argument is indeed stated with a good deal of obscurity, and its links are in a great measure assumed, instead of being proved, arising from the circumstance that, quite unaccountably on the basis on which the view in question depends, our Lord's connection with David through Joseph, David's undoubted descendant, appears to be set forth on the face of the scripture narratives as the fulfilment of those prophecies, and little is said of Mary in this respect except in connection with Joseph. In consequence of this difficulty, the assumed necessity of evidence of Mary's descent from David, if it does not take the place of the actual evidence required, is at least held to give a decisive weight to articles of evidence, which of themselves infer various degrees of probability only, and often very slight ones, of what Mary was, and so to make up for the absence of what may be deemed satisfactory proof. We propose to examine this question, which has recently been the subject of a good deal of discussion. The point at issue is interesting, and it would be momentous, could it be made out that

the Lord must be shown to have descended from David through Mary. We shall state in the sequel our reasons to the contrary, and for the conclusion that Mary's descent from David is not only not mentioned in the New Testament as a fact (whatever may be its probability), and consequently is not the basis of the fulfilment of the promises to David's seed, but that, in accordance with the character of our Lord's mission, her pedigree was purposely intended to be left unnoticed and without positive establishment.

We have hardly any light on this subject but what the scriptures themselves afford us, and this is confined to what is required for their own ends. This is a feature which is characteristic of the scriptures. They record enough in every instance to show that the events which came in the way of the sacred historians were real, that is, pertained to actual and known human interests, and this in a more intense degree, as regards expression and genuine form, than is found in any portion of secular history. But no care is taken merely to convey information, or to gratify curiosity. Wisely, and, we doubt not, purposely, the sacred narrative is guarded from being mingled with the stream of the secular annals of the human race; which are too often both superficial and full of errors, the record of the vain imaginations of men, subserving at best only temporal ends, and altogether failing to show the truth regarding the condition of men as God sees it. The mere matter of fact set forth in the scriptures, genuine as it is, is constantly kept subordinate to the spiritual purpose. We have no expectation that there will ever be much success in perfectly harmonizing sacred and secular history, the objects of the several writers, and the points of view from which they wrote, having been so essentially different as to make such a result as unattainable as undesirable. Subject to this guard from the insuperable heterogeneousness of the materials, we have no desire to discourage such partial illustration of scriptural statements, as can be obtained from the facts of nature or the secular records of history. On the contrary, this, wisely done, is fitted to lead to more enlarged views of the truth and wisdom of the writ-

ten word of God ; only, we insist, the subject-matter and the mere natural judgment of men are both treacherous, and will deceive, if in the examination the purifying eye-salve do not purge the mental sight.

At the time when a pure and powerful influence from God is on the minds of men, as at the chief events of the Jewish and Christian dispensations, those engaged have their thoughts too much absorbed by interests transcending the things of the earth, to admit of their caring for the mere material scenes where they were transacted ; and before the opposite feeling sets in — which it is sure to do as soon as the religious feeling has lost its high tone, and become worldly — the usual effect of lapse of time and of imperfect memorials is to spread a veil over the outward circumstances, and to cover them with uncertainty. Providence would thus kindly dissuade men from making too much of the mere outward material of great events, and confine them to the spiritual substance ; but too often in vain ; for there is a proneness in the natural mind to the idolatry of such things. We need not dwell on what is so well known, — the uncertainty as to the precise scenes of many of the most important events of sacred history. Let two instances suffice. The exact place of the sensible manifestation of the presence of God to the thousands of Israel among the singular mountain cluster which forms the peninsula of Sinai, — the most imposing public event, perhaps, ever witnessed by the eyes of men, — is the subject of keen controversy ; and the disputants appear to be governed in their conclusions rather by the fitness of particular places to exhibit the appearances in what they would deem the most effective manner, than by what may be regarded as sober evidence as to the actual locality. Nay, Mr. Ferguson, of London, in his work on Jerusalem, has startled every one by maintaining the positions, backed by an array of authorities from scripture and ancient travellers, that the real Zion was the temple eminence, and that the site of the temple was not what is now commonly but erroneously termed the mosque of Omar, but was at the south-western end of mount Moriah, chiefly on the spot

where stands the mosque of Aksa; and, more surprising still, not merely that the locality of Calvary and of the Holy Sepulchre is not indicated by the church at present bearing the latter name, — which had been questioned by Robinson, Barclay, and others, — but that the bare rock known to lie within the mosque of Omar, and the cavern underneath, which have ever been held by the Mohammedans in superstitious veneration, are the real Calvary and sepulchre, and that the mosque itself, instead of being on the site of the temple, is the monumental church built by Constantine over them! If the evidence adduced by Mr. Ferguson should be held adequate, — a subject we do not enter upon, — one could not but admire the righteous retribution, that those who have been foremost in casting out the faith of Christ, should thus have been made to bow down in prostrate adoration to the place sanctified by his death.

It is exactly the same as to persons, in their relation beyond the need of scripture. We know nothing as to the private history of such personages as Abraham, Isaac, and Solomon, as soon as, after having satisfied the ends of instruction and type for which they were used, they drop into the background of the inspired recital. To come lower down — who were “the Lord’s brethren,” repeatedly mentioned in the evangelists? Some think they were the children of Joseph by a former marriage; some, the children of a deceased brother, Alpheus; some, the children of another Mary, a widowed sister of Mary the Lord’s mother; some, that they were children of Joseph and Mary; and there are other suppositions still. Similar difficulties surround the question: “Who was James the Lord’s brother,” mentioned in Galatians? To all such questions, and many others, no answers can be given. Scripture is either silent or undecided, and tradition is quite unsatisfactory. There was no practical end for the faith to be answered by the solution of such questions.

Returning backwards to a generation earlier than that of our Lord and his brethren, we find no such difficulties in regard to the position in which Joseph stood in his nation

and tribe. Because it was a point of high scriptural importance that his descent should be perfectly known, the particulars are minutely and emphatically dwelt on. But as to Mary, we find nearly an absolute blank of information of this kind; for we shall show that the apparent absence of such information on the face of the narratives is not obviated on a closer scrutiny of its import. Scripture and tradition are as uncertain as to Mary's descent and connections, as in regard to those of "the Lord's brethren." This is a state of facts just the opposite of what ought to have appeared on the views adopted by the class of commentators mentioned at the outset. They would say that Joseph's kindred and pedigree were matters of no importance, but Mary's all-important. But God's ways are not as man's; and it is our part reverently to bend to his, and to give our best endeavors to discover the reasons for them.

When we turn to the New Testament, nothing can be more natural and engaging than the pictures presented of the families and individuals whom the course of events brings up to view. Every notice, while brief and undesigned, has the stamp of truth and reality, and there is nothing forced or exaggerated. The glimpses of the genuine ways of men in the narratives, compared with the blank before and after, may not unaptly be likened to those of the private ways of the Romans at a period not long subsequent, which have been furnished so wonderfully in consequence of the drawing aside of the rocky screen of ages from the ruins of Herculaneum and Pompeii; saving that in the former the view has the forms of life, while in the latter it has those of death. While every trait is characteristic and full of humanity, the notice of mere external events is rigidly kept within the closest compass that would admit of the due exhibition of the facts and doctrines, which it was the ultimate design of the record to set forth; and hence many minor difficulties, of no importance in themselves, are left unanticipated and unresolved. The narrative has manifestly flowed from a preëxisting life, and not the life from the narrative. The mouth has spoken out of the fulness of the heart. It

has always appeared to us a striking internal proof of the truth of the gospels, that the statements which convey such momentous realities for the faith of men in order to their salvation, should be so restrained and temperate in their details, and, while presenting facts with a power and naïveté unapproached in any work of mere human authority, should have referred to persons, places, and incidents in ways so little intended to beget credence by the arts of composition, and so unlike those of persons engaged in making or explaining a story.

A blank occurs. The gospel has been sown, and has taken root in the hearts of men. So intent are the believers on the working of the new life, of which they have been made partakers; so surpassingly weighty do they find the truth by which they had been made free, and so trivial in comparison not only the aims of men in the world around them, but the mere earthly relations of the persons and events through whose means that truth had been conveyed, — that we hardly find in the church, beyond its authoritative documents, a word of record regarding such topics for two or three centuries after the establishment of the gospel. Generations pass away, leaving untold their remembrances of the worldly connections of the founders of the faith; and the destruction of Jerusalem, and the troubles of the lands which had been the seat of the Lord's residence and ministry, with the outward violence to which Christians were subjected from proscriptions and persecutions, add their influence in extinguishing evidence regarding such matters, as well as in indisposing the minds of believers from being careful about them.

A new condition of things emerges. The churches are found in some stability, and growing formidable in numbers. Something of a more cultivated intellectual condition appears in them. The members begin to inquire, to dispute, to impugn, to write for the instruction or conviction of one another, and of the Jew and the heathen around. But with this a new mind appears in the churches. The word transmitted from the past in purity and simplicity, does not now

satisfy them. They give unmistakable proofs, that "having begun in the spirit," they are desirous of being "made perfect in the flesh." With other vanities, out of place here to mention, they "give heed to fables and endless genealogies, which minister questions rather than godly edifying which is in faith," as their fathers had been inclined to do even in the days of Paul, but which the early vigor of a higher life, and the authoritative teaching of the heads of the church, had restrained for a time. This is the period when, in the natural course of things, myths, legends, traditions, and fleshly conjectures and plausibilities regarding facts, will attempt to make a lodgement in the church, and will partly succeed; while there may also be expected some slight admixture of tradition of a character less questionable.

With the myths and legends, which arose in the early centuries succeeding the apostolic period of the church, in relation to our Lord's earthly connections and the lives and actions of the individuals brought into notice by this means, we have no intention of detaining our readers. Writings of this character appear to have been numerous, but the greater part of those whose titles are found in the writings of the Fathers have entirely disappeared, having sunk into oblivion under the weight of their inherent untruth and folly. A few specimens only, and these probably not of the worst sort, still remain in such works as "The Gospel of the Birth of Mary," "The Protoevangelion," a pretended account of our Lord's birth "by James the Lesser, cousin and brother of the Lord Jesus, chief Apostle and first Bishop of the Christians in Jerusalem," "The Gospels of the Infancy of Jesus Christ," and one or two others. But their contents are so puerile and incredible, at once so unlike nature, and the truth and simplicity of the gospel narratives, as to betray their distance from the apostolic age, and give ground to doubt whether (excepting what is palpably borrowed from the New Testament) there is in them even the slenderest vein of tradition regarding the persons and times professed to be treated of. Whatever of this there may be is so mixed with and overborne by palpable fictions, as to be inextricable.

From the materials which we have described, and which, as we have said, must be limited almost entirely to the information contained in the books of the New Testament, we have to inquire what was the genealogy of the Lord which the scriptures set forth as connecting him with the house of David, of whose seed the prophecies of old declared the Messiah should be. This will best be done by a simple classification of the facts, accompanied by notices of difficulties which have been experienced in explaining them.

1. Joseph, the husband of Mary the Lord's mother, was the known descendant of David, and recognized by his countrymen as of his royal seed. This fact is substantiated so largely on the face of the gospels, as to make details almost unnecessary. Joseph is so described at the outset of the narrative. The record of the annunciation bears, that the angel Gabriel was sent "to a virgin espoused to a man whose name was Joseph, of the house of David; and the virgin's name was Mary" (Luke 1:27). Here the words "of the house of David," naturally belong to Joseph. And the words of the angel to Joseph, when he was pondering what to do as to Mary (Matt. 1:20), applied to him the title, doubtless familiar to his own ear and thoughts: "Joseph, thou son of David, fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife."

2. The narrative of the events of this time embraces, as if regarded as an essential part of it, the position of Mary, as being the affianced spouse of Joseph. We have seen this in the record of the annunciation. In like manner the narrative in Matthew 1:18 bears: "Now the birth of Jesus was on this wise: When as his mother Mary was espoused to Joseph, before they came together," etc. In both these passages the espousals of Mary (a tie having much of the obligation of marriage, and not capable of being dissolved except in a formal way) is made a pointed part of the narrative.

3. Before the birth of Jesus, Joseph was commanded to take Mary to his house as his wife. It is not enough to say, that this was in order to protect Mary. Joseph and Mary, previously joined together by the act of espousals, by this

further act became perfectly one in God's sight; and it conferred on Joseph the title of father, according to the law, of the child about to be, and some time afterwards born of Mary. The gift of a son, in a most important sense, was to Joseph as well as Mary. And God, in so dealing with Joseph's wife, doubtless intended that it should be so. God could give Joseph such a gift, and he could accept it; and its character and relations the law was at hand to define and maintain.

It appears to us that, in considering this matter, sufficient weight is not allowed to the inevitable result that Jesus, in consequence of the marriage of Joseph to Mary, really became the son of Joseph, "by the law and according to the flesh." What was thus scripturally expressed, — which means, not the law of physiology according to our modern scientific language, but just the natural law of human society, and the rules of the Jewish law applied thereto, as distinguished from the law of the higher and purely spiritual life revealed by Christ, — could in such matters deal only with the outward fact; and its conclusion for its own ends was not meant to be traversed by a supernatural fact proceeding from God, and supernaturally revealed. The supernatural fact has its own effects, to those who believe it, for its own sphere, according as its consequences shall be developed; but in regard to earthly things (which succession in the fleshly line of David was), the law according to human ways and the outward fact, so long as the facts abide in that sphere, must take effect according to its own principle. Any rule which would operate otherwise, and cause the supernatural to overthrow the natural, within the proper sphere of the latter, would produce inextricable confusion. Overlooking this, some allow the thought to take shape in their mind, as if the knowledge of the supernatural conception, which has been certainly conveyed to us by supernatural revelation, would make Jesus, as it were, a supposititious child in regard to Joseph and the line of descent through him, with the privileges appertaining, if anything were claimed by inheritance in consequence of such sonship.

This appears to us a notion altogether erroneous. While our Lord's supernatural origin secured to him everything which was to be his inheritance in a sense higher than what was promised to the seed of David in the literal kingdom of Israel, it did not exclude him from that natural benefit which the law gave to him as the son of Joseph, and which no Jew or Jewish tribunal bound by the law could object to his receiving. Jesus was not the less the son of Joseph according to the flesh, that he was the direct gift to him from God.

It may be proper to notice the light indirectly thrown by the scripture on this subject. By a provision of the Jewish law (Deut. 25 : 5—10), when a brother died childless, his surviving brother was commanded to marry the widow : "and it shall be that the firstborn son which she beareth shall succeed in name of his brother which is dead, that his name be not put out of Israel." By this means the Jews were familiar with the idea of an heir being given to one who was not the real father. In their eyes the heir from such a source was as truly such as if born naturally to the deceased. That they remained familiar with this case in our Lord's time, appears from the question put to him by the Sadducees, mentioned by Matthew 22 : 23—28, as well as by Mark and Luke. This levirate law, as it is termed, is brought into notice in regard to an early portion of our Lord's genealogy in Ruth iv. ; and we shall afterwards find that it is again forced on our attention by the earliest, and probably on the whole (notwithstanding the disparaging view of it taken by some modern commentators) the most tenable of the interpretations of the genealogy of our Lord in Luke.

We are inclined to think that there is something more than a mere analogy between the point of the Jewish law to which we have been adverting, and the gift of a son to Joseph on the part of God. The grand truth of Christianity is, that man being dead through sin, and incapable by himself of recovery, God gave redemption and salvation by sending his own Son, the Lord of life, into his nature, to serve as a quickening seed therein by his Spirit to all who should

receive him. Of this truth the scriptures teem with types and illustrations, and it was interwoven with the whole law and customs of the Jews. What more apt figure can we find of it than in Joseph, the husband after the flesh of her of whom the Messiah was to be born, taken as representing either the fallen man after the flesh, or the Jew under the law, or both of them, to whom as in himself impotent for good and dead in trespasses and sins, God as the living One raises up the true seed who shall save and perpetuate the race about to perish? The figure is exactly the same as that which Paul makes use of in Rom. 7 : 1—4, with this difference only, that in the application we have made of it, it embraces the act of God in sending his Son into our nature for our salvation ; while in that made by Paul, it embraces the act by which believers in Christ are enabled to lay hold by faith of what Christ has done,—the one the root, the other the application, of the same truth. We thus see that from the fact of a son being given to Joseph by God through Mary, important meaning may be drawn, in close harmony with the fundamental truth of God's revealed dispensations towards man, and that it throws light upon a pointed rule of the Jewish law, not otherwise capable of easy explanation.

But, however deserving of consideration may be these views of the type and antitype of the levirate marriage, we rest nothing upon them in our present argument. All we contend for are the two following propositions :

(1) That by the birth of Jesus to Mary, Joseph's wife, a son was given by God to Joseph, and accepted by him, who thus was his "according to the law and after the flesh ;" that is, that according to the common laws of humanity and the Jewish rules, which could take cognizance only of external conditions and events, Jesus was the lawful son of Joseph, and entitled, as such, to all the rights and privileges arising from that relation.

(2) That Jesus was consequently of the seed of David according to the flesh, and capable, as such, of receiving in his person the fulfilment of all the promises made to that seed.

4. Jesus, who was at the due time presented in the temple, and recorded in the national register and tables of genealogy, must have been so presented and recorded as the lawful son of Joseph by Mary, and thus must have appeared on the face of the books of the temple as the first-born of their marriage according to the law, by evidence irrefragable by man.

5. Joseph and Mary are called the "parents" of Jesus in Luke 2 : 27 and 41, and in v. 48 Mary calls Joseph his "father." This shows the continuation of the state of things commencing at birth. To the same effect,

6. To the Jews, and to his brethren in the flesh, Jesus was the son of Joseph, as appears both from what has been noticed, and from the current of the narrative of the gospels; as in John 6 : 42, "Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph and Mary, whose father and mother we know? How is it then that he saith, that I came down from heaven?" — also in Matt. 13 : 55; Mark 6 : 3, and Luke 4 : 22. The conclusion is the stronger, that in these instances Jesus was at Nazareth or Capernaum, the places of the residence of the family, where they were well known. The saying: "We know this man whence he is" (John 7 : 27), — by which was meant his known position as the son of Joseph and Mary at Nazareth, — seemed to the Jews a conclusive argument against the claims of Jesus.

7. Jesus was familiarly known to the Jews as "the son of David," which could have arisen only from his being taken to be the son of Joseph, who was known to be of David's line (Matt. 9 : 27; 15 : 22; 20 : 31).

In passing from these details regarding our Lord's personal condition and relations in the sight of his kindred and people, we add, that we consider it a mistake to suppose that the supernatural characters of our Lord's assumption of human nature were any part of the gospel preached to the Jews in his lifetime. As to this, we agree with what is said by Dr. Thiersch, in his "History of the Christian Church," in accounting for the absence from the gospel according to Mark (which is now generally recognized as being the ear-

liest in date of composition of all the gospels), of notice of any event connected with Jesus previous to his baptism by John (p. 95), —

“Granting that the wonderful birth of the Redeemer had been already related to the Apostles by the Holy Virgin before they left Jerusalem; granting that they had already possessed that information out of the bosom of the holy family which Luke has adopted in his first and second chapters; the time to publish these mysteries, that Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin, had not arrived. Even though these things might be talked over within the circle of the faithful, they were such as could not be committed to writing, and exposed to the risk of coming into strange hands.”

It does not appear, from the narratives of the evangelists or from any other source, that these circumstances were known in our Lord's lifetime outside of the family to which they had been entrusted. “Mary kept all these sayings, and pondered them in her heart” (Luke 2:19, 51). In the multitude of our Lord's addresses, he never alludes to his supernatural origin in such a way as that the Jews could understand the literal truth in regard to it, or as founding on it his claims to their faith. On the contrary, he evaded the literal conclusion, and referred sometimes to his words and sometimes to his works as the ground of the faith, through which the Jews might savingly understand that he was sent forth from God, as in John 10:34—8. In the mood in which the Jews were towards him, they could not but have made the circumstances in question the subject of reproach, had they known of them. But, in all their questions and cavils at his doctrine; in their indignation at his testimony, and rejection of his claims; in the betrayal, the accusation, the judgment, and the infliction of death; and in their eager inculpation of their victim, and justification of themselves, there is not an allusion to what they would readily have stigmatized as evidence of imposture, and made the occasion of obloquy. We see the same manner of dealing with the subject in the addresses of the apostles, as recorded in Acts; as of Peter in

chapters 2d, 3d, and 10th ; and of Paul in chapters 13th and 17th ; where, combined with hints of a higher truth regarding the Messiah whom they preached, such as could find a full response only in the hearts of the faithful, the testimony which reached the ears of the people at large from them was to Jesus as "a man approved among you by miracles, and wonders and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know,"—"whom God had raised up, having loosed the pains of death,"—the man of whom David knew that "God had sworn with an oath to him that of the fruit of his loins, according to the flesh, he would raise up Christ to sit on his throne." Such is the combined truth and wisdom with which Jesus is presented to the Jews,—as the son of Joseph, the undoubted seed of David, their own records and the acknowledged fact among their own people being witnesses ; but, at the same time, the accredited messenger of God, whose true nature and dignity those should learn who recognized the words and the works of his Father proceeding from him.

It is plain that the supernatural generation was not a miracle for the conversion of men, but was a fact necessarily flowing from the dignity of our Lord's divine person. There never was preaching from this fact to faith in Jesus, but, conversely, from faith in him to the reception of this fact.

8. There are two genealogies of Jesus to be found in the first chapter of Matthew and in the third chapter of Luke ; the first to show his descent from David and Abraham by the line of Solomon, and the second both to show the same by the line of Nathan, another son of David, and to carry the descent back to the creation. In both of these the descent is traced through Joseph alone, as the last link of the chain leading back to David. But we are here brought to a stage of the inquiry of so much importance as to call for a separate and special notice of the two genealogies.

It is not our intention to notice questions regarding the extension or abridgment of these lists, arising from the various readings of manuscripts and other considerations, be-

cause they do not enter into the matters we propose to discuss in this Article.

It is admitted on all hands that the genealogy in Matthew is that of Joseph ; among the many questions as to matters of fact, this has never been disputed. It begins with Abraham, and proceeds downwards, through David, along the line of the kings of Judah to Jechonias, when the Babylonish captivity took place. Then come Salathiel and Zorobabel, names which are found also in 1 Chron. 3:17,19, as well as others of the later books of the Old Testament ; after which follow nine names, from Abiud to Jacob, the latter being the father of Joseph, which fill up the period from the close of the Old Testament till the time of Joseph. This genealogy was doubtless extracted from the accredited lists preserved by the proper Jewish officers. The Jews must have instantly detected and exposed any erroneous entries, which indeed there is no conceivable motive for any one to have inserted, for Joseph's descent from David was known and commonly admitted. This genealogy, then, never having been called in question, must be taken as correctly setting forth what appeared in the temple register, which is also certain from its being inserted in an inspired composition, and from the use made of it there.

At the beginning, this genealogy has the following title : "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham ;" meaning that the genealogy which follows shows this to be the case. The genealogy ends thus : "and Jacob begat Joseph, the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus who is called Christ." This notice of Mary's union with Joseph is the only interest ascribed to her in this genealogy of her son in the kingly line. And then occurs the statement, that the genealogy before detailed comprises three series of fourteen generations each, viz., from Abraham to David, from David to the captivity, and from the captivity to Christ. Whatever might be the full design of this summary, it at least indicates that Jesus was intended to be pointed out bound up in the threefold series of the genealogy, as having his descent thereby shown through

Joseph both to David and Abraham; and perhaps what was chiefly in view was in this way to express the fact emphatically at the close, as it had been at the beginning.

Here then, as plainly as words could express it, we have the statement that by the links of this genealogy through Joseph and the line of the kings of Judah, our Lord was of the seed of David and Abraham. It is God's own explanation to this effect, and of the manner of it, given in the most formal way, and showing that, in the light of the divine purpose, the Lord Jesus Christ was thereby in a condition to receive the fulfilment of the promises made to the seed of these two fathers.

The other genealogy contained in Luke iii. begins with the Lord, and proceeds upwards, in this way: "Jesus began to be about thirty years of age, being (as was supposed) the son of Joseph, which was the son of Heli," etc. This genealogy equally runs through Joseph, Heli however being represented as his father, and not Jacob, as in the other genealogy. Seventeen names are then reckoned backward after Heli, none of them agreeing with the names in Matthew; and after Rhesa, the seventeenth, come Zorobabel and Salathiel, the same as in Matthew; but instead of Salathiel being represented as the son of Jechonias, the last of the kings, and of the list being continued through the line of kings to Solomon, he is said to be the son of Neri, from whom the line runs through eighteen private persons till it reaches Nathan the son of David; beyond whom it proceeds to Abraham and the creation. The difference between the two genealogies is, in substance, this: that while the one is in the line of Solomon, and the other in that of Nathan, there is the remarkable feature, that Salathiel and Zorobabel appear as father and son in the middle of both, the former in the one having as his father Jechonias, and in the other Neri; and the other in the one having as his son Abiud, and in the other Rhesa.

Of the genealogy in Luke it may be said, as in regard to the other, that no reasonable doubt can be entertained that it was taken from the tables of descent extant in the Jewish

archives, and that the circumstances forbid the supposition of any unfairness in this respect, and of all motive for attempting any. Its very difficulties are a proof of genuineness.

In considering this second genealogy, the first question that meets us is the force of the words "as was supposed," attached to the relation of sonship ascribed to Jesus in regard to Joseph. The original words are *ὡς ἐνομίζετο*, a verb derived from the noun *νόμος*, which, in the lexicon of Hedericus, is explained to mean: 1. *lex, jus*; and, 2. *consuetudo, mos, institutum*. Following its root, *νομίζω*: is said to mean 1. *lege sancio*; 2. *pulo, existimo, arbitror, reor*. Taking the primary sense Matthew Henry says that the phrase means "*uti lege sancitum est* — as we find it in the books, as it is on record;" and the spirit of this interpretation seems most in harmony with the nature of the case. If it should be preferred to assign to the term a slighter and more general meaning, such as it frequently bears, viz., "as was supposed or reckoned," we submit that this should not be held to infer any question of the reality of the sonship of Jesus to Joseph for the ends of the genealogy; for this (besides violating the letter of the genealogy in Luke) would vacate of substantial meaning the genealogy in Matthew through Joseph, the terms of which show that it is the principal genealogy, and that to which the genealogy in Luke is subordinate and supplemental. It sufficiently accounts for these words, that they were necessary to save the supernatural origin of our Lord.

What we have said opens the way to the great difficulty of the case: How is it that the Lord had two genealogies through his legal father Joseph? The genealogies themselves give no answer to this question. They have, indeed, different characters. The one, beginning with Abraham, embraces patriarchs and kings and the heirs of kings. This genealogy may be said to have on it the stamp of Christ the ruler, in the threefold series marked in the genealogy itself, and realized in Jewish history: first, in the form of faith as giving worthiness to rule; second, in that of rule attained in the dignity of king; and third, in the same seen in decay.

The other genealogy, again, which, as far as possible, takes private names and avoids official persons, and which mounts beyond Abraham up to the creation, seems to denote Christ as the subject one, the representative of the whole race of man, whose nature he took as comprehensively as the first Adam had it, "who is the figure of him that was to come" (Rom. 5: 14). These characters, however, do not explain the difference of the contents of the genealogies, and according to what often occurs in scripture, they may have been engrafted on lines of descent, the divergence of which had arisen from an independent cause.

In the examination of this question we naturally betake ourselves first to the views held on the subject by the early church; for theirs was the time for what have long ceased, — real conflicts with the Jews, who were familiar with and directly concerned in the genealogies, as well as the time when tradition and opinion might throw light on this subject. We have important information regarding this matter in the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius, bk. i. c. 7; the more so that, instead of giving any statement of his own, and the views of his own time, the third century, he quotes largely from an epistle (not now extant) to Aristides from Africanus, born at Emmaus, or Nicopolis, in Palestine, near a century earlier, setting forth the tradition which had come down to his day, and which appeared to solve the difficulty in a satisfactory manner.

The explanation of Africanus has reference to that reading of the genealogy in Luke, supported by ancient copies and approved by some commentators, which omits Matthat and Levi, the father and grandfather of Heli, and goes to Melchi, as Heli's father. The substance of his prolix statement is that Matthan (Joseph's grandfather, in the line of Solomon) and Melchi (his grandfather, in that of Nathan) married, successively, a woman named Estha, by whom the former had Jacob and the latter Heli, who were thus brothers uterine. Heli married and died childless, whereupon Jacob married his widow, and had Joseph, who was naturally the son of Jacob in the line of Solomon, but by the levirate law

was accounted the son of Heli in that of Nathan. Africanus gives this account, not as an ingenious speculation, but as a positive tradition derived from the *Desposyni*, the name given in the early church to those who were in affinity with the family of Jesus. He explains the double record thus :

“It was customary in Israel to calculate the names of the generations either according to nature or according to the law; according to nature, by the succession of legitimate offspring; according to the law, when another raised children to the name of a brother who had died childless. For as the hope of a resurrection was not yet clearly given, they imitated the promise which was to take place by a kind of mortal resurrection, with the view to perpetuate the name of the person who had died. Since, then, there are some of those who are inserted in this genealogical table, that succeeded each other in the natural order of father and son, some again being born of certain persons, and ascribed to others by name, both the real and the reputed fathers have been recorded. Thus neither of the gospels has made a false statement, whether calculating in the order of nature or according to the law.”

This view of the matter received credence in the early church, and governed the common opinion for ages. Jerome (on Matt. i.), in answer to the emperor Julian, says : “Julianus Augustus, in this place, attacks the evangelists on the ground of discrepancy. Matthew calls Joseph the son of Jacob, whereas Luke calls him the son of Heli. Had Julian been better acquainted with the mode of speech of the Jews, he would have seen that the one evangelist gives the natural, and the other the legal pedigree of Joseph.” Augustine expresses himself strongly in support of the explanation of Africanus. In a treatise against Faustus Manichaeus, he had said that his objection on the ground of discrepancy was obviated by the fact that the one father was by adoption, and the other natural, but he had not explained the kind of adoption. In his *Retractationes* (bk. 2, cap. 7), he supplies the omission, having now read the work of Africanus, which he had not done when he made that statement. “Hoc in

eorum litteris monitum est," he says, "qui recenti memoria post adscensionem Domini de hac re scripserunt. Nam etiam nomen ejusdem mulieris quae peperit Jacob patrem Joseph de priori marito Matthan, qui fuit pater Jacob avus Joseph, secundum Matthaeum ; et de marito posteriore peperit Heli, cujus erat adoptivus Joseph, non tacuit Africanus."

If the facts were well founded, the explanation of the double genealogy which satisfied the early church sufficiently accounts for it. "The best hypothesis," says Dr. Wall, "that has been given for reconciling the two catalogues, is the old one of Africanus." It is true the explanation rests only on a tradition ; but it conflicts with no other facts ; it states nothing but what is credible, and in accordance with the usages of the people ; and it has, perhaps, as much of the marks of authenticity as any other tradition of that age bearing upon such events. In regard to the relation of this to the other genealogy, it might have sufficed to say, without the explanation of Africanus, that the fact of such an explanation being possible, was enough to show that there might be no inconsistency between them.

Some modern writers have endeavored to explain these genealogies on other principles. We shall first notice one of those schemes which still supposes that the genealogy in Luke is that of Joseph. Grotius had said that the genealogy in Matthew was meant merely to exhibit the successive heirs reigning or entitled to reign, including Joseph, and ending with Christ. The Rev. Lord Arthur C. Hervey, a recent English writer on the subject, who gives, in Dr. Smith's valuable "Dictionary of the Bible," in course of publication in London and Boston, under the title "Genealogy of Jesus Christ," the substance of a treatise he had formerly written, adopts this suggestion, and maintains that the genealogy in Matthew does not show the direct descent of Joseph from David, but only the successive heads of the families entitled to the throne ; and that the genealogy in Luke contains the private genealogy of Joseph. He concludes (as had been previously contended for by Dr. Lightfoot, in the second

series of his "Harmony of the New Testament") that Salathiel and Zorobabel, who appear as descended from Jecho-nias both in the genealogy in Matthew and in 1 Chron. 3: 17, 19, could not have been his natural issue, because it had been declared in Jer. 22: 30 that he should be childless, and that none of his seed should sit upon the throne of David, or rule in Judah; and that, the line of Solomon being supposed to have thus failed, the names in question, which, as the genealogy in Luke seems to show, represented persons descended from Neri of the family of Nathan, must have been transferred from the genealogy of Nathan's family to the royal line of Solomon. He represents Joseph as descended through his grandfather Matthan, or Matthat, — names in the two genealogies which he considers as denoting the same individual, — from a younger son of Abiud, the eldest son of Zorobabel (the same, he says, as the Juda of Luke 3: 26, getting rid of Rhesa and Joanna as interpolations); this Matthan having become head of the royal line on the failure of the elder branch. And finally, he alleges that Matthan, or Matthat, had two sons, Jacob (Matt. 1: 15) and Heli (Luke 3: 23), the former of whom having died childless, Joseph the son of Heli, who had predeceased, became the heir of his uncle, and the head of the royal line. To this scheme we state the following objections:

(1) That it throws aside, without adequate reason, the explanation of Africanus and the opinion of the early church. Hervey, indeed, says that this explanation does not account for the meeting of the two lines in Salathiel and Zorobabel. But Africanus did not need to do this. These names necessarily remained, even on Hervey's principles, in both the tables, and his explanation of the transfer to the royal line, if just, serves as well for Africanus's view as for his own.

(2) That it seems to deny the character of a proper genealogy to the table in Matthew, although claimed by its title, its contents, and the summary at the close. Down to Jecho-nias, and including all the kings, this is unquestionably a proper genealogy, excepting as to certain omissions or condensations not affecting this character, and at variance with

Hervey's principle. Lightfoot's supposition (for it is no more) of the transfer of Salathiel and Zorobabel from Nathan's family, is not acquiesced in by all; and some, holding that the promise to Solomon's seed in 2 Chron. 6: 12—16 precludes the supposition of the failure of his line, explain the entries by the suggestion of a marriage between Salathiel as son of Jechonias and a daughter of Neri; but even were it well founded, it respects only a single link in an exceptional case, and the concluding links ought to be held the links of a proper genealogy, unless the contrary is shown.

(3) It seems quite unlikely that, besides the proper genealogies of families from generation to generation, the priesthood should have kept a table of assorted names, patent to the people, showing the individuals entitled to the throne throughout the whole period from the Babylonish captivity down to the time of our Lord. This would have been a dangerous practice under their jealous masters, both for the priesthood and for the individuals so pointed out.

(4) The state of the families from Abiud down to Matthan, the blending of Matthan and Matthat as one, and the holding Jacob and Heli to be his sons, and so forth, are all speculation and hypotheses, without proof. The scheme consists of the rearranging the names under an assumed thesis, so that no manifest inconsistency appears; it is *not impossible* but that the scheme may be true, but its truth is not necessarily implied, and there is no proof of it.

We do not go more minutely into the theory of Hervey, because, in truth, his views arrive at the same conclusion, practically, as that which we maintain,—that the genealogies, both in Matthew and Luke, are those of Joseph. We hold that Christians are not bound now to explain every difficulty connected with the genealogies. And in regard to our own position, it is enough that there are two genealogies in the sacred records, professing to justify the Lord's claims to be the Messiah on the ground of his descent from David, and not necessarily irreconcilable; published at a time when it might be easy to reconcile them, and when

their falsity must have been capable of easy proof; agreeing as to Joseph's descent from David with the common belief of the nation at the time, — and both bearing on their face that Jesus was descended from David, through Joseph his legal father.

But some maintain another mode of obviating the apparent inconsistency between the genealogies, by supposing that the genealogy in Luke is through Mary, the Lord's mother. There is hardly any trace of this opinion in the early church, and it has been held chiefly by writers subsequent to the Reformation. The less simple character of the modern mind, which binds sequences to physical or semi-physical causes, with little respect to a law not so realized, and which tends towards science rather than faith, accepts with favor a supposition which obviates the difficulty that Joseph, not being the natural father of Jesus, could not serve as a link connecting him with David; and, in consequence, the opinion that the genealogy in Luke is that of Mary, has at present obtained a somewhat wide acceptance. This is a plausible and popular way of solving the problem, rather than, in our judgment, a solid one.

We have already said that the words "as was supposed," at the beginning of this genealogy, are sufficiently explained as having been necessary to save the supernatural origin of Jesus. They are, in fact, the equivalent of Matt. 1 : 16. Some of those who claim the genealogy for Mary say that the words should be read thus: "as was supposed (but erroneously, and really) of Heli," etc.; Heli having been, as they assume, Mary's father. But this is at once too subtle and too violent. No writer, meaning to be intelligible, would make his expressed contradict his real meaning, and trust the discovery of the latter to an ellipsis not hinted at, but to be assumed from unstated facts. Such a style, which makes language a riddle, is far removed from the simplicity of the evangelists. Others make Joseph a name substituted for that of Mary, under the rule of the Jews to exclude women from their genealogies, and substitute their husbands. But, besides that it is not to be supposed that the genealogy

of Mary would be presented, in this form without notice, there is no apparent reason for Joseph getting his name inserted in the genealogy of his wife's family. For there is no ground to suppose that this was ever done by a husband, unless there was an inheritance belonging to the wife, as provided in Numbers xxxvi., of the existence of which, in this case, there is no evidence or hint. This was what the kinsman of Naomi refused to do, "lest he should mar his own inheritance" (Ruth 4 : 6).

Nor is there any evidence that Mary was the daughter of Heli. In apocryphal writings and in some of the Fathers, it is said that her parents were named Joachim and Anna, a statement which may have been derived from a common tradition. This is made consistent with the supposed parentage of Heli, by saying that Joachim is convertible, in Hebrew usage, with Eliakim, of which Eli, or Heli, is the contraction. The reasoning might be fair, if it had been shown that Mary's father was one in the position which Heli holds in the genealogy in Luke in all respects except as to the name; but as this is only an assumption, it is idle: it merely paves the way to a possibility.

The words of the angel to Mary, and her answer in Luke 1:30—34, are thought to show that she was addressed independently as a descendant of David. But her betrothal to Joseph, of the house of David, was carefully mentioned just before, and Mary could not but have understood the address of the angel as having reference to her position in regard to him. Although, then, she might have been of David (of which we shall speak in the sequel), the angel's address would not infer that she was regarded as independent of Joseph. Even the announcement in verse thirty-five, of the exact meaning of which Mary must have had a very imperfect apprehension, must be construed in consistency with the context and with the genealogies.

In the same sense are to be understood the terms in which the apostles speak of Jesus as the promised seed of David according to the flesh. Take, for instance, the language of Peter in Acts 2:30, which is as strong as can be conceived:

“Therefore being a prophet, and knowing that God had sworn with an oath to him, that of the fruit of his loins according to the flesh he would raise up Christ to sit on his throne, he knowing this,” etc. Now, Peter could not have meant to signify anything else by these words than the known descent of Jesus from David through Joseph. The occasion was on the day of Pentecost, next after the ascension, when every hint of the miraculous conception must have been absent from the minds at least of the Jews addressed, who had known Jesus familiarly as the son of David through his connection with Joseph only, and who could not have understood Peter except in this sense. The different parts of the records of inspiration cannot but agree. The words of Peter and Paul merely adopt as true what they found authoritatively declared in the genealogies in Matthew and Luke. “It is evident,” says Paul, “that our Lord sprang out of Judah” (Heb. 7:14). How could this be evident, but in the mode which the gospels point out, — the public facts and the public records and genealogies?

Observations are made, as if the references to our Lord’s supposed connection with Joseph were meant merely, as it were, to humor the peculiarities of the Jews as to the preference of male descent, and the exclusion of female; while the truth behind was, that the genuine link of our Lord with David, according to the flesh, was his mother. We object, decidedly, to this manner of dealing with the scriptures. What the Jews looked for in the Messiah was one of the seed of David truly according to the law; and what God gave them was one justly answering this description. The fulfilment may not have been in the very way the Jews expected, for they were not capable of comprehending the fulfilment which God purposed; but then the mode of fulfilment was beyond their expectation, and not beneath it.

What really gives occasion to the efforts to discover a line of descent for Jesus to David through his mother, is the secret thought that the line through Joseph is not genuine, but pretended. We do not pause longer on the inconsistency of such an impression with the plain terms of scripture

which connect the promise with a definite person in the line of David's seed ; so that, if that line went by Joseph, as the genealogy in Matthew testifies, to find it in Mary would be to vacate that genealogy ; if it went by Mary, which is nowhere said, then all that is so anxiously declared regarding Joseph was fallacious and unmeaning ; and if somehow it went by both, this would be to satisfy the requirements of positive prophecies by surmises and doubtful possibilities, instead of by means of clear issues of fact, which the fulfilment of prophecies requires. But we pass by all this, in order to state the grounds on which it appears to us that the demand of a line of natural descent for our Lord from David by his mother, is not only a mistake in regard to interpretation and the matter of fact, but involves a doctrinal error.

The assumption is, that if Mary is shown, from the scriptures, to be of the line of David, Jesus her son will then appear as his promised seed, the prophecies will be fulfilled, and the strong language of the apostles' description of his relation to David will be justified. It appears to us that there is a vital error at the basis of this way of speaking. We are now considering the case, not from the point of view of the Jew, who saw in Jesus only the son of Joseph, but from that of the Christian, seeing him as, supernaturally, both son of Mary and Son of God. In this point of view we are closed up to contemplate him as God and man in one person. Though, then, all had been as before supposed, Jesus would not have been the seed of David in a natural sense. The seed of David, as the subject of promises, means a human person, and not a mere nature as one of the elements of a person. But Jesus was never, at any time of his being, a human person. We quote from the Athanasian creed, which on this point has ever been regarded as being as orthodox as it is distinct.

“ Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and man. He is God, of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds ; and he is man, of the substance of his mother, born in the world ; perfect God and perfect man of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting ; equal to the Father as touching his Godhead, and inferior to the Father as

touching his manhood ; who, although he be God and man, yet he is not two, but one Christ ; One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God ; One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person ; for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ."

Jesus the Messiah, in the substance of his being as thus described, could never, in a natural or any other than a legal sense, have been the seed of David according to the flesh. The human ancestry of his person could not ascend higher than his mother. There was no power in any human descent, or in all humanity together, could it have been concentrated as one, to give birth even to the human nature of Jesus in the manner in which it was conveyed to him (though the same in substance as that of all men), and still less to his whole person. Nor was there any such power in Mary of herself, any more than in any other of the daughters of the race, for in no respect was she in essence different from or superior to any one of them. Lightfoot (Harmony, 2d series, § 10) says that Jesus "looked on as the seed promised to Adam, 'the seed of the woman,' was to be looked after by the line of his mother." Why so? He was not to derive his personality through the line of his mother, or to receive virtue from it more than from the line of Joseph. Mary's ancestors were not in any sense the derivation of "the seed of the woman." They were themselves the seed of Eve, as all men are ; but Eve was not the woman in the view of the promise, although she may have vainly thought so when at the birth of Cain she said, "I have gotten a (or rather, the) man from the Lord" (Gen. 4 : 1). Mary was that woman, and yet of herself no more a plant fit to yield such seed than Eve had been. The act of God by which Jesus was born of Mary was altogether special, unique, and transcendent. It was preëminently "a new thing" which "the Lord *created* in the earth," when "a woman compassed a man" (Jer. 31 : 22). Indeed, the words "the seed of the *woman*" imply, even in regard to his humanity, the original and underived source of Jesus. Consequently the Messiah

could naturally have no grandfathers or line of human ancestry; he was the seed of no man in this sense. Without a mother he could not have taken hold of the nature in which it was the divine will that God should be manifested. Yet even as to this, the scripture takes the form of paradox, striving to express by this means what ordinary language fails to do, and in order to show how exclusively and directly Jesus came forth by God's power, figures him (as represented by Melchisedec) as without even a human mother as well as father, and without a genealogy: "without father, without mother, without genealogy (*ἀγενεαλόγητος*), having neither beginning of days nor end of life" (Heb. 7: 3).

While Jesus thus could not be naturally of the seed of David, all question as to any supposed rights of his mother was, by that far-sighted wisdom of God by which the scriptures provide for every emergency, removed by means of the rule of the Jewish polity, that a woman could not of herself head a family, or appear in a genealogy. As to this, Lightfoot (Harmony, 1st series, § 4) says:

"There were two remarkable maxims among the Jewish nations: 1. that there was to be no king of Israel, but of the house of David and line of Solomon; and 2. that the family of the mother is not called a family. Hereupon hath Matthew most pertinently brought the pedigree through the house of Solomon, and ended it with Joseph, a male, whom the Jews looked upon as the father of Jesus."

It followed from this rule, that all Mary's rights in respect to her own family passed over to and were represented in the person of Joseph her husband. How, then, could Jesus be of the seed of David according to the flesh, as scripture required him to be and represents him to have been? In no other way than that which the evangelists Matthew and Luke set forth — through his being the son of Joseph according to the law, in consequence of Joseph's union with Mary his mother. This was the result of the law of the flesh, — that is, of earthly humanity under the Jewish law, — above that of mere physiology, and constituted the nearest possible approach our Lord could make as a person to be of the seed of David

according to the flesh, and it made him legally of that seed.

To say that Jesus, having been born of Mary who (as assumed) was of the seed of David, must have been of his seed also, is to attribute an ancestry to one of his personal elements, instead of his person itself; an element, moreover, which itself had originated supernaturally. This language logically involves the principle of what is termed the Nestorian heresy, which consisted in the alleged denial, by Nestorius, that Mary was the mother of the whole person of Christ, and in the assertion that she was the mother only of his human nature, thus dividing his person into two parts, with personal qualities to both. It is to build upon and carry backward this error, to hold Jesus as to his human nature to be of the seed of David, and to have, as such, a line of human progenitors. There was an irreconcilable difference between the person of Jesus and the fleshly line of David in whatever form. The motherhood of Mary was a relation towards the Lord peculiar in all its features, which could not be traced backward to her line of ancestry, because they could not have originated there.¹

¹ We must not be held as meaning that those who claim a pedigree for Mary from David, are chargeable with the Nestorian heresy. We regard constructive heresy to be as great an offence against true charity as constructive treason against just law. The fault is as likely to be confused thinking as anything deeper; but those who have fallen into it, when laudably though erroneously endeavoring to substantiate the statements of scripture, will remember that it is not the less for this an element of weakness. Neither do we express any opinion on the point whether Nestorius was guilty, of which doubt is entertained. The question arose in an unfavorable way. Nestorius had refused to Mary the name of "the Mother of God,"—a refusal with which we sympathize, especially as this manner of speaking arose in the church when the spirit was busily at work to elevate Mary above humanity, and make her an object of worship almost on a level with God, and was one of the proofs and symptoms of its existence. To us it seems that what the term rejected by Nestorius in itself implied, and the fault imputed to him, are complements of one and the same error,—the one supposing the division of the divinity from the humanity, and the other the division of the humanity from the divinity. The Christ, of whom by the ineffable act and inconceivable humiliation of God Mary was made mother, is not God simply, but God humbling himself to exist and act in the form of man, to whose nature the Eternal Son joined himself in order to constitute his person in this new form. The mother of such a one is a term which conveys a

Hence, we conceive, the care with which Mary's connections and ancestors are kept out of view in the whole of the New Testament, and our Lord's connection with David represented as the legal one through Joseph. There was a divine necessity that Jesus should have a human mother, — a fact which, without question, will be held in everlasting remembrance. But we must not be unmindful of the warning which, in view of the death of Christ, Paul found not unneeded by himself: "Though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him no more" (2 Cor. 5: 16). That was the fact of the incarnation, seen as realized in time, rather than its depths and sources in the divine counsel. As Jesus was "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" (Rev. 13: 8), Christians, who now know the whole truth concerning him, are to recognize him in his power and dignity as the Messiah, not as born from any earthly source, in which relation we should see him encompassed with sorrow and weakness, but as born from the Father out of the grave, the first-fruits of the dead, once the "offspring," but now the "root" of Jesse; who, indeed, "was made of the seed of David according to the flesh," but who is "declared to be the Son of God with power according to the Spirit of holiness by the resurrection from the dead" (Rom. 1: 3, 4); "whose name," in the relations of the eternal kingdom, "shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father" (Isa. 9: 6).

Who, then, was Mary? We have already stated our reasons for believing that her origin was purposely kept in obscurity. In the case of Melchisedec the obscurity was total; in order that he might fitly represent, typically, Christ

very different impression from that of the Mother of God without qualification. While those who justified the use of this language may not have received the error into their minds, it was an unsafe dallying with the unlawful thought, which enters into all false religions and all corruptions of religion, and which has since borne abundant fruit, — that the creature can somehow possess a merit or obtain a standing-ground of vantage as towards God; the utter extinction of which thought lies at the root of Christianity, and is the seal of its divine origin. Extremes generate each other. Mary has been made an idol of by the Romanists; and Protestants have been ready to forget that "all generations should call her blessed."

as underived, isolated, independent. In the case of Mary the reason was not subservient to any type, but was the practical one of not seeming to connect the Lord naturally with any human line of descent. This purpose did not require that any mystery should attach to Mary's descent, but only uncertainty. That she was a Jewess appears as undoubted as such a fact can from circumstances. If we dare not speak of a necessity in such a case, still it would be quite too violent to suppose that God, who never acts capriciously, should have suddenly so passed by the Jewish element as at last, without apparent reason (for the Jews were still under trial), to betake himself, for his crowning act, to a strange root. Mary's marriage to Joseph, whose character and descent preclude almost the thought of his marrying a stranger; her being cousin to Elizabeth, the wife of Zacharias, a priest (Luke 1 : 36); her observance of all the rites of the law; and, what is perhaps decisive above all the other grounds of belief, the total absence of reproach on account of the mother of Jesus being a stranger to Israel, — all this, without the slightest counteracting evidence, makes Mary's nationality free from doubt. But here certainty ceases. Eusebius, indeed, asserts loosely that, according to the Jewish law, Mary must have been of the same family with her husband. But this is not the fact; and the utmost that can be said is, that the husband should take his wife out of the same tribe (Num. xxxvi.). How far this was in observance in the changed condition of the Jewish people, when their original rights of inheritance had ceased, and when, as in Joseph's case, he was living out of the bounds of his tribe in a district substantially heathen, it is impossible to say. It is remarkable that the only certain note of relationship attached to Mary carries our attention away from Judah; yet the irregularity may possibly have been on the side of ancestors of Elizabeth only. The angel's address to Mary is at best rendered a doubtful testimony by the careful mention of Mary's betrothal to Joseph. There seems to have been an opinion or belief, in early times, that Mary was of the family of David; but whether this arose from

genuine tradition, or from the desire that it should be so, is hard to determine. The statement seems not sustained by any peculiar marks of reality, and it assumes various forms. Take away the latent persuasion that a Davidic descent was indispensable for Mary, and it will appear that not only no clear evidence of such descent exists, but that, on the contrary, a studied reserve is held in regard to it; that her being of Judah is no more than a probability; and that the only point certain as to her lineage is, that she was a Jewess of the race of Israel.

We do not say that Mary was not of the tribe of Judah and of the house of David. She may have been of both; but the scripture does not allege either, or state facts from which one or both may, with any certainty, be inferred; while it provides distinctly, in another way, for the end supposed to be answered by her having this origin. Its leaving these points unsettled shows that it was not through Mary that the promises to the seed of David were intended to be fulfilled; for prophecy must have a certain, and not merely a probable or conjectural fulfilment.

The Christian church and the Jews seem to us to have now nothing to do with the letter of the genealogies beyond what we have pointed out. The question as to the truth of Christianity, has, in one respect, a new aspect from what it had eighteen hundred years ago. Christianity is, and has been, during that period, *a fact* in every way in which the minds of men can be so addressed — historically and providentially, as well as morally and spiritually. The power and blessing of God have been manifestly with the Christian nations. Christianity has been set forward to speak to the Jew as a living thing, and in some measure it has done so. Its appointed office now is, "to provoke the Jews to jealousy" (Rom. 11:11). Let the Jews ponder the warning which, with whatever shortcomings, has been held up before them during so many centuries of the long-suffering of God. Let the Christian churches, too, ponder their ways, and remember their responsibility to draw the Jews back within the fold of the Lord by their faithful witness.

ARTICLE VIII.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

UNPUBLISHED INSCRIPTIONS FROM SPARTA, THESSALONICA, PHILIPPI,
AND BERYTUS.

WITH COMMENTS BY FISK P. BREWER, NEW HAVEN, CONN.

IN communicating the yet unpublished inscriptions which were found by me the past year in the East, I have added new readings of two or three which are already known.

1. SPARTA. The following in small characters was found on a block of white marble set in the corner of a yet unfinished house (April 1859). There is nothing to indicate how much may be wanting from the beginning of the lines, but the worn space at the end would allow of from two to four additional letters.

- ΙΓ ΩΑΣΑΝΑΡΩΝΦΑΝΕΡΑΙ Σ.
ΕΩΝΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΘΑΘΕΤΩΝΑΞΙΩ
ΝΟ . . ΛΙΣΙΣΕΙΚΟΝΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΝΤΟΣ <ΡΚ
ΣΑΦΕΙΕΝΤΟΣΤΩΝΑΘΑΘΕΤΩΝΤΑΒΡΑΒΕΙΑΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝ
5. ΟΝΤΑΙΔΕΚΑΤΕΙΟΣΟΙΝΕΙΚΩΝΤΕΣΤΟΝΑΧΘΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΝ . .
ΟΣΑΝΑΔΡΙΑΝΤΟΣΑΝΑΘΕΣΙΝ × ΔΟΛΙΧΑΔΡΟΜΟΣ·ΠΑΙΣ·ΚΡΙΣΕ
ΟΣΠΡΟΣΕΘΗΚΕΝΑΓΗΣΙΛΑΟΣΡΑΟΙΧΑΔΡΟΜΟΣΑΝΗΡ
ΗΣΙΣΟΠΑΕΙΤΗΣΘΙΠΕΝΤΑΘΛΟΣΠΑΙΣΚΡΙΣΕΩΣΤΗΣΑΙ
ΟΣΞΣΠΑΙΣΚΡΙΣΕΩΣΤΗΣΑΓΗΣΙΛΑΟΥΤΖΤΑΓΕΝΕΙΟΣΦΑ
10. ΚΑΘΑΡΟΣΖΦΠΑΙΣΚΡΙΣΕΩΣΤΗΣΑΓΗΣΙΛΑΟΥΤΖΧΑΓΕΝΕΙΟΣ
ΤΩΝΝΕΙΚΩΝΤΩΝΠΑΝΤΩΝΔΙΔΟΝΤΩΝΤΟΙΚΑΝΟΝΤΟΙΣΕΝΟΜΟ
ΤΗΝΕΙΚΟΝΑΕΝΕΝΙΤΟΠΩΤΟΥΤΟΥΜΝΑΣΙΟΥΕΞΟΥΣΙΑΝΕΧΟ
ΔΡΙΑΝΤΑΝΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙΕΗΓΡΑΨΟΥΣΙΔΕΠΑΝΤΟΤΕΟΙΤ
ΤΑΔΕΩΝΙΔΕΙΑΤΑΟΝΟΜΑΤΑΤΩΝΑΘΑΘΕΤΩΝΚΑΙΤΩΝΑΓΩΙ
15. ΣΙΝΟΝΑΝΒΟΥΛΩΝΤΑΙΤΑΙΣΕΙΚΟΣΙΝΑΓΗΣΙΛΑΟΥΚΑΙΧΑΡΙΖ
ΟΙΚΕΙΩΝΚΑΙΕΚΤΩΝΩΝΚΑΙΣΥΝΓΕΝΩΝΚΑΙΤΩΝΕΚΤΩΝ
ΜΕΝΩΝΔΙΑΙΩΝΟΣΜΕΤΑΤΗΣΑΝΤΙΤΥΝΧΑΝΟΥΣΗΣΣΤΙ
ΝΑΕΩΝΙΑΚΙΩΝΚΑΘΑΘΑΔΗΜΟΣΗΘΕΛΗΣΕΝΑΠΟΓΡΑΨΟΝ

ΚΑ

Ἔδοξε τῇ πόλει. ὅταν τὰ Λεωνιδεία τελῶνται, πρέπει τιμῇδῆσασθαι τοὺς νεικῶντας κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἥρωας ἀνδρῶν φανερὰ[ν εὐ]σ[έβειαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων καὶ τῶν ἱερ]έων καὶ τῶν ἀλλοδέτων ἀξίω[τάτην εὐεργεσίαν, ἐνός τι]νο[s κ]αὶ εἰς εἰκόνα λαμβάνοντος δη. ρ. κ[αὶ πρὸς νομοφύλακα]ς ἀφειέντος τῶν ἀλλοδέτων τὰ βραβεῖα ἀποδιδόν [των.

5. ἔχειν ἑδω[σ]ονται δὲ κατ' ἑ[τ]ος οἱ νεικῶντες τὸν ἀχθισόμενον [ἄγων, ἀν προαιρῶ]σ[ι]ν, ἀνδριάντος ἀνδρεσιν. [X.] δολιχαδρόμος, παῖς κρίσε[ως] καθ' ὃ μέρος προσέθηκεν Ἀγησίλαος, P. δολιχαδρόμος, ἀνὴρ [ἐκ τῶν πρώτων, νεικ]ήσ[α]ς ὀπλείτης: 8 I. πένταδλος, παῖς κρίσεως τῆς Ἀ[γ]ησιλάου:]ΟΞΘΞ N. παῖς κρίσεως τῆς Ἀγησιλάου: 8 T. ἀγένης φα[ν]εῖς
10. τὸ δλον] καθαρὸς: 8 Φ. παῖς κρίσεως τῆς Ἀγησιλάου: 8 X. ἀγένης, [οἱ προαιροῦσι,] τῶν νεικῶντων πάντων διδόντων τὸ ἱκανὸν τοῖς νομο[φύ]λαξι εἰς] τὴν εἰκόνα, ἐν ἐνὶ τόπῳ τοῦ γυμνασίου ἐξουσίαν ἔχ[ου]σι εἶνα ἀνδριάντα ἀνατιθεῖναι. ἐπιγράφουσι δὲ πάντοτε οἱ τ[ι]μ[ω]ντες] τὰ Λεωνιδεῖα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἀλλοδετών καὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν
15. οἱ νεικῶ[σ]ιν ὃν ἀν βούλονται ταῖς εἰκόσιν. Ἀγησιλάου καὶ Χαριξ[ί]νου καὶ τῶν] οἰκείων καὶ ἐγγόνων καὶ συγγένων καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῶν [νικη]των τετμη[ν] μένων δι' αἰῶνος μετὰ τῆς ἀντιτυνχανούσης συ[ν]στα[σ]εως τῶν [Λ]εωνιδ[ε]ων καθὰ ὁ δῆμος ἡδέλησεν ἀπογράφου[ν]ται τὰ ὀνόματα

TRANSLATION. — "The city has decreed: Whenever the games of Leonidas are celebrated, it is proper that honor should be shown to the victors in accordance with men's manifest veneration for heroes, and the most estimable liberality of the ephors, the priests, and the institutors of the games; provided some individual receives two hundred denarii for an *εἰκών* and pays it over to the nomophylakes when the institutors of the games give over the prizes. But those who conquer from year to year in the contest which is to be celebrated, shall be permitted to have, if they prefer, the erection of a statue.

"Ch., runner in the long race, a youth competing in the trial-game in that part of the contest which Agesilaus added; R., runner in the long race, one of the first citizens, one who has conquered in heavy armor; his son I, who contends in the pentathlon, a youth competing in the trial-game of Agesilaus; * * also, N., a youth competing in the trial-game of Agesilaus; also, T., a lad who has appeared entirely free from blemish; also, Ph, a youth competing in the trial-game of Agesilaus; also, Ch., a lad who prefers it, have authority, provided the victors all give security to the nomophylakes for the *εἰκών*, to erect a statue in a part of the gymnasium. But universally those who have charge of the Leonideia shall inscribe the names of the institutors of the games and whatsoever one of the victorious competitors they please, on the *εἰκόνας*. They shall copy off the names of Agesilaus and Charixenus, and their families, and descendants, and kindred, and those of the victors who have had a life-long honor, together with the contemporaneous celebration (?) of the Leonideia, just as the people desired."

For the forms ἀφείντος (4) from ἀφήμι, νεικῶντες (5), νεικῶντων (11), ὀπλείτης (8), συγγένων (16), ἀντιτυνχανούσης (17), see Sophocles, Gr. Alphabet §§ 29 and 34. Δολιχαδρόμος (6 & 7) is doubtless a Doric form for δολιχοδρόμος like Θεαγένης for Θεογένης. With γυμνασίου (12), may be compared the Laconian κῶμα for κῦμα as given by Gregory of Corinth.

The games in honor of Leonidas at Sparta are known to us from the narrative of Pausanias who says (III., 14, 1), that orations were annually delivered at the graves of Pausanias, the Plataean general, and of Leonidas, and games held at which none but Spartans were allowed to compete. An inscription of Boeckh's (1421), also speaks of a victor in wrestling and the pancratium at the Leonideia.

Our inscription is at once so unique and so defective that the interpretation must be in part conjectural; but we anticipate a more natural reconstruction by others, especially in l. 15. *Εἰκόν* usually means a statue which is a real likeness, *ἀνδρίδας* being used of rough images of boxers, wrestlers, etc. But if that were its meaning here, why engrave on it, as is directed in the next lines, the names of all the athlothetae instead of simply the person represented? May not the word from its primary notion of an imitation, have acquired the sense of *ἀντίγραφον* or a copy on stone of the original decree, and denote the very marble which bears this inscription?

The persons authorized to erect a statue seem to have been seven in number. Their names are indicated only by the initials X, P, I, N, T, Φ, X. The last five, if we may include N, are preceded by that 3-shaped mark which, when following a proper name as is frequent in Laconian insc., is explained by B. as a sign for the genitive of the father's name, it being the same as the son's; thus Καλλικλῆς 3=Καλλικλῆς ὁ Καλλικλέους. When used as a prefix, we may perhaps consider it a substitute for the genitive of the foregoing name, and these five lads were all then the sons of P. The mark before PK (l. 3), is considered by B. another form of the same symbol. I have called it a denarius-mark, though an X crossed once or twice is more usual.

The sense of ἀφείντος (l. 4), is illustrated by the phrase of Thucydides, (II, 13), ἀφ. αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι.

For the sense of κρίσις cf. ἀέθλων κρίσιν δῆκε, Pind. O. III., 21, and ἵσταται κρίσις ἀμφ' ἀέθλοις, VII. 80. Instead of καθ' ὃ μέρος (l. 7), we may supply ἦν ὁ ἔφορος, ἦν ὁ γυμνασιάρχος, or ἦν εὐξάμενος. At the end of the line we supply the lacuna from C. I., 4380 f. which reads ἀνὴρ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐν τῇ πόλει. At the beginning of l. 9, some such word as πένταδλος, preceded by an initial, seems to have fallen out, but the existing letters afford no clue.

Καθαρός (l. 10) may refer to purity of Spartan descent, though it does not appear why the fact is mentioned respecting only this individual which must have been true of all.

L. 12, speaks of "the gymnasium." Pausanias says that there were gymnasia in the Dromus, one of which was the offering of one Eurycles. There may have been one particularly connected with the celebration of the Leonideia, or, if, as is probable, the inscription is a little anterior to the time of Pausanias, there might have been as yet but one in the city.

L. 15. Agesilaus and Charixenus are associated, probably as the athlothetae or instructors of the games, a part of them having been expressly ascribed to Agesilaus (l. 6 and 7). In C. I. 1424 G. Julius Agesilaus and T. Flavius Charixenus μετὰ τῶν τέκνων are called the athlothetae of the games in honor of the emperor Nerva, at which the victor κατὰ τοὺς ἱεροὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τὸν ἀνδριάντα ἀνέθηκεν. The name of Agesilaus is found also in C. I. 1470, an unintelligible fragment from Sparta.

From l. 17, we gather that with the names of those victors who received honors for life, there was to be recorded the contemporary celebration of the games, i. e., the Leonideiad at which the honor was given. There are extant several inscriptions from Balbura (C. I. 4380), respecting gymnastic victories which give the names of the agonothetae διὰ βίου, of his ancestor who founded the game, and of the victors at their sixth, seventh, and eleventh celebrations respectively. Δι' αἰῶνος is used (C. I. 3937) of a nomophylax.

2. From GYTHIUM of Laconia, engraved in small ancient characters, on the rocky face of the hill overlooking the sea. It is found on the left hand as one goes out from the modern town to the ruins. Possibly some letters at the beginning of the lines are hid behind the wall of the adjoining house. The first column is the copy made with the assistance of Graphiades, the teacher of the public school; the second is from Leake's Morea.

ΕΥΕΝΑ	VEIENA
ΓΟΞΤΡΥΘΞΤΑΓ	ΓΟΞΤΡΥΘΞΤΑΙΞ
ΔΕΚΑΑΓ . . ΤΡΥ	ΔΕΚΑΑΠΟ-ΤΡΥΟ
ΤΑΙΑΝ ΑΙΑΤ	ΤΑΙΑΓΑΤΑΤ/
5. ΗΟΔΟΑΟΞ	ΗΟΔΟΑΟΞ
ΑΙΔΕ-ΟΓ'Ε	ΠΑΙΔΕΒΟΓ'Ε
	ΟΥ·Ο·ΛΟΞ
ΟΑΟ	ΟΞΤΑΤΟ

Boeckh gives it (C. I. 1469), after Leake with some unfortunate alterations, inserting a cross before the second Ε (l. 1), omitting one Α (l. 3), and changing Γ to Π (l. 4).

From a comparison of the two texts one would perhaps divide the letters thus : 'Ελένα [ά]πὸ Στρυθέστα[ς] σ[ὺν] δέκα ἀπὸ Στρυθέστα[ς] ἕλκ' ἄτ[ας] ὁδοῦ.

In l. 6, we can hardly extract the word *ἴδε*, but l. 7 of Leake suggests *τοῦτο φάος*. With the variation in the forms of Α, l. 1 and l. 4, may be compared the two forms Α' Α' in Leake's Inscr. No. 2 from Tegea. The proper name Strytheste seems connected with that of the Argolic promontory Στρυθοῦς, and the place may have been in its vicinity.

3. THESSALONICA. On an arch over the main street near the western gate is a well-known inscription of interest to biblical students on account of a coincidence between it and Acts xvii. 6—8. Luke calls the magistrates of this city politarchs. Such officers are referred to in this inscription, and in no other ancient authority, except that a French consul is reported to have sent in 1746 some inscribed marbles from Thessalonica to Paris, one of which, now lost, had the words *πολιτάρχου Μάρκου*.

Muratori (Insc. Vol. II., Milan, 1740) first published it as furnished to him by Bimardus, *vir clarus*. In the division of the lines he errs greatly, as also in representing it as taken from a broken stone.

Pococke (Travels, 1743-5) next gives it, dividing the lines correctly, but with many errors in the letters. Perhaps he found it, as we did, covered with white-wash in accordance with Turkish ideas of beauty, and copied it without cleaning it off; or he may have found difficulty in closely inspecting the antiquities of the place from the fanaticism of the 'Turks. Dr. Clarke (Travels, 1810-23) complains of the latter obstacle, and describes the inscription without giving a copy. Leake (Northern Greece, Vol. III., 1835) gives it thus :

Πολεитарχοῦντων Σωσιπάτρου τοῦ Κλεοπάτρας καὶ Λουκίου Ποντίου Σεκούνδου
υἱοῦ, Αὔλου Ἀούτου Σαβείνου, Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαύστου, Δημητρίου τοῦ Νεικοπόλεος,
Ζω(ίλου) τοῦ Παρμενίωνος τοῦ καὶ Μενίσκου, Γαίου Ἀγυλλήτιου Ποτειτοῦ, ταμίου τῆς
πόλεως Ταύρου τοῦ Ἀμίλιας τοῦ καὶ Ῥήγλου, γυμνασιαρχοῦντος Ταύρου τοῦ Ταύρου
τοῦ καὶ Ῥήγλου.

It was printed in 1832 by Boeckh (C. I., 1967), from the reading of Bimardus with the division of the lines according to Pococke. He, as well as Muratori,

being ignorant of its position on a monument considered it fragmentary, remarking that what was done during the time of these magistrates is wanting. Of the word *νόου* in the third line, he says *ferri non potest*. There is a similar combination however, or Latinism as we may call it, in Insc No. 2060 from the Tauric Chersonesus of the time of Tiberius or Caligula — 'Ορόντας 'Ολβισπολείτας 'Αράβου νόος. Besides as both the parents of Sosipater are here named, it seems necessary to prevent ambiguity. And Boeckh himself in his Addenda after having seen the readings given by Charles Swan (*Journal*, 1826), and by Leake, admits its authenticity.

Our copy was made by Dr. Crosby, a Scotch missionary in Thessalonica, and myself. We compared it with the form given in Conybeare and Howson's "St. Paul," which is the conjectural reading of Boeckh, noted the variations and verified our own copy by a new inspection of the stone. The perpendicular line indicates the boundary between the two stones on which the inscription was cut, where the marble is a little abraded. The fact that the chiselling extends over more than one stone shows almost certainly that the inscription is *in situ*, and the event whose date is thus fixed, is doubtless the erection of the arch.

ΠΟΛΕΙΤΑΡΧΟΥΝΤΩΝ·ΣΩΣΙΠΑΤΡΟΥ·ΤΟΥ·Κ /	
ΠΑΤΡΑΣ·ΚΑΙ·ΛΟΥΚΙΟΥ·ΠΟΝΤΙΟΥ·ΣΕΚΟΥΝΔΟ	
ΥΙΟΥ·ΑΥΛΟΥ·ΑΟΥ·ΤΟΥ·ΣΑΒΕΙΝΟΥ·ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ·ΤΟΥ	Υ
ΦΑΤΣ·ΤΟΥ·ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ·ΤΟΥ·ΝΕΙΚΟΠΟΛΕΩΣ·Ω	ΛΟΥ
5. ΤΟΥ·ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΩΝΟΣ·ΤΟΥ·ΚΑΙΜΕΝΙΣΚΟΥ·ΓΑΙΟΥ·ΑΓΙΑΛΛΗΙΟ	
ΠΟΤΕΙΤΟΥ·ΤΑΜΙΟΥ·ΤΗΣ·ΠΟΛΕΩΣ·ΤΑΥΡΟΥ·ΤΟΥ·ΑΜΜΙΑΣ	
ΤΟΥ·ΚΑΙΡΗΓΑΟΥ·ΓΥΜΝΑΣΙΑΡΧΟΥΝΤΟΣ·ΤΑΥΡΟΥ·ΤΟΥ·ΤΑΥΡ	
ΤΟΥ·ΚΑΙΡΗΓΑΟΥ	

Although the above differs from Leake's only in the Ω of ΝΕΙΚΟΠΟΛΕΩΣ, line 4, which is thus made to correspond with the ΠΟΛΕΩΣ of line 6, and in containing some letters of his bracketed (λου), we have thought that scholars would be interested in an exhibition of its exact appearance on the stone. It will be observed that the separation of the letters of ΚΑΙΜΕΝΙΣΚΟΥ and ΚΑΙΡΗΓΑΟΥ as is done by commentators, is not required by the punctuation, but to avoid the solecism which would exist in the phrase τοῦ Ἀμμίας τοῦ καὶ Ῥήγου.

4. The following inscription, copied by Dr. Crosby, is in the wall of the city where it is formed in a rough way by the combination of bricks.

ΠΕΝΙΜΑΝΟΥΝΗΛΑΤΟΥΚ ΑΤΙΠΤΟΥΔ	+ Ἐμμανουὴλ τοῦ Κρατίππου δ-
ΕΙΠΟΤΟΥ+	εσπότου+
ΗΙΕΗΤΟΝΔΕΠΝΙΓΟΝΑΥΗΤΗΤΙΧΕΙ	αὐτῇ τύχη
ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΔΑΟΥΖΑΠΟΚΟΥΚΕΚΚΗΡΥΜ	Γεώργιος Δουζα Πόκουκος
5. +ΤΟΕΠΙΤΗΝΔΑΝΟΥΗΤΟΥΚΗ ΙΤΗ ΠΥ+	

The first two lines, which were read for me by Antonios Blastos, the public teacher of Tripolitza, seem to record that the wall and inscription are the work of one Emmanuel when Kratiptus was governor.

George Dousa of Holland (who died 1599), spent some time in the East, and on his return published a book "de itinere suo Constantinopolitano." He is referred to in the C. I., as authority for several inscriptions from Thessalonica and vicinity. The name looks oddly here. The letters that follow seem to spell the name of Pococke.

5. From the eastern gate of Thessalonica, and on the right hand as one goes out. It cannot be read when the gate is open, and seems therefore, to have escaped the observation of travellers.

ΜΑΡΚΟΣ ΟΥΑΡΕΙΝΙΟΣ
ΑΚΥΛΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΑΛΕΡΙΑ
ΑΕΚΛΗΠΙΑΣ ΜΑΡΚΩ
Ο΄ ΥΡΕΙΝΙΜΟΡΟΤΦΩΚΙ
5. ΜΑΚΟΟΤΑΡΕΙΝΙΩΑΚΤΑΑ
ΤΟΙΣ ΤΕΚΝΟΙΣ ΚΑ΄Ι
ΕΑΤΤΟΙΣ ΖΩΝΤΕΣ

Μάρκος Ουαρείνιος
'Ακύλας καὶ Ουαλερία
'Ασκληπιάς, Μάρκω
Ο[υα]ρ[ε]ιν[ω]ς 'Ρούφω κ[α]ὶ
Μ[α]κ[ο]κ[ω] Ουαρεινίω 'Ακύλα
τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ
ἐαυτοῖς ζῶντες.

The letters are of the same size as in No. 3, though of different shape, especially the Α and Σ. The Μ which must be omitted in line 4, probably arose from a second view of the preceding ΝΙ which was behind a beam of the gate.

The phraseology employed is common in sepulchral inscriptions, but the proper names, though Roman, do not conform in arrangement to the rule of classical times. Two, *Marcus Varinius*, seem to form the family title to which a third is *affixed*, instead of prefixed, to distinguish the person. Cf. Inscr. 650, 677, 682, in Zell's *Röm. Epigraphik* which commemorate P. Cassius Atticus Salinator, aged four years, son of P. Cassius Sabinus; P. Scantius Julianus, aged eight, son of P. Scantius Augustalis; and M. Vetius Decembris, aged nineteen, son of M. Vetius Trophimus. The case of Cn. Pompeius Magnus, son of Cn. Pompeius Strabo, is not parallel, as he received the new cognomen when twenty-five years old to become founder of a new familia.

6. In the mosque of St. Sophia, which was "built according to tradition in the reign of Justinian" (Smith's Dict.), that is, A. D. 527-65, there remains on the dome a fine piece of mosaic, probably placed there at its erection. It represents the ascension. The lower part has been obliterated and an Arabic inscription in large black characters written across so that the Saviour seems rising out of it. Above his head we detected Greek letters, and copied them by means of a glass. They proved to be the words of Acts 1:11, "Ἄνδρες Γαλιλαῖοι, etc.", exactly according to the *textus receptus* with the usual contractions of ΙC for 'Ιησοῦς and ΟΥΝΟΝ for οὐρανόν.

7. While in Thessalonica we purchased some twenty ancient coins, of which half were Macedonian, and two were struck in this very city. One is autonomous and bears the legend ΘΕC CΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ around a female head turreted and veiled, and on the reverse the inscription ΘΕC CΑΛΟΝΙΚΕΩΝ, in four lines within a wreath. The other has the legend ΑΥ (τοκράτωρ) Κ(αῖσαρ) Γ(άιος) ΙΟΥΑ (ιος) ΟΥΗΡ(ος) ΜΑΧΙΜΙΝΟC around the laureated head of the emperor, who reigned A. D. 235-8. On the reverse ΘΕC CΑΛΟΝΙΚΕΩΝ surrounds a figure of the god Kabirus. He wears a short dress: a doubled cord which hangs down low behind him is fastened by the two ends to his shoulders. His left hand lifts a hammer; his right, towards which he is looking, holds something like a blacksmith's tongs. There is an indistinct object on each side of his feet. Thessalonica is known to have been a distinguished seat of his worship, and the Rotunda or Pantheon, now a mosque and formerly a church, is supposed by some to have been at first a Kabiric temple.

8. PHILIPPI. On a "stone from one of the arches of the principal standing ruins." This and the two following were copied by Dr. Crosby.

BAIBIONOT
 AΛEPIONΦIPMON
 TONKPATISTON
 OΔHMOΣEKTΩN
 IΔIΩN

Βαίβιον Οθαλέριον Φίρμον τὸν
 κράτιστον, ὁ δῆμος ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων.

9. A mile from Philippi on the road to Kavalla (Neapolis), inscribed on a cubical stone measuring eight feet in each dimension.

C·VIBIVS·C·F· C(aius, Vibius, C(aii, f(ilius), Cor(nelius) Quartus,
 COR·QVARTVS
 MILL·EC·MACE mil(es) leg(ionis) V Macedo[n]ic(ae)
 DOVIC

VR·ALAE·CVIVIOR [dec]ur(ioni) alae CVIVIOR

The last letters should perhaps be read c[i]viu[m] R[om].

The fifth legion, Macedonian, is named in many inscriptions, as in Orelli. No. 1345, which contains the name of *L. Vibius M. f. Pop. Vulsus*, one of its military tribunes. It was probably raised in Macedonia by Brutus before the battle of Philippi; but there is no record of its having been stationed there afterwards.

10. Near the preceding — cut into the natural rock on the hill overhanging the road. They are the headings to two catalogues of the donors to certain sacred objects, and seem to have been engraved at different times.

a. PVBLIVSHOSTILIVS PLVTIVSPHILADELPHVS PETRAMINFERIOREXCIDIT ETTITVLVMFECITVBI 5. NOMINACVLTORSCRIPSITET SCVLPSITSACVRSANOSP (Proper names).	b. PHOSILIVSPHILADELPHVS OBHONORAEDILIT TITVLVMPOLIVITDENVOET NOMINASODALINSCRIPSIT 5. EORVMQVIMVNERA POSVERVNTALPENVSASVIS SACERD DOMITIVSPRIMOGENIVSSTATVAM SIGNVM (Proper names).
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a. Publius Hostilius Plutius Philadelphus, petram inferior(em) excidit et titulum fecit, ubi nomina cultor(um) scripsit et sculpsit sac(erdotibus) ur(bis) san(cta)o(blata), s(ua) p(ecunia).

L. 6. SP is a common abbreviation, but the preceding letters are a combination which we have not seen elsewhere.

b. P. Hos[t]ilius Philadelphus ob honor(em) aedilit(at)is titulum polivit denuo et nomina sodal(ium) inscripsit et eorum qui munera posuerunt a(nimo) l(ibente) penus[que] suis sacerdotibus — Domitius Primogenius statuum — signum, etc.

L. 6. AL is doubtless for *animo libente* which is sometimes expressed in full with posuit and posuerunt. *Penusa* may be an error for *penusq.* i. e., *penusque*, and resembles the phrase *et epulum suffic.* which is found in such inscriptions. L. 8 begins the catalogue, where perhaps for *Primogenius* we should read *primigenius*.

The aedileship held by Hostilius must have been that of Philippi, which city being a colonin, had a magistrate of that title.

11. Several inscriptions from Andros, published in the appendix of the C. I., were also copied by the Greek attendant of the Rev. Josiah Brewer, who visited the island in 1827. Though carelessly done, the following variations from the text of Boeckh are noted, 2349d. At the end of line 2, for P read I, which may be the beginning of KAI. The next line is of *οἱ αὐτὸν τὸν ναὺν καὶ τὸ προνάϊον* P. B. has *αὐτῶν*, which demands ἡ δέῃνα γυνὴ αὐτοῦ καὶ between the lines, for which there is hardly room. 2349n. Line 2 is ΤΗΣΣΩΤΗΡΑΚΑΙΕΤ, i. e., αὐ]τῆς σωτήρα καὶ εὐ[εργέτην.

Two inscribed fragments were found in the ruins, one having the letters ΝΟΜC, and the other, ΠΤΘΩ.

12. On a white marble stele in the court of the Hotel d'Orient, Beirut.

ΤΙΤΟC	τίτος
ΦΛΑΟΥΤΟC	φλαούτιος
ΑΠΠΙΝΟC	Ἀππίνος
ΣΗCΑCΚΑΛΩ	Σήσας καλῶ[ς

13. In the same place on a larger stele of variegated marble.

ΑΞ[ΠΑΝΗΜΠΤΙ	Ἀξ[ε]πάνη μ' [ε]πί.
ΑΜΕΤΕΧΡΗΕΤΕ	Ἄμμε, χρηστὲ
ΚΑΛΑΝΙΠΕ	κα[λ] ἑλ[υ]πε,
ΧΑΙΡΕ	χαίρε.

ἐπί (l. 1), is for ἐποίει, like ἐπίει in C. I. 4552, from this vicinity. The horizontal strokes of the initial Ε may have been attached to the preceding Μ, and so been more easily obliterated or overlooked. We do not find the proper names elsewhere, but perhaps the latter of them may have a remote connection with the Heb. Amaziah, LXX Ἀμασίας and Ἀμεσσίας.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.¹

It is nothing new for English statesmen to be accurate and profound scholars. Curran, the Irish orator, carried his Virgil always in his pocket; and his biographer found him crying over the fate of the unhappy Dido, in a storm at sea, when every other person on board would have seen Dido hung up at the yard-arm with indifference. Fox, the English orator, statesman, and historian, complains, in his letters, of the *interruptions* of politics,

¹ Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age. By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, D. C. L., M. P. for the University of Oxford. In three volumes. Oxford: at the University Press, 1858.

while he speaks with delight of whole days devoted to the classics. Sheridan pored over Euripides day and night, and drew from the Greek poet the inspiration of his eloquence. Pitt was the best Greek scholar in the kingdom, — so says Lord Grenville, who was his constant companion in such studies. His apartments were strown with Latin and Greek classics; and they were at all suitable times, his favorite theme of conversation. Sir Robert Peel won the first honors of the university at Oxford, both in the classics and the mathematics. In his inaugural address when entering on the lord-rectorship of Glasgow university, he declares that “by far the greater proportion of the chief names that have floated down and are likely to remain buoyant on the stream of time, are those of men eminent for classical acquirements and classical tastes.” “Take the Cambridge calendar, or take the Oxford calendar, for two hundred years,” says Lord Macaulay, “look at the church, the parliament, or the bar, and it has always been the case that the men who were first in the competition of the schools, have been the first in the competition of life.” And so thoroughly are the leading minds in Great Britain convinced of this truth, and the practical inference which it involves, that by a recent law of parliament civil and military appointments, at home and in India, are based on competitive tests in classical and mathematical studies. We are not surprised, therefore, when we see statesmanship and scholarship go hand in hand in Great Britain.

Yet the appearance of these three large volumes, of nearly six hundred pages each, of Homeric studies by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is without a precedent even in English history. And we cannot but wonder how, with all the completeness of a classical education at Eton and Oxford, and all an English statesman's fondness for the recreations afforded by the classics, he could find time, amid the pressing duties of a life devoted to the public service, to make himself so minutely acquainted with the contents of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and the literature connected with them, and to reflect so carefully, not to say profoundly, upon the ethnological, political, social, moral, and theological problems of the Homeric age.

In his prolegomena, which occupy about a hundred pages, the author reviews briefly the state of the Homeric question, but excuses himself from entering further into the discussion, since the reaction of the German mind, and the immense preponderance of critical judgment in England, most clearly and conclusively expressed in the almost demonstrative argument of Mure, may fairly be regarded as settling thus much at least, that “the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are, in their substance, the true offspring of the heroic age itself, and are genuine gifts not only of a remote antiquity, but of a designing mind.” Without attempting to establish definitely the date of Homer, he argues strenuously that he is “an original witness to manners, characters, and ideas, such as those of his poems,” living doubtless before the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnesus, and probably not later than the grandchildren of the heroes who fought in the war of Troy. Hence the author infers that Homer is entitled to be studied, not only as the patriarch of

poets, but as the contemporary historian of the heroic age, writing with manifestly historic aims, and preëminently worthy of historic confidence; standing, in fact, "in the same relation to letters and to human learning as the early books of scripture to the entire Bible and to the spiritual life of man." He also maintains the general trustworthiness of the text of Homer: that "what *could* preserve the Homeric poems in their unity at all, *must*, in all likelihood, have preserved them in a tolerably genuine state; and that, with due allowance for different circumstances, they were in the pre-historic times of Greece what they were in later times, the broad basis of mental culture; the great monument of the glory of the nation and of each particular state or race; the prime entertainment of those prolonged festive gatherings which were so characteristic of early Greece; and therefore recognized among the institutions of the country, and preserved like the laws of a primitive people.

The remaining five hundred pages of the first volume are ethnological, in which the author labors, with great industry, and, we cannot but think, with the excessive subtlety of the lawyer, to adjust the balance between the Pelasgic and the Hellenic elements in the races, nations, governments, and religions of Greece. The discussion is *racy* and suggestive. But the reader will be very likely to come to the conclusion of one of our ablest professors, that he *knows* nothing of the Pelasgi except that they are the *plagues* (*Plagi*) of Greek literature. Mr. Gladstone traces the *Achaean* name and race back to Persia, and finds in Media a probable source of the Pelasgi. In an "Advertisement," prefixed to the third volume, he adds, that an earlier possession of Rawlinson's Herodotus "would have emboldened him to proceed a step further in the attempt to specify the probable or possible form of the original ethnic relation between the Pelasgians and the Hellenes of the Greek peninsula, by designating the latter as pure Arian, and the former as Arian, with a residue or mixture of Turanian elements."

That part of Mr. Gladstone's work which will most interest the readers of this Journal is the second volume. This is wholly devoted to "Olympus, or the Religion of the Homeric Age;" and the spirit in which it is written shows that the author unites with the learning of the scholar and the wisdom of the statesman the faith and reverence of the Christian. The first two sections, in which he treats of the Mixed Character and the Traditional Element of the Homeric Theology, are contributions of great value to the history of the connection between the religions of the heathen and the religion of the Bible. When we look into the scriptures we read not only of a common parentage for the whole human family, and of events (such as the Fall, the Deluge, and the Dispersion) of common and momentous interest to the race; but in such narratives as the Destruction of Sodom, the Priesthood of Melchizedek, the Prophecy of Balaam, Jethro the father-in-law of Moses, Rahab the harlot, Ruth the Moabitess, the books of Jonah and Daniel, the Visit of the Magi, the Conversion of Cornelius and the Eunuch of Ethiopia, we see proofs that God manifested himself in divers

ways not only to the patriarchs and prophets of the Jewish nation, but sometimes, also, to patriarchs and prophets, priests and kings, beyond the pale of the chosen people. "We have, in short, mingling with the whole course of the Old Testament, a stream of evidence, which shows the partial remnants of the knowledge of God apart from the main current of it, which is particularly traced for us in the patriarchal and Mosaic histories."

Now, it were surely strange if all traces of this knowledge had disappeared at so early an age as that of Homer, among a people deriving their origin from the same East from which the Hebrew patriarchs migrated. We should naturally expect to discover some vestiges, at least, of patriarchal and Mosaic history or tradition in the manifestly primitive scenes of the patriarch of Grecian poets. Nor are we disappointed. When we turn to the Homeric Rhapsodies, we are not only struck with the general similarity of manners, customs, ideas, and usages; we not only meet continually with myths, which remind us of the facts of scripture; but we find conceptions and representations of the gods, which must have come down from the same source as those which we read in Moses and the prophets. The supernatural system of Homer is palpably heterogeneous. There are clearly discernible in it two sets of ideas or attributes, which do not harmonize, and could not have been developed together. The one is traditional, or, as Mr. Gladstone chooses to call it, traditive; the other, invented. The one is theology, more or less corrupted and perverted; the other is mythology. Hence the whole may well be called, after the example of the Germans, *theo-mythology*. The former, as seen in the Homeric poems, is already in a state of visible decline; the latter is in a process of rapid and prolific development. Not to dwell upon the Titans and giants, which are a reproduction of the giants before the Deluge and the rebels at Babel, nor upon the *Ate* of Homer, who answers in so many particulars to the Satan of the scriptures; nor, again, upon the rainbow of scripture, represented in the Homeric Iris; the traditional element in the *theo-mythology* of Homer is most clearly seen in the three great traditive deities, Zeus, Apollo, and Athene, so often the objects of the trine invocation:

Αἱ γὰρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίῃ καὶ Ἀπολλόν·

who are not localized in any particular city or country, but are universally worshipped, and at all times and places addressed in prayer; who rise so far above all the other gods, in their moral attributes as well as in their providence over man and in their power over life and death, heaven, earth, and hell, and who, at the same time, stand in such peculiar, intimate, and endearing relations to each other as to suggest at once to the mind least instructed in Christian theology the idea of a kind of trinity. It is not difficult to identify the father of gods and men, in Homer, with the universal Father of the scriptures; though, of course, the original scriptural idea of the true God is sadly defaced and deformed in the copy by corrupt and

incongruous additions. In like manner, Apollo is the promised seed of the woman, the bruiser of the serpent's head, the source of oracles and inspirer of prophets, the *Logos* or Word of God (Λόγος), the bright and shining Light (Φαῖβος). He is, as his name has been differently explained, both the ἀπολλύνω and the ἀπέλλων, at once the healing and the destroying deity, the god of medicine and the god of the bow; but even as god of the bow, what is most characteristic of him is, that he inflicts death in such a manner as to take away its sting by his loving, gentle arrows (οἷς ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσι). Athene is, at least she resembles and suggests, the personal and divine Wisdom, with whom and by whom God founded the earth and prepared the heavens; the spirit of God that brooded upon the face of the original chaos and breathed into it order and beauty, "rejoicing always before him, and rejoicing, also, in the habitable parts of the earth." Her "delight is with the sons of men," and her providential care is over them. She is the guide and teacher of wise and good men. In short, she is the executive, on earth, of all the most spiritual functions of the providence and government of the Most High.

The attributes ascribed to Apollo and Athene cannot be explained as the spontaneous development of nature-worship or hero-worship, nor as, in any way, the offspring of invention. "They are such as to bring about cross divisions and cross purposes which the Greek force of imagination and the Greek love of symmetry would have alike eschewed. How could invention have set up Pallas as the goddess at once of peace and its industries, of wisdom and of war? How, again, could it have combined in Apollo the offices of destruction, music, poetry, prophecy, archery, and medicine? Again, if he is the god of medicine, why have we Paieon? if of poetry, why have we the Muses? If Minerva be (as she is) goddess of war, why have we Mars? if of the work of the artificer, why have we also Vulcan? if of prudence and equity, and even craft, why Mercury?"

"It seems to be the distinctive character of Minerva, in the Homeric mythology, that though she is not the sole deity, yet the very flower of the whole office and work of deity is everywhere reserved for her. . . . The whole conception is therefore fundamentally at variance with the measured and finite organization of an invented system of religion, and by its own incongruities with that system, it proves itself to be an exotic element."

"Apollo, too, has much of that inwardness and universality of function which belongs to Minerva, as well as a diversity of offices peculiarly his own. . . . The tangled thread runs out, without knot or break, when we unravel it by primitive Messianic tradition; because it was fundamental to that tradition that the person who was the subject of it should exhibit this many-sided union of character and function."

We have exhibited, at some length, the drift of the argument in these sections, because they are of such peculiar interest to the theologian. We have not space to follow the author in the remaining sections, where he treats of the *inventive* element of the Homeric theom mythology, in its marked contrast with the traditive element; the composition and classification of the

Olympian community; their relation to each other, and their influence on human society and conduct. The last two sections in the second volume give a discriminating, and on the whole highly favorable, view of the state of morals and the condition of women in the Homeric age.

The third volume is divided into four parts, the titles of which will convey a sufficiently definite idea of their contents. I. Agorè: Politics of the Homeric Age. II. Ilios: Trojans and Greeks compared. III. Thalassa: the Outer Geography. IV. Aoidos: some Points of the Poetry of Homer.

It would be strange if, in stepping out of the province of the statesman into that of the scholar on the one hand, and the theologian on the other, Mr. Gladstone should not sometimes fall into mistakes. The divine will be amused at reading of "*Melchizedek*, the priest of On, whose daughter Joseph married" (Vol. II. p. 6), and the learned professor will smile at similar inaccuracies, which he may detect in his department. Still such blunders are surprisingly few. And scholars and theologians cannot but feel under great obligations to the Chancellor of the English Exchequer for the sterling thoughts and suggestions which he has treasured up in these volumes for the instruction of the world.

THE PULPIT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.¹

THIS excellent volume contains Election or Thanksgiving Discourses from Dr. Mayhew, in 1750; Dr. Chauncey, in 1766; Mr. Cooke, in 1770; Mr. Gordon, in 1774; Dr. Langdon, in 1775; Mr. West, in 1776; Mr. Payson, in 1778; Mr. Howard, in 1780; Dr. Stiles, in 1783. All of these Discourses are instructive in their philosophical relations, and contain passages of great ethical value. All of them, also, exhibit specimens of genuine eloquence. The Discourses are accompanied with a rich historical Introduction, and with minor but instructive Prefaces. The entire volume impresses upon us the following thoughts.

First: "To the pulpit, the Puritan pulpit, we owe the *moral force* which won our independence" (p. xxxviii).

Secondly: To the anti-prelatical polity of the New England churches is to be ascribed the peculiarly steadfast opposition of the New England Colonies to the usurpations of Great Britain. "It is an interesting fact," says Mr. Thornton, in his valuable Introduction, "that the very able and learned defence of the ecclesiastical polity of New England, written by the Rev. John Wise, of Ipswich, one of the victims of the despotism of the infamous Andros, in 1687, was republished in the year 1772, as a sound political document for the times, teaching that 'democracy is Christ's government, in church and in state.' Thus the church polity of New England began like

¹ The Pulpit of the American Revolution; or, the Political Sermons of the Period of 1776, with a Historical Introduction, Notes, and Illustrations. By John Wingate Thornton, A. M. Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon and Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. pp. 537. 12mo.

principles in the state. The pew and the pulpit had been educated to self-government. They were accustomed 'TO CONSIDER.' The highest glory of the American Revolution,' said John Quincy Adams, 'was this: *it connected, in one indissoluble bond, the principles of civil government with the principles of Christianity*'" (p. xxix).

Thirdly: The colonies of New England are of missionary origin. "Religion, the church, was the great thought, and civil interests were only incidental. 'Arthur Lake, D. of Diuinitie, Lord Bishop of Bath and Welles,' a decided friend of the American colonies, preached, July 2, 1625, before his Majesty and the Parliament, the following words: "Neither is it enough for us to make much of God's truth for our own good, but also we should propagate it to others. And here let me tell you, that there lieth a great guilt upon Christian States, and England among the rest, that they have not been careful to bring them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, to the knowledge of Christ and participation of the gospel. Much travelling to the Indies, East and West, but wherefore? Some go to possess themselves of the lands of the infidels; but most, by commerce, to grow richer by their goods. But where is the prince or state that pitieth their souls, and, without any worldly respects, endeavors the gaining of them unto God? Some show we make, but it is a poor one; for it is but an accessorie to our worldly desire; it is not our primary intention; whereas Christ's method is, *first seek ye the kingdom of God, and then all other things shall be added unto you; you shall fare the better for it in your worldly estate.* If the apostles and apostolic men had affected our salvation no more, we might have continued to this day, such as sometimes we were, barbarous subjects of the Prince of Darkness'" (Introduction, pp. xvi. xvii.).

DR. THOMPSON'S "LOVE AND PENALTY."¹

THE popular objection to the doctrine of eternal punishment is derived from the imagined repugnance of the doctrine to the benevolent character of God. Dr. Thompson has wisely met this objection in the title of his volume, and also in its fundamental theory.

"*Love and Penalty*," — this phrase suggests the ideas, that the penalty is consistent with love, originates from love, results in such ends as love approves and designs. The reasonings of the volume are founded on the theory, that all the divine attributes are reducible to love; that divine justice is but one form of benevolence; that, in the words of a Unitarian writer, whom Dr. Thompson felicitously quotes, "He who reveres the good and cleaves to it, necessarily abhors the evil and denounces it." "It is out of his heart of infinite pity for the world, that the Almighty Father makes the wicked consume away" (p. 131). In the following beautiful language, Dr.

¹ *Love and Penalty, or Eternal Punishment consistent with the Fatherhood of God.* By Joseph P. Thompson, D. D., Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle Church. New York: Sheldon and Company, 115 Nassau street. Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1860. pp. 358. 18mo.

Thompson illustrates the truth, that all the moral attributes of Jehovah are summed up in the attribute of benevolence : " The moral character of God is one pure, central flame of love — a light that we could not look upon and live. But this light is ensphered, as it were, in crystal of many hues, and this revolves upon us the various attributes of God. Where shines the crystal-white, his holiness beams forth upon us from that central fount of love. With softened tone, his goodness and mercy are diffused from that same living flame. But ever and anon the red flame of justice flashes out upon us from the same inward source ; not vindictive vengeance, but love guarding his holy law " (p. 156).

Whenever we admit that the good of the universe requires the punishment of the incorrigible, and that God inflicts this punishment because he chooses to promote the good of the universe, we are thoroughly freed from the suspicion that he is " arbitrary," or " tyrannical," or " cruel," or " unfeeling," in his infliction of deserved pain.

Dr. Thompson has well shown that this divine benevolence, instead of being inconsistent with the theory of the *endless* punishment of the wicked, is eminently congenial with it. " Mere anger might subside. The vindication of personal honor might at length be satisfied. But love cannot die — love will not change ; and the love of God for holiness, and his goodness toward his creatures demand the emphatic severity of his displeasure against sin " (pp. 352, 353). If the punishment of the incorrigible depended on an *instinct* of the divine mind, we should be less certain of the eternity of this punishment, than we are when it depends on his moral *principle*, his rational benevolence.

Another fact on which the reasonings in this volume are founded is, that sin is a voluntary transgression of known law. " The definition which Blackstone gives of law in general, as established among men, may be transferred, with much higher significance, to the law of God. ' Law,' he [Judge Blackstone] says, ' is a rule of civil conduct presented by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.' " " It is a rule of conduct presented, announced, notified " (pp. 143, 144). If our sin be involuntary, we are unable to discern the reasonableness of punishing it. If it be *wilful*, it may be justly visited with everlasting remorse.

The reasonings in this volume are also founded on the principles, that sin intrinsically merits punishment ; that our own nature demands the punitive government of our Sovereign ; that the phenomena of the present life are inconsistent with any other theory than that of God's disposition to punish sin ; that the full demerit of sin must be determined by God himself, and that he has declared the unending ill-desert and the unending punishment of moral disobedience.

The volume is thus an excellent defence of eternal retribution, on biblical, as well as on philosophical grounds. Its arguments are unanswerable.

HENGSTENBERG'S COMMENTARY ON ECCLESIASTES.¹

THE qualifications of Dr. Hengstenberg as an eminent expositor will not be doubted by those familiar with his previous works on the Bible; and a Commentary on this difficult book, by one who has so long and so successfully devoted himself to biblical subjects, will awaken new interest in its study. As an exposition of the language and the general current of the writer's views, the work is full and rich. It is not to be expected, however, that all the difficulties are cleared up. Dr. Hengstenberg, in common with most of the biblical commentators in Germany, and the late Prof. Stuart in this country, does not regard Solomon as the author of the book. He denies the authorship to Solomon on the ground that the book represents the Jews in a disordered and distracted state, "persecuted," "tried in the furnace of affliction," and "under the dominion of heathen rulers;" whereas, during the reign of Solomon there was peace and prosperity; also, on the ground that the book has peculiarities of style and diction, such as did not belong to Solomon's time; also, on the ground of the place which it occupies in the canon, it being placed after the books belonging to Solomon's time, and after Lamentations; besides, it is said, Solomon is expressly declared by name to be the author of "Proverbs," and the "Song of Songs;" but in the Ecclesiastes the authorship is less directly stated: "The words of the Preacher, the son of David, king in Jerusalem." In reference to this discrepancy, Dr. Hengstenberg remarks: "It is a perfectly natural thing that he who wishes to be regarded as the author of any work should employ no other designation than that by which he is already known. To use enigmas and play at hide-and-seek, would be little in place in such a matter. Consequently, the writer of this work in styling Solomon Koheleth, pretty clearly indicates that it is only in an ideal sense he is introduced as the author; that he was concerned with the book only as a representative of wisdom. The very name, which is strictly an impersonal one, shows that the person to whom it is applied, belongs to the region of poetry, not to that of reality. Thus we find that the only argument, with any show of reason for Solomon's authorship, changes sides altogether as soon as it is more carefully examined. The Book of Ecclesiastes was not only not actually composed by Solomon, but does not even pretend to have been."²

While these considerations deserve to be candidly weighed, they are by no means decisive of the question which they are adduced to establish. The Jewish and Christian church with very general unanimity have ascribed the authorship of the book to Solomon; and in modern times this opinion was

¹ Commentary on Ecclesiastes, with other treatises. By E. W. Hengstenberg, D. D., Professor of Theology, Berlin. Translated from the German, by D. W. Simon. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., 1860. 8vo. pp. 488.

² p. 44.

first called in question by Grotius. A sentiment so uniform and so long entertained is not to be set aside except by the most decisive evidence against it. More weight has been given to the objections than a careful consideration of the facts will justify. The kingdoms of the East were peculiarly unstable; revolutions and counter-revolutions were constantly taking place; men were everywhere tried in the furnace; were subject to wrongs, oppression, and servitude. The author of *Ecclesiastes*, therefore, is only delineating scenes of constant occurrence; they may not have been scenes in his own realm, but they were scenes with which he and his people were familiar. Then the peculiarities of style, involving resemblances to the later Hebrew and the Chaldee, when critically examined, are less authoritative proofs against the authorship of the book than they have been supposed. Not more than ten or twelve Chaldeisms can be found in the book. And, further, the place which the book occupies in the canon, and the less explicit recognition of the authorship in the first verse than in the case of the "*Proverbs*," and "*Song of Songs*," are feeble arguments to prove that the reputed author of the book did not write it.

If Solomon was not the writer, the authorship is not known; and those who deny his claims, do not agree as to the time the book was written,—the different dates of its composition ranging over a period of three hundred years. But whatever doubts or speculations there may be in regard to the authorship, the canonical authority of the book is undiminished. Though our Lord does not directly quote from it in his discourses, he makes frequent allusions to it.

The other Treatises in this volume are *Prolegomena* to the *Song of Solomon*, *A Lecture on the Book of Job*, *A Lecture on the Prophet Isaiah*, *The Sacrifices of Holy Scripture*, *The Jews and the Christian Church*.

CODEx ALEXANDRINUS.¹

THE *Codex Alexandrinus* is one of the oldest and most valuable manuscripts of the Greek Scriptures now known. The *Codex Vaticanus*, which has recently been made accessible in Cardinal Mai's Edition, is probably older; and Tischendorf claims that the MS. of the Greek Bible recently found at the convent of St. Catharine, in Mount Sinai, is the oldest yet discovered.

To the biblical student, the *Codex Alexandrinus* is one of the richest treasures in the British Museum. It was presented to Charles I. by Cyril Lucar, at one time Patriarch of Alexandria. It is comprised in four folio volumes: three, of the Old Testament; and one, of the New. Previous to

¹ H KAINH ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ. Novum Testamentum Græce ex Antiquissimo Codice Alexandrino a C. G. Woide olim descriptum: ad fidem ipsius Codicis denuo accuratius edidit B. H. Cowper. Londini venundant Williams & Norgate, et D. Nutt; Edinburgæ, Williams & Norgate. New York: B. Westermann & Soc. 1860. 8vo. pp. xxxviii. 503.

the present edition, the volume of the New Testament has been printed but once. It was published by the authorities of the British Museum, in 1786, in form, type, and all its features, a fac-simile of the MS., edited with Prolegomena and Notes by C. G. Woide. This edition was always expensive, and has now become very scarce. It was printed in capitals, without any regular division of the words, without accents or aspirates, and with very few marks of punctuation. It was, of course, somewhat difficult to read, except for the practised scholar. But all these features are changed in the new edition, which is printed in the common cursive type, with accents, aspirates, and the usual punctuation.

The original MS. is defective in several places. The Gospel of Matthew is wanting till ch. 25 : 6 ; and John's Gospel, from 6 : 50 to 8 : 52 ; and 2d Cor., from 4 : 13 to 12 : 6. The parts thus defective have been supplied from Kuster's edition of Mill's New Testament; the additions being inserted in brackets, so that they may be easily known. The orthography of the MS. is faithfully retained, except that the contractions are written out. The value of Cardinal Mai's edition of the Vatican Codex is greatly diminished by changes in the original orthography.

The order of the books of the New Testament in the three MSS. here referred to, is worthy of notice. In all of them, the four gospels stand first. The order in the Vatican and Alexandrine Codex is the same throughout : — the Acts following the Gospels ; then the Catholic Epistles ; the Epistles of Paul, as in our version, except that the Hebrews precedes 1st Timothy, and then the Apocalypse. But in the MS. found in the convent in Mount Sinai, Paul's Epistles follow the Gospels ; then Acts, the Catholic Epistles, and the Apocalypse, etc. Paul's Epistles and the Catholic Epistles have severally the same order in all the MSS. But in none of these MSS. is the order uniform with that of our version.

Since the publication of Cardinal Mai's edition of the Vatican Codex, a desire has been felt that the Alexandrine Codex should be made accessible in some similar form. This is now done, in the beautiful volume before us, elegantly printed, in large Greek type, by B. G. Teubner, of Leipsic. The still older MS. recently obtained by Tischendorf, and supposed to belong to the fourth century, we may expect will be equally accessible to biblical scholars in two or three years.

EBRARD'S COMMENTARY ON ST. JOHN'S EPISTLES.¹

DR. EBRARD is a pupil of the late Dr. Olshausen, and his successor. He is a man of evangelical views, and an eminent biblical scholar. The present

¹ Biblical Commentary on the Epistles of St. John ; in Continuation of the Work of Olshausen. With an Appendix on the Catholic Epistles, and an Introductory Essay on the Life and Writings of St. John. By Dr. John H. A. Ebrard. Translated by Rev. W. P. Pope, Manchester. Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street, 1860. 8vo. pp. xxxii. & 423.

volume is a continuation of Olshausen's Commentary on the New Testament, of which six volumes have been published in this country. It ably sustains the high character of the previous volumes, and generally gives broad, judicious, and critical views. The Essay on the apostle's Life and Writings is full, and thorough in its investigations. Dr. Ebrard considers the apostle John the author of the Gospel of John, the First Epistle, and the Apocalypse; the Second and Third Epistles he does not attribute to him, but to John the presbyter. The Second and Third Epistles very strikingly resemble each other in style and language, but differ widely from the First. Though the two last, in some of their expressions, have strong resemblances to the First; yet, as the author contends, they are only such as would naturally result from familiarity with the teachings and writings of the apostle John. In this way he would explain the obvious similarity between 2 John 5—7, 9, 12 with passages of the First Epistle. The similar expressions, he thinks, "did not proceed from the author's own mind, but were reminiscences and citations" (p. 366).

This view, Dr. Ebrard claims, does not interfere with the genuineness or canonical authority of the Second and Third Epistles.

THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S DEATH.¹

THIS book was originally printed in the Italian language, at Venice, in the year 1543. It was afterwards translated into the French language, and printed at Lyons. Then it was translated from the French into the English tongue, and published about the year 1577. The Italian original is now lost. The present edition is from the fourth English edition, which was "printed by E. G., for Andrew Hebb, dwelling at the signe of the Bell in Saint Paul's Churchyard, 1638." Its author was gibbeted, or, as some think, burned, by the papal Inquisition, for teaching "justification by faith," at Rome, in the year 1570. Forty thousand copies of this book are said to have been sold, in six years, to the Italians of the sixteenth century.

The volume contains many illustrations of the tendency to employ certain variations from the biblical language in expressing theological ideas: — "And therefore," writes Paleario, "may every poor sinner say, with an assured confidence: Thou, Christ, art my sin, and my curse; or rather, I am thy sin and thy curse," etc. (p. 114).

¹ The Benefits of Christ's Death; or, the glorious riches of God's free grace, which every true believer receives by Jesus Christ and him crucified. Originally written in Italian, by Aonio Paleario, and now reprinted from an Ancient English Translation. With an Introduction by Rev. John Ayer, M. A., Minister of St. John's Chapel, Hampstead, and Domestic Chaplain to the Earl of Roden. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington Street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. pp. 160. 18mo.

THOLUCK'S COMMENTARY ON THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT.¹

THOLUCK's Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount is one of his best works. The discussions are broad and thorough, revealing treasures of rich and varied learning. The meaning of the words is critically examined, and the connection of thought clearly brought out. In its present form, this is the fullest and most exhaustive exposition of the subject that has yet been given to the public.

The merits of the previous editions are not unknown to our readers. Of the improvements in the present edition, the author says : " Many things have presented themselves in a new and clearer light ; I have been able to explain several passages more satisfactorily from the Old Testament and from the works of the Rabbins. I have thrown aside much useless material, and have replaced it by the results of renewed investigations " (Preface, pp. 5 and 6).

RECENT WORKS RELATING TO CLASSICAL STUDY.

A Greek Grammar for Schools and Colleges. By James Hadley, Professor in Yale College. This Grammar is based upon the School Greek Grammar of Professor Curtius of the University of Kiel ; but it has been so thoroughly re-wrought that it is virtually an independent work. It gives, in clear and concise language, a methodical view of the forms, general laws, and idioms of the Greek language, embracing the most valuable results of Comparative Philology, so far as these relate to the Greek. The classification of the verb presents some new features, in regard to which there will be differences of opinion. The work is a scholarly and faithful exposition of the language of which it treats.

Virgil's Aeneid, with Explanatory Notes. By Henry S. Frieze, Professor of Latin in the State University of Michigan. The text of this edition is the revised one of Jahn ; the Notes, the editor modestly remarks, have been derived from most of the ablest Commentators on the Aeneid ; but they show fine taste, discrimination, and critical scholarship in the form which the editor has here given them ; they are neat and pointed, giving the pupil aid where he needs it, elucidating the construction by full references to the grammar, and making the meaning of the more difficult expressions, as well as the general course of thought, clearly understood. The value of the work is much increased by numerous cuts, designed to illustrate ancient usages, arts, costumes, utensils, implements of war, etc. We regard this as the best edition of the Aeneid for the use of schools, which we now have.

First Greek Book. By Albert Harkness, Professor of Greek in Brown University. Professor Harkness is already favorably known by his *Elemen-*

¹ A Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount. By Dr. A. Tholuck. Translated from the Fourth Revised and Enlarged edition, by the Rev. R. Lundin Brown, M. A. Philadelphia : Smith, English, & Co. New York : Sheldon, & Co.. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. 1860. 8vo. pp. 443.

tary Latin Books. His present work is on the same general principles. It contains a complete apparatus for the elementary study of Greek. It embraces the general grammatical principles of the language, accompanied by easy Greek sentences to be translated into English, and English to be translated into Greek; it likewise contains about twenty pages of Greek selections, and the requisite vocabularies. The work everywhere shows critical scholarship, and is a valuable, and at the same time an attractive, introduction to the study of Greek.

With the following views of the author explanatory of the general plan of the book, we heartily concur: "The present work is the result of a growing conviction on the part of the author that the old method of burdening the memory of the beginner with a confused mass of unmeaning forms, inflections, and rules, without allowing him the luxury of using the knowledge he is so laboriously acquiring, is at once unsatisfactory and unphilosophical. It accordingly aims to present a clear and systematic arrangement of the great facts and laws of the language, and to illustrate them step by step with carefully selected examples and exercises. In this way every lesson is learned for actual use, and thus becomes clothed with interest and meaning. The various changes of inflection, otherwise so dry and difficult, are found to be the keys to the rich treasures of ancient thought."¹

The three preceding works are published, in a very attractive style, by the Messrs. Appleton.

Modern Philology. By Benjamin W. Dwight. Second edition, revised and corrected. We expressed a very high estimate of the merits of this work on the appearance of the first edition, about a year since; and we now take pleasure in commending it anew, as containing rich contributions for the study of Philology.

An Analysis of the Greek Verb, by Marshall Henshaw, Professor in Rutgers College, is a clear and successful exhibition of the Greek Verb in its various forms. The root and the accessories of the different forms, prefixes, suffixes, tense-signs, etc., are distinctly presented to the eye by means of paradigms, so that the several elements of a given form are distinguished from one another. In this way a definite idea is gained of the way in which every form grows up. The use of this Analysis in our schools will greatly aid the student in comprehending what is usually considered the most difficult part of the Greek language.

An Ancient Geography, Classical and Sacred. By S. Augustus Mitchell. This is an entirely new edition, and embodies the results of the highest authorities on the subjects of which it treats. It is a practical manual for school use. It omits minute details, and yet is sufficiently full for its object. With the Latin forms of the names of places, it gives the Greek also; it likewise gives the etymology of the principal names. These two features

¹ Preface.

are new in a work of this kind, and add essentially to its value. It is well illustrated by engravings, and is published in the attractive style of Messrs. E. H. Butler and Company, Philadelphia.

Latin Pronunciation and the Latin Alphabet. By Dr. L. Tafel and Prof. R. L. Tafel. This little work of one hundred and seventy pages embodies the results of a prize essay, "On the Pronunciation, Vowel-System, and Accentuation of the Latin Language," by Professor W. Corssen, of Pforte. The Essay of Prof. Corssen is in two volumes, published in 1858 and 1859, and is regarded in Germany as a very able treatise. The subject here treated has been investigated with much interest in Germany within a few years past. Inscriptions have been collected from the early times of the Republic to the latest times of the Empire. By a careful study of these, and by comparing them with each other, it is claimed that the problem of Latin pronunciation among the Romans has been solved. Whether this claim be allowed or not, the volume before us will shed much light upon the subject, and will have special interest for the classical scholar.

The volume also describes the English, Scotch, and Continental methods of pronouncing Latin.

CHRISTIAN SONGS—Translations and other poems. By the Rev. James Gilborne Lyons, LL. D. "The Service of Song." Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., 23 North Sixth Street. 1861. pp. 157. 18mo.

MANY of these poems are truly beautiful. The versification is smooth and elegant. A delightful Christian spirit pervades the original poems. Several of the translations from the heathen poets are prefaced with judicious remarks, and are thus invested with a religious garb.

ELEMENTARY GEOLOGY. By Edward Hitchcock, D. D., LL. D., Professor in Amherst College, and Charles H. Hitchcock, A. M., Lecturer on Zoölogy and Curator of the Cabinets in Amherst College. Remodelled, mostly re-written, with several New Chapters, and brought up to the Present State of the Science. For use in Schools, Families, and by Individuals. New York: Ivison, Phinney & Co., 48 & 50 Walker Street. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 39 and 41 Lake Street. Boston: Brown & Taggard. Philadelphia: Tower, Barnes & Co. and J. B. Lippincott & Co. Cincinnati: Moore, Willstock, Keys & Co. Savannah: J. M. Cooper & Co. St. Louis: Keith & Woods. New Orleans: E. R. Stevens & Co. Detroit: Raymond & Lapham. 1860. pp. 430, 12mo.

THIS volume has been elaborated with great care. It forms an admirable introduction to a science, the extent and importance of which are daily augmenting.

A DICTIONARY OF THE HOLY BIBLE for General Use in the Study of the Scriptures, with Engravings, Maps, and Tables. Published by the American Tract Society. New York: 150 Nassau Street. pp. 534. 12mo.
A CONVENIENT manual.

ANALYTIC ORTHOGRAPHY : An Investigation of the Sounds of the Voice, and their Alphabetic Notation ; including the Mechanism of Speech and its Bearing upon Etymology. By S. S. Haldeman, A. M., Professor in Delaware College ; Member of the American Philosophical Society ; of the Academy of Natural Science of Philadelphia ; of the American Oriental Society ; of the Imperial Economic Society of St. Petersburg ; Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences ; Honorary Member of the Historical Society of Wisconsin ; Correspondent of the Natural History Society of Nuremberg ; of the Boston Society of Natural History ; of the New York Historical Society ; of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania ; of the Maryland Historical Society ; and of the American Ethnological Society. Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott & Co. London : Trübner & Co. Paris : Benjamin Duprat. Berlin : Ferd. Dümmler. 1860. pp. 148. 4to.

MEMOIR OF THE LIFE, CHARACTER, AND WRITINGS OF PHILIP DODDRIDGE, D. D. With a Selection from his Correspondence. Compiled by Rev. James R. Boyd, A. M., Editor of English Poets, with Notes, etc. Published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York. pp. 480. 12mo.

WE wish that this volume had contained a notice of the criticisms which have been pronounced upon Dr. Doddridge's account of the conversion of Colonel Gardiner, especially as these criticisms have been revived in the recent Memoir of Dr. Carlyle.

BISHOP BUTLER'S ANALOGY OF RELIGION, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Edited, with an Analysis, by J. T. Champlin, D. D., President of Waterville College. Boston : Published by Bazin and Ellsworth. 1860. pp. 194. 12mo.

THIS volume contains, in an Appendix, Butler's Ethical Discourses. It is well printed, and is admirably adapted to its purpose, — that of a Text Book in our colleges.

THE HOLY BIBLE. Containing the Old and New Testaments. Translated and Arranged with Notes. By Leicester Ambrose Sawyer. Vol. II. : The Later Prophets. Boston : Walker, Wise & Co., 245 Washington Street. 1861. pp. 384. 12mo.

MR. SAWYER'S edition of the New Testament has been extensively noticed. His version of the Old Testament will be examined more carefully, when it is completed.

THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND SCIENCE ; or, the Ancient Hebraic Idea of the Six Days of Creation. With an Essay on the Literary Character of Tayler Lewis. Andover : Warren F. Draper. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. New York : John Wiley. Philadelphia : Smith, English & Co. 1860. pp. 437. 12mo.

THIS volume is a reply to several Articles in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, respecting the Mosaic account of the creation.

RECENT INQUIRIES IN THEOLOGY. By Eminent English Churchmen; Being "Essays and Reviews." Reprinted from the Second London Edition. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rev. Frederic H. Hedge, D. D. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co., 245 Washington Street. 1860. pp. 480. 12mo.

THESE Essays contain very little which is new, and owe their chief importance to the scholarly and decorous style in which they state the old objections to the strict inspiration of the Bible. These objections have been often answered, and have acquired no new force.

THE CHRISTIAN ELEMENT IN PLATO AND THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. Unfolded and set forth, by Dr. C. Ackermann, Archdeacon at Jena. Translated from the German by Samuel A. Asbury, B. A. With an Introductory Note by William G. T. Shedd, D. D., Brown Professor at Andover Theol. Seminary. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson, 1861. pp. 280. 8vo.

MR. ASBURY was a graduate of Andover Theological Seminary, in the year 1860, and is now a missionary in India.

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, from the Discovery of the American Continent. By George Bancroft. Vol. VIII. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1860. pp. 475. 8vo.

IT is superfluous to utter a word in commendation of a History so well known as that of Mr. Bancroft. The eighth volume equals its predecessors in interest.

From the House of Gould & Lincoln we have received the following works:

PROLEGOMENA LOGICA: An Inquiry into the Psychological Character of Logical Processes. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D., LL. D., Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Oxford, Editor of Sir William Hamilton's Lectures; Author of "Limits of Religious Thought," etc. First American from the Second English edition, corrected and enlarged. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Company. Cincinnati: George L. Blanchard. 1860. pp. 291. 12mo.

THIS volume deserves a more lengthened notice than we have, thus far, found space to give. We hope, ere long, to consider it and some kindred works in a more appropriate manner than our crowded pages have yet allowed.

EVENINGS WITH THE DOCTRINES. By Nehemiah Adams, D. D., author of "Friends of Christ," "Christ a Friend," "Communion Sabbath," etc. etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1861. pp. 415. 12mo.

ALL the works of Dr. Adams contain passages of interest and eloquence. The practical influence of the present work will be salutary.

THE YEAR OF GRACE : A History of the Revival in Ireland, A. D. 1859.
By the Rev. William Gibson, Professor of Christian Ethics in Queen's College, Belfast, and Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. With an Introduction by Rev. Baron Stow, D. D. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. New York : Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati : George S. Blanchard. 1860. pp. 464. 12mo.

AN interesting volume.

THE ROMANCE OF NATURAL HISTORY. By Philip Henry Gosse, F. R. S. Author of " Aquarium," " History of the Jews," " Rivers of the Bible," " Natural History of Birds, Mammals, Reptiles," " The Ocean," " Popular British Ornithology," etc. etc. With elegant Illustrations. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. New York : Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati : George S. Blanchard. 1861. pp. 372. 12mo.

THIS volume is well fitted to fascinate the young.

FORTY YEARS' EXPERIENCE in Sunday Schools. By Stephen H. Tyng, D. D., Rector of St. George's Church, New York. New York : Sheldon & Co. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. 1860. pp. 251. 18mo.

LETTERS FROM SWITZERLAND. By Samuel Irenæus Prime, Author of " Travels in Europe and the East," etc. etc. New York : Sheldon & Co. 115 Nassau Street. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. 1860. pp. 264. 12mo.

THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON. By Edward Everett. New York : Sheldon & Co. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. 1860. pp. 348. 12mo.

IT is certainly remarkable that so much of original matter, on so hackneyed a theme, has been brought within so small a compass as we find it in the present volume.

AMERICAN HISTORY. By Jacob Abbott. Illustrated with numerous Maps and Engravings. Vol. I.—Aboriginal America; Vol. II.—Discovery of America. New York : Sheldon & Co. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. 18mo. pp. 288 and 288.

From the House of William S. & Alfred Martien we have received the following publications :

MAN, MORAL AND PHYSICAL : or, the Influence of Health and Disease on Religious Experience. By the Rev. Joseph H. Jones, D. D., Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Philadelphia : William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut Street. 1860. pp. 300. 12mo.

"THE STARS AND THE ANGELS." Philadelphia : William S. & Alfred Martien. 1860. pp. 358. 12mo.

NOTES ON SCRIPTURE. By Joel Jones, LL. D. Philadelphia : William S. & Alfred Martien. 1861. pp. 584. 8vo.

A VALUABLE work for practical, intelligent Christians.

A COMMENTARY ON THE SONG OF SOLOMON. By George Burrowes, D. D. Second Edition, revised. Philadelphia : William S. & Alfred Martien. 1860. pp. 454. 12mo.

From Robert Carter & Brothers we have received the following works :

GILDAS SALVIANUS. The Reformed Pastor : showing the Nature of the Pastoral Work, especially in Private Instruction and Catechising ; with an Open Confession of our too Open Sins. Prepared for a Day of Humiliation, kept at Worcester, December 4, 1655, by the Ministers of that County, who subscribed the Agreement for Catechising and Personal Instruction, at their entrance upon that work. By the Rev. Richard Baxter. New York : Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. M.DCCC.LX. pp. 560. 8vo.

THIS work of Richard Baxter *can* not be praised too highly, and *need* not be praised at all.

OUTLINES OF THEOLOGY. By the Rev. A. Alexander Hodge, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Fredericksburg, Virginia. New York : Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. pp. 522. 8vo.

AN EXPOSITION OF THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES. By the Rev. Charles Bridges, M. A., Rector of Hinton Martell, Dorsett, author of an "Exposition of Psalm CXIX ;" "Commentary on Proverbs ;" "Christian Ministry ;" "Memoir of Mary Jane Graham ;" etc. New York : Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. pp. 389. 12mo.

ALL the works of Mr. Bridges are valuable helps to Christian devotion.

A BRIEF TREATISE ON THE CANON AND INTERPRETATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ; for the special benefit of Junior Theological Students ; but intended also for Private Christians in general. By Alex. McClelland, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick. New York : Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. pp. 336. 12mo.

THIS volume contains many shrewd and sagacious remarks. It will be read with interest and profit.

MY SAVIOUR : or, Devotional Meditations, in Prose and Verse, on the Names and Titles of the Lord Jesus Christ. By the Rev. John East, A. M., Rector of Croscombe, Somerset, Eng. New York : Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. pp. 252. 18mo.

From the house of Charles Scribner we have received the following publications :

NOTES ON NEW TESTAMENT LITERATURE AND ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY. By Joseph Addison Alexander, D. D. New York : Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. London : Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1861. pp. 319. 12mo.

MANY of these Notes are suggestive, and well adapted to quicken the mind.

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO MATTHEW. Explained by Joseph Addison Alexander, D. D. New York : Charles Scribner. 1861. pp. 456. 12mo.

THIS Commentary exhibits the same intellectual traits, and is written in the same style, which characterize the previous commentaries of its author.

THOUGHTS ON PREACHING. Being Contributions to Homiletics. By James W. Alexander, D. D. New York : Charles Scribner. 1861. pp. 514. 12mo.

THIS volume is fragmentary, yet valuable. It contains many valuable hints, which will be incorporated in some future System of Homiletics.

CHRISTIAN NURTURE. By Horace Bushnell. New York : Charles Scribner. 1861. pp. 407. 12mo.

THE writings of Dr. Bushnell are characterized by freshness and originality of thought, and by great vigor of diction. The substance of the present volume has elicited much controversy, and will doubtless continue to challenge investigation.

We have received from Messrs. Lindsay & Blakiston, of Philadelphia, the *seventh* edition of Kurtz's Manual of Sacred History. In a previous Volume, we have commended this as "the best book of the kind we have ever examined."

From the same publishers we have Kurtz's Text Book of Church History, Vol. I. extending to the Reformation ; Vol. II. (which is in preparation) will extend to the present time. This is a very convenient and reliable manual. The author is eminent in his department ; and he has here condensed, into one 12mo. volume of 534 pages, a vast amount of well-digested and well-arranged matter, relating to the history of the church.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
No. LXXI.

AND
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY,
No. CXXIII.

JULY, 1861.

ARTICLE I.

WAS THE APOSTLE PAUL THE AUTHOR OF THE EPISTLE
TO THE HEBREWS?

BY PROFESSOR R. D. C. ROBBINS, MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

Introductory Remarks.

THE Epistle to the Hebrews has met the fate of all anonymous productions in every age. We cannot wonder that its authorship has been much questioned in modern times, when even Shakspeare's Plays have been accused of illegitimacy, and the Iliad and Odyssey, instead of being allowed to claim the honor of descent from the blind old bard of Scio's rocky isle, have been compelled to be content with an origin from wandering minstrels or cyclic poets. If Junius still wanders like "Japhet in search of a Father," or, with less success than Electra in the play, is yet unable to discern a brother's locks among all its contemporaries, we cannot wonder that an anonymous writing of the first century of the Christian era, whose real or supposed author is not mentioned for a hundred years at least after it first appeared, has given occasion to some discussion in these latter ages, in which, if

a doubt should arise in reference to the foundation of the most costly structure, some hand would be found ruthless enough to undermine it in order to solve the doubt.

In tracing the history of the treatment of this Epistle in ages past, the greatest wonder is, that it should have been, with so little opposition, attributed to one author. The number who have *fully* denied its Pauline origin is certainly very few. And still fewer have been able to satisfy themselves who the author was, if not the apostle Paul. One has conjectured that Barnabas, another that the evangelist Luke, another that Apollos or Silvanus, wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews; but the arguments that have been adduced have been few and of little weight. The canonical authority of the Epistle does not necessarily depend upon the Pauline authorship, although the proof of both is, to a considerable extent, the same; hence some have doubtless felt that it was of comparatively little importance to determine who its author was. Still it cannot be denied that it lends additional interest to the book, if we can feel that it is the production of the great apostle; and especially do the arguments for the superiority of the Christian to the Jewish dispensation gain additional force in the words of him who was a Hebrew of the Hebrews, and had been educated in all the strictness of the Jewish schools, and in the centre of Jewish influence.

It will not, we hope, be deemed inappropriate to ask the attention of the readers of the Bibliotheca once more to the arguments that may have a bearing upon the authorship of this epistle. Most of them have often been brought forward previously, and may be quite familiar to those who have paid special attention to the literature of the epistle; but still they must be repeated, at some length, in order to present the combined influence of the whole proof, which seems to us quite conclusive in favor of its Pauline authorship.

We shall naturally first give the external testimony in reference to the author of the epistle, and then the internal proofs, with such an examination of the objections which have been adduced as the limits of a Review Article will allow.

The Epistle in the Apostolic Age.

During the apostolic age there is no positive testimony in reference to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Many, indeed, maintain that 2 Pet. 3 : 15, 16 is conclusive : " And account that the long-suffering of our Lord is salvation ; even as our beloved brother Paul also, according to the wisdom given unto him, hath written unto you ; as also in all *his* epistles, speaking in them of these things ; in which are some things hard to be understood," etc. It cannot be doubted that there is a similarity of language and sentiment in the first clause of verse 16 to some passages in Hebrews ; as 6 : 12 ; 4 : 15, 16 ; 2 : 17, 18 ; 12 : 24, and we find, also, in Heb. 5 : 11, 12, a passage on which verse 16 may be based. Besides, Forster contends that Peter, in both his epistles, " is under great obligations to the Epistle to the Hebrews for peculiarities of thought and language." He uses " several remarkable words, peculiar to Hebrews and his own two epistles,"¹ and also uses them in connection with " other peculiar words belonging to St. Paul's unquestioned epistles,"² while " these verbal coincidences will be found to open out into coincidences of sentiment and reasoning on a more extended scale."³ Still there does not seem to be anything positive and distinguishing enough to warrant the

¹ *Ἄνωγ*, for example, applied to the death of Christ, *once* for all (1 Pet. 3 : 18 ; Heb. 9 : 26, 28) ; *εἰσόδος*, understood of the entrance of the faithful into Christ's kingdom and glory (2 Pet. 1 : 11 ; Heb. 10 : 19) ; *ἀμύαντος*, applied to designate Christ and Christ's inheritance (1 Pet. 1 : 4 ; Heb. 7 : 26) ; *ἑμῶμος*, employed in the same peculiar sense and application (1 Pet. 1 : 19 ; Heb. 9 : 14). This decisive coincidence is unexampled elsewhere, throughout the New Testament ; *συμπαθής* (1 Pet. 3 : 8) ; *συμπαθεῖν* (Heb. 4 : 15 ; 10 : 34) ; *βαντισμός* (1 Pet. 1 : 2 ; Heb. 12 : 24 ; cf. also, 9 : 13, 19, 21 ; 10 : 22) ; *παρεπιδήμιος* (1 Pet. 1 : 1 ; 2 : 11 ; Heb. 11 : 13). Forster's Apostolical Authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Sec. 14. p. 628.

² *E. g.*, *ἑμῶμος*, 1 Pet. 1 : 19, is coupled with *ἄσπιλος* (a word borrowed also by James), 1 Tim. 6 : 14 ; *ἀμύαντος*, again, 1 Pet. 1 : 4 is conjoined with the Pauline term *ἄφθαρτος* (1 Cor. 9 : 25) ; *παρεπιδήμιος* (1 Pet. 2 : 11), with *πάρκοικος* (Eph. 2 : 19) ; while *βαντισμός* stands in connection (1 Pet. 1 : 2) with the Pauline word *ἁγιασμός* and with *ὁπακοή*, the keystone of Romans, p. 628, 9.

³ On this point cf. 1 Pet. 1 : 1 ; 2 : 11, with Heb. 11 : 13, and Eph. 2 : 19 ; 1 Pet. 1 : 2, with Heb. 12 : 14, 24, and Heb. 9 : 13, 19, 20, 21, and 10 : 19, 22 ; 1 Pet. 1 : 9, 19—20, with Heb. 10 : 36, and Heb. 1 : 1 ; and 9 : 14, and various other passages quoted and commented upon by Forster, p. 629, sq.

confidence which Forster expresses upon this point. It merely amounts to a *probability*, not to a *certainty*.

Forster (p. 567) also finds incidental proof of the Pauline origin of the Hebrews in Barnabas, Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, and especially in Polycarp. The argument in the latter Father in favor of the Epistle of the Hebrews, he thus sums up: "His whole epistle [to the Philippians] consists of phrases and sentiments *taken from the New Testament*. The existence, it follows, of marks of reference in this epistle, to the Epistle to the Hebrews, is, in other words, so far as it goes, the existence of testimony to the canonical authority of this epistle, as valid as that to the canonical authority of any other part of the New Testament. But the marks in St. Polycarp, of reference to the Epistle to the Hebrews, are (his reference to the epistles of Peter not excepted) more numerous than his marks of reference to any other book of the New Testament. The shortness of the latter will enable the reader, without trouble or difficulty, to judge for himself as to the correctness of this statement; while the statement itself will admit of being materially lowered without affecting in the least degree the validity of the proof arising from the series of coincidences here submitted. In the last place, the whole body of references, possible, probable, and undoubted, are, in argumentative fairness, to be taken in connection with the fact that there exists, in this letter of Polycarp to the Philippians, one passage which, tried by the received tests of criticism, amounts to *an undoubted quotation, as a precept of apostolical authority, or rather as a precept of Saint Paul*, of Heb. 12 : 28."

In weighing the testimony of the Apostolic Fathers, we should not forget that the question had not apparently yet arisen in reference to the author and authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and that the testimony in reference to it is "as strongly marked as most of the testimonies of an equally early date bearing upon the canonical authority of the other books of the New Testament. At the commencement of the second century of the Christian era, the Epistle to the Hebrews consequently stood on the same footing, in point

of historical evidences, with by far the greater part of the New Testament.”¹ There is certainly a greater number of allusions, in Clemens Romanus, to the Epistle of the Hebrews than to any other epistle of the New Testament.² Still he nowhere mentions the name of the title or author. Neither does he, in his allusions to the Epistles to the Thessalonians, Ephesians, Romans, Galatians, Colossians, Timothy, only in chap. 47, where he cites the first Epistle to the Corinthians, he reminds the Corinthians most naturally, having special occasion to do so, of that which Paul had already written to them.³

The Testimony of the Eastern Church.

The first testimony is that of *Pantaenus*, the head of the celebrated school at Alexandria, about A. D. 180, “the most learned Christian of the age in which he lived, and one whose weight and authority in the churches was very great.” It is found in an extract from his successor, Clement’s work “Hypotyposes,” preserved by Eusebius,⁴ and is as follows: “Now, as our blessed presbyter [Pantaenus] has said, since the Lord himself was sent by the Almighty as an apostle to the Hebrews, Paul being an apostle to the Gentiles, on account of modesty does not subscribe himself as the apostle to the Hebrews, both out of reverence for his Lord, and because, being a preacher and an apostle to the Gentiles, by a kind of supererogation he wrote to the Hebrews.”⁵

This view of Pantaenus is referred to by *Clement* in proof of his own belief, that Paul was the original author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. For immediately preceding the above quotation from Herodotus, he says: “In the work

¹ Forster, p. 613, 614.

² See Kirchhofer’s *Quellensammlung zur Gesch. d. N. Test. Kanons*, p. 233 seq; Ebrard App. to Comm. Ch. 4 (A), and Forster, p. 575 seq.

³ Ebrard, App. p. 395. Davidson’s *Introd.* Vol. III. p. 262.

⁴ Hist. Eccl. Lib. VI. Ch. 14.

⁵ Ἡ δὲ ὡς ὁ μακάριος ἔλεγε πρεσβύτερος, ἐπεὶ ὁ Κύριος ἀπόστολος ὦν, τοῦ παντοκράτορος ἀπεστάλη πρὸς Ἑβραίους, διὰ μετρώτητα ὁ Παῦλος ὡς ἂν εἰς τὰ ἔθνη ἀπεσταλμένος οὐκ ἐγγράφει ἑαυτὸν Ἑβραίων ἀπόστολον, διὰ τε τὴν πρὸς τὸν κύριον τιμὴν, διὰ τε τὸ ἐκ περιστάσεως, καὶ τοῖς Ἑβραίοις ἐπιστέλλειν, ἔθνων κήρυκα ὄντα καὶ ἀπόστολον.

called Hypotyposes, he [Clement] asserts that Paul is the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and that as it was addressed to the Hebrews, it was written in the Hebrew language ; but that Luke, carefully translating it, gave it to the Greeks. Whence the same coloring of style is found as in the Acts of the Apostles. The inscription : ' Paul the apostle,' is not probably added, because writing to the Hebrews, who were prejudiced against him and suspected him, he very prudently would not deter them from reading it by prefixing his name."¹

It is a matter of no importance, as far as our present purpose, the authorship of the epistle, is concerned, whether the reason given for the omission of the name is the real one or not. The fact that he was at least the original author, seems to be unquestioned. But we have still further proof in the writings of Clement still extant, that Paul was the author, without any reference to the Hebrew original. *E.g.*, "Stromata ii. p. 362, where, in the midst of a literal quotation from Heb. 11 : 1, 2, 6, Clement adds : *κατὰ τὸν θεῖον ἀπόστολον*, according to the divine apostle, i. e. Paul. Cf. also p. 364. In p. 420, he cites Heb. 6 : 11, 20 in connection with Gal. 5 : 6, and both as declarations of Paul. Ibid. iv. p. 514 sq., he cites Heb. 10 : 32—39 and 11 : 36—39, expressly calling them the declarations of the same apostle who wrote Phil. 4 : 11—13, which he had just cited. In p. 525, he attributes Heb. 12 : 14—16 ; 13 : 4 to the same apostle who wrote Titus 2 : 3, which he had just cited. In p. 577 he cites Heb. 5 : 12 ; 6 : 1 expressly as the words of Paul ; and again, in p. 645, he cites a part of the same passage in the same manner."

The testimony of Clement is specially valuable, since he

¹ Ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ὑποτυπώσεσι . . . τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους ἐπιστολὴν Παύλου μὲν εἶναι φησί· γεγράφθαι δὲ Ἑβραίοις Ἑβραϊκῇ φωνῇ· Δουκᾶν δὲ φιλοτίμως μεθερμηνεύσαντα ἐκδιδόναι τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. "Ὅθεν τὸν αὐτὸν χρῶτα εὗρίσκεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστολῆς καὶ τῶν πράξεων. Μὴ προγεγράφθαι δὲ τὸ, Παῦλος ἀπόστολος, εἰκότως· Ἑβραίοις γὰρ φησιν ἐπιστέλλων πρόληψιν εἰληφόσι κατ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὑποκτενοῦσιν αὐτὸν, συνετῶς πάνυ οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀπέστρεψεν αὐτοὺς τὸ ὄνομα θεῖς. Lib. VI. 14.

² See Stuart's Introd. to Comm. on Heb. § 7. p. 88, 9. Ebrard, App. ch. 4 (A) ; Davidson's Introd. Vol. III. p. 187 ; Bleek Einl. p. 99 seq. et alii.

had not passed his whole life shut up in the school of Alexandria, but "had travelled in Greece, Italy, the East, and Egypt, in quest of knowledge, and employed masters in these countries." He may then be considered as giving substantially the general sentiment of the churches, both in the East and West, at the close of the second century. For it is hardly supposable that he would so often and positively speak of Paul as the author of the Hebrews, if he had known of any considerable opposition to this view, without making some allusion to it.

Origen, who flourished about A. D. 220, was the successor of Clement at Alexandria, and spent most of his life in the study and explanation of the scriptures, is the next witness for our epistle. That he often cites it as Pauline in origin cannot be questioned. In his Comm. in Joh. (Opp. iv. p. 60), he says : "And in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the same Paul says : God, who in ancient times, etc., Heb. 1 : 1, 2 ;" ¹ and again, p. 162 : "Paul, in the Epistle to the Hebrews." ² In his book against Celsus, he says : "For it is written by Paul, in his letter to the Corinthians and the *same* apostle says, *ye have need*,³ etc., Heb. 5 : 12." In his treatise on prayer, he quotes the Epistle to the Hebrews as an epistle of the same apostle who wrote the Epistle to the Ephesians (De Oratione, i. p. 250). In a homily preserved in a Latin translation, he says : "Paul himself, the greatest of the apostles, writing to the Hebrews, says," and then quotes Heb. 12 : 18, 22, 23.⁴ In addition to numerous references similar to the above, he (in Homil. vii. in Jos.) ascribes *fourteen* epistles to Paul, including of course our epistle to make out the number. It is true that he sometimes speaks of it as if its authorship were questioned, as in his Comm. on Matt. 22 : 27, where, after quoting the Hebrews he says : "But suppose

¹ Καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑβραίους, ὁ αὐτὸς Παῦλος φησι, κ. τ. λ.

² Ὁ δὲ Παῦλος, ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑβραίους, κ. τ. λ.

³ Γέγραπται γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Παύλῳ ἡμῶν Κορινθίοις ἐπιστέλλοντι ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς φησὶ, καὶ γεγόνατε χρεῖαν ἔχοντες, κ. τ. λ.

⁴ Ipse ergo apostolorum maximus Paulus dicit, ad Hebræos, scribens, etc. See, also, numerous other references to the same effect as the above, in Stuart's Heb., Introd. § 7, Bleek Einl. et alii.

that some one rejects the Epistle to the Hebrews as not Paul's,"¹ and, a little after: "Yet if any receives the Hebrews as Paul's."² There is also a passage in a letter to Africanus, in which he speaks of *the* inclination of those who reject the epistle as not being Paul's, and adds: "With one who does thus, other reasons must be privately employed, in order to show that Paul was the author of the epistle."³

The whole testimony of Origen is perhaps best preserved by Herodotus, in an extract from one of Origen's homilies on the Hebrews, which were published when he was more than sixty years old; and though long, ought perhaps to be quoted entire here. "The style of the Epistle to the Hebrews has not the negligence in diction of the apostle who confesses himself to be rude in speech, *i. e.*, phraseology.

¹ "Sed pone aliquem abdicare epistolam ad Hæbraeos quasi non Pauli," etc. Ebrard says that Origen in this and the following passages presupposes an *absolute denial* of the Pauline authorship as possible, but only as *possible*. . . . He distinctly takes it for granted that some might feel themselves compelled to doubt the authority on *internal grounds*, etc. Ap. IV. (A). Tamen siquis suscipit ad Hæb. quasi epistolam Pauli, etc. See Davidson's *Introd.* Vol. III. p. 187.

² Thus Ebrard says: "The question treated of in the context of this passage (εἰ τις οὖν ἐκκλησία ἔχει ταύτην ἐπιστολὴν ὡς Παύλου), is not at all, whether the epistle was written by Paul or came into existence *without Paul having anything to do with it*. That the ancient tradition imputed it to Paul was a settled point, and only the certainty of this tradition would induce Clement and Origen to form these two conjectures, by which the un-Pauline style *at variance with* the tradition might be explained. The question with Origen is rather, whether the epistle, *precisely as we have it in Greek*, can have come directly from Paul. The old tradition called it Pauline; the un-Pauline style had, however, justly (?) struck the Alexandrians; it had become the settled opinion among them that the epistle in its present form could not be directly from Paul; either it is a translation of an Aramaic original (as Clement wrongly supposed), or, according to the preferable conjecture of Origen, Paul did not dictate the words of it, but gave only the *νοήματα* for it. These views, under the influence of the catechist school in Alexandria and the neighborhood, may have been generally spread; hence Origen carelessly mentions them; but then it may have struck him that this hypothesis might give offence, that there might possibly be churches which would zealously maintain the immediately Pauline origin. Against these, he says, we cannot take any steps, as the ancient tradition names the epistle simply as one of Paul's. That the words ἔχει αὐτὴν ὡς Παύλου, according to the context, forms the antitheses only to the view of Origen, and not to an opinion according to which the authorship of Paul would be absolutely denied, is indeed clear as the sun." App. IV. p. 398.

³ Stuart's *Comm. Introd.* § 7.

But the Epistle is written in purer Greek, as every one must confess who is able to discern differences in style." Again, he says: "The thoughts in this epistle are admirable, and not inferior to the acknowledged writings of the apostle. This every one will grant who is familiar with his productions." Afterwards he adds: "I should say that my belief is that the sentiments are the apostle's, but the phraseology and diction belong to some one who expresses in words the thoughts of the apostle, and as it were commented on the words of his master. If then [*however*] any church receives this epistle as Paul's, let it even receive commendation for this; for not without reason have the ancients handed it down as Paul's. Who penned the epistle, God only certainly knows; but a report has come to us from certain ones, who say that Clement, bishop of Rome, and from others that Luke, the author of the Acts, wrote this epistle."¹

From this testimony of Origen several points should be noticed.

1. It is indisputable that he had an unquestioning belief that the Epistle to the Hebrews was in substance the production of Paul. The numerous instances of direct quotation from it as the apostle's, just as he quoted his unquestioned epistles, and his unhesitating ascription of *fourteen* epistles to him, put the matter beyond legitimate question.

2. He held this belief with the feeling that the style differed from Paul's in his other epistles, and with the knowledge that it had been controverted, but with the confidence that there were arguments sufficient to convince the disbeliever; "for with such a one," he says, "other reasons must be privately employed in order to show that *Paul was the author*."

¹ Ὁ χαρακτήρ τῆς λέξεως τῆς πρὸς Ἑβραίους ἐπιγεγραμμένης ἐπιστολῆς, οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἐν λόγῳ ἰδιωτικὸν τοῦ ἀποστόλου, ὁμολογήσαντος αὐτὸν ἰδιώτην εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ, τουτέστι τῇ φράσει. Ἀλλὰ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστολὴ συνθέσει τῆς λέξεως Ἑλληνικωτέρα, πᾶς ὁ ἐπιστάμενος κρίνειν φράσεων διαφορὰς, ὁμολογήσαι ἔν. Πάλιν τε αὖ ὅτι τὰ νοήματα τῆς ἐπιστολῆς δωδεκάδι ἐστί, καὶ οὐ δεῦτερα τῶν ἀποστολικῶν ὁμολογουμένων γραμμάτων. Καὶ τοῦτο ἂν συμφέσαι εἶναι ἀληθὲς πᾶς ὁ προσέχων τῇ ἀναγνώσει τῇ ἀποστολικῇ.

3. We have proof from these quotations that the authority of tradition, as he estimated it, was in favor of the *direct* Pauline origin of the epistle. For what else can he mean by the declaration: "The ancients (οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἄνδρες)¹ have, not without reason, handed it down as Paul's; i. e., as *his* in opposition to Origen's view, that the thoughts were his, while the language was another's?

4. There is no proof, from Origen, that there was a tradition that either Clement or Luke was the author of the Hebrews, only that an opinion to that effect had been expressed in his own time; for nothing more can safely be made out from the phrase ἡ δὲ εἰς ἡμᾶς φθάσασα,² *a report has come to our ears*, especially when taken in connection with the words ὑπὸ τινων μὲν λεγόντων, κ. τ. λ. *from those who say*, etc.

5. The meaning of the declaration "Who wrote the epistle," etc., is not who is the *author of it*, but *who committed it to writing*, who penned it. Otherwise there would be a direct contradiction to what he says in this same passage: *the sentiment, or thoughts, are the apostle's*, as well as to his frequent and unequivocal designation of Paul as the author in numerous other passages.

6. Although Origen, from *the style merely*, attributed the penning of the epistle, perhaps from Paul's dictation, to some other hand than the apostle's, yet he was not able to designate the person, and did not give his assent to the report that Clement or Luke wrote it, and did not allow this notion in reference to the style to weaken

¹ The reference of οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, *exclusively* to Clement and Pantaenus is absurd, since they were Origen's immediate predecessors and almost contemporaries. Thus Davidson well says: "If Origen does not intend *all the ancients*, including the Christians in the East and West, he must refer generally to the ancient men belonging to the Alexandrian church. And those who were ancient in relation to this father must have immediately succeeded the apostles. Thus Pantaenus and Clement may be *numbered among the ancients*, though it is an arbitrary and unnatural restriction to limit it to them." Vol. III. p. 190.

² We are aware that Davidson and others maintain that this phrase implies that "such accounts had existed before his time," but it seems to us without good reason. See Davidson's Introd. Vol. III. p. 190.

his confidence in it as the *real* production of the great apostle.¹

After the time of Origen, for two centuries at least, the testimony of the church and school at Alexandria is unhesitating and unvaried. Dyonisius, his disciple, who flourished about A. D. 247, says in an epistle to Fabius of Antioch: "Paul also says, 'They also, like those to whom Paul bore testimony (Hebrews 10:34), took with joy the spoiling of their goods.'"² Theophrastus (about A. D. 282) is equally explicit: "Paul also says, For it is impossible for those who have been once enlightened," etc. (Heb. 6:4—6).³ So Hierax, Peter, Alexander, Athanasius, Theophilus, Serapion, Cyril of Alexandria, down to Euthalius (A. D. 460), who, although he recognizes the fact that objections have been made to it, yet sets them aside and declares it to be Paul's.⁴ Other persons in Egypt, though not Alexandrians, might also be quoted, but it is deemed unnecessary.⁵

We should not neglect to notice that its position in the canon was different in these early ages from the one it now occupies. Ebrard says its Pauline origin "is confirmed by the remarkable circumstance that the Epistle to the Hebrews, as is still evident from the numbering of the Kephalaia in the Cod. B., originally stood between the Ep.

¹ Thus Forster says: "Origen, at the commencement of the third century, following out, apparently, an obscure hint of his master, Clement of Alexandria, first started a doubt as to the Greek of the Epistle to the Hebrews being the composition of Saint Paul; the style, in his opinion, being *ελληνικωτέρα*, purer Greek than that of St. Paul in his other writings. *This doubt, however, regarded not in the least degree the question of authorship.* For both Origen and Clement, agreeably to the tradition of the church in their time, constantly held the epistle to be the production of St. Paul. The opinion, therefore, pronounced by the former, amounts only to this, — the private judgment of a very eminent, but very fanciful scholar, on the character of St. Paul's Greek style." Apostol. Auth. of Hebr. Introd. p. 5.

² Καὶ τὴν ἀρπαλὴν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις οἷς καὶ Παῦλος ἐμαρτύρησε (Heb. 10:34), μετὰ χαρᾶς προσεδέξαντο. Hierod. Hist. Eccl. VI. 41.

³ Apud Athan. Opp. Ep. ad Serap., quoted by Davidson; καὶ ὁ Παῦλος δὲ φησὶν ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῖς ἀπαξ φωτισθέντας, κ. τ. λ.

⁴ See for the references in these authors, Stuart's Com. Introd. § 7, and Davidson, III. p. 191.

⁵ See Stuart, as above.

to the Galatians and that to the Ephesians, and was not till a later period in the fourth century placed after the Epistle to the Thessalonians (as in Cod. A and C), and still later after the pastoral epistles.”¹

In Syria, Palestine, and Greece, the tradition was uniformly in favor of the Pauline authorship, until the time of the Arian controversy. About the middle of the third century the council at Antioch, in its official capacity, definitely designates it as Paul's, and ranks it with the epistles to the Corinthians: now the Lord is that Spirit, according to the apostle (2 Cor. 3:17). And, according to the same, For they drank of the spiritual rock, etc. (1 Cor. 10:4) And of Moses the apostle writes: Esteeming the reproaches of Christ greater riches, etc. (Heb. 11:26).² Methodius, bishop of Olympus in Syria and of Tyre, probably refers to 10:1 and 12 of this epistle of Paul, though it is not absolutely certain.³ Gregory Thaumaturgus, Jacob of Nisibis (A. D. 325), and Ephrem Syrus, in numerous passages, ascribe this epistle to Paul.

But still more important confirmation of the Pauline origin of the epistle is found in the ecclesiastical historian Eusebius of Cesarea, who was the first who made the enumeration of the books of the canon of scripture the object of his special attention. In his commentary on the Psalms, he refers to and quotes the epistle very frequently, attributing it to the apostle Paul without the least hint of any doubt about its authorship.”⁴ Thus, in his Commentary on the Second Psalm, he writes: “The Hebrew said that the right reading was *ἔτεκον*, which also Aquila had; but the apostle, being acquainted with the law, in the Epistle to the Hebrews made use of the word in the LXX. (Heb.

¹ App. to Comm. Ch. IV. (A).

² Ὁ δὲ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμα, κατὰ τὸν ἀπόστολον κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτόν. ἔπινον γὰρ ἐκ πνευματικῆς πέτρας, κ. τ. λ. . . . Καὶ περὶ Μωϋσέως· μείζονα πλοῦτον ἡγησάμενος, κ. τ. λ. Mansi Collect. Concil. Tom. I. p. 1036.

³ See Stuart, Davidson, and Bleek.

⁴ See Davidson, III. p. 192, where he quotes as follows: ὁ μὲν τοιγε Ἑβραῖος ἐλέγετο κύριον εἶναι τῆς λέξεως ἔτεκον, ὅπερ καὶ Ἀκύλας πεποίηκεν· ὁ δὲ ἀπόστολος, νομομαθὴς ὑπάρχων, ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑβραίους τῇ τῶν ὁ ἐχρήσατο, κ. τ. λ.

1:5).” So in his History he says: “*Fourteen* epistles are *clearly* and certainly Paul’s, but yet it is proper to say that some, with the church at Rome, reject that to the Hebrews, alleging that it is denied to be Paul’s.”¹ And in another passage (Eccl. Hist. ii. 25) he plainly reckons the Hebrews among the *acknowledged* (ὁμολογούμενοι) epistles, while James, Jude, 2 Peter and 2 and 3 John are among those which are *disputed* (ἀντιλεγόμενοι). In one passage, while he maintains the Pauline authorship of the epistle, he has been supposed to give his sanction to the theory of Origen, of a Hebrew original. After saying that Clement often quoted the Epistle to the Hebrews, he adds: “Wherefore not without reason this epistle is reckoned among the writings of Paul. For when Paul had written to the Hebrews, in their vernacular language, some say that Luke the evangelist, and others that this same Clement, translated the letter, which latter appears more like the truth, since there is a resemblance between the style and sentiments of Clement’s Epistle and the Epistle to the Hebrews.”² This passage, standing as it does by itself, affords no very decided proof that Eusebius meant anything more than to defend the epistle upon the ground of those who stumbled at the supposed dissimilarity of style between the Hebrews and the other epistles of Paul. This is the more probable, not to say almost certain, when we compare this passage with that quoted above from his Commentary on Ps. II., where the phrase: The apostle, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, *made use of the word in the LXX.*, plainly implies a Greek original.

It is true that one passage is found which seems, at first,

¹ Τοῦ δὲ Παύλου πρόβηλοι καὶ σαφεῖς αἱ δεκατέσσερες· ὅτι γε μὴν τινες, ἡδετήκασι τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους, πρὸς τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐκκλησίας, ὡς μὴ Παύλου οὖσαν αὐτὴν ἀντιλέγεσθαι φήσαντες οὐ δίκαιον ἀγνοεῖν. Hist. Eccl. III. 3.

² Ὅθεν εἰκότως ἔδοξεν αὐτὸ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἐγκαταλεχθῆναι γράμμασι τοῦ ἀποστόλου. Ἑβραίοις γὰρ διὰ τῆς πατρῴου γλώττης ἐγγράφας ὠμιληκὸς τοῦ Παύλου οἱ μὴ τὸν εὐαγγελιστὴν Λουκᾶν, οἱ δὲ τὸν Κλήμεντα τοῦτον αὐτὸν ἐρμενεύσαι λέγουσι τὴν γραφὴν· ὁ καὶ μᾶλλον εἶη ἂν ἀληθὲς τῷ· τὸν ὅμοιον τῆς φράσεως χαρακτῆρα τὴν τε τοῦ Κλήμεντος ἐπιστολὴν, καὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους ἀποσώζειν, καὶ τῷ μὴ πόρρω τὰ ἐν ἑκατέροις τοῖς συγγράμμασι νοήματα καθεστάναι. Hist. Eccl. III. 33.

contradictory to the above representation, where Eusebius appears to rank the Epistle to the Hebrews among the *ἀντιλεγόμεναι γραφαί* in the time of Clement of Alexandria; since he speaks of Clement as making use, in his *Stromata*, of testimonies from the Wisdom of Solomon, the Book of Jesus the Son of Sirach, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and those of Barnabas, Clement, and Jude.¹ But, taken in connection with his abundant and unqualified testimony² to the authorship of our epistle, it cannot so much as intimate a passing doubt in his own mind, but merely a declaration that Clement quoted from writings that *all* did not receive without question.

The extent to which the denial of the Pauline authorship of the Hebrews went in the time of Eusebius, is plainly indicated by another passage of the *Eccl. Hist.* vi. 20, where he says that Caius, in a dispute against Proclus, held "at Rome in the time of Zephyrinus, blames the temerity and audacity of his opponents in composing new writings, and mentions only thirteen epistles of Paul, not numbering that which is inscribed to the Hebrews. Moreover, even to the present time this epistle is reckoned by *some of the Romans* as not belonging to Paul."³ The natural inference would be, that all the opposition to the epistle which the historian deemed of any account was by *some of the Romans*.

¹ Hist. Eccl. VI. 13.

² Stuart refers to the following passages in addition to those already referred to: In Comm. or Ps. II. Montfauc. Nov. Coll. Tom. I. p. 15, he says, *περὶ οὗ φησιν ὁ Παῦλος*, quoting Heb. 12 : 22, and Gal. 4 : 26. The same passages are also referred to as the language of Paul on pp. 191, 201, 313, 360, 388, 431, 431, 539, and several other parts of his works. Heb. 12 : 22, is also often referred to by itself. *E. g.*, pp. 49, 50, etc. In p. 57, Heb. 11 : 1, and 1 Cor. 13 : 13, are cited as words of the same apostle; so p. 175, Heb. 8 : 1, 2; p. 248, Heb. 11 : 38; p. 175, Heb. 6 : 18; p. 615, Heb. 2 : 14. Vol. II. (Montf.) p. 437, Heb. 11 : 37; De Eccl. Theol. 1 : 19 § 10, Heb. 11 : 24; *ibid.* § 12, Heb. 4 : 14. In *Praep. Evang.* (Paris, 1628), p. 171, Heb. 7 : 7; 6 : 17, 18; 7 : 20—25. In Hist. Eccl. II. 17, he says: *ὁποίας ἢ τε πρὸς Ἑβραίους, καὶ ἄλλαι πλείους τοῦ Παύλου παρέχουσιν ἐπιστολαί, i. e., such as the Epistle to the Hebrews, and several other of the epistles of Paul contain.* See Stuart's Comm. Introd. § 7.

³ *Τῶν τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀποστόλου δεκατριῶν μόνων ἐπιστολῶν μνημονεύει, τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους μὴ σὺν ἀριθμήσας ταῖς λοιπαῖς. Ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰς δεῦρο παρὰ Ῥωμαίων τίσι, οὐ μοιζέται τοῦ ἀποστόλου τυγχάνειν.* Lib. VI. 20.

That Eusebius was understood to give his sanction to the Pauline authority of the epistle, would seem to be evident from the uniformity of that belief in the Eastern church after his time.¹ Among others, Cyril of Jerusalem (about A. D. 348), the council of Laodicea (363), in its sixtieth canon, Epiphanius (368), Basil the Great and Gregory Nazianzen (370), Gregory of Nyssa (371), Titus, bishop of Bostra (371), Theodore of Mopsuesta (392), and Chrysostom (398), all give testimony in favor of the Pauline origin of the Hebrews.² Jerome also remarks, in an epistle to Evagrius, that all the Greeks receive this epistle.³ We might proceed to quote authorities in the fifth century also, but it is needless, as no one denies that, at this time, it was received in all the Eastern churches.⁴

The Testimony of the Western Church.

In the Western church there is no *direct* evidence either for or against the Pauline origin of the Hebrews, until near the end of the second century; and that adduced as belonging to that time is very doubtful. It is found in Photius, a writer of the ninth century, who says that Stephen Gobar (a writer of the sixth century) says that Irenaeus (of the close of the second century) and Hippolytus declare the Epistle to the Hebrews not to be Paul's.⁵ In the writings of Irenaeus extant, no such testimony can be found, nor indeed any *entirely certain* evidences⁶ of quotation from

¹ Archelaus bishop of Mesopotamia, as well as the author of the Synopsis of Scripture (Athanasius), who were nearly contemporary with Eusebius, unhesitatingly received the epistle as Paul's.

² See Stuart's Comm. Introd. § 7.

³ Omnes Graeci recipient.

⁴ See references in Davidson, III. p. 194.

⁵ "Οτι Ἰππολύτος καὶ Εἰρηναῖος τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους ἐπιστολὴν Παύλου, οὐκ ἔκρινον εἶναι φασιν.

⁶ Ebrard says: "That he knew the epistle is certainly confirmed in some measure by allusions in the writing Adv. Haereses." After speaking of apparent allusions to Heb. 1:3, and 11:5, he says: "On the other hand, in a third passage (IV. 11, 4), Quae (mundities exteriores), in *figuram futurorum traditae*

the Hebrews. From this last fact many have, with some reason, supposed that Gobar drew the inference that Irenaeus did not receive the epistle as Paul's. Eusebius says nothing that would indicate the rejection of this epistle by Irenaeus, although he must have had his writings in a more perfect state than Gobar, and was accustomed to refer to the doubts, when any were expressed, by those from whom he quotes or to whom he refers. He testifies that Irenaeus did quote the Epistle to the Hebrews, but gives no positive indication whether as authorized scripture, or not. He says: "He wrote a book of various disputations, in which he mentions the Epistle to the Hebrews and the book called the Wisdom of Solomon, quoting some expressions from them."¹ The circumstance that it is mentioned in connection with the Book of the Wisdom of Solomon, does not by any means necessarily imply that he placed them in the same category, as Davidson claims, but merely that he found sentiments in both that were apposite to the purpose of his writing. On the whole, very little reliance can be placed upon the opinion of Irenaeus, whether in favor of or in opposition to the Pauline origin of the Epistle to the Hebrews.²

The evidence that Hippolytus denied that Paul was the author of the Hebrews depends entirely upon the quotation from Photius above, and needs no further comment. The

erant, velut umbrae cujusdam descriptionem ficiente lege, atque delineante de temporalibus aeterna. terrenis coelestia, it would be difficult not to see a recollection of passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews (10:1, σκιὰν γὰρ ἔχων ὁ νόμος τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν; cf. 8:5, σκιὰ τῶν ἐπουρανίων; 9:23, τὰ ὑποδείγματα τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς"). Comm. App. p. 401.

¹ The whole passage is as follows: 'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ πρὸς τοῖς ἀποδοδεῖσιν Εἰρηναίου συγγράμμασι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς φέρεται καὶ βιβλίον τι διαλέξεων διαφόρων, ἐν ᾧ τῆς ποδὲς τῆς ἐπιστολῆς καὶ τῆς λεγομένης σοφίας Σολομῶντος, ῥητὰ τινὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν παραδέμενος. B. V. 25.

² Ebrard says that if there had been positive statements of denial of the Pauline origin of the Hebrews in the writings of Irenaeus, "Eusebius would assuredly have adduced the substance of these statements in the passage (v. 8) in which he brings together all that Irenaeus had expressed respecting the biblical books." . . . "It is certainly not impossible that Irenaeus held our epistle to be un-Pauline; but it is quite as possible that he had brought with him from Asia Minor to Lyons the tradition respecting the Pauline origin, but that he was unwilling to urge this upon the Western church."

opinion of Caius, a presbyter at Rome at the close of the second century, is against the Pauline origin of our epistle, as appears from the quotation above (p. 482, note). Muratorius has published a fragment of an unknown author (A. D. 190), perhaps the Caius mentioned above, in which the number of Paul's epistles is said to be but *thirteen*.

Tertullian (about A. D. 200) plainly ascribes the epistle to the Hebrews to Barnabas: "For there is extant," he says, "an epistle of Barnabas inscribed to the Hebrews, written by a man of such authority, that Paul has placed him in the same rank with himself in respect to abstinence," etc.¹ This statement is more positive against the reception of the Hebrews by this Father and some of those about him, since it was to his purpose to make use of it as authoritative. But all he claims for it is, that it was written by the companion of Paul, and better received by the churches than the "Shepherd of Hermas."²

Cyprian is supposed to reject the Epistle to the Hebrews from the list of Paul's writings, since he says: "The apostle Paul who has mentioned this legitimate and certain number [seven], writes to the *seven* churches,"³ thus omitting our epistle. But it is by no means certain that he does not include it in this numeration, because it has no address to any church, although Davidson maintains that Jerome gives the commentary upon Cyprian's words: "The apostle Paul writes to *seven* churches; for the *eighth*, to which the Hebrews was written, is put by very many out of the number."⁴ But it is unnecessary to allude to other authors, as it is not questioned that the Pauline authorship of the Hebrews was denied, in the Western church, until some time early in the fourth century.

¹ De Pudicitia c. 20; Exstat enim et Barnabae titulus ad Hebraeos, adeo satis auctoritatis viro ut quem Paulus juxta se constituerit in abstinencia (1 Cor. 9:6).

² Et utique receptor apud ecclesias epistola Barnabae, illo apocrypho Pastore [Hermas] moechorum, etc.

³ Et apostolus Paulus, qui hujus numeri legitimi et certi meminit, ad septem ecclesias scribit.

⁴ Paulus apostolus ad septem ecclesias scribit (octava enim ad Hebraeos a plerisque extra numerum ponitur).

We have already seen that in the time of Eusebius (fl. in the first half of the fourth century), a *part* of the Roman church only rejected the Hebrews. Hilary (about A. D. 350) quoted Hebrews 1:4¹ as the words of Paul. So Lucifer, bishop of Cagliari (354); Victorinus, a rhetorician of Rome (360);² Ambrose of Milan, Philaster, bishop of Brescia, Gaudentius his successor, Rufinus and others in the latter half of the fourth century. Others, as Victorinus, Zeno, and Ambrosiaster, still doubted.³

But the testimony of Jerome and Augustine, which shows that the opinion had been previously divided, and whose influence settled the question for succeeding centuries, is of special importance here. Jerome *often* quotes the Hebrews, without question or modification, as Paul's, or, which is the same thing, the apostle's. So in his Epistle 26 ad Pam-mach. (Opp. Tom. I. 168, Ed. Par. 1643); also Ep. 61; Adv. Jovin. I. 3. p. 323; II. 1. p. 361; Ep. 34 ad Jul.; Epist. 3 ad Heliod., Comm. in Esaiam, Tom. IV. p. 21; also 28.⁴ In his Commentary on Matt. xxvi. he says: "Paul, in his Epistle to the Hebrews, although many of the Latins doubt concerning it, says," etc.⁵ So in Comm. on Isa. c. 6, he says: "Hence Paul the apostle, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which the Latins do not generally receive," etc.⁶

¹ De Trinitate, 4:11; Paulus ad Hebraeos dixit; tanto melior factus est angelis, etc.

² Stuart's Introd. § 7.

³ Davidson, III. p. 179.

⁴ See numerous other passages (referred to by Davidson Vol. III. p. 179, 80 note), in his Comm. on various books of both the Old and New Testaments, and also in his work *De nominibus Hebraicis*.

⁵ Paulus, in epistola sua quae scribitur ad Hebraeos, licet de ea multi *Latinorum* dubitent, etc.

⁶ Illud nostris dicendum est, hanc epistolam quae inscribitur ad Hebraeos, non solum ab ecclesiis orientis, sed ab omnibus retro ecclesiasticis Graeci sermonis scriptoribus quasi Pauli apostoli suscipi, licet plerique eam vel Barnabae vel Clementis arbitrentur; et nihil interesse, cujus sit, cum ecclesiastici viri sit et quotidie ecclesiarum lectione celebretur. Quod si eam *Latinorum* consuetudo non recipit inter scripturas canonicas nec Graecarum quidem ecclesiae Apocalypsin Joannis eadem libertatae suscipiant; et tamen nos utraque suscipimus, nequaquam hujus temporis consuetudinem; sed veterum scriptorum auctoritatem sequentes, qui plerumque utriusque abutuntur testimoniis non ut interdum de apocryphis facere solent, sed quasi canonicis. Quoted in Davidson, III. p. 181-2.

In his Epistle to Dardanus, he says: "It must be maintained that this epistle, which is inscribed to the Hebrews, is received as the apostle Paul's, not only by the churches of the East, but by all the ecclesiastical Greek writers of former times, though most [of the Latins] ascribe it to Barnabas or Clement;" and he also remarks that "it makes no difference whose it is, since it belongs to an ecclesiastical man, and is daily read in the churches. But if the Latins do not commonly receive it as canonical, the Greek churches use the same liberty in reference to the Apocalypse of John. We, however, receive both, not regarding the custom of the present time, but the authority of ancient authors, who for the most part avail themselves of the authority of both as *canonical*, not as they are wont to employ apocryphal writings."¹ The proof is *abundant* and incontrovertible that Jerome *himself* received the Hebrews as Paul's, although he often, out of regard to those who rejected it, referred to it in a hypothetical manner.²

One passage in Jerome's Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers deserves attention, as showing the opinion of those of his time who rejected it from the number of Paul's writings: "But the Epistle 'to the Hebrews' is believed not to be his [Paul's], on account of the difference of the style, but either Barnabas's, according to Tertullian, or Luke the evangelist's, according to others, or Clement's, afterward bishop of Rome, who, they say, arranged and adorned the sentiments of Paul in his own language; or, indeed, because Paul was writing to the Hebrews, and on account of the prejudice against him among them he had omitted his name in the inscription. But he had written as a Hebrew to Hebrews, in Hebrew, his native language, most eloquently, so that those things which were eloquently written in Hebrew, are translated into more eloquent Greek than his other epistles,

¹ Unde et Paulus apostolus in epistola ad Hebraeos, quam Latina consuetudo non recepit, etc. See also passage quoted above from Comm. on Matt. 26.

² Comm. on Tit. Cap. 1. Si quis vult recipere eam epistolam quae sub nomine Pauli ad Hebraeos scripta est; so in Ezech. c. XXVIII., Amos VIII. and some other passages.

and accordingly this seems to differ from the rest of the epistles of Paul.”¹

In reference to the opinion of Augustine, there would seem to be little question, although Bleek and some others think they find evidence of vacillation, if not of unbelief, in some of his writings. In his Book *De Doctrina Christiana* (ii. 8) there are *fourteen* epistles of Paul,² among which he particularizes the one “ad Hebraeos.” He also often refers to and quotes the Hebrews as unquestionably Paul’s, in several instances, as: “You have heard the apostle exhorting,” etc.,³ quoting Heb. 12: 7 sq.; “Hear, therefore, what the apostle says,”⁴ quoting Heb. 13: 4; and so in many other instances.⁵ In his commentary on “Romans,” he not only attributes the Epistle to the Hebrews to Paul, but refers to a reason for the omission of his name in the inscription, and speaks of some who reject the epistle in consequence of this omission: “Except *the epistle which he wrote to the Hebrews*, where he is said to have omitted the usual salutation at the beginning, designedly, lest the Jews who so perseveringly railed at him, taking offence at his name, should read it with a prejudiced mind, or refuse to read at all what he had written for their salvation. Hence, therefore, some have feared to receive that epistle into the canon of scripture,”⁶ etc.

¹ Epistola autem quae fertur ad Hebraeos non ejus creditur propter stili sermonisque distantiam, sed vel Barnabae juxta Tertullianum, vel Lucae evangelistae, juxta quosdam, vel Clementis, Romanae postea ecclesiae episcopi quem aiunt sententias Pauli proprio ordinasse et ornasse sermone; vel certe, quia Paulus scribebat ad Hebraeos et propter invidiam sui apud eos nominis titulum in principio salutationis amputaverat, scripserat autem ut Hebraeis Hebraice, id est suo eloquio dissertissime, ut ea quae eloquenter scripta fuerant in Hebraeo eloquentius verterentur in Graecum, et hanc causam esse, quod a ceteris Pauli epistolis discrepare videatur. Davidson, III. p. 180.

² Quatuordecim epistolas Pauli apostoli.

³ Audisti apostolum exhortantem, etc. Sermon. 55, 5.

⁴ Audi ergo quid dicit apostolus, etc.

⁵ See Sermon. 159, 1: ad Hebraeos dicit Apostolus, etc., quoting Heb. 12: 4; in Sermon. 177, c. 11, after 2 Cor. 8: 13; Heb. 13: 5 is quoted as words of the same apostle.

⁶ Excepta epistola quam ad Hebraeos scripsit, ubi principium salutatorium de industria dicitur omisisse, ne Judaei, qui adversus eum pertinaciter oblatrabant, nomine ejus offensi vel inimico animo legerent vel omnino legere non curarent

A very strong confirmation of the opinion of Augustine, if any were needed, is found in the decrees of several councils at which Augustine was present and exerted a somewhat controlling influence. In that at Hippo, A. D. 393 (can. 36), and in the third at Carthage, A. D. 397 (can. 47), it is mentioned separately¹ from Paul's other epistles, as his; and in the fifth at Carthage, A. D. 419 (can. 29), his epistles are reckoned as *fourteen*.²

Neither is it any valid objection to his confidence in this epistle that he frequently refers to it, without naming the author, as "the epistle which is written to the Hebrews," "the epistle to the Hebrews," "the epistle inscribed to the Hebrews."³ Nothing would be more natural than to refer to it in that way, as we now often do; but he was doubtless influenced by the feeling that some for whom he wrote did not receive it as Paul's. Hence he sometimes adds, after naming it, "which the majority say is the writing of the apostle Paul, but some deny to be his."⁴

After the time of Augustine, almost every writer of importance received the Hebrews as the apostle's, though some few still abstained from quoting it.⁵ "Thus," says Davidson, "from the beginning of the fifth century the Pauline authorship was generally acknowledged and believed in the Latin church." Innocent I., near the beginning of the century, writing to Exsuperius, bishop of Toulouse, and giving a catalogue of canonical books, mentions among the others *fourteen* epistles of Paul. Near the end of this century, pope

quod ad eorum salutem scripserat. Unde nonnulli eam in canonem scripturarum recipere timuerunt, etc.

¹ Pauli apostoli epistolae tredecim; ejusdem ad Hebræos una.

² Epistolarum Pauli apostoli numero quatuordecem.

³ "Epistola quæ scribitur ad Hebræos," "Epistola ad Hebræos," "Epistola quæ inscribitur ad Hebræos, etc.

⁴ Quam plures apostoli Pauli esse dicunt, ~~quidam~~ vero negant. De Civitate Dei. XVI. 22.

⁵ No reference is found to it, according to Davidson, in Leo the Great, or Orosius of Spain. And Isidore of Seville, speaking doubtless in reference to earlier ages, says: Ad Hebræos autem epistola plurisque Latinis ejus (Pauli) esse incerta est, propter dissonantiam sermonis eandemque alii Barnabam conscripsisse, alii a Clemente scriptam fuisse suspicantur.

Galasius, at Rome, with a council of seventy bishops, included in a catalogue of canonical books which they made, *fourteen* epistles of Paul, to whom *epistola una ad Hebraeos* is attributed. Even the most sceptical must, with Bleek (p. 234), acknowledge that this is sufficient testimony to show that the churches of the West, at this time, received the Hebrews as the apostle's.

Recapitulation.

1. In the apostolic age the Epistle to the Hebrews stands in the same category with nearly all of Paul's other epistles, as far as authorship is concerned, and has as good a claim, *at least*, to a Pauline origin as most of the books of the New Testament have, of being the productions of their respective authors.

2. In the Western church there is no directly reliable testimony, either for or against the Pauline authorship of the Hebrews, until about the close of the second century. Still the testimony of Clement of Alexandria, who had travelled extensively both in the East and the West, would decidedly imply that no considerable opposition had been made to it there, previously to the time of his writing.

3. It is acknowledged that the testimony of the Latin church Fathers, from the end of the second or beginning of the third, until some time in the first half of the fourth century, was generally against the Pauline origin of our epistle, although but little positive testimony to that effect can be adduced. During the middle and latter part of the fourth century the testimony is not uniform, but gradually increasing, in favor of Paul as the author. From the time of Jerome and Augustine, who both favored the Pauline authorship, there were few dissentient voices even in the Latin church. Popes and councils almost uniformly, until a late period, when doctrinal questions exerted an influence, attribute fourteen epistles to Paul.

4. In the Eastern church, including Greece, Egypt, Syria,

and Palestine, the testimony is continuous and decided in favor of Paul as the author of the Hebrews. This is not a mere unquestioned assent, such as might be handed down from one to another without inquiry, but it is a positive testimony, given with the full consciousness that its authorship had been disputed, and in some cases, as that of Origen, with a persuasion, from the internal characteristics, that it must have been a translation or transcription by another hand.

5. It is scarcely necessary to add a word further, since the preponderance of testimony is so decidedly in favor of the Pauline origin of the epistle. Yet two or three additional considerations seem to place the matter almost beyond question in a historical point of view. It is not merely to the *number* of witnesses that we are able to appeal. Davidson well says: "The value of the evidence furnished by the early Latin church cannot be put into comparison with the early Alexandrian. The former church was *uncritical* in comparison with the latter. It cannot be placed on an equal footing with the Alexandrian, either in learning or critical skill."¹ Besides, the authority of Jerome, who, although later in point of time, yet was "learned" and "extensively read," and one "who made use of the library of Caesarea, and therewith of the entire Christian literature of the first centuries,"² would go far to annul the negative testimony of his predecessors, were they far more numerous and learned than they can be claimed to be. Another consideration has still more weight in favor of the Eastern belief. It is natural to suppose that there would be more, and more accurate knowledge among those to whom the epistle was sent, than among those with whom the author was temporarily residing. Ebrard says: "In Jerusalem [and Palestine], whither the epistle had been sent, it *must* have been known and learned who the author was; for although he does not name himself in the inscription, the bearer of the epistle would certainly not deliver it with the words: 'Here I bring you an epistle out of Italy from *somebody*;' who that some-

¹ Vol. III. p. 196.

² Ebrard's Comm. App. p. 399.

body is, you must not know,' — for then had the authority of the epistle been but ill cared for."¹ In some way it was doubtless indicated who the author was; and as this "divinely authenticated document for the loosing of the bond between Christianity and Judaism gradually came to have a high significance for the whole of oriental Christendom, the knowledge of its author, too, must have spread first and most surely to Lesser Asia, Syria, Egypt, and Greece."² In Italy the knowledge of the existence of such an epistle was doubtless but slowly spread abroad, and slowly received; and hence some negative testimony against it was almost unavoidable. The entire change in the West as soon as the communication with the East became more frequent and intimate, shows that the arguments in favor of Paul as the author were such as could not well be resisted. It may be added, in conclusion, that those who questioned the Pauline authorship of the epistle, in the Latin church, are not at all agreed who the author is, so that we have the testimony of all early ecclesiastical writers of any value in favor of Paul's, except a few in the Latin church, for two or three centuries, who would almost necessarily have little knowledge of the epistle, and little comparative interest in it, against one or two who have attributed it respectively to Barnabas, or Luke, or Clement of Rome, or Apollos, as author.

Internal Evidence that the Apostle Paul is the Author of the Hebrews.

The arguments from the characteristic peculiarities of style, and subjects treated of in the epistle have been many and various, and some of them claimed, with about equal right, by both the defenders and impugnors of the Pauline authorship. The uncertainty of arguments from the different degree of finish of particular pieces of writing, the casual use of particular words or even phrases, the omission of a particular formal manner of commencing or closing

¹ Comm. App. 405.

² Comm. App. 405.

or even conducting a course of reasoning or sentiment or feeling, might be easily and clearly shown by a reference to different productions of any of our English authors. But it is unnecessary to take time to show a thing that is patent to every careful observer. Who can doubt that the peculiarities of a subject, the different circumstances of the writer, mental or physical moods, the real or supposed character and position of the persons to be influenced, and various other causes, will operate to produce a very different style in different writings of the same individual?

Who can say what causes operated upon the writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*? We may naturally suppose that this letter, although sent to a particular church, was intended to exert an influence upon the Jews generally in Palestine. Now, although Paul was specifically the apostle to the Gentiles, yet the deep interest that he felt in his own brethren is often shown in his writings. "I could wish," he says, "that myself were accursed from Christ, for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh." "Brethren, my heart's desire and prayer to God for Israel is that they might be saved." With this strong feeling for those of his own nation, whom he had forsaken for the far-off Gentiles at Rome, while not improbably discouraging accounts were reaching him of the defection or little progress in Christian knowledge of those who had given hopes of better things, what improbability that the apostle was impelled to an effort of a higher literary character than ordinary? The very theme itself—the superiority of our Lord Jesus Christ—would also have genially stirred the apostle as he could hardly have been, in writing any of his other epistles. It seems to me that the surprise would be more natural if, in these circumstances, he had not risen to an unusual rhetorical effort.

Even those who consider the style of the epistle as being at variance with its Pauline origin, when they speak of the style of the apostle without any reference to the Hebrews, recognize the difficulty of bringing all of the acknowledged epistles into one category in respect to characteristics. Thus Davidson says: "The style and diction usually

constitute an index of the mental and moral features, particularly in such individuals as are of transparent character. In the present case there is a great variety, as might be expected from the many-sided man who stands before us. The epistles addressed to individuals and communities, under different circumstances, are wonderfully adapted, in tone and contents, to the parties in question; while at the same time they represent different states of mind and feeling in the writer. In like manner, the speeches delivered by Paul before various audiences, evince a philosophic spirit or an unpolished aspect, in conformity with the minds he had to deal with. Hence the philosophical Athenians, and the rude Lycaonians, were addressed in a very different style. Every reader has felt the difficulty of obtaining a comprehensive and discriminating view of Paul's general diction. One letter exhibits phrases and forms of expression which serve to characterize itself; but analogous expressions do not run through *all his epistles*, so commonly and clearly as to evince at once their common source. Similarities of diction are more within the circle of one, than the wider sphere of all. Hence it is much easier to characterize the apostle as a writer, from one or several epistles, than from the *entire collection*."

It must be confessed that many of the arguments from internal characteristics, standing by themselves, are at least somewhat uncertain; and that there is nothing in them that is so palpable as to leave no room for doubt. But so much has been made of this kind of argumentation, that it is necessary to draw out, at some length, the particulars that have been adduced upon both sides, in order to come to a satisfactory conclusion. And in this way, it appears to us, that we can make it appear, not only that we are not forced to yield to those who oppose the Pauline authorship; but that, taken in connection with the strong external evidence, we need not doubt that it is Paul who gives his words of encouragement, exhortation, and admonition to his Jewish brethren.

The Allusions in the Epistle to the Hebrews that are indicative of Authorship.

Not unfrequently a single allusion, in a piece of composition, may be such as unequivocally to designate its author. But no such designation is found in the *Epistle to the Hebrews*. There are, however, allusions which have been referred to, by both those who defend and those who impugn its Pauline authorship, which deserve a brief notice here.

1. Ch. 2 : 3, "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation, which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him." The author of the *Hebrews*, it is said, here classes himself with those whom he addressed, as having heard the facts pertaining to Christ's life and mission from those who were eye-witnesses, and thus distinguishes himself from Christ's immediate disciples, and implies that he could not have been an apostle, instead of laying stress upon his apostolical authority, as Paul is accustomed to do ; *e. g.*, Gal. ch. i. and 2 Cor. xi., xii.

In the first place, the passage does not necessarily derogate at all from the apostolical authority of the writer of the *Hebrews*. He might, as the chiefest of the apostles, thus by a kind of courtesy rank himself with those whom he addresses. So Paul does often, as in 1 Cor. 10 : 8, 9 ; 2 Cor. 7 : 1 ; Rom. 13 : 11—13. We might, with as much propriety, consider Paul in the latter passage as implying that he had previously lived "in rioting and drunkenness," "in chambering and wantonness," "in strife and envying," as charge upon the author of the *Hebrews* any deficiency in respect to apostolical authority in the passage under discussion. The figure of speech here employed is common in all languages and ages.¹

But, furthermore, apostolical authority is not here at all

¹ Stuart, in his commentary on this passage, appositely inquires, whether, because it is said in one of Cicero's orations, *nos perdimus rempublicam*, we are to conclude that he did not write the oration, because he did not himself destroy the republic.

brought into the account. "The author is not," it has been well said, "addressing those who cast doubts on his authority; and the question in the Epistle to the Hebrews is not, whether Paul derives his office as immediately as the twelve from Christ; but the antithesis is between the word of *the law*, which was spoken by *angels* on Sinai, and the word of the New Testament *salvation* which has been made known 'to us,' first by the Lord himself and then by *ear-witnesses* (therefore is perfectly sure — ἐβεβαιοῶθη)." ¹ The pronoun ἡμεῖς is used here for *Christians* generally, as opposed to those under the Old Testament dispensation.

Finally, the omission of the name of the author in the introduction of this epistle, shows that he did not propose to lay any stress upon his individual authority in this letter, and it would certainly have indicated a want of tact unworthy of the great apostle, if he had laid any claim to special authority on the ground of his divine commission. Even if his apostolical authority were questioned by the churches to which the epistle was directed, of which we have no proof, yet "circumstances of which we are now ignorant may have determined him not to insist on his apostleship" ² in writing to them.

2. It is very strongly implied, in verses 18 and 19, taken with verse 23d, that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews was in bondage when he wrote it, or at least had been so, and was yet in some way restrained, but with a strong probability of soon being in a situation to make them a visit with Timothy, who was also then in bondage (ἀπολελυμένον), or better, *had been sent away* on business.³

¹ Ebrard's Comm. App. p. 408.

² Davidson's Introd. III. p. 207.

³ Even Davidson acknowledges that the meaning *sent away* given to ἀπολελυμένον, is authorized by its use in such passages as Acts 13:3; 15:30, and others; and his reasoning, that in case this were the meaning here, "it is most likely that something would have been added to indicate the place from which he had been sent, as well as the direction and object of the journey," is little less than absurd, as if in this incidental mention of his absence he would stop to detail all the attending circumstances. See Davidson, Vol. III. p. 200.

“Pray for us,” he says, “and I request you the more earnestly to do this, in order that I may speedily be restored to you;” and, “know ye that our brother Timothy is sent away, with whom, if he return speedily, I shall visit you.” Compare this with Phil. 2:9, “But I trust in the Lord Jesus to send Timotheus to you shortly, that I also may be of good comfort when I know your state,” and verses 23 and 24: “Him therefore I hope to send presently, so soon as I shall see how it will go with me. But I trust in the Lord that I also myself shall come shortly.” If we may interpret ἀπολελυμένον *sent away*, as above, there is at least a probable allusion to the same circumstances in the condition of the writer of the two epistles. Paul, when he writes to the Philippians, was evidently in bondage, and in danger of death at the hand of his enemies, and yet not without hope that he should escape from his persecutors, and be permitted to visit his former friends before a very long time. But even before that, as soon as he could foresee his fate, he would send to them the faithful Timothy, who, he says, “as a son with the father, hath served with me in the gospel.” Nothing is more natural than to suppose that when the Epistle to the Hebrews was written, the circumstances of the writer were just what would be implied in the expectation of Paul when he wrote to the Philippians, *i. e.*, that Timothy had been sent away to them and his own circumstances were such as induced him to express full confidence that he should soon be enabled to revisit the scenes of his former labors. It should be noticed here that the manner in which the author of the Hebrews speaks of Timothy in the passage above quoted, as compared not only with Phil. 2:18 sq., but with Col. 1:1, Παῦλος ἀπόστολος . . . καὶ Τιμόθεος ὁ ἀδελφός, and Philem. 1:1, Παῦλος . . . καὶ Τιμόθεος ὁ ἀδελφός, is certainly Pauline, and, taken in connection with the attending circumstances, not without weight in determining who was the author of our epistle.

Even if we give the meaning of *released* from bondage to ἀπολελυμένον, it is no valid objection to Paul, as the author of the epistle, that we have no mention in his other epistles

of the incarceration of Timothy, since Paul in none of his letters professes to give an account of the doings of his fellow-laborers, and if at all, only incidentally mentions them.

3. The salutation in 13 : 24, "They of Italy salute you," has been adduced both in proof and refutation of Paul as the author of the Hebrews. While nothing is more certain than that it is no argument against the Pauline authorship, I cannot feel that, by itself, it can have much force in favor of it. That *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας* means simply here *those of Italy*, i. e., the *Italian* brethren, and is equivalent to the article with the partitive Genitive, ought not, it seems to us, to be questioned. See Stuart's Introduction ; Kühner's Grammar, § 300 (a) ; Tholuck's Comm. upon that passage, and Intro. ; and various other authorities. We can hardly suppose that there were not those at Rome, at least occasionally, from other parts of Italy, whom Paul might wish to include with those belonging to Rome itself, in Christian salutations to the Hebrew Christians addressed in this epistle ; and no phrase could have been found more brief and appropriate to include all, than the one here employed, *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας*. The passages quoted by Davidson, such as 2 Tim. 1 : 15, 16, 17 ; 2 Tim. 4 : 11, 16, we cannot think have the least weight against this supposition ; for, in close connection with the complaint that of all his *fellow-laborers* only Luke remained (1 Tim. 4 : 11), and that in his first answer no man stood with him, but all forsook him, he says (verse 21st), "Eubulus greeteth thee, and Pudens, and Linus, and Claudia, and *all the brethren*." While, then, this salutation is a perfectly natural one for Paul to make in the conclusion of a letter written at Rome during his stay there, it is also not denied that another similarly situated *might* have penned it.

4. The description of the tabernacle and its utensils, in 9 : 2 sq., is alleged to be erroneous. In 1 Kings 8 : 9 and 2 Chron. 5 : 10 it is said that "there was nothing in the ark save the two tables which Moses put therein at Horeb, while the author of the Hebrews includes with the tables of the cove-

nant "the golden pot that had manna, and Aaron's rod that budded." In answer to this objection, we need only say, that the author of the Hebrews naturally refers, not to Solomon's temple or to the temple as subsequently rebuilt, but to the tabernacle made by Moses, and patterned after that which he "had seen upon the mount," and built with special divine aid and direction; and consequently considered by Jews as the most perfect material structure for divine worship. Now, we read in Ex. 16:32 sq. that the Lord commanded Moses to "fill an omer of manna to be kept for future generations;" "and Moses said to Aaron, Take a pot and put an omer full of manna therein, and lay it up." . . . "As the Lord commanded Moses, so Aaron laid it up *before the testimony*, to be kept." And in Num. 17:10 (25) "the Lord said unto Moses, Bring Aaron's rod again *before the testimony* to be kept for a token against the rebels;" . . . "and Moses did so." It is plain from these passages that both the pot of manna and Aaron's rod were preserved either *in the ark before the tables of stone*,¹ or in some depository affixed to the ark,² and that the whole was placed for safe keeping in the holy of holies. In either case, the language in our passage is entirely appropriate.

But still more objection has been made to this passage from the fact that the *θυμιατήριον* is included within the holy of holies, and is designated as χρυσοῦν, golden. There is much doubt in reference to the import of the word *θυμιατήριον*. It may with equal propriety, as far as derivation is concerned, designate the *altar of incense* and the *censer*. Usage, too, about equally favors both interpretations; for while in the Seventy this word is never used for the altar of incense, but always *θυσιαστήριον θυμιάματος*; yet in Josephus, Philo, Clemens Alex., and Origen, it is often so used.

¹ Ebrard maintains, with very strong probability, that this was their position; but we will not take the room here to quote his argumentation, which may be seen in Comm. on Heb. 9:4.

² This view is favored by Davidson (Introd. III. p. 223), but the only argument in favor of it seems to be that Josephus and Philo say that the ark in Moses's time contained only the two tables of stone.

As we should naturally suppose, in these circumstances, there has always been a difference of opinion in reference to the meaning. The Itala, Calvin, Gerhard, Mynster, Bleek, De Wette, Olshausen, Ebrard, and many others, translate by *altar of incense*; while the Syriac and Vulgate, Theophylact, Luther, Boehme, Kuinoel, Stier, Stuart, Tholuck, Davidson, etc., defend the meaning *censer*. As the only argument against the latter interpretation is an *argumentum e silentio*, i. e., from the fact that such a censer is omitted in the enumeration of the articles belonging to the tabernacle, it seems to us quite probable that this should be the translation in this place, for it was not incumbent on the writer to specify every particular. Davidson refers to a similar omission in Josephus, which is not supposed to invalidate his authority as a writer, or imply that he was not the author of the "Antiquities of the Jews."¹ It need only be said in respect to the epithet *golden*, that there can be little question that, if there was a censer belonging to the holy of holies, it would be constructed of gold; still, if any prefer the other rendering it is very easily explained without an imputation of ignorance upon the writer of the epistle. "The altar of incense *stood*, indeed, in the holy place, but *referred* to the holy of holies." The smoke of the altar of incense was not intended to penetrate backwards into the holy place, but into the holy of holies as a symbol of worship *near to the veil of which* it stood, just before the ark of the covenant. So it is said in 1 Kings that the altar is *at* or *before* the holy of holies, where the preposition לְ is used: לְדָבָר, for which the Greek participle ἔχουσα is substituted. Thus, says Ebrard, in his commentary, we render the words: "the holy of holies *to which* the golden altar of incense belonged." The author had the less reason to shrink from this use of the ἔχουσα, as he might well take it for granted that the *local* position of those vessels was familiar to *all* his readers; and moreover, verse 7th showed that it was not

¹ In Antiquities, XIV. 4. 4, he says that Pompey, entering into the sanctuary, sees "the golden table and sacred candlestick, the cups, and the multitude of frankincense," but says nothing of the golden altar of incense.

unknown to himself. It need only be remarked, further, that the imputation of mistake, if it could be proved, has to do with Paul as the author of our epistle, rather than some other person, only on the supposition that he would be less liable to mistake on such a point than one dwelling at Alexandria for example, and that our epistle is unworthy of his high character for accuracy and consistency of statement. Hence it only incidentally comes into our argument for the Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

5. Hebrews 10 : 34, καὶ γὰρ τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου συνεπαθήσατε, has sometimes been claimed as a proof of Pauline authorship; but as δεσμοῖς, upon which the argument depends, is a questionable reading, we will not stop here to discuss it. We will only say, in conclusion of this part of the argument, while there is nothing in itself decisive, yet there is nothing that is at all at variance with the condition of Paul at Rome in circumstances alluded to in this letter; but, taken with other arguments, the allusions are corroborative of the proof of Paul as its author.

Similarity of Sentiment or Doctrine in the Hebrews and acknowledged Epistles of Paul.

The argument from the similarity of sentiment and doctrine is perhaps the most valuable of the internal evidences for the Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews; and on this account we shall dwell at some length upon it. In order fully to appreciate this evidence, it should constantly be borne in mind that the object of the epistle is quite different from any of the acknowledged epistles of Paul, and addressed to an entirely different class of readers. The author of the Hebrews writes to converted Jews, those who had been educated in the Jewish ritual, and been all their lives conversant with all the imposing ceremonies connected with priestly offerings, sacrifices, and temple worship; with its holy of holies, its golden altars and censers, its courts, its embroidered hangings, and its cherubim, which appeal so strongly to the eye, and through that to the taste

and feelings. It is no wonder that the great apostle felt it incumbent upon him, who understood all of these matters so well, and felt the force of them so much, to prepare an argument for the superiority of the Christian worship, which, as it was so simple with its one sacrifice, one altar, and one mediator, was in danger of losing its influence over those so differently educated, so that defection and apostasy would be the result. So Neander justly says: "The author of this epistle directs his argumentation especially against those who were still captivated by the pomp of the temple worship, the priesthood and the sacrifices, and were in danger of being entirely seduced from Christianity by the impression these objects made upon them; this gave its peculiar direction to his reasoning, and it aimed at showing that by all this ritual their religious wants could not be satisfied, but that its only use was to direct them to the sole true means of satisfaction."¹

1. Our first argument under this head is its similarity to the acknowledged epistles of Paul, in expressions indicating the superiority of *Christianity to Judaism*. It would of course be unreasonable, on the one hand, to look for extended arguments of this kind in the other epistles; and on the other, not to expect that all the epistles of other writers would contain indications of their preference for Christianity over Judaism. Our argument only requires that it be shown that special emphasis is laid upon this thoughts in the epistles of Paul.

(1) First: the *Jewish* was only a type of the *Christian dispensation*, and, as such, temporary and comparatively imperfect. Compare Heb. 10:1, "For the law having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things," etc., with Col. 2:17, "which [*i. e.*, ceremonial observances enumerated in ver. 16] are a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ." The similarity of language as well as sentiment should be noticed in this connection: σκιὰν . . . ἔχων ὁ νόμος τῶν μελλόντων κ. τ. λ., and αἱ ἐστί σκιὰ τῶν μελλόντων. This use of σκιὰ (shadow)

¹ Planting and Training of the Ch. Church, B. VI. App. 2.

as opposed to εἰκών (exact image) and σῶμα (substance), is found in no other New Testament writer ; and not only so, but in the 5th verse of the same chapter we find σῶμα used with the same substantial significance as in the verse quoted from the Colossians: σῶμα δὲ κατηρίσω μοι. In Heb. 8:5 we have a similar use of σκιά: "who [i. e., the priests under the Mosaic law] serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things," etc.

(2) The Jewish rites and ordinances, the temple and its appurtenances, are only a symbol or type (παραβολή), a pattern or example (ὑπόδειγμα), of the blessings under the gospel, and, as such, are temporary and introductory, not eternal and perfect ; not such as can satisfy the spiritual nature of man, to which they owe their origin. So in Heb. 7:15, 16, "there ariseth another priest, who is made not after the law of the carnal commandment, but after the *power of an endless life* ;" ver. 19, "for the law made nothing perfect, but the bringing in of a better hope did," etc. The preparatory and introductory office of the Mosaic rites and ceremonies is more plainly indicated in ch. 9:9 sq., "which was a figure *for the time then present*, in which were offered both gifts and sacrifices that could not make him that did the service perfect as pertaining to the conscience, . . . but Christ having come an high priest of good things to come by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, etc., entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us," etc. See the whole passage to the end of the chapter, and also 8:1—9. Now, compare what the apostle Paul says in Gal. 3:23 sq.: "But before faith came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which *should afterwards be revealed*. Wherefore the law was our school-master," etc. ; but after that faith is come, we are *no longer under a school-master*. In Gal. 4:3 sq., where Paul calls Judaism τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου, and especially in the exposition in verse 9th, are we emphatically reminded of the same hand that penned the Epistle to the Hebrews: "But now after that ye have known God, or rather are known of God, how turn ye to the weak and beggarly elements

whereunto ye desire again to be in bondage." Compare also ver. 3 of the same chapter, and also Gal. 5 : 1, "stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage." Numerous other passages might be quoted did our limits allow it. But enough have been adduced to serve as examples, and to indicate the nature of the argument which a careful inquirer may find for himself, if he compare the Hebrews with the acknowledged epistles of Paul, and then with the other epistles of the canon. Where can such coincidences in reference to the relations and comparative value of the old and new dispensations be found in the epistles of Peter or James or John, as those above referred to? Also 2 Cor. 3 : 10 sq., especially verses 15 and 16, "But even unto this day when Moses is read the veil is upon their heart; nevertheless when it shall turn to the Lord, the veil shall be taken away." The insufficiency of the law is plainly declared, also, in Rom. 8 : 3, "For what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh."

2. The views and statements in reference to Christ's person, offices, humiliation, and final exaltation, are similar in the Hebrews and acknowledged epistles of Paul.

(1) His person. He is represented in Heb. 1 : 3 as the "brightness of [the Father's] glory, and the *express image of his person*" (*ἀπαύρασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*); and in Col. 1 : 15 as *the image of the invisible God* (*εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*); in 2 Cor. 4 : 4 as *the image of God*; in Phil. 2 : 6 as *in the form of God* (*ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ*).

(2) The work of creation is imputed to him: "By him and for him are all things made." Heb. 1 : 2, "whom he appointed heir of all things; by whom he also made the worlds;" ver. 3, "upholding all things by the word of his power;" ver. 10, "thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth," etc. Col. 1 : 16, 17, "for by him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in

earth, visible and invisible, . . . all things were created by him and for him ; . . by him all things consist." Eph. 3 : 9, " God, who created all things by Jesus Christ." 1 Cor. 8 : 6, " One Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things."

(3) His humiliation and exaltation are spoken of in a similar manner, and as having the same relation to each other. Heb. 2 : 9, " But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor;" 12 : 2, " who, for the joy that was set before him, endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God." Phil. 2 : 8, 9, " And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God hath also exalted him and given him a name above every name," etc. Davidson well says that this idea, " that Jesus not only passed, through suffering obedience, to an exalted state, but obtained it as a reward for obedience unto death," is found in no epistle of the New Testament except those of Paul.¹ The connected thoughts that through the humiliation and suffering of death our Lord Jesus Christ destroyed the power of death, and the influence of him who had the power of death, the devil, is Pauline, and is found in Heb. 2 : 14, " He also himself likewise took part of the same [flesh and blood], that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is the devil," etc.; and in 1 Cor. 15 : 26, " The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death;" and verses 56, 57, and the context, " The sting of death is sin, . . but thanks be to God which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ;" and 2 Tim. 1 : 10, " By the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death," etc. It should not escape notice that the same figure of speech, introduced in a similar way, is used in the account of the subjection of all things to Christ, taken from the Old Testament, and nowhere else employed, as in 1 Cor. 15 : 25, 28; Eph. 1 : 22; Phil. 3 : 21; and Heb. 2 : 8 and 10 : 13 sq.

¹ *Introduct.* III. p. 212.

(4) The one sacrifice of Christ, and its effects, are conspicuously and similarly spoken of in the Hebrews and Paul's acknowledged epistles. The general fact of the expiatory nature of Christ's death is an ever recurring theme,¹ and in this Paul differs from the other New Testament writers only in the prominence which he gives to this topic, which indeed makes up a large part of the Epistle to the Hebrews, from the end of ch. iv. to ch. xi. The particular representation of the *one* death for the *sins of all*, and the subsequent exaltation above the *possibility* of suffering and death, is peculiar to the Hebrews and Pauline epistles. Heb. 9 : 26, 28, "Now once, in the end of the world, hath he appeared, to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. . . . So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation;" 10 : 12, "But this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, forever sat down on the right hand of God." Compare Rom. 6 : 9, 10, "Knowing that Christ, being raised from the dead, dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him. For in that he died, he died unto sin once; but in that he liveth, he liveth unto God."² In this connection, the office of Christ as a redeemer should not be passed over as exhibited in many passages, e. g., in Heb. 9 : 15, "For this cause he is the mediator of the new testament, that by *means of death for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament*, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance;" and Rom. 3 : 25, "Whom God hath set forth *to be a propitiation through faith in his blood*, to declare his righteousness *for the remission of sins that are past*," etc. His power of redeeming from death is indicated by the same peculiarly Pauline word³ as in Heb. 2 : 14, ἵνα διὰ τοῦ θανάτου καταργήσῃ τὸν τὸ κράτος ἔχοντα τοῦ θανάτου, κ. τ. λ. and 2 Tim. 1 : 10, διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καταργήσαντος μὲν τὸν θάνατον, κ. τ. λ.

¹ See the passages quoted by Stuart in the Introd. to his Comm. on Hebrews, p. 132.

² Quoted by Davidson, Introd. Vol. III. p. 212.

³ See on the use of this word in the sequel.

(5) Christ in his exaltation is spoken of in the same manner in the Hebrews and other Pauline epistles. He was "made higher than the heavens," Heb. 7:26; "is passed into the heavens," 4:14; he "ascended up far above the heavens," Eph. 4:10; "he is seated at the right hand of God;" he "sat down on the right hand of majesty on high;" Heb. 1:3, "Forever sat down on the right hand of God." So in Rom. 8:34; Eph. 1:20; Col. 3:1. All things are subject to him, except him who put all things under him. Compare Heb. 2:8 with 1 Cor. 15:27. He intercedes with the Father, Heb. 7:25, "seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them," and Rom. 8:34, "who also maketh intercession for us."

(6) Access to the Father is obtained only through Christ, Heb. 10:19, 20, "Having therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus," etc. Rom. 5:2, "By whom we also have access by faith," etc., and Eph. 2:18, "For through him we both have access, by one Spirit, unto the Father." His office as mediator, *μεσίτης*, by which this access is obtained, especially as mediator of a new covenant, is found in Heb. 8:6; 9:15; 12:24; and in 1 Tim. 2:5. The word *μεσίτης* is used also by Paul, in reference to Moses, in Gal. 3:19, 20, but not elsewhere found in the New Test. It should not escape notice, that the same word, *ἐντυγχάνειν*, is used to denote the intercession of Christ, both in the Hebrews and Romans: *εἰς τὸ ἐντυγχάνειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν*, Heb. 7:25; *ὃς καὶ ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*, Rom. 8:34.

3. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of faith (*πίστις*), and illustrates it in a way, and attaches an importance to it, which no other New Test. writer has done except Paul in the Epistle to the Corinthians and Galatians. Compare Heb. 3:5; 10:38—11:40 with Rom. 4:3 and Gal. 3:6—14. But especially Pauline is the use of the triad faith (*πίστις*), hope (*ἐλπίς*), and charity (*ἀγάπη*). See Heb. 10:22, 23, 24 and 1 Cor. 13:13; also Heb. 6:10—12, as compared with 1 Thess. 1:3 and 2 Thess. 1:4.

These are some of the more conspicuous examples of

similarity of sentiment and doctrine in the Hebrews and acknowledged epistles of Paul; others may be found referred to in Stuart, Davidson, and others; but these are "clear and unmistakable." "Unquestionably," says Davidson, "the same type of doctrine is exhibited here as appears in the authentic writings of the apostle. The agreement is palpable. It cannot fail to arrest the observation of every reader."¹

Objections have been adduced from discrepancy of sentiment between the Hebrews and the undoubted epistles of Paul.

1. Christ's *resurrection* is not made prominent in the Hebrews as in the Epistles to the Corinthians and Thessalonians. Neither is it in the Romans or Galatians; and if it is an objection to Paul as the author, so is it in those epistles. There was special reason for the prominence given to this doctrine in the epistles above named, inasmuch as it was doubted by the Corinthians and wrongly understood by the Thessalonians. This objection would be valid only on condition that the non-existence of the resurrection would be inferred. But so far is this from the fact, that its existence is everywhere implied, and indeed "lies at the basis of this epistle." Christ's exaltation to heaven, which is made so prominent in contrast with the entrance of the Jewish priest into the holy of holies, is a most natural implication of the resurrection, and all that this theme requires. Thus Neander has said, for substance, 'that the exaltation of Christ to heaven is more frequently adverted to than his antecedent resurrection in this epistle, may be traced to the prevailing form of the representation, which gave less occasion to make prominent the former doctrine than that to which it forms an introduction and transition.' Still the resurrection is more directly implied in such passages as 12:2, "Endured the cross . . . and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God;" 5:7, "Who offered up prayers and supplications . . . unto him that was able to save him *from*

¹ Introd. III. p. 214.

death, and *was heard* in that he feared," i. e., was delivered from the grave; 13: 20, "That brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus." "In these words," says Neander, "it is implied that Christ, by his resurrection, became the leader from death to life of the church of God, formed by him as the Redeemer, and laid the foundation for its salvation; and therefore God, in raising him from the dead, proved himself to be the God of salvation."¹ But we will not dwell longer upon a point so palpable to the careful reader.

2. It is maintained that the opposition between *faith* and the works of the law is not exhibited in the Hebrews. But is it so exhibited in the Epistle to the Thessalonians? Besides, such an exhibition as is made in the Romans and Galatians, where the question whether the law is to be observed by the Gentiles, is discussed, would be entirely out of place in the Hebrews; since he addresses those who are in danger of being led away from the simplicity of Christian worship by the ceremonies of the temple, and the more imposing Jewish ritual, which, as he shows, are not sufficient to make satisfaction for sin, but merely point to the real source of justification. Nothing is plainer than that the same *faith*, under different forms, is implied in both. Only in the one case the representation is, that it cannot be attained by the observance of law; and in the other, by the Jewish rites and sacrifices. Ebrard well says: "Those to whom the Hebrews was addressed, were not *work-righteous*," as the Galatians and their false teachers were; on the contrary, they were *earnestly desiring atonement* (the necessity of which they did not doubt), but they could not believe that the one sacrifice was sufficient. Thus in their case the opposition could not be between *ἔργα νόμου* and *πίστις*, but only that between the *σκιὰ νόμου* and the *τελείωσις*. In dealing with such readers, Paul also could certainly not write otherwise than is written in the Epistle to the Hebrews. For no one will fail to perceive that the difference between the

¹ Planting and Training, VI. 2. p. 220.

doctrinal system of the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of the Epistle to the Romans is only a formal one.”¹

3. The author of the Hebrews is accused of an allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament. If this is to be understood literally, all the answer we need to make is to deny the accusation. *Allegory* is no more found in the Hebrews than in the acknowledged Pauline epistles. So Ebrard, Davidson, and all other modern critics, except those who are especially desirous of disproving the Pauline authorship of the Hebrews. But if it is meant merely that *typology*, i. e., a giving of a greater prominence to the types of the Old Testament is more conspicuous in the Hebrews than in the Pauline epistles, it is not only granted, but claimed as an indirect proof of Paul as the author. It could be no objection unless it could be shown that it was not only not found in the writings of Paul, but not found where it would be naturally expected. But so far is this from the reality, that we find, as has been said, “not only just such, but a bolder” instance of this typology in Gal. 4: 22 sq. Now, in the Hebrews, the typical character of the Hebrew worship is the basis of the whole writing. It was the main object of the epistle to show that the Jewish ceremonies point forward to something more perfect; that this perfection, *τελείωσις*, was found in Christ and his worship; that is, that they were mere *types*. How could the gifted, the learned apostle have attained his object more directly and naturally than it is done in the Hebrews? A candid examination of the use made of the Old Testament types shows, not that Paul did not write the epistle, certainly; nor, directly, that he did; but that it is worthy of him as author.

Some few other objections have been adduced under this head: such as, that nothing is said in the Hebrews of “the kingdom of God,” of “Satan’s kingdom,” or that the author is the “apostle to the Gentiles;” but they are so palpably without support, after an examination of the object and aim of the Hebrews, and a comparison of the other epistles,

¹ Comm. App. p. 412, 13.

against which the same accusation might be made, that one cannot find the excuse of a man, or even a skeleton of straw, to beat down.

General Characteristics of Form in the Hebrews and acknowledged Epistles of Paul.

The general characteristics of form are the same in the Hebrews and in the acknowledged epistles of Paul. This is not so positive and direct as, by itself, to compel us to attribute it to the great apostle; much less is it such as would indicate the hand of an imitator. Still it is sufficient to remind the careful reader of relationship to the most characteristic of all the Pauline epistles, the Romans, and next to that, the Galatians.

1. The general arrangement of materials is the same. In the Hebrews, from ch. 1—10 : 19, the argument and doctrine of the epistle is contained, with occasional bursts of emotion or strains of exhortation, which the strength of the writer's feelings in the consideration of his subject forces from him. From 10 : 20 to the end comes the hortatory and practical part of the epistle, with an expression of the author's longing for intercourse with those whom he addresses, 13 : 19, 23 ; his desire for their prayers, 13 : 18 ; and his fervent commendation of them to the " God of peace," with a concluding " Amen," before the final salutations. In like manner, in the Romans, ch. 1—10 are doctrinal, and the remainder practical, salutatory, etc. Towards the close, his desire to see those to whom he writes appears in 15 : 22 sq., 32 ; the same petition for prayer in his behalf in 15 : 30 ; the same commendation to the *God of peace*, strictly Pauline, with the concluding Amen in 15 : 33 ; and finally, salutations to the brethren, more individual and specific than in the Hebrews, as addressed to a particular church, where were particular individuals known to him. The same thing in general may be said of the Epistle to the Galatians, and of other epistles, though in a less marked and definite manner.

There is one point of difference, however, that should

here be noticed, namely, less of personal allusion, in the beginning of the Epistle to the Hebrews, than in the other epistles. In the Romans, for example, several verses are taken up in indicating the author's claims to apostleship, his interest in those to whom he writes, his desire to see them, in order to "impart some spiritual gift," or himself be "comforted together with" them. Nothing of this kind is found in the Hebrews. The author enters almost at once upon the proofs of the superiority of Christ to angels, the first head of his argument. Now, can this be tortured into an indication that Paul was not the author of the Hebrews?

Let us attempt to learn from the epistle itself with what feelings the author of the Hebrews seated himself for his work. He had become impressed with the feeling that his brethren who had been converted from Judaism were not making that progress in the knowledge of Christianity which the length of time since their conversion, and their opportunities, might have enabled them to do (5:12); he also knew the danger of apostasy (6:1 sq.) to those who constantly fed upon the milk of the word, and who consequently were unskilful in the word of righteousness (5:13); he was sensible, too, of the attractions to them of the Jewish ritual, and the persecutions that assailed them (12:1 sq.); and with all this he strongly felt the ruin that apostasy would bring upon those thus situated; for it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted the heavenly gift, etc., if they shall fall away, to renew them to repentance (6:4—6). Now, imagine the apostle, imbued with these feelings, sitting down to write a general letter to these Hebrews, would it be natural for him to dwell at once upon his personal feelings, his relation to those addressed, and things of that kind? The man of argument would have recourse to that. And what more fitting to the occasion and to the character of Paul than a presentation of the glory of the person and character of our Lord Jesus Christ, "the heir of all things," "the brightness of the Father's glory," "the express image of his person," "the Creator of all things," who had now sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on

high, the Son of God, and hence superior to angels, who are his servants, "ministering spirits sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?"

2. Clearly connected with what precedes, the absence of the name of the writer has been often adduced as against the Pauline authorship of the Hebrews. The early Fathers, as Pantaenus and Clement, recognize the fact that even in their time this had been made an objection to the Pauline authorship, but as not influencing their opinion. They accordingly give reasons for the omission, as the *modesty* of the apostle in writing to the Jews since he was the apostle to the Gentiles, or to avoid influence from prejudice against him, or for some such reason. These considerations may or may not have influenced him; and there may have been numerous reasons, which are not and cannot be known to us, for this suppression. It was unquestionably the practice of the age to incorporate the name in the address at the beginning of an epistle; and whether Paul or Luke or Clement wrote it, we should expect the name to be inserted, if it were commenced in the ordinary way. But who can doubt that Paul, as well as another, might omit this inscription? And if what has been said in the preceding paragraph has probability, we should certainly not expect a writer of tact to insert his name. As he begins, not with personal allusions, but with argumentation, only one who felt it necessary to adhere to the usual formulary of letter-writing would foist this in as a preface to his letter. Not so, certainly, should we suppose the apostle Paul would do.

The Manner of Quoting from the Old Testament in the Hebrews.

The manner of quoting the Old Testament is the same in the Hebrews and the acknowledged Pauline epistles. A frequent reference to the Old Testament on such a subject as the Epistle to the Hebrews discusses, would be natural, whoever was the author; hence we at present have to do

only with the manner of the quotation and employment of scripture language.

1. The author of the Hebrews, as well as of the authorized epistles of Paul, quotes often without any formula of quotation; *e. g.*, Heb. 3:2, 5; 10:37; 11:21; 12:6; 13:6. Rom. 9:7, 21; 10:6—8, 13, 18; 11:34. 1 Cor. 2:16; 10:26; 15:25, 27, 32; 2 Cor. 9:7; 13:1. Gal. 3:11, 12. Eph. 5:31. 2 Tim. 2:19.

2. There are forms of quotation that are strikingly similar in the Hebrews and acknowledged Pauline epistles. In Heb. 4:7 it is said, "Again he limited a certain day *saying in David*" (ἐν Δαβὶδ λέγων); in Rom. 9:25, "*As he saith also in Osee*" (ἐν τῷ Ὡσηὲ λέγει); and 11:2, ἐν Ἠλῖα τί λέγει. Notice, also, the use of τὸ δέ in Heb. 12:27, and τὸ γάρ in Rom. 13:9, and ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι in Heb. 3:15, and ἐν τῷ in Gal. 3:11.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the formulas of quotation generally used in the Hebrews differ from those used in the acknowledged epistles, but still not more than these differ among themselves. For in the Romans, in the forty-eight instances, we find a great variety of quotation — γράφω, λέγω, εἶπω, and ῥέω — used either impersonally or with the author of the quotation, or γραφή, or some kindred word as subject. In two cases only is Θεός to be supplied: 9:15, 25. In the first Epistle to the Corinthians, only γέγραπται is used in the eleven formal instances of quotation, except in 6:16, where φησί (sc. ἡ γραφή) is used. In 2 Cor. again, there is more variety: in 8:15; 9:9, καθὼς γέγραπται is used; in 4:13, κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον; in 6:17, λέγει κύριος; 18, λέγει κύριος παντοκράτωρ; in 6:16, καθὼς εἶπεν ὁ Θεός; 6:2, λέγει (sc. Θεός). In Gal. γράφω is employed in 3:10, 13; 4:22, 27; λέγει with Θεός implied, in 3:16, and with ἡ γραφή in 4:30. Not to specify further, in several of Paul's epistles no forms of quotation are found.

In the Hebrews there is also some variety in the manner of quotations, though the most common method is with some form of the verb εἶπω, λέγω, φῆμι and μαρτύρεω, with Θεός, κύριος, Χριστός or Ἰησοῦς implied. So in eighteen

instances—1:5; 6:7; 2:12; 4:3; 5:5,6; 7:17,21; 8:5,8; 9:20; 10:5,8,9,30; 12:26; 13:5. In seven additional cases, both a form of one of the preceding verbs and nominatives are to be supplied—1:5,8,10; 2:13 bis,14; and 10:30. The nom. *τις* (sc. *Δαβίδ*) is expressed in 2:6; *τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον*, in 3:7; 10:15; and *Θεός*, or a pronoun referring directly to *Θεός* in 6:14. It is plain from the above that, if we draw an argument against the Pauline origin of the Hebrews from the manner of quotation, we must also, as far as this argument goes, exclude the first Epistle to the Corinthians, and several other of Paul's epistles, from the catalogue of the writings of the author of the Romans. But who does not know that any person writing at different times, and for different objects, without even being sensible of it, varies his style in such particulars as forms of reference to other authors? Indeed, if the forms of quotation had been precisely the same in the Hebrews as the Romans, we should rather be reminded of the hand of an imitator than of the same author. Neither should it seem to be any objection to the epistle, that God is represented as speaking, in the Old Testament, and that too in the third person, while Paul elsewhere only introduces God as speaking in the first person, when the words are properly his own. For not only is God introduced as speaking in the third person in the Old Testament, but he often speaks of himself as a third person in the same way that another would speak of him. Besides, there are peculiar reasons for the writer of the Hebrews introducing God as speaking, in his quotations. He addresses those who acknowledged the authority of the scripture as the *word of God*, and his argument receives additional weight when it can be prefaced by "thus saith the Lord."

One need only examine the quotations in the first chapter, to be convinced of the naturalness and force of the manner of quotation. In the fifth verse, what other form could have been properly used than the simple *εἶπε*, with *Θεός* to be supplied from the preceding context? "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners *spake*," etc. Who, in such a connection as this, where the authority of God is to be made

especially prominent, would have introduced: 'Thou art my Son, etc., by "it is said," "some one has said," "as it has been written," or some such phrase? No one, plainly, who did not either himself question the inspiration of the words quoted, or expect they would be questioned by those to whom he wrote, neither of which can be supposed here. The whole point of the argument would have been lost. In the sixth verse, if Θεός is the subject of εἰσαγάγῃ, what could emasculate the quotation more than to give it an impersonal construction? Similar remarks might be made upon the quotations in the seventh and eighth verses; and so of many of those following. But it is needless. We can hardly conceive that the manner of the introduction of the quotations in the Hebrews would have been used against the Pauline authorship, unless for the sake of substantiating an opinion or confirming a doubt previously existing.

3. Closely connected with the introductory forms of quotation we adduce, as a peculiarity of the acknowledged epistles of Paul and the Hebrews, the custom of *accumulating* passages from the Old Testament in confirmation of the argument in hand, and connecting them together by *καὶ πάλιν*. In both these respects these writings differ from all the other books of the New Testament. Instances of *cumulative* quotation are found, for example, in Rom. 3: 10—18; 9: 7—33; xi.; and in Heb. 1: 5—14; iii.; 10: 5—17; the use of *καὶ πάλιν* in Rom. 15: 9—12; 1 Cor. 3: 19, 20; Heb. 1: 5; 2: 12, 13; 4: 4; 10: 30.¹

4. The same passages are quoted from the Old Testament with peculiarities which mark the same hand.

(1) In Heb. 2: 8 we find the words Πάντα ὑπέταξας ὑποκάτω τῶν ποδῶν αὐτοῦ, taken from Ps. 8: 6, and the same

¹ These passages are so peculiar as to warrant the exhibition of two or three of them side by side. Rom. 15: 9—12; καθὼς γέγραπται διὰ τοῦτο ἐξομολογήσονται σοι ἐν ἔθνεσι, καὶ τῷ ὀνόματί σου ψαλῶ. Καὶ πάλιν λέγει· εὐφράνῃτε ἔθνη . . . καὶ πάλιν· αἰνεῖτε τὸν Κύριον πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, . . . καὶ πάλιν Ἡσαΐας λέγει, κ. τ. λ. Heb. 2: 12, 13; λέγων· ἀπαγγελῶ τὸ ὄνομά σου τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς μου . . . καὶ πάλιν· ἐγὼ ἔσομαι πεποιδῶς ἐπ' αὐτῷ, καὶ πάλιν· ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ, κ. τ. λ. It should not be forgotten, that *καὶ πάλιν* is used out of Paul and the Hebrews only once in Matt. 3: 7, and there in a different way from the passages above.

passage in 1 Cor. 15:27, and again in Eph. 1:22. We have here not merely the same quotation, but in Hebrews and Corinthians the same digression upon a word (*ὑποτάσσω*), which is so marked a characteristic of Paul. In Hebrews the words follow: For in that *he put all in subjection* (*τῷ ὑποτάξαι*), he left nothing *not put under* him (*ἀνυπότακτον*). But now we see not yet all things *put under* (*ὑποταγμένα*) him; and Cor.: But when he saith all things *are put under him* (*ὑποτέτακται*), it is manifest that he is excepted which did put all things under (*ὑποτάξαντος*) him. And when all things shall be put under (*ὑποταγῇ*) him, then shall the Son also himself be subject (*ὑποταγήσεται*) to him who put all things under (*ὑποτάξαντι*) him, etc.

There is still another circumstance to be noted here. In the preceding context (in Heb. 1:13), Ps. 110:1, "Sit on my right hand until I make thine enemies thy footstool," is quoted. In connection with the previous quotation in Eph. 5:20, we find the first part of the quotation from Ps. cx. in an altered form: and "set him at his right hand;" and in 1 Cor. 15:25, the latter part of it: "till he hath put all enemies under his feet." Furthermore, the same mode of quotation as in Ephesians is adopted in Heb. 8:1 and 12:2. "Nor is this all. It remains to be noticed, as a concluding indication of the same mind and pen, that the substance of the entire quotation, Heb. 1:13, is repeated Heb. 10:12, nearly in the words of its *disjecta membra*, Eph. 1:20 and 1 Cor. 15:25 . . . ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκδεχόμενος, ἕως τεθῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν αὐτοῦ."¹

(2) In ch. 8:10 and 2 Cor. 6:16, in connection with a similar train of reasoning, and "as a part of a *tissera* of Old Test. quotations," Ezek. 37:26 is cited, with a very slight variation in the phraseology, both from the LXX. and from each other, such as one would naturally make in quoting from memory, while the Hebrews conforms exactly to the Hebrew original.²

¹ Forster, Sect. 10.

² The Hebrew runs thus: עָשָׂה לִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל כְּכֹהֵן יֵשֶׁע. The Greek of the Hebrews: ἵσταναι αὐτοῖς εἰς δεξ., καὶ αὐτοὶ ἵστανται μοι εἰς λαὸν.

(3) In Heb. 10 : 38, Rom. 1 : 17, and Gal. 3 : 11, there is a common quotation from Habak. 2 : 4 ; and, what is specially significant for identity of authorship, in Romans and Hebrews the quotations are exactly the same, even to the connecting particle ; and in Galatians ὅτι is introduced instead of δέ, merely because the connection in which it stands requires it, while in other respects it is identical with Romans and Hebrews ; but in Hebrew, instead of the simple—"the just shall live by faith," as in the quotations, the reading is, "the just shall live by *his* faith," and the LXX : "the just shall live by *my* faith." Is it probable that two authors would make just this same departure from the original Hebrew and Septuagint ? It should not be forgotten that this passage is found nowhere else in the New Testament but in the passages quoted above from Paul and the Hebrews.

(4) In Heb. 6 : 14 and Gal. 3 : 8, different parts of the same promise found in Gen. 22 : 17, 18, are quoted in such a manner as to indicate "the natural recurrence of the same writer to the same passage of scripture, but also that discriminative appropriateness in its distribution so peculiarly indicative of the manner of St. Paul ; the part of the promise most offensive to the Jews, and most encouraging to the Gentiles, being omitted in the Epistle to the Hebrews, but introduced in that to the Galatians."¹

(5) One more passage must be referred to, and we have done with this branch of our argument. In Heb. 10 : 30 and Rom. 12 : 19 we find the same identical words : Ἐμοὶ ἐκδίκησις ἐγὼ ἀνταποδώσω, quoted from Deut. 32 : 35, where there is a material departure from the LXX. and in substantial accordance with the Hebrew, though with the omission of the connecting ἡ (and). This Forster calls "the most remarkable coincidence in quotation, in respect to *choice* and *mode*, throughout the New Testament," and the most plausible explanation that can be given of it in consistency with

The LXX: ἔσομαι αὐτοῖς θεός ; καὶ αὐτοὶ μου ἔσονται λαός. Corinth. I. ἔσομαι αὐτῶν θεός, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔσονται μοι λαός.

¹ Forster, Sect. X. p. 398.

a denial of Paul as author of the Hebrews, is that of Michaelis, that "*it is very possible* that in the first century there were MSS. of this reading in Deut. 32:35, from which Paul *might* have copied in Rom. 12:19, and the translator of this epistle, in Heb. 10:30. *How probable* this is, we need not stop to say.¹

5. The conformity of the quotations in the Hebrews to the Septuagint has often been made an objection to its Pauline origin. But so little can be made of this argument, even by those most desirous to impugn the Pauline authorship, that it is unnecessary to delay long upon it.² Even Davidson, who denies, without refuting, many of Stuart's positions, and is inclined to give the objection its full weight, is obliged, in looking at the "entire argument," to confess that "on comparing the Epistle to the Hebrews with the thirteen epistles of Paul, it makes out no clear case of difference between their quotations. A general rule is said to characterize those quotations. One exception to that rule in the one epistle is of greater weight than three similar exceptions in the thirteen, when we take their respective contents into account. It so happens that more important departures from the Hebrew, on the part of the LXX. are found in the citations made by the writer of our epistle than any equal number that could be selected out of Paul's acknowledged letters. But there are a goodly number of passages in the apostle's writings where he follows the LXX.'s departures from the Hebrew. When we consider, also, that all the quotations in the present epistle which follow the Septuagint against the Hebrew *give the sense* of the latter, the unavoidable conclusion is, that Bleek's position wants a proper foundation. And if such be the case, nothing can be built on it in proof of diversity of authorship."³

¹ Forster, Ap. Auth. of Ep. to Heb. Introd. p. 27, and Michaelis's Introd. N. Test. Vol. IX. Ch. 24, Sect. 16, p. 256.

² We are well aware that there is a great deal of *assertion* upon this point by Bleek, Schulz, and others; but, as it seems to us, very little proof.

³ Introd. III. p. 231, 2.

"The general rule" referred to above, which even Bleek is obliged to recognize,¹ is, that "*Paul usually cites the Old Testament according to the LXX.*" This he does naturally, not only from his own familiarity with it, but because it was better understood than the original by those to whom he wrote, and everywhere acknowledged as authoritative. Still in his acknowledged epistles there are cases, as appears from the references above, where the Hebrew is followed when it differs from the Septuagint; and in the Hebrews there are also as striking individual cases of reference to the Hebrew where it does not agree with the LXX. So that all that can be justly claimed is, that it so *chances*, perhaps, that a larger number, in proportion, of passages in the Hebrews conform to the Septuagint than in some of the other epistles of Paul; and Stuart is not far from right when he says: "Yet after all, as the facts above show, actual changes are here little, if any, less frequent than in the other epistles of Paul. They are certainly more frequent, in proportion, than in the second Epistle to the Corinthians."² Who that is unprejudiced can feel that there is here any ground for an argument against the Pauline origin of our epistle?³

Superiority of Style in the Hebrews.

Much has been made of the general superiority of style in the Hebrews to the undisputed epistles of Paul. It cannot be denied that under this head there is large extent of

¹ p. 388.

² *Introd.* to *Comm.* p. 187.

³ We omit to speak here of an argument from the use of different MSS. in the Hebrews and acknowledged epistles of Paul; for even the most strenuous opposers of the Pauline authorship admit the untenableness of this argument; for, as Schulz says: "The number of passages where the readings of Paul differ from the Vatican copy and agree more with the Alexandrine; and on the other hand, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where they agree more with the Vatican than the Alexandrine, is not much less than where the reverse is the case." It is in part, as Davidson declares, "*absurd* to try the question of authorship by such minutiae, or to suppose that they should have any proper bearing on the point." See Davidson's *Introd.* III. p. 231-2, and Schulz in *Hal. Allgem. Literaturzeit.* 1829, No. 104, 5.

debatable ground. One person, with a previous feeling of different authorship, will find almost innumerable beauties in the Hebrews, which are not to be found in the acknowledged epistles of Paul; another will scarcely discover faint shades of superiority. As far as identity of authorship can be made out from the use of particular phrases in similar connections, from peculiar words, from a similar manner of quoting and applying the Old Testament scriptures, very few of the acknowledged epistles are so plainly and peculiarly Pauline as the Hebrews. But, notwithstanding all this, we are told "that the Epistle to the Hebrews is written in a *more select style* than the Pauline epistles;"¹ also that "it is oratorical" in style. "The periods are regular, and are rounded; the rhythm smooth. The construction of sentences is more exact and complete. There is less abruptness and liveliness. Hence it abounds with full-toned expressions, with words of a poetical complexion. The tone is calm, solemn, dignified, unlike the apostle's fiery energy and irresistible excitement. We miss his dialectic method, and have in its stead the periodic, stately, polished eloquence of one who builds up his sentences with regularity and rhythm. This oratorical character has had some influence on the choice of simple words and phrases. It has led to the adoption of fuller terms and of finer rhythm. But it is not seen in them so much as in the conformation and succession of periods in their flow and construction."²

Now, grant all that is claimed above for that superiority of the *style* of the Epistle to the Hebrews, — and more, certainly, cannot be asked, — is it any real objection, laying aside for the moment all the other numerous and incontrovertible arguments, to the Pauline authorship? Is there anything in all this that we cannot suppose Paul capable of writing? For this should be shown in order to make this argument valid. The style is "*more select*," it is said. Can you doubt that Paul was capable of writing in a more select style than appears in the familiar letters written to those

¹ Ebrard, Comm. App. D. p. 417. ² Davidson's Introd. Vol. III. p. 250.

among whom he had often labored, and in the midst of journeyings and toils, and interruptions innumerable? It may be supposed that he had leisure in his confinement at Rome to use *selection* in writing, and for the construction of exact and complete and rounded sentences. It is "*oratorical*." Is no oratory exhibited in Paul's address from Mars Hill, before the imperial tribunal at Caesarea, or in any passages in Romans and Corinthians? It has sometimes "*words of a poetical complexion*." Was Paul capable of no poetical inspiration, when his theme called to mind and into use some of the loftiest predictions of the psalmist and the prophets? Was there no poetic inspiration in the description of the ministration of angels, in the contemplation of the "mount that might be touched," and that "burned with fire," and especially in the vision granted him of "Mount Zion, the city of the living God," "the holy places not made with hands," into which Christ had entered, of "an innumerable company of angels," "the general assembly and church of the first-born," and of "God the judge of all?"

"*It has less of abruptness and liveliness*." Should we expect that an encyclical letter, discussing a particular subject, would have the same life and variety as one written familiarly in order to express the writer's varied feelings in calling to mind the peculiar phases of character in a little church or band of brethren? Could the author of the Hebrews, be he Paul or Silas or Luke, or even John, in treating of the dignity of the angelic world, the authority of the Jewish priesthood and temple worship, and especially when representing our Lord Jesus Christ as superior to all these as the Maker of this world, the Son of the Most High, who had already passed into the heavens and was seated at his right hand in majesty and glory, use any other than "*a calm, solemn, and dignified tone*?" The answer cannot be doubtful.

It may not be inapposite to examine briefly the characteristics of the style of Paul, as exhibited by those who argue against the Pauline authorship of the Hebrews on this ground, in order to see how great the discrepancy is, when

we leave out of the account general assertions, and come to the actual comparison. Davidson has comprised these general characteristics under four heads: "First, his style is the expression of a didactic, logical, reflecting mind. It images forth a mental conformation which is didactic and syllogistic — a mode of thinking *analytical* in its cast. Hence it is *periodic* and *antithetic* in structure."¹ Before proceeding to his exemplification of this general enunciation, which we venture nothing in saying applies far better to the Hebrews than to several of the acknowledged epistles of Paul, and as well as to most, if not all the others; it should be noticed that the very characteristics here attributed to Paul are brought as objections against the Pauline authorship of the Hebrews. Davidson himself says²: "We miss his dialectic method, and have in its stead the *periodic*, stately, polished eloquence." And Ebrard says³: "In the Epistle to the Hebrews we find everywhere a strictly *syllogistic* arrangement." Eichhorn maintains that "the manner of it [the Hebrews] is more tranquil and *logical* than that in which Paul with his strong feelings could write."

But in particular, Davidson says: Paul "often employs *abstract terms* in conformity with the reflective habit of mind he possessed." Are not *abstract terms* employed in the Hebrews, when required by the subject discussed? See, for example, 1:9; 4:15; 6:1, et al.

"Again, he proves his statements. Seldom does he advance any general position, or make an assertion, without subjoining some such particle as *γάρ* or *ὅτι*."⁴ Of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the same author says: "It is remarkable how often *γάρ* is used, even where," according to his opinion, "other conjunctions might have been more appropriate."⁵ Schulz says: "The use of *γάρ* in our epistle is excessive." To whom Stuart replies that he finds on comparison that in the Romans *γάρ* is used, on an average, a little more than ten times, and in the Hebrews a little

¹ Introd. Vol. II. p. 145.

² Introd. Vol. III. p. 250.

³ Comm. App. p. 419.

⁴ Introd. Vol. II. p. 145.

⁵ Introd. Vol. III. p. 251.

more than nine times to a page.¹ To show that *ὅτι* is not unknown to or unused by the writer of the Hebrews, we need only refer to its use in 2: 6 bis; 3: 19; 7, 8, 14, 17; in four consecutive verses, ch. 8: 9, 10, 11, 12; in 11: 8; 12: 17, 13, 18 et al. "Conjunctions which mark the end, purpose, or cause for which something is done," are frequent in Paul. See the use of *ὅτι* also, e. g., in Heb. 2: 17; 3: 13; 4: 11, 16; 5: 1; 6: 12, 18;—12: 3, 13, 27; 13: 12, 17, 19; of *ὅπως* in 2: 9. For the use of *εἰς τό* with the Infin., claimed as Pauline, Stuart says: "In Rom. I find fifteen cases; in 1 Cor. five; in 2 Cor. four; in Gal. one; in Eph. three; in Col. not one;" and, to omit the other epistles, "in Heb. seven times, and two others of the same nature."²

2. "The vigor and fire of his [Paul's] mind are expressed in the vigor and fervency of his style." The vigor of the style in the Hebrews has, we believe, scarcely been questioned; and if there is any want of fire, as compared with the acknowledged epistles of Paul, it is because fire is less demanded in a piece of consecutive reasoning than in writings of a more hortatory or polemic character. For the same reason, irregularities of construction are of course fewer and less marked than in some of the Pauline epistles, but yet not enough so to mark diversity of authorship. To our own mind, a frequency of such irregularities in such a piece of writing, and for such an object, would be far more *un-Pauline* than a sparing use of them. But as examples of *suspended sentences*, *digressions*, and *anacolutha*, see Heb. 5: 6; 7: 1; 9: 7, 11, 12,³ et al.; and for interrogations and exclamations, for which the apostle's style is distinguished, compare, e. g., Heb. 1: 5, 13, 14; 2: 3, 6, 17, 18; 9: 14; 10: 2, 29; 11: 32; 12: 7, 9, et al.

3. "The apostle's style is distinguished by fulness and copiousness. He had abundance of good Greek words at his command,"⁴ etc. As the only objection of any weight

¹ See Stuart's Comm. Introd. § 12.

² Ibid.

³ See also remarks of Stuart on these passages in Introd. § 12, and Comm. on the passages; also Forster, Auth. Hebr.

⁴ Davidson, Introd. Vol. II. p. 150.

ever alleged against the Epistle to the Hebrews is that first started by Origen, that the author wrote too good Greek, it is hardly worth while to say a word under this head. But two or three particulars may be noticed. "The great variety of particles which the writer [Paul] uses, is seen from a few passages, such as Gal. 2:12; 1 Thess. 1:8 to the end; Rom. 3:25, 26," et al.¹ "Besides, they are varied at pleasure, so as to express distinctions and shades of signification." According to the opinion of the same writer, the only difference in the Hebrews is that the same characteristic is carried a little further, since the Greek particles are there used "with greater copiousness and variety than in any of Paul's epistles of equal length,"² as, it may be added, is entirely natural in a writing which has so many characteristics of a systematic treatise.

"The rich fulness of the writer's [Paul's] mind . . . may also be seen in his copious use of synonymes and rich participial constructions."³ Set over against this Seyffarth's objection against the Pauline authorship of the Hebrews: "Our author [*i. e.*, of the Hebrews] is partial to the use of participles and of the Genitive Absolute. He employs eighty-four active participles and a hundred and seven passive and middle ones, and seven cases of the Genitive Absolute; while in the Epistle to the Romans there are only ninety active participles and forty-two passive, and no case of the Genitive Absolute" (p. 81). But, lest this make a wrong impression, Stuart puts the principle to test in some of the other epistles. "If," he says, "I have rightly counted, the Epistle to the Colossians has Act. Participles thirty-four; passive, forty; pages, three; average number to a page, twenty-four. Ephesians has Act. Part. sixty; Pass., twenty-four; pages, four and a half; average to a page, twenty-three. If nineteen participles on a page proves one epistle spurious, what shall we say of these epistles which have twenty-three and twenty-four to a page?"⁴

¹ Davidson, *Introd.* Vol. II. p. 150.

² *Ibid.* III. p. 251.

³ Davidson, *Introd.* II. p. 151.

⁴ See also further remarks upon the Gen. Absol. in Stuart's *Introd.*

4. "Tenderness, delicacy, disinclination to severity, are conspicuous features in his [Paul's] mental character."¹ These qualities are certainly as prominent in the Hebrews, considering the subject-matter and the more general destination of the epistle. The author, in his exhortations, includes himself with those addressed; as, for example, in 2: 1, 3, "How shall *we* escape," etc., and so *passim*. One of the most pointed rebukes in the epistle, in the end of ch. v. and beginning of ch. vi., is followed by: "Beloved, we are persuaded better things of you, and things that accompany salvation, though we thus speak. For God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labor of love," etc. So in the latter part of the 10th chapter, 19 sq., the most faithful and pointed admonitions are accompanied by words of encouragement, and a most delicate reference to previous acts of kindness toward himself and others, in the midst of persecution and reproach and worldly loss. And how could the delicacy or tenderness be better exhibited than in ch. xii.? as, for example, in the 3d and following verses: "For consider him that endured such contradiction of sinners against himself, lest ye be weary and faint in your minds," etc. See, also, 13: 1—3. There is also a peculiar delicacy shown in this epistle, on the supposition that Paul is the author, in not referring to his apostolic calling to the Gentiles, and his success in labor among them.

We have enumerated the principal points in the characteristics of Paul as presented by Davidson, and we know of no one who has exhibited them more at length and more clearly, and it is certainly not a little remarkable that they should be so distinctly illustrated in one epistle, to a particular class of readers, on a specific subject. We can hardly refrain from quoting one further passage from the same author, in reference to the character of Paul, so well would it be established from the Epistle to the Hebrews alone. "Thus there is a refined perception of propriety, an avoidance of the distasteful in the view of his readers, along with as much fidelity as

¹ Davidson's Introd. as above.

the most direct language could convey. It is therefore impossible to resist the idea that his feelings were always under control, else such phenomena could not have happened. He is never borne away by mere enthusiasm. Infallibly guided as he was, there are minute distinctions which show that discretion never forsook him, even in moments of the highest emotion. The reasoning faculty was quick and powerful, so that his enlarged feelings could find expression as well in the finer and less perceptible streams of propriety, as in the full channel of Christian love.”¹

Similarity of Thought and Expression in the Hebrews and acknowledged Epistles of Paul.

The passages where the same or synonymous words are used, or there is a similarity of thought, or peculiarity either in thought or expression, are many, and this argument would be deficient without an enumeration of some of them.

Heb. 1 : 2. Δι' οὐ [Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] καὶ τοὺς αἰῶνας [ὁ Θεὸς] ἐποίησε.

Eph. 3 : 9. Τῷ [Θεῷ] τὰ πάντα κτίσαντι διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

Heb. 1 : 3. ὃς ὦν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ.

Col. 1 : 15. Ὁ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου.

Phil. 2 : 6. Ὃς ἐν μορφῇ ὑπάρχων.

2 Cor. 4 : 4. Ὃς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ.

Heb. 1 : 3. Φέρων τε τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ.

Col. 1 : 17. Τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε.

Heb. 1 : 4. Τοσοῦτῳ κρείττων γενόμενος τῶν ἀγγέλων ὅσῳ διαφορώτερον παρ' αὐτοὺς κεκληρονόμηκεν ὄνομα.

Eph. 1 : 21. Ἐπεράνω . . . παντὸς ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένου οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι.

Phil. 2 : 9. Ὁ Θεὸς . . . ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα· ἵνα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ πᾶν γόνυ κάμψῃ ἐπουρανίων, κ. τ. λ.

¹ Vol. II. p. 152.

Heb. 1 : 3. Ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μεγαλωσύνης ἐν ὑψηλοῖς.

Eph. 1 : 20. Ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις.

The similarity of sentiment and language between Heb. 1 : 2, 3, and Eph. 1 : 18—21 is highly significant.

Heb. 1 : 5. Τίός μου εἰ σύ, ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε.

Acts 13 : 33. Τίός μου εἰ σύ, ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε.

Heb. 1 : 5. Εγὼ ἔσομαι αὐτῷ εἰς πατέρα, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔσται μοι εἰς υἱόν.

2 Cor. 6 : 18. Ἔσομαι ὑμῖν εἰς πατέρα, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθέ μοι εἰς υἱούς κ. τ. λ. There is plainly, in both these passages, an allusion to 2 Sam. 7 : 14, but with a different application.

Heb. 1 : 6. Τὸν πρωτότοκον

Rom. 8 : 29. Εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν τὸν πρωτότοκον.

Col. 1 : 15. Πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως. Ver. 18. Πρωτότοκος.

It should be noticed that the appellative in these last quotations is nowhere else applied to Christ in the New Testament except Rev. 1 : 5. And the common literal quotation from Ps. ii., in ver. 5, not elsewhere applied to Christ in the New Testament, points more emphatically to the same author from the similarity of sentiment in the preceding context, directed also to the same individuals, the Jews.

Heb. 1 : 1. Πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως¹ πύλαι ὁ Θεὸς λαλήσας τοῖς πατράσιν ἐν τοῖς προφήταις, ἐπ' ἐσχάτων τῶν ἡμερῶν τούτων, ἐλάλησεν ἡμῖν ἐν υἱῷ.

Acts 13 : 32. Καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑμᾶς εὐαγγελιζόμεθα τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας ἐπαγγελίαν γενομένην, ὅτι ταύτην ὁ Θεὸς ἐκπεπλήρωκε τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτῶν ἡμῖν, ἀναστήσας Ἰησοῦν. With Heb. 1 : 1, as quoted above, Eph. 3 : 4, 5 should be compared, where, as Forster says, "we meet fresh marks of the same hand." Who can doubt, on a careful examination of all the preceding passages, that Forster is not far wrong when he says: "The result is, that every quotation, every thought, and

¹ This word, not elsewhere found in the New Testament, has parallel phrases used only by Paul; e. g., Rom. 3 : 2, κατὰ πάντα τρόπον; Philip. 1 : 18, παντὶ τρόπῳ; 2 Thess. 3 : 16, ἐν παντὶ τρόπῳ.

nearly every word of Heb. 1:1—5 [6] are the thoughts, the words, and the quotations of St. Paul.”¹

Our limits allow us merely to refer to such passages as Heb. 2:2 and Gal. 3:19, where the law as dispensed by angels is spoken of in a similar manner; Heb. 2:4; 1 Cor. 12:4, 11; Rom. 12:6, in which the varied “miraculous gifts of the Holy Spirit” are characterized by the same shade of thought; Heb. 2:8; 1 Cor. 15:27; Eph. 1:22; Phil. 3:21, where phraseology from the Old Testament designating the sovereignty conferred upon Christ, is found nowhere else in the New Testament, and Heb. 2:10; Rom. 11:36; Col. 1:16; 1 Cor. 8:6, where God is designated in the same manner as Lord of all things.

Heb. 2:14 deserves a little more extended notice: “*Ἰνα . . . καταργήσῃ τὸν τὸ κράτος ἔχοντα τοῦ θανάτου, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸν διάβολον.*”

1 Cor. 15:26. “*Ἐσχατος ἐχθρὸς καταργεῖται ὁ θάνατος.*”

2 Tim. 1:10. *Καταργήσαντος μὲν τὸν θάνατον.* There is here not only a similarity of idea and language, in a more extended passage of like characteristics,² but the word *καταργέω* is employed in Hebrews, which is a very rare word in any author but the apostle Paul, only once found in the New Testament except in Paul, viz., in Luke 13:7; and then in a sense different from that given to it by Paul in the twenty-six instances in which he uses it. There could scarcely be a use of a word more indicative of identity of authorship than that furnished by this passage with this *peculiarly* Pauline word.

In Heb. 2:16 we find the phrase *seed* or *posterity* of *Abraham*, to designate Christians; which is found elsewhere only in the writings of Paul, as in Gal. 3:29, with which compare Gal. 3:7 and Rom. 4:16, where the phraseology is parallel. The same is true of the *heavenly* or *divine calling*, Heb. 3:1; Phil. 3:14; Rom. 11:29. Passing several parallelisms adduced and commented upon by Forster,³ we place side by

¹ Apost. Author of Ep. Hebr. p. 347.

² See Forster's Apost. Auth. Ep. of Heb. Sect. II.

³ Sect. VI. p. 348, sq.

side Heb. 4:12. Ζῶν γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ . . . καὶ τομώτερος ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν μάχαιραν δίστομον.

Eph. 6:17. Τὴν μάχαιραν τοῦ πνεύματος, ὃ ἐστὶ ῥῆμα Θεοῦ. Compare, also, Rom. 11:22 and an extension of the sentiment and expression in Heb. 4:12, 13, in 1 Cor. 2:10, 11; 4:4, 5 and 2 Cor. 10:4, 5.¹

In the fifth and sixth chapters there are several passages where words and connections of words peculiar to the apostle Paul are used. We can only refer to the following: Heb. 5:8 and Phil. 2:8; Heb. 5:13 and 1 Cor. 3:1; Eph. 4:14, Rom. 2:20, Gal. 4:3; Heb. 5:14 and 1 Cor. 14:2; Heb. 6:1 and Col. 3:14; Heb. 6:3 and 1 Cor. 16:7; Heb. 6:10 and 2 Cor. 8:24.² It is needless to go through with the remaining chapters. Any one who will consult Davidson's Introduction or Stuart's Commentary, will see that the parallelisms with Paul's acknowledged epistles are scarcely, if at all, less striking in the latter than in the former part of the Hebrews; and that the more closely these points of similarity are examined in their connections and dependencies, the more convincing will be the argument for identity of authorship.

Similarity of Leading Passages in the Hebrews and acknowledged Epistles of Paul.

Forster has a separate section of thirty-five or forty pages upon "some leading parallel passages from the Epistle to the Hebrews and the undisputed epistles of St. Paul." The limits of a Review Article allow a separate examination of but two or three of the more important passages. Heb. 3:7—19, 1 Cor. 10:1—12, "are parallel in the following respects: 1. Both passages relate to the exode of the Israelites from Egypt and their temptations of Jehovah in the wilderness. 2. The verbal agreements between the quotation of Ps. xcvi. in Hebrews and the apostle's own

¹ Quoted by Forster as above, p. 350.

² See also Forster's extended remarks upon the parallel between Heb. 6:9—12, and 2 Thess. 1:3, and 1 Thess. 1:3—5.

composition in first Corinthians, are precisely such as might be looked for in the case before us, . . . that of the original composition being from the same hand which had employed the quotation. 3. In both contexts, the Divine person in question is *Christ*: Heb. 3:6, 7, the quotation from the Psalms is applied to CHRIST; and 1 Cor. 10:9, Christ is the person tempted. Heb. 3:6, the Hebrew Christians are styled *the house of Christ*; 1 Cor. 10:4, Christ is termed *the rock of the Israelites*; the similarity of the vein of thought thus indicating, throughout, sameness of mind and pen.”¹

The similarity between Heb. 6:10 sq. and 1 Thess. 1:3 and 2 Thess. 1:4 is pointed out at length by Forster. “In all three contexts,” he says, “we have the same subject, and this the favorite subject of St. Paul’s, ‘faith, hope, and charity,’ treated in the same order.” The similarity is more striking from the use of two of St. Paul’s most peculiar words, *πληροφορία* and *μιμητής*, in common in the passage in Heb. and 1 Thess.; and in Heb. and 2 Thess. the words *ἐνδείκνυμι* and *ἐνδευγμι*, which are also peculiarly Pauline. It should be noticed that there is a much closer verbal parallelism between Heb. and 1 Thess. than between the two passages from the 1st and 2d Thess.; and yet there is a “most significant agreement between the place of 2 Thess. and that of the Heb.,” without a parallel in the passage from 1 Thess., namely, the common definition of *ἀγάπη*, as “love manifested in acts of benevolence toward the saints.”² The same idea is implied merely in *τοῦ κόπου τῆς ἀγάπης*, which the 2d Thess. has in common with Heb.,³ whilst we find in Col., where St. Paul is treating of the same subjects, faith, hope, and charity, almost the identical words of the Heb.: *τὴν ἀγάπην, τὴν εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἁγίους*.

In Heb. 6:13, 14, we meet one part of a quotation from

¹ P. 348—9, and note.

² 2 Thess. 1:3; *καὶ πληροῦσαι ἡ ἀγάπη ἐνὸς ἐκάστου πάντων ὑμῶν εἰς ἀλλήλους* and Heb. 6:10; *τῆς ἀγάπης ἥς ἐνδείξασθε . . . διακονήσαντες τοῖς ἁγίοις, καὶ διακαρτερῶντες*.

³ For further remarks upon these passages and their connections, see Forster, p. 355 sq.

Ger. 22 17, while the other part is found in Galatians. In Heb. 6 : 18—20 and Phil. 3 : 12—14, there is the same imagery borrowed from the Grecian games. Compare also Heb. 9:15 and Gal. 3:18—20; Heb. 9:16—20 and 1 Cor. 11:25, 26; Heb. 10:25 and 2 Thess. 2:1, 2; Heb. 10:16—31 and 2 Tim. 3:7, 8 and 2:25, and various other passages.

Words peculiar to the Hebrews and acknowledged Epistles.

We find, also, a large number of separate words that are peculiar to the Hebrews and the acknowledged epistles of Paul, *i. e.*, are not used in other parts of the New Testament, nor in the LXX. or the Apocrypha;¹ others that are found in no other part of the New Testament, but are found occasionally in the LXX. and the Apocrypha;² and still others, that occur occasionally in the other parts of the New Testament, but in *manner* and *frequency* belong to the Hebrews and undisputed epistles of Paul.³ On the other hand, there are words used in the Epistle to the Hebrews not elsewhere found in the writings of Paul; so are there

¹ Such are the following: ἁθλησις Heb. 10:32, and ἀθλέω 2 Tim. 2:5, twice; αἰδώς Heb. 12:28, and 1 Tim. v. 9; ἀναλογίζομαι Heb. 12:3, and ἀναλογία Rom. 12:6; ἀνυπότακτος Heb. 2:8; 1 Tim. 1:9, and Tit. 1:6, 10; ἀπειθεία Heb. 4:6, 11; Rom. 11:30, 32; Eph. 2:2, 5:6, and Col. 3:6; ἀπεκδέχομαι Heb. 9:28; Rom. 8:19, 23, 25; 1 Cor. 1:7; Gal. 5:5; Phil. 3:20; ἀπόλαυσις Heb. 11:25, and 1 Tim. 6:17; ἀφιλάργυρος Heb. 13:5 and 1 Tim. 2:3; ἔνδικος Heb. 2:2, and Rom. 3:8; ἐνεργής Heb. 4:12; 1 Cor. 16:9, and Philem. 6; ἐφάπαξ Heb. 7:27, 9:12, 10:10, Rom. 6:10, and 1 Cor. 15:6; μήπω Heb. 9:8, and Rom. 9:11; μηδέπω Heb. 11:7, and μηδέποτε 2 Tim. 3:7; νεκρόω Heb. 11:12, Rom. 4:19, and Col. 3:5; ὀρέγομαι Heb. 11:16; 1 Tim. 3:1 and 6:10; παρακοή Heb. 2:2; Rom. 5:19, and 2 Cor. 16:6; παραπλησίως Heb. 2:14, and παραπλήσιον Phil. 2:27; πηλίκος Heb. 7:4, and Gal. 6:11; πληροφορία Heb. 6:11, 10:22; Coloss. 2:2, and Thess. 1:5; τοιγαροῦν Heb. 12:1, and 1 Thess. 4:8; φιλοξενία, Heb. 13:2; Rom. 12:13; φιλόξενος, 1 Tim. 3:2, and Tit. 1:8.

² See these also enumerated in Stuart's Comm. Introd. § 11. 4, III. and Forster's Authent. p. 234 sq.

³ Of this class there are between forty and fifty words which with references may be found in Stuart's Comm. Introd. § 11. 4, II.

also in the other epistles ; and Davidson acknowledges "that an immense array of *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα* is not insisted upon now by the opponents of the Pauline authorship, and there are no less than one hundred and eighteen in the Epistle to the Hebrews : but it has been shown, by Stuart, that there are two hundred and thirty in the first Epistle to the Corinthians ; so that the argument goes to prove too much."¹ He claims, however, that there are *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα* which indicate another author ; but these have been sufficiently discussed by Stuart, and at best can have little influence either for or against identity of authorship with the acknowledged Pauline epistles.

The argument from similarity or dissimilarity of words, without reference to their connections, we deem of little importance either for or against the Pauline authorship of the Hebrews. But it seems to us that a candid critic will find more that favors than that opposes Paul as author, even in the use of individual words. The least that can be said is, in the language of Davidson, that "were we to give an opinion as to the respective claims of the conflicting arguments before us, we should assign the preference to those founded on similarity, because they are more numerous and striking than the opposite. Taking them by themselves they outweigh the diversities."²

Recapitulation and Conclusion.

In conclusion little need be said. The amount and value of the external evidence is, to say the least, strongly in favor of Paul as the author of the Hebrews.³ Internal evidence, though not perhaps, in any one point taken by itself, so clear as not to admit of question ; yet, in almost every particular, sufficient to render the composition by the apostle Paul probable. Circumstances alluded to in the epistle, if they do not point to the apostle to the Gentiles as author, do

¹ Vol. III. p. 249.

² Vol. III. p. 249.

³ See the recapitulation of these arguments above.

not, certainly, any more clearly suggest any other author. The sentiment and doctrines of the epistle, when its object and aim are taken into view, seem to us strikingly Pauline. So Davidson acknowledges them to be,¹ and Ebrard says that while they do not "necessitate our coming to the conclusion that Paul was the author, yet at all events [the author] must be sought for among the disciples and helpers of the apostle Paul; our epistle must have emanated from this circle; only thus can the recurrence of Pauline ideas and combinations of ideas, even in the minutest particulars, be accounted for."²

The general characteristics of form are the same in the Hebrews and acknowledged Pauline epistles, with however many differences, such as we should expect in any encyclical letter purposely anonymous. While some of the formulas of quotation are unlike those most commonly used in some of the acknowledged epistles of Paul, as those epistles differ among themselves; still, there are forms of reference to the Old Testament strikingly indicative of the same hand; and passages quoted with peculiarities which scarcely admit the supposition of diversity of authorship from the Pauline epistles.

The superiority of style so generally attributed to the Hebrews, when brought to the test of a critical comparison, does not only not seem to demand diversity of authorship, but indicates a higher and more studied effort of the same mind and pen. Similarity rather than diversity in the Hebrews and acknowledged epistles of Paul, in the use of particular words and phrases, is now generally acknowledged.

We cannot, then, give our assent to those who exclude the Epistle to the Hebrews entirely from the circle of Pauline teachings; neither can we, with Origen, in ancient times, and Davidson, in our own age, "come to the conclusion that though Paul was the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, he did not put it into the phraseology and style it now

¹ See passage quoted above.

² App. to Comm. p. 415. Eng. Ed.

bears." We believe that the apostle was entirely competent to write as good Greek as that found in the Hebrews ; and instead of accepting the conclusion of Ebrard: " By how much the spirit and doctrine of the epistle is Pauline, by so little can it be supposed that this diction should have come from the hand of the apostle ;" we should say : By how much the spirit and doctrine of the epistle is Pauline, by so much may it be believed that the diction is entirely the apostle's.

ARTICLE II.

A SKETCH OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

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INDIA has never taken an active part in the drama of human history. Although emphatically the "land of desire" to all nations, it has itself, shut out both by physical barriers and natural inclination from engagement in the stirring scenes of earth, turned to the solution of those weightier problems which concern the spiritual life here and hereafter. Hence results that strange anomaly of a nation without a history ; for events of time have too little significance in the estimation of the Hindu to be recorded on the calendar, or narrated for his own instruction or the benefit of his descendants.

But for this very reason is it that the history of India assumes so important a position in the esteem of a student of mankind, furnishing, as it does, an instance of a completely "home-sprung development," which finds no parallel elsewhere ; a development, not so much of social, civil, and political, as of philosophical and religious ideas. To one who would acquaint himself with the history of such development in a country like India, where no documentary annals exist, the only resource left is to construct a history

out of the body of literature which that country presents to him, and which will faithfully reflect the varying phases of thought and feeling which time produces.

Such a work is now doing for India. Taking their point of observation at that period in the life of India which the Greek invasion has made historic, oriental scholars have succeeded in discovering a clue to the mazes of Hindu literature. As the result of long-continued, pains-taking investigation, they have been able to resolve this mass of writings into five distinct portions, each portion representing, in a certain sense, a well-defined historical epoch. These divisions are the Vedas, the Philosophical Treatises, the Buddhist writings, the Epic Poems, and the Purânas.

The Veda is the oldest historical document of India, and, indeed, of the Indo-European race. In its original form it consists of hymns in praise of the gods, or of supplication to them, which the ancient Aryans sang on their first occupancy of the plains of the Panjâb. The religion of the people, as reflected in these hymns, was a religion of nature, and there was among them but little diversity of belief. As, however, from one mountain range two streams may rise which shall pursue totally diverse courses, so from the Veda as the source flowed two currents of thought and faith, existing together in history, yet constantly diverging in their character, so that the whole history of India life is but a history of these separate streams, in their individual courses and in their occasional enforced commingling. On the one hand we have the growth of a superstitious supernaturalism, finding a partial and an early representation in the Epic Poems, and its fullest development in the Purânas; and on the other a speculation, at first hesitating and latterly bold and uncompromising, best exposed to view in the productions of the several philosophical schools. Occasionally, also, and signally in the case of Buddhism, we have an attempt to unite religion and philosophy, and to bring the teachings of the few into the arena of practical life.¹

¹ See the Preface to Wilson's *Vishnu Purâna*, and the review of E. Burnouf in the *Journal des Savants*, 1840.

Whoever, then, would possess an intelligent understanding of the internal history of India, must make himself familiar with these writings, keeping the above-mentioned distinction ever in mind.

To sketch briefly the rise and progress of philosophical speculation, as represented in Indian literature, is the purpose of the present Article.

We begin with the Veda. The Veda is clearly divisible into two portions: the Mantras and the Brâhmanas. The Mantra portion is the real Veda, consisting of the original hymns. The Brâhmanas, named so because composed by and for Brahmans, are later additions to the hymns, written when the original sense of the hymns was passing out of sight, and for the purpose of explaining these hymns in the interest of a growing priestly class. They consist, for the most part, of minute directions respecting religious ceremonies, and of puerile glosses upon the original text, including also a body of treatises called Upanishads, which are devoted to speculations respecting the source of the universe and the nature and destiny of man.

In the age represented to us by the Mantra portion of the Veda, the Aryan race was comparatively in its childhood. Its religion was, for the most part, a simple, unreasoning adoration of the elements, without much questioning whether one Spirit breathed through all, or whether all was under the control of a single will; and it was but seldom that the worshipper paused to ask the question: "Who knows whence this great creation sprang?" If philosophy was present, it lay unseparated from the religious faith; and yet there must have been in that religion the germs, at least, of later speculations; for, in the language of Müller, who has himself given us translations of some of these early utterances, "the Upanishads did not spring into existence on a sudden; like a stream which has received many a mountain torrent, and is fed by many a rivulet, the literature of the Upanishads proves, better than anything else, that the elements of their philosophical poetry came

from a more distant fountain.”¹ For the most part, however, these Vedic hymns are occupied with simple prayers to the several deities of nature, with request for cattle, lands, health, long life, and preservation from foes,—the worshipper, engrossed in this world, thinking but little of what might be beyond.²

But the child grew, and in the stage immediately succeeding we find speculation indeed; a speculation unreasoning, wayward, wanton, like the first wild dreaming of youth uncurbed. Religion was not absent, yet it was no longer the simple expression of hope or fear, but a religion in which there was felt to be a conflict, and which was therefore the very occasion of sceptical thought. But there was as yet no avowed divorce between reason and faith; the worshipper, perplexed by difficulties, did not at once cast off his faith, or thrust aside his rational conviction. It is not until we pass to the following period that we see the estrangement to be complete, beholding on the one side a narrow formalism, a rigid ecclesiasticism, a blind allegiance to a crafty priesthood; on the other, a bold, independent, and even partially atheistic philosophical belief, where religion and philosophy, born sisters, are rudely separated, and religion becomes but an irrational superstition, philosophy an infidel dogmatism. The *Brâhmanas* proper, Müller characterizes as “a literature which, for pedantry and downright absurdity, can hardly be matched anywhere. The general character of these works is marked by shallow and insipid grandiloquence, by priestly conceit, and antiquarian pedantry. They deserve to be studied as the physician studies the twaddle of idiots and the raving of madmen.”³

But the *Upanishads*, which are the later portions of the *Brâhmanas*, do not come under this condemnation; for, while full of puerilities and childish conceits, they are of positive and peculiar interest, as containing the earliest recorded results of Hindu speculation. These only, of all

¹ *A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature.* By Max Müller. p. 566.

² *Rig Veda Sanhita.* Translated by H. H. Wilson. 3 vols.

³ *History*, p. 389.

the Vedic writings, are to-day regarded by the Hindu as worth perusing, and they alone constitute for him the Veda. To these, under the title of Veds, did Rammohun Roy appeal, when he sought to call back his people from gross polytheism to the monotheistic faith of their fathers. Anquetil du Perron, a young and zealous Frenchman, was the first to bring these works to notice, from a Persian translation.¹ But this roundabout process did not add to the clearness of the original treatises; and, according to Wilson, his Latin version is nearly as unintelligible as the Sanskrit itself. H. T. Colebrooke, that prince of Sanskrit scholars, was the first to bring them fairly before us, in his celebrated Essay upon the Vedas, for thirty years the sole source of information upon these ancient writings.² His Essay contained various extracts from the Upanishads, and some complete translations. Rammohun Roy subsequently translated several of them, which were afterwards collected together.³ His translations, however, while preserving the sense in the main, followed later glosses too implicitly to be wholly trustworthy. Besides the versions of Poley into French, and of Weber into German, we have lastly the valuable translations of Dr. Rœr, in the *Bibliotheca Indica*.⁴

The number of these treatises is not large, ten only laying claim to any high antiquity, all of which we have through the translation of Dr. Rœr. Their date is as uncertain as that of all early Hindu works, being placed by Müller at from B. C. 800—600, and by Wilson as far back as B. C. 1100, for their earliest limit.⁵ As to character, these speculations are excessively mystical and obscure, often utterly unintelligible. They mostly treat of Brahma, or the Divine Spirit as the moving mundane force, in its various workings in nature and in man. As no description, however, can

¹ Oupnekhat, id est, Secretum tegendum, etc. 1801-2.

² Asiatic Researches, Vol. VIII. p. 369. Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus, p. 1. We shall quote from the last edition of the Essays, Vol. I.

³ Translation of the Veds. London, 1832.

⁴ *Bibliotheca Indica*: a collection of oriental works. Calcutta. The following are the numbers containing translations: 27, 38, 41, 50, 78, 135.

⁵ History, p. 445. Wilson's review of the same, Edinb. Rev. Oct. 1860.

adequately present either the matter or form of these treatises, we shall offer a sample of the more intelligible and interesting passages.

The first extract is the whole of the *Isa Upanishad*, whose object is to commend the study of the supreme *Brahma* as the chief road to bliss, and the practice of works as a secondary road.¹

1. Whatever exists in this world is to be enveloped by (the thought of) God. By renouncing it (the world) thou shalt save (thy soul). Do not covet the riches of any one.

2. Performing sacred works, let a man desire to live a hundred years. If thou thus (desirest), O man, there is no other manner, in which thou art not tainted by work.

3. To the godless worlds covered with gloomy darkness, go all the people, when departing, who are slayers of their souls.

4. He (the soul) does not move, is swifter than the mind; not the gods (the senses) did obtain him; he was gone before: standing he outstrips all the other (gods, senses), how fast they run. Within him the Ruler of the atmosphere upholds the vital actions.

5. He moves, he does not move; he is far and also near; he is within this all; he is out of this all.

6. Whoever beholds all beings in the soul alone, and the soul in all beings, does hence not look down (on any creature).

7. When a man knows that all beings are even the soul, when he beholds the unity (of the soul), then there is no delusion, no grief.

8. He is all-pervading, brilliant, without body, invulnerable, without muscles, pure, untainted by sin; he is all-wise, the Ruler of the mind, above all beings, and self-existent.

¹ Bib. Indica, No. 41, p. 71. The term "*Upanishad*," meant originally, according to Müller, "the act of sitting down near a teacher," then, "implicit faith," and lastly, "truth or divine revelation." Hist. p. 319. The native interpretation is, "that knowledge of *Brahma* which completely destroys all else." *Bṛihad Arany. Upan.* Bib. Indica, No. 27, p. 1. N. B. *Brahma* refers, throughout the Essay, not to *Brahmā* (Masc.), one of the triad, but to the impersonal spirit.

He distributed according to their nature the things for everlasting years.

9. 'Those who worship ignorance, enter into gloomy darkness; into still greater darkness those who are devoted to knowledge.

10. 'They say, different is the effect of knowledge, different the effect of ignorance; thus we heard from the sages who explained (both) to us.

11. Whoever knows both, knowledge and ignorance together, overcomes death by ignorance, and enjoys immortality by knowledge.

12. Those who worship uncreated nature, enter into gloomy darkness; into still greater darkness those who are devoted to created nature.

13. 'They say, different is the effect from (worshipping) uncreated nature, different from (worshipping) created nature. This we heard from the sages who explained (both) to us.

14. Whoever knows both, created nature and destruction together, overcomes death by destruction, and enjoys immortality by created nature.

15. To me whose duty is truth, open, O Pushan, the entrance to the truth, concealed by the brilliant disk, in order to behold (thee).

16. O Pushan, Rishi thou alone, O dispenser of justice (Yama), O Sun, disperse thy rays, collect thy light; let me see thy most auspicious form; (for) the same soul (which is in thee) am I.

17. Let my vital spark obtain the immortal air; then let this body be consumed to ashes. Om! O my mind, remember, remember (thy) acts, remember, O mind, remember, remember thy acts.

18. Guide us, O Agni, by the road of bliss, to enjoyment, O god, who knowest all acts. Destroy our crooked sin, that we may offer thee our best salutation.

The following is from the Kena Upanishad, and might be added to Hamilton's appendix upon "Learned Ignorance."¹

¹ Bib. Indica, No. 41, p. 80.

1. If thou thinkest, I know well (Brahma), what thou knowest of the nature of that Brahma (with reference to the soul) is indeed little (it is indeed little); what thou (knowest) of his nature with reference to the deities; therefore is Brahma even to be considered by thee. (The pupil says:) I think he is known to me. I do not think, I know (him well); but I do not know that I do not know (him). Who-soever amongst us knows that (word), "I do not know that I do not know him," knows him.

2. By him who thinks that Brahma is not comprehended, Brahma is comprehended; he who thinks that Brahma is comprehended, does not know him. Brahma is unknown to those who (think to) know him; known to those who do not (think to) know him.

3. If he is known to be the nature of every thought, he is comprehended. (Hence, from this knowledge) one gains immortality. He gains power by the soul; by knowledge, immortality.

4. If in this world one knows (the soul), then the true deed is (gained); if a person in this world does not know (the soul), there will be great calamity. The wise who discern in all beings (the one nature of Brahma), become immortal, after departing from this world.

We have space for but one more extract. It is from the Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad, the most extensive of all those yet published, and in contents will remind us of the current Hindu fable of the support of the universe. The fact that it forms a part of a dialogue between a holy Rishi and a young woman, is a point worthy of remark, revealing to us the condition of women in early days as much above that of their modern sisters.¹

"Then asked him Gargi, the daughter of Vachaknu:

'Yâjñavalkya, all this earth is woven and rewoven upon the waters; upon what, then, are the waters woven and rewoven?'

'On the wind, Gargi'

¹ Bib. Ind. No. 135, p. 198. For a further quotation, see Müller, Hist. p. 22.

‘ On what, then, are woven and rewoven the wind ? ’

‘ On the worlds of the atmosphere, Gargi.’

‘ On what, then, are woven and rewoven the worlds of the atmosphere ? ’

‘ On the worlds of the Gandharvas, O Gargi.’

‘ On what, then, are woven and rewoven the worlds of the Gandharvas ? ’

‘ On the worlds of the Aditya, O Gargi.’”

Thus they proceed, by the worlds of the moon, stars, gods, Indra, Prajâpati, to the worlds of Brahma.

“ ‘ On what, then, are woven and rewoven the worlds of Brahma ? ’

‘ Gargi, do not ask an improper question, in order that thy head may not drop down. Thou askest the deity, which is not to be questioned. Do not question, O Gargi.’ Thence Gargi, the daughter of Vachakna, became silent.”

It would be difficult to construct any consistent system of philosophy from the loose rovings of thought in these Upanishads. They all breathe a more or less subtile pantheism ; but the shades of sentiment are so various, the expressions so equivocal, and the statements at times so palpably contradictory, that we are not surprised to find all the widely differing schools of later days professing to build their doctrines upon these early writings, and sustaining their position by ample quotations.¹ It is only when we pass to the period next succeeding the Brâhmanas, that we meet with any clear and orderly attempt to explain the phenomena of existence, or to assign to them an intelligible source. This general period is represented to us in the extant writings of the different schools of philosophy.

Six schools of philosophy are usually enumerated by native writers, as follows :

I. The Sâṅkhya.

II. The Yoga.

III. The Nyâya.

IV. The Vaiseshika.

¹ Dr. Rûer gives, in an introduction to each of his translations, a synopsis of the philosophical notions of each.

V. The Mīmāṃsā.

VI. The Vedānta.

Of these, the third, fifth, and sixth have the honor of being reputed orthodox, that is, conformed to the Vedas; while the others are either openly denounced as heretical, or are but reluctantly acknowledged to be true exposition. Colebrooke was the first explorer also in this field. He has given us a faithful analysis of each of these six schools, and of various minor sects; and it is from him that such writers as Ritter, Tenneman, Schelling, and Cousin have gained their information, while their deductions from the facts afforded them are rarely reliable.¹ The missionary Ward also gives analyses of the different systems in his work;² but Colebrooke has shown them to be exceedingly faulty. Lastly, J. R. Ballantyne, LL. D., late Principal of Benares College, has been editing and translating the whole series of original texts, so that we are in a fair way of being supplied with authoritative works upon a topic where conjecture has too long supplied the place of accurate knowledge. These, with other special treatises, shall be specified in their places.

The Sāṅkhya philosophy, which is indisputably the oldest of the six systems, and the only independent and complete philosophy, derives the title, probably, from its character. It is the "sāṅkhya," or "rational" philosophy, in that it exalts reason above revelation. Its reputed author is Kapila, whom succeeding ages have identified, either with one of the seven sons of Brahmā, or with an incarnation of Vishnu. His original teachings are considered to be still extant, briefly, in a work called *Tattwa Samāsa*,³ and more at length in the *Sāṅkhya Pravachana*.⁴ Both of these have been translated by Dr. Ballantyne. The original verses of these works, and of every work in which the doctrines of the founder of a

¹ *Essays*, p. 143.

² *View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos*. Vol. II.

³ *A Lecture on the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, embracing the text of the Tattwa Samāsa* (Mirzapore, 1850).

⁴ *The Aphorisms of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy* (Allahabad, 1852). Oriental works are procurable through Messrs. Williams & Norgate, London.

school are stated, are called "Sûtras," or "strings." All works in this form consist of a string of short sentences pressed together into the most concise form. Brevity is the great aim of the composers, and it is a proverbial saying among the learned, that "an author rejoiceth in the economizing of half a short vowel as much as in the birth of a son." They were probably written in this form to facilitate the committing of them to memory. Their excessive brevity renders them utterly unintelligible without a commentary, and such always accompanies them. For the Sâṅkhya we have also a more lucid original treatise by a follower of this school. It has been translated by Colebrooke, and edited by Wilson, together with a native commentary and copious illustrative matter. In its present form it serves as an admirable introduction to the study of this philosophy, and we shall follow, mainly, its orderly arrangement in our synopsis.¹ For an interesting, though too diffuse, dissertation upon the Sâṅkhya, we would refer to the Essay of Barthelemy St. Hilare.²

Without further preface, let us proceed at once to the synopsis of the system, remembering that what St. Hilare remarks of our dogma may apply to many others: "obscure, because false."

The Kârikâ opens with a formal announcement of the object of inquiry: "The inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment," or, as the Sûtras have it, "well, the complete cessation of pain, of three kinds, is the complete end of man." Every system of Hindu philosophy is at one in stating the object of investigation; every philosopher admits man to be in bondage to nature; the sole points at issue are the nature of that bondage and the best methods of liberation. This liberation is also stated to be the *chief* end of man, the chief among four, the other three being merit, wealth, and pleasure. The three kinds of pain, the scholiast defines to be: 1. Those

¹ The Sâṅkhya Kârikâ, or Memorial Verses upon the Sâṅkhya Philosophy. Oxford, 1837. For convenience sake we shall quote distinctively the Tattwa Samâsa under its own name, and the Aphorisms as "Sûtras."

² *Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences de l'Institut de France.* Tome VIII.

arising from one's self, as bodily diseases or mental distress ; 2. Those arising from the elements ; 3. Those arising from supernatural causes, as gods or devils.

An objector here interposes : Why betake yourself for relief from pain to the study of the truth, which the Sâṅkhyast is about to recommend, when you have adequate remedies at hand, such as medicines, spells, and potent herbs ? The reply is : " Nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished ; " that is, the evil will return. Repeat it, then, rejoins the objector, whenever occasion requires ; to which Kapila replies, that a physician will not always be procurable, nor his drugs infallible ; and at last, to shut the objector's mouth, he quotes scripture against him. This summary appeal to revelation seems hardly to come with good grace from our rational philosopher, who plumes himself upon his superiority to external authority. He, however, is never loth to strengthen a weak spot by plastering it with a perverted text, a curious example of which is the second aphorism, where it is stated, that the revealed mode of liberation, by means of devotional rites, is no more effectual than that by physical remedies, and the Veda itself is forced to do unwilling service in his favor. It was, however, real policy on the part of Kapila not to break outwardly with the religionist, who, if he chose, could curse him to the death, while a quieter method of procedure suited his purpose equally well. But he is bolder at times.

From this point the Kârîkâ proceeds to enounce the true method of liberation, and to develop the several tenets of the faith. The Sûtras, however, digress to reply to an objection. The objection is thus put : " Bondage is either essential or adventitious ; if the former, it is indestructible ; if the latter, it will perish of itself ; why concern yourself about it ? " To this it is replied, that bondage is neither essential nor adventitious : it is not essential, else scripture, which is " an exact measure of the truth," would not enjoin liberation, which would be impossible ; that it is not adventitious, is proved by answering in detail the suggestions that " time,"

"space," "works," "ignorance," etc., may be the cause of bondage, and the true nature of this bondage is stated to be "the conjunction of 'nature' with 'soul.'" This bondage, further, is not real, not essential, nor adventitious, but "reflectional," caused by its proximity to nature, as a vase is colored by the presence of a rose.

We have noticed this discussion both for the sake of the definition of bondage here given, and to call attention to a single objection raised. Sûtra 41. b. affirms in the words of an objector: "Since nothing really exists except *thought*, neither does *bondage*, just as the things of a dream have no real existence. Therefore it has *no* cause, for it is absolutely *false*." To this idealistic assertion Kapila replies, with a directness which would do honor to a Scotch philosopher: "Not thought alone exists, because there is the intuition of the external." To the rejoinder that, if the mere intuition of the external world prove that world to exist, then the objects of thought in dreams actually exist, because we believe them to, Kapila replies, that if you deny the existence of the objective from the evidence of the senses, you cannot prove the existence of thought itself, — which is sheer nihilism. Thereupon, "the very crest-gem of the heretics rises up in opposition," and affirms: "The reality is a void; what is, perishes, because to perish is the habit of things," and bondage is thus merely phenomenal. To this Kapila deigns only to reply: "This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons," meaning, the scholiast would have us to believe, that a thing need not be perishable because it exists; "because things that are not made up of parts cannot perish." Kapila also takes occasion to declare that this mere void, this final annihilation of the soul, is not the "summum bonum," since all the world holds that the aim of the soul consists in the joys "which shall *abide in it*," implying thus its permanence.

But to return to the Kârikâ. The true method of liberation is declared to consist "in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul." Under these three terms are em-

braced all the objects of knowledge, or categories of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. To familiarize ourselves with the terms of this philosophy, we shall first describe them in brief.¹

Aphorism III. of the Kārikā thus summarily divides all existing things: "Nature, the root, is no production. Seven principles, the Great or intellectual one, etc., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (and unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive." The term rendered "nature," is Prakriti, from "pra" (præ) and "kri," "to make," that is "primary." It is applied to the source of anything, whether original or secondary. In the latter sense it is applied to the "seven principles," etc., which are themselves products, but it is usually limited to the unproduced source, "the root," of all, save soul. In this sense we shall use it. It is also matter, the *substance* of all things, and not merely the "plastic nature" of the ancients, which would seem to have been a force residing in substance, rather than substance itself. It is not, however, matter in form; it is crude essence, incorporeal, invisible, and eternal, by an inherent energy and ever-acting self-necessity, unfolding itself, step by step, into the visible universe.

The first of the seven "perceptible principles," and the only immediate product of Prakriti, is Buddhi or Intellect, styled, from its preëminence, "The Great One." It occupies a prominent place in the system, as the principle by which knowledge is apprehended, and as the medium of communication between nature and the soul; of which more hereafter.

From Buddhi springs Ahankāra, literally, "the making of an Ego," having no exact equivalent in English, sometimes rendered Egotism, sometimes self-consciousness. It is that principle which gives rise to the sense of personality, leading one to say, "*I feel*," "*I am rich*," etc.²

¹ The sources of knowledge according to the Sāṅkhya, we shall consider under the Nyāya, which dwells at length upon them.

² Tattwa Samāsa, p. 9.

From self-consciousness issues a two-fold production : the first is what is termed "the eleven-fold set, comprising the five "organs of sensation," eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and skin ; the five "organs of action," voice, hands, feet, and the organs of excretion and generation ; and "the eleventh," Manas (mens), mind, which is defined as both an organ of sensation and of action, its function being "to perceive the objects presented by the senses, and form them into a positive idea." The second set, which is the product of self-consciousness, is that of the "Five Rudimental Elements," sound, touch, form, flavor, odor. Do not confound these with the senses ; for by them is meant not sound, etc., in the literal sense, but certain subtile elements, in which sound and the rest are supposed to inhere. They are styled "subtile," or "rudimental," in contrast with the remaining five, which proceed directly from the subtile, viz., The Gross Elements. Their origin is thus briefly described : "From the rudiment smell, earth proceeds ; from the rudiment flavor, water ; from form (color), fire or light ; from touch (substance), air ; and from the rudiment sound proceeds ether."¹

We come, lastly, to Soul. Soul is coëternal with Prakriti, like it, no production ; unlike it, no producer. It is without "qualities" (a technical term), void of merit and demerit, bound in pain only by its reflectional connection with Prakriti. It is not one, but many ; one in genus, but distinct in each individual.

We conclude the outline by giving a native description of the mode of operation of these several principles. "The ear hears the twang of a bow-string ; 'mind' reflects that this must be for the flight of an arrow ; 'self-consciousness' says, it is aimed at me ; and 'intellect' determines, I must run away."²

Let us now return and examine more in detail the several categories of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Archer Butler uses the following language when discoursing upon the Physics of Plato : "The subject-matter of Plato is utterly

¹ Sāṅkhya Kārikā, p. 119.

² Ibid, p. 106.

without qualities, being considered antecedent to all sensible phenomena and their qualities. It could exist only in a state of things to which none of the forms of either sense or understanding have any reference. To express this original subject-matter Plato has exhausted every form of expression. It is the Receptacle, the Nurse of all that is produced. It alone gives any reality and definiteness to the evanescent phantoms of sense, for in their ceaseless change they cannot justly receive any title whatever."¹ With slight qualification, this language could be applied to what Kapila intends by his Prakriti, or nature. "The inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, and likewise eternal, devoid of savor and odor,—without beginning or middle, anterior in order to mind, firm and chief,—thus do the learned designate it. Subtile, devoid of characteristic attributes, unconscious, without beginning or end,—so, too, whose nature it is to produce, without parts, one only, the common source,—such is the "undiscrete."² But while there does exist this similarity in language between the two philosophies, if we look more narrowly at the sense of the terms employed, we shall find a marked difference. In the mind of both Kapila and Plato (probably), this "nature" was eternal; but Plato advocated the existence of a supreme Ruler, who fashioned this nature into visible forms, after the pattern of certain archetypal ideas; according to Kapila, Nature possessed an inherent capacity of self-evolution. They both, furthermore, reasoning from the inconstancy, instability of the world as we see it, inferred the existence of something from which this world proceeded, but which was itself stable, always "the same." Plato declared this primitive Matter to be devoid of qualities, in order to difference it from formal matter, whose instability resulted from the possession of such qualities. Kapila, however (with better reason?), did not divest his Nature of qualities: he affirmed Nature to be nothing but those qualities *in equi-*

¹ Lectures upon Ancient Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 169. Ritter uses similar language. History of Ancient Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 340.

² Tattwa Samāsa, p. 6.

librio, and thus neutralizing each other,—at rest in the source, out of balance, and ever-working in the product.

But we may deceive ourselves by ambiguity of terms. We speak of “qualities;” what does Kapila mean by “qualities?” The Tattwa Samâsa gives us the best reply. “The triad of qualities consists of Goodness, Foulness, and Darkness.”¹ The sense is not essentially different from the proverbial triad of “good, bad, and indifferent,” in which we attempt to include all qualities. The Hindus of all schools, however, assert the really essential existence of these qualities, led to the position from the felt necessity of accounting for the diversities of animal or moral being. Thus one stanza says: “Above (in the divine regions) there is prevalence of goodness; below, the creation is full of darkness; in the midst, is the predominance of foulness, from Brahmâ to a stock.”² “Goodness,” continues the Tattwa Samâsa, “is endlessly diversified, accordingly as it is exemplified in calmness, lightness, complacency, attainment of wishes, kindness, contentment, patience, joy, and the like. Summarily, it consists of happiness. Foulness is endlessly diversified, accordingly as it is exemplified in grief, distress, separation, excitement, anxiety, fault-finding, and the like. Summarily, it consists of pain. Darkness is endlessly diversified, accordingly as it is exemplified in envelopment, ignorance, disgust, abjectness, heaviness, sloth, drowsiness, intoxication, and the like. Summarily, it consists of delusion.”³ The term rendered quality, is “guna,” and according to Prof. Wilson, is not to be regarded as signifying “an insubstantial or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul, through the medium of the faculties.”⁴ It is not, then, a property of nature; it is the essence, the substance; Nature itself. “We speak of the ‘qualities of nature,’” says a native commentator, “as of the trees of a forest.”

The nature of this first cause is still further elucidated in the endeavor to prove its existence. Says the Kârikâ: “It

¹ Tattwa Samâsa, Aph. 49.

² Sâṅkhya Kârikâ, Aph. LIV.

³ Tattwa Samâsa, Aph. 50—53.

⁴ Sâṅkhya Kârikâ, p. 52.

is owing to the subtilty of nature, not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects."¹ In this statement he concurs, strikingly with Anaximenes of Miletus, who, according to Ritter, maintained that the primary substance, "air, so long as it is perfectly homogeneous, *i. e.*, while as yet it is without the differences of its derivatory things, eludes perception; but that, through the qualities it assumes, through cold and warmth, moisture and motion, it becomes manifest."²

It is evident, furthermore, that this Nature was, in the mind of Kapila, in some sense what, according to Butler, matter was to Plato, "rather a logical entity than a physical; it is *the condition or supposition* necessary for the production of the world of phenomena;" for Kapila affirms that Prakriti is simply a *name* given to that which is the cause of all things, and such a cause there must be, else there would be a "*regressus in infinitum*."

In attempting to prove the existence of Prakriti, Kapila is led to develop his theory of cause, which for substance is nothing but the old axiom, "*ex nihilo nihil fit*." Effect exists, he states, antecedently to the operation of cause; for "the production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place," and, "because of the rule that there must be some material;" and, "because everything is not possible everywhere, always;" and furthermore, "because it (the effect) is nothing else than the cause in the shape of the product." To the inquiry how that can *become*, which already *is*, he replies, that the becoming is simply "a manifestation" of what previously existed unseen.³ The general argument in proof of the existence of a first cause is purely *à posteriori*, the author proceeding step by step from the more to the less known, under guidance of the principle that "like proceeds from like."

In his theory of cause and effect, the Hindu has but con-

¹ Sāṅkhya Kārikā, Aph. VIII. ² Ritter. Hist. of Anc. Phil. Vol. I. p. 206.

³ Sūtras, Aph. 115—123.

firmed the statement of Hamilton, who affirms that "we are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished. We cannot conceive either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or, on the other, something becoming nothing."¹

"Ascertainment is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power are its faculties, partaking of goodness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse."² Such is the summary definition and description of the first product, Prakriti, Buddhi, Intellect, The Great One. Upon the province of this principle, a native commentator thus enlarges: "Every one who engages in any matter, first observes or considers; he next reflects, It is I who am concerned in this; and then determines, This is to be done by me; thence he proceeds to act: this is familiar to all. Thence this ascertainment that such act is to be done, is the determination of intellect, which is, as it were, endowed with reason, from the proximity of the sentient principle (soul)."³ This determination is not always connected with volition, but may be simply the ascertainment of a truth. A complete definition of Buddhi, or Intellect, necessarily involves a contradiction in our conceptions; for Intellect is sheer matter, not a spiritual essence, and works blindly, obeying instinctively the behests of soul, and equally instinctively conveying to soul the deliverances of sense, while at the same time it is the sole medium through which the soul can know anything, either within or without itself. This unnatural severance of soul or spirit, and the intelligent principle, arose, it would seem, from Kapila's desire to make soul a pure spiritual essence. Action, though virtuous, is, in the Hindu conception, impossible to pure spirit; for it entails evil. Hence Kapila, while affirming soul to be the only real seat of knowledge, of intelligence, denies it, if we may so speak, all *intellection*; it is, as we shall see, a

¹ Discussion on Philosophy, etc. p. 585.

² Sāṅkhya Kārikā, Aph. xxiii.

³ Ibid, p. 86.

passive intelligence. Kapila, then, led perhaps by the conviction that virtue and vice really belonged to the rational nature, proceeds to invest Intellect, the first great principle, and that most intimately associated with the spirit itself, with their faculties, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, and their opposites. Action, remember, is but the result of the disturbed balance of the three qualities. Prakriti, the Equipoise of the three, is said to operate by means of them, producing effects varying in character according to the different proportions in which these may combine. Goodness preponderating, virtue and its fellows characterize Intellect; darkness preponderating, vice results. This predication of vice and virtue, as constituents, not of spirit, but of an unintelligent, necessitated principle, is not the least of the evils resulting from such a faulty psychology.

The four faculties of Intellect and their opposites are severally subdivided. Knowledge is two-fold; knowledge external, relating to the Vedas, Purânas, logic, theology, and law; knowledge internal, the discriminative knowledge of nature and soul. The former is the occasion of admiration and worldly distinction; the latter, of liberation. Dispassion is two-fold: indifference to the world, resulting from disgust at its defects; and that which arises from desire of liberation. Power is eight-fold: the first four qualities of it are, minuteness, lightness, reach, and magnitude, by which a man may make his way into a solid rock, or "dance on a beam of the sun," or touch the moon with the tip of his finger, or expand himself so as to occupy all space.

Buddhi, it may be remarked, is identified by the Tattwa Samâsa, with Brahmâ, the mythological creator.

The second product of Prakriti, and equally material with Buddhi, is Ahankâra, Self-Consciousness, or Egotism. It is, as we have said, that principle which introduces the conception of "self" into every act of man. Originating from the Intellect, it first awakes to activity upon receiving impressions from the external world. It is, of course, wholly distinct, in essence, from Soul.

From Self-Consciousness issues a double product. Five

organs of perception or sensation, and five of action, together with Mind, constitute the first, resulting from Goodness. These ten organs are not the external and visible instruments, but rather the hidden faculty or sense. The Eleventh "internal organ," as it is styled, Mind, is of prime importance in this system. Its proper function is Reflection. According to the Kârikâ, it is both an organ of sensation and of action. "It ponders, and it is an organ, as being cognate with the rest."¹ It is cognate with the rest, that is, of the same material, and therefore, literally, a sensorium. It stands between the several senses and Self-Consciousness. As an organ of sensation, it receives the different deliverances of the different senses; as an organ of action, it combines these into a definite idea, which it transmits to the faculty behind it, which in turn hands it over to Intellect, for the use of Soul. Its function is analogous to that of Intellect, mediating between the outward world and Self-Consciousness, as Intellect does between the latter and Soul; indeed, the Tattwa Samâsa mentions "mind" as a synonyme of Intellect. This Mind is but the sixth sense, or Consciousness, of Dr. Brown, which gathers into one the several deliverances of sense, and is not unlike in character to the "Heart" of Aristotle.² St. Hilaire regards the doctrine as the saving feature in the Sâṅkhya scheme.³

The three principles, Intellect, Self-Consciousness, and Mind, form what is termed "the triad of internal organs;" their office is similar: in native phrase, "these three are warders, the rest (the senses) are gates." Perception results from the union of these three either instantaneously or successively, with any separate sense. The senses must operate at the instant that an object presents itself; the

¹ Sâṅkhya Kârikâ, Aph. xxvii.

² Ritter. Hist. Vol. III. p. 241.

³ "Le Sâṅkhya sépare le moi de l'intelligence, il sépare l'intelligence de l'âme; mais pourtant il sent encore, malgré ces erreurs énormes, que l'être raisonnable et actif est un. Cette unité qu'il vient de détruire, il est forcé de la recomposer; cet ensemble qu'il a brisé, il faut le refaire; et c'est la théorie des manas qui le sauve d'une erreur complète." — *Memoir sur le Sâṅkhya*, p. 213.

three internal principles may act afterward, whenever a sensation formerly experienced is brought to mind. Another and unique function ascribed to these three principles, is that of being the efficient agents in the evolution and circulation of the vital airs, supposed to be essential to breathing, circulation, and digestion.

The second product of Self-Consciousness, in the evolution of which the "dark quality" is concerned, are the "elementary particles, or "subtile elements," Sound, Touch, Color, Flavor, Odor. These are defined by a native writer as "subtile substances, the elements which are the holders of the species of sound, touch, color, taste, and smell,"¹ designating these particles, not by their substances, but by their most prominent property. From these five proceed the five gross elements. The relation of gross matter to these intangible elements, which Kapila declares are perceptible only to the gods, is not unlike that which Thales, Anaximenes, and Diogenes assumed to subsist between their primal element and the subsequent products, while the strange association of the elements with the senses, noticed previously, finds a counterpart in Plato's doctrine that taste and touch may be referred to earth, smell to fire, hearing to air, and sight to water.²

We have considered the "eight producers," viz., Prakriti, Intellect, Self-Consciousness, and "the five subtile elements;" and also the "sixteen productions," viz., "the eleven organs," and "the five gross elements;" then remains the twenty-fifth principle, the correlate of Prakriti in the dual system of Kapila, Soul. "Soul," says the Tattwa Samâsa, "is without beginning, subtile, omnipresent, intelligent, without qualities, eternal, spectator, enjoyer, not an agent, the knower of body, pure, not producing aught."³ We must again call attention to the fact that it was Kapila's anxiety to secure his "soul" from all the accidents of life, everything transient or changeable, which led him to rob it of any and all activity. To a Hindu, activity is

¹ Sâṅkhya Kārikā, p. 120.

² Tattwa Samâsa, Aph. 34.

³ Ibid, Aph. 34.

almost invariably a curse; activity from any interested motive always is. Hence Kapila conceived the idea of a spirit which should be at once the only intelligence, and purely inactive. "Through 'passion' and 'darkness,' through an erroneous view, it foolishly imagines, 'I am the agent' in regard to these 'qualities' which belong to nature. Though incompetent even to the crooking of a straw, soul imagines, 'All this was made by me — this is mine:' thus saying, it, through a vain imagination, foolish, insane, becomes as if it were an agent."¹

To prove the existence of soul, Kapila adduces five arguments. 1. The existence of an assemblage of irrational objects, such as Intellect and the rest, suggests a user, just as the parts of a bed suggest an occupant. 2. The opposite of that which has the three qualities must exist. 3. Nature and its products are unintelligent; there must be one to direct and govern. 4. Nature and its products are fitted for enjoyment, but are themselves incapable of enjoying; therefore, soul is. 5. Every one has a conviction of his existence apart from body, manifested in his desire to be liberated from body. Another and conclusive proof is sometimes added: "The soul exists, because there is no means of proving that it does not exist."

Strange was it, we may remark, that Kapila, after arguing for the existence of a soul in man from the presence of his faculties, did not take the next step in logical order, taken in fact by his successor, and affirm his belief in a Supreme Spirit, a divine artificer, God. But in India one need not dwell upon the proof that spirit exists: the dogma of transmigration was too deeply rooted in the popular mind to be easily displaced by any holding to the identity of spirit and body, and the death of the former with that of the latter. These arguments in favor of the existence of spirit we shall place with those of Socrates for its immortality, not as valid in themselves, but as ever pointing to that invincible conviction in every man, that "the soul dies not with the dying

¹ *Tattwa Samāsa*, Aph. 43.

² *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, Aph. xvii.

frame," which is itself the highest evidence of that which in his weak way he would strive to prove.

An important question now arises: Is Soul one or many?

The Vedas, or at least the Upanishads, with the schools which arise immediately from them, are uniform in asserting the unity of soul in essence, allowing an individuality only in separate manifestations; in the words of a text, "this one soul is beheld collectively or dispersedly, like the reflection of the moon in still or troubled water." Kapila, however, boldly arrays himself against this orthodox tenet, in asserting the literal and eternal individuality of soul. "If," says the Tattwa Samāsa, and the Kārikā asserts the same, "if there were only one soul, then when one is happy all would be happy; when one is grieved, all would grieve; when one is of mixed race, all would be of mixed race; when one is born, all would be born; when one dies, all would die."

We may well ask, what right has Kapila to argue respecting the soul from the facts of virtue and vice, happiness and misery, birth and death, or any of the incidents of life, which have confessedly nothing to do with soul? But that he does hold to the multiplicity of souls is clear; and when a troublesome opponent thrusts in his face a text of scripture which countenances the opposite doctrine, he parries the objection by affirming that the text in question merely asserts the unity of soul in *genus*, and that he is ready to admit.¹ J. C. Thomson, in his introduction to the translation of the Bhagavad Gîtâ, would draw from the teachings of the Sāṅkhya philosophy the opposite tenet,—that all souls after liberation lose their personal identity, and are swallowed up in an Absolute Spirit. That personal identity may depart upon liberation, may be a logical inference from the teachings of a system which would make consciousness an attribute of perishable matter, though Kapila nowhere asserts this; but that the Vedānta tenet of the resolution of all souls into a primal source from which they were at first

¹ Tattwa Samāsa, Aph. 45.

² Sūtras, Aph. 155.

drawn is to be found in the Sâṅkhya system, can only be asserted by one who has a special theory to support. Kapila could use no plainer language in support of the distinct and separate existence of souls, and any apparent ambiguity is attributable to his distinction between unity in essence and unity in genus.¹

Soul is intelligent, but passive; matter is unintelligent, but active: for the proper exercise of its faculties, soul must therefore be in some way associated with matter, in the words of the Kârîkâ, "For the soul's contemplation of nature and for its abstraction, a union of both takes place."² Why, if liberation is so desirable, a union should be sought, Kapila does not explain; he probably views the individual only as under the control of previously acquired character, which necessitates a new birth. But for the experience of pleasure and pain, which are properties of intellect, it is further and more definitely stated that there must be the enclosing presence of a "gross body," "such as springs from father and mother."³ These gross bodies, the seat of emotion, are composed of the five gross elements, and dissolve at death. And, as the reward of good or evil deeds, in the shape of pleasure or pain, cannot be received when separate

¹ Mr. Thomson has fallen into this error from too implicitly following the lead of Barthelemy St. Hilaire. The latter, in illustrating the tenet of the individuality of souls according to the Kârîkâ, appeals to the Sûtras for confirmation. But he oddly enough adds to that Sûtra, which does contain the doctrine, two others which state the opposite doctrine, and which were cited by the Sâṅkhyast for the purpose of refuting them, and quotes all three as supporting the doctrine of Kapila. These three Sûtras have numbers 141, 142, 143, which in Ballantyne's edition are 150, 151, 152. Now Thomson expressly says, in support of his position, that "one instance will suffice," and quotes these very Sûtras 142, 143 in support. Well he might! We must give him credit for a keener sight than his teacher. See *Memoir sur la Sâṅkhya*, p. 179. Bhag. Gîtâ, p. LXVII.

Another instance in which Mr. Thomson errs from following St. Hilaire, is in repeating the assertion of the latter, that the Sâṅkhya system was alone in affirming the doctrine of the (apparent) individuality of souls. The Nyâya and Vaiseshika systems are no less explicit. It was an unpardonable oversight in Mr. Thomson not to have availed himself of any original authority save Colebrooke.

² Sâṅkhya Kârîkâ, Aph. XXI.

³ Ibid. Aph. XXXIX.

from such gross body, the individual is forced to successive migrations from one such body to another, ever "eating the fruit of his own doings," until perfect discriminative knowledge shall absolve him from the necessity of further birth and death. But the Sāṅkhyast conceives it wholly unfitting that the spirit in its passage from one body to another should go utterly nude, and accordingly frames a second kind of vestment or body, less gross than the gross body, which he styles "the rudimental body." This inner wrapper, or coating of the soul, composed of all the products of Prakriti, save the gross elements, is conceived to have been always present as the indument of spirit, from the time of its union with matter, and to remain with it until its entire liberation from matter. It is "unconfined," "swifter than the wind," "able to pass through the solid rock." Colebrooke remarks: "This notion of animated atom seems to be a compromise between the refined dogma of an immaterial soul, and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence unattached to matter."¹ Barthelemy St. Hilaire regards it, and, as we think, with good reason, as a dogma to which Kapila was driven by his unnatural severance of soul and the faculties of intelligence, and in the restoration of this harmony, as a recurrence to a true psychology.² It is, in a word, our "person."

But, in the view of some later philosophers of this school, even this body is too ethereal to afford due protection to the spirit during its transit from one gross body to another, and they accordingly assume a third body, a medium between the other two, composed of the five gross elements, but in an exceedingly tenuous form, which they name, from its office, "the vehicular body."

That the conception of a covering of the soul, less gross than flesh, was not peculiar to this philosophy, may be seen by referring to the tenets of the early Greek philosophers, and especially the later Platonists, whose opinions have been

¹ Essays, p. 155.

² *Memoir sur le Sāṅkhya*, p. 453—461.

collected and commented on by Cudworth and his editor, Mosheim. "It appeareth," says Cudworth, "that the ancient asserters of the soul's immortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body; but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them, though in different degrees of purity or impurity respectively to themselves. As also that they conceived this spirituous body (or at least something of it) to hang about the soul also, here in this life, before death, as its interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it when that other gross earthly part of the body is, by death, put off, as an outer garment."¹

Another interesting parallel is to be found in the common doctrine that a body of some kind is essential to suffering and enjoyment. The Sâṅkhya theory is, that in this birth and in a gross body we receive the rewards of conduct in a previous existence. The later Greek notion was that punishment was inflicted in Hades, and that a body formed of the more tenuous of the elements was the seat of the infliction; as Philoponus, an Alexandrian of the seventh century, affirms: "If the soul be incorporeal, it is impossible for it to suffer. How then can it be punished? There must of necessity be some body joined with it."²

To return to our text. The union of soul with nature for the sake of soul's benefit is variously illustrated; one aphorism states: "For the sake of soul's wish, that subtile person (nature) exhibits before it, like a dramatic actor;" that is, as an actor appears upon the scene, in turn a god, a mortal, a buffoon, "so the subtile body, through the relation of causes and consequences, having entered the womb, may become an elephant, a woman, or a man." Again: "This evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements, is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively; done for another's sake, as for self." Such evolution, it

¹ Intellectual System of the Universe (Harrison's Trans.). Vol. III. p 265.

² Ibid. p. 266.

must be borne in mind, is the result of no rational conviction, but of blind necessity, as is well illustrated in an aphorism: "As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent substance, to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief principle to liberate the soul."¹

This doctrine of the independent operation of these two principles, nature and soul, and the adaptation of the one to the other, St. Hilaire compares with Leibnitz' theory of preëstablished harmony, and also with that of Spinoza, "who believed in a parallelism between the soul and the body." But we shall discern a still closer analogy between certain doctrines of the early Greek philosophers and those of Kapila which respect the union of body and soul and their dissolution. After considering the union of the two, the Kârikâ thus treats of their dissolution: "Then does sentient soul experience pain, arising from decay and death, until it be released from its person: wherefore pain is of the essence of bodily existence. As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to the gaze of soul. Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit to herself, the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities. Nothing, in my opinion, is more gentle than nature; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul."² Mark, now, how closely this sentiment of the Hindu sage is echoed by his Greek brother. Ritter, commenting upon the doctrines of the Pythagorean school, remarks: "We must further add, that it is only the union of the soul with the body, however little this may seem to imply the otherwise perfect life of the soul, that furnishes it with means for its activity; for it is through the body that it receives the organs of its action and cognition—the senses. This was admitted in their dogma, that the soul loves the body, because otherwise it cannot employ the senses, which nevertheless are indispensable to it for

¹ Sāṅkhya Kārikā, Aph. xvii. lvi. lvii.

² Ibid. iv: lix—lxvii.

cognition. The soul's existence in the body, therefore, was regarded by them, on the one hand, as an unhappy state; on the other, as necessary, and having, in the universal interdependency of all things, its destination for good."¹

The Kârîkâ, the Sûtras, and the Tattwa Samâsa, all spend much time in treating of various hindrances to an impartial knowledge of the truth, in answering objections, and in discussing different incidental topics. These we omit, having, as we believe, presented a faithful outline of the general system, as found in its most approved text-book, the Sâṅkhya Kârîkâ. This treatise sums up the discussion in the following vigorous statement: "So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I AM, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist." This somewhat startling declaration does not, however, as Cousin supposed, amount to "le nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme;" the writer simply intends to assert that the soul, the true self, has no real, but only an apparent, a reflectional connection with this world of matter, as the succeeding aphorism states: "Possessed of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure and at ease nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change." He desists, because he has seen her; she does so because she has been seen. In their (mere) union, there is no motive for creation."² A single objection yet remains to be answered. If this knowledge is attainable in this life, how happens it that the body still clogs our way? to which sensible inquiry the Kârîkâ replies, in conclusion: "By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless; yet soul remains awhile invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given to it." "When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished."³

¹ Hist. Anc. Phil. Vol. I. p. 410.

² Sâṅkhya Kârîkâ, Aph. LXIV—LXVI.

³ Ibid. Aph. LXVII., LXVIII.

In taking a general survey of the Sâṅkhya philosophy, two points arrest our attention, the atheism of Kapila, and his theory of the origin of the universe. The Sâṅkhya system is styled in native writings "*nir-iṣwara*," literally "without God." Kapila is, however, often said not to have denied the existence of a God, but merely to have rejected his existence in the construction of his system. But this neglect to acknowledge a creator appears to us tantamount to a direct denial of his existence, especially when taken in connection with the only reference to a creator which we have met with in his writings. This is to be found in the Sûtras. The doctrine of Perception is under discussion, and the definition of perception given by the Sâṅkhyast is objected to, upon the ground that it would not apply to the perception of "the Lord." But to this Kapila simply replies: "This objection has no force, because it is not proved that there is a Lord."¹ The commentator here avers that this is nothing but a hypothesis for argument's sake, not an actual statement of Kapila's belief, but this is a mere make-shift on the part of a zealous defender of a later day, as is evident from the dilemma upon which Kapila proceeds to thrust the theist, by which it appears impossible to prove God's existence, as well as from his affirming that "all scriptural texts which make mention of 'the Lord' are either glorifications of the liberated soul, or homage to the recognized deities of the Hindu pantheon," whose existence Kapila could consistently admit. When, further, we find arising out of this esoteric philosophy a popular revolution, a fundamental tenet of which was the denial of a God, and when we find another philosophical school coming forward, avowedly to remedy this defect in the Sâṅkhya scheme, we cannot properly withhold our assent from the universal testimony of native works to the inherent atheism of the Sâṅkhya philosophy.

It is a less easy matter to give this system any of those special titles by which we are wont to designate the various

¹ Sûtras, Aph. 93.

shades of western philosophy. By most writers, Kapila is called a materialist; by some, though most falsely, a sceptic; and by St. Hilaire, an idealist. But neither of these terms accurately represents his position; and it will be best to accept the native phrase, and style his system the Sankhyâ, or Rational Philosophy of India. The opinion that the system is materialistic, rests upon the fact that not merely inanimate creation is developed from an unintelligent first principle, but that in these developments are included also Intellect, Self-Consciousness, and Mind. But how is this a fair imputation, while there exists by the side of this eternal nature an equally eternal Spirit or Soul, pure and free, and the only real intelligent being? We admit that only this doctrine of the Soul saves the philosophy from the charge of materialism; but that it does save it, who can deny? The inconsistency between the notions of a passive intelligence and of a material intellect, is patent; but we are better justified in holding to the real independent intelligence of soul, regarding the other principles as bare media, or organs of intelligence, than in wholly denuding the soul of sense and giving it to matter. This latter remark bears also upon the judgment of St. Hilaire, that Kapila was an idealist. True, he develops the sensible world from the triad of internal organs, the "le moi" among them; but these three are themselves but products of a principle still back of them, while the real Ego, the Self, is the eternal and unproductive Soul. That Kapila approaches each of the above positions is evident; that he adopts neither is no less clear. "He is saved by his inconsistencies."

One subject claims a passing notice, in concluding this synopsis of the Sankhya philosophy. This is transmigration, to escape the necessity of which, is the chief end of this and every other system of Hindu speculation. As Prof. Wilson remarks: "This belief is not to be looked upon as a mere popular superstition; it is the main principle of all Hindu metaphysics; it is the foundation of all Hindu philosophy."¹

¹ Preface to Sankhya Kârîkâ, p. 10.

Save by a meagre school of materialists, we do not know that the doctrine is ever brought in question in philosophical discussions. Yet nothing is more certain than that not the slightest foundation for the theory exists in the Vedic writings, the earliest authority of the Hindu faith. In the language of Prof. Wilson: "There is no hint in the Vedas of the metempsychosis, or of the doctrine which is intimately allied to it, of the repeated renovation of the world; on the contrary, there is one remarkable passage which denies this elsewhere unquestioned proposition. 'Once, indeed, was the heaven generated; once was the earth born; once was the milk of Prisni drawn.'"¹ When and how this doctrine, which now underlies all speculation, and saddens life in the Hindu world, took its rise, no mortal can tell; the mists of antiquity have hidden its cradle from our sight, and nothing but dim surmise is left to us. For the theory of Voltaire, who attributes its rise to climatic influences, which led men to abstain from killing, and at last to exalt animals to an equal rank with themselves, St. Hilaire would substitute the theory that "loss of the sense of personality, and the general adoption of a belief in a soul of the world, induced men to see this soul in all about them."² Mr. Thomson would refer the origin of the notion to the previously existing polytheism, and thinks that the exaltation of heroes to a divine rank led men to regard the gods as having like souls with themselves, while frequent intercourse with the beasts of the wood induced a like belief in their intelligence, and thus led men to fancy that this ever-acting universe was informed with a single soul, and that a man, a god, a tree, or a beast, might constantly interchange places.³ Still another theory is that of Dr. Ballantyne, who deems the dogma but an attempt to explain the origin of evil by thrusting it back indefinitely through previous states of existence.⁴ It only concerns us to know that the oldest philosophical system of India does not introduce the tenet, nor at all dis-

¹ Introduction to Rig Veda, Vol. III.

² Memoir, p. 208.

³ Bhagavad Gītā. Introd.

⁴ Tattwa Samāsa, p. 56.

cuss its origin or validity ; it accepts it as an admitted fact, sad but true, and points to a mode of deliverance from it.

The Sâṅkhya system was a system of philosophy, but it had a moral significance. Kapila himself was a philosopher; his home was the forest, his class-room the shady walk, his pupils the thoughtful few; but the true springs of his philosophy were in the busy world without. For, as we hinted at the outset, there were other spirits at work in the bazaar and open field, than the spirits of philosophers. While anxious questionings upon man and God had engaged the minds of the few, which first found a scientific statement in the formulas of the Sâṅkhya school, there was gradually rising into power a class of men who arrogated to themselves the sole right of mediation between heaven and earth, and who had finally succeeded in crushing the masses of the people into a state of spiritual bondage. It is in this growing system of priestcraft, this spiritual despotism which was gradually rearing itself over the whole Hindu race, that the Sâṅkhya philosophy finds its explanation, against which it was a silent reaction and a virtual remonstrance. But Kapila did not openly break with the popular creed : he was willing to admit the existence of the several deities of the pantheon, as long as he was not forced to give them a nature superior to man's, or a position above that of the men who had attained perfect knowledge ; he did not even discard the scriptures, though enthroning reason above them, but often made use of them against his opponents. The consequence was, that as long as this philosophy was held simply as a theory, the Brahmans suffered it to pass unrebuked, or at most scoffing at it as the empty dreamings of a hair-brained speculator, which never could harm them, and which none but a few like-minded ones gave heed to. But the crafty priests were for once in error ; the great moral truth of the true spiritual equality of all men, which the Sâṅkhya philosophy held in scientific form, was also latent in the minds of the common people, and gradually working its way into some outward expression. The time came. The man in whom this word found expression, and through whom it

was proclaimed to multitudes of priest-ridden ones, was Sâkya-Muni, and the movement to which he gave form was Buddhism, the Protestantism of India.

Sâkya-Muni, "the 'solitary' of the race of Sâkya," or, as he afterward called himself, Buddha "the wise," was born, according to modern calculation, toward the close of the seventh century B. C., at Kapila-vastu, a city under the shadow of the mountains of Nepâl.¹ A Kshatriya by birth, the son of a king, a youth of bright promise and of high hope, he yet disdained the luxuries of court life, and declined the honor of sovereignty, deeming it a higher honor, a more ennobling employment, to seek to release his fellow-men from that spiritual bondage in which all were alike enslaved. Spending a series of years in diligent study of received doctrines, and in faithful performance of prescribed austerities, he at last broke loose from all instructors, announced a new mode of deliverance, as the only efficacious one, and went abroad, preaching freedom to all, "through the truth" contained in his "law." He gained many adherents during his lifetime, and after his decease his disciples propagated, still further, his doctrines. But events move slowly in India, and for many centuries Buddhism remained only one of many sects. It was first recognized as a state power about the middle of the third century B. C., whence it continued to have the ascendancy for several hundred years, until Brahmanism again gained that foothold which it has never since lost.

The ruling spirit of Buddhism was not so much metaphysical as moral; and yet, as taking its rise, probably, in philosophical speculation, and itself embodying an individual philosophy, it claims a place in our sketch.

Our first thorough acquaintance with Buddhism dates from the year 1828, when Mr. B. H. Hodgson, then civil resident in Nepâl, having collected a series of native works from the Buddhist monasteries of the country, published the results of his investigations in the organ of the Asiatic

¹ Müller has lately shown the precarious ground upon which the conventional dates of Buddha's birth and death rest. *Hist. Anc. Sans. Lit.* p. 263.

Society of Bengal.¹ He continued the subject through the medium of the Bengal and London Asiatic Societies.² He was followed by Csoma de Körös, a young Hungarian, who presented an analysis of various Buddhist works in Tibetan, which were discovered by Mr. Hodgson. Turnour and Gogerly also furnished the learned world with Ceylonese documents bearing upon the same subject, while Schmidt and Remusat investigated Buddhism as it existed in Mongolia and China.³ But Hodgson did the greatest service by forwarding to the various oriental societies and libraries of Great Britain and Europe the original documents discovered by him in such quantity. The dust still rests upon those in the libraries of Great Britain; but in France they fell into good hands, and it will be the lasting honor of Eugene Burnouf, that he first gave the world a true acquaintance with Buddhism, in his clear, careful, and exhaustive analysis of the Buddhist literature of Nepâl,⁴ and by his translation of one of the most celebrated Buddhist works.⁵ Lately, Mr. Hardy, Wesleyan missionary in Ceylon, has published two valuable works as results of his study of Singhalese documents.⁶ Colebrooke also treats briefly of the Buddhist philosophy. For a general view of Buddhism we would refer to the two volumes of Barthelemy St. Hilaire,⁷ and the interesting little pamphlet of Max Müller, a reprint from the *London Times*, April 17 and 20, 1847.⁸

In studying the metaphysics of Buddhism, we are not favored, as in studying the orthodox doctrines of Hindu schools, with succinct treatises upon the subject: the nature

¹ Asiatic Researches, Vol. XVI.

² We give the most important references. Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Soc. Vols. II. and III.; Jour. Bengal Asiatic Soc. 1836, Nos. 49 and 50. 1834, Nos. 32—34. All Mr. Hodgson's papers were published collectively at Serampore, 1841, under title of Illustrations of the Literature and Religion of the Buddhists.

³ Asiat. Res. Vol. XX.

⁴ Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme Indien.

⁵ Lotus de la Bonne Loi.

⁶ Eastern monachism. Manual of Buddhism.

⁷ Du Bouddhisme. Bouddha et sa Religion.

⁸ Buddhism and Buddhist Pilgrims.

of Buddhism reveals itself in the more popular form of its expositions. The authorities for the Buddhist doctrine are a three-fold collection, gathered, tradition says, at a council convened immediately after Buddha's death. This collection embraces the Sûtras, or doctrinal precepts, the Vinaya, or discipline of the priesthood, and the Abhidharma, or metaphysical portion. The Sûtras are said to be the very words of Buddha, and are the most important of the three collections, from which the other two collections gained the material which they arranged and added to. These original sources are not accessible to the English student: he must consult, for Indian Buddhism, the works of Hodgson, Burnouf, Turnour, and Hardy.

A doctrine which lies at the root of Buddhism, received everywhere, in the south and east as well as in the north, is that of the "Four Verities," which we will unfold after a translation of a native work.

"O religious one, what are these four sublime verities? Grief, the production of grief, the destruction of grief, the way which leads to the destruction of grief. What is that grief which is a sublime verity? The following: Birth; old age; disease; death; meeting with that which one loves not; separation from that which one loves; inability to attain that which one wishes and seeks for; form, sensation, idea, conception, perception; in one word—the five attributes of conception; all this is grief. What is that cause of grief which is a sublime verity? It is desire, constantly recurring, accompanied with pleasure and passion, which seeks to be satisfied here and there. What is that destruction of grief which is a sublime verity? It is the complete destruction of that desire which is constantly recurring, accompanied with pleasure and passion, and which seeks to be satisfied here and there; it is the detachment of desire; it is its death, its abandonment, its annihilation; it is its entire renunciation. What is that sublime verity, of the way which leads to the destruction of grief? It is the sublime way composed of eight parts: right view, right will,

right effort, right action, right life, right speech, right thought, right meditation.”¹

Popular tradition represents Sâkya-Muni as having been drawn away to a religious life, from meeting, at successive times, on his way to the pleasure-grounds of the palace, a sick man, an aged and infirm man, and a corpse, the sight of whom created in him a disgust at life, and a longing to know the true method of release from such woes, which, he was told, were common to men. Be the legend true or false, — and it bears the marks of authenticity, — a belief in the ceaseless round of birth, decay, and death characterizes Buddhism equally with all other Hindu faiths. “A past action,” says a Sûtra of Buddha, “does not perish; it perishes not, whether it be good or bad. A good action, well accomplished, a bad action, wrongfully performed, when they have arrived at their maturity, bear equally the inevitable fruit.”² This chain, which links action in man with its results, compelling to further servitude in the body, and from which it is the aim of Buddha to release man, is termed “the chain of causes and effects,” and occupies a conspicuous place in all Buddhist metaphysics.³

Ascending from effect to cause, we have, as the cause of decay and death, Birth. Birth, in turn, is occasioned by Existence, not barely material and spiritual existence, but the moral state, or *status*, the result of past actions. Existence is caused by Conception, a term containing both a physical and metaphysical signification; in the latter sense implying some activity on the part of the one to be born, leading him to seize “the five attributes of conception” above specified, — form, etc., — “which, united with the five senses and the gross elements, of which the body is composed, mark his appearance in one of the six modes of existence.” The fifth cause is Thirst or Desire, “the longing for renewal of pleasurable feeling, and desire to shun that which is painful.”⁴ “Thirst,” says Burnouf, “is a con-

¹ Burnouf: Introduction, etc. Note 2, p. 629.

² Burnouf: Introduction, p. 98.

³ Ibid., p. 485 et. seq.

⁴ Colebrooke, *Essays*, p. 255.

dition of the individual previous to conception, or of the archetypal being, according to Mr. Hodgson; which is not unlike the 'rudimental body,' or body composed of pure attributes, admitted by the Sâmkhya school." "Starting with Desire," continues Burnouf, "we enter upon a series of conditions which are viewed independently of any material subject, and which form the envelope of an ideal subject. It is not easy for our European minds to conceive of qualities without substances, or of attributes without a subject; still less easy to understand how qualities can form an ideal person, which will at last become real. But nothing is more familiar to the Indians than the realization, and in some sort the personification, of absolute entities, apart from any being which we are accustomed to see joined to these entities; and all their systems of creation are but the passage, more or less direct, more or less rapid, of abstract quality to concrete subject. Making, then, to the term which occupies us, an application of these remarks which would be susceptible of further development, I would say that in the term Thirst or Desire we must not conceive of a material being who desires, but only an abstract, bare desire, which terminates the evolution of the immaterial and primitive forms of the individual, and which produces that 'conception' which commences the series of material and actual forms."¹

The cause of Thirst is Sensation. This is not external sensation, but the internal sensibility, the product of that sixth sense which is affirmed to exist by Buddha equally with Kapila, the Manas or Mind, and belongs, of course, not to the material, but to the ideal person. The seventh cause is Contact, which, in turn, is conditioned upon the six seats of the five senses and manas. The doctrines of mediate and immediate perception, it is worth observing, both find advocates among different schools of Buddhists. Name and Form constitute the ninth cause. These give distinctness to objects, which facilitates perception. Regarded as a

¹ Burnouf: Introduction, p. 498.

single idea, they have for their cause Consciousness, or that sentiment which gives us discriminative knowledge. Its cause is termed Concept, or Imagination. Concepts are things which the mind fancies, "the belief in the reality of that which is but a mirage, accompanied with a desire for that mirage, and with a conviction of its worth and reality," as a native commentator has it. The twelfth and last cause in this order, the first in the order of nature, is Ignorance, "the mistake of supposing that to be durable which is but momentary." It has a double sense, including non-being as well as non-knowing, implying the denial of an external world, and to a certain extent the subject living within the world. But this extreme position Buddha did not himself take, though charged upon him by his opponents: his own words assert the real existence of a spirit or person who could believe or disbelieve in the existence of the external.¹

To recapitulate this chain of causes and effects in the language of a native writer:

"Concepts have for their cause, ignorance; consciousness has for its cause, concepts; name and form have for their cause, consciousness; the six seats have for their cause, name and form; contact has for its cause, the six seats; sensation has for its cause, contact; desire has for its cause, sensation; conception has for its cause, desire; existence has for its cause, conception; birth has for its cause, existence; decrepitude and death, grief, sorrow, and despair have for their cause, birth. Thus is there occasion for the production of this world, which is nothing but a vast mass of sorrow. The production! the production!"²

These two theories, of the four verities and the chain of causes and effects, are held by all Buddhists, and doubtless were a part of the teaching of Buddha himself. But there is a marked difference between the doctrines of original Buddhism and those which have gained acceptance in later

¹ See also Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 391.

² Burnouf: *Introduction*, p. 488.

days. Mr. Hodgson has made us acquainted with four separate schools of philosophy, now recognized in Nepâl. These schools we shall describe, mainly in the language of Mr. Hodgson.

I. Swâbhâvikas.

“These deny the existence of immateriality; they assert that matter is the sole substance, and they give it two modes, called Pravritti and Nirvritti, or action and rest, concretion and abstraction. Matter is eternal as a crude mass; and so are the powers of matter, which powers possess not only activity, but intelligence. The proper state of existence of these powers is that of rest, and of abstraction from everything palpable and visible, in which state they are so attenuated, on the one hand, and so invested with infinite attributes of power and skill on the other, that they want only consciousness and moral perfections to become gods. When these powers pass from their proper and enduring state of rest into their casual and transitory state of activity, then all the beautiful forms of nature or of the world come into existence, not by a divine creation, nor by chance, but spontaneously; and all these beautiful forms of nature cease to exist when the same powers pass again from this state of Pravritti, or activity, into the state of Nirvritti, or repose.”

“Inanimate forms are held to belong exclusively to Pravritti, and therefore to be perishable; but animate forms, among which man is not distinguished sufficiently, are deemed capable of becoming by their own efforts associated to the eternal state of Nirvritti; their bliss in which state consists of repose or release from an otherwise endlessly recurring migration through the visible forms of Pravritti.” Some affirm that man is conscious in this state; others deny it. The Swâbhâvikas do not reject design, pointing to the beauty in nature as proof of an inherent intelligence in matter itself; but they reject a personal designer who created or gave order to the universe. A minor branch of this school, while adopting its general tenets, “inclines to unitize the powers of matter in the state of Nirvritti; to

make that unit duty, and to consider man's *summum bonum*, not as a vague and doubtful association to the state of Nirvritti, but as a specific and certain absorption into this deity, the sum of all the powers, active and intellectual, of the universe."

II. Aishwarikâs.

"These admit of immaterial essence, and of a supreme, infinite, and self-existent Deity, whom some of them consider as the sole deity and cause of all things, while others associate with him a coequal and eternal material principle; believing that all things proceeded from the joint operation of these two principles." Although this school believes in a God, it denies to him providence and dominion. The school is clearly later than the Swâbhâvika, and arose much, as we shall see, as did the Yoga branch of the Sankhya, in order to supply a radical defect in the older creed.

III and IV. Kârmikas and Yâtnikas.

"These derive their names, respectively, from Kârma, by which I understand conscious moral agency, and Yâtna, which I interpret conscious intellectual agency." These schools were also late, and occasioned probably by a reaction against the materialism of the first. They exalted the moral and the intellectual sense, declaring that through their culture could absolution be best achieved.¹

The above sketch was derived by Mr. Hodgson from the Sanskrit authorities of Nepâl. But it is remarkable that Csoma de Körös, searching the Tibetan documents, brought to light authorities for the existence of four other schools of philosophy, having no connection with those of Nepâl, neither mentioning them, nor mentioned by them. Furthermore, Colebrooke, deriving his information from the controversial writings of the Brahmans, finds these same four schools which the Tibetan documents disclose. They are to us the more interesting, as having such intimate association with the six schools of Hindu philosophy, and also as being probably the most ancient. They are as follows:

¹ See for the above the Asiatic Researches, Vol. XVI., and Jour. Bengal Asiatic Soc. 1836.

I. Vaibhâshika.

These were divided into four sects, said to have proceeded from the four pupils of Buddha. They are said by Csoma to have discussed but little. According to Colebrooke they held to immediate perception in opposition to the contrary doctrine, which was maintained by —

II. Sautrântikas.

These separate into two divisions, one resting proof upon scriptural authority, the other upon argument. Colebrooke states that these two schools held to the doctrine of only four atoms, excluding ether, which the ordinary schools recognized:¹ but the original authorities do not bear him out in his opinion, which he gathered from their adversaries, as is evident from the following passage, attributed to the Vaibhâshikas:

“Upon what rests the earth, O Gôtama? demanded Kâsyapa. The earth, O Brahman, rests upon the circle of the water. And the circle of the water, Gôtama, upon what does it rest? It rests upon the wind. And the wind, Gôtama, upon what does it rest? It rests upon the ether. And the ether, Gôtama, upon what does it rest? You go too far, O great Brahman, you go too far. The ether, O Brahman, has nothing upon which it rests, it has no support.”²

III. Yôgâchâras.

These maintained the existence of conscious sense alone, declaring all else to be void.

IV. Mîdhyamikas.

This is the most important school of Buddhistic philosophy. Its founder is said to have been Nâgârjuna, who lived, according to native authority, four or five centuries after the death of Buddha, though Müller shows the uncertainty of this date also.³ This system is one of pure Pyrr-

¹ Essays, p. 253.

² Burnouf: Introduction, p. 448. Burnouf justly compares this passage to the speculations of the Upanishads. It is not unlike one previously quoted. See *ante*.

³ Hist. Anc. Sans. Lit. p. 266.

honism; its name designates it as the "intermediate" system. Says Burnouf: "We may characterize the doctrine of Nâgârjuna as a scholastic nihilism. This philosophy does not suffer to remain any of those theses which are laid down in the different Buddhistic schools, respecting the world, beings, laws, the soul; by doubting, it destroys equally positive, negative, and indifferent affirmations; all is passed over, God and Buddha, the spirit and man, nature and the world. It is placed, in fact, between affirmation and negation; while speaking of things, it establishes that it is no more possible to affirm than to deny eternity."¹ "Buddha himself is like to an illusion," says an axiom of this author.

We remarked above that Buddha himself, while denying the actual existence of the external world, did not go to the length of denying the existence of spirit; but Nâgârjuna did. If we turn to the translations of Hardy, we shall find this sentiment emphatically asserted. Thus in a conversation between a king Milinda and Nâgasêna,² translated from the Singalese documents, "the king said, 'How is your reverence known? what is your name?' Nâgasêna replied: 'I am called Nâgasêna by my parents, and by the priests, and others; but Nâgasêna is not an existence, or being.' 'Then to whom are the various offerings made? who receives these offerings? who keeps the precepts? There is no merit or demerit; neither the one nor the other can be acquired; there is no reward, no retribution. Were any one to kill Nâgasêna, he would not be guilty of murder. Who is Nâgasêna? Are the teeth Nâgasêna? Or is the skin, or the flesh, or the heart, or the blood Nâgasêna? Is the outward form Nâgasêna? Are any of the five *Khandas* (seats of the five senses) Nâgasêna? Are all the five *Khandas* conjointly Nâgasêna? Leaving out the five *Khandas*, is that which remains Nâgasêna?' — 'No!' — 'Then I do not see Nâgasêna. Nâgasêna is a mere sound without any mean-

¹ Burnouf: Introduction, p. 560.

² The identity of Nâgârjuna and Nâgasêna is apparent. See Burnouf's Introduction, p. 750.

ing. You have spoken an untruth.' 'It is not the skin, the hair, the heart, or the blood that is Nâgasêna. All these, united or combined, form the acknowledged sign by which Nâgasêna is known ; but the existing being, the man, is not hereby seen.'¹

Another point in which the later Buddhism differs from the teachings of the founder of the faith, is the doctrine of Nirvâna, the state of liberation from the evils of this world, to which Buddhism consigns the faithful. According to Burnouf, who is supported by the majority of scholars, Nirvâna (literally "blowing out"), meant, in the mind of Buddha, complete extinction, annihilation of being. All souls migrated through different existences, animate or inanimate, until, having obtained a full knowledge of "the law," they passed from this transitory existence into a state of annihilation, which, in contrast with this state of evil, could even be termed a joyful condition. The Singhalese documents are fully as explicit upon this tenet as are those of the North; and Mr. Gogerly gives us translations in which Buddha is supposed to be discoursing upon the future state of souls, where he states that Nirvâna is not a state of sensuous enjoyment, nor of intellectual enjoyment, nor of incorporeality, nor of consciousness, nor of unconsciousness, nor a state that is neither conscious nor unconscious. The only possible meaning, therefore, which can be applied to it, is that of non-entity.² Revolting as such a doctrine appears to us, and inexplicable as it may seem that it could exercise any influence over the popular mind, we cannot candidly place any other interpretation upon the term.³ That such a tenet should become modified in the course of time, we should naturally expect. As Müller says: "Human nature could not change. Out of the very nothing it made a new Paradise."⁴

¹ Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 424.

² See Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, p. 280. Gogerly gives an extended account of various doctrines in *Jour. of Ceylon Branch of the Asiat. Soc.* No. II. 1846.

³ For the opposite view, see an article by M. Alfred Jacobs, *Revue de deux Mondes*, March 1, 1860

⁴ *Buddhism and Buddhist Pilgrims*, p. 21.

As many of the tenets of the Mâdhyamika school, though differing from those of primitive Buddhism, may be said to have flowed logically from them, so the doctrines of Buddha himself may be, and often are said to have been drawn from the teachings of Kapila, the Sâṅkhya philosopher. The general relation of Buddhism to the Brahmanism which it supplanted, we cannot give as well as in the words of Bur-nouf: "The doctrines of Buddha stand in opposition to Brahmanism, as a system of morals without God, and as atheism without nature. That which he denies is the eternal God of the Brahmins, and the eternal Nature of the Sâṅkhyas; that which he admits is the multiplicity and individuality of human souls, of the Sâṅkhya, and the transmigration of the Brahmins. That which he seeks to attain is the deliverance or freeing of the Spirit, as all the Indian world wishes. But he does not loose the Spirit, as do the Sâṅkhyas, by detaching it forever from Nature; nor, as do the Brahmins, by replunging it into the bosom of the eternal and absolute Brahma: he destroys the conditions of its relative existence by precipitating it into the void, that is to say, according to all appearance, into annihilation."¹

But however close may be the connection between the philosophical tenets of Kapila and Buddha, it is in the practical bearing of the teachings of the Sâṅkhya school upon the Buddhistic reform that we recognize its chief importance. The truths which Kapila preached only to a select company, Buddha brought down to the arena of common life. He was a firm believer in the power of simple truth over the hearts of men, and with no martial equipment or political manoeuvring, but by the simple proclamation of his Law, he reconstructed Indian society. And when, in after years, a king gave in his adhesion to this new faith, he sent his own son and daughter as foreign missionaries of the word.²

¹ Introduction, p. 522.

² See also Barthelémy St. Hilaire. *Memoire sur le Sâṅkhya*, p. 493: *De l'influence du Sâṅkhya sur le Bouddhisme*. Oral proclamation of the word has been said to characterize the history of the spread of Christianity alone. For general comparisons between Buddhism and Christianity, see Hardwicke, *Christ and other masters*, Part II.

This practical influence of the Sâṅkhya philosophy upon Buddhism is specially seen in the relation which Buddhism bears to the Brahmanic religion, and to the Brahmanic theory of caste. Kapila, as we have seen, raised reason above revelation, yet did not suffer his speculative belief wholly to modify his practical life. But Buddha openly attacked the holy books of the Brahmans, and brought down upon his head their anathemas from this very cause. Burnouf furnishes us with an apposite illustration of this. Two young men were discussing the relative superiority of two favorite Brahmans, as teachers of "the way." Unable to settle the dispute, they resolve to repair to Buddha, of whose fame they have heard. Buddha, after listening to their inquiries, asks them if any of these Brahmans, or holy Rishis, had ever seen Brahma "face to face." They reply in the negative. He then says : "Things being so, is there not, on the part of these Brahmans who possess the three-fold knowledge an act of jugglery?" — "Yes, O Gôtama; these things being so, the language of those Brahmans who possess the three-fold knowledge is an act of jugglery." "Thus," concludes Buddha, "the language of those Brahmans is very like to the staffs of blind men : the first does not see, that of the middle one sees not, and the last sees no more. Their language is simply ridiculous; mere words, an empty, vain thing."¹

It is from the Sûtras of Buddha, which contain various references to the several popular divinities, that we find evidence that this movement originated at a time when, on the one hand, the Brâhmanas were collecting and their compilers forging heavier fetters for the masses, and when, on the other hand, philosophy was beginning to find a footing apart from traditional revelation, and to be regarded no longer as the exclusive heritage of a favored class, but as the common birthright of all.² Buddhism finds its justification in India, as Mohammedanism did in Turkey, in the

¹ Lotus de la Bonne Loi, p. 494.

² The whole question as to the prior origin of Brahmanism or Buddhism is ably treated by Burnouf: Introduction, p. 129.

spiritual and moral condition of that society in which it originated. Sâkya-Muni found already existing in India various separate classes; the Brahmans, whose specific duty was the teaching of the Vedas, but who served also as the confessors and even political advisers of kings; the Kshatriyas, the warrior and royal caste, to which Sâkya himself belonged, who exercised the kingly function, and who are represented as being often extremely tyrannical, possessed of powers knowing no limit but that of caste-prerogative; the Vaisyas and Sûdras, mercantile and agricultural classes; and the Chândâlas, outcasts, the lowest of the low. Sâyka, in direct opposition to both the spirit and practice of Brahmanism, built up, in place of a narrow and exclusive formalism, a system of morals without a God, and preached deliverance from sorrow alike to all. That a morality resting on no religion must be devoid of binding power, we must admit; but it was at least not less worthy than a gross polytheism which discarded virtue; while in fearlessly combatting the authority of a powerful hierarchy, and boldly challenging their right to enslave the consciences of men, Buddha stands side by side with Luther, and we seem to breathe the spirit of the great Protestant reformer when we hear Buddha declare: "My law is a law of grace for all."

It was this bold denunciation of the priestly prerogative which at once favored the spread of his doctrines and brought down upon him the curses of the Brahmans. But it must be borne in mind that Buddhism in its inception was no fanatical onslaught upon the existing order of things; it was no system of democratic communism which would seek to bring all classes of society to a dead level; it was solely against caste as a *religious* institution that Buddha inveighed: the feudalism of the age he did not attempt to break down, nor could he have succeeded, had he made the attempt.¹ On this ground only can we explain the apparent anomaly that caste exists in Buddhistic Ceylon, or the fact

¹ See an able review of Muir's original Sanskrit Texts, *London Times*, April 10 and 12, 1858. Doubtless by Max Müller.

that in the Buddhist Sûtras we find but slight allusion to opposition to any caste besides the Brahman. Nor was Buddha the first to oppose these insolent pretensions of the priests; long before his day, a Kshatriya had struggled long and successfully against a rival Brahman, for personal supremacy in a king's court.¹ But Buddha sought not personal aggrandizement; his aim was nobler; he sought liberation for a race enslaved; and not content, as was Kapila, barely to announce the truth, he established an organization to which all were invited on equal terms, and to which, in fact, persons from all grades and castes in society betook themselves.

The Brahmans bitterly reproached Buddha for taking out of their hands their means of subsistence. They were loth to part either with the flattering homage or the comfortable pecuniary benefits which they had so long exclusively enjoyed. But, if we may trust to their professions, it was a still sorer grief to these pure-minded maintainers of the faith that Buddha should receive among his disciples those who had been notorious for their crimes or their poverty, — the “publicans and sinners” of their day. A curious legend exists, which will exhibit this contrast between the two sects. A king, who was a Chândâla by birth, presumed to seek the daughter of a Brahman, as a spouse for his own son. But on making his request, the Brahman rose upon him in wrath. “You are nought but a Chândâla, and I am of the caste of Dvidyas. How dare you, wretch, to seek the union of the most noble with a being the most vile! The good, in this world, are united to the good, the Brahman to the Brahman. You demand a thing impossible, in wishing to join with us yourself, contemned in the world, the lowest of men. Chândâlas are united here below with Chândâlas, and so Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sâdras, each with their caste; but never has one seen Brahmans allied with Chândâlas.” But to this outbreak the king replied: “Between a Brahman and a

¹ Mair's Original Sanskrit Texts. Part I. Early contests between the Brahmans and Kshatriyas.

man of another caste there is not the same difference as between gold and a stone, as between light and darkness. A Brahman, in fact, is born, not of the ether, nor of the wind; he is born of a woman, just as the Chândâla. Where then do you see the cause which should make one being noble and another vile? The Brahman himself, when he is dead, is left as a thing impure and vile; it is with him as with other castes: where then is the difference?"¹

No wonder that multitudes flocked to the standard of such a reformer. Hither came those who felt the despotism of kings, and dreaded incurring their displeasure. The hope of obtaining the rewards promised by Buddha to such as received his doctrines attracted others. The young Brahman, despairing of success in following the injunctions of his spiritual teachers, betook himself to Buddhism as a system of "easy devotion;" while multitudes whom some sudden reverse of fortune had impoverished, or calamity bereaved, or who were weary of their previous life, came to the retreat of a mendicant life as a solace for their souls.

In this last class the professional gambler is to be found, who is represented in the drama of the Toy Cart.

Gambler. Lady, as I find my profession only begets disgrace, I will become a Buddha mendicant.

Lady. Nay, friend, do nothing rashly.

Gambler. I am determined, lady. In bidding adieu to gambling, the hands of men are no longer armed against me. I can now hold up my head boldly, as I go along the public road."²

It would be travelling too far out of our course to follow Buddhism in its progress from India to Tibet and China, and note the several phases of the faith as prevailing in these countries; but we cannot leave it without briefly explaining that peculiar form of Buddhism well known in Nepâl, which Mr. Hodgson developed in his first communication to the Asiatic Researches. The distinguishing tenet of this branch of Buddhism is that of a Supreme Being, or Âdi Buddha, who holds the same position in this school

¹ Burnouf: Introduction, p. 208. ² Wilson's Hindu Theatre, Vol. I. p. 56.

as the absolute, impersonal *Brahma* does in the current Brahmanism. *Ādi Buddha*, according to this theistic school, the self-existent, infinite, and omniscient, created by five acts of wisdom five *Dhyāni* (divine) Buddhas. These *Dhyāni* Buddhas, thus originating in the combined power of knowledge and meditation, are mere "personifications of the active and intellectual powers of nature," but endowed with this double energy, each in turn gives birth to a divine or *Dhyāni* *Bodhisatwa*. These *Bodhisatwas* pass for the actual creators of the visible world. But this world is perishable and they perish with it. Three of the five creations have already passed away and we are in the fourth. The deity of this present "eon" is *Padmapāni*, or *Avalokiteśvara*. He is worshipped to-day in western Tibet and *Nepāl* as the tutelary deity, and to him divine homage is also paid among the Mongols and Chinese.

Besides this series of *Dhyāni* Buddhas, this school hold also to a series of human, or *Mānushi* Buddhas, seven in number, among whom *Bhudda* was the last. These are said to "win the rank and powers of a Buddha by their own efforts." But this notion of seven mortal Buddhas is simply the offspring of a desire, natural in India, to throw back the origin of any faith to as remote a date as possible. *Sākya* is the only historical personage, and it is noticeable that the legends rarely refer to the acts of any other.

How opposed this doctrine of creative agents is to primitive Buddhism will be seen if we look at the original meaning of *Bodhisatwa*. According to *Burnouf*, a *Bodhisatwa* was originally "one who possesses the essence of *Bodhi* or of the intelligence of a Buddha," a man whom the practice of all virtues and the exercise of meditation had prepared for the securing the high state of a perfect Buddha. He who would acquire such a state must first gain, in numerous existences, the favor of some of those ancient and gigantic Buddhas, in whose existence the Buddhists believe. Descending, then, from heaven to earth, he appears as a *Bodhisatwa*, and, after severe proofs of his faithful performance of the required austerities and study, becomes a Buddha. As

a Buddha he is fit to proclaim the law and save men from the evils of transmigration, and is then, but not before, prepared to enter the state of a perfect Buddha, beyond which it is but a single step to Nirvâna, or annihilation.¹

Another instance of the change which modern times have produced in Buddhism is seen in the different significations of the formula "Buddha, Dharma, Sangha." Originally, these words had a very simple sense: Buddha, The Law, The Congregation; but later Buddhists appear to have recognized in it a mystical trinity, akin to the Brahmanic. In the language of Hodgson, "in the transcendental and philosophic sense, Buddha means mind; Dharma, matter; and Sangha, the concretion of the two former in the sensible or phenomenal world," and may be interpreted theistically or atheistically, according as Buddha is placed before or after Dharma.²

As to the worship of Buddha or any other being as supreme, nothing could have been further from the thought of the founder of this faith. The only objects of religious reverence by early Buddhists were apparently images of Buddha, and his relics enshrined in sacred monuments or "topes": the worship or sacred reverence paid to the last of these was natural to enthusiastic admirers of the great master, while the use of images was merely to remind the pupil of the master's teachings, an aphoristic summary of which was always graven on the base of the statue.³ Morality, in fact, was, in Buddha's estimation, far above religion. "Brahma," he was heard to say, "dwells in homes where the sons revere their father and their mother."⁴

It was owing, doubtless, to the rise of Sivaism in the

¹ Burnouf: Introduction, p. 110.

² Asiat. Res. Vol. XVI.

³ Burnouf: Introduction, p. 344.

⁴ The Buddha, in the "Toy Cart," well puts his morality against religious practices:

"Why shave the head and mow the chin,
Whilst bristling follies choke the breast?
Apply the knife to parts within,
And heed not how deformed the rest:
The heart of pride and passion weel,
And then the man is pure indeed."

Wilson's Hindu Theatre, Vol. I. p. 122.

north, and the local proximity of Buddhism and Brahmanism, that there came to be such an unnatural fusion of these opposing systems as is now common. We have, on the one hand, one sect of Brahmanism adopting Buddha as an incarnation of Vishnu, and, on the other, the Buddhists installing by the side of the image of their revered teacher the idols of Brahmanic worship, and even admitting into their holy places the female divinities, with all the unholy practises which find their full sanction in the abominable teachings of the Tantras.¹ But all these modifications of Buddhism are of quite modern growth. The belief in a supreme being did not arise, according to Csoma, before the tenth century of our era. In the terse phrase of Mr. Hodgson, pure Buddhism was "monastic ascetism in morals, philosophical speculation in religion." It was only after it reached its culminating point, and began to feel the rising power of Brahmanism, that there was introduced the notion of a God, the establishment of permanent religious houses, and the fiction of tiers of heavens and hells with their appropriate occupants, which characterize the Buddhism of the present day. From this we turn. But before resuming the consideration of the Brahmanic philosophy, it is proper to refer briefly to the tenets of that sect which alone in India inherits the doctrines of Buddhism, and is to be found more or less numerous throughout the country,—the Jains. The sources of our information respecting the Jains are the essays of Mackenzie, Buchanan, and Colebrooke;² the papers of Colebrooke, Delamaine, Hamilton, Franklin, Tod, and Miles;³ the essay of Wilson on the Religious Sects of the Hindus,⁴ the work of Mr. Bird upon the subject,⁵ and the translations of Dr. Stevenson, published by the Oriental Translation Fund.⁶

¹ Burnouf: Introduction, Sect. V.

² *Asiat. Res.* Vol. IX.

³ Transactions of Royal Asiat. Soc.

⁴ *Asiat. Res.* Vols. XVI. and XVII. This Essay has been published in separate form, and is a valuable digest of the various sects. Calcutta, 1846.

⁵ "Historical Researches on the Origin and Principles of the Bauddha and Jaina Religions." Bombay, 1847.

⁶ "Kalpa Sûtra and Nana Tatva. Two works illustrative of the Jain Religion and Philosophy."

The Jains, who have flourished most in western India, probably originated between the fourth and seventh centuries of our era. They have often been confounded with the Buddhists, both by native and foreign writers, and not unnaturally, as their founder passes under the same name with the founder of Buddhism, while their tenets seem to be in truth little more than exaggerations of Buddhist dogmas. Like the Buddhists, the Jains are atheists. The universe, according to them, is divisible into two portions: Jiva, animate, and Ajiva, inanimate. Both of these are eternal and imperishable. The latter has no divine creator: it originates from atoms, of which the various elements are modified compounds. Jiva, which represents the living principle and soul combined, is defined as "without beginning or end, endowed with attributes of its own, agent and enjoyer, conscious, subtle, proportionate to the body it animates; through sin it passes into animals or goes to hell, and through virtue alone it ascends to heaven: through the annihilation of both vice and virtue, it obtains emancipation."¹ The notion that the soul is always proportionate in size to the body it inhabits, has been selected as a special object of ridicule by their adversaries.

The highest stage to which a man can attain is called by various names: Tirthankara, Arhat, Jina. The term Arhat is evidently borrowed from the Buddhists. Among them it signified "venerable," and was applied to that class of holy followers of Buddha who surpassed others by their transcendent wisdom and supernatural power.² The exaggeration in the transfer is noticeable, since, while the Buddhists recognized but seven mortal Buddhas, the Jains count twenty-four in each of three eons, a past, present, and future. The last two of the present age were probably the founders of the faith, as in their reputed age and stature they resemble ordinary mortals much more than do their supposed predecessors. The Jains, like the Buddhists, allow the worship of the Brahmanic divinities, but exalt far above them their

¹ Wilson.² Burnouf: Introduction, pp. 294, 298.

deified saint Tirthankara. "There is no god superior to the Arhat, no future bliss superior to Mukti."¹ This Mukti, or final liberation, there seems to have been not a little confusion about, some asserting it to be, like the Nirvâna of Buddhism, sheer annihilation; others contending for a sort of dreamy, unconscious, and yet pleasing state.

The Jains are noted in Hindu dialectics as the discussers of seven points, to each of which they are wont to prefix a "may be." These are: 1. A thing is. 2. It is not. 3. It is and it is not. 4. It is not predicable. 5. It is, and yet not predicable. 6. It is not, and is not predicable. 7. It is and it is not, and is not predicable. This conceit is a favorite object of ridicule by a later school: "to say that a thing is and is not, is as incoherent as a madman's talk or an idiot's babble."

The following sentence from one of their works—"the world is without bounds, like a formidable ocean; its cause is action (Karma), which is as the seed of a tree"—may suggest to us a connection between the Jains and the Buddhist sect of Kârmikas, whose theory of the origin of the world is the same.²

The Jains are divided into two bodies: the Digambaras, literally "sky-robed," naked philosophers, veritable gymnosophists, and Swetambâras, or "clad in white." The latter are the more modern, while the former no longer retain their primitive habits. They do not essentially differ in doctrine. Another generic division of the Jains is into clergy and laity.

The Jains, as the Buddhists, pay more attention to moral precepts than religious practices; and here again push to an extreme the moderate doctrines of the latter, as is the case with religious characters, who, to avoid taking life, a crime also among Buddhists, wear a piece of cloth over their mouths to prevent insects flying in, and usually carry a brush, with which to sweep the path before them, or the seat on which they sit. "Upon the whole," says Wilson

¹ Kalpa Sûtra, p. 10.

² See also Bird, *Historical Researches*, p. 46.

“the doctrine of the Jains is a system of quietism, calculated to render those who follow it perfectly innoxious, but to inspire them with apathetic indifference towards both this world and the next.”

We return to the Brahmanical philosophy. Buddhism, we have seen, was in great part but the application of the Sâṅkhya philosophy to social life. The result was a revolution. Sâkya-Muni was forced, by virtue of his own teachings, to break with the priesthood, and was consequently denounced by them as a heretic. But he quietly bore the brunt of their denunciation, and it is to his credit that the anathema of the Brahman became an empty sound, that the spell of priestly power was, for a season at least, broken. But this general movement, which in a revolutionary form became historical in Buddhism, in a form less avowedly opposed to received dogmas, found expression in a system of philosophy which we have specified as the second of the six chief systems of India, the Yoga.

This school seeks to popularize the Sâṅkhya philosophy, not merely by disrobing it of its practical exclusiveness, but by maintaining that the abstract meditation therein enjoined as the road to liberation would be facilitated by a previous discipline of austere practices and mortifications of the flesh. Its chief advance upon the Sâṅkhya was, however, in supplying the glaring defect in the latter system — the absence of a God. In contradistinction from the Sâṅkhya, the Yoga philosophy is popularly styled Theistic.

A sage called Patanjali is the reputed founder of this school; but, though he may have reduced the practice of rigorous austerities to a systematized form, and exalted it to the rank of a philosophical method, he was no more the first actually to practise or recommend such a course, than was Kapila the first to exercise his rational faculties upon the phenomena of existence; so that a native commentator is not extravagant in tracing the teachings of his master to the Katha Upanishad.

The doctrines of the Yoga school are contained in a treatise embracing four chapters. Of these, two have been

translated by Dr. Ballantyne, with a native commentary.¹ Besides this, the partial analysis of Colebrooke² and the questionable translation of a commentary by Ward,³ are all that are available for the study of the doctrines.

The four chapters of the Yoga Sûtras are as follows: I. On Contemplation. II. On the means of its attainment. III. On the exercise of transcendent power. IV. On Abstraction or Spiritual Insulation.

The term Yoga is from a root "*yuj*," "to keep the mind fixed in abstract meditation." Rendered by Ballantyne "concentration," it is defined in the second aphorism to be "the hindering the modifications of the thinking principle," in other words preventing thought, in our view rather a paradoxical definition. Five modifications of the thinking principle are specified, that is to say, five states or exercises of the mind—evidence, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory: in respect to which enumeration the commentator laconically adds "clear." Hardly, else Patanjali, if retaining his classification, should at least substitute for "evidence," right judgment resulting from evidence, and for "sleep," the condition of the mind in sleep, which was clearly what he meant. He then defines these several modifications, affirming sleep to be "that modification which depends upon the conception of nothing;" and that it is an act of the mind, the commentator argues from the fact that we remember having enjoyed ourselves during sleep.

The question then arises: How is this modification of the thinking principle to be effected? and the reply is: By "Dispassion" and "Exercise;" Dispassion being utter indifference to "objects seen on earth or heard of in scripture," and Exercise being the determined effort to preserve the mind in its unmodified state. The peculiar phraseology used we shall consider under the next school. The aim of all effort at concentration is to attain abstract meditation, through which liberation may be achieved. About this

¹ The Aphorisms of the Yoga Philosophy. Allahabad.

² View, et c., Vo'. II. p. 199.

³ Essays, p. 143.

notion of meditation the whole system is accordingly built up. Meditation is defined to be of two kinds : 1. That in which there is distinct recognition of an object ; 2. That in which all distinct recognition is lost, and the mind is intently engaged, thinking upon nothing ! Some, affirms the text, never pass beyond the first stage and thus fall short of complete liberation ; others, perhaps most, will find this second stage a difficult one to reach, and accordingly, for their benefit an easier method of attaining the same height is proposed, namely, " by profound devotedness towards the Lord."

It is this introduction of a " Lord " into the system, which distinguishes this branch of the Sâṅkhya school, and accordingly Patanjali deems it fitting to dwell at some length upon the theme, and proceeds " to declare in order the nature, the proofs, the preëminence, and the name of the Lord, the order of his worship, and the fruit thereof." ¹

" The Lord is a particular Spirit, untouched by troubles, works, fruits, or deserts." By " particular," is meant individual ; by " troubles," any distress ; by " works," actions involving merit or demerit, both equally obnoxious in the eye of a Hindu ; by " fruits," whatever ripens out of works, as birth, life, and all that mortals experience as the consequences of their actions ; by " deserts," the conditions or tendencies resulting from the same cause. The commentator also adds that the term " Īswara," Lord, denotes " one who is able to uphold the world by his mere will."

The proof of the existence of such a being is thus stated : " In Him does the germ of the omniscient become infinite." That is to say, explains the scholiast, just as properties which admit of degrees must find a limit somewhere ; for instance, parvitude in atoms, magnitude in the ether ; so knowledge and the like, which we find conditional in man, must somewhere be unconditioned, and he in whom this " germ " ripens into infinity is " the Lord."

He is preëminent ; for " he is the preceptor even of the

¹ Aphorisms, 23.

first, for he is not limited by time." "Of the first," that is, of Brahman, the head of the recognized deities of the Pantheon, and as he is above the creator, as his instructor, he is above all.

"His name is Glory."

"Glory," the commentator says, "is the technical term employed in speaking of the mystical name of the Supreme — OM." This monosyllable is met with as the mystical name of God, in all Hindu writings, and is perhaps the most ancient general designation. It is of frequent occurrence in the Upanishads, where meditation upon it is held forth as the great means of bliss. Thus, in the Māndūkya Upanishad: "Om! this is immortal. Its explanation is this all; what was, what is, and what will be, all is verily the word 'Om;' and everything else which is beyond the threefold time, is also verily the word 'Om.'" And again, the Prasna Upanishad declares: "The wise obtain this threefold world by the word 'Om,' as means, and even the highest (Brahma) who is without strife, without decay, without death, and without fear."¹ "Om! peace, peace, peace," is a frequent exclamation at the commencement or close of a treatise. Analyzed, "om" is composed of three letters, a, u, m, and is variously defined, but usually as representing the three gods, Brahmā, Siva, and Vishnu. Rammohun Roy says: "Om implies the three Veds, the three states of human nature, the three divisions of the universe, and the three deities."²

In the succeeding aphorism, Patanjali enjoins upon the disciple "the repetition of Om, and reflection upon its signification," with a view to abstract meditation. "Thence comes the knowledge of the rightly intelligent (Spirit), and the absence of obstacles." It will be remarked that, although Patanjali clearly holds to the existence of a supreme being as an intelligent creator and governor, he by no means

¹ Bibliotheca Indica, No. 50, pp. 137, 167.

² Translation of the Veds, p. 109. For a more mystical explanation, current in South India, see Jour. Am. Orient. Soc. Vol. IV. p. 74, and Madras Christian Instructor, November, 1844.

exalts him to the position of a deity, to be worshipped and obeyed by man, as his chief end. Far from that; this worship is but subsidiary to the exercise of severe thought, its end being only to facilitate such thought, or wholly to take its place as an easier devotion. However much, then, we may place the Yoga philosophy above the Sâṅkhya, as recognizing a God, we can hardly deem it entitled to the honor of being called a theistic philosophy.

After stating this easy method of attaining abstract meditation through "devotion towards the Lord," the Yoga Sûtras proceed to treat of certain obstacles which may distract the mind from this single pursuit. These, such as laziness, fickleness, sickness, etc., are to be strenuously contended against by a variety of expedients, such as the practice of kindly virtues, which will bring the mind into an equable frame; keeping the thoughts fixed upon a single truth at a time; thinking of some renowned Yogi, whose example will inspire one; dwelling upon dreams; or, and chiefly, regulating the breath, forcibly restraining and expelling it, bearing in mind, we are cautioned, that expiration can take place only after inhalation; or finally, fixing the thoughts upon some sensuous object, as odor, color, sound; this latter exercise to be facilitated by fixing your mind upon the tip of your nose, "whence will arise the perception of celestial odor," or upon the root of the tongue, whence will arise a perception of sound, etc., etc. As the result of this, by withdrawing your thoughts gradually from one object and another, until you have but one remaining, this also will drop away, meditation will be "without a seed," and you will have reached that state of thoughtless, abstract meditation, when the world, with all its accompaniments, will have passed away, and you yourself be free.

Thus closes chapter first.

Chapter second takes us back of this, and discusses the "practical part of Concentration," which as conducive to meditation, must first be attended to by the disciple. This practical part is said to consist in "mortifications, mutterings, and resignation to the Lord;" and in the development of his

subject, the author states the various afflictions of life, and the methods by which we may be freed from them. The subservients to Concentration are summed up as : 1. Forbearance; 2. Religious Observances; 3. Postures; 4. Suppression of the breath; 5. Restraint; 6. Attention; 7. Contemplation; 8. Meditation. Forbearance is said to consist of "not killing, veracity, not stealing, continence, and not coveting," and a curious result of the exercise of this habit is stated. From not killing, all creatures become the friends of the Yogi; from veracity, the fruit of any one's works will accrue to any individual at the Yogi's bidding; by abstinence from theft, "the jewels that exist in every quarter come to him, even though he covet them not;" from continence, he gains all power; from not coveting, he becomes perfectly familiar with all previous states of existence. Again, it is stated as a result of "inaudible mutterings, that "one's favorite deity becomes visible, and grants any boon desired."¹

Patanjali has much to say upon the regulation of the breath, giving directions as to those postures which best facilitate such an exercise, explaining how the breath should be expelled to the distance of just twelve inches from the nose, and for the space of thirty-six moments, enjoining it upon the Yogi so to breath that there shall be perfect rest, the vital airs remaining motionless; and much more to like effect.

Of the third and fourth chapters we have nothing in English, save the doubtful translations of Ward and the brief analysis of Colebrooke. Transcendent power is treated of, which the Yogi may at last attain, even while invested with the body. He may thus hear sound, however distant; transform himself into each or all of the five elements; pass and penetrate anywhere; change the course of nature; and, finally, by means of that abstract meditation through which he gains this power, escape the thralldom of nature by destroying all consciousness of personality.

¹ The Buddhist dogma of the superiority of Buddha to the god is no more than an expansion of this. Wilson on Buddhism. J. R. A. S. 1850.

Mr. Thomson holds that the introduction of a supreme will into the system of Kapila was not the work of Patanjali himself, but of some other persons intervening between him and Kapila. Judging from the mere form of the doctrine as it appears in the Yoga Sûtras, we might naturally incline to the same opinion, as this form is not sufficiently apologetic to have been the earliest authoritative statement of the doctrine; but when we remember that one great obstacle to the satisfactory study of Hindu philosophy is the fact that we seldom see *processes*, but only *results*; that, further, the real utterances of a great teacher have rarely, if ever, come down to us, save in the scholastic formulas of his disciples; and that when any new statement of a doctrine had gained currency, all former treatises upon the subject have usually fallen into disuse, — we may hesitate before refusing Patanjali the honor of having remedied (so far as he did) the prominent defect of the Sâṅkya philosophy. As it now stands, however, the Yoga philosophy is less a system of metaphysics than a religious scheme, offered as a substitute both for the atheistic speculations of the philosophers, and the irrational superstitions of the common people.

(To be concluded).

ARTICLE III.

SOME REMARKS ON AN EXPRESSION IN ACTS, XXV. 26. — A MONOGRAPH.

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THE words “of whom I have no certain thing to write τῷ κυρίῳ,” suggest the inquiry whether a Roman official, like Festus, when speaking of the emperor, could, in conformity with Roman usage about the year 60 of our era, have uttered the words τῷ κυρίῳ, which are here attributed to him. This inquiry has not been overlooked or unan-

swered. We name only among the commentators on the scriptures, Wetstein, in his edition of the New Testament, as having furnished a valuable collection of materials for a satisfactory answer; and, among other writers, Lipsius, in an excursus on the Annals of Tacitus, ii. 87, and Zell, in his *Röm. Epigraphik*, as having elucidated a parallel use of *dominus*. We propose to go into this inquiry at greater length than others within our knowledge have done, with the result, as we hope, of setting forth the accuracy of the evangelist Luke.

The first question to be answered in considering these words is: Whether Luke wishes to represent Festus as talking in the Roman or in the Oriental style. On the latter supposition, he might, one may say, attribute to the procurator, without any accurate knowledge of the usages of speech prevailing among Roman gentlemen, expressions similar to those which he met with in the Septuagint; or again, Festus, adopting a more Oriental style than was his wont at home in Italy, and accommodating himself to his companion king Agrippa, might call the emperor *κύριος*, when he would not call him *dominus* at Rome. This latter part of the alternative, however, seems too refined; if any one chooses to adopt it, he will, of course, rate the accuracy of Luke highly. It is natural enough to suppose that Romans of rank accommodated themselves in a degree to eastern forms of address, while living in the eastern parts of the empire; but if it can be shown that the use of *dominus* and of *κύριος*, as titles of the emperor, went along together, this of itself will be good proof that Festus in these words was talking as a Roman would. The Greeks employed *αὐτοκράτωρ* as an equivalent of *imperator*; they also used *βασιλεύς* of the emperor, while the Romans, for reasons obvious from their history, were avoiding *rex*. But we shall endeavor soon to show that the two agreed in the use of the title *κύριος* and *dominus*, in whatsoever part of the empire this use may have originated.

But might not Luke put *τῷ κυρίῳ* into the mouth of Festus without any exact knowledge of what he said, and in

imitation of the style of address and of reference which prevails in the ancient scriptures? If such were the case, he would only follow the approved custom of many accurate ancient historians, and could not be found fault with if he did what such truthful writers as Thucydides and Tacitus have sanctioned. This ground is taken by Lekebusch, who otherwise has done much to vindicate the honesty and accuracy of Luke. But this cannot be conceded beyond the point of admitting that the evangelist reduced his materials, derived from his own notes or recollection or from other sources, to a Greek style substantially the same everywhere; for the adaptation of the speeches to the characters shows too great a historic art to have proceeded simply from the author of the rest of the narrative. In the present case, however, the only way of showing the contrary, as far as it can be shown, is to show that Festus would be altogether likely to have used the expression which is ascribed to him, and that the writer, who accompanied Paul a short time afterward on his voyage to Italy, was very naturally his attendant on this occasion.

But before proceeding to our main point, let us briefly consider the use of *κύριος* among the Jews in addresses to persons of rank, and also the resemblances and differences in the Greek and Roman terms translated commonly by our word *Lord*. First, then, *κύριος*, in the Seventy and in the Apocrypha, is the usual equivalent not only for *ādōn* (Lord), but also for *Jehovah*, both when spoken of and when addressed. Examples in proof will not be called for. We cite, as being nearer to the times of the New Testament, Judith 11 : 10, 11; 12 : 6, 13, 14; 1 Esdras 11 : 17, 18; 4 : 46. In the New Testament the usage is the same: in hundreds of instances both God and Jesus are thus spoken of. Indeed, in the Acts, so common is it to call the risen Saviour by the title of *κύριος*, that the reference in a number of passages is ambiguous. In the first and most noticeable of these ambiguous cases, Acts 1 : 24, we feel compelled to believe that Christ is addressed by the title *κύριε, καρδιογνώστα πάντων*, as continuing that choice of his apostles which he began on earth. Of other beings

besides God and Christ, *κύριος* is rarely used in the New Testament; yet the reason for this lies most probably in the infrequency of the other occasions where it could be introduced. The "Greeks," in John 12: 21, apply the term to the apostle Andrew; and Mary, in John 20: 15, to the supposed gardener, no doubt *more patrio*; and in the Greek town of Philippi, which had become a Roman colony, the jailer (Acts 16: 30) calls Paul and Silas thus, which is due, perhaps, to the awe which they had inspired in him as being in some sort divine persons. Many, however, of the more fanatical Jews, at this time, either from religious motives or from political, because a Roman *κύριος* reminded them of subjection, and that to heathen authority, refused to call even the emperor by this title. Such were the teachings of Judas of Galilee to his followers, who regarded God (Joseph. Antiq. xviii. 1, 6) alone as *ἡγεμόν* and *δεσπότης*; so that, as Theophylact (on Luke xiii. cited by Wetstein) says, many were severely punished *ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ εἰπεῖν κύριον τὸν Καίσαρα*. Others, on the contrary, of the less fanatical Jews, did not scruple to use such words of the highest personage in the Roman world. Philo-Judaeus, writing on the legation to Caligula, in which he had a part (de leg. § 36), gives the words *καὶ ἐγὼ τίς εἰμι τῶν εἰδότην ὅτι δεσπότην ἔχω καὶ κύριον*, as part of a letter of Herod Agrippa the first, and in the same letter the emperor Caius is more than once called *δεσπότης*.

A few words are needed here to discriminate between the terms which answer to our word *Lord*. Of the Latin ones, *herus* is the strict correlative of *servus*, and differs from *dominus* in that the latter is the wider term, embracing the relations of the master to the slave, and of the owner to the property. Derived from *domus*, it denoted first the house-master, and then the proprietor. The *dominus* was such in relation to his chattels, including his slaves, but not in relation to his wife and his children, great as was his power over them. This relation was expressed in the word *dominium*, so important in the civil law. The special applications of *dominus*, which concern us in this essay, we pass over for the present.

Δεσπότης, like *herus*, was in its strict sense a correlative of slave, δούλος; and in an extended sense was used of the master over men in political bondage, like the Great King, as well as of the gods. In a still wider sense it denoted proprietor or *absolute owner* of things; as δ. ὄρνυγος, the owner of a *quail*; δ. οἰκίας, the master of a *house* or household; whence the οἰκοδεσπότης of the sacred writers. A Greek would have resented the calling of any magistrate over free Greeks a δεσπότης, because the term reminded him of its correlate, and he had for the holder of usurped and absolute power another word, τύραννος, which although the same at its origin with κοίρανος, took on in time a bad sense. Examples of these uses of δεσπότης are too frequent for citation. We adduce only, Eurip. Hippolyt. v. 88, Ἄναξ· θεοὺς γὰρ δεσπότας καλεῖν χρεών. Comp. a fine contrast between κοίρανος and δεσπότης in Eurip. Alcest. 210—212. It is only a seeming exception to what has been said, if in a few passages the tragic poets intend by δεσπότης the sovereign or king who is conceived of as having a more uncontrolled power in mythical times than was known in historical Greece. Thus the chorus of free persons in the Electra of Sophocles, v. 764, says:

Φεῦ, φεῦ· τὸ πᾶν δὴ δεσπύταισι τοῖς πάλαι
Πρόρριζον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔφθαρται γένος.

Κύριος is a word of wider meaning, and originally an adjective derived from κύρος, denoting *having authority, power, or validity*. The authority or highest power in a state might thus be called τὸ κύριον, as by Aristot. (Polit. iii. 10), and a person who was his own master, was said to be κύριος αὐτοῦ, *sui juris*. With the genitive of a person following it, κύριος denotes having power over or in respect to that person. A noted case of this was where, in Attic law, a husband was called his wife's κύριος, as having the representative power for her in legal proceedings, since in Attic law married women could, no more than minors, sue or be sued in person. In this sense the word has been used to

illustrate the Hebrew Baal, denoting, first, *possessor*, *lord*, then *husband*; but without reason, for the husband was not the wife's κύριος, save in the forensic sense just mentioned. As implying the possession of authority or power, κύριος is a broad term, applicable to the relations of political and social life, and has no bad sense like δεσπότης, nor the notion of property, like dominus. It can describe all who have authority, men and gods, and thus became fitted to take that place which it occupies in Hellenistic Greek. In the Greek classics it is rarely spoken of a sovereign, although a few examples of such a use are to be met with. Comp. Soph. Oed. Col. 1644, 288, and Ajax 734. Ellendt., in his Lexicon of Sophocles, defines it "*penes quem jus, potestas, arbitrium est.*" The distinction between it and δεσπότης is exhibited in a rude way by Ammonius, the writer on synonymes. Under δεσπότης, he has δ. ὁ τῶν ἀργυρωνήτων, κύριος δὲ καὶ πατήρ υἱοῦ καὶ αὐτός τις ἑαυτοῦ; and again voce κύριος, κ. τῆς γυναικὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ, καὶ τῶν υἱῶν ὁ πατήρ· δεσπότης δ' ἀργυρωνήτων (ῆ) τινῶν ἄλλων.

In turning dominus into Greek, both δ. and κ. would occur to the mind of the Greek writer. When dominus is used in its strict sense of house-master, slave-master, no other word was so apposite as δεσπότης; and in the civil law, we believe, δεσποτεία answers to dominium. In the later applications of dominus, especially where it is used of the Roman emperor, either word might be used, but κύριος more readily, as being without that odor of slavery which adhered to the other term. On the other hand, in turning κύριος, when used of a person possessed of power, into Latin, dominus is its equivalent, as in countless instances where the Vulgate expresses the κ. of the Seventy and the New Testament by this word.

We are now prepared to remark that, about the end of the republic, dominus came to be used of others besides the master of slaves, the proprietor of a thing, and a divinity; it came to be applied, as Dirksen, in his manual of the fountains of the civil law expresses it, "*principi et personis domus Augustae, aliisque dignitati conspicuis, adfectu nōbis devinctis.*"

The first time in which it is known to have been applied to the emperor finely illustrates the change in the use of words produced by moral and social changes in the nation making use of them. The old free Roman could never have shaped his lips to call any man his own *dominus*. But with the empire came in a feeling of subjection. The power of the prince, though in theory conferred on him by people, was in degree and kind that of a master, or *αὐτοκράτωρ*, as the Greeks called him; and a population, like the vast majority of the inhabitants of the imperial city, made up of freedmen and of foreigners from countries where rulers had been masters, would feel no great reluctance in telling the truth by this ill-sounding title. Accordingly, on one occasion, when Augustus was in the theatre and a mime had uttered the words, "O dominum aequum et bonum," the audience expressed loud applause, as if it had been spoken of the emperor. Augustus, too prudent to show his liking of this, and possibly too old-fashioned to like it, by his hand and countenance checked the unbecoming adulations of the people, and on the next day rebuked the practice "*gravissimo edicto*." So Suetonius (August. § 53). Other writers refer to the same occurrence, as Dion Cas. (lv. § 12), Philo Jud. (de legat ad Caium § 23), and Tertullian (Apol. § 34). Dion says: *καὶ δεσπότης τότε ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ὀνομασθεῖς*, etc. Philo says that "the clearest proof that he was not enchanted and puffed up by excessive power, was *τὸ μὴ δεσπότην μητὲ θεὸν ἑαυτὸν ἐδέλῃσαι προσειπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ, εἰ λέγοι τις, δυσχεραίνειν*." Tertullian's words, where he alludes to the same event, are these: "Augustus imperii formator ne dominum quidem dici se volebat. Et hoc enim dei est cognomen. Dicam plane imperatorem dominum, sed *more communi*, sed quando non cogor ut dominum dei vice dicam. Ceterum liber sum illi: dominus enim meus unus est, Deus omnipotens et aeternus, idem qui et ipsius. Qui pater patriae est, quomodo dominus est?" This passage is important as showing at once that this was a common appellation of the emperor, when Tertullian wrote, about A. D. 222, that the old unpleasantness of the word to a free mind had not left it,

and that a new consecration of it to God had grown up in Christian minds.

Augustus was not able to effect much by his edict in regard to the title *dominus*. Under Tiberius the usage of addressing the emperor in this way continued, but that wary prince rejected the title, as his stepfather had done before him. "Acerbe increpuit," says Tacitus of him (Annal. xi. 87) "eos qui divinas occupationes ipsumque dominum dixerant." To the same effect Suetonius (Tiber. § 27): "Dominus appellatus a quodam denunciavit ne se amplius contumeliae causa nominaret," etc. A verse in Phaedrus (ii. 5),

Perambulante laeta domino viridia,

has been cited, as illustrating this usage; but *domino* here has relation to the slave of Tiberius, of whom the story is told. So, too, when Virgil says (Aen. vi. 397) *Hi dominam Ditis thalamo deducere adorti*, we cannot infer, with Lipsius, although he has the authority of Servius for it, that Proserpine is so called as being the wife (the lady) of Pluto. Charon styles her thus, as his mistress, or else there is allusion to the title *Δέσποινα*, which she especially bore.

The successor of Tiberius, the infamous Caligula, can have had no scruple in regard to this title, since he arrogated the higher ones of Hero and God, and called Jupiter his brother. (Comp. Dion. Cass. lv. 26. Sueton. Calig. § 22.) Philo (de legat. § 11) reports him as reasoning that, since the rulers over sheep and goats are of a higher nature than sheep and goats, so the ruler over mankind is something more than mortal. It was in this spirit that the insane wretch ordered Petronius, praefect of Syria, to raise a statue to his honor at Jerusalem, and even after Herod Agrippa had induced him to abandon the project, he returned to it, intending to have the temple called by the name of *Διὸς ἐπιφανοῦς νέου Γαίου*. About the same time a sedition broke out between the Jews and the Greeks at Alexandria, in which the latter endeavored to put statues of the emperor in the proseuchae of the former. In reference to this

difficulty, Philo and others went to Rome as a delegation from their countrymen to mitigate the emperor's mind, and there encountered deputies of the other faction. In his memoir on this embassy, which we have already cited more than once, Philo makes Herod Agrippa address the emperor several times with the title of *δεσπότης*, and puts the same word in the mouth of one of his adversaries, in reply to whose calumnious charges the Jewish deputies cry out *κύριε Γάϊε συκοφαντούμεθα*. The word, if they spoke Latin, was *dominus*, in both cases; if Greek, Philo means to mark the servility of the other faction (u. s. § 48). To Philo *κύριος* seemed a very fit word to use towards the emperor. 'Η γὰρ 'κύριος' προσρῆσις, says he (de nom. mut. ed. Mangey, 1. 581) ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἐστί.

The style of *speaking* of the emperor, as the *dominus* or *κύριος*, went along with, or somewhat after, that of *addressing* him by such a title; but the former would be the less common, among the Romans at least, on account of the associations of *dominus* with slavery. Under Domitian we find the poet Statius (Silv. iv. praeſ.) writing "multa ex illis jam domino Caesari dederam." This emperor affected the title, as we learn from Sueton. (Domit. § 13) and from Eutropius; the latter of whom is incorrect when he says "dominum se et Deum primus appellari jussit," for Caligula had already done as much. He began a circular letter, according to Suetonius, with the words "dominus et Deus noster," and gladly listened to the acclamation, in the theatre, "domino et dominae feliciter." It is with reference to this that Martial writes :

Frustia, blanditiae, venitis ad me
 Attritis miserabiles labellis :
 Dicturus dominum Deumque non sum.
 Jam non est locus hac in urbe vobis :
 Non est hic dominus sed imperator.

Pliny, also, in his panegyric on Trajan, § 2, alludes to the same thing : "Nusquam ut Deo blandiamur; non enim de tyranno sed de cive, non de domino sed de parente loquimur." (Comp. §§ 55, 63.) *Dominus* then, in a distinct

political acceptation, as where a vile tyrant like Domitian wanted men to feel that he was their master, had not lost its old twang; and yet the style of politeness continually made use of it,—the best proof of which is afforded by the fact that the same Pliny, in his letters to Trajan, calls him *dominus* more than seventy times.

It is needless to trace the uses of this word further down in the empire. Some emperors, as Alexander Severus, refused to be so called. Avidius Cassius (Vulcat. Gallic. in Vita § 5), addressing Mark Antonine, says: *recte consulisti mi domine*; and Antoninus Diadumenus (Ael. Lamprid. in Vita § 9) in writing to his mother concerning his father, Opilius Macrinus the emperor, says: “*dominus noster et Augustus nec te amat nec ipsum se*,” which he might have said of his father, though not an emperor, as will presently appear.

The *lapidary* style affords frequent examples of the same mode of designating the emperor. In Latin inscriptions the form generally was *dominus noster* (D. N.; and in the plural, DD. NN.), and the earliest extant examples belong to the age of Domitian. Thus in Orelli's Collection (1. 143, No. 521) we have the following Egyptian epigraph, one of the very many yet extant on the statue of Memnon.

Sex. Licinius Pudens legionis xxii
xi. K. Januarius anno iiii D. N.
Domitiani Caesaris Augusti
Germanici, audi [audii] Memnonem.

Another, found at Corduba in Spain (Orelli 1. 185, No. 766), begins thus:

D. N. Imperator Caesar
Divi Vespasiani Augusti, etc.,

and belongs to the same reign.

In Mommsen's Latin Inscriptions of the kingdom of Naples (p. 212), occur the words: “*Pro salute optumi principis et domini nostri*,” relating to the same emperor.

On Greek inscriptions *κύριος* is found frequently enough;

but *δεσπότης*, if we are not deceived, almost never. Wetsstein's only reference is to a marble of Smyrna, in which occur the words *τοῦ κυρίου Καίσαρος Ἀδριανοῦ*; but we have not found this in Boeckh's Collection, perhaps have overlooked it. Without making an exhaustive search, we have noticed among the inscriptions of Asia Minor one of Aphrodisias in Caria, of uncertain date; another of Stratonicea in Caria, of the reign of Adrian, and another of Bagae on the Hermus, belonging to the reign of Diocletian, in which the title is employed. But it is found most abundantly on the monuments of Egypt. Nearly fifty instances have fallen under our eye. The earliest pertains to the reign of Tiberius. Then occur Nero, and the emperors of the second century, the latter very often. With equal frequency, the gods of Egypt, as Isis, Ammon, etc.; or imported gods, as Pan. We have noticed no cases in which the line of Lagidae received this title, and may infer that it came into vogue under the Romans. Inscriptions with this appellation of *κύριος* abound especially on the statue of Memnon, at Philae, in Elephantina, etc. One, discovered in the oasis of Thebes, and belonging to the reign of Galba, is remarkable, as containing the words: "the ordinance sent to me *ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου ἡγεμόνος*, Tib. Julius Alexander," praefect of Egypt, — the person speaking being the strategus of the nome.

The passage which we have quoted from Suetonius, in his life of Augustus, affords us another early use of *dominus*. After the occurrence in the theatre, Augustus "*dominum se appellari ne a liberis quidem aut nepotibus, vel serio vel joco, passus est; atque hujusmodi Blanditiis etiam inter ipsos prohibuit.*" From this it appears to have grown already into a custom for children, adopting perhaps the style of slaves in the household, to address their parents by this title, and even thus to address one another. That this practice continued to be rife, is shown by a passage of Seneca (Epist. 104), which is regularly quoted by the commentators on Acts for another reason. "*Illud mihi,*" says he, "*in ore erat domini mei Gallionis* [his brother]; qui, quum in Achaia febrem habere coepisset, protinus navem ascendit, clamitans non

corporis esse sed loci morbum." Martial, half a century afterward, refers to the custom of calling a father *dominus*, in the following epigram (i. 82) :

E servo scis te genitum, blandeque fateris,
Cum dicis dominum, Sosibiane, patrem.

The same usage is pointed at by Palladas, an epigrammatist of the end of the fourth century. He speaks of a person who, in the hope of getting some present from a friend, addressed him as *δόμνε φράτερ*, and when he had no such expectation, used *φράτερ* alone. "*Αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε*," continues the poet :

"Οὐκ ἐδέλω δόμνε, οὐ γὰρ ἔχω δόμεναι,"

which seems, by the way, to indicate that *ε* and *αι*, in that age, did not differ in their sound.

For another use of *dominus*, in polite discourse, Seneca is again, our earliest voucher. In his third epistle he says : "Sic illum amicum vocasti, quomodo omnes candidatos bonos viros dicimus ; quomodo obvios, si nomen non succurrit, dominos salutamus." So, too, a crowd was addressed, under the emperors, as *domini* or *κύριοι*. When Nero, in the character of a citharoedus, exhibited himself to the Romans in the theatre, he began : *κύριοί μου εὐμενῶς μου ἀκούσατε* (Dion. Cass. lxi. 20). We may add here that in addresses to *known* persons, of no very high rank, the title was employed. It is thus employed by Petronius, and if the judgment of Dr. Charles Beck, lately professor at Harvard, referring him to the first century, should be sanctioned by the critics, he would become a very early voucher for it. It is found, again, in Apuleius, as *Luci domine* (Metam. ii. 30. ; iii. 50), *domine* alone (iv. 75), and *domine fili*, "sir, son," spoken by Jupiter to Cupido. See also a passage in Quintil. vi. 3. 100, a part of which we do not understand. It closes : *et verus* inquit *domine*.

It is natural that the use of *domina*, *κυρία*, should go on pari passu with that of *dominus*, *κύριος*. An example or two may be produced. When the vile and crazy Nero associated

with himself Pythagoras as husband and Sporus as wife. καὶ κυρία καὶ βασιλὶς καὶ δέσποινα ὀνομάζετο (Dion. Cass. lxiii. 13). Another infamous emperor, Elagabalus, affected to be a woman, and when Aurelius Zoticus said to him κύριε αὐτοκράτωρ χαῖρε, replied, μή με λέγε κύριον· ἐγὼ γὰρ κυρία εἰμί (Dion. Cass. lxxix. 16, comp. 14). The Roman women, says Epictetus (Enchirid. 40), at the age of fourteen, are called κυρίαὶ by their husbands; but this means no more than that, when married at that early age, a girl is called *domina*, i. e., mistress of the family or slaves. In the Pastor of Hermas, *domina* is a constant form of address. So *dominus* (e. g., lib. i. vis 1, lib. ii. mand. 5).

Here we may touch upon the question: What is the proper translation of 2 John vv. 1, 5, where our translation is "lady"? dismissing as impossible the view which is expressed by the translation "the lady Eclecta," as giving her the same name with her sister (ver. 13), or as requiring the rendering "Eclecta" in the one case, and "elect" in the other, and regarding as nearly absurd, the opinion of Huther, which finds in κυρία the κυρία ἐκκλησία, we have remaining the two renderings, "the elect Lady," or "the elect Kyria." The former is opposed by the absence of the article before ἐκλεκτῇ, while in the latter case this absence, although not usual, can be better endured. Kyria seems to have been a rare proper name.

In concluding this monograph, which is already longer than we could have wished, we desire to present to our readers, in a brief form, our most important conclusions.

1. About the beginning of the empire the custom grew up of *addressing* the emperor as *dominus* or κύριος; nay, sometimes even δεσπότης was heard. This usage became a part of established etiquette.

2. When the emperor spoke of *himself* as a *dominus*, it grated on Roman ears, as savoring of slavery.

3. When the emperor was *spoken of* in inscriptions, he was freely called by these titles. The same probably was true of other modes of speaking of him.

4. When an *unknown* person, or one whose name *was not*

remembered, or a crowd was addressed, these words were used.

5. Other persons besides the emperor were so addressed or spoken of. This is true of parents, brothers, even of children, and perhaps of other persons important in the view of the speaker, and that both with and without appending the individual's name.

6. The same remarks hold of the corresponding female terms.

7. Finally, whatever can be argued with regard to *dominus* in Italy, can with more force be argued of *κύριος* in the Greek-speaking parts of the Roman empire, and especially in the East.

It can therefore be readily believed, that when Luke, in the passage before us, attributes to Festus the words *τῷ κυρίῳ*, spoken of the emperor, he attributes to him what he would be likely to say, even as a Roman official. Furthermore, as we have already observed, he was probably on the spot, seeing that he sailed soon after with the apostle, and he may have been an ear-witness to words which were spoken in a public assembly.

ARTICLE IV.

METHOD IN SERMONS.

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VERY much attention has been paid by most sermonizers to the method, the order, and the division of their discourses. In some associations, it is a constant exercise to exhibit the skeleton of a sermon as a subject of criticism; and yet the success of this labor, it seems to us, has borne no proportion to the labor itself. We have known some cases in which the order of a sermon has been bad just in propor-

tion to the labor bestowed upon it. There are two reasons for this result: One is, there is a spontaneous course of thought in our minds, which is only disturbed by an artificial attention to it; just as a winding river is sometimes changed by art into a straight canal; and, second, the mind of the writer has been injured for want of a comprehensive view of what the true design of method is: he has preferred a pedantic form of method, while all its freshness and power has been lost. We would, therefore, preface this discussion by stating what we suppose the true design of method to be. ~

The design is founded on the very nature of the human mind. Man is, himself, a system. Everything he sees around him is a unity of assembled truths. A house, a tree, an orchard, an animal, a field, an army—each one is a system, and every unity is a collection. The conception is then within us, and we have been trained up by our own consciousness, and all that is within us, to observe systems, and to be ourselves systematic; and of a system it may always be said, that there is one order of unfolding it which is the most simple and the best. It is founded in the nature of things. Hence the importance of method. It belongs to rational creatures. It has its foundation in the laws of thought.

It is very true that men differ in this ability to select the best method of presenting a subject. Method arises from a sort of intellectual foresight. The man of method thinks first of that which he executes last. Were you to see an archer preparing his bow, making ready his arrow on the string, taking deliberately his aim, and finally hitting his mark, you would see an emblem of the aim and ends of method in a discourse. The speaker has one great impression which he wishes to make. He always keeps his end in view. In his introduction, his figures, his diction, his arguments and his arrangement of them, he makes everything subservient to his last impression. No matter what his variety may be, if all accumulates on one point, and tends to one result. The first thing in method is:

THE INTRODUCTION.

The object of an introduction is to prepare the way for the subject. It should excite attention and give the mind a previous interest. A paradox is sometimes a good introduction. Sometimes, also, arguing for a foe against the very point you wish to prove, you sometimes set a very powerful objection in the strongest light. Sometimes you begin by an apology: how little time you have had to prepare; how young you are; how humble you feel as to your poor abilities; how you did not intend to speak, but are compelled by the magnitude of the occasion. Though all this is very trite, yet sometimes, by exciting compassion from the extent of your difficulties, it has some efficacy. An introduction should have something of the hue and nature of the subject, as the key-note of a tune bespeaks its cheerful or mournful character. When Burns wrote the mournful song, at the time he was expecting to leave his native land, the introduction is admirable. He dresses up a scene exactly suited to the sentiments that are to follow.

“ The gloomy night is gathering fast ;
Loud roars the wild, inconstant blast ;
Yon murky cloud is foul with rain ;
I see it driving o’er the plain :
The hunter now has left the moor,
The scathed coveys meet secure,
While here I wander, pressed with care,
Along the lonely banks of Ayr.”

Some poets would have given us vague description, but every item in the material world, as Burns manages it, corresponds to the tone of his mind and the impression he wishes to make.

Even the apparent exceptions to this rule only serve to confirm it. Dr. Blair’s twenty-third sermon, on Death, begins in a remarkably cheerful manner. His text is in the twenty-third Psalm, fourth verse: “ Though I walk,” etc. “ This Psalm exhibits the pleasing picture of a pious man rejoicing in the goodness of Heaven. He looks round on

his state, and his heart overflows with gratitude. When he reviews the past," etc. It might be thought, at first view, that this is too cheerful a tone for a sermon on so solemn a subject as death. But the fact is, he has misnamed his sermon. The fault is in his title. The sermon is not on death generally, but on the consolations which religion, more than philosophy, gives in that trying hour. For this, then, his introduction is remarkably appropriate. Dr. Blair has been praised for his introductions; and some of them are remarkably happy. Mr. Jay, considering the general excellence of his discourses, is not eminent in this part of his execution. An introduction should prepare the way, but not announce the subject. We should descend to our theme by soft gradations. Our first paragraph should not be like Trinity church in Boston, remarkably plain and simple without, and within all the filagree work, which contradicts the first design.

Sometimes it is good to begin from some remote point, and by a natural and unexpected deduction come to your subject, like some of Dr. Johnson's *Ramblers*. The hearer wonders why you begun there, and where you are going. But this must not be too constant, nor have too much art.

And after all, you cannot always have an introduction; certainly you cannot always have a good one. If you have no good one, make it very short, or plunge at once into your theme. We are called to write so many discourses, that we cannot often afford the labor requisite for the gain of a good introduction. This part of a discourse, next to the close, is the most difficult; and we are inclined to think it should be written last. Only in this way there is danger you should lose nature and magnify art.

It is a bad way to begin with scripture; it draws away attention from your text. A commonplace preacher is very apt to begin with a truism; and if his design be to hoist a flag and show what he is, it is admirable. But your first sentence is the last place to put a worn-out sentiment, such as: Paul was a good man; Paul was a zealous apostle; Prayer is the breath of Christians. It is not well to begin even

with the proposition that Pascal has made so much of : All men desire to be happy. On the other hand, it would not be well to begin with an affected falsehood, as Sterne does, when, after quoting some words of the apostle, which are susceptible of being understood as teaching a falsehood, begins his discourse by saying: *That I deny.*

If you use labor, beware lest it conduct you away from simplicity ; if you use art, let it be the perfection of art.

In getting good introductions, we must study models. Cicero's are fine, but very artificial. The same may be said of those of our Everett. Paul's before Agrippa is simple and beautiful. Its aim is to conciliate a reluctant ear. Stephen's, in Acts vii., is supremely beautiful. It resembles the funeral oration of Demosthenes over the slain in the battle Chaeronea. Its design has not always been seen, even by some learned critics. It was dictated by the same philosophy that dictates our first speech to an acquaintance, not very familiar. We begin by saying: It's a cold day ; cold wind to-day ; it is very hot ; or, It is a fine season ; — the meaning of which is : I will begin with something you must agree to ; I will not have a dispute with you in the outset. So Stephen, knowing how the Jews would dissent from his main views, begins with a string of historical facts to which they must agree. Besides, it proved that, in embracing Christianity, he had not denied the great facts of Judaism. He thus, in a masterly manner, gained and kept their attention. Webster's introductions at Knapp's trial, and in his dispute with Hayne, are very happy. What a stock of magnanimity he continues to lay up for future influence !

The most daring introductions are those in which your burning subject justifies you in bursting out like a volcano, like Cicero's first oration against Catiline, or he who spoke the Enlgy on Louis the Great. The French preacher entered the church while all the funeral lamps were burning ; the pale corpse of the king was before him ; the dirge died away on his ear, and he arose, to a breathless audience, and with a low and trembling voice, casting a glance at the regal coffin, said : " Ah ! my hearers, God alone is great." But in all such cases, you must remember yourself and the

occasion. If you cannot mount to the third heavens, you must sink to bottomless perdition as an orator. The sublime may be before you, perhaps above you; but the ridiculous is beneath your feet, and a single step may plunge you among its horrors.

But the most important place for a suitable introduction is when you extemporize. Here I can only speak from my own experience. Every man, no doubt, has expedients of his own invention, which, as he has devised them, most readily assist his own practice. Our mental habits differ. For myself, I must say it is a great thing to get a-going; not to stumble at the threshold. It is necessary for me to begin as simply as possible; not with a truism, but something that is plain and excites attention. A narration is useful; something that I know I can remember even before I have recovered from my first confusion. Here I must beg leave to contradict Cicero. He says that an elegant, artificial sentence trims your mind and elevates your subsequent spontaneous style.¹ It is just the reverse with me. To me it is like a head land on the sea. I walk from wavy grass and blooming flowers to plunge down to extemporaneous waves, all of whose waters pass over my head and sink me in their tumult and confusion.

METHOD.

This is important, and, as Coleridge says, marks the cultivated mind; though native strength will often anticipate it. Two kinds of method have been mentioned by the logicians, the analytic and synthetic, which "differ," says Dr. Watts, "as the way which leads up from a valley to a mountain differs from itself, considered as it leads down from the mountain to the valley." We use the synthetic when we wish to conceal from our hearers the point to which we are going; and we use the analytic when we openly state the conclusion, and then prove it.

The best definition of a good method is that of Hooker :

¹ *De Oratore*, Lib. I. § 33.

“When all that goes before prepares the way for all that follows, and all that follows confirms all that went before.” The object of method is to present a compact whole in the best order.

The stereotyped rule for a sermon is, first to explain the text; then deduce the doctrine; prove it; answer objections, and make the application. But, after all, a cryptic method is often the most real and efficacious; where your thoughts, like a genial river, wind naturally, always progressing, and where every bend detains you among green fields and waving trees, and leaves the whole landscape impressed on the mind. It is best always to be moving, though not with equal rapidity, to our termination.

There are certain kinds of method suited to various subjects. Doctrinal subjects generally demand a more logical method. But such a strict method, formally announced, is not suited to lighter subjects. There is the dramatic, as that of Shakspeare in *Hamlet* or *Othello*. There is the poetic, with its various kinds, as the epic, the ode, the satire, the didactic poem. One of the beauties of an ode is a method free from the chains of logic, almost invisible at first, and yet visible on closer inspection. It shows how a genial mind, while it breaks the rigid laws of thought, imposes new ones of its own. The connection is slender and loose; not constrained or confined; quick transitions, congenial digressions; the picture of a free mind, not governed by the associations of logic, but by those of fancy, and yet by no means moving at random. Take the first ode of Horace as an example: “Maecenas, descended from ancient kings, my protector and my delightful pride, there are some who are pleased to collect the Olympic dust and the palm of whose skilful victories exalt them to the gods; another is pleased with the honors of the people; one gathers his harvest, and another is never tired with commercial gain; he practises the rural life and refits his broken ships, unskilled to bear poverty. Some spend whole days over their cups, now stretched beneath the shady tree, and now beside the gentle stream. One delights in war, another in hunting,

remaining in the cold air, forgetful of his tender wife, and busy with his nets and his dogs. But I — I love the muse. Me the ivy wreath, the cool grove, the chorus of nymphs and satyrs, separate from the people and exalt to the gods; while Euterpe yields the pipe and Polyhymnia the Lesbian lyre. But if you, Mæcenas, should accept me as a poet — I should knock my head against the stars.” Now let us suppose that Horace was asked what his order was, and why he chose it? I have no doubt his first answer would be — that he followed his instinct, and had not thought much about it. But, after all, his mind had its tone, and this ode has its end; and whether he knew it or not, he moved according to the mental laws of genius. There was a silent cause of this order. He mentions the passion for the Olympic games first, because of the vast disproportion between the strength of the passion and value of the reward. It was an obvious instance: political honors are more substantial, and not so strange; property, still better; the merchant’s conduct gives variety to the catalogue, and a dash of satire; the drinker, to Horace’s epicurean philosophy, was still more rational, and the hunter and the warrior gave a fine contrast, to the glorious wreaths of the poet with which he tops his climax, and pays a compliment to his patron. Now here is a chain of thought, though it is a loose one, and the order seems to me to comply with every demand of poetic method. It was what suited the subject and represented the author’s mind.

We must allow that sermons also demand a different method, according to the more rigid or laxer nature of the subject. There are three kinds of subjects: 1st, the doctrinal; 2d, contemplative subjects; and 3d, pathetic; the last are also hortatory. In the first, *i. e.*, the doctrinal, the *formal* method is to be adopted; in the other two, an order free, but natural; and, let me add, it is far less necessary to announce your method. The more feeling, the less method. The force of the order, in such cases, depends more on particular transition than a studied whole. You go from one sad scene to another by similitude, by contrast, by climax,

by relief, or any other principle that seems to suit your intended impression. Thus Dr. Blair, in his second sermon on Death (sermon xxxv), says: "One day we see carried along the coffin of the smiling infant, the flower just nipped as it began to blossom in the parent's view; and the next day we behold a young man or young woman, of blooming form and promising hopes, laid in an untimely grave." Who does not see the nature of this transition? striking similar notes, having the same loose principle of connection, and yet not without a tie—the coffin—the infant—the smile—the parents—and then passing to the young man laid in the untimely grave. In such cases, the slighter your connection, provided it be a real one, the better for your subject. You are preaching on spring—the very subject is contemplative and descriptive: how absurd it would be to adopt a logical method—I shall, 1. show what spring is; 2. I shall prove there is a spring; 3. I shall answer the objections; I shall endeavor to confute those who say there is no spring; and, lastly, I shall apply the subject. I question whether Burgersdyckius himself would sanction such a division. No: you adopt the contemplative even in your arrangement. You begin with the desolations of winter; you show the ground softened by the first radiance of the returning sun; you paint the contrast; you pass from the birds to flowers; you show us the spring in all its perfection; and you pass to the spiritual spring in the heart of man, and paint the universal bloom that is finally to cover creation with its verdure and its flowers. Rise with your subject, and reserve your most glowing strains for the last, and no one will complain of your want of method.

The essence of method is, *to keep moving to a given point.* The mind here resembles a vessel which sometimes moves directly with the wind; and sometimes, when the wind is ahead, is obliged to tack, making her long and short reaches according to the occasion, but still keeping the point in view, and always gaining on it. Perhaps the most difficult method, and often the best, is to move on a latent line; to put together a string of affiliated truths, where the first

prepares the way for the second, and you reach your end by a journey which no one fully sees until it is finished, and then every one sees. For example : I am preaching on the doctrine that few will be saved. I take my text from Matt. 7 : 14, *Because strait is the gate and narrow is the way*, etc. I begin by saying : Our existence in life is a gift and a blessing. God is our Creator, and the Bible is full of the goodness of God ; creation proclaims it, and our experience gives hourly proof. It is easier to be good than to be wicked ; morality is easier than vice ; it leads to a smoother path. The *spirit* of morality is easier than morality without its spirit, because more spontaneous. It is easier to follow conscience, than to face its pains and resist it. It is hard, we think, to resist our selfishness. But the generous man makes the best provision for himself. It is a remarkable fact that no abilities combined with supreme selfishness ever knew how to secure their own ends. The devil is an example. He is always tormenting himself. It is easier to build a good character on real goodness, than it is to gloss over a false pretence ; and finally, if religion is a real path to morality and reputation, it is easier to obey from love than to attempt formal obedience without its inward spirit. Love makes self-denial, losses, poverty, martyrdom, easy. How, then, is it true that the gate is so strait and the way is so narrow ? It must be so *relatively* — with respect to man ; and this reads us a lesson of adoration and humility. We see our hope ; we see our danger. We have hope, because there is a gate and a way ; and we see our danger, because the way is narrow ; and the alarm is still greater because the narrowness is caused by our own depravity. Now, in this method I am always progressing ; I move on ; I reach my end ; and yet I do not lay down a formal definition ; I do not pass from the general to the specific. My order is not a syllogism, like Cicero's Defence of Milo. It is a train of consecutive truths, not imposed by a logical necessity, and yet moving in a natural order. I resemble the musical composer, who arranges his notes so that the tune may at once please and make the best impression.

In such cases, however, you must have three rules : 1st, to be always moving on, not swing like a door on its hinges ; 2d, you must remember to keep the main point in view ; and 3d, to have a reason for your order, though at each step the collocation may not be imperative. Method in such sermons is like a path in the woods : there is a path, though sometimes it is doubtful, and sometimes you find two or three, either of which you may take with equal propriety and success.

Sometimes you take a mingled method, a consecutive, which comes nearer to the formal, and for which there is a greater reason. I am preaching on the vanity of human prospects in human life. I take my text, Ecclesiastes 1 : 2, *vanity of vanities*, etc. I begin by observing : In this strain all nations agree, Christian and Pagan. It needs not the light of revelation to find out the emptiness of life. All feel, all allow. But the conviction is curious, universal, but not practical. It checks no desire, alters no plan, abates no labor. The strain is even pleasing. But there is a *practical* conviction. What ? When ? And how useful ? What ? It is deeper ; it is painful ; it checks, it urges to a new pursuit. But it is produced by occasions. When ? In loss, in affliction, in old age. Sometimes even in youth : an early discovery. Sometimes in the bloom of prosperity, as Byron felt the fulness of satiety. But the most practical is, when it is produced by the Spirit of God, like Solomon in his pleasures, or Belshazzar at his feast. Then a train of concomitants, and it often leads to conversion — 1st, As it brings us into the line of the gospel offer : *Come unto me all ye that labor*, etc. 2d, As it teaches the value of the gospel hope, in the only effectual way ; 3d, As we are impelled to seek something better than worldly good ; and lastly, as it removes the very evil of which we complain, giving to life a substantial object. Now this order I call a mingled one. There is a fixed cause for the general order : 1st, Impractical conviction — the practical, and then the what ? when ? and how ? But if any one should insist on knowing why, under the when, I arranged the circumstances as I did,

viz., in loss, in affliction, in age, even in youth, and sometimes in the midst of prosperity, and, finally, as produced by the Spirit of God,—I would give *some* reason, but not an imperative one : I took loss first as the most obvious ; the rest seems to follow, on the climax principle — it is stranger that youth and prosperity should feel this vanity, than age and disappointment ; and finally, the most important instance is that produced by the divine Spirit ; and yet if one should insist that I ought to have put prosperity before youth, all I can say is, I felt myself on free ground, only choosing where there was reason for a choice. When it was the fashion to arrange soldiers in three ranks — the short men in the front rank, the middle-height men in the second rank, and the taller ones behind — no doubt there were cases in which the orderly serjeant was perplexed where to put a particular individual ; and yet he had his general rule, and never abandoned it. Every deviation is not an abandonment.

Logicians speak of the formal and the cryptic method, and the cryptic is always revealed sufficiently at last. You find it on retrospect : it is but one of those roads whose course you see whenever you have travelled it. Now, I cannot but think that this latter method is the most important, and needs the most cultivation. I strongly suspect that many of the associations in Massachusetts have suffered by cultivating a formal method, by carrying in skeletons of sermons. Two evils emerge : 1st, you fall into a pedantic and formal track, much more nice in the plan than good in the execution ; and 2d, in some of your heads, by sticking to your plan, you fall into expansion and tautology. Both these evils are great and common. For the same principle that leads you, by following an uncomprehensive plan, to expansion and repetition, leads you to miss many important things in the field of nature which lie out of your prescribed path. You miss and you too much find ; you lose and you repeat ; you repeat your path and fail of collateral observation. You resemble a traveller going into a new country to explore, who should leave the shore and

travel inward on one point of the compass; going and returning, he passes over his selected track twice, but he sees nothing of the fertility or barrenness which is spread wide around him and lies on his right hand and left. I never heard one of these strict *methodists* long, without observing both these evils: they expanded too much, and they lost what was deeply interesting; for a stern logician knows nothing about the loose chain which binds a side-treasure to the subject. Hence Burke, when he wrote his letter on the French Revolution, took care to say that he should express his feelings just as they arose in his mind, with very little attention to formal method (page 27). He wished to be *comprehensive*; he knew that a formal method would narrow his track, — just as a tree, to spread a circular shade, must shoot out its branches in every direction. There are subjects, undoubtedly, where the formal method exhausts about all you need to say, but not *all* subjects; for some subjects are circular in their very nature, and a straight line leads you away from them. Last sabbath (Sept. 16, 1860) I heard a discourse on Acts 26:29, the desire Paul had for the salvation of the world: 1. the fact; 2. the object before him; 3. the course to which it led. Now the heads of a discourse must bear some proportion to each other. But the first head might be dispatched in three words: the speaker was therefore tempted to a needless expansion in his first head. The second was not much better; in short, the whole sermon, though a noble subject, was injured by the division. In one of our academies, a few years ago, a young aspirant wrote: ON TIME — the very choice indicating how little time he had seen; and his division was, 1. the nature of time; 2. the effects of time; and one of the hearers whispered: It was a marvel how he could ever begin the first head, or ever finish the second. Only think — the effects of time! It would take a whole eternity to tell. And yet this subject and this division is an exquisite picture of a youthful production. We see the reason of his partitions: he was anxious to find enough to say.

The stereotyped divisions often tempt us either to this

needless expansion or an indefinite object. This is peculiarly the case when you put *the nature of a thing* as one of the objects. I shall first show the nature of happiness, or the nature of sin, or what law is, etc. I do not deny that where there is any obscurity, it may sometimes be appropriate to show the nature of an object whose nature is generally mistaken. Thus Cicero begins his first book of Tusculan Questions by showing what death is. But he says expressly: Though it is a thing that seems to be known, yet in its obvious form it produces diversity and confusion. In all such cases, remember that nature is above rules, and the end more important than the means.

It has always seemed to me that this free, informal method, being the most difficult and the most exquisite, needs to be studied most. When you seem to abandon order, you impose on yourself the task of a more latent and delicate one. Thus in the fifth book of Cowper's *Task*, a poem which is peculiarly free and spontaneous, whose very title seems to insinuate that, though the author will take no formal rules, we still have a method which suits meditation, and where the connection, though loose, is not forgotten. Let us take the table of contents as we have it. It is a perfect specimen of the lighter chain: "A frosty morning—the foddering of cattle—the woodman and his dog—the poultry—whimsical effect of frost at a waterfall—the empress of Russia's palace of ice—amusements of monarchs—war one of them—wars, whence—and whence monarchy—the evils of it—English and French loyalty contrasted—the Bastile and a prisoner there—liberty the chief recommendation of this country—modern patriotism questionable, and why—the perishable nature of the best human institutions—spiritual liberty not perishable—the slavish state of man by nature—deliver him, deist, if you can—grace must do it—the respective merits of patriots and martyrs stated—their different treatment—happy freedom of the man whom grace makes free—his relish of the works of God—address to the Creator." In all this it is obvious, 1st, that there is a connection; 2d, that it is a slight one; it might

have been in some respects different with little or no loss to its value ; 3d, that it is more close in single steps than in the whole order ; 4th, that its degree of fixedness and laxity suited the subject ; and lastly, that the very order as well as the subject is a beautiful picture of the author's mind. If any one doubts whether the method here is real and is a picture, I would refer him to Hamlet's soliloquy : " To be or not to be," which certainly is loosely methodical, and is expressly intended to be an exhibition of a mind intensely meditative, employed in its deepest meditations.

If you wish, then, to learn this order and to secure its best form, adopt the following expedients. Cultivate this turn of mind ; open the fountains in your soul ; read the best specimens ; some beautiful ones are found in the Bible, especially the Psalms. Consider your subject, and always adopt this method in the subjects that demand it. Be immersed in your theme ; find, with the Psalmist, *while I was musing the fire burned*. Keep your end point-blank in view ; in many cases, surrender yourself to the natural current of your thoughts, though you must review your work in a cooler and more artificial state ; let your eye be single, and your whole body shall be full of light. In a word, be conscious of the existence and value of this sort of method ; cultivate it, and your labor will not be in vain in the Lord. You have nature before you — retiring, beautiful nature ; and none ever worshipped at her shrine over whom she did not cast the fragrance of her flowers and the order of their arrangement.

One of my parishioners lately went down into the Aroostook country to see a son ; and he walked out into the vicinage and was lost in the dark forest which shades that fertile region. How should he find his way back ? He climbed up into a high tree to see the cheering glade, and to discover, if possible, the houses. Now suppose this man, in the distance, to discover the opening, his wavering way back may be an emblem of this freer method. He has the mansion in view ; he has found the points of the compass, and he knows generally at what point to aim ; and yet his walk is far from being a straight one. Here he meets a rock, there

a bog; now a clump of trees, and now a circle of tangled vines. He must turn his course for reason or for fancy; and he gets home by a bending line, which has increased both his fatigue and his pleasure. A surveyor would have taken his compass and moved on his line. The surveyor is a logician; but the other is a man.

The great art in method is to make common sense pre-
side over formal rules. A rule is always a general approxi-
mation to the truth; and hence the common maxim, *exceptio probat regulam*. Even in the formal method there are
varieties. Take what is often used as the first head, as an
example, viz., the nature of a thing, or what a thing is. If it
be doubtful, if there be confused notions prevailing, it is
well to begin by giving precision to your subject, and show-
ing distinctly what it is. But if it be one of those common
notions which no words can make more plain, it is better at
once to enter your discourse. The great temptation, in for-
mal methods, is — that in one of your heads, at least, you
will be tempted to expansion and tautology. Sometimes a
method has an artistic beauty, but no practical importance.
When we gain nothing by a formal method, let us always
forsake it, and take one which may be more real for not
being formal. Let us always sacrifice the substance to the
soul.

Dr. Paley, in one of his charges to his clergy, gives the
following advice: "Propose one point in one discourse,
and stick to it; a hearer never carries away more than one
impression; disdain not the old fashion of dividing your
sermons into heads — in the hands of a master this may be
dispensed with; in yours, a sermon which rejects these helps
to perspicuity, will turn out a bewildered rhapsody without
aim or effect, order or conclusion." The first part of this
advice may be as wise as the head that gave it; but I should
advise every young preacher to be roused by the archdeacon's
insulting assertions to show how completely they may be
confuted, by any degree of cultivation which is necessary to
make a religious teacher. Certainly the clergy of England
must be vastly below those of America, if the skill that

could make a helpful division in a sermon is not competent to make it clear without a formal division. The fact is, if a man is so confused in his thoughts that he needs the form to keep him from rhapsody and confusion, he will be very likely to wander from his plan when he has once made it; and hence we often see the announcement of a plan is the last we hear of it; just as a man may put a bridle to a horse's mouth, and then suffer him to wander at will. It is well worth a young man's study to show to himself and others how completely orderly and progressive he can be without the ostentation and barren formalities of the schools. A bad plan, however announced, is an impediment to the discourse, and the worse, the more strictly it is followed. A narrow plan makes a narrow sermon. There was a preacher in this vicinity who never failed to announce his plan, and it never failed to perplex his subject. He generally had seven heads to his discourse; and, like the beast in Revelation, it might as well have had ten horns; for the first head was almost invariably two-thirds of the sermon; and, in the remainder, the parts went before the whole, the specific before the general, and the consequences before the antecedent, in the most miraculous confusion. The sermon resembled one of those grab-bags which are employed at our parish fairs: you can never foresee what is to come out next. Yet this helter-skelter orator was a man of respectable powers, of uncommon popularity, and had often preached with great success. We withhold his name; but, with or without a formal plan, he was as little able to write a clear, consecutive sermon, as to set his name to PARADISE LOST.

Here comes in the art of logic. Its sole value is that it teaches the science of method. It is wholly relative. All the metaphysicians previous to Sir William Hamilton speak depreciatingly of it: Locke, Read, Campbell, etc. They say there is no syllogism which does not contain a *petitio principii*. But Cicero saw the true use and only value of logic. It is an art, says he (*De Claris Oratoribus*, sect. 41, p. 429), quae doceret rem universam tribuere in partes, latentem

explicare definiendo, obscuram explanare interpretendo; ambigua primum videre, deinde distinguere, postremo habere regulam, quâ vera et falsa judicarentur; et quae quibus positis essent, quaeque non essent consequentia. Hic enim ut tulit hanc artem omnium artium maximam, quasi lucem, ad ea, quae confusi ab aliis aut respondebantur, aut agebantur, — an art which teaches to divide all things into constituent parts, to explain the latent by defining, to illustrate the obscure by interpreting, to discuss the ambiguous part and thus distinguish it, and finally to have a rule by which the true and the false can be judged; what consequences follow from whatever premises we establish. He [*i. e.* Sulpicius] brought this art, the greatest of all arts, as a light to those things which others had involved and left in confusion.

The majority of mankind suppose they understand a thing when they can classify it, that is, assign its species or genus. If they have seen other things like it, and can put it into a class or rank with them, and give it a common name, they suppose they understand it for all the purposes of common life. This we see illustrated in that curious passage in Gulliver's Travels when he got among the giants: "The king sent for the literati to determine what the little man could be. These gentlemen, after they had awhile examined my shape with much nicety, were of different opinions concerning me: they all agreed that I could not be produced according to the regular laws of nature, because I was not framed with a capacity of preserving my life either by swiftness, or climbing of trees, or digging holes in the earth. They observed by my teeth, which they viewed with great exactness, that I was a carnivorous animal; yet most quadrupeds being an overmatch for me, and field-mice with some others too nimble, they could not imagine how I should be able to support myself, unless I fed upon snails and other insects, which they offered by learned arguments to evince that I could not possibly do. One of the virtuosi seemed to think I might be an embryo or abortive birth. But this opinion was rejected by the other two, who observed my limbs to be perfect and finished, and that I had lived several years, as it was

manifest from my beard, the stumps whereof they plainly discovered through a magnifying-glass. They would not allow me to be a dwarf, because my littleness was beyond all degrees of comparison; for the queen's favorite dwarf, the smallest ever known in that kingdom, was near thirty feet high. After much debate, they concluded unanimously, that I was only *RELPLUM SCALCATH*, which is, interpreted literally, *lusus naturae*; a determination exactly agreeable to the modern philosophy of Europe, whose professors, disdaining the old evasion of *occult causes*, whereby the followers of Aristotle endeavored in vain to disguise their ignorance, have invented this wonderful solution of all difficulties, to the unspeakable advancement of human knowledge." (Gulliver's Travels, Pt. II. ch. iii. p. 99, 100.) Now, amid all this satire, we see that *relplum scalcath* expresses a class. So Dr. Johnson, talking of ghosts, said he knew one friend, who was an honest man and a sensible man, who told him he had seen a ghost—old Mr. Edward Cave, the printer, at St. John's Gate. He said Mr. Cave did not like to talk of it, and seemed to be in great horror whenever it was mentioned. Boswell—"Pray, sir, what did he say was the appearance?" "Why, sir, something of a shadowy being." Here the ghost is classified: he belongs to the race of shadowy beings—you could put your hand through him; which I believe is the true idea of a ghost, the next genus and the specific difference.

Our first business in this world is to sort things. We trace a resemblance, and not only resemblance, but that peculiar resemblance on which species and genus are founded. To these classes we give names; and when we have once done both these, we suppose ourselves to understand both language and things. Nothing can come to our observation which does not indicate itself and the class to which it belongs; or if it does not, the mind is impatient to reach a class. We call it a non-descript, or a *lusus naturae*, or, as Dr. Johnson did his ghost, a *shadowy being*; and if we cannot arrange it now, we have no doubt that further knowledge would enable us to do it. Induction in logic always

precedes deduction, or the use of syllogisms. Now, the whole object of this classification is not to penetrate into the nature of things, like the chemist or metaphysician, but to arrange our thoughts as others arrange them, to be in harmony with all mankind; and as logic is founded on order, the species being a part of the genus, and the individual a part of the species, logic is, as Cicero says, an art which brings light to confusion. When you have a subject where a regular syllogism can embrace all you wish to say, a strict method is admirable. As Cicero's Milo: 1st, There are times when it is lawful to kill; 2d, the case of Milo, assaulted by Clodius, was one. Every one can see how comprehensive each of these points, and how naturally the one precedes the other

But all subjects are not cast in such a regular mould.¹ Sometimes the logical steps are too obvious to detain for a single moment; and then there are occasions when you choose to steal on conviction by the synthetic method. All I contend for is, a preacher should be free.

It is sometimes the case that the most consecutive minds are induced to adopt an order which seems very abrupt and strange, until we see the reason of it. If a man could look out of a window on the sea, and observe a vessel aiming at the river's mouth with a head wind, he would consider her motions erratic and strange while she was tacking, provided he did not know which way the wind was. In like manner, many authors have a latent reason for an incomposite method, unaccountable until explained. Paul himself was an example. He had a very methodical mind; that is, moving on a mental line with perpetual divergences. He was methodical just as Burke was methodical, and all that class of men, wavering with a centre to which they perpetually return; and sometimes with an assumption which the subject does not immediately suggest. Thus the second

¹ The design of the discourse is accomplished, if the audience fully understand its genius and main import, become interested in it, and inspired by it to a virtuous life. Neither the ancient nor the modern pulpit orators have confined themselves to the use of the partition. — *Schotts' Treatise on the structure of a Sermon*. See *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Nov. 1848, p. 742.

epistle to the Corinthians seems, on the first perusal, to be a jumble of unconnected themes. It resembles one of those apple-trees which have russets on the north side, pearmains on the west, winter-sweetings on the south, and the baldwins on the east, all growing from one root, and hanging in rich confusion. Rosenmuller observes concerning this epistle: *Desiderari in hac epistola arctiorem argumenti connexionem, a multis est animadversum.*—Well, what is the reason? Has nature violated her laws, and has the apostle forgot his character? We wonder at the phenomenon, until we learn the cause. The fact was, that the Corinthians had subjected to him a series of questions, which he was bound briefly to answer. In like manner, I can imagine a preacher to be addressing his people, perhaps in a farewell discourse, on whom the topics are forced by the occasion, and his method by those on the spot (interpreted by the silent conditions existing in each of their minds) may seem perfectly natural; yet when those silent conditions have evaporated into a new state of things, his order in the discourse may seem abrupt, arbitrary, and inconsequential. The best method, often, like the tallest tree, grows up from a root the deepest hidden in the ground. A clear mind never can shake off its fetters, just as some minds never can put them on. There was a youth in one of our colleges, some fifty years ago, who had no fondness for the inventive work of a scholar (or indeed any other), who ingeniously lighted on this method of composing his theme: he would ask each visitant in his room to write a paragraph; and each one wrote, not knowing what the other had produced. When he came to present the unity of his composition to the admiring class, the late Professor Kingsley drily remarked to him, that it was as beautiful a specimen of consecutive harmony of thought as he ever knew *him* to produce.

SPECIMENS.

In the following specimens I shall give two of a regular plan, formally announced, and two others, examples of consecutive thoughts without a regular plan. No man has

exhausted the subject who does not cultivate both these methods. Can you make your plan very slight, and yet not wholly lose it?

SERMON FIRST.

Gospel of John 10 : 11 — “I am the good shepherd ; the good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep.”

INTRODUCTION.

Christ represents his variety of excellence to us as a Saviour by a variety of similitudes. A shepherd, one. Seen in the light of antiquity, beautiful and affecting. Let us consider :

I. He is a shepherd.

II. He is the good shepherd.

III. Why? — he gives his life for the sheep. His love expressed in the atonement.

IV. The assurance we have of this truth — his own unbroken word.

But what! will you take the testimony of each individual to himself? Will you believe that Mahomet is the prophet of God because he says so? No : but consider who Christ is, and what proofs he gave. The word of Christ is a word divine.

CONCLUSION.

A shepherd implies a flock. It is a relative term. Of those that hear me, some see the Shepherd's beauty, hear his voice, and love his person. Others are blind to all his charms, and deaf to all his invitations. O, my insensible hearers! if you see nothing in the work or person of Christ that touches your heart, it is because you are not of his flock.

SERMON SECOND.

Luke 9 : 59, 60 — “And he said unto another, Follow me; but he said, Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father. Jesus said unto him, Let the dead bury their dead; but go thou and preach the kingdom of God.”

The heart of man is a sand-bar where two tides meet. It is unstable; it is washed by two currents, which disturb

its stability. Religion meets us with a command, and we should meet that with decision.

All sinners have an accusing conscience and a corrupt heart. They often know their duty without a disposition to do it.

The man in the narrative of which our text is a part, had a great veneration for the gospel and its author. He had even determined to become a disciple. He only asks for a little delay, and for that he seems to have a most excellent excuse. He wishes to go and bury his father. Some suppose that his father was not yet dead, and that by the expression "bury my father," he means, Let me wait until I receive my inheritance, settle my affairs, and then I will be ready to attend to religion. But our Lord requires his immediate service. He allows of no procrastination. The propensity is general, and so is the lesson. We remark :

I. Men have many excuses for delaying to give religion their present attention.

II. These excuses really have some weight; they are often very plausible.

III. They are all overruled by the superior importance of religion.

I. Men have many excuses :

1. 'This we know from observation and experience ; from what we have seen, and what we have felt.

2. It arises from the human heart: no man is a total unbeliever. Conscience sheds some light on the darkest mind. Most feel the necessity of doing something for their salvation. But it is hard to begin a work we do not love. The conviction of danger is not deep enough.

II. These excuses really have some weight. Of this we have an example in the text: "Bury my father." How important! How becoming! How necessary! There is a class of such duties: the youth has an education to secure; the man of business, a family to support. Many things demand our time and attention. When religion is weighed against some sensual trifle, all see the difference; but when one solemn duty is opposed to another, the partial mind is deceived.

Be it ever remembered, that the antagonism is a false one. We may as well say that the liquid ocean prevents the solid ship from going through it, as to say that true piety impedes the execution of any real obligation. No. *We are straitened in ourselves.*

III. This brings me to the last remark: all these objections are overruled by the superior importance of religion. You are exhorted here to flee from the wrath to come; your immortal interest is at stake; death and judgment are before you, and your opportunity is flying away on the wings of every hour. God himself has appointed the duty and the time. *To-day if ye will hear, harden not your hearts.*

CONCLUSION.

How much there is to seduce us! How easily are we seduced! Satan is never more malignant than when he is *transformed into an angel of light.*

SERMON THIRD—METHOD UNANNOUNCED.

Ps. 42 : 5 —“ Why art thou cast down, O my soul? and why art thou disquieted in me? Hope thou in God; for I shall yet praise him for the help of his countenance.”

This psalm presents an extraordinary spectacle: a man remonstrating with himself; a single soul dividing itself into two parts, and one part undertaking to instruct the other. Strictly speaking, this is impossible, and yet nothing is more common than this impossibility. Who has not, etc.? The pagan moralist, long before the Bible was known, had pictured this dissent of unity, these dialogues with one's self. Cicero has said, Somehow or other we are two: one part of our nature resists the other; the one commands, the other obeys. (Tusc. Quest. lib. ii. § 20.) What did the psalmist mean, when he said to his soul: Why art thou disquieted in me? Who is *me*? who is the person speaking? and who is the person addressed? What is there left of a man, when you have abstracted his soul from him and made it an objective personage? Who is the *I* addressing the soul in

him? It would be impossible to give an analytic answer to such questions; and yet nothing can be more natural than the words of our text.

Indeed, all serious reflections begin in this mysterious self-remonstrance. The very idea of repentance is, that a man differs from his former self. A converted man hates what he once loved, and loves what he once hated.

The natural man, the very pagans, had something of this duality. They had a higher nature, which condemned the desires and pursuits of the lower. They remonstrated with themselves. Every sinner is a sinner because he condemns himself in the thing he alloweth.

This dialogue is often very remarkable before the commission of sin, and still more so after it. Then he perceives how small the gain, how infinite the loss.

Sometimes when we are nerving ourselves up to some hard conflict which it requires all our courage to begin, we summon our powers, we rebuke our own timidity.

Sometimes in great dejection, under a great loss, we say: *Why art thou cast down, O my soul, etc.?*

But the true Christian, with grace in his heart, is the most striking specimen of this self-remonstrance. He is a strong instance of this duality of being. He often has to argue the point with himself, to preach to himself; and it is the most direct preaching, because he knows his audience.

Paul has carried this duality of person to the greatest extent, Rom. 7: 15, 16, 17 — *For that which I do, I allow not; for that which I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that I do. If, then, I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good. Now, then, it is no more I that do it.* Such, then, is the conflict. Let us apply the subject by asking three questions.

1. Have we ever held this dialogue with ourselves? Have we thus rebuked our own hearts? It is essential to all serious reflection.

2. How did the dramatic scene end? Which power prevailed? Did the rebuking power conquer, or did the culprit persist?

3. If the latter was the case, that is, if the remonstrance did not prevail, what did you then? Did you give up in despair, and let the crushing serpent twine his folds around your gasping heart?

The result of such a conflict shows our need of help and the place of prayer.

SERMON FOURTH.

Matt. 16 : 26 — “ For what is a man profited if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul? ”

Great complaints are made by many people of the perplexities of faith and the intricacies of religion. They pretend to wish that the subject was simpler and plainer. Revelation presents us too many mysteries; doctrines hard to digest, as they are difficult to prove; such as the trinity, original sin, free grace, election, and the power of God acting on the volitions of men. There are so many opinions, they say, we hardly know what to believe.

But when Jacob saw his ladder in vision, though the top might lean on heaven, the first round was but one step from the ground. It was an emblem of our holy system. The first truth is nigh us, even in our mouths and hearts, and it sheds its radiance on all the rest, and prepares the way for our receiving them; for as no man, in a clear winter evening, ever saw one star alone, but must have passed his eyes through sparkling constellations, so some of the articles of our faith are simple yet inclusive; they give importance and grandeur to the whole system.

The immortality of the soul! what an inexpressible grandeur it gives to the pursuits and destiny of man! It changes the whole economy of human life; it changes prudence into religion; it shades with finer light the purposes of God; it makes his mercy and his justice infinitely greater; it awakens new desires in our hearts, and presents new objects of prayer, and it sheds its lustre on the darkness of the tomb, and presents heaven and hell as rewards and

punishments for a soul created for the joys of the one or the flames of the other.

But this truth, to have its effect, must be believed. The very presentment of it is a part of its truth ; for everything proclaims the existence of God : this mighty fabric of creation, this lofty arch over our heads, that golden sun, the great and wide sea, the rolling clouds and revolving seasons show the greatness of the design ; and yet how inadequate are the pursuits of life to the longings of the soul ! Immortality explains the mystery, and the very presenting of the doctrine shows a purpose worthy of the efforts of man, worthy of the wisdom of God.

Two objects are presented to us which explain each other by their contrast : the poor rewards of this life, and an unfading crown in heaven. This balance facilitates our choice, if we are wise ; *for what is a man profited if he gain, etc. ?*

It shows our perversity if we do not choose right ; for the blindness which can thus dispose of eternal glory for the shadows of life, must be a voluntary blindness ; it must indicate intense hatred to piety, arising from intense love of the world. So that you gain religion, or become a monument of its truth, by your perversity and loss.

This text sends us to our best instructor, our own experience. We are continually feeling the consolations of religion, or the vanity of the world. It is an increasing experience. If we refuse, we are sinning against God and our own happiness at the same time.

What an alternative is before us ! what a responsible condition is our place in life !

The grand sin that seduces all and ruins thousands, is **WORLDLINESS**. We love the world, we live for the world, we hope to gain the world. But what is the world worth, if we lose our Saviour, and are left to die in our sins ?

The first motive by which religion influences us, is here presented and sanctioned. In both parts of this text, in the value of the soul and in the little value of gaining the world, our prudence is addressed. No doubt the professed Christian proceeds to higher motives : he has disinterested love ;

his last lesson is to crucify the flesh with its affections and lusts ; but he begins by a sense of his own personal danger. He contemplates the fearful possibility, that *his own* soul may be lost. It alarms him into reflection. He fears, he trembles, he compares ; and this first step in religion is an excellent point of view to distinguish the second. " I must rise," he says, " higher than this ; my danger shows me the common danger of a dying world."

The inconsistency of two pursuits is presented : the care of the soul, the gain of the world. The pursuit of the one implies the renunciation of the other.

In the day of judgment, it will be a sad aggravation of our sin and folly to see for what poor rewards we have lost the eternal glory. The baits of Satan will then be surveyed in their true light. The bribe will be weighed ; the remorse will be complete. Judas will see the value of thirty pieces of silver for which he betrayed Christ. Nabal will see his churlishness ; Saul will see how needlessly he afflicted himself in his jealousy of David ; yes, in the light of a burning world, when the heavens are passing away with a great noise, the righteous Judge will hold up the toys, the chaff, the momentary pleasures, the transient honors which seduced you, and in this amazing brightness you will see the folly of your choice and the justice of your doom. Verily the wicked have their reward.

How dreadful the condition of him whose joys are seen only in an increasing retrospect, and whose agonies are the whole of his eternal experience !

ARTICLE V.

GOD'S OWNERSHIP OF THE SEA.¹

BY REV. LEONARD SWAIN, D. D., PROVIDENCE, R. I.

PSALM 95 : 5. — "*The Sea is his, and he made it.*"

THE traveller who would speak of his experience in foreign lands, must begin with the sea. Especially is this the case if he would speak of his journey in its religious aspects and connections. For it is through the religion of the sea that he approaches those lands, and through it that he returns from them. God has spread this vast pavement of his temple between the hemispheres, so that he who sails to foreign shores must pay a double tribute to the Most High; for through this temple he has to carry his anticipations as he goes, and his memories when he returns. Nor can the mind of the traveller be so frivolous, or the objects of his journey so trivial, but that the shadows of this temple will make themselves felt upon him during the long days that he is passing beneath them on his outward, and then again on his homeward, way. The sea speaks for God; and however eager the tourist may be to reach the strand that lies before him and enter upon the career of business or pleasure that awaits him, he must check his impatience during this long interval of approach, and listen to the voice with which Jehovah speaks to him as, horizon after horizon, he moves to his purpose along the aisles of God's mighty tabernacle of the deep.

God's way is in the sea as it is in the sanctuary; and

¹ This Article is a Sermon, which was preached by the author to his own people soon after his return from Europe. Many who heard it felt desirous of its publication; and many who heard of it, requested that it be printed in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. It has been yielded to the press by its author reluctantly, and in compliance with the earnest wishes of his friends. — EDS.

having so recently come from beholding it, that the roll of the ship and the roar of the waves are scarcely yet vanished from my brain, let me speak to you of it in his house to-day; that so his works may combine with his word to teach us the lessons of his greatness, and that some strains of that vast anthem of the deep that praises God round the whole world this morning may mingle with the worship which rises to him from this sanctuary.

In speaking of God's ownership of the sea, I wish to consider, first, some of the more important material uses which he has made it to subserve in the economy of nature and for the welfare of the world, and then to refer to some of those more distinctively religious elements of impression by which it becomes the symbol of his presence and the earthly temple of his glory.

It is very natural, in looking at the ocean, and in travelling over its enormous breadth, to wonder why such an immense mass of water should have been created. When we think that three-fourths of the entire surface of the globe are covered by its waves, it seems to us like a vast disproportion. It is a common thing, in speaking of the sea, to call it "a waste of waters." It seems as if it were a mere desert, incapable of being turned to any profitable use, and as if it would have been much better were its vast hollows filled up with solid land, and its immeasurable area covered with fields and forests, waving with harvests and resounding with the noise of cities and the busy life of men.

But this is a mistake. Instead of being an incumbrance or a superfluity, the sea is as essential to the life of the world as the blood is to the life of the human body. Instead of being a waste and desert, it is the thing which keeps the earth itself from becoming a waste and desert. It is the world's fountain of life and health and beauty; and if it were taken away, the grass would perish from the mountains, the forests would crumble on the hills, the harvests would become powder on the plains, the continents would be one vast Sahara of frost and fire, and the solid globe itself, scarred and blasted on every side, would swing in

the heavens as silent and dead as on the first morning of creation.

1. Water is as indispensable to all life, whether vegetable or animal, as is the air itself. From the cedar on the mountains to the lichen that clings to the wall; from the mastodon that pastures on the forests to the animalcule that floats in the sunbeam; from the leviathan that heaves the sea into billows to the microscopic creatures that swarm a million in a single foam-drop; all alike depend for their existence on this single element, and must perish if it be withdrawn. But this element of water is supplied entirely by the sea. All the waters that are in the rivers, the lakes, the fountains, the vapors, the dew, the rain, the snow, come alike out of the ocean. It is a common impression that it is the flow of the rivers that fills the sea. It is a mistake. It is the flow of the sea that fills the rivers. The streams do not make the ocean, but the ocean makes the streams. We say that the rivers rise in the mountains and run to the sea; but the truer statement is, that the rivers rise in the sea and run to the mountains; and that their passage thence is only their homeward journey to the place from which they started. All the water of the rivers has once been in the clouds; and the clouds are but the condensation of the invisible vapor that floats in the air; and all this vapor has been lifted into the air by the heat of the sun playing upon the ocean. Most persons have no impression of the *amount* of water which the ocean is continually pouring into the sky, and which the sky itself is sending down in showers to refresh the earth. If they were told that there is a river above the clouds equal in size to the Mississippi or the Amazon; that this river is drawn up out of the sea, more than a mile high; that it is always full of water, and that it is more than twenty-five thousand miles in length, reaching clear round the globe, they would call it a very extravagant assertion. And yet not only is this assertion substantially true, but very much more than this is true. If all the waters in the sky were brought into one channel, they would make a stream more than fifty times as large as the Mississippi or

the Amazon. How many rivers are there in the sky? Just as many as there are on the earth. If they were not first in the sky, how could they be on earth? If it is the sky that keeps them full, then the sky must always have enough to keep them full; *i. e.*, it must always be pouring down into them just as much as they themselves are pouring down into the sea. It is computed that the water which falls from the clouds every year, would cover the whole earth to the depth of five feet; that is, if the earth were a level plain, it would spread over it an ocean of water five feet deep, reaching round the whole globe. The sky, therefore, has not only a river of water, but a whole ocean of it. And it has all come out of the sea. The sea, therefore, is the great inexhaustible fountain which is continually pouring up into the sky precisely as many streams, and as large, as all the rivers of the world are pouring into it. It is this which keeps the ocean at the same level from year to year. If it were not sending off into the air precisely as much as it receives from the rivers, it would be continually rising on its shores, and would finally overflow all the lands of the earth.

And now if the sea is the real birthplace of the clouds and the rivers, if out of it come all the rains and dews of heaven, then instead of being a waste and an incumbrance, it is a vast fountain of fruitfulness, and the nurse and mother of all the living. Out of its mighty breasts come the resources that feed and support all the population of the world. All cities, nations, and continents of men, all cattle and creeping things and flying fowl, all the insect races that people the air with their million tribes innumerable, all grasses and grains that yield food for man and for beast, all flowers that brighten the earth with beauty, all trees of the field and forest that shade the plains with their lowly drooping, or that lift their banners of glory against the sky as they march over a thousand hills — all these wait upon the sea, that they may receive their meat in due season. That which it gives them, they gather. It opens its hand, and they are filled with food. If it hides its face, they are

troubled, their breath is taken away, they die and return to their dust.

Omnipresent and everywhere alike is this need and blessing of the sea. It is felt as truly in the centre of the continent, where, it may be, the rude inhabitant never heard of the ocean, as it is on the circumference of the wave-beaten shore. He is surrounded, every moment, by the presence and bounty of the sea. It is the sea that looks out upon him from every violet in his garden-bed; from every spire of grass that drops upon his passing feet the beaded dew of the morning; from the rustling ranks of the growing corn; from the bending grain that fills the arms of the reaper; from the juicy globes of gold and crimson that burn amongst the green orchard foliage; from his bursting presses and his barns that are filled with plenty; from the broad forehead of his cattle, and the rosy faces of his children; from the cool-dropping well at his door; from the brook that murmurs by its side, and from the elm and spreading maple that weave their protecting branches beneath the sun, and swing their breezy shadows over his habitation. It is the sea that feeds him. It is the sea that clothes him. It is the sea that cools him with the summer cloud, and that warms him with the blazing fires of winter. He eats the sea, he drinks the sea, he wears the sea, he ploughs and sows and reaps the sea, he buys and sells the sea, and makes wealth for himself and his children out of its rolling waters, though he lives a thousand leagues away from the shore, and has never looked on its crested beauty or listened to its eternal anthem.

Thus the sea is not a waste and an incumbrance. Though it bears no harvests on its bosom, it yet sustains all the harvests of the world. Though a desert itself, it makes all the other wildernesses of the earth to bud and blossom as the rose. Though its own waters are salt and worm-wood, so that it cannot be tasted, it makes all the clouds of heaven to drop with sweetness, opens springs in the valleys and rivers among the hills, and fountains in all dry places, and gives drink to all the inhabitants of the earth.

2. A second use of the sea is to moderate the temperature

of the world. A common method of warming houses in the winter is by the use of hot water. The water, being heated in the basement, is carried by iron pipes to the remotest parts of the building, where, parting with its warmth and becoming cooler and heavier, it flows back again to the boiler, to be heated anew, and so to pass round in the same circuit continuously. The advantage of this method is, that the heat can be carried to great distances, and in any direction, either laterally or vertically, so that apartments many hundred feet removed from the furnace can be warmed as well as if they were close at hand.

Precisely such an office is performed by the sea in warming the distant regions of the earth. The furnace is in the tropics. The ocean is the boiler. The vertical rays of the sun pour into it a heat that is almost like fire itself. The temperature of the sea is raised to eighty-six degrees, and the water, swelling and rising in the same proportion, is compelled to seek its level by flowing off to the right and left of the equator. Flowing to the north, these waters are gathered into the Gulf Stream, which acts as a conducting pipe three thousand miles in length, and sends them, with a velocity swifter than that of the Mississippi river, and with a volume that is greater by a thousand fold, to spread out their treasured heat over the North Atlantic, where the winds take it up into their breath, and blow it in gales of continual summer across the lands that border on the ocean. A similar current passes down the opposite side of the equator, and conveys towards the polar regions of the south a stream of heated water, which is sometimes known to be sixteen hundred miles in breadth. The effect of these currents in raising the temperature of the cold climates is almost incredible. They make Great Britain and France as warm as they would otherwise be if they were fifteen or twenty degrees nearer the equator. It is computed that if the amount of heat thus spread out over the Atlantic by the single influence of the Gulf Stream in one winter's day, were concentrated upon the atmosphere of France and Great Britain, it would be sufficient to raise the temperature of

these two countries from the freezing-point to the full heat of summer. It is also computed that the heat carried off every day from the Gulf of Mexico alone, by this agency, is "sufficient to raise mountains of iron from zero to the melting-point, and to keep in flow from thence a molten stream of metal greater in volume than the waters daily discharged by the Mississippi river." Thus a double purpose is served by these currents; for while they convey the needed warmth to the colder regions, they bear away from the tropics that superfluous heat which, if it were allowed to remain, would render the whole line of the equator intolerable and uninhabitable. And this is not the whole of the process of mitigation. For while the warm currents of the tropics are flowing towards the poles, the cold currents of the icy latitudes are moving towards the equator. Immense trains of icebergs are borne down by these streams towards the flaming furnaces of the line, and so the fervors of the torrid zone are cooled and comforted by the frosty breath of the arctic and antarctic waters. Thus each region gives to the other what it has in excess, and receives from the other what it has in deficiency. The poles are warmed by the sun which does not reach the poles, and the tropics are cooled by the ice which cannot be formed within the tropics. If it were not for the sea, the entire belt of the tropics would be a desert of perpetual fire, and the entire polar regions would be a desert of perpetual frost. One third of the whole earth's surface would be unendurable with heat, another with cold, and only the remaining third would be fit for human habitation; whereas now, under these tempering influences of the ocean, the whole width of the world, with few exceptions, is given to man for his dwelling; and wherever he goes he finds a thousand forms of vegetable and animal life, which the same genial influence has made to wait upon him and be subservient to him. If we praise the ingenuity of man, who breaks the cold of winter by artificial heat, and that too by inventions which are themselves but a feeble and distant copy of what Nature has done before him on an infinitely grander scale, how should we

admire the wisdom and goodness of him who first *set* the great copy for man, and who makes the ocean itself an apparatus for storing up the heat of the vast tropical furnace, and sending thus all the softness and wealth of the garnered summer to the most distant quarters of the globe!

3. A third important use of the sea is to be a perpetual source of health to the world. Without it, there could be no drainage for the lands. The process of death and decay, which is continually going on in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, would soon make the whole surface of the earth one vast receptacle of corruption, whose stagnant mass would breed a pestilence, sweeping away all the life of a continent. The winds would not purify it; for, having no place to deposit the burden, it would only accumulate in their hands, and filling their breath with its poisonous effluvia, it would make them swift ministers of death, carrying the sword of destruction into every part of the world at once. The only possible drainage of the world is by water. It is as necessary for the purpose of carrying away the feculence of decay and death, as it is for the purpose of bringing in and distributing to their place the positive materials of life. It is in this respect precisely what the blood is to the body. It not only brings what is necessary for growth and sustenance, but it takes away and discharges from the system everything which has accomplished its office, and which, by remaining longer in its place, would be a source of disease and death.

Its first office is simply mechanical. The rains of heaven come fresh from the sea. Evaporation has emptied their hands of all previous burdens, so that their utmost powers of absorption may be ready for the new toil. Falling upon all the surface of the world, and penetrating beneath as far as the process of putrefaction can reach, they dissolve all substances which decay has touched; and while a portion of it is carried down to the roots of the trees, the grasses and the grains, there to be taken up and moulded into new forms of life, the remainder is washed into the brooks, by

them carried to the rivers, and by these conveyed to the sea, whose caverns are vast enough to contain all the dregs of the continents, and whose various salts and chemical reagents are abundantly sufficient to correct all their destructive powers, and prevent them from breathing up out of that watery sepulchre an atmosphere of poison and of plague.

Thus the sea is the scavenger of the world. Its agency is omnipresent. Its vigilance is omniscient. Where no sanitary committee could ever come, where no police could ever penetrate, its myriad eyes are searching, and its million hands are busy exploring all the lurking-places of decay, bearing swiftly off the dangerous sediments of life, and laying them a thousand miles away in the slimy bottom of the deep. And while all this is done with such silence and secrecy that it attracts no notice, yet the results in the aggregate are immense beyond conception. More than a thousand million tons of the sediment of the lands, mixed with this material of disease and death, is borne from either continent to the sea by the river-flow of a single summer. All the ships and railroads of the world, and all the men and animals of the world, working together upon this great sanitary toil, could not accomplish what is thus silently and easily accomplished by the sea.

And besides this mechanical process of drainage, by which the decay of the continents is continually washed from the lands and swept into the caverns of the deep, there is another important process by which the sea itself, in its own domain, is perpetually working for the health of the world. It is set to purify the atmosphere; and so the winds, whose wings are heavy and whose breath is sick with the malaria of the lands over which they have blown, are sent out to range over these mighty pastures of the deep, to plunge and play with its rolling billows, and dip their pinions over and over in its healing waters. There they rest when they are weary, cradled into sleep on that vast swinging couch of the ocean. There they rouse themselves when they are refreshed, and, lifting its waves upon their shoulders, they dash it into spray with their hands,

and hurl it backwards and forwards through a thousand leagues of sky, until their whole substance being drenched, and bathed, and washed, and winnowed, and sifted through and through by this glorious baptism, they fill their mighty lungs once more with the sweet breath of ocean, and striking their wings for the shore, go breathing health and vigor along all the fainting hosts that wait for them in mountain and forest and valley and plain, till the whole drooping continent lifts up its rejoicing face and mingles its laughter with the sea that has waked it from its fevered sleep and poured such tides of returning life through all its shrivelled arteries.

Thus, both by its mechanical and its chemical powers, is the sea set for the healing of the nations. It veins the earth with healthful blood and feeds its nostrils with the breath of life. It cleanses it from the corruption of its own decay, repairs the waste and weakness of its growing age, keeps its brow pure and sparkling as the sapphire sky, thrills its form with the pulse of eternal youth, and fires it with the flush of eternal beauty.

4. It may be mentioned, as a fourth office of the sea, that it is set to furnish the great natural pathways of the world. Perhaps one of the first impressions in looking upon the sea is, that it is a great barrier between the nations; that it puts the continents much further asunder than they would otherwise be; and that thus it acts as an unsocializing force, hindering the intercourse of the world. The truth lies in just the opposite direction. Instead of a barrier, the sea is a road across the barrier; instead of putting the ends of the earth further apart, it brings them nearer together; instead of being an unsocializing and an alienating force between them, it is the surest means of their acquaintance, and the most effectual bond of their fellowship.

Water is indeed a treacherous element, and will not, like the solid land, bear the foot of man or the hoof of beast; and so, when they come to its borders in river, lake, or sea, both man and beast instinctively turn back as they would from a wall of rock or a circle of fire. The sea, therefore, is

to that extent a barrier, that it lays instant restraint upon human travel in its primitive method and its freest detail. It does draw a decisive boundary around a nation, and keep its main population in on every side. But this is, in itself, a blessing. For boundaries are necessary to give individuality to nations, as they are to give individuality to men. There must be an outline to their personality; and the firmer that outline is drawn, the greater vigor of character, and the deeper intensity of life they are likely to possess. The sea, therefore, first defines a nation to itself, fills it up with the refluxence and reaction of its own proper life; and then, when it has reached a certain height and fulness, opens the door and lets it forth to find the life of other nations, and feel the brotherhood of the world. Hence, other things being equal, the strongest nations in civilized history have always been the insular or peninsular ones, like England, Italy, and Greece, which, using the sea in the beginning as a separation from other lands, and making it a boundary, a barrier, and a defence, have by it been able so to compress and compact their own energies that they have, at last, become strong enough to burst the ocean barrier that surrounded them, and then to employ the sea itself as an arm of power to reach and subsidize the ends of the earth. For while man cannot tread the sea with his foot, he can travel it by his hand; and when his hand becomes strong enough to lay the keel and spread the sail, and his art is cunning enough to poise the needle and map the stars of the sky, then the sea lays all its breadth beneath him, brings all the winds of heaven to his help, unlocks the gates of distant continents to his approach, and pours the riches of the globe at his feet.

Thus, as in so many other instances, that which was at first a hinderance, becomes at last a help and a blessing; for the very presence of the barrier suggests, provokes, and compels that development of skill and power by which the barrier may be overcome; and when it is overcome, then that which was at first a wall to bar all further progress, becomes a path of such breadth, and permanence, and ease of tread, as could not have been constructed by all the art and all the

strength of man. Hence the ocean has been the great educator of the world. It has furnished the prime stimulus of national energy, and has determined, in the beginning and for all time, the paths in which all great history must run. The course of empire began on its shores, and has always kept within sight of its waters. No great nation has ever sprung up except on the sea-side, or by the banks of those great navigable rivers which are themselves but an extension of the sea. Had it not been for the Mediterranean, the history of Egypt, of Phenicia, of Greece and Rome and Carthage, would have been impossible. Had it not been for the ocean itself, had the surface of the globe been one vast unbroken continent of land, the inhabitants on its opposite sides would have been practically as far apart as though they lived on different planets. All effective communication between remote parts of the world would have been impossible, for there would have been no highway between the nations. Only a system of railways, netting the world like the lines of latitude and longitude, could have made up for the want of the sea; and these could be furnished only as the latest and most wonderful result of that national development in wealth, power, and mechanical skill which is the fruit of a civilization that has already spanned the globe, and laid the resources of the world under contribution. Even with all the wealth, genius, and civilization which the world now contains, there is not a single railroad across either of the continents; but the broad path of the sea, that requires no building or repairing, has stretched between and around them ever since the creation of man. The railway is one of the last products of civilization and human skill, but a ship is one of the first; and so through all these thousands of years commerce has been moving on its way, first guiding its timid prow along the shores of the nations, then pushing its keel athwart the inland seas, and finally nailing its flag to the mast and laying its adventurous course right across the main ocean. Hence the sea has divided the lands only at last to bring them more closely together. It has made the nations strangers for a time, only to bring them at length

into a more intimate and helpful fellowship. The world has become acquainted with itself much more speedily and thoroughly than it could have done had it been all dry land; and so the wide channels of the deep have been but the needful spaces on which the vital forces of all the lands might meet and mix in one, and from which, as from a central heart, they might send the pulse of their mingled life beating steadily around the globe.

And what is true of the whole world in this respect, is equally true of each separate division of the earth. How much more rapidly was our own land explored and settled; how much more easily is it held and wielded by the civilized life that now occupies it, than would have been possible without the ocean border which girds it and the gulfs and bays and lakes and mighty streams, which are themselves the children of the sea, and which carry the ocean-paths for thousands of miles inland, even to the very base of the central mountains! How long would it have taken for all the civilization of the world combined to open such roads of entrance into the depths of this continent, as are furnished by the great chain of lakes which the sea has thrown, like a necklace, around our northern border, and by that equally stupendous river which it has sent up to meet them from the Gulf of Mexico on the south? By means of these great natural pathways, which God's hand had opened, the most interior recesses of the country could be penetrated at once; so that while the land was yet an unbroken wilderness, hundreds of years before plank roads and railways could have pushed the westward wave of civilization over the Alleghany hills, these great liquid roads which the sea had builded, were stretching their silver pavements for a thousand miles on every side, ready to convey the explorer or the emigrant from the ocean to the mountains, and from the mountains to the ocean, and to pour into the inmost heart of the continent the floating commerce of the world.

5. A fifth office of the sea is to furnish an inexhaustible storehouse of *power* for the world. The two greatest available powers known to man, are those of running water and

steam; and both these come out of the sea; the former being the mere mechanical weight of the rivers falling from the uplands to the ocean, and returning to it the treasures which they have received from it through the sky, and the latter being the expansive force of water under the application of heat. And as these two are the greatest, so they are the most enduring, powers; they will last until the rains cease to fall from the clouds, until the forests are hewn from the mountains, and the treasures of coal are all dug from the depths of the earth.

Of the three great departments of labor which occupy the material industry of the race — agriculture, commerce, and manufactures — we have seen how the first two depend on the ocean, the one for the rains which support all vegetable life, the other for the thousand paths on which its fleets are travelling. We now find that the third one also, though at first appearing to have no very intimate connection with the ocean, does in fact owe to it almost the whole of its efficiency. Ninety-nine hundredths of all the mechanical power now at work in the world, is furnished by the water-wheel and the steam-engine. Ninety-nine hundredths, therefore, of all the manufacture of the world is wrought by the sea. The ocean is not that idle creature which it seems, with its vast and lazy length stretched between the continents, with its huge bulk sleeping along the shore, or tumbling in aimless fury from pole to pole. It is a giant, who leaves his oozy bed and comes up upon the land to spend his strength in the service of man. With power enough to carry off the gates of the continents, and to dash the pillars of the globe in pieces, he allows his captors to chain him in prisons of stone and iron, to bind his shoulders to the wheel, and set him to grind the food of the nations and weave the garments of the world. The mighty shaft which that wheel turns, runs out into all the lands; and geared and belted to that centre of power, ten thousand times ten thousand clanking engines roll their cylinders, and ply their hammers, and drive their million shuttles, till the solid planet shakes with the concussion, and the sky itself is

deafened with the roar. It is the sea that keeps all your mills and factories in motion. It is the sea that spins your thread and weaves your cloth. It is the sea that cuts your iron bars like wax, rolls them out into paper-thinness, or piles them up in the solid shaft strong enough to be the pivot of a revolving planet. It is the sea that tunnels the mountain and bores the mine, and lifts the coal from its sunless depths and the ore from its rocky bed. It is the sea that lays the iron track, that builds the iron horse, that fills his nostrils with fiery breath, and sends his tireless hoofs thundering across the longitudes. It is the sea that fashions the leviathan ship, forges its thousand plates, drives its million bolts, pushes its reluctant bulk from the stocks, like a floating island broken from the mainland, and sends it from shore to shore, a nation on its decks, a continent in its sides, and the arms of ten thousand Titans heaving the vast machinery in its bosom. In short, it is the power of the sea which is doing for man all those mightiest works that would be else impossible. It is by this that he is to level the mountains, to tame the wilderness, to subdue the continents, to throw his pathways around the globe, and make his nearest approaches to omnipresence and omnipotence. If the ocean were to be dried up, the right arm of his power would be withered ; the wheels of all progress would stop, and the wave of civilization would instantly roll back a whole century. No earthly force or combination of forces now known could supply a ten-thousandth part of the deficiency. Man's greatest strength lies in that weakest of all known substances — water. The sinews of the world are laid in the sea, and the tides and billows of its ever restless surface are but the swell and play of those mighty muscles that could tear the continents from their roots and hurl the mountains from one pole to the other.

6. A sixth office of the sea is to be a vast storehouse of life. We have considered the ocean, hitherto, as ministering to the life that exists on the land, giving sustenance and strength to plants, animals, and men. But it does something more. The objects of its ministry do not thus lie, all

of them, out of its own boundaries. The sea has a whole world of life in itself. It spreads its table, first of all, for its own children, and these other gifts which it makes to the lands, royal and munificent as they are, are but the superfluities and remainders that are left from its table and wardrobe, after all its own inhabitants are housed and nourished, and clothed, and fed. It is said that the life in the sea far exceeds all that exists out of it. There are more than twenty-five thousand distinct species of living beings that inhabit its waters. There are more than eight thousand species of fish, and some of these swarm in such innumerable millions, that often they "move in columns that are several leagues in width and many fathoms thick; and this vast stream of life continues to move past the same given point for whole months together. Incredible numbers of them are taken from the sea: in Norway four hundred millions of a single species in a single season; in Sweden, seven hundred millions; and by other nations, numbers without number." But those that are taken bear only a small proportion to those that remain of the very same species, while the whole of these species themselves are but a fraction of the entire population of the larger marine life; and this entire population of larger life, again, is but a drop of the bucket compared to the various forms of microscopic and animalcular life with which immense tracts of the ocean are filled. These animalcules are some of them so small that it would take forty thousand of them to measure an inch in length, and so closely crowded together that a large drop of water contains five hundred millions; *i. e.*, half as many as there are human inhabitants on the whole globe.

It is not necessary to ask whether all this infinitude of life is meant for the use of man, or whether it has anything whatever to do in promoting his comfort or providing his food. It is certain that many of the larger forms of marine life are intended for his benefit, and are fitted for his use. Whole tribes of men derive almost their entire sustenance from the sea. The inhabitants of the polar regions draw

their support more from this source than from all others combined. The same is true of the savage tribes on many of the islands of the Pacific, and along some of the shores of the continents. Even civilized lands levy immense contributions on the life of the sea. Many thousands of vessels are employed in taking fish of various kinds from its waters, and uncounted millions of them are sent into every part of the world; so that the sea is full of God's riches, if we consider it only as a vast storehouse of food for man.

But all the life of the sea does not need to be designed for man in order to explain its use. Life is its own use; and wherever it exists, and in proportion as it exists, it is, in itself considered, the proof and illustration of the goodness of God. It is one of the noble uses of the sea, therefore, that it furnishes the dwelling-place for such an inconceivable immensity of life. It is even more full of God's goodness than it is of his power; for while the latter requires larger masses for its exhibition, the former is best seen by examining the minutest portion. Nothing is more powerless than a single drop of water; and yet, by placing this single drop under the microscope, we discover the character of vast masses of the ocean, and learn that in every one of these little globes of inhabited sea-water there is literally a whole continent of happy beings that draw their existence from God, wait upon him for food, and receive their daily sustenance at his hand.

7. The last use of the sea which I shall mention, is what may be called the geological one. I mention it last, and as the culminating view, because it brings into sight the impressive element of time, and sends us back to that gigantic history of the past when the forces of the sea, which are now in comparatively feeble play, were set to their Titanic task, and wrought out those stupendous results which belong to the very framework of Nature itself, and which will endure till the very substance of the globe is dissolved. God has appointed the sea to be the architect of the world. It has quarried the materials

and brought them to their place, and then with its building tool and dressing hammer it has given them shape, and piled them, layer above layer, for the walls of the great house of life.

There is the clearest evidence that every part of the known earth has been, successively and for unnumbered ages, under the dominion of the sea. When the cooling crust of the globe had become one unbroken sphere of granite rock, then the waters were let in upon it by Jehovah's hand, to join, with fire and frost and moving ice, and all the forces of the volcano and the earthquake, in tearing asunder this quarry of the continents — disintegrating, grinding, pulverizing and sifting, till the sands and limes and clays and various earths were separated from their rocky prison, assorted each after its kind, carried a thousand miles by mighty currents, spread out over the bottom of the deep, cemented firmly in their place by pressure, heat, and inward chemistry, piled story above story, till they were many thousands and many ten-thousands of feet in thickness; and so the great house of the world being built and finished and furnished beneath the sea, with endless stores of all things needful, — coal, and iron, and marble, and copper, and gold, — it felt the uplifting hand of God, and rose into the sky, parting the ocean from pole to pole, a mighty continent, with mountain, and valley, and river, and plain, soon green and golden, from side to side, with grass and grain, and forest and flower; a house not made with hands, high as the heavens, deep as the centre, wide as the firmament, bright as the light; a glorious habitation, waiting for the footstep, the eye, and the voice of its great coming master — man.

Having thus considered some of the material uses by which the sea proclaims the wisdom and goodness of its Maker, let us notice one or two of those qualities by which it more directly suggests his being, and brings near to us the sense of his presence and power.

“The sea is *his*,” says the Psalmist; and we may take the emphasis of that assertion as if it meant that in some sense

he claimed exclusive possession of the sea ; that he gave the land to man, but in a manner reserved the ocean as his own domain. And it is so. Man's dominion is the solid land. There he rears his habitation, hews down the forests, upturns the hills, fills the valleys, spreads his waving harvests, lays his roads of stone and iron like net-work across a whole continent, plants cities that last for thousands of years, changes the face of Nature herself so that she can never regain the lost expression, and when he dies builds monuments over his dust of such magnitude that they might be seen from another planet, and of such endurance that they defy all the ravages of time, and live till the globe itself is consumed.

And this is the impression which is made upon the traveller, whether in the Old World or in the New : that the land is given to man ; that it is possessed by man ; and that wherever he goes, there is something which speaks to him of man. In the older continent, the vast cities, the unnumbered populations, the immeasurable culture, the mighty ruins, everything testifies of man ; almost everything which the eye can see has felt his power, and shows upon itself the mark of his hand. Almost every particle of that ancient dust has been trodden by his foot, and been tributary to his life. And as the Old World speaks of man, and tells where he *has been*, so the New World speaks of him, and tells where he *shall be*. In the forests of the Mississippi, a thousand miles beyond the outmost cities, the sound of the axe and the gun declare that the all-conquering wave of civilization is coming ; and a thousand miles further on, where even these prophetic sounds have not been heard, there is that which speaks of human approach. The stillness which is there is the stillness of fear, and not of security. It tells that man is coming. The very silence is full of his name. The trees whisper it to one another. The fox and the panther utter it in their cry. The winds take up the secret, and give it to the hills, and these to the echoing vales. The fountains publish it to the brooks, and the brooks to the rivers, and the rivers spread it a thousand miles along

their banks, and proclaim it at last to the northern seas — that man, the conqueror and king, is coming ; that his footstep has been heard on the Atlantic shore ; that the hills await him ; that the vales expect him ; that the forests bend their tremulous tops to listen for him ; that the fear of him is upon the beasts of the wood, the fowl of the mountain, the cattle of a thousand hills ; upon all rivers and plains, upon all quarries of rock and mines of precious ore ; for all that is within the compass of the land is given to his dominion, and he shall subdue its strength and appropriate its treasure, and scatter the refuse of it as the dust beneath his feet.

But there man's empire stops. God has given the land to man, but the sea he has reserved to himself : " the sea is *his*, and he made it." He has given man " no inheritance in it ; no, not so much as to set his foot on." If he enters its domain, he enters it as a pilgrim and a stranger. He may pass over it, but he can have no abiding place upon it. He cannot build his house, nor so much as pitch his tent within it. He cannot mark it with his lines, nor subdue it to his uses, nor rear his monuments upon it. If he has done any brilliant exploit upon its surface, he cannot perpetuate the memory of it by erecting so much as an arch or a pillar. It steadfastly refuses to own him as its lord and master. It is not afraid of him, as is the land. Its depths do not tremble at his coming. Its waters do not flee when he appeareth. When it hears of him, then it laughs him to scorn. All the strength of all his generations is to it as a feather before the whirlwind, and all the noise of his commerce and all the thunder of his navies it can hush in a moment within the silence of its impenetrable abysses. Whole armies have gone down into that unfathomable darkness, and not a floating bubble marks the place of their disappearing. If all the populations of the world, from the beginning of time, were cast into its depths, the smooth surface of its oblivion would close over them in an hour ; and if all the cities of the earth and all the structures and monuments that were ever reared by man, were heaped together over that grave for a tomb-

stone, it could not break the surface of the deep, and lift back their memory to the light of the sun and the breath of the upper air; the sea would still clap his hands in triumph over them, and roll the billows of his derision a thousand fathoms above the topmost stone of that mighty sepulchre. The patient earth submits to the rule of man, and the mountains bow their rocky heads before the hammer of his power and the blast of his terrible enginery. But the sea cares not for him; not so much as a single hair's breadth can its level be lowered or lifted by all the art, and all the effort, and all the enginery of all the generations of time. The land tells of man because his footprints are there, and his marks and monuments are on every side. But the sea does not tell of him, for he can build no monuments upon its domain. Though he travel a thousand years upon the same path, he leaves upon it no footprint to tell where he has been. Nor can he, with all his skill, fix upon it any mark of ownership. It steadfastly refuses to receive any impression or keep any memorial of him. He comes and goes upon it, and a moment after, it is as if he had never been there. He may engrave his titles upon the mountain-top, and quarry his signature into the foundations of the globe; but he cannot write his name on the sea.

And with this is connected that other feature of the sea which marks its reservation to God: I mean its *loneliness*. One who has never travelled upon it expects to find it somewhat thickly populated. He thinks of the vast traffic and travel that goes over the waters, and he is ready to imagine that the great deep is alive with this hurrying to and fro of the nations. He reads of the lands "whose commerce whitens every sea," and he is ready to think that the ocean itself is as full of sails as the harbor of some mighty metropolis. But he finds his mistake. As he leaves the land the ships begin to disappear. As he goes on his way they soon all vanish, and there is nothing about him but the round sea and the bended sky. Sometimes he may meet or overtake a solitary ship during the day; but then, again, there will be many days when not a single sail will cross the

horizon. The captain of the Adriatic told us that he had repeatedly made voyages across the Atlantic and not seen a single ship between soundings. We asked him if it was on the ordinary line of travel. He replied that it was on the great highway of commerce between the two hemispheres. When we reflect that all the travelling that is done upon the seas is confined to a very few paths, and that those paths cover but an infinitesimal part of the whole surface of the ocean, this loneliness of the sea becomes astonishing and overwhelming. There are spaces measured by thousands and thousands of miles, over which no ship has ever passed. The idea of a nation's commerce whitening every sea is the wildest fancy. If all the ships that have ever been built were brought together into a single fleet, they would fill but a handbreadth of the ocean. The space, therefore, that man and his works occupy on the sea, is as small in extent as the hold he has on it by his power is slight and superficial. Both together are as nothing. Both together must always be as nothing. The ocean covers three-fourths of the surface of the globe, and by far the greatest part of this vast expanse is and ever has been entirely free from his presence and visitation.

And it is this vastness, this loneliness, and this impossibility of subjugation by man, that set it apart from the secular aspect that belongs to the rest of the world, and consecrate it as the peculiar possession and dwelling-place of the Most High. Like some vast builded temple, it perpetually speaks of him and for him. It bodies forth his immensity. It represents eternity. Girded round all the lands, as death is girded around all life, it seems to bring the unseen world to our vision, and to sound and shine with the glory and the awfulness of that state which is beyond the grave. Traveling out into its vastness, we seem to be moving beyond the boundaries of space and time. Sailing on, day after day, without any apparent progress, never reaching the horizon that is before, never leaving the horizon that is behind, it is as if we had lost all connection with the earth which we inhabit, and were voyaging upon the infinite expanse of the

skies, travelling to some world that lies beyond the stars of heaven. The strangeness of this sensation becomes perplexing and oppressive. It is almost as if we had quitted life itself, and the winds of eternity had taken our sails and were blowing us over the sea of death towards the throne of God and the bar of the judgment. A feeling of the supernatural begins to steal upon us. Familiar sights and sounds take on a weird and mystical significance. We look at one another, and in our reverie wonder if we are not already disembodied spirits. We look at the ship, and wonder if some unseen hands are not grasping its keel, holding it to its course, and lifting it from billow to billow. We look at the engines, and wonder if they are not a kind of archangels of the deep, prisoned to their task, and bowing to one another with some secret intelligence as they lay their mighty shoulders to the wheels and push the trembling vessel along its path. We look at the sun, and it seems to shake its beams upon us with a new and strange significance. We look at the stars by night, and they seem to be nearer to us, and to be gazing upon us as with longing eyes, and with a more fixed and solemn earnestness. We look at the track of the ship, and it is a wake of sparkling fires, as if our bark had left at length the seas of earth behind it, and were sailing over the ocean of the firmament. We have forgotten time ; we are thinking of eternity. We have forgotten man ; we are thinking of God. The bondage of the senses is dissolved, and the things that are beyond them come breaking into our being. The earth which we have left behind us seems as far away as if it were another planet, and the themes that used to lie beyond the planets find easy entrance to our thoughts, and rule us with a strange and sudden dominion. The petty interests that engrossed us a while ago are shrunk to nothingness. The eagerness of anticipation, the excitement of departure are all forgotten, as the departed soul forgets the pain, the restlessness, and the fear of the dying-bed, when the shores of a receding world fade out of its sight, and the strange calm of that vast, new ocean of life over which it is sailing, takes possession of its con-

sciousness. We are alone with God. We are walking in his temple, and it would scarcely surprise us if we should see him riding upon the clouds, or descending upon the deep, and moving towards us in his chariot of the waters.

In speaking thus of God's presence on the sea, I do not mean to imply that he is not also on the land, or that the earth does not contain abundant indications of his presence. I only speak of those things which mark the ocean as in some respects the place of his peculiar dwelling and the sphere of his special manifestation. We know that the earth is full of his works; that his footprints are upon every plain and mountain, the mark of his fingers on all its fields and forests and streams. Yet we cannot help saying and feeling that his dwelling-place is in the heavens, because of its vastness, its omnipresence, and its separation from man. We involuntarily look up to the sky when we refer to him. We point thither when we would indicate his residence; as if, though the earth is his footstool, and the place where his works are wrought, still the heavens were his habitation, and there he had his throne and peculiar dwelling. So, in lesser measure, is it with the sea. Its vastness, its omnipresence, and its separation from the presence and power of man, set it apart as the symbol of God, the temple of his abode, and the place of his special manifestation. It is to the land which it embosoms what the sky is to the whole globe which it encircles: it is a sky beneath the sky, touching the earth with a more solid grasp than that, and surrounding it with a more palpable firmament. And as the sky would have a vaster mystery if we could sail over it as we sail upon the sea, so the sea *has* a vaster mystery because we can sail over it and find it a more palpable sky, only with its arch inverted and its firmament under our feet. The sky is distant, but the sea is near. We can walk down to the shore and lay our hand upon its waters; and when we do so, we feel as if we touched the feet of Jehovah; as if we saw the very fields of immensity and eternity, and held within our

grasp the lines that bound us to another life. And it is this which gives the sea its mystery and might, that it is fraught with these divine elements; that it is charged with these spiritual suggestions; that it is the symbol of eternity and infinity, and crowds upon us, with irresistible majesty, the vision of that life unseen, and those worlds unknown, for which our souls are made, and to which the feet of every one of us are swiftly and irreversibly travelling. There is a sea within us which responds to the sea without. Deep calleth unto deep, and it is the answer and the yearning of these inward waves, in reply to that outward call, which makes our hearts to swell, our eyes to grow dim with tears, and our whole being to lift and vibrate with such strong emotion when we stand upon the shore and look out upon the deep, or sit in the stern of some noble ship and feel ourselves cradled on the pulsations of its mighty bosom. There is a life within us which calls to that sea without — a conscious destiny which only *its* magnitude and *its* motion can symbolize and utter. There is that in man which draws him to the sea by some secret spell, whose attraction he cannot resist or master. There is a deep, eternal brotherhood between him and the rolling ocean. Though it scorns his power, and will not take his chain nor bear his handwriting, nor even his very presence except as a pilgrim and stranger, it still links itself to him by ties that are stronger than steel, and that draw him towards it from cities and forests, from the tops of mountains and the depths of midland deserts. Though he have never looked upon it, and dwells thousands of miles away from it, still it is a reality, a presence, and a power unto him. He thinks of it by day; he dreams of it by night. In his imagination he fashions its shores, pours its mighty tides around the land, stretches its azure expanse like the sky, pushes his bark upon its waves, loosens the winds upon its sounding billows, and sweeps out from the fading headlands to lose himself in the dread immensity, and find himself alone with the sea and its Maker.

Hence, in a season of calm weather,
Though inland far we be,
Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
Which brought us hither;
Can in a moment travel thither,
And see the children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.

And as the sea, which thus speaks to man, repels and draws him, stirring his inmost being with the urgency of these mighty contradictions; so is it with that God whom the sea declares, whose pavilion is upon its floods, whose chariot rides upon its waves, and the beams of whose chambers are laid upon its waters. Between him and fallen man there is a repulsion and an attraction, which rests upon a far deeper basis, and stirs the soul with the sense of a far profounder contradiction. Needing him and yet fearing him, drawn by his infinite goodness and driven back again by his infinite holiness, man alternately flies toward him, and flees from him; until, these conflicting forces that play between the creature and the Creator being reconciled at the cross of Christ, they flow together, sea to sea and soul to soul, and the joy of their union is like the gladness of the waters when the ocean receives to its bosom the streams of the world, and the noise of their jubilee rolls round the globe.

And so, by its material uses and its spiritual voices, does the sea ever speak to us to tell us that its builder and maker is God. He hewed its channels in the deep, and drew its barriers upon the sand, and cast its belted waters around the world. He fitted it to the earth and the sky, and poised them skilfully the one against the other, when he "measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance." He gave the sea its wonderful laws, and armed it with its wonderful powers, and set it upon its wonderful work.

O'er all its breadth his wisdom walks,
On all its waves his goodness shines.

Let us give thanks, therefore, for the sea. Let us remember him that gave it such vast dominion, and made it to be not only the dwelling-place of his awful presence, but the beautiful garment of his love and the mighty instrument of his goodness. Let it speak to us of his unfathomable fulness. Let it teach us that he has made nothing in vain. Let it remind us that the powers of destruction and death are under his control, and that behind the cloud of darkness and terror that often invests them, they are working out immeasurable results of blessing and life for the future time, for distant regions, and for coming generations. Let it lead us to confide in him who "ruleth the raging of the seas, who stilleth the noise of their waves and the tumult of the people;" who has all the forces of the world at his control, and all the ages of time at his command; who knows how to build his kingdom beneath the sea of human opposition, as he built the continents beneath the ocean waters; who makes all the powers of dislocation and decay yield to that kingdom some element of strength or richness; and who, when the appointed hour shall come, will lift it irresistibly above the waves, and set its finished beauty beneath the heavens, with the spoils of all time gathered upon its walls, and the nations of the saved walking in its glory.

ARTICLE VI.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

WITHINGTON'S COMMENTARY ON THE SONG OF SOLOMON.¹

It is with much pleasure that we call the reader's attention to Dr. Leonard Withington's Commentary on the Song of Solomon. Of this work, the most important part, occupying 222 pages, is what the venerable author styles "*The Manuduction*," by which he intimates, as we suppose, that its office is to take the reader, as it were, by the hand, and introduce him to an acquaintance with the principles of this divine allegory, and the hidden meaning which lies under it. The reader who is familiar with Dr. Withington's previously published writings will not be surprised to find in this "*Manuduction*" a wide range of topics. He manifestly starts from the principle announced by Cicero, that "all the arts which pertain to human culture have a certain common bond, and are held together, as it were, by a certain relationship to each other."² On p. 107, sq., is a discussion respecting the foundation of virtue. Further on, pp. 133—139, we find some very interesting and instructive remarks on the theory of verbal inspiration, to which the author, with much force of argument, objects, "because it does not place the authority of the Bible high enough." Then again we have, p. 187, sq.; a pretty severe flagellation of the metaphysicians, in which the author's sparkling and epigrammatic style appears in all its perfection. Take the following as a specimen :

"Men are always forming systems, drawing nice lines, in morals as well as mathematics; they are fond of points without magnitude, and lines without breadth and thickness; and from these fixed ideas they hope to draw certain demonstrations. But it is not so in the kingdom of nature. Look round the world. Who can tell us where the sea commences and the dry land ends? How high must the swelling mound be to pass from a hill into a mountain? When does a shrub rise into a tree, and what is the difference between an elegant house and a palace? Is New Holland an island or a continent, or are the Bermuda islands in the West Indies or not? Nature delights to make her works perfectly obvious without nice lines, and she seems to say to man, You must understand me on these conditions." pp. 187, 188.

And again: "Revelation is for the people, not for the few. When we consider that mankind at large have neither patience nor ability to under-

¹ Solomon's Song: Translated and Explained, in Three Parts: I. The Manuduction; II. The Version; III. The Supplement. By Leonard Withington, Senior Pastor of the First Church in Newbury, Mass. ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ᾔφελεϊ οὐδέν. Boston: J. E. Tilton and Company, 161 Washington Street. 1861.

² Etenim omnes artes, quae ad humanitatem pertinent habent quoddam commune vinculum, et quasi cognatione inter se continentur. — *Pro Archia Poeta*.

stand these nice distinctions, we may well rejoice in the Mercy that, in pitying our hearts, has pitied our intellects, and has condescended to clothe the words of salvation in a vesture of light." — p. 192.

After all this, and much more in the same strain, he turns round, pp. 221, 222, and assures the reader that "it is far from the object of these remarks to depreciate the study of metaphysics;" that "perhaps there are no writers to whom, on the ground of collateral utility the world owes so much as to metaphysicians;" that, although "they uniformly travel a road that leads to nothing," "it does not follow that their speculations have been useless," since the sum of all their investigations, concerning those absolute ideas which the metaphysician seeks, comes to this: We know, first, that they must exist, and, secondly, we know we never can find them. "This teaches us the amplitude of knowledge, and gives us a lesson of humility."

But alongside of these and other like digressions, the reader will find in the "Manuduction" all the great questions that have an immediate bearing upon the interpretation of the Song of Solomon very fully and ably discussed. He plants his feet on the ancient ground taken by the Christian Church from the beginning, that this Song is a divine allegory, shadowing forth the love that exists between Christ, the heavenly Bridegroom, and his church, which is "the bride, the Lamb's wife;" and this ground he maintains in a thorough and able way.

One of the strongest of his arguments is that drawn from the analogy of scripture:

"If," he says, "this Song were the only place where this imagery is used, the difficulty of deciding would be greatly increased. But it is the favorite figure. God is perpetually the husband of his people. As a king he is also a bridegroom, and his inauguration on his throne is his marriage with his people. The imagery is carried out; he is a jealous God; he is jealous of his people. They go a *whoring* from him by idolatry; and some of the most daring pantomimes are acted by the holy prophets to impress these oriental views." — p. 31.

He refers especially to the transaction recorded in the beginning of Hosea, which he takes as "a scenic illustration," and to the numerous other passages in which the same figure is carried out, in both the Old and the New Testaments. Of the forty-fifth Psalm, which stands in the closest relation to the Canticles, he says:

"It is curious, however, to see how all critics meet the double sense" — that is, the higher application of the Psalm, covered as a *ὁμολογία* under the literal imagery — "whatever path they choose to take. Such, then, being the obviousness of a double sense, that even the destructive critic is obliged to confess it, and such being the barren meaning which those are driven to who do not apply the *ὁμολογία* to Christ, the believer in real revelation regards the Psalmist as here predicting the glories of the Messiah. The imagery is abundantly of the erotic kind. . . . This is the same luxuriant imagery that is to be found in the Canticles, — the scented garments, the myrrh, the cassia, and the foreign bride that is to forget her father's house,

— and it is sealed to the Messiah in the same way, not by an explicit interpretation, but by the magnificent promises in the last verse: ‘I will make thy name to be remembered in all generations; therefore shall the people praise thee for ever and ever.’” — pp. 35, 36.

Dr. Withington is peculiarly happy in his power of grasping and setting forth the grand central idea of this Song, which is the exhibition of religion under the form of a divine passion, — a personal love-union between the Redeemer and his people, — and in showing how this meets the deepest want of fallen humanity.

“There is one question which meets almost every sinner in his struggles with his own soul: How shall I get the will? How shall I form the purpose of obeying God? I am told that the duties of religion are easy to him who once has a disposition; but how shall I get that disposition? How shall I conquer my own heart?

“Now, this book answers that question as far as it can be answered. It shows there is revealed to the regenerate heart a new passion; a love stronger than death, which makes all duty easy. Self denial is lost in the voluntary sacrifice. The soul, divorced from its grovelling passions, is devoted to the heavenly bridegroom. It is borne on by the whole of its new nature to a delightful obedience. The beauty of Christ being revealed to the soul, the corresponding passion springs up in the heart, and, like a resistless stream, draws every faculty and power into its channel. It cannot disobey; the love of Christ constrains it.” — pp. 45, 46.

What he says of “Divine Love as an intellectual and informing passion,” — of the power of a worldly passion, on the one hand, to blind the intellect, and of the enlightening influence, on the other hand, of a pure affection, p. 95, sq., — is very beautiful and pertinent; but our limits will not permit us to make further quotations, either on this point, or on what he has said of “the use of the imagination,” the so-called “double sense,” and “the dramatic element in interpreting the Bible.” One sentence more only we will add, which has a bearing on a common objection urged against this book. “Objections,” he says, “have been made to this Song, as being too luscious in its imagery, and leaning to the sensual side, but surely by critics who never put their antique shoes on.” We commend to the reader this sentence and what follows, pp. 168—170, where we think that, for a pure mind, the author meets and answers this objection in a manner at once brief and thorough.

On pp. 91—94 are some remarks on the different constitutional tastes of different minds, that are well worth pondering. The author tells us he is far from thinking that a man is not a Christian because he does not relish this book. Before he presents it to him with the least hope of profit, he wishes to know the type of his piety. Some minds have no relish for its beautiful conceptions. For them the Bible has other portions. But other minds must have one such book as this for their comfort and edification. Let them enjoy it.

In the above remarks we have purposely abstained from expressing any

opinion on the author's assumption that the heroine whose marriage to Solomon gave, as he supposes, occasion to this divine allegory was not, as many have supposed, an Egyptian princess, but "a rural lass, having that mixture of rusticity and refinement which marks the daughter of some sheik, — just such qualities as would now characterize an Arab princess." — p. 7. Of the scope of this Song we are more certain than of its occasion. It may or may not have had, on the human side, a special historic origin. But even if it did, the Shulamite whose praises it celebrates is raised by the process of idealizing far above any mortal woman, and has qualities and actions ascribed to her that are very appropriate and beautiful, taken allegorically, but very strange and extravagant upon any literal interpretation.

The second part of Dr. Withington's work, entitled "*The Version*," occupies only 50 pages, or not one fourth part of the space allotted to "*The Manuduction*." To the last named part the reader must look for a full discussion of the principles upon which the Song of Solomon is to be interpreted. The author has proceeded upon the supposition that if these are correctly apprehended the main difficulty is overcome. The Commentary connected with the version is more *expository* than *exegetical*, laboring not so much to explain the grammatical meaning of particular words and phrases as to bring out the general scope and aim of the Song. The author's general plan is to give first the literal meaning, according to his hypothesis of an Arab princess, and then the spiritual sense that lies under it. This latter he has, we think, developed in an able and satisfactory manner. As a translation, this part of the work is not all that could be desired. The translator's office is to reproduce, as faithfully as possible, the Hebrew text in an English dress. It does not belong to him to sum up the meaning of the original in equivalent expressions, nor to interweave the version with his own explanations. Both these works belong to the *commentator*. The reader wishes first to know, as precisely as possible, what the original text says, and then he is ready to hear the expositor's explanations. For example: in ch. 7: 8, 9, the bridegroom thus addresses the bride: "This thy stature is like to a palm-tree, and thy breasts to grape clusters. I said, I will ascend into the palm-tree, I will take hold of the boughs thereof; and let now thy breasts be like clusters of the vine, and the smell of thy breath (literally, thy nose) like apples;"¹ — glowing imagery, no doubt, but pure, for it represents pure love. As the author has well said, p. 168, "So much ardor was never expressed in such refined language; that is, primitive refinement." In the version, however, he has "softened and generalized" this passage into the following: "Thy height is like the palm, and thy bosom like clustering grapes. I will taste that breath like the flavor of apples." Against this we protest, first, as being no translation; secondly, as injuring the cause which it is intended to help, and which, on p. 168, he has so ably vindicated.

¹ Verse 6, preceding this passage, is omitted entirely. Whether by oversight, or by the process of "softening and generalizing," we cannot say.

Again, the simple rendering of chap. 1 : 1, first clause, is, as in our version, "Let him kiss me with the kisses (בְּנִשְׁקָיוֹ, more literally, with some of the kisses) of his mouth." The translator says, "his sacred mouth;" correctly, no doubt, as an *expositor*, but not as a *translator*. Once more, chap. 5 : 9, he renders the words הַיָּפִיּוֹת בְּנָשִׁים, not as elsewhere, "O thou most beautiful of women," but "thou beauty," because, as he tells us in the notes, "we must suppose the word ironical." Whether the words be ironical or not, it is the office of the version to give them as they stand. On the same principle he renders these same words, chap. 6 : 1, "O thou fair among rustics;" and chap. 7 : 2 (7 : 1 of the English version) בַּת נָרִיב "O prince's daughter," he gives, "O daughter of a generous sheik;" by which rendering he makes Solomon responsible for his theory concerning the Shulamite.

There is another point on which we wish to add a word. The Hebrew accurately distinguishes the bridegroom from the bride; first, by the terms used, הָיָד, *beloved*, being constantly applied to him, and אֶחָבָהּ, *love*, רֵעָהּ, *female friend*, יוֹנָה, *dove*, בִּלְהָ, *spouse*, etc.,¹ to her; secondly, by its distinctions of gender. Here the author has sometimes failed through inadvertence. Thus, not to mention other instances, he ascribes chap. 2 : 14 to the *bride*; where a glance at the original shows that it is the language of the bridegroom addressing his bride.

Considering the great excellence of this Commentary as a whole, we confidently anticipate that a second edition will be speedily called for. In that the solid learning and fine taste of Dr. Withington will be well employed in correcting these defects of the version. Such a correction will add much to the completeness of his work.

The third part, entitled "*The Supplement*," consists mainly of a vigorous argument for the true doctrine of inspiration, as opposed to rationalism and the mythical hypothesis. But on this our limits do not permit us to dwell. We earnestly commend the book to the favor of the Christian public, and trust it will have an abundant circulation.

SERMONS AND MEMOIR OF PRESIDENT SMITH.*

PRESIDENT SMITH belonged to that class of men, never more needed than at the present day, who, at the commencement of professional life, take a position, and stand upon it with mingled wisdom, firmness, and perseverance, until the Great Taskmaster calls them to their rest. Such men, in the midst of the vacillations of society, constitute what in military phrase is

¹ The only apparent exception is the formula in Chap. 2 : 7, 3 : 5, 8 : 4, which should have been rendered, "*until she please*," as any one may see by consulting the original; and so it was translated in all the earlier English versions.

* Select Sermons of the Rev. Worthington Smith, D. D., late President of the University of Vermont. With a Memoir of his life, by Rev. Joseph Torrey, D. D. Andover: Warren F. Draper, 1861.

called a *point d'appui*, — a basis for operations both defensive and offensive. 4 In peaceful times, their strong, calm understanding and tranquil force pass unnoticed by the superficial eye, though all the while their influence is contributing to produce and preserve the very prosperity that somewhat conceals them from the public gaze, and allows the sciolist and charlatan to attract it. But in real emergencies, when reflection, foresight, prudence, and comprehensiveness are required, all eyes are turned to them, as those who hold the key to the difficult problem.

Dr. Smith, soon after graduating at Andover Theological Seminary in 1819, accepted an invitation to settle as pastor over a small and feeble church in St. Albans, Vt., upon the frontiers of the United States, and in a region all of whose institutions were then unformed and somewhat chaotic. Here he stood for a quarter of a century, impressing his opinions and spirit not only upon the church and town which were the immediate field of his labors, but also, to no small extent, upon the whole commonwealth itself. After this long pastorate, he was elected to the presidency of the University of Vermont. Into this difficult sphere of labor he brought enlarged and liberal views of education, united with an uncommonly generous and paternal spirit in the management of young men. The short period of six years which was allotted him by Providence, though not long enough to allow of the complete execution of his well-formed plans, was sufficient to demonstrate that the same talent for organizing and guiding, which had been so successful in the parish, would have produced like results in the college. In the commencement of this new career of usefulness, he was enfeebled by disease and cut down by death. Essentially a Roman in the structure and movements of his mind, the reputation which he has left behind him is massive and enduring. Probably no Vermont clergyman has inspired more general confidence in the integrity of his character, the probity of his motives, and the judiciousness of his plans.

The sermons of Dr. Smith which are published in this handsome volume, are a faithful exponent of the traits of his mind, and the elements of his education. Selected out of a very large number, without reference to intrinsic superiority over others, they are simply specimens of a sermonizing that was uniformly excellent. In this respect they are models for preachers. Dr. Smith never debilitated himself upon single discourses. The sermon, in his view of it, should be the even and spontaneous efflux of a mind constantly thinking, and steadily composing, as the weeks flow on. Of him it might with great truth be said, that one sermon was as excellent as another. Every Sabbath, he fed the people with knowledge and understanding.

The memoir of President Smith, by his friend and colleague Professor Torrey, is the narrative of the quiet life of a pastor and preacher and teacher. The biographic materials in such instances are of necessity few, and contain little that is dazzling or startling. But there is a deeper charm than that of outward incidents, — the charm of what Wordsworth would call the growth of an individual mind. This species of interest per-

vades the sketch prefixed to the volume, — a sketch which, it is needless to say, is everywhere marked by that perfect taste and plain sense which is the matured fruit of a most profound and pure culture.

DR. NAST'S COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TESTAMENT.¹

DR. NAST, of Cincinnati, is preparing an elaborate German Commentary on the New Testament. We have received seven numbers, bringing the work down to Matt. 24 : 22. The page is a large one, with closely printed double columns, and the seventh number closes with page 448. When we assure our readers that the style is neither diffuse nor wordy, that the sentences are neatly compacted, and the ideas expressed with commendable brevity, they can judge for themselves of the greatness of the labor expended upon the work, and the amount of information it must contain. The first 158 pages are occupied with the discussion of preliminary topics which, till recently, have been scarcely noticed in English commentaries, but which the skeptical criticism of the last half century has rendered absolutely necessary to any intelligent estimate of the Bible. Among these topics are the following: The ground on which the canon of the New Testament rests; The apostolic origin of the New Testament writings — external and internal evidence of it; Incorruptness of the New Testament text; Refutation of the so-called myth hypothesis; Historical credibility of the Gospels; One Jesus Christ the subject of the gospel history; The inspiration or divine authority of the New Testament; The relation of the New Testament to the Old; The interpretation of the Bible.

Each of these topics is discussed very fully, with competent learning, and with direct reference to the most recent developments of that school of skeptical criticism which, after having nearly played itself out in Germany, is beginning to start on a new career in England.

Dr. Nast possesses a combination of qualifications for this work which can scarcely be found united in any other man. Born and reared in Germany, and educated in one of the most celebrated of its universities (Tübingen), an intimate friend and for six years the classmate and roommate of the celebrated Dr. D. F. Strauss, he early became familiar with all the phases of Teutonic idealism, mysticism, and rationalism; and after his education there had been completed, he emigrated to America, was converted, and became a man of evangelical piety, realistic activity, and common sense. For about thirty years he has been laboring as a gospel minister in connection with the Methodists, and his labors have been abundant and most fruitful. The best results of all his learning and experience we have in the commentary before us. No more acceptable or useful present could he make to the land of his adoption. By all means the author should give us a good English edition of it.

¹ Kritisch praktischer Commentar ueber das Neue Testament von Wilhelm Nast, Doktor der Theologie. Cincinnati: Poe and Hitchcock.

ARTICLE VII.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

Of the literary activity of German scholars we are continually receiving fresh evidences. Though a larger proportion of their works have a popular character than was the case formerly, their contribution of erudite productions to the literature of the times is by no means inconsiderable. We have received the first half of Stähelin's *Life of Calvin* (*Johannes Calvin von E. Stähelin*), which makes a good octavo volume of 544 pages. This delicate and difficult undertaking has fallen into good hands. Except Jules Bonnet, the editor of Calvin's Letters, few persons, probably, are so well acquainted with the original sources of information respecting Calvin's life as this writer. In the art of arranging his materials, and executing his task as a biographer, he greatly excels his predecessor, Dr. Henry. In fact, the plan and character of the two works are so different, that they do not stand at all in each other's way. Henry's rich collection of materials will probably never lose its value; but he who wishes to see John Calvin placed before him just as he was, and to follow him closely through his career in life, will be thankful for such a guide as he will find in this volume.

The year 1860, being the three-hundredth since the death of Melancthon, was prolific in literary monuments to his memory. Of the many minor works setting forth his merits as a reformer in theology and literature, those of Czerwenka (*Melancthon nach seinem Leben und Wirken*), of Meurer (*Melancthon's Leben*), of Heppe (*Melancthon, der Lehrer Deutschlands*), of Thilo (*Melancthon in Dienste der heiligen Schrift*) and of Planck (*Melancthon Preceptor Germaniae*) are the best. Nothing, however, in this line, will be received with greater enthusiasm than the complete life of Melancthon by Professor Schmidt, which has just come from the press (*Melancthon, Leben und ausgewählte Schriften*. pp. 722, Ebberfeld, 1861). The biography is very properly more historical than theological. The method of treatment is similar to that adopted by the author in his life of Peter Martyr. There are no select works of Melancthon in the volume, as the title would lead one to expect, but interesting passages are interwoven with the narrative. There is no attempt to give a history of the Reformation, or an account of Luther, in this biography. Presupposing a knowledge of these subjects, the author wisely determined to present Melancthon's individuality to the reader, as distinctly and completely as possible. The chief prominence, therefore, is given to those scenes and events in which he was the principal actor.

Two biographies of Blaurer appeared during the last year, both founded on original investigations, the one by Prof. T. Keim (*Ambrosius Blaurer, der schwäbische Reformator*, pp. 156) being the briefer, the other, by Preussel (*Ambrosius Blaurer's des schwäbischen Reformators Leben und Schriften*, pp. 611) being much the larger, and more satisfactory to the student of history.

Professor Wilhelm Vischer's History of the University of Basle from its Origin in 1460 to the Reformation in 1529 (*Geschichte der Universität Basel von der Grundung 1460 bis zur Reformation 1529*) is a well-written volume. Being prepared with reference to the fourth centennial celebration of the founding of the University, which took place last year, it appears in a more splendid style of typographical execution than is usual in works of this nature. It is specially interesting to those who wish to know the state of learning from the beginning of the Revival of Letters to the Reformation. It gives glances also of several characters who figured in the Reformation.

Still more important is F. W. Kampschulte's University of Erfurt in its Relation to Classical Learning and the Reformation (*Die Universität Erfurt in ihrem Verhältnisse zu dem Humanismus und der Reformation*), in two small volumes, the first of which, entitled *Der Humanismus*, appeared in 1858; the second, entitled *Die Reformation*, in 1860. It is a work of German diligence, furnishing much new information, and embracing topics of absorbing interest. The flourishing school of *humanists* and Latin poets at Erfurt, and the studies of Luther in the midst of them, and his subsequent contests with the theologians of the university, lend a peculiar charm to the narrative. The first volume possesses the most novelty, inasmuch as Jürgens left less to be gleaned after him, on the subject of Luther, than was left by the writers who have treated of classical studies at Erfurt.

Von Polenz's valuable History of French Calvinism till the Revolution (*Geschichte des französischen Calvinismus bis zur Nationalversammlung i. J. 1789*) has reached to the third volume, part second. To a considerable extent, it follows manuscript authorities.

H. Heppe has just published two excellent volumes under the general title of Writings Relating to the Calvinistic Theology (*Schriften zur reformirten Theologie*). The first volume contains a collection of the Confessions of the Reformed Church of Germany, the second a systematic exhibition of the Calvinistic theology according to the teachings of the older theologians (*Die Dogmatik der evangelisch reformirten Kirche dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt*). Schweizer has given the Calvinistic theology in the garb of modern philosophy. Heppe has followed the method of Hase's *Hutterus Redivivus*, and has consequently given us the old Calvinistic orthodoxy in its purity, without mingling with it his own opinions. His method is "purely objective," as the Germans would say.

The second volume of Ranke's History of England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (*Englische Geschichte vornehmlich im sechszehnten und siebenzehnten Jahrhunderts*) will be welcomed by every lover of

history. It affords one true pleasure to contemplate England, in this important period of her history, as seen by the eye of a foreign, philosophical historian. Such a writer observes relations to other countries not noticed by the native historian. The period embraced in this volume extends from the latter part of the reign of James I. to the commencement of the civil war under Charles I.

Of Bernhardt's History of Greek Literature (*Grundriss der Grischischen Literatur*), the first volume of the third edition has made its appearance. It seems to be designed to go with the second edition of the other two volumes published in 1856 and 1859. This new volume, which is a greater improvement upon the second edition of the same than the second was upon the first, is wholly taken up with a general view of Greek literature through the entire period of its history. On this account it is the most interesting volume of the three for the general scholar.

In the second edition of the history of Grecian Philosophy, by Zeller, formerly noticed in this journal, there was a chasm of all that related to the philosophy of Aristotle. This is now supplied by a volume of 350 pages, and is one of the most important parts of the whole work.

Grässe, the author of the great work on the history of literature, and of the *Trésor de Livres Rares et Précieux*, has just published a very useful and valuable volume, entitled *Orbis Latinus*, or a dictionary of the Latin names of cities, countries, mountains, rivers, etc., of all parts of the world, with a complete German-Latin index.

A. Schleicher's German Language (*Die Deutsche Sprache*) is a critical and philosophical work in a popular form, differing in manner from Trench's various works on the English language by dealing more in principles, and less in details. In an elaborate introduction, occupying a third of the volume, he discusses the subject of language in general, the Indo-Germanic family of languages, the German, the High German, and the science of language. In the body of the work, there is a systematic view of the changes which the language underwent in passing from the older to the more modern forms. It is designed to aid the German student in understanding the old German, — that of the later middle ages, — and in tracing the history of the German words now in use. The laws of change, as applied to vowels and consonants, are more noticed than the forms of individual words.

K. Matthes's Ecclesiastical Chronicle for the year 1860, the seventh number of the series, gives a full account of the events of the year in the religious world, particularly in Germany.

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ARTICLE I.

A SKETCH OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

BY REV. DAVID C. SCUDDER, MISSIONARY OF A. B. C. F. M.

[Concluded from Vol. XVIII. p. 595.]

IN a previous Article we endeavored to trace the history of philosophy in India from its origin in the speculative writings of the Vedic age until it assumed its earliest scientific form in the Sâṅkhya system, and a later and practical development in the Buddhistic reformation and the theistic Yoga philosophy. We recognized in the rationalistic Sâṅkhya philosophy a speculative reaction against the extreme ritualistic tendencies of the age in which it arose, and in Buddhism a moral reform, which was at bottom a bold protest against the arrogant pretensions of a favored class, and which sought to substitute a rigid moral code without a religion in the place of an effeminate superstition which enslaved the masses, while the Yoga philosophy found an explanation in considering it as an attempt to unite the deductions of reason with the received dogmas of religion, and thus restore the broken harmony between the priesthood

and the people. There is good reason to believe that the order in which we considered these developments was the order of history, reasoning mainly from internal affinities between them : but we come now to consider a system of philosophy, or pair of systems, whose position in history is a little more uncertain, but which we are justified in placing between the Sâṅkhya and the latest system, the Vedānta.

These two systems are the Vaiseshika and Nyâya. The former of these has for its reputed author, Kanâda, and is distinctively a system of physics. The latter is attributed to one Gôtama, and frequently passes under the title of Hindu Logic. But this title of Logic is a misnomer, and has gained Gôtama a deal of undeserved condemnation, given under the impression that he preferred to give a complete exposition of the laws of thought. At the same time, the Nyâya does pay special attention to the principles of logic, and as a system enjoys a high reputation in India, being the first system which engages the attention of the young student of philosophy.

These two systems are even more closely allied than are the Sâṅkhya and Yoga, and we shall accordingly consider them together.

The original Sûtras of Gôtama are given us by Dr. Ballantyne, together with an illustrative commentary.¹ He has also translated a succinct compendium embracing both the Nyâya and Vaiseshika systems,² and has published a synopsis of science based on the Nyâya, for use in the Benares college.³ Dr. Rœr, secretary of the oriental department of the Bengal Asiatic Society, has translated an independent treatise upon the Nyâya by the commentator upon the Sûtras, who flourished, according to Dr. Rœr, about two

¹ The Aphorisms of the Nyâya Philosophy. (Allahabad.)

² Lectures upon the Nyâya Philosophy, embracing the text of the Tarka Sangraha. This we have failed to obtain, but have procured a translation from a Hindi version, made by Fitz Edward Hall, an American scholar at Calcutta.

³ A Synopsis of Science, in Sanskrit and English, reconciled with the truths to be found in the Nyâya Philosophy. Also in Hindi and translated.

hundred years ago.¹ The treatise is celebrated throughout Bengal, every well-read pundit knowing it by heart. It is also accompanied by a further commentary. Besides these, we have the translations of Ward, and the analysis of Colebrooke, who is fuller upon this than upon any other system. We must add, that the best analytical statement of the two philosophies that we know of, is furnished us by Dr. Röer in an introduction to his translation. A more accessible and quite lucid exposition is that by Max Müller, in an appendix to the work on logic by Mr. Thomson.² Barthelemy St. Hilaire has also presented us with a criticism of the system and a translation of the Sûtras.³ Many of his remarks are instructive, but his occasional misunderstanding of radical points in the system, make one cautious in perusing his essay. How much he relied on the assistance of the learned Burnouf in his translation (to whom he acknowledges himself indebted), we cannot say; but some of the aphorisms are an egregiously incorrect rendering of the text.

The Sûtras of Gôtama commence in true Hindu style. The first aphorism reads as follows: "From knowledge of the truth in regard to evidence, the ascertainable doubt, motive, example, dogma, confutation, ascertainment, disquisition, controversy, cavil, fallacy, perversion, futility, and occasion for rebuke, there is the attainment of the *summum bonum*." This compact statement is a complete summary of the whole system, which is again unfolded in Book First, and still more in detail in the remaining five books. So orderly and lucid is this synopsis, that Dr. Ballantyne is fully justified in taking earnest exception to Ritter's hasty condemnation of the system as "tedious, loose, and unmethodical."⁴

¹ Bhâsha Parricchêda, or Division of the Categories of the Nyâya Philosophy. Bibliotheca Indica, Nos. 33 and 35. We have failed also to procure the Aphorisms of the Vaiseshika, Part I. of which has been translated by Dr. Ballantyne.

² Outline of the Laws of Thought. London 1857, Appendix on Hindu Logic.

³ Memories de l'Academie des Sciences de l'Institut de France, 1841.

⁴ Ritter. Hist. of Anc. Phil. Vol. IV. p. 366.

Each of the above-mentioned objects of knowledge Gôtama considers in turn, and the most important portion of his treatise is occupied in discussing the "ascertainable," which he divides as follows: "soul, body, sense, sense-object, knowledge, the mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beatitude, are that regarding which we are to have right knowledge."

Instead, however, of following the Sûtras of Gôtama, we have thought it preferable to take the more compact *Tarka Sangraha*, which follows in the main the same method as the *Bhâsha Parricchêda*. The *Tarka Sangraha* starts in true Aristotelian fashion, by presenting us with seven "categories," under which all that is conceivable may be arranged. These are: "Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, Difference or Individuality, Co-inherence or Intimate Relation, and, though excluded by some, Non-Existence."

Substance is defined to be "the substrate of qualities, and to have substantiality." So the Nyâya, Kanâda adds "actions" to qualities. Qualities, it is said, "abide in substance, and are without qualities and actions." Their existence is known by perception, while by inference from them substance is proved to exist. This definition of substance and quality, as purely relative terms, expresses truthfully the only condition under which we are able to conceive them.¹ "Action produces motion." But Substance was defined as having also Substantiality, by which was intended the fourth category, Genus. Genus was by no means regarded as simply a conception of the mind, a condition under which it was possible to classify objects, but which had no correspondent reality in the world of existence; Gôtama and Kanâda were both thorough-going realists, and affirmed stoutly that Genus had actual, positive existence, independent of any mind that conceived it. It was asserted, also, to have a twofold character, to be eternal in eternal things, non-eternal in things transient.

Individuality resides in all substances in their eternal,

¹ Hamilton. *Discussions on Philosophy*, p. 580.

unperceived, atomic form. But Gôtama feels a difficulty. Having assumed his substances and given them qualities and actions, having also predicated genus and particularity of substance, quality, and action, the question arose: By what principle is this connection of substance with quality, etc., effected? To solve the difficulty, he contrives another category, and names it Co-Inherence or Intimate Relation, that relation which unites the above-mentioned categories. We at once inquire: "But what binds this Intimate Relation itself with substance on the one hand, and quality, etc., on the other?" Gôtama is silent, and of course at fault; yet it is certainly to his credit that he felt the necessity of meeting the difficulty, and made the attempt. The last category is Negation or Non-Existence, the contradictory of the six preceding.

Let us now return, and treat more in detail these categories. Substances are nine: "Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time, Place, Soul, Mind." The first five are the material elements, which find a place in every system of Hindu philosophy; but while other systems are content with a bare enumeration, or the briefest description of them, the Nyâya looks further, and inquires into their interior nature. The elements, except Ether, it affirms to be of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal. In the latter form they appear in perceptible, gross matter, and are cognizable in three aspects: as organism, organ, and inorganic matter. The Earth, for instance, is seen as organism in the body; as organ, it is the apprehender of smell; as inorganic, it is seen in stones, clods, etc. Considered as eternal, the elements are affirmed to be atomic. This theory of atoms, though accepted by Gôtama, would seem to be the distinctive property of Kanâda, who is specially engaged with physics. According to him, "an atom is what exists, has no cause, and is without commencement and end; an atom is contrary to what has a measure."¹ Gôtama defines it, more briefly, as "what is absolutely beyond being cut."² Their existence is argued upon the ground that otherwise

¹ Bhâsha Par. p. 14, note.

² Sûtras. Aph. 82.

there would be a "regressus in infinitum," which is the Hindu's special horror. As the Yoga argument for the being of God was that we must conceive of infinite magnitudes just as we do of an infinite parvitude, so here the same reasoning is applied in the reverse order. Moreover, it will not do, they tell us, to assume an infinite divisibility of matter, else there would be no difference between an elephant and a gnat, between a mustard-seed and Mount Meru. A single atom is invisible, and is not considered as a substance. The smallest substance is a compound of two atoms; the next of three double atoms: this is the smallest perceptible substance,¹ and of the size of a mote in the sunbeam.

We have, then, in India a theory of physics not unlike the Greek theory as held by Leucippus and Democritus. Both theories assume an atom as the ultimate substance; but the Indian is superior to the Greek, in that it is not so grossly material, nor so prominent an element of the general system. Democritus did not hesitate to assume motion as inherent in atoms, and to affirm the soul itself to be "a composite body of a finer species, similar to the particles in the sunbeam, and which, residing in the grosser body of animated beings, is the cause of their motions."² Kanâda is decidedly above him in both denying the atomic nature of the soul, and in referring all combination and activity of atoms to a superintending Deity. This will appear in the sequel.

The Elements are regarded as the sites of qualities. Thus 'earth has the quality of smell. Its site is in the forepart of the nose. The quality of water is savor, whose sense resides in the tip of the tongue. The quality of light is color, the sense of which, sight, resides in the forepart of the pupil of the eye. Air has tangibility, and the sense is found throughout the whole body. The fifth element, ether, whose presence in all the Hindu cosmogonies is constantly surprising us, differs in the Nyâya view from

¹ Coleb. Essays, p. 176.

² Ritter. Hist. Anc. Phil. Vol. I. p. 560.

the other four. Although eternal, it is not atomic, but is infinite, "filling out space, and can therefore be distinguished from space only by a less degree of density." According to Dr. R  er, this notion of a sublimated essence was no essential ingredient of the Ny  ya scheme, but was assumed "historically, or as a part of the views on matter which had been formed previously." He thinks the theory more ancient than the doctrine of the soul.¹ Ether has the quality of sound. The organ of hearing is ethereal, being a portion of the ether confined in the hollow of the ear, endued with a peculiar and unseen virtue. The argument for the existence of ether is based on the existence of sound; as sound cannot be apprehended by either of the other organs, or be an attribute of either of the above four elements, there must be assumed a special substratum, and that is ether. The question: Is sound eternal? — a pet subject of the M  m  ns   — is here mooted, but we defer comment upon it until we consider the latter system.

Time and Space, the next following substances, are said to be each "one, all-pervading, and eternal." "Time is thought the producer of all that may be produced, and the support of the worlds. It is the cause of the knowledge of priority and posteriority; it has many names, as that of day, etc. Space is the cause of the notion of distance and proximity. It obtains various designations, as east, west, etc."² The S  tras of G  tama have a brief discussion of the possibility of time present. "There is no time present (says the sceptic), because of a thing falling we can demonstrate only the time through which it has fallen and that through which it has to fall." To this G  tama replies: "Those two also (the past and future) would not be, if the present were not, because they are relative to it." The sceptic rejoins: 'That since the past and future are substantiated sufficiently by their relation each to the other, they have no necessary relation to any present. But the reply is that that would be a mere reasoning in a circle — from past

¹ Bh  sha Par. p. x.

² Ibid. 44—48.

to present, and from present to past. "Well," says the objector, "what were the loss if these two also did not exist?" To which the reply is: "Were there no present (as then there would not be), there would be no cognition of anything, because perception would be impossible."¹

The eighth substance is Soul. In their statements respecting this essential doctrine, Gôtama and Kanâda approach the most closely of all Hindu philosophers to the Christian dogma. They are *par excellence* the Theists of India. Says the Tarka Sangraha, concisely: "The substratum of knowledge they call Soul. It is of two kinds, the animal soul and the supreme soul. The supreme soul is God, the omniscient. He is One only, and devoid of joy or sorrow. And the animal soul is distributed to each body. It is all-pervading and eternal."²

The Nyâya agrees with the Sâṅkhya philosophy in asserting the individuality and eternity of souls; it goes wholly beyond it in affirming with equal explicitness the existence of a Supreme Spirit. It agrees again with the Yoga in declaring this supreme soul to be omniscient; but it goes equally beyond it in declaring elsewhere that God is the ruler and prime mover of the universe. Creation out of nothing was never dreamed of, yet atoms, the material of creation, had in themselves no inherent energy nor plastic power; combination of atoms must be effected in order to creation, yet no combination could occur unless Deity interpose, unite, and cause motion. Again, mind, the instrument of soul's knowledge, could never act as that instrument unless Deity effect what was termed the union of soul and mind. Thus this conception of a God was no adventitious addition to the scheme; it was an essential element, and a striking feature of it. The argument in proof of his existence, as stated by the authorities of this school, is strictly and solely *à posteriori*: thus, one work states that "such productions as a water-jar are produced by a maker, and so also are the vegetable sprouts and the

¹ Sûtras. Aph. 39—44. See Hamilton. Discussions, etc. p. 518.

² Tark. Sang. p. 7.

earth, etc., and to make them is not possible for such as we are; hence the existence of the Lord as the maker of these is demonstrated.”¹

In the Nyâya philosophy there is a decided advance upon the atheistic and vague dogmas of the Sâmkhya and Yoga schemes, and as infinite a superiority to the later pantheism of the Vedânta; indeed, this spiritual conception of God as a free being, wholly distinct from nature, and also the sole former of the material world, strikes us with peculiar force, standing thus in solitary grandeur in the midst of such generally gross and crude notions as prevail in India; where, indeed, outside of Christianity, will you find so pure and exalted theism? The faulty conception of God as devoid of all emotion, the Nyâya shares in common with all Hindu theories; in their view, it militates with his perfection.

The existence of the animal soul is argued in various ways. The general proof is as follows: “Desire, Aversion, Volition, Pleasure, Pain, and Knowledge are the sign of the Soul.”² Its existence as separate from body is argued on the ground that sin remains after the body dies. But it is eternal, and the proof of this is also various. The fact that “joy, fear, and grief arise to him that is born, through relation to his memory of things previously experienced,” proves its eternity; also, “because of the desire for milk caused by the practice of eating it, in one that has (been born after having) died.”³ The animal soul is said to be distributed to each body, and thus, as an individual, suffers the rewards of good and bad deeds, transmigrating until, by the attainment of supreme knowledge, it is released from connection with matter. It is also infinite, but only as genus and in quantity, the union of identity between the animal and supreme soul being clearly denied, and the literal individuality of the animal soul clearly affirmed.

The ninth and last in the list of substances is Mind. Soul was defined as “the substratum of knowledge.” But the

¹ Ballantyne. *Christianity Contrasted with Hindu Philosophy*, p. 12.

² Sûtras. Aph. Book I. Aph. 10.

³ Ibid, Book III. Aph. 19—28.

soul can know only by virtue of its instrument; this instrument is mind. Says the Tarka Sangraha: "The sense which is the cause of the perception of pleasure and pain, etc., they call the Mind. And it is innumerable—for this reason, that it remains with each soul. It is in the form of an atom, and is eternal."¹ There are innumerable minds, but only one in each body, "because," says the Sûtras, "cognitions are not simultaneous," which they might be, were there a plurality of minds to each body. Some one interposes and denies the correctness of his premiss; "we do perceive simultaneously several acts of cognition." But the answer is: "The apprehension thereof is in consequence of the rapid succession, as in seeing a circle in the case of a firebrand."² And for the same reason that the mind is one for each body, each mind is an atom, which only could prevent more than one thought at a time from crowding in upon the soul.³ This theory of the mental faculties, which considers the mind as the sole mediator between the soul and the external world, is perhaps less arbitrary, in our view, than that of the Sâṅkhya, which felt itself obliged to assume a separate organism for each mental act, adding to mind also intellect and self-consciousness. The relative position of Soul and Mind, according to the Nyâya, is well expressed by Dr. Ballantyne. "In the Hindu systems, the soul is the *self*, and the mind is the organ or faculty which, standing between the self and the deliverances of sense, prevents those deliverances from crowding in pell-mell." In the same connection he remarks, that "the English reader," he might have added, missionary, "who is accustomed to hear the words *soul* and *mind* employed interchangeably, must not carry this laxness of phraseology into any Indian dialect, if he desires to be understood."⁴

¹ Tark. Sang. p. 7.

² Sûtras, Book III. Aph. 129—132.

³ By a strange oversight, Ritter states it to be "a principle of the Nyâya, that the soul is an atom." A more thorough study of Colebrooke would have prevented such a misconception. Hist. Anc. Phil. Vol. IV. p. 376.

⁴ Christianity and Hindu Phil. p. xxiii.

Before concluding the consideration of Substance, it will be well to remark that the Nyâya occupies as high ground upon the question of the reality of the external world, as it does upon the doctrine of God. The doubt is raised in the Sûtras, whether *things* are anything other than *ideas*. They may, it is suggested, be "like the conceit of things in a dream, or like jugglery, or the city of the celestial quiristers, or the mirage." But Gôtama replies that the non-existence of the external cannot be proved, whether there be proof of the fact or not; for, if you say that there is such proof, then, by your own admission, that proof exists, and that is external; if you say there is no proof, then the lack of evidence of the non-existence of the external proves the contrary. Gôtama also combats the Mâdhyamika by name, who, it may be remembered, were a sect of Buddhists and denied not merely the existence of the external world, but also the thinking subject. Gôtama says that "as in the case of the external, so there is no reasonable denial of the existence of knowledge, because we are conscious of the reality of its cause."¹

We come next to the category of Quality.

Qualities, according to the Tarka Sangraha, are twenty-four in number. "Color, Savor, Odor, Tangibility, Number, Dimension, Severalty, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Weight, Fluidity, Viscidity, Sound, Understanding, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Merit and Demerit, Faculty."² Color is said to inhere in earth, water, and light; Savor, in earth and water; Odor, in earth; Tangibility, in earth, water, light, and air. In earth, these four qualities are said to be produced by maturation, and are then transient; in the other elements they are not thus produced, and are eternal in eternal things, transient in transient.

Omitting any notice of the intervening qualities, we proceed at once to the consideration of Understanding, under which the Nyâya develops its theory of knowledge. "Knowledge, which is the cause of every conception (that

¹ Sûtras, Book IV. Aph. 91—103.

² Tarka Sangraha, p. 3.

can be put in words), they call understanding. It is of two kinds—Remembrance and Notion. The knowledge which is produced only by its own antecedence, they call Remembrance; and knowledge which is different from that is called Notion. This is of two kinds—right and wrong. Right notion is of four kinds, according to the divisions of Perceptions, Inferences, Conclusions from similarity, and authoritative assertions understood.”¹

In this enumeration of the sources of knowledge, the Nyâya differs from all other schools; it differs from the Sāṅkhya, which reduces all to three heads—Perception, Inference, and Right Affirmation, including under the latter the verbal testimony and comparison of the Nyâya; it differs from the Vaiśeṣika even, it would seem,² which would exclude Comparison from a separate mention, including it in Inference; it differs from the Mīmāṃsā, which would add Rumor, Conjecture, Probability and Non-Existence, Gôtama affirming that Rumor is nothing else than Testimony, and the other three, Inference; it differs, finally, from the materialist Chârvâka, who admits only Perception.³

The Tarka Sangraha, referring to the causes of Perception, etc., pauses to define a cause. “That which is invariably antecedent to some product, and is not otherwise constituted, is the cause.” “Cause is of three kinds, according to the distinction of intimate, non-intimate, and instrumental. That in which an effect intimately relative to it takes its rise, is an intimate cause (of that effect), as threads are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own color. Where this intimate relation exists, that cause which is associated in one and the same object (as a necessarily immanent cause) with such effect or cause, is non-intimate. Thus the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and the color of the threads that of the color of the

¹ Tarka Sangraha, p. 10.

² The Tark. Sang. however agrees with the Sūtras.

³ Sūtras, Book II. Sections I—XI. See Sāṅkhya Kārikā, p. 20. The mention in the text, by name or reference, of the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, would indicate the priority of the Nyâya to these systems.

cloth. The cause which is distinct from both of these is the instrumental cause, as the weaver's brush, the loom, etc., are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that only is called an instrumental cause which is not a universally concurrent cause or condition (of all effects, as God, time, place, etc., are)."¹

To return to the theory of the Understanding.

The first method of proof is Perception, or, as Dr. Ballantyne would prefer to call it, The Deliverance of Sense. It is thus defined: "The cause of the knowledge called Sensation is an organ of sense; knowledge produced by the conjunction of an organ of sense and its object is Sensation."² It is of two kinds: determinate, the perception of an object as a *certain* thing; or indeterminate, the perception of an object as a something not fully known. These organs of sense are five in number, and are asserted to arise from the five elements, in opposition to the Sâṅkhya theory, which produces them from Self-consciousness. From the above use of terms in the text, or rather in the *translation*, it might appear that Gôtama confounds Sensation with Perception; but that he in fact was aware of the distinction is evident from the method of his reply to an objector who asserted that the conjunction of a sense with its object was not the cause of Perception, because this union might exist and no perception follow. Gôtama replies that there would seem to be then no perception, because of the engrossing attention to some other object, thus asserting that perception always ensues upon sensation, but admitting the distinction between the two in consciousness. But what is this "conjunction of an organ of sense with its object?" Gôtama answers the question in a chapter upon the senses. He adduces sight as an illustration. Contrary to the Buddhist theory, that vision resides in the eye-ball, he affirms it to exist in the visual ray which proceeds from the eye-ball, and says that "it is by contact of the ray and the object that it is apprehended," which in his mind is simple sensation. Some

¹ Tarka Sangraha, p. 11.

² Ibid, p. 12.

one doubts the existence of this visual ray, because it is not perceptible. Gôtama replies that its invisibility is no proof of its non-existence; but asserts further that it is seen in some nocturnal animals, as cats and the like, which effectually silences that objector. But that this distinction between sensation and perception is understood by the Hindu philosophers in general, is further evident from the definition of what they term "a modification of the thinking principle." It may be remembered that, in the Yoga philosophy, concentration was defined as "the hindering the modifications of the thinking principle," which we promised to explain in treating of the Nyâya. This we cannot do better than in the language of a Vedânta work quoted by Dr. Ballantyne, in which the distinction between these separate acts of the mind is, we think, plainly stated. Says this treatise, which, though belonging to another school, equally well represents this :

"As the water of a reservoir, having entered by a channel, tanks (designed for irrigation), becomes four-cornered or otherwise shaped just like these, so the manifesting internal organ (or mind) having gone through the sight or other channel to where there is an object, for instance, a jar, becomes modified by the form of the jar or other object. It is this altered state (of the mind), that is called its modification." "This manifesting internal organ," continues Dr. Ballantyne, "while it is regarded as moulding itself upon the object, is regarded as at the same time manifesting it as a mirror does. 'To a considerable extent this theory of the Understanding is analogous to the theory of vision entertained by those who regard the retina as reflecting to the intelligent principle those visible forms of which the retina itself is uncognizant; while the intelligent principle itself is cognizant of things visible only inasmuch as they are reflected to it by the retina. The 'modifications' are akin to Locke's 'ideas.' "1

The second method of proof is Inference, or, as it is termed, "The Recognition of a sign." An inference is

further defined as "knowledge that results from syllogizing, and the following is given as the ordinary form of a syllogism :

1. The mountain is fiery
2. Because it smokes.
3. Whatever smokes is fiery, as a culinary hearth.
4. And this does so.
5. Therefore it is fiery, as aforesaid.

The five members of this syllogism are severally named :

1. The Proposition.
2. The Reason.
3. The Example..
4. The Application.
5. The Conclusion.

This five-membered syllogism has been the object at once of ridicule and extravagant laudation. Ritter, in his exposition of the Nyâya, founded upon Colebrooke, declares that the followers of this system "can lay but slight claim to accuracy of exposition, as is proved clearly enough from the form of their syllogism, which is made to consist of five instead of three parts. Two of these are manifestly superfluous, while by the introduction of an example in the third, the universality of the conclusion is vitiated."¹ Sir William Hamilton, also, while discussing the two possible forms of the syllogism, the analytic and synthetic, affirms that "the Aristotelic syllogism is exclusively synthetic, the Epicurean exclusively analytic, while the Hindu syllogism is merely a clumsy agglutination of these counter forms, being nothing but an operose repetition of the same reasoning enounced 1, analytically, 2, synthetically."²

The simple and satisfactory reply to the adverse criticisms of these Western philosophers is, that this five-membered syllogism is not laid down by Gôtama as a *logical*, but merely as a *rhetorical* form of argument. The misconception arises from the radical misunderstanding of the nature

¹ Hist. Anc. Phil. Vol. IV. p. 365. St. Hilaire pronounces like condemnation. Memoire sur le Nyâya.

² Discussions, etc. p. 616.

of the Nyāya scheme. This system does not profess to be an outline of the laws of thought; its author in its enunciation has in view solely the deliverance of the spirit from the entanglements of the flesh, and the best method for accomplishing that deliverance; this point he keeps steadily in his eye, and if he has occasion to state the process of reasoning, he discusses it, not as a bare fact of the mind, but in its bearing upon his main end; he has in mind an opponent whom he is seeking to overthrow, or a disciple whom he is endeavoring to persuade. That this is the true solution of the difficulty, the correct explanation of this syllogism has been abundantly shown by Dr. Ballantyne in an able and eloquent appendix to his work upon Christianity and Hinduism, and is placed beyond a doubt by the following passage in the *Tarka Sangraha*, which we quote entire :

“An induction is of two kinds, inasmuch as it may be employed for one’s self and for another. That which is for one’s self is the cause of a private conclusion in one’s own mind. For example : having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire; having gathered the invariable attendedness of smoke by fire; having gone near a mountain and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it; having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendedness, viz., ‘where there is smoke there is fire.’ This is called the ‘pondering of a sign.’ Thence results the knowledge that ‘the mountain is fiery,’ which is the conclusion. This is the process of influence for one’s self.

“But after having, for one’s self inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five-membered form of exposition, with a view to the information of another, then is the process one of ‘influence for the sake of another.’ For example: 1, The mountain has fire in it; 2, because it has smoke; 3, whatever has smoke has fire, as a culinary hearth; 4, and so this has; 5, therefore it is as aforesaid. By this exposition, in consequence of the sign (or token) here brought to his notice, the other also arrives at the knowledge that

there is fire.”¹ The criticism of Ritter that the presence of an example in the third member vitiates the conclusion, is answered in the last sentence of the above quotation, which asserts that this example is adduced, simply to remind the person of the fact of universality.

Hindu writers have also stated in so many words that a perfect syllogism need embrace but three members, thus in a Vedânta treatise, it is said: “Since no more than three members are required to set forth the general principle and its relevancy to the subject, the other two members are superfluous.”²

But Dr. Ballantyne, who is enthusiastic in his defence of the Hindu system, affirms that the Hindu form of the three-membered syllogism is even more closely conformed to the actual process in thought, than is the Aristotelic. “In thought” says Hamilton, “the syllogism is organically one; and it is only stated in an analytic and synthetic form, from the necessity of adopting the one order or the other, in accommodation to the vehicle of its expression — language.”³ Dr. Ballantyne takes up this statement, and avers that the Hindus have been the most successful in attempting “to embody *this organic unity of the syllogism in thought* in a linguistic unity of expression. When they discuss the laws of the mind syllogising ‘*for itself*,’ — *i. e.*, to use Sir William’s language, ‘in thought,’ — they notify the organic unity of the process by wrapping the two premises in one sentence so constructed (*viz.*, in the shape of a period), that, until the last word of the sentence is uttered, no demand is made — or, rather, no pretence exists — for either assent or dissent. In reference to the stock example above quoted, the premises ‘*in thought*’ are propounded, in their unity, by writers on the Nyâya, thus: ‘By smoke, invariably attended by fire, is attended this mountain.’”⁴

¹ Tarka Sangraha, p. 14. We quote the wording of Ballantyne: Christianity and Hinduism, p. 150.

² This, it should be stated, is later than the Nyâya.

³ Discussions, p. 616.

⁴ Christianity and Hindu Philosophy, p. 145. Müller vindicates the Hindu form in his appendix to Phoradû’s Logic.

Before passing to the next method of proof, we must not forget to mention an interesting division of this "Recognition of a Sign," into three parts. "1, Having as a sign the *prior*; 2, having as a sign the *posterior*; 3, consisting in the *perception of homogeneousness*."¹ These terms, literally translated, correspond precisely with our inference "*à priori*," "*à posteriori*," and "from analogy."

After enumerating at some length various fallacies, the Tarka Sangraha defines the third method of proof. "Comparison, or the recognition of likeness, is the cause of an inference from similarity. Such an inference consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and the thing so named;"² or, according to the Sûtras: "The recognition of likeness is the instrument in the ascertaining of that which is to be ascertained through its similarity to something previously well known."

"A man is told that the *gavaya*, or 'bos gavaeus,' is an animal like a cow. Going to the forest, he sees an animal like a cow. By means of the instrumental knowledge above described, he arrives at the conviction that 'this thing is what is meant by the word *gavaya*.'"³

The last method of proof, included by the Vaiseshika under Inference, is Verbal Evidence, or Words.

"A word is the speech of one worthy. One worthy is a speaker of the truth. A speech is a collection of significant sounds; as, for example, 'Bring the cow.' A significant sound is that which is possessed of power. The power is the appointment, in the shape of God's will, that such and such an import should be recognizable from such and such a significant sound." Note the strange conceit that in the order of nature, the *name* precedes the *object* named.

"Notion" was before stated to be divisible into two kinds: right notion and wrong notion. The four kinds of right notion we have now considered; the Tarka Sangraha concludes the discussion by defining and describing briefly the three forms of incorrect notion, — doubt, mistake, and such opinion as is open to *reductio ad absurdum*.

¹ Sûtras, Aph. 5.

² Sûtras, Aph. 6.

³ Tarka Sangraha, p. 19.

This theory of the Understanding, it will be remembered, we have been considering under the general category of Qualities, where the Nyâya classes it. After Understanding come some others. These with Understanding are said to be "distinctive of God alone." "Intellect, desire, and effect are of two kinds, eternal and transient; eternal in God, transient in mortals."

The remaining five categories, Action, Genus, Difference, Intimate Relation, and Non-existence, follow next in order of treatment; but nothing of importance can be added to the definitions already given.

The Tarka Sangraha, which we have followed in the main, is quite condensed toward the close, and throughout the treatise a single and straightforward course is pursued; the original Sûtras however, dwell at some length upon Pleasure, Pain, and the methods of Emancipation, affirming the Yoga doctrine to be praiseworthy, but enjoining a study of its own tenets as a practical aid in inducing the desired meditation. They also branch off frequently in curious discussions upon various topics, such as, "the nature of a doubt," "what is meant by wholes," "the force of a word," "the possibility of atoms," whether the world may not have originated from chance, "is everything eternal or uneternal?" "does the eternal exist?" etc., etc., to more than merely refer to which would draw us away too far from our general purpose. The very fact, however, that such themes were discussed, speaks not a little for the subtlety of the minds which were engaged about them.

We conclude this analysis of the two systems by presenting a comparison which Dr. Ballantyne draws between the Sâṅkhya and the Nyâya :

"A noticeable distinction between Kapila's way of speaking of things and that of the Naiyâyikas presents itself in their respective choice of a fundamental verb. The language of the Nyâya is moulded upon the verb 'to be,' and that of the Sâṅkhya upon the verb 'to make.' The Nyâya asks: 'What *is*?' the Sâṅkhya asks: 'What *makes* it so?' The one presents us with a *compte rendu* of the Universe

as it stands; the other presents us with a cosmogony. As the one subdivides its subject-matter into the two exhaustive categories of Existence and Non-existence, the other exhibits everything (except Soul, the spectator of the phantasmagoria) under the two aspects of 'producer' and 'produced.'"

The success of Bhuddhism, which, from a heretical sect grew to be a dominant political, as well as religious power about the third century before Christ, was the signal for the rise of numerous other heresies, even more bitterly opposed to the Brahmanical faith: the sway of the hierarchy once broken, nothing prevented any schismatic spirit from proposing a new method for the liberation of soul, or from propounding the most grossly material sentiments. For a period of at least two centuries both before and after Christ, India was in a state of religious ferment. We judge this, not from any monuments which remain to us, of these various schisms, but from the writings of the upholders of the established or traditional faith, which are filled with the opinions of the heretics, cited for confutation. Many of these tenets Colebrooke has collected and arranged,¹ as also Wilson, in his sketch of religious sects.²

One of these sects, the Jains, we considered in the previous Article. Another, and perhaps the most notorious of these sects, were the Chârvâkas.

The most peculiar tenets of this school are two; first, the restriction of the sources of knowledge to Perception; second, the denial of any distinction between the soul and the body. The following is a statement of this latter dogma, taken from the writings of an opponent:

"Seeing no soul but body, they maintain the non-existence of soul other than body; and arguing that intelligence or sensibility, though not seen in earth, water, fire, and air, whether simple or congregate, may nevertheless subsist in the same elements modified in a corporeal frame, they affirm that an organic body, endued with sensibility and thought, though formed of those elements, is the human person.

¹ Essays, p. 243.

² Asiat. Res. Vol. xvi., xvii.

"The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements, in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor.

"So far there is a difference between animate body and inanimate substance. Thought, knowledge, recollection, etc., perceptible only where organic body is, are properties of an organized frame, not appertaining to exterior substances, or earth and other elements simple or aggregate, unless formed into such a frame. While there is body, there is thought, and sense of pleasure and pain; none where body is not; and hence, as well as from self-consciousness it is concluded that self and body are identical."¹ Other sects are mentioned by Colebrooke and Wilson, but as being more religious than philosophical, they hardly call for special notice.

But the atheism and nihilism of the Bhuddhists and Jains and the materialism of the Chârvâkas never could have gained a footing in India, except as a reaction against an opposite extreme. The real sympathies of the Hindu had far more affinity with Brahminism, than they could possibly have with any system that offered them no God and a meagre ritual service. Hence the religious teachers of the people did not miscalculate their strength, when, after the first popular wave of revolution had begun to subside, they sought to reinstate themselves in favor. But they had learned wisdom by defeat. Conquered by an appeal to reason, they themselves adopted the weapons of their adversaries, and the first movement of the Brahmans to recover a footing was a philosophical movement. True, they grounded their authority upon the Vedas, and their leading and avowed purpose was to bring back the masses to allegiance to the faith of their ancestors, and yet throughout their writings there is apparent a manifest attempt to show that these teachings of the inspired word were not opposed to the genuine deductions of reason, but that in these ancient writings was in fact contained the only true philosophy.²

¹ Colebrooke. *Essays*, p. 259. The tenets of a large number of these sects may be found stated and commented upon by the Tamil writers in Rev. H. R. Hoisington's translations. *Jour. Am. Or. Soc.* Vol. IV.

² See Max Müller. *Hist. Sans. Liter.* p. 259.

The result of this wide-spread movement remains to us in the writings of what is termed the Mîmânsâ school of philosophy. This school is divided into two branches, called Pûrvva Mîmânsâ or "prior" Mîmânsâ and Uttara Mîmânsâ or "later" Mîmânsâ. These terms "prior" and "later" do not refer, as Ritter supposed, to an earlier and later development of this philosophy. The word *mîmânsâ* means "a seeking to understand" and the *pûrvva mîmânsâ* is "a seeking to understand the 'prior' (or ritual portion of the Veda)" the Brâhmana portion, which stands first in order, and the *Uttara mîmânsâ* is "a seeking to understand the 'later,' (or theological portion of the Veda)," the Upanishads, placed after the Brâhmanas. Of these two schools, the 'later' is the only one which has a claim to the title of philosophy. It is better known under the name of Vedânta, and is the prominent school of modern day. The "prior" school is known distinctly as the Mîmânsâ. Its acknowledged aim is simply an explanation of the various rites enjoined in the Brâhmanas or ritual portion of the Vedic writings; it is occupied with tedious comments upon the meaning of words and phrases. It has not a little of interest to the student of Indian life, but it has slight bearing upon any philosophical doctrines which the Vedic writings may contain. One dogma however, which relates to the object of its discussions may deserve a passing notice. It is that of the Eternity of Sound.

We have no extended translation of any treatise of this school. Colebrooke¹ presents us with an analysis of the Sûtras of Jaimini, the reputed founder of the school, which comprise twelve lectures. The first chapter of the first lecture has been translated by Dr. Ballantyne. In his work upon Christianity and Hindu Philosophy,² he also gives an appendix, containing the most of this translation with valuable illustrative matter. Ward also gives an abridgment of different treatises.³

The famous discussion upon the eternity of sound is intro-

¹ Essays, p. 189.

² Aphorisms of the Mîmânsâ Philosophy (Allahabad).

³ View, etc. Vol. II. p. 286.

duced at the very outset of the treatise. The first aphorism reads as follows : " Next, therefore (O student that has attained thus far), a desire to know Duty (is to be entertained by thee)." What is a duty ? " A matter that is a duty is recognized by the instigatory character (of the passage of scripture in which it is mentioned)." The commentator adds, that what constitutes anything a matter fit to be urged in scripture as a duty, " is the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure." A little by-play is worthy of notice. Jaimini, in the aphorism, had given the word 'duty' a wrong gender, according to received authorities in the commentator's day, and some had raised inquiry on the point. The commentator haughtily says : " If you ask why, then take as the reason thereof the fact that Jaimini is a great sanctified sage, and of course can give the word what gender he pleases." To prove that a text of scripture alone is sufficient authority for enjoining duty, the author shows that nothing *else* would be authority, as, for example, the senses.

" When a man's organs of sense are rightly applied to something *extant*, that birth of knowledge which then takes place is Perception, and this perception is *not* the cause of our recognizing Duty, because the organs of sense are adapted only to the apprehension of what is then and there existent." As sense cannot be the cause, so neither can Influence, or Analogy, or Conjecture, for all these " have their root in Perception." But, says an objector, language, the relation of words and meanings is merely conventional, devised by man ; and just " as sense-knowledge wanders away from truth in respect of mother of pearl or the like, (when it mistakes such for silver), so language, dependent on man, inasmuch as it has reference to the knowledge of a connection which was devised by man, is liable to part company with veracity in matters of declaration, and so the *instigatory nature* of a passage (which is composed of words) cannot be the instrument of correct knowledge in respect of Duty." To this, Jaimini replies that the connection of a word with its sense is not conventional, but *natural*, that is, *eternal*, and therefore, " the intimation of scripture is unerring though

imperceptible." This is simply the Nyâya dogma that the connection of a word and its sense is in the shape of "power," or God's will, and therefore eternal.¹

This introduces the discussion upon Sound, which, Jaimini asserts, must be itself eternal, else words, which are formed of sound, could not have the property of eternity.

Our author, strong in his belief, enumerates first the doctrines of his opponents. They may be found also in the Nyâya Sûtras.² Sound is not eternal, says the objector, because, 1. We see an effort made in its production. 2. It is transitory. 3. We speak of *making* sound. 4. It may be present in different places at once. This is an argument based on the dogma of the Mîmânsâ, that the *eternity* of sound implies also its *unity*, and is directed against the latter notion. 5. Sounds assume different forms — a grammatical point. 6. "By a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it."

In reply, Jaimini first states the point on which all agree, viz., that the *perception* of sound is transitory. He then answers the objections in turn.

1. Sound always *exists*, but is not always *manifested*. A vibration of the air causes manifestation, and stillness of the air obstructs perception. 2. The expression "making," really means "employing." 3. Sound may be simultaneously *heard* in different places, and yet be but one, as in the case of the sun and sight. 4. This change of sounds is simply their modification. 5. Noise, not sound, is increased by a multitude of voices.³

He now betakes himself to positive arguments in proof of his theory. "Sound must be eternal, because its exhibition is for the sake of another." That is, explains the commentator, as the sound of a word spoken to a person must last *some* time after being uttered, else its sense could not be seized by the person addressed; it must be eternal, because you cannot assign any other instant at which it may be

¹ Sûtras, Aph. 1—6.

² Sûtras, Aph. 6—18.

³ Ibid.

proved to cease. Again : sound is eternal, because any number of hearers may at once recognize a sound, *e. g.*, "cow." Again : sound is eternal, because of the absence of number in the repetition of a word. For example, the word "cow," pronounced ten times, is always the same word, and not ten words of the form "cow." Again : sound is eternal, because we see no ground for anticipating its distinction. And, finally, sound is eternal, because a proof text of scripture says: "By language that alters not, eternal," etc.¹

So ends this celebrated dispute, which we have cited more as a "curiosity" of Hindu literature, than as of any philosophical value.

The chapter concludes by considering an objection against the eternity of the Vedas, which "some declare to be something recent, because there are the names of men in it," who must therefore have lived prior to its composition. Jaimini replies by saying, that the eternity of sound has already been proved; that the names of men refer only to names of the readers of certain sections where the names occur; and finally, by affirming that the terms in the text are common to other objects, and do not there designate men. Thus, in illustration of the last position, the word *Prâvahani*, the name of a man, really means here, the "wind which moves very fast;" and the word *Babara*, also the name of a man, is here a word imitative of the sound of the wind,— "so that there is not even a *smell* of inconsistency."

We pass now to consider the Uttara Mîmânsâ, or Vedânta philosophy, the last of the six schools into which Hindu Philosophy is divided. Inasmuch as this is the latest school, and the one whose fundamental doctrines underlie the whole structure of modern Hinduism, we should naturally anticipate less difficulty in reaching the exact sense of its teachings than we have found attending the examination of either of the foregoing systems. But the fact is far otherwise; for although writings upon this scheme of philosophy

¹ Sûtras, Aph. 18—24.

abound, yet these writings cover so extensive a period, and embrace so wide a diversity of sentiment existing within the circle of the system, that the very abundance of material serves but to confuse. No school has, we believe, so large a body of adherents ; its doctrines are promulgated, not only in the classical Sanskrit, but in various vernacular dialects, in the South and West as well as in the North ; the philosophy itself, as the acknowledged champion of orthodoxy, the staunch defender of the Vedic doctrines against opposers of whatever stripe, is forced to discuss a wide range of topics, and constantly to shift its ground, in order to adapt itself to the various shades of doctrine which the Vedic writings themselves contain ; while in its position as the reconciler of both the words of the Veda and the teachings of philosophy with the fanciful creations of the popular faith, it finds ample occasion to test the elasticity of its principles and their fitness to meet the varying demands of the Hindu mind.

The chief difficulty, however, in the way of an English student, in the consideration of this system, lies in the fact that there is no complete translation of the original authority of this school. The father of this philosophy is known as Veda-vyâsa, a sage, who, if we credit all the legends respecting him, must have lived at least a thousand years. He flourished probably about the third century after Christ.¹ His writings remain under the title of *Brahma Sûtras* or *Vedânta Sûtras*. But of these we know scarcely anything except what Colebrooke presents in his analysis. Unfortunately for us, this analysis makes it certain that the original form of this philosophy differed essentially from the form in which it appears in the treatises to which we have access. It would have been an interesting task to become familiar with this early phase of the philosophy, and trace thence the several developments which have since appeared. As we should have expected, the philosophy of the founder of the school is a much simpler system of doctrines than the

¹ Weber places him A. D. 400—500.

exceedingly involved and mystical set of theories which his later followers have zealously propagated. We must, however, be content with what we have. Colebrooke's essay is too bare to afford us much light upon the original teachings of Vyâsa.¹ Ballantyne has translated but a brief portion;² we must therefore resort to a work which shall give us a synopsis of this philosophy in its later dress. For this purpose we have at hand a popular compendium of the Vedânta doctrines in the *Vedânta Sâra* or "Kernel of the Vedânta," translated by Dr. Ballantyne.³ Though advocating a system differing from that of the founder of the school, it is not an authority for the extreme school of modern Vedântism, but occupies a middle ground, as will appear in the sequel.

The word *Vedânta* is a compound term, *Ved-ânta* signifying "the end or scope of the Veda;" and accordingly, at the outset of his treatise, the author of the *Vedânta Sâra* refers us back to the Upanishads for authority for his doctrine. Several inquiries naturally arise in the mind of one who undertakes such a study as is now proposed, and these the author divides into four, which respect—1. The competent person; 2. The object-matter; 3. The relation; 4. The purpose.

First, who is the person competent to enter on the study? "He is that well-regulated person, who, by the perusal, as prescribed, of the Vedas and their dependent sciences, has attained to a rough notion of the sense of the whole Veda, — who, by renouncing, in this or in a former life, things desirable and things forbidden, and by observances of the constant and of the occasional ceremonies, of penances and of devotions, being freed from all sin, is thoroughly purified in his heart; and who is possessed of the quaternion of requisites."

¹ *Essays*, p. 208.

² *Aphorisms of the Vedânta Philosophy*, Part I. We have failed to procure even this.

³ A Lecture on the Vedânta, embracing the text of the *Vedânta Sâra*: Allahabad. Colebrooke cautions us against Ward's version of the work. *Essays*, p. 215.

The four requisites are stated to be : 1. The discrimination of the eternal substance from the transient ; 2. Disregard of the fruits of here and hereafter ; 3. The possession of tranquillity and self-restraint ; and, 4. The desire of liberation.

The "object-matter" "is the fact, to be known for certain, that the soul and God are one ; for this is the drift of all Vedânta treatises." The "Relation," is simply that "of information and informer ;" the "purpose" or end, "is the cessation of the *ignorance* which invades this identity which is to be known, and the attainment of that bliss which is his essence." That it is possible, by means of knowledge, to achieve liberation from the world, may be inferred from the scriptural text, that "He who knows what soul is, gets beyond grief ;" — and from the text that "He who knows God, becomes God."

"This qualified person," the Vedânta Sâra proceeds, "being burned by the fire of this world in the shape of birth, death, and the like, as one whose head is heated by the sun takes refuge in a body of water, having approached, with tribute in his hands, a teacher who knows the Vedas and who is intent on God, follows him — becomes his disciple." "The teacher, with the greatest kindness, instructs him by the method of 'the refutation of the erroneous imputation.'" "Erroneous imputation is the allegation that the Unreal is the Real." — "The Real ?" This is God (consisting of) existence, knowledge, and happiness — (the One) without a second. The Unreal is the whole aggregate of the senseless — beginning with ignorance."

It will be seen that, by the author of this treatise, the universe is divided into the Real and the Unreal ; that God is the first factor, and that all else is the second factor ; the phenomenal, and only phenomenal, originating in ignorance. This conceit we shall find running through the work ; we shall find it to be the fundamental idea, about and upon which all the philosophy is constructed. Now, it is important to remark, that not a syllable of this "philosophy of ignorance" is, as far as we can find, present in the Sûtras

which profess to be the original authority of this school. Dr. Ballantyne has translated only a brief portion,—and this we have not,—but Colebrooke gives an analysis of them, and we find in that analysis not the slightest allusion to any such conception as Ignorance as a cause of the world. According to his quotations, the Sûtras seem to unfold a pure and intelligible pantheism, a more definite and formal statement of the vague theosophizing of the Upanishads. Furthermore, Colebrooke, at the close of his essay, remarks: “The notion, that the versatile world is an illusion, that all which passes to the apprehension of the waking individual is but a phantasy presented to his imagination, and every seeming thing is unreal and is all visionary, does not appear to be the doctrine of the text of the Vedânta. I take it to be no tenet of the original Vêdântin philosophy, but of another branch, from which later writers have borrowed it, and have intermixed and confounded the two systems.”¹ It is a matter of real regret, therefore, that for the purposes of our investigation we have not access to these original Sûtras, but must content ourselves with a knowledge of a development of this earlier philosophy, such as is presented to us in the Vedânta Sâra.

Our author has before stated it to be the end of a knowledge of the Vedânta, to annihilate that ignorance which is regarded as the source of the unreal. What is this Ignorance, and whence arose the conception of it as the cause of the phenomenal world?

The first question is thus answered: “Ignorance is a somewhat that is not to be called positively either entity or non-entity—not a mere negation, but the opponent of knowledge,—consisting of the three fetters.” That there is such a

¹ Dr. Ballantyne seems to think that Colebrooke refers only to the last development, that of Mâyâ, or “Illusion” distinctively; but we think he is mistaken. See Vedânta Sâra, p. 16. It is not a little embarrassing to the student to find in the Sâṅkhya Sûtras, supposed to be one of the oldest authorities of the Sâṅkhya philosophy, quotations of doctrines, such as that of Ignorance, etc., regarded as late developments of a philosophy whose origin is placed no earlier than A. D. 300! See Aphorisms of the Sâṅkhya, 20. One comes to doubt whether it is possible to reach the original opinions of any school.

thing as Ignorance, the author states, is proved "from the judgment (of consciousness) that 'I am ignorant;'" and from scripture.

The origin of the conception it is more difficult to explain. Historically, we are absolutely in the dark; logically, we may account for its origin somewhat in the manner which Dr. Ballantyne suggests, which we present.

"God, infinite in power, omnipresent, omniscient, exists. The Sâṅkhyast would object, but the almost unanimous voice of India is opposed to him. There was a time, furthermore, the Vedântin affirms, when nothing but God did exist. How could or did creation ensue? Not, by the assumption, from existing eternal matter, as qualities according to Kapila, or as atoms according to Kanâda; nor by sheer feat, out of nothing, — a notion wholly alien to the Hindu mind; there remained but one possible method, — by development from God himself. Spirits form a portion of this world; spirits, therefore, are a product of this unconditioned being, or rather *are* that being, in no proper sense separate from him; they too, therefore, know no condition. Here, however, Consciousness enters a caveat, and the Hindu, no more than the western philosopher, has a right to disregard it. "I am ignorant — I am limited." Here is a clear conflict. "I am God, and I do not recognize myself as God, but as different from him." Where is the escape? With even worse logic than that of the Cartesian, who would prove the *existence* of God from the existence of the *idea* of God, the Vedânta exalts his ignorance of the identity of soul and God — his erroneous conception of the actual existence of the phenomenal world — to the rank of Creator; Ignorance actually "projects the world!" What further phases this notion of Ignorance afterwards assumed, we shall see in the sequel.

Ignorance was defined as "consisting of the three fetters," and as thus binding the soul. The "three fetters" are nothing more, in the literal meaning of the term, than the "three qualities" which the Sâṅkhya philosophy adopts as summing up all possible qualities in the universe; *i. e.*, "goodness, passion, and darkness." But in this connection it is well to

remark that a double use of the term "quality" or "fetter," by the Vedânta, has led to no little confusion among foreign writers, and given rise to undeserved condemnation of the system. The term translated "quality" or "fetters," is "*guna*," literally "a cord," which is said to "fetter the soul." In the Sâṅkhya philosophy it is used to designate these three qualities which, in perfect harmony, constitute primal nature, and, in various combinations, form the several products of nature. In the Vedânta system, the "three-fold cord" is also said to be equivalent to developed matter, — the phenomenal in its view, — and thus identical with Ignorance.

The opposite of this phenomenal, this Ignorance, was God: consistency therefore required that he be also regarded as devoid of this "three-fold cord," which hampered soul, which was the essence of Ignorance. Hence, a common designation of God by the Vedânta, is "*nir-guna*," the "unfettered." But as the term rendered "fetter" is also rendered ordinarily "quality," some foreign writers have been misled, and have gone so far as to declare that the God of the Vedânta is devoid of all qualities, and consequently as good (or as bad), as a non-entity. This is simply unfair; as may be seen from an original Sûtra of Vyâsa, which affirms that "every attribute of a first cause exists in Brahma who is devoid of qualities," when the term "qualities" is clearly not identical with "attributes."

The Vedânta theory of God seems to have arisen in the desire to remove God as far as possible from man. He does not think, nor feel, nor act after the imperfect manner of man; but so far from being destitute of all attribute or quality, in one sense he is nothing *but* attribute, — the Vedântin conceiving no substratum necessary, but thinking of him, as we saw at the outset, as existing *as* sheer existence, thought, and joy, "in their identity as an ever-existing joy thought." ¹

After defining Ignorance, the Vedânta Sâra proceeds to

¹ See the able discussion of Dr. Ballantyne. Christianity and Hindu Phil. p. 38. Vedânta Sâra, p. 14.

state in detail the process of creation by means of it. In giving an analysis of this most mystical portion of the treatise, we dare not flatter ourselves that we shall be understood; we may accomplish something if we convince the reader that the history of philosophy in India does not culminate in a philosophy of common sense.

Ignorance, we are told, may be viewed either collectively or distributively; collectively, as the ignorances of different persons, though the singular form of the word may be retained; distributively, as the ignorance which each individual possesses: at the same time, we are bid to remember, these two forms of ignorance are, in fact, the same. Again: "Of this Ignorance there are two powers—envelopment and projection." By the envelopment of ignorance, the soul gets the impression "that it is liable to mundane vicissitudes; that it is an agent, a patient, happy, grieved, and so forth." By the "projective power," "Ignorance raises up, on the soul enveloped by it, the appearance of a world, ether, etc." Mark now the process of creation.

Deity, who is usually called Intellect, in order to create must have a certain body; this body is Ignorance with its two powers, viewed collectively. Of Intellect, "located" in this aggregation of Ignorance, it is said, "being possessed of such qualities as omniscience, omnipotence, and superintendence over all, imperceptible, all-pervading, Maker of the world, Intellect is called the Lord."

Again: "Intellect, located in Ignorance with its two powers, is, in its own right, the instrumental cause (of creation); and in virtue of what it is located in, the substantial cause;—as the spider is personally the instrument, and, in virtue of its own body (in which the soul of the spider resides), the substance; in regard to its product, the thread." The original doctrine of the Vedânta was, undoubtedly, that the Supreme Being is immediately the material as well as efficient cause of the world.¹ In this later form of the philosophy, he is still held to be the efficient or instrumental

¹ Colebrooke, *Essays*, p. 223.

cause of all; but is the material or substantial cause, only indirectly, through the medium of Ignorance, the mystical body of Deity. Creation thus ensues: "From Intellect immersed in Ignorance, with the Projective power, there arises the Ether; from the Ether, Air; from Air, Fire; from Fire, Water; and from Water, Earth." The difference between this scheme and those of the Sâṅkhya and Nyâya, will be noticed.

From these five subtile elements are produced the subtile bodies and the gross elements. The subtile bodies correspond almost exactly to the "rudimental body" of the Sâṅkhya philosophy; they are the individual, viewed apart from his gross body of flesh. A subtile body consists of seventeen portions,—the set of five intellectual organs, Understanding (Intellect of the Sâṅkhya) and Mind, the set of five organs of action, and the set of five vital airs." This subtile body is divided into a "triple of sheaths," as follows: "This Understanding, being associated with the five intellectual organs, is the 'intelligent sheath.' But the mind, being associated with the organs of action, becomes the 'mental sheath.' The set of five vital airs (respiration, flatulence, circulation, pulsation of the throat and head, and assimilation), associated with the organs of action, becomes the 'vital sheath.'"

From the subtile elements the gross also arise, and after this fashion: Each gross element is compounded of one-half of the subtile element whose name it bears, and one-eighth of each of the other subtile elements, so that each shares in each others substance, yet is designated by the name of that which preponderates. From the gross elements arise the seven heavens, the seven hells, the egg of Brahma, with the four kinds of gross bodies, and their food and drink. The four kinds of bodies are the oviparous, viviparous, equivocally generated, and germinating, *e. g.*, as plants. So much for the development of the phenomenal world, drawn by regular gradations from Ignorance viewed aggregately, as the abode of Intellect, the Maker of the world.

But this Supreme Intellect is regarded as located, not only in Ignorance as unmodified, but also in the same Ignorance when developed into "subtile bodies," and "gross bodies," in their aggregate form. Furthermore, a parallel is closely drawn throughout between the Lordly and the individual Intellect and Ignorance in the aggregate and in its distributive form. Let us follow this parallel. We saw that the aggregation of Intellect was regarded first as the body of "the Lord," and the cause of all. Viewed distributively, on the other hand, Ignorance is said to be the abode and body of its Inferior, *i. e.*, the human soul. "Soul, located in this, having such qualities as want of knowledge and want of power, is called 'the very defective intelligence.'" This body is also said to be a cause, — the cause of the conceit of individuality and the like. Between these two Intellects there is really no more difference, we are told, than exists between a forest and the trees which compose it. Again: subtile bodies may be viewed in their totality, or in their individuality, and the aphorism which states the connection between Intellect and subtile bodies, is interesting as unfolding a connection between this Vedânta philosophy and the creations of mythology. Thus it is said: "Intellect, located in this collective totality of subtile bodies, is called 'Soul-thread' because it is passed like a thread through all, — and the 'embryo of light' (*hiranyagarbha*), because it is the superintendent of the intelligent sheath, and 'life,' because it is the superintendent of the 'vital sheath.'" This collective totality is the subtile body of *Hiranyagarbha*. This personage, whose name we will not again inflict upon the reader, figures largely in mythological writings, as the earlier Upanishads, in connection with the creation of the world. His appearance here is a mark of the attempt by the Vedânta school to reconcile philosophy with the popular religion. "Intellect located in the distributive arrangement of subtile bodies is called 'the resplendent.'" Once more: Intellect located in the collective aggregate of gross bodies, is called the "Spirit of Humanity," and this gross body is called the "nutrimentitious sheath." "Intellect located in the distributive

aggregate thereof is called the 'Pervader,' because, without abandoning the subtile body, it enters into gross bodies." It is next stated, that the collective aggregate of these three worlds is really but one great world, and that the Intellect in its correspondent forms, is really but one only.

Before quitting this cloud-land, another doctrine demands our notice. There are four conditions of the soul: 1, waking; 2, dreaming; 3, dreamless sleep; 4, "the fourth." When wide-awake, a man is as far as possible from bliss; he is encompassed with gross body, and in the full experience of sense. The next stage is the dreaming state; then a man is wrapped in the triad of sheaths, the subtile body knows nothing of the gross body or sensuous enjoyments, and dreams. The scene is called the "place of the dissolution of the totality of the gross;" forms seem to pass before him, but do not, and, to a dreamer, in the opinion of the Vedântin, the world really *is* not. The third scene is called "the place of the dissolution of both the gross and the subtile body." At that time, *i. e.*, in profound sleep, the Lord and the individual intelligence, enjoy blessedness by means of the very subtile modifications of Ignorance illuminated by Intellect. But even this height of felicity is not lofty enough for the aspiring soul; the developments of Ignorance have been got rid of; there still remains ignorance itself, in its "subtile modifications." This last stage is "the fourth," when the soul becomes identical with pure Intellect, the "Indivisible," consisting of existence, knowledge, and joy.

"Thus have we exhibited, under its generic aspect, the great error of clothing or investing the Real with the Unreal."

The Vedânta Sâra then specifies different objects with which men are liable to confound the soul, and proceeds to illustrate the true doctrine by an explanation of the "great sentence," "That art Thou." This sentence may be understood in two senses: when discrimination is not exercised, it is made to mean — That aggregate of the phenomenal art Thou; when understood clearly, it means — That Intellect apart from enwrapping Ignorance, art Thou; and then

resolves itself into the identical formula, Thou art Brahma, or God is God. And what is the result? "When the meaning of the Indivisible has thus been communicated, then does there occur to the competent student a modification of the understanding as moulded on the form of the Indivisible, and he says, '*I am the eternal, pure, knowing, free, true, self-existent, most blessed, infinite Brahma,—without a second.*'" But this is not enough; this act of thought is itself different from the Indivisible, and therefore a relic of Ignorance, the other member of the duality, and itself must die;—all *object* must cease, and subject alone remain.

"What more need be said? This one, merely for the sustenance of his body acquiescing in the experience of these retributive fruits, in the shape of pleasure or pain, procured from desire or aversion on our own part or on another's, — on the cessation thereof, his life dissolving away into the Supreme Deity who is unmingled beatitude, on the destruction of Ignorance and the *vis inertiae* of its results, — abideth God — in absolute simplicity — unvarying felicity — free from every semblance of difference."

We have spoken of the Vedânta philosophy as an attempt to harmonize the dogmas of the schools with the popular superstitions. We have seen how the Vedânta Sâra bears evident marks of this endeavor in its introduction of the mythical personage of the Upanishads and later religious writings, and in its mention of Brahma's egg, with the general cosmogonic apparatus so familiar to modern Hinduism. Before leaving this philosophy, let us note still another point in which, in a later phase, this philosophy has met the popular religion. We refer to the identifying of Sakti, the female energy of the Gods, with Ignorance, and the exalting of Illusion, a synonym for Ignorance, with the wife of Brahmâ. The possible mode in which this personification took place may be thus explained. Ignorance, regarded as the cause of the world, would naturally be identified with the Nature

or Prakriti of the Sâṅkhya philosophy. But as this world is the creation of God's will, according to the Nyâya system, the direct origin of the world, Ignorance or Prakriti, might with equal propriety, be called Sakti or the "power" or "energy" of God. Lastly, this world, if Ignorance alone cause it to exist for us, is in truth a sheer illusion, a mirage, and for Ignorance, why not substitute Mâyâ — deceit, illusion, jugglery?" However these fanciful conceptions arose, they are to-day the popular philosophy. Sakti is not the unconscious cause of all, nor is Mâyâ abstract illusion; Sakti is the personified energy, the ever-present consort of the deities, while Mâyâ has taken her seat in the Hindu pantheon, as the wife of Brahmâ.¹

The fall of Buddhism was coincident with the rise of Vedântism. For the first few centuries after Christ, Buddhism was actively propagated in the north and west of India. In the fourth century, Fa Hian, a Buddhist pilgrim from China, speaks of his faith as prevailing everywhere, though from his mention of its decline in the region of its birth, we gather that its aggressive movements were hardly more than struggles for life, if not the result of persecution; while in the seventh century, Hionen-thsang, another Chinese pilgrim, who journeyed to India for the purpose of visiting the holy places of Buddhism and gathering original documents relating to the faith, laments over the decay which was apparent everywhere, — "in deserted monasteries, ruined temples, diminished number of mendicants, and augmented proportion of heretics." Buddhism from that time lingered along, until in the sixteenth century, the minister of the emperor Akber could find no one competent to give an intelligent account of its teachings.²

Various opinions have been offered as to the cause of its decline. Burnouf gives us what purports to be a prediction of sufferings which the Buddhists would in some future day

¹ Vedânta Sâra, p. 15. Vishnu Purâna, p. 655.

² See Müller: *Buddhism and Buddhist Pilgrims. A Review of Julien's 'Voyages des Pèlerins Bouddhistes.'* Wilson: *Essay on Buddhism.* J. R. A. S. Vol. xvi. Part 2.

undergo ;— a passage, written doubtless when persecutions were threatening or actually in progress.¹ Current tradition in India traces the disappearance of Buddhists to a renowned teacher of Brahmanism, Kumârila Bhatta, who is said to have stirred up persecution against them, and been the means of expelling great numbers from the country. He lived about the seventh century of our era.² We think, however, that Wilson is most probably correct, in supposing that Buddhism died a natural death; or that if it owed its extinction to any pressure from without, that pressure was from the pen rather than from the sword,— the pen, whether of the kindred but antagonistic Jains, or the no less bitterly opposed Vedântists. Among the latter, perhaps the most widely celebrated was Sankara Âcharya ; well known throughout India for his numerous commentaries upon the Upanishads and the Vedânta Sûtras. As a religionist, Sankara achieved special renown for his service in reviving or more extensively propagating the worship of Siva, in opposition to that of Vishnu, whose adherents were specially numerous in the north. Sankara's success was chiefly in the south, although one legend recounts his triumphs in Kashmiri.³ In his commentary upon the Vedânta Sûtras, he stands forth as the uncompromising defender of traditional Brahmanism against all heresies, and specially the Buddhist. "The whole doctrine" says he "when tried and sifted, crumbles like a well sunk in loose sand. The opinions advanced in it are contradictory and incompatible; they are severally untenable and incongruous. By teaching them to his disciples, Buddha has manifested either his own absurdity and incoherence, or his rooted enmity to mankind, whom he sought to delude."⁴

The style of these writings, we may remark, is not a little interesting. Thus, when we hear the atomists contemptuously nick-named by their adversaries, as "feeders upon lit-

¹ Lotus de la Bonne Loi, p. 165, and note p. 408.

² Colebrooke Essays, p. 190. Wilson: Religious Sects of the Hindus.

³ Ibid: "Dandis." Preface to Sanskrit Dict., First Ed.

⁴ Colebrooke Essays, p. 257.

tle," and other sects, as, "lovers of controversy," we seem to get quite a lively picture of the polemical life of the day.¹

But the Vedântic writings are not the only class of works which seek to construct a satisfactory philosophy of religion. Vedântism was aimed directly against such schools as the Sâmkhya and Vaiseshika; but this occasioned difficulty in the mind of many; Kapila, Kanâda, and Gôtama, though sometimes accounted heretical, yet professed to found their teachings upon the Veda, and supported their position by ample quotations; if then, all philosophies, whether called orthodox or not, were equally based upon the Veda, all were equally true: why were they at variance with each other? Again; if two sets of doctrines, so palpably opposed to each other found like countenance in the Veda, then the Veda itself must be self-contradictory and unreliable. The attempt to obviate this difficulty gave rise to a sort of eclectic philosophy, which sought to construct a common basis, upon which the various conflicting theories of the Vedas and the other schools of philosophy could stand. The two best representatives of such an attempt, which remain to us, are to be found in the doctrines of the Swêtâswatara Upanishad² and the Bhagavad Gîtâ.

The former of these originated some time after the Composition of the Vedânta Sûtras, and before the time of Sankara, as it mentions all the six schools by name, and is itself commented on by Sankara.³ That a writing, comparatively so modern, should be received as one of the Upanishads is

¹ A relic of Buddhism still exists, it is supposed, in the worship of the well-known Jagannath. Mr. Cunningham, known for his explorations of Buddhist mounds, thinks the triad of Jagannath, his brother and sister, to be nothing but a modified form of the Buddhist symbol of Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha, the result of a politic compromise on the part of the Brahmans. A confirmation of this plausible suggestion is the fact that caste is actually set aside within the precincts of this temple and on the festival in honor of the god. The only other case which has come to our knowledge, where caste is disregarded, is in the instance mentioned by Gangooly, in his "Life and Religion of the Hindoos," a little book which, as written by a native, contains much curious matter relating to the social and religious life of the people.

² Bibliotheca Indica, No. 41. Translated by Dr. Rœr. See Introduction.

³ Sankara flourished in the Eighth Century, A. D.

not strange in an unhistorical country like India, where an author could best gain currency for his sentiments by stamping them with the mark of antiquity. The treatise seeks apparently to harmonize the Sâṅkhya and the Vedânta theories. It admits the Prakṛiti of the former, but identifies it with the Mâyâ of the latter.¹ It accepts the definition of the soul as the thinking principle, common to the Sâṅkhya and Vedânta, but holds the Vedânta tenet that all souls are but one and the same great soul, and the Sâṅkhya tenet that soul is eternal. Creation, it asserts, could not come from a blind Nature, nor from a fallible human spirit; its cause must be an allwise and almighty being. It also borrows from the Yoga school, the theory of mortifications as an aid to liberation.²

We quote in illustration a single passage, in which the relation of the supreme to the individual soul is set forth :

“Two birds (these two souls) always united, of equal name, dwell upon one and the same tree (the body). The one of them (the individual) enjoys the sweet fruit of the fig-tree, the other looks round as a witness.

“Dwelling on the same tree (with the supreme soul) the deluded (individual) soul, immersed (in the relations of the world) is grieved by the want of power: but when it sees the other, — the long worshipped ruler as different (from all worldly relations), and his glory, then his grief ceases.”³

But the most striking attempt at harmonizing conflicting theories comes to us in a work which has obtained even an occidental celebrity; viz., the Bhagavad Gîtâ.

Sir Charles Wilkins was the first to present his countrymen with a translation of this work, — 1785. His English version was followed in 1823 by a Latin translation of A. W. von Schlegel, which was revised in 1846 by his pupil C. Lassen. In the same year Galanos, a Greek, published a translation of the work into that tongue which is the most

¹ This indicates that the conception of Mâyâ had currency before Sankara's day at least.

² See the interesting introduction of Dr. Röer.

³ S. Upan. p. 58.

renowned of all the daughters of Sanskrit. Lastly, Mr. J. C. Thomson has published a choice English version, and accompanied it with copious notes and a lengthy introduction upon the history of philosophy in India. In his introduction, he brings forward a good deal of interesting matter, but it is to be regretted that he did not avail himself of the labors of scholars since Colebrooke. He contributes no facts which are not to be found in the latter author.

The Bhagavad Gîtâ is professedly a portion of the Mahâ-bhârata, one of the two great epics of India, but its connection with this work has sometimes been misunderstood. This epic is in fact, a vast collection of legendary matter relating chiefly to the early Argan settlers in India; yet it by no means possesses any unity of plan throughout. The most connected portion of the work, about a fourth of the whole, is occupied with the recital of the strife between two kindred but rival lines, for the sovereignty of a kingdom in Upper India. The Bhagavad Gîtâ appears as an episode in this portion of the epic: it is a discussion between Arjuna, a leader of one of the hostile parties, and the god Krishna, who had come to befriend him. The opposing forces are drawn up in battle array, when Arjuna, dismayed at the sight of near relations in the ranks of the enemy, throws down his weapons, declaring that "it would be better to eat the bread of beggary in this world, than to slay these venerable men of great esteem." Thereupon, the god, to encourage him, entertains him on the spot with a lengthy harangue upon philosophy, proving conclusively that Arjuna's present duty was to fight. This episode is, however, universally regarded now as not an original portion of the story, but as an interpolation by a later hand, ingeniously woven into the plot of the epic, the result of an attempt, it will be seen, precisely similar to that which we last mentioned, to gain currency and authority for a philosophical theory by associating it with a work which already enjoyed a high repute.

¹ The Bhagavad Gîtâ: translated by J. Cockburn Thomson. Hertford, Eng. 1855. We shall refer to this edition.

Which of the two is the earlier, it is difficult to say. Mention is made in it of the "Vedânta" and of the "Brahma Sûtras,"¹ and there is throughout the work a general prevalence of Vedânta ideas; yet it does not refer to these so pointedly as to the Sâmkhya and Yoga. We feel disposed to refer the work to a period when the Vedânta philosophy was just rising into prominence, and to consider the treatise itself as designed to harmonize the Sâmkhya and Yoga doctrines, from a Vedânta point of view.

The Sâmkhya, we have seen, lays down knowledge without works as the road to bliss; the Yoga, works as a preparation, and, to a certain extent, a substitute for knowledge. The special doctrine of the Bhagavad Gîtâ is well expressed in the opening of the fifth chapter. "Renunciation of, and devotion through, works are both means of final emancipation; but of these two, devotion through works is more highly esteemed than renunciation of them. He who neither hates nor loves is to be considered a constant renouncer of actions. For he who is free from the influence of opposites, O strong armed one! is liberated from the bonds of action without any trouble. Boys, but not wise men, speak of the Sâmkhya and Yoga doctrines as different. For he who is devoted to one only, experiences the fruits of both. That place which is gained by the followers of the Sâmkhya, is also attained by those of the Yoga system. He who sees that the Sâmkhya and Yoga are one, sees indeed." The cardinal doctrine of the Gîtâ is, briefly, disinterested action,—action put forth with no reference to a reward. Says Krishna: "Let then the motive for action be in the action itself, never in its reward. Do not be incited to actions by (the hope of) reward only, nor yet indulge a propensity to inertness." This last clause seems to be aimed against the followers of the pure Yoga school, which counselled retreat from the world. Krishna is more Christian in

¹ Bhag. Gîtâ, p. 86, 101. Thomson tries unsuccessfully to explain away this fact.

² Ibid. p. 16.

enjoining upon his pupils to be in the world and yet not of it. The principle of entire indifference is forcibly laid down in the following passage.

“He who neither rejoices, nor hates, nor grieves, nor loves, who has no interest in good or bad, and is full of devotion, is dear to me. The man who is the same to a foe or a friend, in honor or ignominy, the same in cold or heat, pleasure or pain, and free from interests, alike in blame or praise, taciturn, and content with whatever may be, who has no home, who is steady-minded and full of devotion, is dear to me.”¹

According to this system, it is not actions themselves which entail evil, but merely actions associated with interest. Actions are, as in the Sāṅkhya, necessitated; “For one can never, for a single moment, even exist without doing some action. For every one is forced, even against his will, to perform an action, by the qualities which spring from nature.”²

The theory of the poem respecting the bearing of devotion upon works, is interesting, especially when compared with the kindred doctrine of the Yoga. The latter system urges devotion as a help to renunciation of works, but attaches slight importance to worship of Deity in itself. The Gītâ views devotion with reference to the same end, but makes far more prominent the idea of worship itself, and also identifies an individual Deity,—Krishna, with this supreme spirit. The work was evidently composed in the interest of a religious sect. The prominence of devotion will be seen from the following extracts :

“Renunciation of actions is difficult to obtain without devotion. The anchorite who practises devotion approaches the Supreme Spirit in no long time. The practiser of devotion, whose spirit is purified, who has subdued himself and vanquished his senses, whose soul participates in the souls of all creatures, is not polluted even by action.”³

¹ Bhag. Gītâ, p. 84.

² Ibid. p. 22.

³ Ibid. p. 38. For an interesting view of devotion as a means of liberation, in the B. Gītâ and Vedânta, see Burnouf: *Introd. to Bhāgavata Purāna*, p. cxi. note 1.

“Those who worship me, placing their hearts on me with constant devotion, and gifted with the highest faith, are considered by me as the most devoted. But those who worship the indivisible, indemonstrable, unmanifested, omnipresent, difficult-to-contemplate, all-pervading, immovable, and firm, — if they restrain all the senses, and are equally minded towards everything, and rejoice in the good of all beings, also attain to me only. Their labor is greater, since their thoughts are directed to an object which has no manifest form. For the path which is not manifest is with difficulty attained by mortals. But if men renounce in me all their actions, intent on me, and meditating on me with exclusive devotion, worship me, — if their thoughts are directed towards me, I become ere long their extricator from the ocean of the world of mortality. Dispose thy heart towards me only, to me attach thy thoughts, without doubt thou wilt dwell within me on high after this life. But if thou art not able to compose thy thoughts immovably on me, strive then to reach me by assiduous devotion, O despiser of wealth! If thou art not capable even of assiduity, be intent on the performance of actions for me. If thou art unable to do even this, though filled with devotion to me, then abandon (regard for) the fruit of every action, being self-restrained. For knowledge is better than assiduity, contemplation is preferred to knowledge, the abandonment of self-interest in every action to contemplation; final emancipation results immediately from such abandonment.”¹

In its theory of God and the world, the Gîtâ partly harmonizes the doctrines of other schools, and partly propounds new views. It accepts the Prakriti of the Sâṅkhya, and asserts that all things emanated spontaneously from it; yet it associates with Prakriti one who is not merely, according to the Nyâya, a creator by will, but also the *material* cause of creation, and one with Prakriti, which is nothing less than original Vedântism. Thus Krishna says, identifying himself, as also throughout the poem, with the supreme Being:

¹ Bhag. Gîtâ, p. 82.

"I am the cause of the production and dissolution of the whole universe. On me is all the universe suspended, as numbers of pearls on a string. I am the savor in waters, the luminous principle in the moon and sun, the sound in the ether, the masculine essence in men, the sweet smell in the earth; and I am the brightness in the flame, the vitality in all beings, and the power of mortification in ascetics."¹

But this Supreme Spirit, which, united with Nature, is the origin of all developed matter, is also the source of all individual spirits, which at liberation return to it, and lose their individual existence. But besides this Supreme Spirit, the double source of matter and separate spirits, the Gîtâ mentions a third spiritual essence, and differs in this from all other schools. It is thus described :

"These two spirits exist in the world, the divisible and also the indivisible. The divisible is every living being. The indivisible is said to be that which pervades all. But there is another, the highest spirit, designated by the name of the Supreme Soul, which, as the imperishable master, penetrates and sustains the triple world. Since I surpass the divisible, and am higher also than the indivisible, I am, therefore, celebrated in the world and in the Vedas as the highest Person. He who, not deluded, knows me to be thus the highest Person, knows all things, and worships me by every condition."²

If we understand the poem, this third Being is the only true personality, and the highest object of worship; the indivisible is rather the impersonal creative energy, vitalizing both matter and individual souls.

The poem seems to be arranged in three divisions of six short chapters each. The first section treats mainly of practical Yoga, with the modifications accepted by the author; the second of theology; while the last develops specifically the metaphysical opinions of the writer, based chiefly upon the Sâṅkhya.

It would be admitted on all hands, that there occur

¹ Bhag. Gîtâ, p. 51.

² Ibid. p. 101.

throughout this poem, passages of peculiar force and beauty, and after dwelling upon them, one can easily imagine the control which they would exercise over a Hindu mind, and understand the high esteem in which the work has ever been held in India. In dismissing it, we would first quote a few of the more striking passages. The appeals to Arjuna to fight, notwithstanding relatives might fall by his hand, are exceedingly adroitly framed, as they appear even in the stiffness of a translation.

"Thou hast grieved for those who need not be grieved for, but thou utterest words of wisdom. The wise grieve not for dead or living. But never at any period did I, or thou, or these kings of men, not exist, nor shall any of us at any time henceforward cease to exist. . . . These finite bodies have been said to belong to an eternal, indestructible, and infinite Spirit. Therefore fight, O Bhârata! He who believes that this spirit can kill, and he who thinks that it can be killed, both of these are wrong in judgment. It neither kills nor is killed. It is not born, nor dies at any time. It has had no origin, nor will it ever have an origin. Unborn, changeless, eternal, both as to future and past time, it is not slain when the body is killed.¹

"How can that man who knows that it is indestructible, constant, unborn, and inexhaustible, cause the death of anybody, or kill anybody himself! As a man abandons worn out clothes and takes other new ones, so does the soul quit worn out bodies and enter other new ones. Weapons can-

¹ How admirably has Mr. Emerson seized the spirit of this passage in his rendering : —

"If the red slayer think he slays,
Or the slain think he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass, and turn again ;" etc.

This passage from our poem was adopted from the *Katha Upanishad*, where the English version approaches closely Mr. Emerson's language. "If the slayer thinks I slay, if the slain thinks I am slain, then both of them do not know well. It does not slay, nor is it slain." — *Bibliotheca Indica*, No. 50, p. 105. Mr. Griffith has also versified this passage, "*Specimens of old Indian Poetry*." London, 1852.

not cleave it; fire cannot burn it, nor can water wet it, nor can wind dry it. It is impenetrable, incombustible, incapable of moisture and also of drying. It is constant, capable of going everywhere, firm, immovable, and eternal. It is said to be invisible, incomprehensible, immutable. Therefore, knowing it to be such, thou art not right to grieve for it.”¹

We quote one more passage, in which the author attempts to describe the Infinite Spirit. Arjuna had besought Krishna to reveal to him his sovereign form. Krishna complies, and Arjuna exclaims:

“I behold all the gods in thy body, O god! and crowds of different beings, the lord Brahmâ on a throne of a lotus cup, and all the Rishis and celestial serpents. I see thee with many arms, stomachs, mouths, and eyes, everywhere of infinite form. I see neither end, nor middle, nor yet beginning of thee, O Lord of All! Of the form of All! Crowned with a diadem, bearing a club and a discus. I see thee, a mass of light, beaming everywhere, hard to look upon, bright as a kindled fire or the sun, on all sides, immeasurable. I believe thee to be the indivisible, the highest object of knowledge, the supreme receptacle of this universe, the imperishable preserver of eternal law, the everlasting person. Tell me who thou art, of awful form. Salutation to thee, O best of gods! Be merciful! I desire to know thee, the primeval one, for I cannot divine what thou art about.” Krishna replies: “I am Death, come hither to destroy mankind,” and bids Arjuna fight; whereupon he again addresses Krishna: “O infinite king of gods! habitation of the universe! thou art the one indivisible, the existing and not existing, that which is supreme. Thou art the first of the gods, the most ancient person. Thou art the supreme receptacle of this universe. Thou knowest all, and mayest be known, and art the supreme mansion. By thee is this universe caused to emanate, O thou of endless forms! Air, Yama, fire, Varuna, the moon, the progenitor, and the great grandfather (of the world) art thou. Hail! hail to thee! hail to thee a thousand

¹ Bhag. Gîtâ, p. 11.

times! and again, yet again, hail! hail to thee! Hail to thee from before! Hail to thee from behind! Hail to thee from all sides too! Thou All! of infinite power and immense might; thou comprehendest all; therefore thou art All. As I took thee merely for a friend, I beseech thee without measure to pardon whatever I may, in ignorance of this thy greatness, have said from negligence or affection, such as, O Krishna! O son of Yadu! O friend! and everything in which I may have treated thee in a joking manner, *Eternal One.*"¹

Before concluding this sketch of Hindu philosophy, there remain to be noticed a few phases which it has assumed in modern days, the most important of which is represented to us in the Purânas. The eighteen Purânas close, if we may so speak, the canon of Hindu scriptures. They are a crude compound of mythology and philosophy, of ancient tradition and modern history, of geography and uranography, containing also minute directions for the social and religious life. They are written, each in the interest of some special deity, usually some form of Siva or Vishnu, and appear to have originated in that general religious awakening which occurred under the leadership of Sankara Âcharya and his rivals of the Vaishnavite school, about the seventh century of our era. Of these Purânas, the two most celebrated have been translated, one by Wilson into English,² and the other by Burnouf into French;³ both of these contain valuable introductions.

The philosophy in these Purânas can hardly be said to belong to any school, or be itself a separate system. It is rather a jumble of various theories, without much regard to

¹ Bhag. Gitâ, p. 75.

² The Vishnu Purâna: a system of Hindu Mythology and Tradition; translated by H. H. Wilson, Oxford, 1840.

³ Bhâgavata Purâna: ou histoire poétique de Krishna; texte Sanscrit et traduction française, par Eng. Burnouf. 3 vol. Paris. This is a truly imperial work. M. Neve has also published interesting "études" upon the Purânas. Paris: 1852.

consistency of statement. Its chief alliance is with the Sâṅkhya, but it borrows largely from the Vedânta.¹

In the Vishnu Purâṇa, the impersonal Brahma is said to be source of all, and is of course identified with Vishnu himself. Brahma is said to exist in four forms, as Supreme Spirit, as Prakriti, or undeveloped matter, as developed matter, and as Time. "These four forms, in their due proportions, are the causes of the production of the phenomena of creation, preservation, and destruction. Vishnu, being thus discrete and undiscrete substance, spirit and time, sports like a playful boy."² At the dissolution of the universe, when, as in the Sâṅkhya system, spirit is said to be detached from all matter, the Deity as Time is held to abide alone, to sustain both matter and spirit, and to be the agent of their reunion after the lapse of a certain period.

The successive developments of matter, at creation, proceed much as in the earlier systems, but to account for the origin of living beings a theory is introduced which is a stranger to most of those systems, though unquestionably of ancient origin. It is that of a creative egg, which thus arose.

The several elements, with their respective properties, assumed, we are told, "the character of our mass of entire unity; and from the direction of spirit, with the acquiescence of the indiscrete principle, Intellect and the rest, to the gross elements inclusive, formed an egg, which gradually expanded, like a bubble of water. This vast egg, O Sage, compounded of the elements, and resting on the waters, was the excellent natural abode of Vishnu in the form of Brahmâ. Its womb, vast as the mountain Meru, was composed of the mountains; and the mighty oceans were the waters that filled its cavity. In that egg, O Brahman, were the continents and seas and mountains, the planets and divisions of the universe, the gods, the demons, and mankind." This egg was surrounded by seven envelopes, — the five elements,

¹ The Bhag. Purâṇa acknowledges Kapila as teacher. Book III. chap. 33.

² Vishnu Purâṇa, p. 9.

self-consciousness, Intellect, and Prakriti. Vishnu (= Brahma) in the form of Brahmâ, proceeds to *create* the universe. As Vishnu, he *preserves* it until the close of a period termed Kalpa. As Siva, he *destroys* it. "Having thus devoured all things, and converted the world into one vast ocean, the Supreme reposes upon his mighty serpent-couch (symbolical of Time), amidst the deep: he awakens after a season, and again, as Brahmâ, becomes the author of creation. Thus the one only god takes the designation of Brahmâ, Vishnu, and Siva, accordingly as he creates, preserves, or destroys."¹

The details of creation bear more upon mythology than philosophy, and need not occupy us. It is noticeable that while the ancient myth of a creative egg is so prominent in this Purâna, the conception of Mâyâ as the author of creation is "a doctrine foreign to most of the Purânas, and was first introduced among them apparently by the Bhâgavata."²

The notion of an egg is found in the Laws of Menu,³ a work of probably several centuries before Christ, and which also advocates a modified form of the Sâṅkhya philosophy. According to this author, "the soul of all beings, having willed to produce various beings from his own divine substance, first, with a thought, created the waters, and placed in them a productive seed; that seed became an egg, bright as gold, blazing, like the luminary, with a thousand beams; and in that egg he was born himself, Brahmâ, the great forefather of all spirits."⁴ From this egg proceeded the several developments of Prakriti, in the order of the Sâṅkhya philosophy, the reverse order of the Purânas.

Of the six schools of Hindu philosophy which we have now considered, the Nyâya and the Vedânta are the most popular in India at the present day. Vedântism finds its

¹ Vishnu Purâna, chap. II.

² Ibid. p. 8.

³ Institutes of Hindu Law, or the Ordinances of Menu; translated by Sir William Jones.

⁴ Ibid. chap. I.

advocates, not only in North India, nor only in the classical speech of the Brahmans ; it is cultivated in other parts of the continent, and in dialects deemed barbarous by the Sanskrit settlers of India. Tamil in the South, the most vigorous of all the indigenous languages has an extensive philosophical literature, only lately opened to us. Rev. H. R. Hoisington, late missionary in Jaffna, Ceylon, translated several treatises from the Tamil.¹ These contained a certain mystical element which seems to be the special offspring of the Tamil mind: indeed, it was the translator's opinion that there were not a few indications to be gathered from these works, that philosophy was independently cultivated by the Tamil speaking people previously to the Sanskrit colonization of southern India. How far he was correct in his opinion, we do not feel prepared to say: that the works themselves, as the most popular treatises of south India, are deserving of careful study, no one who reads them can fail to see. Two works upon the Vedânta philosophy in its most modern dress, have also been given us by Dr. C. Graul of the Lutheran Missionary Institution, Leipsig;² and Rev. Thomas Foulkes, Church Missionary at Madras.³

But Vedântism, with all pure Hindu speculation, is passing away; it is leaving the hands of the few, the "twice-born," and becoming the possession of all classes and professions. A native writer might lament over philosophy as one long ago did over poetry: "Now, old and decrepid, her beauty faded, and her unadorned feet slipping as she walks, in whose cottage does she disdain to take shelter?" but the ground for his lament we look upon as ground for rejoicing. This freedom to search the truth, the English conquest has procured for India, and while Kapila, Gôtama,

¹ Jour. Am. Orient. Soc. Vol. IV. On the Antiquity of Dravidian Literature. See the Introduction to Caldwell's Compar. Gram. of Dravidian Languages. London: 1856.

² Kaivaljanavanita (Fresh Butter of Eternal Bliss): a Vedânta Poem; translated by C. Graul, D. D. Leipsig: 1855.

³ The Elements of the Vedântic Philosophy; translated by Thos. Foulkes. Madras: 1860.

and Vyâsa are still revered and studied, the teachings of Plato, Bacon and Descartes find also many a zealous defender upon the banks of the sacred river. England has hitherto given India an education shorn of Christianity, and the consequence has been that the favorite school with "Young Bengal" is a school of Deism; but a brighter day is dawning: revolutions in opinion do not spring up suddenly in this oriental world; yet the time is coming, when the Gospel of Christ, having gained access to the spiritual convictions of the multitude of India, shall gather up and appropriate to itself those secret truths which Hinduism contains, and shall solve those serious problems of life and eternity with which the Hindu mind has been so long and fruitlessly engaged.

ARTICLE II.

THEORIES OF MESSIANIC PROPHECY.

BY REV. S. C. BARTLETT, PROFESSOR IN CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE subject of Messianic Prophecy is attended with great difficulties. Certain portions of the Old Testament are so direct in their reference to Christ and his Kingdom, and so distinctly appropriated by him and his apostles, as to secure a general recognition among all who believe in prophecy and inspiration. But around this circle of clear light — the direct prophecies — there is a broad penumbra of doubt and debate.

In regard to a large part of this debated ground, the question among evangelical expositors has often been more as to the mode than the fact of a Messianic reference. And their concurrent recognition of the fact has often been the more weighty and impressive by reason of their diverse theories concerning the mode. It is interesting also to

observe how the weight of evidence in regard to particular passages has sometimes pressed upon candid scholars, till it has forced them to remodel their theories, or even to receive the fact to the detriment of their theories. Rosenmuller was constrained to reverse the judgment of his first edition, and in his Compend to receive not only the second, forty-fifth, seventy-second, and one-hundred and tenth, but even the twenty-first Psalm, as Messianic. Hengstenberg, in the interval between his Christology and his Commentary on the Psalms, found it necessary very materially to modify his views, and to include the thirty-fifth, thirty-eighth, forty-first, and sixty-ninth Psalms in the same class with the sixteenth, twenty-second, and fortieth. He did it by abandoning the exclusive reference of the latter class to Christ, and making them a set of generic utterances concerning "the ideal righteous sufferer," which apply in their fulness only to the suffering Saviour. We may question the theory; but it resulted in very considerably enlarging his catalogue of the Psalms ultimately relating to Christ. The late Professor Stuart, in discussing the numerous citations of Psalm sixty-ninth by Christ's apostles,¹ though he takes the position that "David is originally and personally meant, and not Christ," and that these citations are made only as apposite and felicitous quotations, just as "we are accustomed continually to quote and apply maxims and sentiments from the classic writers," yet changes the whole bearing of his position by the brief remark that "David, as King, was, beyond all reasonable doubt, a type of King Messiah; and what was done in respect to the type may, by the usage of the New Testament writers, be applied to the antitype."² The gradual expansion of view in the mind of Tholuck is well exemplified by a single instance: The fourth edition of his Commentary on John explains the Saviour's declaration, "Moses wrote of me" (John v. 46), as a reference to the

¹ Matt. xxvii. 34, 38, xxiii. 38; Mark, xv. 23; John, ii. 17, xix. 28, 29, xv. 25; Acts, i. 20; Rom. xi. 9, xv. 3.

² Stuart's Hints on Prophecy, pp. 37, 39.

single passage found in Deut. xviii. 18. But in the seventh edition he writes as follows: "On ἔγραψεν the commentators refer to different Mosaic prophecies, especially to Deut. xviii. 18. But the train of thought in our passage leads us to take it in a universal sense, by virtue of which Bengel adds to ἔγραψεν a 'nusquam non, he writes everywhere.' . . . Christ may have had in his eye the indirect and typical prophecies of Moses as well as the direct ones."

The fluctuating views of individuals, no less than the conflicting opinions of different writers, indicate the intrinsic difficulty of the subject. The topic itself has lain before the church and occupied the attention of its leading minds from the beginning. It was not brought there by idle curiosity; but the sacred writers themselves have placed even its more difficult aspects on the threshold of the gospel. The first two chapters of Matthew comprise four of the most perplexing of the Old Testament citations. Mark begins his narrative with quotations from Malachi and Isaiah. The first chapter of Luke connects the infant Saviour with the "throne of his father David" and the "house of Jacob," and in various ways binds the new dispensation close upon the events and predictions of the old.¹ John's gospel brings at once before its readers in connection with Christ, the voice in the wilderness, the Lamb of God, Jacob's vision, the psalmist's zeal for his Father's house, the temple, and the brazen serpent. And similar allusions run through the whole texture of the New Testament. The subject was not introduced by Rabbins, nor Alexandrian Jews, nor Christian Fathers, but by the sacred writers themselves.

The recent Oxford doubters have well indicated the importance of the topic. After objecting to such things as the recognition of any "symbolism of the gospel in the law," or of any distinction "in the elder prophecies between

¹ E. g., the sending of Gabriel, the prophecy concerning "Elias," the quotations from Zachariah and Isaiah, and the putting of Hannah's song in the mouth of Mary.

the temporal and the spiritual Israel," one writer proceeds as follows: "The question which has been suggested runs up into a more general one, 'the relation between the Old and New Testaments;' for the Old Testament will receive a different meaning accordingly as it is explained from itself or from the New. In the first case, a careful and conscientious study of each one for itself is all that is required; in the second case, the types and ceremonies of the law, perhaps the very facts and persons of the history, will be assumed to be predestined or made after a pattern corresponding to the things that were to be in the latter days. And this question of itself stirs another question respecting the interpretation of the Old Testament in the New. Is such interpretation to be regarded as the meaning of the original text, or an accommodation of it to the thoughts of other times?"¹ The writer does not exaggerate the importance of the question, nor deny the method of the sacred writers, while he clearly intimates his refusal to accept their authority as interpreters. He also, by implication, suggests some of the sources of difficulty.

The difficulties of the subject may be best presented by a few well-known instances. Of Christ's abode in Egypt and return to Palestine, it is declared in Matt. ii. 15: "He was there until the death of Herod, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, Out of Egypt have I called my Son." But the original passage (Hosea ii. 1), as Mr. Barnes truly says: "evidently speaks of God's calling his people out of Egypt under Moses;" and he ventures to add: "It cannot be supposed that the passage in Hosea was a prophecy of the Messiah, but was only used by Matthew to *express* that event." Again, Hebrews i. 5 applies to Christ the declaration: "I will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a son." The quotation is from 2 Sam. vii. 12—16, a passage in which God promises David a posterity with an everlasting kingdom, but threatens that posterity with chastisement "if he commit

¹ Professor Jowett, in "Recent Inquiries in Theology," p. 407.

iniquity," and closes with the assurance that "my mercy shall not depart from him, as I took it away from Saul." So the citation in Hebrews x. 5—7 ascribes to the Messiah the utterance of the words in Psalm xi. 6—8: "Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not," etc., though the same speaker, in verse 12, speaks of "mine iniquities." A similar difficulty in the sixty-ninth Psalm (ver. 5) was so formidable as to prevent Hengstenberg from admitting it into his Christology, although, as Alexander truly observes, no Psalm except the twenty-second is more distinctly applied to Christ in the New Testament. In 1 Cor. x. 3—6 we read that the fathers were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and did all eat the same spiritual meat, and did all drink the same spiritual drink; for they drank of that spiritual rock which followed them, and that rock was Christ; and that these things were our examples" (τύποι). John records, xix. 35, of the exemption of the Saviour from the breaking of his bones: "these things were done that the scripture should be fulfilled, which says, A bone of him shall not be broken." But the passage, Exodus vii. 46, which he quotes, is a direction concerning the paschal lamb. Paul, in Gal. iii. 16, refers thus to the promise to Abraham and his seed (Gen. xiii. 15, xvii. 8): "He saith not, And to seeds as of many, but as of one, And to thy seed, which is Christ." Afterwards he argues that by the union of believers to Christ, the same promise is to them, and concludes in verse 29: "And if ye be Christ's then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." Add to these instances the quotation of the eighth Psalm in Heb. ii. 6—8, with the subsequent application to Christ, the use of Isaiah vii. 14 in Matt. i. 22, 23, and of Isaiah xxix. 13 in Matt. xv. 7, and we have at least specimens of the chief forms of difficulty surrounding the subject of Messianic Prophecy.

The problem is to discover some fundamental and central principle, according to which these various kinds of passages can be understood, so as neither to abrogate the authority of the New Testament, nor to set aside the authority of the Old.

In enumerating the various attempts to solve the problem, we now lay aside the Rationalistic view, which holds that the cited passages of the Old Testament, and all other supposed Messianic prophecies, were destitute of all such reference, and that the apostles in their use of them were only misled by false methods of interpretation prevalent among their contemporaries. This ripe and rotten fruit of Neology seems at last to have found its way bodily into the English church.¹ This view strikes at the root of all authoritative teaching in the New Testament, and does not fall within the scope of this discussion.

Among the attempts made in modern times to meet, in whole or in part, the difficulties of the problem, we encounter:

I. The theory of accommodation. It might well be called of forced accommodation. It endeavors to escape the difficulty of some of the most troublesome passages, by denying that the apostles intended to cite the passages as veritable prophecies, and affirming that they employed them only as apt quotations. This principle was rigidly applied to all cases, however distinctly alleged by the evangelists to have been fulfilments, and even designed fulfilments, of the Old Testament, in which an earlier intended reference of the language plainly appeared. For the theory involves the principle that a given utterance can have but one legitimate reference.

The exegetical corner-stone of this theory was laid in that interpretation of the phrases *ἵνα πληρωθῇ, ὅπως πληρωθῇ, τότε ἐπληρώθη*, so elaborately defended by Tittmann, and in this country adopted so incautiously, as we think, by some of the standard-bearers of the church, till, through the great influence of Stuart and Woods and Robinson and Barnes, it has been spread through the land.² A chief part of the process was to maintain that *ἵνα* in the New

¹ See the articles by Dr. Williams and Professor Jowett, on Bunsen's Biblical Researches and the Interpretation of Scripture, in "Recent Inquiries."

² Tittmann's Discussion, with Professor Stuart's endorsement, may be found in the Biblical Repository, Jan. 1835.

Testament, besides its *telic* sense, denoting purpose, has also an *ecbatic* sense, "marking the event, result, upshot of an action, *so that, so as that*, implying something which actually takes place,"¹ and that this ecbatic sense is a very common signification.² The subjunctive mode of the following verb of course loses the force of a subjunctive, and becomes virtually indicative. Thus all intention is eliminated from the statement. Still further, the asserted "fulfilment" ceases to be an accomplishment of any actual *meaning* of the Old Testament writer, and becomes, in fact, a simple coincidence with his words. That this statement is not overdrawn appears in the language of the venerable Dr. Woods: "These phrases," he says, "are indeed used, and very properly, to introduce a real prediction which is accomplished, but not for this purpose only. They are often used, and with equal propriety, to denote a *mere comparison of similar events*, — to signify that the thing spoken of answers to the words of a prophet, so that his words may be justly applied to it. Accordingly, we might in many instances take a passage where it is said, such a thing was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, or that what was spoken by the prophet was fulfilled, and might express the same thing by saying, the declaration of the prophet had an accomplishment in what took place, or his words may be justly applied to it, or *they very well express it, or his observation is true in reference to the present case, or this thing is like what the prophet describes*."³ The only thing that could well be added to this extreme latitude of meaning would be Kuinoel's remark, that these phrases are employed not only when the very thing which was predicted takes place, but also "when anything occurs of such a character as to bring words like these to our own recollection!"⁴ And the convenient breadth of the principle was such that, while by means of it evangel-

¹ Robinson's N. T. Lexicon, Article *ἵνα*.

² See Tittmann's article, and Robinson's Lexicon.

³ Woods' Works, I. p. 122. The italics are his.

⁴ Kuinoel in Matt. i. 22.

ical writers were removing the difficulty from such passages as Matt. ii. 15, 17, Kuinoel and his fellows were taking out the prophecy from the citation in Matt. i. 22, and all similar declarations in the New Testament. And thus it made little difference whether you denied the inspiration or forced the language of the evangelists; the same result was easily reached.

Theological considerations have even been adduced to help the exegesis. It has been argued that to insist upon the telic sense in the passage last referred to (Matt. i. 22), would make the sacred writer assert that the Saviour's birth and the circumstances connected with it took place simply or chiefly for the sake of fulfilling a prophecy of Isaiah. "But," says Professor Stuart, "here the reflecting reader will be constrained to pause and ask, What, then? was it not to redeem a world in ruin that the Saviour's miraculous birth and the events accompanying took place, rather than merely to accomplish a prediction of Isaiah?" Yet in the next sentence he gives a virtual answer to his own difficulty: "The proper answer to this question may undoubtedly be that *both* of the purposes named were to be accomplished by the birth of Jesus. The world was to be redeemed, and the prophecy was also to be fulfilled. But the great and ultimate end must be the redemption of mankind. The other, viz. the fulfilment of the particular prophecy in question, was altogether subordinate, and merely preparatory."¹ Very true. But may not the writer ever allude to the subordinate end, especially when he is narrating the very circumstances that bear directly upon its accomplishment? In that connection it is the only relevant allusion. God had provided for the prophecy and the fulfilment. There was a designed adjustment of the circumstances of Christ's birth to meet the prophecy; and the events were brought to pass as they were, *in order to complete* God's arrangement. In stating that design and its accomplishment, the writer neither affirms nor denies the great purpose of his mission

¹ Bib. Repos. Vol. V. p. 86.

to the world. Precisely so the evangelists continually record the immediate and proximate ends of the Saviour's own proceedings, without deeming it necessary on every occasion to state the chief end of his life and labors. On this very ground Professor Stuart rebukes the excessive zeal of Tittmann. For when the latter pronounces the *ἵνα* of John xviii. 37 to be ecbatic ("For this end was I born," etc.), Professor Stuart expresses a doubt whether it be necessary to abandon the telic sense, adding: "We do not suppose the Saviour to mean that he had no other ends in view."¹

Another mode of argument is employed by Tittmann: "In Matt. ii. 15 we are told that Joseph remained concealed in Egypt till the death of Herod, that it might be fulfilled," etc.; but "it is quite certain that the end proposed by Joseph, and to be accomplished by staying in Egypt, was not the fulfilment of prophecy." True; but Matthew most manifestly relates it as one of *God's* designs in the case. To this it is objected by Dr. Robinson,² that to recognize the purpose of God in the case rather than the purpose of the subject of the clause, "is to introduce a new element in interpretation, and to destroy the force of language." But, we ask, can this principle be pushed through a single book of the Bible, that to learn the real and avowed purpose of a transaction we are tied down to the purpose of "the subject of the clause?" Or does the Bible, from beginning to end, distinguish between the lower, human intent and the *real, divine* object of that transaction? Is it not characteristic of the book? And do we need to be told by such men as Knobel, Meyer, and Winer, that "the Hebrew *teleologia* represents every (important, and especially every surprising) event as intended and designed by God?" And is it not a narrow principle of interpretation in any book that will, at all hazards, set aside the clear scope of the whole representation, and nowhere admit any other purpose of the

¹ Bib. Repos. Vol. V. p. 107, note.

² New Testament Lexicon, *ἵνα*, ii. note.

³ Winer's N. T. Grammar, § 53, 6.

transaction than the purpose of the subject of some "clause," in connection with which the purpose is stated? Now, in these narratives of fulfilled prophecy, are the Evangelists viewing man or, most manifestly, God as the chief actor in the event? And when the sacred writer, thus clearly viewing God as the real author of the series of events which he describes, adduces one of God's prophecies as receiving a designed fulfilment in that series of events, which, we ask, is the new element of interpretation,—to recognize, or to refuse to recognize, the intention of the moving agency to which the writer plainly refers the whole transaction? And is it destroying the force of language to understand the aim of a phrase of citation in accordance with the very design for which the writer makes the citation? It is of no consequence whether the citation be of a direct prophecy, or of an historical or typical parallel. If the writer sees fit to assert a real and pre-arranged connection between the type and the antitype, it is the duty of an interpreter to permit him to make his own statements.

The laws of language, fairly applied, must govern here. And the best scholarship of the present day, by an overwhelming vote, repudiates this view of ἡνα πληρωθῆ, and this forced accommodation. The advocates of this view had at least four points which they were bound to establish: well-proved instances of the ecabatic use of ἡνα in the New Testament; a clear necessity for substituting the alleged exceptional meaning in *any* given case for the almost universal telic meaning; the most weighty reasons for elevating this exceptional meaning into a quite common usage; extraordinary arguments to justify such a course in the case of utterances so deliberately and distinctly asserting an intention and arrangement, as, "all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet;" "these things were done that the scripture should be fulfilled," etc. But even the first of these positions is far from being unanimously conceded at present. Tittmann, indeed, with a dashing carelessness of citation, found plenty of instances, and among them such as John i. 7; xi. 4; xv. 42;

xviii. 37, and the like! But Meyer declares that the particle *iva* in the New Testament "is never anything else than the particle of purpose, *that, in order that.*" Alford takes the same ground, and endeavors to sustain it in his interpretation of particular passages. Olshausen asserts that it "always expresses an intention."¹ Passow, in the last edition of the *Lexicon*, though referring to the N. T. use of the word, does not give the ecbatic meaning as found there. Winer in his grammar goes through with a brief examination of passages, and does not, unless in a single instance (found in the Apocalypse), distinctly admit the meaning. Tholuck (on Rom. iii. 19) ventures only to say that the ecbatic meaning "can hardly be denied with safety in the New Testament, since at all events the distinction is here and there so subtle, that it can scarcely have come to the speaker's consciousness." Ellicott guardedly admits three uses of *iva*, — the final, sub-final, and eventual; the first being "the primary and principal, and never to be given up except on the most distinct counter arguments;" the second, "occasional;" the third, "apparently in a few cases, and due, perhaps, more to what is called 'Hebrew Teleology,' (*i. e.* the reverential aspect under which the Jews regarded prophecy and its fulfilment) than grammatical depravation."²

Such is the present attitude of eminent scholars even on the naked question of the ecbatic or eventual use of the conjunction *iva*. But as to the other points involved, and especially the main question, whether the phrase *iva πληρωσθῆ*, under all the circumstances in the passages referred to, can fairly be understood in the sense advocated by Dr. Woods, Prof. Stuart, and Mr. Barnes, and whether it indicates anything short of a previously designed correspondence, — some sort of objective connexion between the fact and the Old Testament utterance, — the best modern scholarship, so far as we are aware, is almost wholly on one side, — and that side is the negative. Such is the position not only of Meyer, Alford, Winer, and Olshausen, but of De Wette,

¹ See the comments of Meyer, Alford, and Olshausen on Matt. i. 22.

² Ellicott on Ephesians, i. 17.

Wordsworth, Tholuck, Alexander, Davidson, Fairbairn, Lee.¹ Thus Winer, *e. g.*, says in regard to the expression in question, "there can be no doubt of its having in the mouth (of a Jewish teacher and consequently) of Jesus and the apostles (in reference to an event already taken place) strictly and precisely the sense of *that it might be fulfilled*." And Rudelbach sums up the present state of the case thus: "The signification of the oft-recurring phrase, *ἵνα πληρωθῇ*, as involving a real connection between prophecy and its fulfilment, is no longer questioned by the more judicious expositors. The fact that grammar itself, against the will of those who handle it, is compelled at least to give formal testimony to the Faith, is not to be overlooked as an apologetic element of the Christian evidences; and indeed it has never, when the occasion offered, been overlooked by the ancients. The sense, however, of that formula is plainly nothing else than what lies in the expression itself, viz. that the fulfilment has taken place *in order* to display the truth of the prophecy."² We need have no hesitation in accepting substantially this statement of the case; in the words of Alexander, "the event was necessary to the execution of the divine purpose, as expressed in the prediction." For even if we should admit an occasional "hypotelic" or "eventual" use of the single word *ἵνα* in the New Testament, yet in those deliberate statements in which the sacred writers are solemnly recording the wonder-working Providence of God, that made event and utterance correspond, we believe that to reduce the grave declaration, *τοῦτο δὲ ὅλον γέγονεν ἵνα πληρωθῇ τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ κυρίου διὰ τοῦ προφήτου*, or the simpler phrase, *ἵνα πληρωθῇ τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ κυρίου*, to the announce-

¹ See the Commentaries of Alford, Alexander, De Wette, Meyer, Olshausen, Wordsworth; Davidson's *Hermeneutics*, p. 475, seq.; Fairbairn's *Typology*, Vol. I. p. 401, seq.; Winer's *N. T. Gramm.* p. 482; Tholuck's *Citations of the O. T., Bib. Sacra*, Vol. XI. p. 601; Lee on *Inspiration*, p. 304.

It should be remarked, however, that Tholuck and some others of the German scholars commit themselves only to the fact that such was the view of the sacred writers. They do not always regard that view as correct, — in other words, do not fully admit their inspiration.

² Quoted in Lee on *Inspiration*, p. 304.

ment of a mere general similarity, or of a superficial correspondence to the words, and not to the intent and meaning of God's prophecy, is but an evasion of the real scope of the passages, accomplished too at the expense of the lexicon and grammar and the true laws of language.¹

II. The theory of alternating subjects of prophecy is a crude hypothesis, perhaps now nearly, but not altogether, obsolete. It is not only among the theories to be found in Poole's Synopsis, and occasionally advanced by Henry, Scott, and Adam Clarke, but still finds a place in certain books designed for popular use. The fossil remains of it are found embedded in the vast morasses of the "Comprehensive Commentary." This work draws its supply, in this respect, partly from Williams' Cottage Bible and Morison's Exposition of the Psalms, two English works published just before it.

The theory endeavors to solve difficulties by referring one portion of a connected passage (a Psalm, for example) exclusively to one subject, perhaps David or Solomon, and another exclusively to another subject, perhaps Christ;

¹ It may be impertinent, in such a discussion, for the writer to express his profound sense of obligation to the venerable men from whose views he differs, including, as they do, two of his own instructors. But it is proper to say that their error, if it be so, was for a time the prevalent view, and that the whole subject has since undergone much careful investigation, of which they had not the benefit. We would suggest that Dr. Robinson's articles bearing on this subject, in his excellent Lexicon, seem to require a revision. Out of more than six hundred instances of the use of *iva* in the N. T., some fifteen are cited to prove the ecclastic use. Several of these are unhesitatingly rejected by such expositors as Alford, Hackett, Eadie, Ellicott — indeed the case is clear at a glance — e. g. Acts, ii. 25; viii. 19; Gal. v. 17; Phil. i. 26; John, v. 20. Nearly all the instances cited by him require only the recognition of so simple facts as the existence of subordinate or coördinate ends, or of purposes in *God's mind* somewhat distinctly implied by the writers, to harmonize perfectly with the legitimate use of the word. E. g. Luke xxii. 30 is quoted as a clear case of the ecclastic sense, with the remark: "Here the feasting is not the *end* or purpose of the kingdom to be given, but a *result* or consequence." To which we need only say, the blessedness thus described is *one* of the ends of the heavenly kingdom. After this limited and questionable set of cases, it is added, "here belongs the frequent phrase *iva πληρωθῇ, κ. τ. λ.*"; and *all the instances* occurring in the N. T. are summarily included.

sometimes returning to resume at the end of the passage the subject that was excluded in the middle. This theory of a vibratory subject was applied to such passages as 2 Sam. viii. 11—16, Psalms xl., lxix., and the like, in which a portion of the remarks imply an erring and sinful being, and other portions are applied by the scriptures to the Messiah. In regard to the fortieth Psalm, we are informed that Williams, after Kennicott, divides the Psalm into three parts, the first of which (vs. 1—5) he applies primarily to David, and typically to the Redeemer; the second, (vs. 6—10,) to the incarnation, and to that only; the third, (vs. 11—17) again to David. And Morison is quoted as referring vs. 7—11 strictly to the Messiah, but at verse 12 remarking: "I am not without suspicion, sustained by some of the most distinguished biblical critics that ever lived, that the theme is here changed, and that David speaks in his own person, and expresses his own experience and that of the Church." Williams, we also learn, interprets Psalm sixty-ninth "partly of David and partly of Christ."¹ Dr. Scott says of the last-mentioned Psalm: "it is so manifestly a prophecy of Christ, that we should consider him as the speaker *in most parts of it*." Adam Clarke refers Psalm xxii. "partly to Christ and partly to David." Of Psalm xl. he decides that in the first portion David gives thanks for being healed of sore disease; that vs. 9—11 apply only to the atonement of Christ; and that the remainder belongs to the seventieth Psalm. Matthew Henry seemingly distributes the promises of 2 Sam. vii. 12—16, alternately to Solomon and to Christ.

Such a theory is manifestly but a clumsy device to escape the pressure of a difficulty. It deliberately sets aside all aim at unity and continuity of discourse, and, under that form, hardly requires elaborate refutation. Professor Stuart well says: "the violence which is done to sound rules of interpretation by arbitrarily introducing *two* subjects of the writer's discourse when he plainly and obviously presents

¹ The above quotations of Morison and Williams are from the Comprehensive Commentary.

but one, is so great that but little danger to the churches can ever arise from such an error. It is so plainly a trespass against the laws of our nature as to the interpretation of language; it is so arbitrary in its proceedings, when it appropriates one part of the text to one subject, and another part which is indissolubly connected with it to another, that nothing like a general persuasion of propriety in practising such a method of interpretation can ever be brought about.¹ The difficulty of interpretation is not to be met by sacrificing the fundamental principles of rational discourse.

III. Another attempt to solve a portion of the difficulties is the theory of a twofold signification, or "double sense." These significations are called primary and secondary — lower and higher — literal and allegorical or typical. It is a very ancient method. Chrysostom held that the eighth Psalm treated primarily of man, but in a higher sense (*κυριώτερον*) of Christ, the first-born of the human race. In more modern times Poole says: "undoubtedly the Psalmist had in view the Messiah; nevertheless I do not, with others refer this whole Psalm literally, properly, and immediately to Christ." So Scott says of Psalm lxix: "It is probable that David composed this Psalm during Absalom's rebellion, with reference to his own case; but the Holy Spirit evidently spoke of the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow." Poole speaks in a similar manner of the forty-first Psalm. Henry and Scott consider the fortieth Psalm as relating primarily to David, but secondarily, and in parts exclusively, to Christ. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to adduce instances of a view which has been quite common.

Here, perhaps, should be reckoned Olshausen's view of the *υπόνοια*, or deeper sense of the scriptures, which recognizes the literal or historical sense as strictly true (in contradistinction from the "allegorical" theories of former times, which denied it), and finds also a further meaning, not differing in character from the literal one, "but only a deeper

¹ Hints on Prophecy.

lying sense, bound up with the literal one by an internal and essential connection — a sense given along with this, and in it, so that it must present itself whenever it is considered from a higher point of view, and is capable of being ascertained by fixed rules.”¹

Now, when we consider the number of eminently thoughtful as well as pious minds which have adopted this view in some form, we may suspect that this is a defective mode of statement, or a partial apprehension, of a truth. It is certain that a portion of the argument and ridicule with which it has been assailed have misconceived the theory, — perhaps chiefly from its looseness of statement.

Much has been said of the effect of this theory to turn the scriptures into “riddles, conundrums, and ambiguous heathen oracles,” etc.² But candor compels us to say that this is too strongly put. The more intelligent advocates of a double sense, we believe, have not contended that the scriptures admitted *opposite* or essentially *diverse* meanings, but, as they have sometimes expressed it, a lower and a higher meaning of *the same kind*, and lying in the same direction.³ Some portions of Professor Stuart’s reasonings, by failing to do justice to the theory, failed, as we think, fully to meet the case, although his charges as to its lack of law and limit undoubtedly hold good. Thus Davison inquires: “What is the double sense? Not the convenient latitude of two unconnected senses, wide of each other, and giving room to a fallacious ambiguity, but the combination of two related, analogous and harmonizing, though disparate, subjects, each clear and definite in itself; implying a two-

¹ Klausen’s Hermeneutik, in Fairbairn’s Typology, Vol. I. p. 47.

² Hints on Prophecy, p. 17, seq. Bib. Sacra, Vol. IX. p. 459.

³ There are occasional exceptions and inconsistencies. Dr. Alexander maintains that there is an “actual ambiguity or twofold meaning in the מָוֶן in Psalm xvi.; which word he considers as derivable both from מָוֶן, to sink, thus meaning pit or “grave,” and from מָוֶן to corrupt, hence signifying also “corruption.” “The use of the equivocal expression,” he says, “may have been intentional, in order to make it applicable both to David and to Christ”; and, “the ambiguity, or twofold meaning, of the Hebrew word cannot be explained away without embarrassing the interpretation of this signal prophecy.” See his Commentary on this Psalm.

fold truth in the prescience, and creating an aggravated difficulty, and thereby an accumulated proof in the completion."¹ To the same effect but, still more distinctly, the Roman Catholic commentator, Allioli, says that "in the prophetic intention, such events as, gradually taking place in time, together form but one divine act, are represented under one point of view with and in each other," and accordingly "one is communicated in the other and by the other." He terms such events, (e. g. the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of the world, as described in Matt. xxiv.) "parts of one great God's-deed."

The theory of a "double-sense" is not only open to the charge of being an infelicitous statement of what its best advocates have in mind. It also lacks method, precision, and limitation. "Why not three, seven, ten, or (with the Jewish Rabbies) forty-nine senses?" asks Professor Stuart. What is its basis and principle? The phraseology and whatsoever it would *properly* describe should be discarded. The principle which its more discriminating advocates seem to have had in mind, may be termed,

IV. The theory of a reiterated reference. This view asserts but one signification of the language, but assigns to that one signification repeated applications. It assumes that he who was able to adapt his utterances to one future event, was equally able to adjust them to more than one,—to shape the course of events in the execution of his schemes so that one event shall stand over against another, and both of them shall lie along in the one line of his prophetic word. Those events might lie along in the same level, in which case the fulfilment is a simple repetition; they might be related as members of an ascending series, in which case the fulfilment rises from a lower to a higher sphere. The latter method is that which is most frequently claimed.

The advocates of this view may certainly maintain that it contains nothing out of keeping with the methods of the

¹ Davison on Prophecy, quoted from Fairbairn's Typology, I. p. 130.

² Quoted by Professor Stowe, in Bib. Sacra for 1850, p. 477.

Bible in its non-prophetic utterances. It is not unusual for the language in the same utterance to pass from a lower to a higher range; and for a symbolic expression to stand both for itself and for that which it symbolizes.¹

This view of a repeated reference—an intended application of the same meaning to two or more successive instances, in the same or a higher sphere—may be understood as the view intended by some of the advocates of a double-sense or a deeper sense. Such seems to be the doctrine of Davison, Allioli, and Olshausen, as quoted above. This mode of statement obviates one chief objection to the other theory, that it denies any settled meaning to language. Here may be distinguished:

1. Instances of “double reference.” This designation is adopted, and the principle strongly advocated by Professor Stowe, who says that “no one can reject it, without at the same time repudiating the authority of the New Testament writers, as divinely inspired interpreters of the Old.”² To give an example, Isaiah xxix. 13, (“This people draweth near me,” etc.) is plainly a rebuke of the prophet’s contemporaries.³ But in Matt. xv. 7, Christ says to the Scribes and Pharisees around him: “Well did Esaias prophesy of *you*, saying, ‘This people,’ etc. Several of the passages which Matthew introduces with the phrase, “that it might be fulfilled” (e. g. ii. 15) had indisputably a previous application. So John xix. 36. In such cases the alternatives before us are these,—to force upon the writers a meaning which (as we have seen) the best modern scholarship repudiates; to deny the correctness of the New Testament exposition, as some have done; or to admit a second reference, and that, too, *connected with the original intent of the utterance*, as that utterance was prompted by the Holy Spirit,

¹ Examples of the first: Whosoever will lose his life for my sake, shall save it; Let the dead bury their dead. Of the second: But the meek shall inherit the earth, Ps. xxxvii. 11; Every one of them in Zion appeareth before God, Ps. lxxxiv. 7.

² Eschatology of Christ, Bib. Sacra, 1850, p. 478.

³ So Henderson. Knobel and Rosenmuller recognize no other reference. Hengstenberg does not include the passage in his Christology.

whether so understood by the original writer and readers or not.¹

It is at this point,—the *intended* and actual reference of the utterance itself, or the fact involved, to the second subject,—that we find the serious defect of the view advocated by Prof. Stuart and Mr. Barnes, after Kuinoel. They say that the utterance *can* be applied to the second case, but had no such original reference;² whereas the writers of the New Testament, according to the best modern scholarship, declare the second application to be a *bona fide* reference of the original statement.

Under this head may be included the theory of *typical predictions*. Of this again there are two forms. The more common view holds, in regard to the larger class of declarations in the Old Testament concerning earlier persons and events which are applied in the New Testament to Christ and the events connected with him, that they were intended for a

¹ To this effect an able writer on prophecy in the Princeton Review, Jan. 1861. "The expressions of certain prophecies were so framed under the guidance of the Spirit, whether with or without the knowledge of the original writer and readers, as to apply with more or less exactness to distinct subjects. The same fact or principle which is represented in the one appears likewise in the other, but in greater perfection; and the prophecy is so drawn as to cover both, in its more limited and lower sense answering to one, in its larger and higher sense, to the other. This may be done not only where both events lie in the future, but where one is already past."—P. 96.

In like manner Lee on Inspiration, p. 309; "The Holy Spirit when inspiring God's servants in former times, had infused a deeper significance into their words than the men who uttered them, or who committed them to writing, perceived. The depth of meaning conveyed could only be apprehended in the fullness of time by those who, like the writers of the New Testament, had the mind of Christ, and who thereby were enabled to unfold the hidden mystery couched under the earlier form."

² The view is skillfully defended, and its real basis somewhat disguised, in the incidental discussion by Prof. Stuart in the Bib. Sacra for 1852, pp. 460—2, but its true purport emerges in the distinct statements that Hosea xi. 1 was "merely and simply a historical declaration," and that the only fulfilment in Matt. ii. 15, was that "an occurrence took place like the ancient one." He states also in the same connection that there was not a fulfilling "in our usual sense of the word 'fulfil,' but in the sense which the *Jews* gave the word." In other words, there was in the original utterance and arrangement absolutely no reference whatever to the case which Matthew says occurred "that it might be fulfilled," and the fulfilment was—a Jewish conceit.

proximate and lower reference to those earlier subjects, but for a higher and ultimate application to the later ones. Thus Adam Clarke speaks of one of the Psalms, (the second,) "The prime subject of this Psalm is Christ; the type, David."

The other mode of viewing a typical prediction, denies a twofold reference of the *language* employed; it finds but one reference of the language, and another reference, so to speak, of the *fact* or subject involved in the language. This is substantially the view which is ably maintained and applied by Fairbairn in his "Typology of Scriptures." The type itself is simply an obscure kind of prophecy, — a pre-arrangement of facts instead of a preintimation in words. He would accordingly view many of the passages which others take in a lower and higher application, as having but one application, the lower — as referring simply to the type. But as the type itself was provided with direct reference to the antitype, that arrangement itself is the prophecy. He insists strongly on "the reality of the connection between the alleged type and antitype, — between the earlier circumstance or object described, and the later one to which the description is prophetically applied. On any other ground such references as those in the one evangelist to Hosea, and in the other to Exodus (Matt. ii. 15, John xix. 36) can only be viewed as fanciful or strained accommodations. But the matter assumes another aspect if the one was originally ordained in anticipation of the other, and so ordained that the earlier should not have been brought into existence if the later had not been before in contemplation. Seen from this point of view, which we may regard as that of the inspired writers, the past appears to run into the future, and to have existed mainly on its account. And the record or delineation of the past is naturally, not by a mere fiction of the imagination, held to possess the essential character of a prediction, embodying a prophetic circumstance or action; it is itself named by one of the commonest figures of speech, a prophecy." ¹ This mode of viewing a typical prediction

¹ Typology of Scripture, Vol. I p 106

certainly better meets the apparent facts, in some instances, than does the other. But without absolutely deciding the question, we may safely admit that the twofold reference, including typical predictions, should be recognized in our theories of prophecy.

2. But there are also instances of alleged manifold reference. Here again are found different subordinate theories :

(1.) "Generic prophecies" are advocated, "prediction not of individual events, but of a series of events, in each of which they have a separate fulfilment."¹ The same writer from whom these words are quoted, proceeds, — a little wide of the point, as it seems to us, — "they are commonly such as reveal a particular principle in the divine administration, which secures a fixed result from given antecedents. As often, consequently, as the prescribed conditions exist, so often the predicted consequence will follow." He would refer to this class, Is. xl. 3; Joel ii. 28; Deut. xxiii. 18. Of this last he says: "It is generic, contemplating the entire prophetic order culminating in Christ." He also specifies 2 Sam. vii. 12—16. We must doubt both whether all the cases cited belong to the class alleged, and whether the mere enunciation of a principle of government according to which certain antecedents shall secure certain results, is to be called a prediction at all.

More to the purpose is Alford's remark on the citation of Is. vi. 9, 10, which was undoubtedly spoken first concerning the Jews of the prophet's time. But in Matt. xiii. 14 the Saviour asserts that this same declaration of Esaias "is fulfilled" in reference to the crowds then around him; and the same passage is also applied John xii. 40; Acts xxviii. 26, 27; Rom. xi. 8. Alford here understands the phrase "is fulfilled" to signify, "finds one of the stages of its fulfilment,— a partial one having taken place in the contemporaries of the prophet." He takes a similar view of Matt. xv. 7 (quoted from Isaiah xxix. 19), as "one of those deeper and more general declarations of God which shall be ever having their successive illustrations in his dealings with men."

¹ Princeton Review, Jan. 1861, p. 94.

It may be safely admitted that a truth is expressed in this theory, which meets certain aspects of the prophecies concerning Christ's kingdom, and which belongs to a full view of the subject. Here, perhaps, belongs Bacon's well-known remark about those prophecies which "are not fulfilled punctually at once, but have springing and germinant accomplishment, though the height or fulness thereof may refer to some one age."

(2) Far more questionable is the theory of indefinite prophecy, concerning "the pious man in general," or "the ideal person of the righteous one," applicable to all parties who fall within its conditions, and therefore preëminently applicable to Christ. This view was invented, so far as we are aware, by Hengstenberg, to meet the defects of his earlier theory. In his "Christology" he had rigidly adhered to the doctrine of a single reference, and had thereby excluded from his list of Messianic Psalms some whose claims were equally strong with those he admitted, besides encountering practical difficulties in those which he received as Messianic. In his Commentary on the Psalms he therefore swings over to the opposite side; and, with the same vehemence with which he formerly maintained that the twenty-second Psalm in all its parts referred directly and only to Christ, he now declares that it refers to no one in particular, but describes the lot of the righteous in general, as exposed to suffering in an ungodly world, and may be appropriated by every righteous man in proportion "as he embodies in his own person the ideal righteous man;" and he declares that "nothing but ignorance can object to this interpretation that it is arbitrary." He maintains that in this class of Psalms the writer, even when speaking in the first person, "does not speak from his own person, but from the person of every righteous man who finds himself engaged in severe warfare;" that he "is an ideal person, the personification of the whole class;" that such Psalms "do not refer to any individual sufferer; the speaker is the suffering righteous man; there are no individual references whatever."¹ Com-

¹ Hengstenberg on Psalms xxii., xvi., lxix., xi., and others.

posed thus for the use of the church, and in the name of the church (though suggested, he admits, by individual experience), every particular righteous man might expect to realize the hopes expressed in them, so far as his character corresponds to that of the ideal righteous man struggling in a sinful world. And as the most perfect righteousness belongs so necessarily to the idea of the Messiah, "the inference is clear that the Messiah, if a righteous, must also be a suffering one;" and "we infer that this salvation, in the highest and fullest sense, must be the lot of him who should be the first to realize in perfection the idea of suffering righteousness." These Psalms therefore belong to Christ, after all, not by direct reference, but by inference: to him only as to other righteous men, as a general principle fits many cases, and his case perfectly. Dr Alexander, with more brevity and caution, closely follows Hengstenberg in this theory, as in other things, in his Commentary on the Psalms.

This explanation certainly enables Hengstenberg to break over the narrow and arbitrary limits of his former position, and to find a considerable amount of seeming Messianic reference in the Psalms. But equally arbitrary is the position that effusions, many of them so thoroughly stamped with individuality of expression, are vague utterances, whether of or for "the righteous man in general." The Psalms are not written in that mode; they do not deal with possible or "ideal" personages; they are concrete utterances of actual persons dealing with actual facts and characters. And though applicable, more or less closely, to the condition of all righteous men, it is not through vagueness of utterance, but similarity of experience. Furthermore, if it is only as an inference that such Psalms as the twenty-second can be applied to Christ, we question the fairness of pretending that they were *prophetic* of him. We seem to be travelling back toward the old rationalistic region of Messianic hopes and aspirations. We might well question the principle on which it is sought to construct the inference, viz. that suffering in this world must always be in propor-

tion to righteousness. But most especially do we reject the statement that these Psalms are not distinctly individual in their character. We cannot conceive what meaning can be conveyed by the term "individual," special, or personal, which does not attach (for example) to the twenty-second Psalm. If it include utterance in the first person throughout, minuteness of details, specifications of that which is peculiar and unique, and which is also specifically appropriated by Christ and his apostles, all this is found in the Psalm in question. Without pausing to dwell on Christ's prayer of agony, taken from the first verse, and his last words, which are pronounced both by Hengstenberg and Alexander to be an allusion, less distinct, to the last verse (*τετέλεσται* corresponding, as they think, to the Hebrew *נִפְּלָא*), consider the "laughing to scorn," the "shaking of the head," with the exclamation "he trusted in God," the seizing or wounding "the hands and feet" (whatever be the reading and rendering of *כַּאֲרִי*), the "parting of the garments," and "casting lots upon the vesture," the declaration, "I will declare thy name in the midst of my brethren," and other traits equally unique, and distinctly appropriated to Christ; then look at the closing portion of the Psalm (vs. 26—31),—as thoroughly Messianic in its promised results as any of the direct prophecies,—and we must deny the fundamental position of the theory that would ascribe a "non-individual" character to such a Psalm. Indeed, Hengstenberg himself seems to repudiate his own principle when he says (speaking of Psalm xxii.), "it is necessary to observe that the providence of God so directed the circumstances that the *inward* conformity of the sufferer of our Psalm [to the idea] should be *outwardly* visible. The Psalm would have been fulfilled in Christ, even although the passers by had not shaken the head, or the mockers quoted its very words, even although there had been no dividing of his garments or casting lots upon his vesture. But the striking resemblance in these particulars must be considered an *index* pointing out a resemblance of an *inward* character. The same object, subserved by this

secret guidance of Divine providence, Christ also had in view when he borrowed in his first exclamation on the cross the opening words of the Psalm, and referred in his last expression to its closing sentence, thereby impressively intimating that the whole Psalm was now in the way of being fulfilled." Alexander, also, referring to the same quotations made by Christ, says that they bring "the beginning and the end of this remarkable Psalm into connection with each other and with that affecting scene to which there are so many clear and pointed references in the whole composition, thus completing, as it were, the proof, already strong enough, that Christ is the great subject of the Psalm, as being the great type and representative of that whole class to whom it ostensibly relates, but of whom some parts, and especially the last five verses, are true only in a modified and lower sense." How a writer can hold that the Psalm refers to the pious sufferer in general, while admitting that it contains "clear and pointed references" to the peculiar history of Christ, or how he can maintain that "it ostensibly relates to a whole class," when its utterances can be true of that whole class "only in a modified or lower sense," we leave him to determine. We fail to find *any* "ostensible" indication that it relates to a whole class. We believe these Psalms to be not indefinite, but to refer either directly and singly to Christ, as in some instances, or, as in other cases, mediately, — prefigured by a type, or as the chief member of a definite line, — but always specifically.

The theories which have been presented, it will be perceived, contain many true views. But these views, so far as they are true, need to be located in a broader scheme, as parts of a whole. A view has been advanced which endeavors thus to gather up what may be true in the other hypotheses, and to assign it an appropriate relation.

V. It is the theory of an organic connection and correlation sustained by the whole Old Testament economy to

that of the New Testament. Tholuck calls it "organic-typical." It finds one continuous scheme of God running unbroken through the two dispensations, of which the earlier portion sustains a pre-ordained parallelism to the later, being typical, or rather representative, of it. This earlier train of arrangements being not ultimate, but, by the intention of the Holy Spirit, preparatory and representative, points forward, and thus even the language describing them involves a prophecy, while also the utterances that point most distinctly to the distant future not only clothe themselves with the forms of the present, but commonly view that future from the point of view and *through the medium of its present representation.*

Such is the basis of what we believe to be the true and comprehensive view of the case. It is with some diversities of mode, advocated substantially by Fairbairn, Wm. Lee, Ebrard, Tholuck, and others; and is to some extent a return toward the earlier views of English Theologians. Tholuck, however, contents himself with the general basis of such an organic parallelism, while he distinctly denies the complete accuracy of the New Testament writers as expounders of that relation. His views (as found in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, July 1854) are greatly disfigured by the ascription of gross errors in interpretation to those writers. He defends the Saviour himself, and him alone, from "historically erroneous exposition." And among many similarly offensive statements, he says of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that "the defects in hermeneutics which were striking in Paul and the evangelists, appear in this epistle in a yet higher degree."¹ Very different from this is the tone of Ebrard: "The Holy Scriptures of the old covenant testify of Christ, not merely because particular prophecies pointing to Christ are to be found here and there in them. The entire history of the revelation of God in the Old Covenant is one grand pre-intimation of the future Messiah; and this *fact-revelation* and *fact-prophecy* formed the condition and

¹ See *Bib. Sacra*, Vol. XI., pp. 600, 601, 606.

the basis of the particular *word*-prophecies which God gave in a supernatural manner by his special instruments. It is wrong to overlook this unity of basis; but it is equally so to attempt to derive these particular word-revelations as developments from that basis, and to overlook their purely supernatural character."¹ Fairbairn and Lee hold the general theory in connection with the strictest views of the inspiration of the New Testament writers.

A postulate indispensable to any satisfactory theory in the matter, is the ultimate unity of authorship in the scriptures. If we set aside the inspiration of the New Testament writers, and their perfect qualification to interpret the older scriptures and the designs of God in them, the whole subject is hardly worth discussing. And when we once admit an actual correspondence of facts, divinely pre-arranged, and in any degree pre-intimated, we may as well concede the supernatural disclosure of God's plans after Christ as before. The pre-arrangement and the subsequent interpretation belong together.

The first main position of the present view is the real oneness and continuousness of the fundamental system contained in the two Testaments. The church of the New Testament is one with that of the Old Testament, only purified and enlarged,—the old olive-tree with the wild olive-tree grafted in; the true Israel continued; the kingdom of God on earth. Its requisitions are the same,—faith in God, working by love, and obedience—worthless except as originating in the heart. Its true members in each case a spiritual seed. Its issue and triumph is in each case to be found in the triumph of the one Great Anointed. *Towards this one issue and consummation all its arrangements and prophecies are looking.*

The other main position of the view is the pre-ordained parallelism of the earlier to the later portion of the system. This parallelism stands directly related to the continuousness of the scheme and its prospective reference to the great final issue. The perfected condition of the scheme has an actual

¹ Introduction of his Commentary on Hebrews.

though imperfect living representation in its earlier and immature condition, and *the lines of representation run down through its whole history*. Before the advent of him on whom the whole scheme depended for its realization, it was the wisdom of its author, in various modes, closely to connect the present with that future, as a constant reminder and pledge of the consummation. The ceremonial of the early church was symbolical in its character; the outward history of the chosen people in their sufferings and deliverances was made expressive of the distant future relations of God's people to their foes; and still more closely were the two periods interwoven by means of certain eminent and chosen personages, whose experience and relations remarkably foreshadowed those of the great Anointed, some of whom also stood in direct lineal connection with him.

Several phenomena thus arise. Often a prophecy of near deliverance ends with a sudden glance to the great final triumph. Or predictions which respect that ultimate future are clothed in forms borrowed wholly from the present. Again, the prophecy runs down the whole continuous line, in language which covers both the earlier and the later stages of fulfilment. Or again, the utterance which seems to expend itself upon the present is interpreted by a later messenger of God as containing, at least in the fact involved, a real reference to the future.

The typical or representative parallelism is that portion of the theory, perhaps, which calls more especially for proof. Of course its existence became, from the nature of the case, far more distinctly visible after Christ than before. Still, that earlier economy was not absolutely destitute of intimations of it. There is not only the general air of expectation which forms, as Archer Butler has ably argued,¹ the inward spirit of the whole Old Testament, and the manifest incompleteness of the daily gross offerings with which those believers were directed to approach a God representing himself to them with attributes most intensely spiritual. There

¹ Sermon xiv. First Series.

are here and there distinct intimations of a repetition of the past in the future, which the Jews interpreted only too literally. Moses promised that "a prophet like unto me shall the Lord your God raise up." Ezekiel promises (xxxiv. 23) a return of the person and times of David. Zechariah (vi. 12, 13) connects with the rebuilding of the literal temple a more glorious rebuilding by "the Branch." Malachi (iv. 5) predicts the second coming of Elijah. The monarch of the future was to be (Ps. cx. 4) "a priest for ever, after the order of Melchisedek." Joshua, the high-priest, and his fellows are pronounced (Zech. iii. 8) to be typical men, *אֲנֹכִי מִתָּהָרָה* — "for behold I bring forth my servant, THE BRANCH." The whole series of predictions connecting the Messiah with the royal house of David; the continual transitions of prophecy from the nearer deliverances and triumphs of Israel to the greater ones in store; all the promises of an extended Jerusalem and exalted Zion, — were calculated to awaken, and did awaken, in the Jewish mind, a sense of the close relation of their present condition to the higher and better future. They erred in expecting a repetition too exact in kind, differing only in degree.

When the New Testament and the Old both lie before us, we read at a glance many obvious marks of parallelism well fitted to awaken deeper inquiry. Without alluding to the natural similarity in phraseology, nor even to the remarkable borrowing of thought and expression which makes such a book as the Apocalypse almost a transcript of the older prophets; there are singular correspondences of fact, not to be wholly overlooked by the cursory reader. In the earlier dispensation there were remarkable births, one of them at least entirely out of the common course of nature, — the God-given Isaac prefiguring the birth of the greater gift of God, his lineal descendant. Angelic visits and promises connect these births, and the two dispensations themselves. The song of Mary is largely a repetition of the song of Hannah, and in her mouth alone do the words receive their full significance. The infant lawgiver of Israel like the infant Saviour narrowly escaped a monarch's vengeance. His

history, too, was through a course of opposition, unbelief, and sometimes desertion by the members of his own household. He also had a kind of transfiguration, when his face shone so from communion with God, that the people could not look upon him. The inspiration of the seventy elders was an earlier pentecostal scene. As Moses and Elias and Christ stand upon the mount together, we remember that each of them had in their lives been sustained forty days without mortal food. Various earlier acts of healing, even to the leprosy, paralleled the multitudinous healing miracles of Christ. The conversion of water into wine, the feeding of the multitudes, were foreshadowed in the healing of the waters of Jericho, the multiplication of the widow's oil and meal, and Elisha's feeding of the hundred men. Elijah, shutting and opening the windows of heaven, preceded him who controlled the wind, the waves, and the storm. The restoration to life of the children at Zarephath and Shunem reminds us at once of the scenes at Nain, Capernaum, and Bethany. The ascension of Christ was heralded under the patriarchal and Mosaic economies by those of Enoch and Elijah. The position of Daniel before Nebuchadnezzar was as much like that of Peter and John before the magistrates, as was the deliverance of both by the angel of God. It was in harmony with the peculiar office-work of Christ that the miracles of vengeance in the old economy in but few instances found a parallel in the new; while the abundant castings-out of evil spirits by Christ stand almost without a prototype.

We admit that these and many other such things are but superficial; and yet the outward correspondence might properly hint the deeper coincidence, which rests on the express testimony of Christ and his apostles. It is idle for the rationalist to talk of erroneous conceptions in the writers of the gospels and epistles. The assertion of a broad and deep foreshowing of Christ through the whole body of the Old Testament scriptures stands on the authority of the Lord Jesus himself. The evangelist and writers of the epistles only followed where he went before.

The Saviour speaks as though he were the chief subject of the whole Old Testament. "Search the scriptures . . . they are they which testify of me;" "Had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me; for he wrote of me," John v. 36, 46. On the way to Emmaus, "beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself," Luke xxiv. 27. And to make it clear that he found this testimony running through the whole volume, he specifies the threefold division then current,—"all things must be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses, and in the Psalms, and in the prophets concerning me;" Luke xxiv. 44. And this general view he applies in detail. He declares that in John the Baptist appeared the predicted Elijah, Matt. xi. 14. He also intimates that the violent opposition encountered by Elijah was a typical prediction of the treatment of John—"Elias is indeed come, and they have done unto him whatsoever they listed, *as it is written of him*," Mark ix. 13. On this passage Tholuck inquires, "in what other than a typical sense can this be said?" and Hengstenberg takes the same view.¹ Furthermore, by his application of Mal. iii. 1 to John the Baptist (Luke vii. 27), our Lord identifies himself with the angel of the Covenant of the older dispensation.

In accordance with this general view our Lord denominates his own body the temple of God, John iii. 19; speaks of the serpent in the wilderness as prefiguring the lifting up of the Son of Man, iii. 14; of the manna as bread from heaven, but of himself as the true bread from heaven, vi. 33; and twice of the sign of Jonas as about to reappear in him, Matt. xii. 40; xvi. 4. Still more explicitly does he say of the passover: "I will not any more eat thereof, until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God," Luke xxii. 16.

Intermediate between these references and the more clearly direct prophecies, quoted and appropriated by the Saviour, is another noticeable class of passages which he applies to

¹ Christology, Vol. III. p. 351.

himself and his circumstances with the phrase *ἵνα πληρωθῇ*. Thus John xiii. 18 appropriates Psalm xli. 9. In like manner John xv. 24 applies Psalm lxix. 4, the same remarkable Psalm of which he quotes the first and, as some say, the last verses upon the cross. In John xvii. 12 it is generally conceded that he refers to Psalm cix. 8, the passage which Peter also applies to Judas, Acts i. 12. Equally explicit in the application, though more difficult of location in the Old Testament, are the several statements of the Saviour concerning the circumstances of his betrayal and death, Matt. xxvi. 24, 54, 56, which he affirms took place thus "that the scriptures of the prophets might be fulfilled." His references to Psalms viii. and cxviii. in Matt. xxi. 16, 42 are less conclusive, though quite noticeable when taken in connection with the use of the same Psalms in Heb. ii. and 1 Peter ii. 6, 7. Christ also said that in his contemporaries "is fulfilled the prophecy of Esaias" (vi. 9), though the prophecy certainly referred first to the contemporaries of the prophet. In Matt. v. 12; xxiii. 34, 35, he describes the labors, sufferings, and successes of his disciples (wherein they shared the fate of their master) as but a continuation of the experience of the old prophets. In the choice of twelve apostles and seventy special messengers we may read his design outwardly to indicate the inward connection of the two economies.

Christ's quotations of direct Messianic prophecy¹ require no special comment. Nor is it quite to the purpose to notice how, as in the temptation and on other occasions, the language of the Old Testament was the natural method of his utterance. But in view of his entire use of the scriptures, we are authorized to say with Tholuck: "He regards the Old Testament with its institutions, in its history and in its single expressions, predominantly as typical."²

The evangelists and authors of the epistles follow in the same spirit and method. The coming up of Israel, the chosen seed, from Egypt prefigured the return of the greater

¹ Luke iv. 21; xxii. 37; Matt. xxii. 42—45; xxvi. 31.

² Bib. Sacra, Vol. XI. p. 590.

seed of promise, Matt. ii. 15. The blow that was dealt by Nebuchadnezzar, within the territory of Rachel's favorite son, at the welfare of the chosen people, anticipated the more ruthless blow of Herod at the great hope of Israel, in sight of Rachel's tomb, ii. 18. Christ's residence in Nazareth stood in symbolic relation to the prophecies, ii. 23. His healing of diseases was the symbolic beginning of his great work of salvation (viii. 17) and was in partial accomplishment of the prophecy (Is. liii. 4) which was completely met when he hung upon the cross, 1 Pet. ii. 24. His discoursing in parables (Matt. xiii. 35) was "that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, saying, I will open my mouth in parables" — the Psalm quoted (lxviii. 1) being a record of events in the history of Israel which Paul (1 Cor. x. 1-6) alludes to, as being *τύποι ἡμῶν*. In Matt. xvi. is recorded, in connection with the fulfilment of a direct prophecy, the minute care with which the Saviour made even the outward and symbolic action conform to the prophecy of Zech. ix. 9. Similar minute fulfilments are recorded (Matt. xxii. 9, 35) concerning the thirty pieces of silver and the parting of the garments. The preservation of the Saviour's limbs from violence is declared (John xix. 36) to be a fulfilment of the directions concerning the paschal lamb, as we are elsewhere told that "Christ our Passover was slain for us," 1 Cor. v. 7. The piercing of his side is referred to the prophecy of Zech. xii. 10. The more clearly direct prophecies quoted by the evangelists do not require special allusion.¹ A most remarkable series of scripture applications, mingling direct and typical prophecies, is that which was made by the disciples when they were fresh from our Lord's own teachings on the subject (as recorded in Luke xxiv), to which Fairbairn thus calls attention: "We find Peter (Acts i.) applying without hesitation or reserve what is written in Psalm cix. of the persecutions of Jesus and the apostasy of Judas; again, in chapter ii. ap-

¹ Matt. i. 22; iv. 14; xii. 17-21; John xii. 38, 40; xix. 24, etc. The first of these some have considered a typical prediction, but the more common view now holds it to be direct prophecy.

plying in like manner what is written in Psalm xvi. to Christ's speedy resurrection; Ps. cx. to his exaltation to power and glory, and Joel ii. 28—32, to the gift of the Spirit; in chapter iii. affirming Jesus to be the prophet that Moses had foretold should be raised up like unto himself; in chapter iv. speaking of Jesus as the stone rejected by the builders, but raised by God to be the head of the corner, as written in Ps. cxviii. (an application that had been already indicated, at least, by Christ in a public discourse with the Jews, Matt. xxi. 42) and along with the other apostles describing Christ as the anointed king against whom the heathen raged."¹

Without following in detail the citations of Paul, it is important to observe how he interprets the promise of God to Abraham as containing a high and spiritual meaning, and, in that sense, fulfilled, not to all the patriarch's lineal descendants, but to his spiritual lineage, Rom iv. 11—16; ix. 6—3. Yet that pregnant meaning is certainly wrapped up in the form of a temporal good. And in Gal. iii. 16, 27—29, he still more carefully states the case, that the promise was not to all the lines of that posterity, but to the one seed, the collective unity, CHRIST, including all who are Christ's.² It should be observed, too, that the Saviour had declared the same truth to the Jews with a slight variation of form; he admits (John viii. 37), that they are "Abraham's seed," but denies that they are his "children;" they sprang from him, but had no family likeness and affiliation to him. In Gal. iv. 22—26, Paul further declares the two sons Ishmael and Isaac to be representatives of the merely literal and of the spiritual seeds. And in his allusion to the ejectionment of

¹ Typology, Vol. I. p. 393.

² We do not understand Paul as giving in verse 16th merely a grammarian's criticism on the Hebrew word זרע, but an apostle's authoritative interpretation of the scope of the promise. As Windischmann (in Alford) well says: "The argument of the apostle does not depend on the grammatical form, by which here Paul only puts forth his meaning in the Greek, but on this, that the spirit of God, in the promise to Abraham and the passage of scripture relating to that promise, has chosen a word which implies a collective unity, and that the promise was not given to Abraham and his children," nor to all his lines of offspring, but to one peculiar line, of which Christ is the representative.

the one from the inheritance of the other (verse 30), he had been again anticipated by the Saviour, John viii. 35. The apostle also declares various transactions of the Exodus (1 Cor. x. 1—6) to have been *τύποι ἡμῶν* — of us “the spiritual as distinguished from the literal Israel” (Alford). The passage is a reference to Psalm lxviii., in which the whole journey is set forth in detail.

The writer to the Hebrews takes up this last-mentioned topic, and declares (chap. iii.) that the rest which was promised by God to his ancient people was something more than the attainment of the earthly Canaan, though couched under that form of speech. In chap. xi. 9—16 he tells us that those ancient believers to whom the promise was made, sought a “better country, even an heavenly.” Indeed it is the aim of the book to show how the whole history and sacred rites of the covenant people point forward to a more perfect realization in and around Christ. The high-priest calls for a greater Priest, of whom Melchisedek was the type; the sacrifices prefigure the great atoning sacrifice; the tabernacle foreshadows the more perfect tabernacle not made with hands, while even the parts of it are invested with a spiritual significance; and the high-priest’s entrance once a year looks to the absolute redemption, once for all, through Christ.

Such are some of the indications, running through the New Testament, of that close typical parallelism between the two economies, or rather of that real unity whereby the earlier was the imperfect *representative* of the later, — which has compelled the assent not only of unlettered Christians, but of scholarly men like Olshausen, Ebrard, Tholuck, Henderson, Fairbairn, Alford, Ellicott. Even De Wette lived to speak these remarkable words; “Christianity sprang out of Judaism. Long before Christ appeared, the world was prepared for his appearance; the entire Old Testament is a great prophecy, a great type of him who was to come, and has come. Who can deny that the holy seers of the Old Testament saw in spirit the advent of Christ long before he came, and in prophetic anticipations, sometimes more, sometimes less clear, described the new doctrine.

The typological comparison of the Old Testament with the New was by no means a mere play of the fancy; nor can it be regarded as altogether an accident that the evangelical history in its most important particulars runs parallel with the Mosaic. Christianity lay in Judaism as leaves and fruits do in the seed, though certainly it needed the divine sun to bring it forth.”¹

From this point of view — the continuous organic unity of the system, whereby the earlier portion, as a constituent part and but a part of the same whole, is not only the appointed, but the fit representative of the later portion and of the whole — we are enabled to comprehend the method of Messianic prophecy and its several phases, and to combine whatever is true in the partial theories we have noticed. References to the Messianic future may be found, and the influence of this fundamental unity and parallelism exhibited, in the threefold mode: direct prophecy, typical transactions, and typical and representative predictions. Let us briefly view the relation of the fundamental principle to these several cases.

1. Direct Messianic prophecies take their form and method from this ground principle.

(1.) Predictions concerning the distant future are clothed in forms borrowed from the present, and that future appears as an exalted and glorified present. Thus, even in the Apocalypse, the abode of the redeemed is the New Jerusalem, magnificently built and gorgeously furnished; the redeemed themselves are the sealed of the twelve tribes; and Sodom, Egypt, and Babylon all reappear. In the Old Testament, however distant the scene of prophecy, God's people are Israel, their home is Canaan, and Jerusalem or Zion is the scene of God's immediate presence. The enemies of his people are known by their ancient names, Egypt, Edom, the Assyrians, Moab, and Ammon, even when those nations had already ceased to be. The conversion of the

¹ “*Charakteristik des Hebraismus.*” Quoted in Fairbairn's *Typology*, Vol. I. p. 45.

Gentiles in gospel times is predicted under the image of their flocking to mount Zion, erecting altars, offering incense, keeping the Jewish festivals, even coming to Jerusalem to the new-moons and Sabbaths "out of all nations, upon horses, and in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and swift beasts" (בְּרִמְיָהוּ, dromedaries) Is. lxvi. So, all manner of blessing was promised under the pregnant phrase, "inherit the land."

From disregarding this important feature of prophecy come the schemes of literalism, among them that of the literal return of the Jews. But here the literalists inconsistently retain a part of the imagery and reject the rest. The simple fact is, that the present images forth an *exalted* future; not a repetition, but a consummation. Precisely so John the Baptist was predicted as Elijah, and Christ sometimes as David (Ezek. xxxiv. 23; Hos. iii. 5.), and commonly as a glorious monarch. The Jews, who took these things literally and sensually, were on the same plane of interpretation with those who look for a literal regathering of all the Jews to Palestine.

(2.) Another feature of the case is that even the direct predictions seldom stand isolated, but usually as the terminal scene of intermediate events, — as the great deliverance back of all other deliverances, the grand consolation in the deepest present distress, or the great crowning joy and mercy. Everything looks forward to the consummation; and these inferior manifestations of God are but preparatory to the supreme. And that distant glory, that lies down far beyond these earlier events, is evermore abruptly flashing through. Throughout the prophets instances are too abundant to require citation. Isaiah continually turns from terrible threats (e. g. iv. 2) to Messianic consolations. Promises of deliverance from Assyrians and Babylonians are rounded off with visions of the greater deliverance by the Messiah; and the certain coming of Immanuel seems even to be made (chaps. vii. and viii.) the pledge of present succor. In Zechariah the rebuilding of the literal temple suggests the true temple (chap. vi.); and the rescue of Jerusalem from

the fear of Alexander (chap. ix.) terminates in a view of Christ's triumphal entry.

(3.) It is another natural consequence that direct prophecies, viewing the Messianic state of things as terminal, also commonly view it in its perfected condition. Some have applied the term "apotelesmatic" to this characteristic of the predictions.¹ The Messianic times are thus usually contemplated by the prophets in their consummated and glorious condition—a state of peace and harmony and holiness, victory, prosperity, and blessedness. The period of struggle and conflict is merged in the view of the triumphal issue.²

2. Typical transactions form another portion of the system of preintimation, directly related to the organic unity and parallelism of the scheme. That the Jewish ritual stood to Christ and his work in the relation of type to antitype is, as we have seen, abundantly asserted in the New Testament. How far this may have been understood or conjectured by the devout Jew we cannot determine. It was arranged by God, and in due time interpreted by his inspired servants. The reflecting Jew certainly must have understood that those ritual observances were not in themselves an end, nor even an efficient means. For he was constantly warned that these things were valueless alone, and the true sacrifice and circumcision were of the heart. And as he was constantly reminded of the intense spirituality of God, while yet all these ceremonials were rigorously required, it is at least not incredible that he may have dimly understood these things to be typical in reference to God's arrangements, as they were symbolical in reference to the worshipper's condition. It will be remembered, however, that many other things besides the ritual observances were typical.

The type is treated in the New Testament precisely like a verbal prediction, and introduced with the same formula,

¹ Prof. Stuart uses it differently. Bib. Sacra, IX. 462. Dr. Noah Webster recognizes neither signification.

² Thus, Is. ii. 2, 3; xi.; xxv.; xlix.; lv.; lx., etc.; Jer. xxiii. 4—7; xxxi. 31—35; Ps. ii.; lxii.; Zech. vi. 12, 13; ix. 9, 10.

e. g. John xix. 36. But the concealment of its reference was much more complete; and in the case of isolated types that concealment must have been so decided that only their completion could suggest the previous arrangement of God. The type has accordingly been defined by Davison as "a concealed prophecy which only the completion explains." And it should be added that in the case of persons and events standing detached from certain great lines of connection, only the express testimony of the inspired writers can authorize us to suppose them typical.

But it is noticeable that nearly all the typical characters, events, and localities do stand gathered into certain related groups around some certain central lines of persons. And this brings us to one of the most important exhibitions of the organic unity and parallelism.

3. Typical and representative predictions. We refer to that large class of cases in which the word of God fixes expressly upon certain prominent persons and their relations, and makes these characteristic individuals stand as representatives of a whole future series. The prophecies then traverse these established lines, take their shape in accordance with them, and enwrap a pregnant reference to that future in the utterance concerning the representative; while the history of that representative is so adjusted in the counsels of God as to be prefigurative, and even the record of that history is treated as prophetic. And by virtue of the central appointment the group of adjacent circumstances becomes significant, — as the enemies of David, the wives of Abraham. In this way are to be explained that difficult class of prophecies which have been variously described as having a double sense or a reiterated reference, as being typical predictions, or as describing the ideal righteous person.

We call the earlier objects not merely types, for usually they are more. Frequently, they not only prefigure future persons and events, but are themselves constituent members of the line or series, and *represent* the series both as being vitally connected with it, and, for the time, its best embodi-

ment. Thus it was with Isaac, Jacob or Israel, and David. It will be found that the great mass of prophecies concerning the Messiah and his times are of this description; and that those which are specially noted in the New Testament, for the most part, traverse four main lines. These lines are successively subordinate, shooting forth from within, like the growths of an endogenous tree. There was the primal prophecy concerning the seed of the woman; the promise to Abraham and his seed; the more full and definite limitation in Jacob or Israel; and the assurance of the perpetual kingdom of David. Each of these promises includes a collective unity.

(1.) The opening line of Messianic prophecy is found in the promise concerning the "seed of the woman," which should bruise the serpent's head. Most interpreters have referred this to Christ alone. Hengstenberg understands it more broadly of Eve's believing posterity as a body, citing Rom. xvi. 20 in proof. We would include both,—the church as a body, and preëminently Christ its head. Not only is this the method of the other chief lines of Messianic prophecy; but this reference is particularly confirmed in the New Testament. The conflict of the church with Satan is alluded to in various passages; and Christ himself is specially designated as waging the warfare and gaining the victory.¹

The earlier economy furnishes no clear type or representative in this broader line, unless we understand Noah to be so designated.² But in this first prediction was laid the foundation for Christ's chosen title, "the Son of Man," though the form of it may have come through the eighth Psalm and the seventh chapter of Daniel. He is also "the last Adam," "the second man," 1 Cor. xv. 21, 45, 47. Here is found the explanation of the argument of Heb. ii. 5-9,

¹ Rom. xvi. 20; Eph. vi. 11, 12; Rev. xii. 17; Luke x. 17, 18; Heb. ii. 14; 1 John iii. 8; John xii. 31.

² In Gen. ix. the original promise of dominion is renewed to Noah and his seed; and in the obscure passage 1 Peter iii. 21, baptism is described as the *ἀντίτυπον* of the water wherewith Noah and his family were saved. If Noah, the "preacher of righteousness," be viewed as a typical person, it may have some bearing on the greatly controverted passage, 1 Peter, iii. 19.

and the quotation 1 Cor. xv. 27, applying the eighth Psalm to Christ. That Psalm is not to be understood, with some, as referring exclusively to Christ, nor with others as having no reference to him. It is an utterance concerning MAN, but true of man only as inclusive of Christ, and finding its completion only in and through him. Intended, therefore, by the Holy Spirit to have its fulfilment in him, the use of it in the epistles is not an accommodation. The obvious reference of the Psalm to the original dominion of man as still retained, cannot be mistaken. But that dominion, as the apostle shows, belongs to him through Christ and preëminently in Christ, — “that MAN who is the constituted head of man’s nature, the second Adam, who has more than recovered all that the first Adam lost.” Very noticeable is Christ’s own quotation of this Psalm upon his triumphal entry into the holy city, Matt. xxi. 16; while various incidents in his history, including his control over “whatsoever passeth through the paths of the seas,”¹ remind us of the dominion there asserted over nature.

The first temptation in the wilderness carries us back to this promise, as well by the attack and defeat of Satan as by the form of Christ’s reply, identifying himself with the human race, — “*man* shall not live by bread alone.” Similar allusions to the promised conflict and victory are found in John xii. 31; xvi. 11; xiv. 30; Matt. xii. 28; and, according to Auberlen, Fairbarn, and others, the “man-child” of Rev. xii. that warred with the “serpent,” is this promised seed, the Son of God, born of the “woman,” or Old Testament church. The prophecy in Daniel vii. 13, 14, written some four hundred years later than the eighth Psalm, combines with the appellation “Son of Man,” which took shape in that Psalm, the fuller prophecy of a kingdom in this world. The Saviour’s declaration John v. 27, seems to refer to this form of the prophecy.

(2.) Another more specific and more prominent line traversed by this class of prophecies, is found in the promise

¹ Luke v. 4; Matt. xvii. 27; John xxi. 6. The coincidence is worthy of attention.

to Abraham and his seed.¹ This is often referred to in the Old Testament, sometimes by mere allusion to the "God of Abraham;" while the terms of the promise are frequently quoted in connection with other forms of Messianic prophecy.² On these promises, the Jews founded their estimate of themselves as the favorites of God.

But the New Testament writers declare that these promises, in their fulness, were made to the natural offspring of Abraham only so far as they possessed the same spiritual traits with him; and that they included all persons who were like Abraham in faith, whether his descendants or not, Rom. iv. ; ix. ; Gal. iii. In the last-mentioned passage, Paul shows that the promise of a seed culminated in Christ, and included all that are Christ's,—the promised seed being an organic unity, of which Abraham and Isaac were only *representatives*. The same general truth is affirmed by the Saviour, John viii. 39 and Matt. viii. 11, 12; and by Paul, Phil. iii. 3.

Paul also makes Ishmael a representative of the rejected seed as Isaac was of the accepted; and furthermore, Sarah typifies "Jerusalem which is above, the mother of us all," and Hagar "Jerusalem which now is."³ And still further, Canaan the inheritance plainly represented or typified a higher blessing. The conclusion is almost inevitable, that if the promised seed were more than a literal offspring, the inheritance is more than an outward Palestine. So the scriptures interpret. Even before Christ, the phrase "to inherit the land" rose into a higher plane of meaning (Ps. xxiv. 12; xxxviii. 11, 29); and the Saviour (Matt. v. 5) adopted it as the terminology of his kingdom. The writer

¹ Gen. xii. 3, 7; xvii. 7, 8; xxii. 17, 18.

² Ps. xxi. 6; lxii. 17; xxii. 27; Jer. xxxiii. 22.

³ Olshausen here remarks: "It is not the women *per se* who are here used as types, but Abraham's wives. According to the scriptures, the typical character seems confined to some few chief persons, who are, as it were, central characters. To these Abraham especially belongs, as the ancestor of the people of God. What happens to him and about him admits of a prefigurative acceptance, and so do his wives and children, but by no means every wife and child." Comp. Gal. iv. 25.

to the Hebrews (xi. 13, 16) ascribes to the patriarchs such expectations, and shows by a course of scriptural argument that the true "rest" or resting-place promised to God's ancient people, and which certainly was expressed under the form of the land of Canaan,¹ was not that to which Joshua brought them. Paul also identifies the promised inheritance of Abraham's seed with the hopes of Christians, when he closes the discussion thus: "If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs (*κληρονόμοι*) according to the promise," Gal. iii. 29. But for possible collateral questions, we might call attention also to Paul's assertion that Abraham's promise was that "he should be heir of the world" (Rom. iv. 13) in connection with the promise to Christ (Ps. ii. 8), "I shall give thee the heathen for an inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for a possession."

(3.) A still more prominent line of Messianic prophecy is that in which it passes through Jacob, or Israel. The sacred writings not only identify the patriarch with his posterity, but they envelope references to the church of the future and to its great Head, under cover of utterances, whether openly prophetic or historic, concerning "Israel."

In the message that Moses conveyed to Pharaoh, God described the collective whole of Jacob's descendants as "Israel, my son," and the name Israel or Jacob became a common appellation of that people as a unity. At the same time the distinction of the true and the false Israel, so clearly stated by Paul (Rom. ix. 6), is as clearly brought out in the Old Testament. It is found not alone in a few scattered statements like Psalm lxxiii. 1 and xxiv. 6,² but in requisitions, warnings, and rebukes, and in the constant turnings of God's word from an Israel sinful and perverse to an Israel full of holiness, about to fulfil God's will, and to be crowned with blessings (Is. xlii. 1—7; xlix.; lxi.).

¹ Deut. xii. 9; Ps. xciv. 11. Compare Deut. i. 35; Num. xv. 23.

² "They that seek thy face are Israel." So, substantially, Rosenmuller, Hengstenberg, Tholuck, Alexander, De Wette. Gesenius differs.

Many of the latter passages are plainly descriptive of Messianic times. The whole church of the future is often described under this phraseology, and the New Testament, in a great variety of passages and forms, adopts the same view.¹ The pervading idea of the New Testament concerning the Gentiles is that they are to be gathered into the purified Israel,—grafted into the ancient and good olive-tree.

In this connection the principle of representation finds place somewhat in the same manner as in the case of Abraham and his seed, but much more extensively. The "Israel" of the Old Testament is either the patriarch, or the whole nation,—his descendants; and while the chief ruler of this people in his songs of praise sometimes so identifies himself with the whole people as to speak in their name (Ps. xxv. 22), so also do the New Testament writers represent the chief history and experiences of the earlier Israel,—the unity, as prefigurative of Christ and the latter days.

Christ's allusion to the vision of Jacob as realized in himself (John i. 51) may perhaps be called a simple figure of speech. But other references require us to understand that the New Testament writers viewed the main experiences of the Israelitish nation as typical and representative,—as having an intended correspondence to future events. Thus the connecting link between Matt. ii. 15 and Hos. xi. 1 is found in Ex. iv. 22, 23, where God calls the whole nation of Israel "my son, my first-born," and commands, "Let my son go;" the summons of the earlier first-born from Egypt prefiguring that of the greater seed,—the only-begotten Son. The figurative language which described the cruel stroke aimed at the earlier Israel is quoted by Matthew as "fulfilled" in the still more cruel blow aimed by Herod at the whole hope of Israel in all time.

But there was one great group of transactions standing out with remarkable prominence in the history of Israel, which the New Testament declares in many ways to have

¹ See Gal. vi. 16; Rom. ix. 6; John i. 47; Matt. xix. 28; Luke xxii. 30 Rev. xxi. 12; Rom. xi.

pointed forward. We refer to the exodus and journey to Canaan, to the institutions then established, and the events then occurring. The "rest" or resting-place in view foreshadowed another rest "that remaineth for the people of God." Very many things foreshadowed him who should procure that rest, and their relation to him. Christ was typified in the passover, and the sacrifices, and the priest who made the offering. The heavenly manna and the miraculous supply of water that refreshed them on the way, the brazen serpent that healed their deadly wounds, all represented him, the true bread, the living water, the resurrection and the life. And there seems to be no valid reason to doubt that other features of the journey, not distinctly specified, were equally significant.¹ The identity of the names Joshua and Jesus is not to be regarded as accidental.² The rescue at the Red Sea is so blended with the deliverance of the future church from the great world-power, that the song of victory is to be "the song of Moses the servant of God, and the song of the Lamb," Rev. xv. 3. And all the final joy and glory of the redeemed is symbolized under the forms of Jerusalem, Zion, the temple, and the tribes.

As Israel is thus one continuous whole, so the threats against his enemies or hypocritical friends cover the whole class in all time, who are alike in character and doom; and hence those prophecies of reiterated reference, quoted Matt. xx. 7; xiii. 14, and elsewhere.

(4.) The fourth great channel into which the current of Messianic representative prophecy was restricted, was the family and the kingdom of David. The original prophecy, of which several Psalms are expansions, is found in 2 Sam. vii. 11—16. Here again the promised offspring is often

¹ Fairbairn has well shown the unsatisfactoriness of the position that absolutely *nothing* must be viewed as typical except what the New Testament expressly declares to be so. *Typology*, Vol. I. p. 48 sq. The error inclined to the safer side — caution.

² We need not remind the reader that *Ἰησοῦς* is the Septuagint form of Joshua, nor allude to the confusion introduced into Heb. iv. 8 by its not being so translated.

viewed as an organic whole, and the kingdom commonly as an unbroken continuity, of which the king never dies.¹ The line of monarchy culminates in the great Messiah who came to "sit on the throne of his father David," and to fulfil all the predictions concerning that kingdom which "the God of heaven shall set up." The inferior monarchs are viewed as members of that line, and precursors of the Great Monarch. Especially is this the case with David, the founder of the line, and its noblest human specimen, who not only stands as representative of the *monarchy*, but often also in his sonship and headship as a type of its greatest *king*.

In the great compass of that kingdom, and the diverse quality of its headship, is found occasion for some variety of representation. Often that kingdom is viewed in its complete and triumphant state, as in Daniel ii., vii., and its monarch the great and final sovereign in his glory, as in Ps. ii., xlv., lxii., cx.; at times in a struggling and depressed condition, with a glorious future still in prospect. In like manner, some of the utterances concerning its monarchy apply only to the human and sinful portion of that one royal line, as is the case with one noted verse of the original promise: "If he commit iniquity I will chasten him with the rod of men," 2 Sam. ii. 14. Other declarations apply to the whole line alike. A consideration of the varying condition of that kingdom and of the mixed character of its monarchy alone enables us to solve the seeming incongruities of these prophecies.

But there is another aspect of the case. David, the founder of that line, is not only a representative of the whole monarchy, but is singled out to be preëminently a type of Christ — the first monarch, of the last. As a favored son and servant of God, as the embodiment of Israel, the chosen seed, in his conflicts, sufferings, faith, and victories, he prefigured his great successor, who was to pass

¹ See this whole subject ably discussed by Professor Barrows in the Bib. Sac., Vol. XI. 306—328. For the views here expressed the writer is much indebted to that Article.

through obedience, faith, and suffering to his triumph. His experience was made not only in general, but sometimes with special peculiarity, to correspond to that later experience, and often the language in which it was set forth was made singularly and circumstantially descriptive of the history of Christ. To this class of predictions belong many of the most remarkable Psalms, such as the sixteenth, twenty-second, fortieth, forty-first, sixty-ninth, and others less prominent, including the class of which Hengstenberg and Alexander find the subject to be the ideal sufferer and the ideal righteous man. They are concrete and typical predictions, — utterances of the Psalmist, the son and servant of God, descriptive of his own experience, but that experience prefigurative of the greater son and servant, and the very language in which it was couched so shaped as exactly to meet the peculiar circumstances of Christ, — the betrayal and desertion, the mockings, the wounding, the parting of garments, the resurrection. In a few instances (as in Ps. xl. 12) we are met by a confession of sin. The difficulty it creates is not peculiar to this theory, but is relieved by it. The acknowledgement of sin may be understood to belong simply to the type, or perhaps as a personal burden in the type, designed to represent the official burden of the antitype. All the utterances concerning enemies are, in accordance with the fundamental principle, freely applied to the enemies of Christ, and especially to Judas.

Such are the chief lines of representative prediction. It will be found, we believe, that nearly all the typical personages and transactions of the Old Testament are grouped around these lines. The typical men are usually prominent individuals in these lines — heads of the series, princes, prophets, priests, and those closely connected with them. And thus, from this point of view, the organic connection and pre-ordained parallelism of the Old and New Testaments, we are enabled to interpret the citations of the one from the other, without repudiating its authority or forcing its language.

ARTICLE III.

A REVIEW OF SOME POINTS IN BOPP'S COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR.¹

BY LEONARD TAFEL, PH. D., PHILADELPHIA, AND PROFESSOR RUDOLPH
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ON reviewing the labors of the modern scholars in the province of language, we find that in Germany especially they have cultivated this field in almost all possible directions, and although they frequently seem to arrive at contradictory results, these results, nevertheless, are necessarily supplementary to each other, and advance the cause of philology as a whole. While the adherents of the old school confine their studies to the classical languages, and devote themselves more to the cultivation of syntax, the modern school, or that of comparative philology, after starting many and sometimes absurd hypotheses, have at length arrived at a profound knowledge of the laws of analogy, which none of its followers could violate with impunity in his investigations. Indeed, the growth of the various grammatical formations in the languages belonging to the Indo-European stock has been so clearly traced out by this school, and is so well supported by facts, that it may be safely asserted that future investigations must rest upon them as their foundation. These investigations of comparative philology, moreover, throw light on many hitherto dark portions of history, proving from the common stock of words and the cognate development of the forms of their languages

¹ *Comparative Grammar of the Sanscrit, Zend, Armenian, Greek, Latin, Lithuanian, Old Slavonian, Gothic, and German Languages.* By Franz Bopp. Second Edition. Reviewed throughout. Berlin: 1857-60.

² Our thanks are due to our learned friend, Professor Chas. Short, of Philadelphia, for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this Article.

that many detached nations of the present day belong to the same race, and were originally united. Indeed, comparative philology even points out the length of the period when they were thus united, and the time when they separated, and it furnishes information as to the state of the mental culture of these aboriginal people and their mode of living, and thus supplies the place of direct historical documents.

To Mr. Bopp is due the praise of having acted as a pioneer in this new field of human science, but around him have gathered other congenial minds, and under his leadership they have fought bravely against all kinds of opposition in order to plant securely the standard of their new science. Mr. Bopp has been enabled to lay before the learned public a new edition of his *Comparative Grammar*, which, according to his own statement, has been entirely remodelled. A few weak positions have been abandoned, because they were untenable, and others taken in their place which are in advance of the former. This new edition may be regarded as a very complete repertory of all investigations made by Mr. Bopp and others since the publication of his first edition. The learned author has subjected all theories put forth by others to a close scrutiny, and has either adopted or refuted them. Most of the positions taken by this great scholar are now established beyond any doubt, but he himself will acknowledge that there are some points still open to discussion, and a few of these we propose to reconsider.

Mr. Bopp's laws of sounds, as they are developed in the second edition, will probably not be disputed by any one. On page 9 he opposes those Sanscrit Grammarians, who, according to a later pronunciation in India, admit the transition of an original *a* as in *sofa*, into *e* as in *bed*, and into *o* as in *not*, as has been done in the earliest stages of the Greek language, and also in the Zend. But the fact that the short vowels *ē* and *ō* did not exist in the Old Sanscrit, any more than in the oldest Germanic dialect of which we have knowledge, is proved by Mr. Bopp by the consideration "that, suppose even these sounds to have existed while

the Sanscrit was a living language, they could only have been developed from a short *a* after Sanscrit writing had become fixed; because in its alphabet, where the minutest shades of sound are noticed, the distinction between *ā*, *ẽ*, and *õ*, would certainly not have been neglected" (I. 9). The fact that the sound of *e* was developed from *a* at a later period, is also proved by the Semitic languages, and especially by the Arabic, in which, at the present day, the sound of *a* has been retained by the Bedouins, *the Sons of the Desert*, with whom the vowels were less subject to change; while in the settled communities it has passed over into other sounds. The same thing we find in the Ethiopic, where the original Semitic *a* has frequently passed into the weaker sound of *ẽ*, and the vowel *i* has always been changed into *ẽ*.

As regards the weight of the three fundamental vowels, *a*, *u*, *i*, Mr. Bopp, to the best of our knowledge, was the first to point out the difference in gravity between these vowels, a subject which has also been discussed by us in our criticism on Mr. Corssen's work on Latin Pronunciation.¹ Mr. Bopp starts with those Sanscrit verbs in which a long *a* is changed into *i* in places where other verbs undergo other changes, and where, for instance, *yoondāmi*, *jungo*, *yooneemas*, *jungimus*, and also *ẽmi*, instead of the older *aimi*, *ẽμi*, *I go*, Plural, *ĩμεν*, may be compared. In the Gothic tongue, which in Mr. Bopp's grammar is the representative of the Germanic languages, this weakening of *a* into *i*, which is done to lighten the vowel, is most clearly seen in the verbs of Grimm's tenth, eleventh, and twelfth conjugations, where in the singular of the preterite, on account of its monosyllabic nature, a radical *a* has been preserved, while in the present tense, and all other forms dependent upon it, on account of the greater number of syllables, it has been weakened into *i*. Thus, *at*, *I ate*, bears the same relation to *ita*, *I eat*, as the Latin *cano* to *cecini*,

¹ *Latin Pronunciation and the Latin Alphabet*, by DR. L. TAFEL and PROF. R. L. TAFEL. Mason & Brothers: New York. 1860.

cipio to *accipio*. The Sanscrit, he continues, proves in all those verbs where a comparison can be instituted, that in the above-named Gothic conjugations, in the singular of the preterite tense, the genuine radical vowel has been preserved; and among these verbs he mentions, *at, I ate* (also in the third person), *sat, I sat*; *vas, I remained, I was*; *vack, I pursued*; *ga-vag, I moved*; *frah, I asked*; *gvam, I came*; *bar, I bare, bore*; *ga-tar, I tare, tore, I destroyed*; *band, I bound*; saying, in conclusion, that "henceforth, in historical grammar, the letter *a* of the above-named preterites, and of all other similar forms, can no longer be regarded as a permutation of the vowel *i* of the present tense, for the sake of expressing the past, however, it may appear so far from a survey of the Germanic languages only, inasmuch as the reduplication, the proper means for expressing this relation of time, has either entirely vanished in these preterites, or else can no longer be distinguished, on account of contraction, as in *étum, we ate, sétum, we sat*."

We are pleased to see that Mr. Bopp, in taking this ground, has advanced considerably beyond the positions he took in the first edition, § 1—7, where he treats of the same subject. He now admits that the root of the preterite is more primitive, and that the present (as well as the imperative mood, as we shall presently see) has been shortened from it, and we are convinced that Mr. Bopp will finally admit that not only the primitive form, but also the primitive signification, of the verb was that of the preterite or aorist.

It may, indeed, appear preposterous to enter into any discussions about the forms of language, when man first expressed his thoughts by words. But both the arguments of reason, and the vestiges of the earlier stages of the development of various languages, enable us to draw conclusions, chiefly negative, but partly positive, as to some sounds which could not have been used in those aboriginal times, and also as to some grammatical forms which could not have been primitive; while, on the other hand, aided

by the history of language, we are enabled to specify those forms which are most ancient, or at least are comparatively most ancient.

As regards the origin of language, unless we suppose that language sprang forth from the head of the primitive man, ready furnished, as Minerva from the head of Jupiter, we must assume that language, like all other attainments of man, was made gradually; and if we admit that the first man, in speaking, as well as in thinking, was instructed by Deity himself,¹ we must further grant that the Divine Being in this, as in all other cases, has followed his own pre-established order, to which he subjected himself in the process of his incarnation, the order, namely, of educational progress. If this be so, then the first man, when intending to express by words his feelings, intentions, and thoughts, was assisted or instructed by the Divine Being; but this assistance or instruction was conformed to man's first mental wants which were obviously very few and simple, and such, we hence infer, were the primitive forms of language.² The original forms were successively developed and modified, until, at last, they attained to that fulness of growth and perfection which appeared necessary to the various tribes, races, or nations. We shall confine our remarks to the Arian or Indo-European family of languages, with occasional references to the Semitic tongues, which offer some striking analogies in what appear to us their primitive formations. After these languages had, as it were, reached their highest point of bodily growth, their mental growth began to prevail; and the more their intellectual strength increased, the less it was necessary to retain all those external minutiae of grammatical forms which were developed in the earlier stages of the language, since those using it understood others, and were likely to be understood by

¹ It is proved by incontrovertible evidence that new-born babes, when left to themselves, or exposed among beasts, do not learn to think or speak; and when left among beasts utter only sounds in imitation of those of beasts.

² The demonstrative pronoun *היא*, for instance, in the older Hebrew, meant both *he* and *she*, and *בן*, a youth of both sexes, a boy or a girl.

others, even when, in expressing their thoughts, they dispensed with these external grammatical inflections. There is, however, no necessary reason why all members of the same family of languages should have branched out to the same extent, and have produced the same amount of grammatical forms. Just as in nature all trees of the same genus or species have not the same growth, nor do all the members of the same family of men attain the same stature or the same bodily or mental perfection. Thus, of all the Arian tongues, the Greek and Latin only have generated a pluperfect (as the Syriac also among the Semitic idioms), the Latin only a future perfect in the active, and the Greek in the passive voice; so, likewise, there was a diversity in the number of cases, in the use of the dual and plural, etc. If this be so, we are not authorized to maintain, as is frequently done by Mr. Bopp and his school, that all these languages, in the ante-historical times, were provided with the same number of forms, but subsequently dropped them.

Nevertheless, there are in the words and the forms of words many indications that the Arian, as well as the Semitic nations, originally constituted one people, and, in the ante-historical ages, spent a part of their youth together; after which they separated, and each developed itself in its own way, until at last they attained the maximum of their growth. Of this primitive language some idioms have preserved one, and others another, heirloom, as it were; but they all agree in this, that they retain more or less of the vestiges of that simple tense (the preterite or aorist), the priority of which it is a dictate of reason to acknowledge. For the first thing in order which a man would naturally express by speech was a phenomenon, or an act or fact completed. That form by which this realization was expressed, and which seems to have been originally monosyllabic, as in German, we call the *Aorist*, or, as is done in the Semitic tongues (the Chaldee, Syriac, Samaritan, Hebrew, Ethiopic, Arabic), the *Perfect tense*, in contradistinction from the Imperfect tense, that is, the *tense* and *mood* of *non-reality* or

uncompletedness. This form, naturally demanded by reason as the original one, we find in the German, and, as we have seen above, in the Sanscrit; it is likewise found (even without the suffix of the pronoun, as in the German in the strong form) in the Semitic idioms, this being the most simple; and we meet with it also, in the Slavonic, Lithuanian, and Greek, where the pronoun, in its oldest form, is appended to the root.

As regards Mr. Bopp's assertion that the proper means of expressing the past tense, the reduplication, had disappeared from the language, or had become disguised, we cannot agree with him. The reduplicated form could not have been the original one; because the simple form must first have existed before it could be reduplicated, and the first simple form, as we have seen above, expressed something which had taken place, and thus, at least by implication, had reference to the past. We hold that the reduplication is a subsequent formation, which was introduced, after the aorist form, by its being employed also for the imperative mood, had appeared to be more vague; and, moreover, reduplication does not seem to have ever been generally adopted.

On page 144, Mr. Bopp assumes two contradictory processes in language, to explain the same thing. In a footnote he observes that, according to Dobrowsky (pp. 39-41), the transition of gutturals to sibilants, through the retro-acting influence of a following soft vowel, is very evident in the Slavonic languages. But, in the aorist-ending *χu* and *χomu*, of the first person singular and plural, in *daxu* and *daxomu*, he derives the guttural from an original sibilant, and starts the hypothesis, that the aspirate *χ*, in the Slavonic languages, is of a comparatively later origin, and only took its rise after the Lettic languages had separated from the strictly Slavonic tongues. He says, also, that in the Lithuanian language we find *k* in the place of an original sibilant, as (p. 143), Lith. *jukka*, *black soup*, Slav. *juxa*, compared with Sanscrit, *yás'a-s* (masc.), *yás'am* (neut.), Lat. *jús*, *juris*, from *júsis*; and in the Lithuanian imperative mood, ending in *ki*, and *ki-te*, in which, he says, he recognizes the aorist

of the potential mood (Gr. *Oplative*); on this account he holds the letter *k* in Lith. *dūki-te* to be identical with the Slavonic χ in *da χ u*, *I gave*, *da χ omu*, *we gave*, and with the Sanscrit *s* in *dā-si-dvām*, *you might give*. He, moreover, mentions incidentally, that formerly the preterite ending in *χu* (which is proved to have been originally *χam*) was supposed to be related to the ending *-ka* of the Greek perfect, and refers to Grimm's Grammar I. p. 1059, and to Dobrowsky's Grammar, I. 2, § 19, and 7, § 90. The latter scholar regards the letter χ as a part of the personal ending, and we think his view is right, and shall endeavor to prove it elsewhere. If Mr. Bopp considers the letter *k* in *dūki-te*, to be identical with the Slavonic χ in *da χ u*, he ought still more to have regarded it as identical with the Greek κ in the aorists *ἔδωκα*, *ἔδθηκα*, *ἦκα*, which we shall discuss below, than the κ of the Greek perfect tense. We need not decide which of these three letters, κ γ χ is the oldest; but if Mr. Bopp (§ 23) maintains that the letter *h* in *a χ am*, is to be pronounced like a soft χ ; if, moreover, *ū* in *χu* stands for *um* or *om*, and this again stands in the place of *am*, as in the Lithuanian present, we should have to regard *da-χu* or *da[a]χu* (instead of *da χ am* in the Slavonic aorist) as one of the oldest formations in the Arian languages; and, so long as Mr. Bopp does not prove to us from an ante-Lettic or ante-Slavonic monument, that is, from a monument dating from the time when these two languages were not yet separated, that their common aorist sounded exclusively *sam* or *as-am*, and not *χam*, so long we shall consider ourselves authorized to maintain, that the Slavonic form is the more archaic, or the older, and that the Lithuanian *sam* or *sau* was either weakened from *χam* or *χau*, or, as is more commonly supposed, was a composition of the verbal root with the substantive verb *asam*. And, as regards the fact that in the Sanscrit language, which possesses the oldest written documents in the world, the verbs are only found with the ending *sam*, it does not hence follow that its forms also are always the oldest; nor are they generally regarded as such by the learned.

We suppose, that many scholars are not altogether satis-

fied that our leaders in philology regard it as a settled matter, that the personal pronoun of the first person singular in the nominative case is of a different root from that of the oblique cases. Mr. Bopp says (§ 326): "All languages here treated agree in this remarkable particular, that the nominative singular of the first person is of a different root from that of the oblique cases." The nominative in question sounds thus in these different languages: Sanscr. *aḥam*, *I*; Zend. *ašem*; Gr *ἐγώ*; Lat. *ego*; Goth. *ik*; Lith. *aš* (*ash*); Old Slav. *ašu*; Armen. *es*. The original form *akam*, the existence of which we shall prove, which is preserved in the Sanscr. *aḥam* (*aḥam*), and, as we have shown above, in the Old Slavonic suffixes, had the letter *k* or *χ* assibilated even in the Vedo-Sanscrit plural *asamē*, *asmē*, in the place of *aχmē*, (which latter form still survives in the Slavonic); in the Zend. *ašem*; in the Old Slavonic pronoun *ašu* for *ašum*, *ašom*, *ašam*, from *aḥam*; in the Lithuanian *aš* (*ash*) and the Armenian *es*, where the vowel-sound of the second syllable was moreover dropped; while the strong guttural remained in the Gothic *ik*; Ang. Sax. *ik*, Dutch *ic*, but was weakened into the middle in the Icelandic *eg*; Swed. *jag*, pronounced *yag*, and, also, *yah*, Dan. *jeg*, pronounced *yeg*, also *yeh*, with *eh* as *ey* in *they*; in the Latin and Greek it was also weakened into the middle, but, while they lost the final *m* or *n*, they still preserved the preceding vowel; in the German, however, the strong guttural became aspirated into *χ*, and in some of its dialects *χ* was reduced to *h*.

Mr. Bopp's supposition, that in the Sanscrit the second syllable of the first person does not constitute an essential part of the pronoun, because there are some other pronouns terminating in this same syllable, we think ought not to be admitted. For, *first*, these endings are not found in a single one of these pronouns in any other language, and thus they are either simply accidental, or else they were formed by an imitation of the pronoun of the first person. *Secondly*, the fact that the ending *am* is not merely an idle appendage, but an essential ingredient of this pronoun, is clearly proved by this consideration, that this last syllable

of the pronoun has been preserved in all the primitive formations of the verb, in the oldest languages of the Arian stock. If, now, this syllable forms an integral part of the root, that is, if it was regarded as belonging to the original root, and was used as a suffix in the formation of the first person of the verb, this very root, which became subsequently somewhat changed wherever it was not used as a suffix, appears in its most original form in the Greek ἐμ-οῦ, ἐμ-οῖ, ἐμ-έ, in the adjective ἐμ-ός, for which we even find, in the dialects, the more original form ἀμ-ός, and even ἀμ-έ, instead of ἐμ-έ. Compare Buttman, *Ausführliche Grammatik*, § 72, pp. 291—293.

By deriving the Vedic nominative plural *asmé'* from *asamê* = *asamoi* or *asamai*, we no longer need the hypothetic form *sma*, which was called into requisition by Mr. Bopp as a *Deus ex machina*; but we agree with him in this, that in the Greek plural ἄμμες, the letter σ, by assimilation, passed over into μ, as in ἐμμι from ἐσμι; we also believe that in the Armenian form *smes* (for *sames*), there is still a trace left of the original *s*. 'Αμές (Acc. ἀμέ), on the other hand, which Mr. Buttman, in the above paragraph, teaches to have been another form for ἡμεῖς, we would trace back immediately to *aḥam*, where, after the initial *a* had been cast off, the letter *s*, a sign of the plural, was added by means of the connective *e*. *H* with the hard breathing in ἡμεῖς, which, according to the best of our knowledge, neither Mr. Bopp nor Mr. Buttman has attempted to explain, is best accounted for in this manner, viz. the initial *a* was placed after the breathing letter, and *āā*, after coalescing into *ā*, was weakened into *η*. When this pronoun was subsequently used as a suffix, the letter *h*, as frequently happens, was lost, but, as we shall see, it was retained in the first aorist passive, where it aspirated the preceding demonstrative τ.

As regards the origin of the Sanscrit (and, consequently, of the Greek) augment as described by Mr. Bopp (I. 415 ff. § 557), we confess that we did not expect to find this explanation retained in the second edition; since it appears

to us too artificial, too far-fetched, and too illogical. Mr. Bopp maintains that the augment in the Sanscrit (and thus also in the Greek) arose from the *alpha privativum*. To this we object for the following grounds. *First*, we see no reason whatever why the *alpha privativum* should not have been retained; but changed into ε, of which change of this prefix we do not find a single instance in Greek. *Secondly*, if, according to Mr. Bopp, the object of the *alpha privativum* was to deny that the predicated verb is found in the present tense, Mr. Vorländer in his *Grundlinien einer organischen Wissenschaft der Seele*, is perfectly right in objecting to this assumption of Mr. Bopp by saying that *a simple negation of the present does not yet imply the past*. Mr. Bopp in this, as in his whole doctrine of the verb, starts with the wrong idea that the present tense is the original form, and that the other tenses are derived from it. The simple *a priori* consideration that a tense which expresses an incomplete action, or an action in the process of being performed, and which in the Old Slavonic is absolutely employed to express the future, could not have been the original tense, ought to be sufficient to prove the fallacy of this assumption. *Thirdly*, the usually lengthened form of the present tense indicates *a posteriori*, that this form had a later and more gradual origin, while the form of the so-called second aorist, or of the strong preterites which have been discussed above, which form is the same as the simple one of the imperfect tense, e. g. in ἔλεγον, ἔφη (Buttmann, *Ausführliche Grammatik*, § 109, *Anmerk.* 3), as every one may see from his own reading, bears all the traces of originality, inasmuch as in its formation, as we shall soon show, the pronouns are immediately appended to the simple root. If, now, this tense, expressing the past, was the older form, and if the idea of the past was inherent in it from the first, it is utterly impossible for the augment to express the negation of the present tense, which tense arose much later; but the origin of the augment belongs to a later period in language, and, although Mr. Buttmann did not keep pace with the modern school of linguistics, yet, by his more refined sense for lan-

guage, he was led to see the real state of things, and he described the augment as a wearing off of the [more] original reduplication. His own words are:

“From this circumstance alone, that both augments [the augment proper and the reduplication] belong exclusively to the preterites, we may presume that they are of the same origin. Without entering into any psychological disquisitions on the subject, we can well conceive how the old language would make use of the reduplication in order to express something past. Since the greater part of the changes, brought about in language in a mechanical way, consist in blunting and wearing off a form, and since, especially, we meet in other instances with a wearing off of the first letters in Greek words (see § 26, *Anmerk.* II., *δοχος* for *μόσχος*; *δοτταβος*, *ήγγανον*, for *κότταβος*, *τήγγανον*; *ήμί*, *ήν*, *ή*, for *φήμί*, *φήν*, *φή*; *αΐψηρός*, *λαιψηρός*; *είβω*, *λείβω*; *αΐα*, for *γαΐα*; *ΐα* for *μία*, etc.), it is perfectly analagous to assume that the reduplicated syllable containing an *ε* was reduced to a mere *ε*, and that the desire of drawing distinctions, availing itself of this feature, employed it particularly in the narrative style. This assumption, moreover, is fully proved (1) by the existing reduplication of the verb in some cases passing over into a mere *ε*, and (2) by the second aorist instead of having its regular augment being still found in the Epic with the reduplication of the perfect, as in *πέπληγγον*, *λελαβέσθαι*, etc.”

We are not at all satisfied with the manner in which Mr. Bopp (§ 568, II. 445, ff.) endeavors to explain the archaic forms *ἔδωκα*, *ἔδηκα*, *ἦκα*. After he seems to have come very near the truth, by bringing these forms into connection with the Old Slovenic *daχu* and the other analogous formations in this ancient idiom, and with the Lithuanian imperative mood in *dūk*, *give*, *dūkite*, *give ye*, he suddenly turns off again, and says:

“We can do no better than to regard *ἔδωκα* as a degenerate form of *ἔδωσα*; whether the letter *s* at *one leap* [*sic*!] became *κ*, or *κ* associated itself with the sibilant of the substantive Verb, as in the imperfect form *ἔσκον*, *ἔσκει*, in the

Old Lat. future *escit*, and in the imperfect tenses and aorists, ending in -*εσκον*, -*εσκομην*, -*ασκον*, -*ασκομην*, as *δινεύεσκε*, *καλέεσκον*, *καλέσκητο*, *ἔλασκε*, *δασάσκητο*, where we cannot help noticing the addition of the substantive verb, which, moreover, has been doubled in *σα-σκον*, *σα-σκομην*. In *ἔδωκα*, *ἔδηκα*, *ἤκα*, however, provided they sounded originally *ἔδωσκα* etc., the euphonic addition to *σ* simply remained, and thus an original *ἔδωσα* first became *ἔδωσκα*, and finally, *ἔδωκα*. Perhaps the letter *κ* was originally placed before *σ* in *ἔδωσα*, as in *ξύν* from *σύν* = Sanscr. *sam*, so that *ἔδωκα* would have to be regarded as a reduced form of *ἔδωξα*; even as the form *xum* must have preceded the Latin *cum*, in case this is related to *ξύν*, *σύν*, *sam*."

§ 569. "The Lithuanian, also, presents a form related to the Greek and Sanscrit [and Old Slavonic?] aorist, in which as it seems to me, *κ* takes the place of an original *s*; I mean the imperative mood, in which I recognize that Sanscrit mood, which agrees with the Greek optative of the aorist, and by which *k* in *δῦκ*, *give*, *δῦκίτε*, *give ye* = Sanscr. *dasidvām*, *you may give*, (Precat. mid.), becomes related to the *κ* in the Greek *ἔδωκα* (§ 92, p. 144.)"

In our remarks above we have declared ourselves against this generation of *k* from *s*, which Mr. Bopp endeavors to vindicate in the above extract. His explanation appears very arbitrary, and, at the very outset, conflicts with a circumstance which seems to have been disregarded by all who have embraced Mr. Bopp's view without further examination. The point is this, that these three aorists are invariably found with the augment, which, as is well known, is usually not placed with the suffix *σκ*. This suffix, although dating back to an early period, arose, nevertheless, on Pelasgic ground, after the members of the Arian stock had separated; for it only exists in the Greek and Latin Languages. Besides the older form *ἔδωκα*, we, in fact, also find *δόσκον*, but without any augment or reduplication whatever, according to the general rule; even the poets, according to Buttmann (§ 94. *Anmerk.* 2), employed the augment offered them by analogy, only in a very few cases, and only *where it*

seemed imperatively demanded by the metre. According to our opinion, these three verbal forms, together with the Lithuanian imperative mood, are rather remnants of the comparatively oldest formation of the verbs,¹ with the more recent addition of the augment. **Έδωκα*, *Έδηκα* and *ήκα* are evidently instead of *Έδωκαμ*, *Έδηκαμ* and *ήκαμ*, in which the letter *μ*, as in all other aorists, first became nasalized, that is, was pronounced more or less indistinctly, until, finally, it was entirely suppressed, both in speaking and writing. The forms *δῶκα*, *δῆκα*, *ήκα* are instead of *δῶκαμ*, *δῆκαμ*, *ήκαμ*, and these, again, are contracted from *δό-ακαμ*, *δέ-ακαμ*, *έ-ακαμ*, so that we obtain from them the suffix *akam*, which corresponds exactly to the Sanscrit *aḥam*, i. e., *aḥam* (with a weak *χ*), and to the Old Slovenic² *aḥam*. We believe that this particular formation, in the primitive times, as in the Old Slovenic, was confined to the first person singular and plural, and that, at a later period only, after the independent pronoun of the first person, where it was not suffixed, had gradually become changed, and a knowledge of its signification, where the pronoun was suffixed, had thus become lost. The letters *κ* and *α* of the first person, as in the Lithuanian and the Greek, were also extended to the other persons, and the final consonant only was used to indicate the other persons. The same thing, also, we notice in the Sanscrit, in regard to the vowel *a* before the final consonant; thus, we find *ā's-am*, *ās'-is*, *ās'-it*, and likewise, *ā's-am*, *ās'-as*, *ās'-at*, etc. The fact, that the guttural of the pronoun, where it was not suffixed afterwards, with some of the members of the Arian family became a sibilant, and that the vowel *a* of the last syllable was obscured and became *o* (*u*) or *e*, as in the Zend. *azem*, Old Sloven. *ašu[m]*, Gr. *agám*, *agám*, *ἀγάν*, *ἀγόν*, *ἐγόν*, *egon*, Lat. *egom*, *ego*, does not preclude the possibility that the various members of this family had originally common forms for the several pronouns, of

¹ To which, perhaps, is to be added *Έδηδ-ονα* besides *Έδηδός*.

² Mr. Bopp calls this language the *Old Slavonic*, but Mr. Miklosich (preface, p. vii.) calls it the *Old Slovenic*, because it is merely a part of the Old Slavonic, (compare *Vergleichende Laut lehre der slavischen Sprachen*, von Fr. Miklosich).

which forms that of the first person was particularly retained, as a suffix to the oldest form of the verb, that is the aorist. It cannot be decided with certainty, whether the original guttural of the first person was a smooth, middle, or aspirate, since we find all three represented; but by reasons of analogy we assume that the hardest sound is the oldest, which is also proved by the Gothic, the oldest Germanic idiom of which any traces have been left us. The suffix *akam*, as we have shown above, was originally used entire, but in this primitive state we find it only in the Greek, in the three above-named forms of the aorist, and in the Old Slavonic, in that particular tense which, for other reasons, we have designated as the primitive one. The original form *aχam*, in this primitive tense, gradually assumed several forms, all of which, however, may be traced back again to this same original form: thus, from *aχam* we get *aχom*, *aχum*, *aχum̃*, *aχu*, *oχu*, *êχu*, *iχu*, as in Old Slovenic *daχu*, *I gave*, from *da-aχu* or *d'-aχu*; *sus-aχu*, *I sucked*, *ber-uñ*, *I gather*, Aor. (*ber-aχu*) *braχu*; *deruñ*, *I split*, Aor. (*der-aχuñ*) *draχuñ*, *s'enuñ*, *I drive* Aor. *gnaχu*, *I drove*. In the aorist of those verbs which correspond to the 10th Sanscrit conjugation, the pronoun is suffixed to the original root, as is done in those verbs where *n*, *t*, or *d*, is inserted, e. g. in *rüd-as-uñ*, *I lament*, Aor. *rud-aχu* for *rud-aχum*; *güb-n-uñ*, *I perish*, Aor. *güb-oχu* (*oχum*). The same is the case in other verbs, where other letters have been inserted before the pronoun, as in *gorjun* *I burn*, Aor. *gor-êχu*; *orjuñ*, *I plough*, Aor. *or-aχu* [*or-aχum*], Lat. *ara-o*, Gr. *ἀρώ*]; *plujuñ*, *I make to flow*, Aor. *plio-aχu*; *dejuñ*, *I do*, Aor. *dejaχu*. When the pronoun is preceded by a nasal sound, its initial *a* is dropped, as in *vinuñ*, *I wind*, Aor. *vinuñ-χu*; but in the iterative form *vinjaχu* there is no nasal sound; *penjuñ*, *I span*, Aor. *penχu*, *I spanned*. In one Slavonic dialect, the Lusatian, the final *m* or *n*, together with the preceding vowel, is entirely dropped, and the aorist ends with the guttural of the pronoun, or the guttural passes over into a sibilant, or is dropped altogether, as *daχ*, *I gave*, *staχ*, *I stood*; *beχ*, *bjex*, *I was*; *noseχ*, *I bore*, iterative form *noshax*; *vovam*, *I cry*, *vovaχ*, *I cried*; *piχ*, *I drank*. from *piju*,

I drink. In the plural, however, the original *m* is restored, as *daχ*, *daχme*; *staχ*, *staχme*; *beχ*, *beχme*; *tru*, Lat. *tero*, *trjex*, *trjexme*, *trivimus*.

As in the Semitic¹ languages, so also in the Indo-European, the suffixing of the dissyllabic pronoun became inconvenient, and they had, therefore, recourse to various means in order to facilitate this process. Thus, *aħam* seems to have been changed into *ħaam*, *hām*, *hēm*, *ήμ*, (*ήν*); by dropping the guttural *ħ*, was obtained *aam*, *ām*, *ημ*, *ην*; by shortening *ām*, the syllables *ām*, *ōμ*, *om*; and the final *m*, in the Greek language, was first nasalized, and imperfectly pronounced, and, at last, totally dropped. In the first stage of contraction or shortening, we find *hām*, *hēm*, *ήμ*, where the final *m* afterwards was preserved only in cases where it was supported by a following vowel. This form of the pronoun, when suffixed to the demonstrative *τ* of the Greek verbal adjective, aspirated the dental smooth, and this the preceding guttural or labial smooths and middles, while it assibilated the preceding dental, as in *τυπ-*, *τυπ-τ-ος*, *έτυπ-τ-ᾱμ*, or *ήμ*, *έτυφθημ*, *έτυφθᾱμ*, *ετύφθημ-ες* or *εν*, *έτύφθᾱμ-ες*; hence the infinitive mood *τυφθήμ-εν*, *τυφθή-ημ-εν-αι*. Afterwards, however, the letter *μ*, when final, according to the laws of Greek phonology, was changed into *ν*; hence we have the future *τυφθή[ν-ε]σομαι*. A second stage of the weakening of the pronominal suffix consisted in the dropping of the aspirate, so that the long syllable *ām* or *ēm*, *āμ* or *ημ* was appended immediately to the original unincreased verbal root, which, in this case, taken in its intransitive meaning, assumed the function of the passive voice, as *χαρ-* (*χαίρ*), *έχάρην*, *I was in a state of χαρ-ά*, joy, rejoicing, *έ-γήρ-αμ*, *έγήρ-αν*; *σταλλ-*, *έστάλ-ην*, *σταλη[ν-ε]σομαι*, *σταλήσομαι*; *ῥν-* (*ῥέ*), *έῤῥύην*, *I flowed*, *I was in a state of flowing*; *πληγ*, — *έπλήγην*. In a third stage of contraction or weakening, which was entered upon at an early period, the syllable *ām* was shortened in various

¹ E. g. in *לִּכְרוֹם*, *e-k'tol*, *I will kill*, *כ* is shortened of *כָּרַם*, *ani*, *I*; in *לִּכְרוֹמֵנוּ*, *ni-k'tol*, *we shall kill*, *נִ* stands for *נִכְרוֹמֵנוּ*; in *הָחַתְּלָהּ*, *katal-ta*, *thou hast killed*, masc., *ta*, *thou*, is contracted from *at-ta*; in *הָחַתְּלָהּ*, *thou hast killed*, fem. *t'*, *thou*, fem., is instead of *at-at*.

ways. While the letter μ in this tense, in the Lithuanian language, passes over into the vowel u , which is related to the labial letters through v , but in the plural reappears; in the Greek it is at first nasalized, afterwards pronounced indistinctly, and at last entirely dropped. This particular form of the aorist we still find in $\epsilon\iota\pi\alpha$ for $\epsilon\iota\pi\alpha\mu$, $\eta\upsilon\epsilon\gamma\kappa\alpha$ for $\eta\upsilon\epsilon\gamma\kappa\alpha\mu$ (from which are derived $\epsilon\iota\pi\acute{\alpha}\mu\eta\nu$, $\eta\upsilon\epsilon\gamma\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\eta\nu$), and perhaps in $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\sigma\alpha$ for $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\alpha$. In the popular language this particular form of the aorist (which we prefer to call the strong aorist, because it is certainly not formed by a composition with the substantive verb) seems to have generally prevailed, and from this it seems afterwards to have intruded into the written language, as $\epsilon\iota\delta\alpha$, $\epsilon\iota\lambda\alpha$, $\epsilon\lambda\alpha\beta\alpha$, (conf. Buttmann, *Ausführl. Grammat.* §. 114, p. 278, 279). Instead of being dropped, the letter μ , however, usually changing into ν , and $\alpha\nu$ is contracted with the preceding vowel into one syllable with a long vowel, which, in some verbs, is shortened again in the plural; unless we prefer to regard the ν , the last letter of the syllable, as the suffix, representing the personal pronoun as, ($\delta\iota\delta\rho\alpha\sigma\kappa$, $\delta\rho\alpha$), $\epsilon\delta\rho\alpha\alpha\nu$, $\epsilon\delta\rho\alpha\nu$; $\epsilon\delta\sigma\alpha\mu$, $\epsilon\delta\sigma\alpha\nu$, $\epsilon\delta\omega\nu$; $\epsilon\delta\epsilon\alpha\mu$, $\epsilon\delta\epsilon\alpha\nu$, $\epsilon\delta\eta\nu$; $\epsilon\alpha\mu$, $\epsilon\eta\nu$, $\eta\nu$; $\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\alpha\nu$, $\epsilon\sigma\tau\eta\nu$; $\epsilon\delta\upsilon\alpha\mu$, $\epsilon\delta\upsilon\alpha\nu$, $\epsilon\delta\upsilon\nu$; $\epsilon\phi\upsilon\alpha\mu$, $\epsilon\phi\upsilon\alpha\nu$, $\epsilon\phi\upsilon\nu$ (compare $\iota\chi\theta\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$, $\iota\chi\theta\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$, $\delta\epsilon\iota\kappa\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha\sigma\iota$, $\delta\epsilon\iota\kappa\nu\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota$). Most frequently, however, in the written language of the Greek, the suffix $\alpha\mu$, $\alpha\nu$, was weakened into ov . In the Old Slavonic, as it seems, it was first nasalized into om or um , afterwards into on or un , where the final n was first pronounced indistinctly, and at last entirely suppressed; in the plural, however, both in the Lithuanian and the Old Slavonic, it was universally pronounced with a preceding full o , and only the s of the plural, which has survived only in the Sanscrit, the Greek dialects, and the Latin, was worn off; as Lith. *gawaú* *I got*, dual *gawówa*, *we two got*, plur. *gowóme*, *we got*; Old Slav. *dvigŭ[m]*, *I moved*, dual *dvigově*, *we two moved*, plur. *dvig-omu[s]*, *we moved*.

In regarding the ending *am* (*an*, *on* = *av*, *ov*) as a constituent part of the suffixed pronoun of the first person, we only follow the example of the Indian grammarians themselves, who lived some thousands of years nearer to the

origin of these verbal formations than Mr. Bopp and ourselves, and who may be imagined to have still had a sort of consciousness of the mode in which the forms in their language were generated, which consciousness has been lost by us. In fact, Mr. Bopp himself (§ 500) declares, that he must attribute a pronominal origin to what are usually termed "the copulative vowels *ε* and *ο*" in verbs, such as *φερ-ο-μεν* (which we rather divide thus, *φερ-ομ-εν*, *φερ-ε-τε*); but we cannot agree with him in his further deductions, and rather side with the Indian grammarians, who regard the vowel *a* in the ending *am* (*om*, *on*) as a part of the pronoun. Even Mr. Bopp himself, in a note to § 437, p. 268, remarks: "Although we have divided above *άb'ar-a-m*, just as we did *έφερ-ο-ν*, yet, we must observe, that, according to the Indian grammarians, the full ending of the first person singular of the secondary forms [we rather call them primary, because they were first in use] is not *m*, but *am*. The ending *am*, indeed, is also found in verbs where the letter *a* cannot be regarded as the characteristic vowel of the class to which the verb belongs; as from *ί*, *to go*, we do not form *άi-m*, *I went*, but *άy'-am*, and the Sanscrit *άstrnav-am*, plur. *άstrnuma*, is found together with the Greek *έστόρνυν*, *έστόρνυμεν*. But, inasmuch as the second person singular is expressed in the Sanscrit by the letter *s* only, and the third by *t*, and as, for instance, the Sanscrit *άstr-nό-s*, *άstr-nό-t* corresponds to the Greek *έστορνύ[s]*, *έστορνύ[τ]*, we may conclude from this, as well as from the fact that in the Greek, also, the first person is simply expressed by *ν*, that the letter *a* in *άstrnavam* is an inorganic admixture from the first principal conjugation, even as in Greek *έστόρνουν* would correspond to *έστορνύ-ν*." Instead of having recourse in Sanscrit to an inorganic formation, we prefer to look upon this formation as organic, by showing that *έστόρνυν* is, indeed, a contraction of *αμ*, *αν*, and that *ο* in *ον* has been weakened from this, and that the contraction of *να* into *ν* is not of such rare occurrence in Greek; as we have seen above, as *όσφύας*, *όσφύς*; *άπολλάσιν*, *άπολλύσιν*; *όφρύς* from *όφρύας*, *the eyebrows*.

From these considerations, we think, it is made clear that Mr. Bopp is wrong in regarding the suffix *am* as a blunted secondary formation of *ami*, $\alpha\mu$; for it is much rather a primary formation, existing before the present tense, which tense, from reasons of common sense only, must be regarded as of a later origin, since it does not express a completed fact, but one which is in the process of completion, and inasmuch, as, in the Slavonic language, it is absolutely used in the place of the future. — Conf. Prof. Bopp's *Verbalism*, III. p. 98.

On page 259, § 431, Mr. Bopp, says: "The double form of the personal endings is shown in the Latin also by the circumstance that wherever there was originally the fuller ending *mi*, this was entirely dropped, with the single exception of *sum* and *inquam*; while the original final *m* has been preserved throughout; thus, we find *amo*, *amabo*, but *amabam*, *eram*, *sim*, *amem*, as in the Sanscrit *á-b'avam* and *á'sam*, *I was*, *syám*, *I may be*, *kámáyêyam*, *I may love*." We must emphatically declare ourselves against this statement of Mr. Bopp, which, starting with him, has been adopted by all grammarians, that, namely, in Latin, with the single exception of *sum* and *inquam*, the suffix of the first person has been dropped. We are, on the contrary, of the opinion, 1, that the ending *mi* which Mr. Bopp most probably regards as a shortened form of *ma*, and which latter form we moreover hold to be a metathesis of *am*, *om*, *em*, *im*, never existed in this language, and, as a general thing, was developed only in the Sanscrit and the Zend, after they had separated from the other members of the Arian family; 2, that not the entire suffix, but only the final *m* of the suffix *om*, had become lost, after it had first become nasalized, and had gradually been pronounced more and more indistinctly. This suffix was originally *am*, as in *inquam* (*inquam*), and it lost the letter *m* about the same time, as the unsuffixed pronoun *ego*, which originally sounded *aham*, *axam*, *akam*, *agam*, *egam*, *egom*. If Mr. Bopp's supposition were right, and if the letter *o* of the first person were nothing else than a copulative letter, it would seem inexpli-

cable to us how this copulative letter should have remained stereotyped, as it were, in the first person singular and plural, in four members of the Indo-European family, the Latin, Greek, Lithuanian and Slavonic, and should therein manifest a marked difference from the other persons of the verb. The history of the formations of the verb proves clearly that this letter *o* is the last remnant of the pronóminal suffix of the first person. The plural alone of the Greek *λέγ-ομεν*, *λέγ-ομες*, (*leg-omen*, *leg-omes*), the Latin *volumus* for *volomos*, *quæsumus* for *quæsomos*, &c., and the Slavonic and Lithuanian forms *nesoxu*, plur. *nesoxomu[s]*, *we bore*; *raud-aju*, plur. *raud-ojome[s]*, shows that this letter has been weakened from the nasalized *om*, *on*, *um*, *un*, and that the letter *m* was originally pronounced full, — and we need no other evidence. It is not our intention to call the Messrs. Ritschl and Fleckeisen to account for rejecting the forms *dicom*, *faciom*, *incipissom*, *subigitom*, *videom*, which occur in some of the manuscripts of Plautus, because, as they say, none of the old grammarians seem acquainted with any such forms in the singular. At all events these forms are not mere errors in writing, since we cannot conceive how the copyist, by a mere mistake, should have, in more places than one, written down these endings, unless he had still some sort of indistinct recollection of them, or was made familiar with them by written traditions and documents which are now lost to us. It by no means appears strange, that, while the letter *m* disappeared in the present tense, it should still have continued in *eram*, *amabam*, *monebam*, *legebam*, *nequibam*, *ibam*; for, inasmuch as the letter *a*, in these endings, was not weakened into *o*, its connection with the personal pronoun *ego*, in its later form, was completely lost sight of by the people: while, in the present tense, where this connection still remained visible, the form of the suffix was accommodated to that of *ego* in its more modern garb. The Lithuanian, however, proves that *u* or *o*, *um* or *om*, were originally *am*; for, while, in the singular, *a* was obscured into *u*, and the letter *m* dropped, in the plural the vowel *a* is still preserved, and the letter *m* retained, because

followed by a vowel; as, sing. *wéžù*, plur. *wežame*, *we carry*. The same thing we find in the Gothic present tense, where the letter *m* has been preserved in the first person plural, because a whole syllable had been dropped after it, while, in the singular, this same letter *m* of the suffix *am*, was first nasalized, and afterwards given up entirely; just as in the Greek, where the letter μ was dropped in the singular of the active voice, as in *ἔτυψα*, while it was retained in the plural and in the middle, or else was partly changed into *ν*; as in *ἐτύψαμεν*, *ἐτυψάμαμ*, *ἐτυψάμαν*, *ἐτυψάμην*; *ἐφθάρ-αμ*, *ἐφθάρ-αν*, or *a = η*, *ἐφθάρ-ην*. A similar change of the letter *a* of the suffix *am*, which sounded like *a* in *far*, into the long English *a* in *fate*, we notice in the Armenian and Albanian; and the addition of the suffix *am* or *em* to the vowel of the root, with which it coalesced into one long vowel, we find to some extent in the Gothic and Old-Saxon among the Germanic tongues, and likewise in the Persian, Armenian, and Albanian.

Mr. Bopp says (§ 434, p. 261): "At all events the ending *μαι* of the middle and passive voices, which [in Greek] is common to all classes of verbs, shows that they all had originally the ending *μ* in the active voice. As regards the general preservation of the character of the first person in all forms of the middle and passive voices, the Greek has an immense advantage over its Asiatic sisters, which in the singular of the middle, both in the primary and the secondary forms have lost the *m*. In the same manner, therefore, in which from the Sanscrit *b'ár-âmi*, we, as it were, restore the Greek *φέρω*, so also from the Greek *φέρομαι*, we trace back the blunted Sanscrit form *b'árê* to its original form *b'ár-a-mê* or *b'ár-a-mê*." Even if we grant that the two members of the Arian family, the Sanscrit and the Zend, had this complete ending in the middle voice, after the ending of the first person singular in the active voice, but that, in the course of time *am* had become *mi*, we need not, on this account, assume the same of the Greek. On the contrary, in the Greek, as well as in the Lithuanian and the Slavonic, the suffix *a* was shortened into *mi* only in a small number of

verbs. The ending *μαι*, in Greek, may be explained in two ways; either the letter *m* of the first person in the active voice, by imitation of the second and third persons *σαι* and *ται*, which were themselves expanded from *σι* and *τι*, was formed into *μαι*; or else, since the passive voice is by no means one of the oldest formations, the passive ending of the first person singular of all verbs, by imitation of the ending of the first and second persons, was formed from the shortened suffix *μ*, which had already been introduced in a small number of verbs. In the Sanscrit and Zend this shortened form did not become general until after their separation from the rest of the members of the Arian family, and in the Greek, Lithuanian, and Slavonic, it was confined to a small number of verbs, while in the Latin, Gothic, High German, Old Saxon, Persian, Albanian, and Armenian, not a single trace of this secondary form of the active voice, and still less of that of the passive voice, can be found. It can be proved, however, that all these languages in the beginning in the first person of the present tense had the ending *am*, *um*, *em*, (*im*); and their present tenses, therefore, appear formed of a portion of that suffix, which we claim to have been common to all.

We agree perfectly with Mr. Bopp in § 477, pp. 324, 325, where he explains the Latin *r* of the passive voice by the reflexive *s*; for this *r* is certainly identical with *s*, and also, in the remaining idioms of the Arian family it serves to express the passive voice. In the neighboring Semitic family, even in the Hebrew (*Niphal* conj. Chaldee, Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic, the reflexive relation is the bridge by which we pass over into the passive voice).¹ We have to repeat, however, our objections to Mr. Bopp's explanation of the second per-

¹ In case it is true, and we are very much inclined to believe it, that the Indo-European languages, together with the Semitic, originally formed one primitive language, the fact that all the Semitic, and a part of the Indo-European languages, use the same letters, in *all* persons, to represent the reflexive relation, would go very far towards proving the priority of this mode of expressing the reflexive relation to that mode by which the reflexive form is strengthened, in the several persons, by the distinctive words for each person; for this latter form evidently belongs to a later stage of development.

son plural, which we have raised in our work already referred to.¹ In order to leave the mind of the reader unbiased, we extract from Mr. Bopp's work the article in question:

"It is easy to see that the second person plural bears no relation whatever to the remaining persons of the passive voice; but it is entirely owing to the circumstance that the former cultivators of grammar did not trouble themselves at all about the *rationale* of linguistic phenomena, and, that the relationship which exists between the Latin and Greek languages was not studied in a truly scientific and systematic manner, that the form *amamini* so long occupied its place among the paradigms, without anybody's asking whence it came and how it originated? I think I was the first to raise this question in my *Conjugation system* (Frankfort a. M., 1816, p. 105, ff), and I repeat here confidently the explanation which I there made, that *amamini* is a participle of the passive voice in the masculine nominative plural; thus, that *amamini* stands for *amamini estis*, as in the Greek *τετυμμένοι εἰσι*. The Latin suffix is *minu-s*, which corresponds to the Greek *μένος* and the Sanscrit *māna-s*. But inasmuch as these participles, as such, passed entirely out of use in the Latin, and only remained in the second person plural, in a state of petrification, as it were, they assumed in common language the character of a personal form, and as their nature of a noun was no longer recognized, the distinction of the genders, also, was no longer observed in them, and the addition of *estis* was discontinued. It may be proper to allude here to a similar process in Sanscrit. In this language, *dātā* (from the root *dātār-*), for instance, properly signifying *daturus*, is used in the sense of *daturus est*, without taking into consideration the genders; it is thus likewise used for *datura* and *daturum est*, although this form, which is also equivalent to the Latin *nomen agentis* in *tor*, is provided with the feminine ending in *trī* (Lat. *trī-c-* § 119), and a *female who gives* is in Sanscrit just as little called *dātā* as

¹ "Latin Pronunciation and the Latin Alphabet."

dator in Latin. In the plural, moreover, *dâtâras*, when used as a noun, signifies *givers*, but when used as a verb, *they will give*, in all genders; the same is the case with the plural form *dâtârâu*. The Sanscrit use of this form is still more remarkable than the Latin, because, in the former language *dâtâ*, *dâtârâu*, *dâtâras* are still used as substantives. It is, then, entirely owing to the circumstance of the language, in its existing state, being no longer able to dispose of these forms in the sense of future participles, that in *dâtâ*, *dâtârâu*, *dâtâras*, where they signify *dabit*, *dabunt*, the consciousness of their adjective nature and their power of expressing the different genders was lost, and that the character of common verbal persons was assumed by them."

In order to be impartial, we must, moreover, state what Mr. Bopp adduces in favor of the existence of these participles in Latin. On pp. 326, 327 he continues: "But to return to *amamini*, the reviewer of my *Conjugation system* in the *Jenaer Litteraturzeitung* (G. F. Grotefend, if I am not mistaken) supports this explanation by the forms *alumnus*, *Vertumnus*, which evidently belong to this particular formation of the participle, but in which the letter *i* has been lost. This letter was preserved in *terminus*, which Mr. Lisch very properly, as it seems to me, explains, *that which has been crossed*, from the Sanscrit *tar*. *Fe-mina*, *she who bears*, consequently in the middle voice [conf. *οἱ γεινόμενοι*, *parents*, in Herodotus], which is likewise adduced by Mr. Lisch, I had previously regarded as a kindred formation; its root is *fē*, from which are also derived *fetus*, *fetura*, *secundus*. In addition to these, *gemini* (those who have been born at the same time, from the root *gen*), which is in the place of *genmini*, *genimini*, may be taken into consideration [we object to this; for by this explanation there would be wanting in this word two essential points which are inherent in the idea "*twins*," viz. that of duality, and that of being born at the same time]."

This theory of Mr. Bopp, endorsed by learned men, such as Grotefend, was received in the grammars without scarcely meeting with any resistance whatever. But as regards Mr.

Bopp's assertion that the proceeding in the Sanscrit language is much more remarkable, than that advocated by himself, we, and very probably many of our readers, cannot agree with him ; for in the Sanscrit, we only need to supply *est* and *sunt*, but in the Latin, according to Mr. Bopp's idea, *estis, sitis* (*eratis, essetis*), *este*, or *estote* and, moreover, five participles for various tenses and moods in which no participle has ever existed in any language ; thus *leg-iminu-s*, *leg-imini estis* ; *leg-aminu-s*, *leg-amini sitis* ; *leg-ebaminu-s*, *leg-ebamini estis* ; *leg-ereminu-s* *leg-eremini sitis* ; *leg-iminu-s legimini este, estote*, which is a linguistic absurdity.

As, for the reasons here given, we cannot embrace Mr. Bopp's theory, we must endeavor to supply a better one, and for this purpose, as is done by Mr. Bopp himself, we undertake to ascend into the ante-historical ages, and to vindicate, if possible, to this form also a reflexive character. As we look upon the imperative mood as the oldest form next to the aorist, and are confirmed in this belief by the consideration that the form most immediately required by language, after it had given birth to the aorist, which expressed a fact, act, or phenomenon completed, was that by which the repetition of such an act or fact was demanded, so also in the present case we start with the imperative mood. The oldest form of this mood in the passive voice was *iminor*, which originally consisted of *imin* and *os* or *or*. It is true that the genuineness of this ending has been disputed lately ; but we have seen in the case of the ending *om* of the first person singular, how very ready even our best scholars are to throw anything away, on the plea of its being a slip of the pen, that does not agree with their own ideas. It is a well-known principle in hermeneutics, in case we have to choose between two readings, to select the more difficult or rarer as the genuine one ; for the copyist may, indeed, be supposed to have changed a more difficult or rarer reading into an easier one, but not *vice versa*. The original *os* or *or*, like *s* in general, was gradually pronounced more and more indistinctly, until at last it vanished altogether, when the consciousness of its origin and its meaning

had become lost among the people; indeed, on account of its ending in *o*, it was then even wrongly employed in the singular, while in the plural it was changed into *i*. According to our view the ending *iminos* or *iminor* is the original complete form, composed of *imin* and *os*. *Imin* is the Sanscrit accusative *yusman*; the letter *s*, in this word was early assimilated in the Greek to the following μ , and the consonantal *y* either passed over into the aspirate, or it vanished altogether $\dot{\upsilon}\mu\mu\epsilon\varsigma$, acc. $\dot{\upsilon}\mu\mu\alpha\varsigma$ for $\dot{\upsilon}\mu\mu\alpha\nu[s]$; in Latin, where this pronoun was used as a suffix, *y* disappeared entirely and the letter μ was not doubled, of which we find analogous cases in other old Latin words; *a*, in the syllable *an*, was changed into *i*, because it was not sustained by the accent, and it gave up the letter *n* to the following syllable *os*, commencing with a vowel; *u*, in the penult was weakened in the Greek into *u*, and in the Latin into *i*; the connecting vowel *o* is the same as *u* in *legit-u-r*, and *e* in the Umbrian, but *s* or *r* is the genuine reflexive sign. This letter, however, either disappeared in the way above-mentioned, and *o* was weakened into *i*, or it went through the same changes as the genitive singular and the nominative plural of the *o* declension; that is, it first became *oi*, afterwards *oe*, and finally, *i*, (compare our work on Latin pronunciation, p. 115). The ending *iminor* corresponds exactly to the Greek $\dot{\upsilon}\mu\alpha\varsigma\ \alpha\iota\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, and it is the only relic of the strengthened reflexive form in the Latin.

Mr. Bopp says, (§ 515): "If the question is raised, whether the Sanscrit from ancient times has made use of its three past tenses without any syntactical distinction whatever, and whether it uselessly expended its creative powers in their production; or whether, in the course of time, the more refined distinctions of their significations were lost sight of in popular usage, it seems to me, it ought to be decided in favor of the latter; for even, as the forms in language were gradually worn away and blunted, so also their significations were subject to a wearing away and blunting."

In this remark there are two points in which we are at issue with Mr. Bopp. *First*, he seems to suppose that the different forms for the expression of the past tense arose

simultaneously; *secondly*, that these three forms originally represented various modifications or shades of the past tense, which, in the course of time, were lost by a sort of process of degeneracy or wearing away, and that this is proved by the indiscriminate use made of these forms in the Sanscrit writings which we now possess. We are, on the contrary, of the opinion that these three forms arose at different times, and that each new form, at its rise, did not completely crowd out the former one, as may be seen in the case of the so-called first and second aorists in Greek. In this language, moreover, the strong or old aorist still partly coincided in its form, or at least in its use, with the imperfect tense; for we find the imperfect tense *ἔλεγον* of *λέγω*, *ἔφην* of *φημί*, and also *ἔβόα*, *ἀνεβόα* of *βοάω*, *ἀναβοάω* and *ἦεν* of *εἶμι* more frequently used in the sense of the aorist, than of the imperfect tense. The so-called second perfect was certainly nothing else originally than another form of the strong or old aorist, and at one time was employed in the place of the aorist, and at another or later time in that of the perfect tense. According to our opinion, the act of fixing the different shades in the meaning of the past tenses supposes a state of mental majority, which can only exist in the manhood, and not in the childhood, of a nation; but it is not by any means necessary that each people should have reached the culminating point of mental cultivation in every direction. So the Latin remained behind the Greek in the development of the verb, inasmuch as it has *no* separate forms for the aorist and the perfect tense, and although it has one more case in the declension of the nouns than the latter, it still expresses *coming from* and *being in* a place by the same form; as *venit Carthagine*; *vixit Carthagine*. It is, therefore, not at all improbable that the Sanscrit should have remained behind both these languages, and should never have arrived at the same degree of logical precision; especially since it is an established fact that it has never succeeded in developing the pluperfect tense.

Mr. Bopp says further, (§ 516, p. 389): "It may be said that language, in the aorist, rids itself of the *guna* and

other characteristics of class for this reason only, because, in its anxiety to report facts, it has no time to pronounce them; as in the Sanscrit, in the second person of the imperative mood, on account of the hurry in which a command is given, the lighter verbal form is employed, and we thus find in the second person *vid-dī*, *know thou*, *yoongdī*, *unite thou*, while in the third person we have *vêt-tu*, *let him know*, *yoondktu*, *let him unite*. This species of aorist, which has just been mentioned, is, however, comparatively rare both in Sanscrit and in Greek, and the giving up of the characteristics of class in both languages is not confined to the aorist; besides, more letters are usually found in the aorist than in the imperfect tense; compare, for instance, *ádics'am* = *ἔδειξα* with the imperfect tense, *ádis'am*, which is exactly like the above-mentioned aorist. The sibilant of the first aorist, also, cannot be regarded, in my view, as that particular element of sound to which this tense owes its peculiar signification, since this letter occurs likewise in several other forms, the meaning of which is in no wise connected with that of the aorist." As regards the first statement of Mr. Bopp, to which he himself does not seem to attach much weight, he cannot expect us to agree with him, since there is certainly no necessity at all why people, in their anxiety to report a fact, should not have had the time, or should not have taken the time, to pronounce a long vowel or a diphthong instead of a short vowel. With respect to the length or shortness of the original roots this is a subject which, at the present day, can no longer be decided with any certainty. However, this much it seems to us may be established beyond any doubt: that the roots were originally monosyllabic; therefore, any form which consists of more than one syllable may be at once put down as a later formation. Thus, on comparing *ádadam* or *ἔδιδαν* with *ádám* or *ἔδαν*, the latter would naturally have to be regarded as the older form; so that there is no reason why we should suppose with Mr. Bopp (p. 389), that, in the formation of the second aorist, the *guna* and other characteristics of class were dropped, if they had not even

existed at that time. As regards the fact that in Sanscrit *áb'aram*, and in Greek *ἔλεγον*, together with *ádadam* and *ἐγίνωσκον* and *ἐλάμβανον* are designated as imperfect tenses, this only proves the arbitrary mode of proceeding of the grammarians, since it is very plain that the two former words belong to an earlier stage of development of the language, while the longer forms were produced subsequently. In those cases where the monosyllabic root had a long vowel or a diphthong, we find it quite natural that the long vowel of the original root, when another syllable was prefixed to it (for instance, when the first two letters of the root were reduplicated), should have been weakened and shortened, since in this case it was deprived of the accent. This weakening, however, did not always take place, but sometimes the accent was simply shifted to the prefix, as may be seen from the following examples, where we regard the so-called second perfects as originally identical with the strong (second) aorist: *as*, *λήθε* (the original form then), *λέληθε*, *λέλαθε*, *ἔλαθε*, *λάθε*. On the other hand the following forms were used simultaneously: *ἤραρον*, *ἄραρα*, *ἄρηρα*, *φέυγε*, *πέφευγε*, *πέφυγε*, *ἔφυγε*, which forms were subsequently employed to express various shades of the past.¹ Compare also the Doric *λᾱκ-εω*, Ionic *ληκ-έω*, the Attic sibilated *λάσκω*, *λέλακα* for *λέλακαμ*, aorist *ἔλακον*. The long syllable occurs even in the aorist, e. g. in *πέπληγον* (*ἔπληγον*, *πλήγουν*). A similar weakening of the vowels, as is well known, has taken place in the Latin, where *a* passed over into *e* and *i*, e. g. *cap-*, *cap-it*, *con'cip-it*, *con'cep-tum*, which subsequently became *con-cep'tum*, *fall-it*, *fé'fell-it*; the cause of this weakening was that the accent was first placed on the prefix, and afterwards settled down upon the root.

Mr. Bopp first advanced in his *Conjugation system* the

¹ In the forms *ἐδήδ-οκα* and *ἀγή-οχα* for *ἀγήγ-οχα*, which are found together with *ἔθηδός* and *ἤγαγον*, we recognize remnants of the same original suffix, which we have found in *ἔδωκα* (*ἔδδ-ακα*), *ἔθηκα* (*ἔθδ-ακα*), *ἤκα* (*ἔ-ακα*), viz. *ἀκα*, *ἀκαμ*; in the above words this suffix passed over into *οκαμ*, as in the Old Slavonic, instead of the later form *έγομ*, *έγον*, *έγά*, *ο* must be regarded as the first weakening of *a*, and *ε* as the second.

idea, which he repeats in the present work, § 526—528, pp. 404—406, and which seems to us perfectly correct, that the Latin, in addition to the root *as* (*es*), which was employed also by other members of the Arian family in the formation of their tenses, also made use of the Sanscrit verb *bhu*, *φύ*, *fu*, wherein it was followed by the Irish dialect of the Gaelic idiom; as, *mealfa-m*, *meal-fâ-* (which we would rather divide thus: *meal-f-am*, for *meal-fi-am*), or *mealfa-maid*, or *mealfa-maoid*, *we shall deceive*, *meal-faidhe*, *you will deceive*, *meal-faid*, *they will deceive*, *meal-fai-r*, *thou wilt deceive*, *meal-fai-dh*, *he will deceive*. The circumstance that the Latin *bam* expresses the past, but the Irish *fam* the future, Mr. Bopp continues, ought not to prevent our regarding these two forms as identical in their origin. We are troubled much less by this circumstance than Mr. Bopp himself, since we regard not merely the letter *m*, but also *am* as the suffix of the first person *singular* and plural. The proper form of the Irish suffix ought to be *fiam* or *biam*, since in its isolated position *biad|me* signifies *I shall be* (literally *it will be me*), *biadmaoid*, *we shall be*, where the character of the third person singular has amalgamated with the root. The exponent of the future relation in these forms, Mr. Bopp goes on to say, is the vowel *i*, with which may be compared the Latin *i* in *amabis*, *amabit*, and also in *eris*, *erit*, etc. We object to this view, for we think that the future relation is expressed by the root *bhu*, *φύ*, *fu* itself, which not only signifies the state of *having become*, *πεφύκέναι*, or of *being*, but also the *act of becoming*, *φίω*, *φύω*. This idea of *becoming* is contained both in the imperfect tense and in the future; for the very name of the imperfect tense implies that it describes an imperfect action, or one which is in progress, or is becoming, that is, one which is not yet completed when another action takes place. The idea of the past, however, which is not contained in that of becoming, was furnished to the imperfect tense by the predicate of the primary clause, and in case the imperfect tense was employed in the primary clause itself, this idea could be supplied to it from the context, as is done with the present itself in a clause

introduced by the conjunction *dum*, when concomitant to the predicate in a past tense. The application of the word *becoming* in the formation of these two tenses is very appropriate, as all existence is a continual becoming, or a continual repetition of the same act. In the Latin, also, we find the ending *esco*, which signifies to become, employed in the formation of the future; as *superescit* for *supererit*, in Ennius. According to our view, *ero* did not originally have an exclusive signification of the future, as little as the Greek *ἔσομαι*, *ἔδομαι*, *πλομαι*, but it is an original form of the present tense, *esom*, *som*, *sum*, where the letter *m* was at first pronounced indistinctly, and at last was dropped entirely, while *s*, between two vowels, became *r*. The fact that the future, which originally was expressed by the present tense, gave rise to the idea of *becoming*, or *coming into a state of existence*, is proved by the later German, where the future *ich werde gehen* means literally *I am becoming to go*, or, *I am coming into a state of going*. This idea of becoming, in German, was even transferred to the present and imperfect tenses of the passive voice, where *ich werde*, or *ich wurde gelehrt* signifies *I am becoming*, or *I was becoming taught*; *ich bin*, *ich war gelehrt worden*, *I have become*, *I had become taught*.

Mr. Bopp (§ 527) justly regards as strange the long *e* in *ebam* of the third and fourth conjugations, *leg-ēbam* and *i-ēbam*, and together with Ag. Benary he explained it formerly (in the *Berliner Jahrbucher* for 1838, p. 13) as an amalgamation of the class-vowel with the augment. Without entirely abandoning his former view, he seems now more inclined to the opinion that the only purpose for which the class-vowel was lengthened in these forms was to enable it to bear the burden of the suffixed substantive verb, and thus to give more strength to the theme of the principal verb.

We do not think that the assumption of an augment in order to explain the long *ē* of the imperfect tense can at all be justified, since there is not a single instance on record where the reduplication in Latin was weakened into an augment; we very readily admit, however, that the imper-

fect and future tenses of the third and fourth conjugations, in their formation, may have conformed in an inorganic manner with these tenses in the second conjugation. In the third conjugation this is chiefly limited to the imperfect tense, but in the fourth conjugation we often meet with the ending *bo*, instead of *am*; as *scibo*, *aperibor*, instead of *sciam*, *aperiar*. The vowel *i*, in the fourth conjugation, was originally long; for, like *a*, in the first conjugation (and sometimes even *e* in the second), it arose from the diphthong *ay*, which signifies *a making*. This suffix *ay* was not only contracted into a long *a* (*a* in *father*) in the first conjugation, and into a long *e* (*ey* in *they*) in the second conjugation, but, through the mediation of the diphthong *ēi* (*ei* in *height*), into which *ai* or *ay* had been obscured, it likewise passed over into a long *i* (*i* in *machine*). This long *i*, when followed by a vowel, became short, as in *audio*, but when followed by a consonant, it preserved its long character, as in *scibo*, where the ending *bo* was appended immediately to the stem or suffix *i*, and also in a few imperfect tenses, as in *vestibam*, *largibar*, for *vestiebam*, *largiebar*, unless we prefer to regard *scibo* as a contraction of *sciēbo*, and *vestibam* of *vestiēbam*; in the majority of cases, however, in the formation of the imperfect tense of the fourth conjugation the analogy of the third conjugation was followed where the vowel *e* in *ebam* had been lengthened in an inorganic manner, by analogy with the imperfect tense of the second conjugation.

For those who are not satisfied with this explanation, we have still a third one to offer of our own. The long *ē* before *bam* is neither an augment which coalesced with the final vowel of the stem into a long *ē*, nor is it an inorganic imitation of the second conjugation, but it arose from the diphthong *ēi*, the vowel *i* of which had been developed from *s* before the labial *b* (as before the labial *m* in *εἶμι*); so that the diphthong *ēi* takes the place of the substantive verb *es*, *to be*, or *being*. *Amabam*, consequently, arose in the following manner: *am-ay-es-bam*, *amā-esbam*, *amā-esbam*, *amā-eibam*, *amā-ēbam*, *amābam*, and, when translated literally, it signifies: *bam*, *I was becoming*; *es*, *one being*; *ay*,

making, *am*, love: *mone-esbam*, *mone-eibam*, *mone-ēbam*, *monēbam*, *I was becoming one being reminding*; *leg-esbam*, *leg-eibam*, *leg-ēbam*, *I was becoming one who was reading*; *audi-ēbam*, *I was becoming one who was hearing*; *ama-esbo*, *ama-eibo*, *ama-ēbo*, *amābo*, *I am becoming one being loving*. The letter *s* in other places also passed over into *i* (cf. our work on *Latin Pronunciation*, p. 80), as in the Greek, before the labial μ , $\epsilon\iota\mu\iota$, $\epsilon\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ for $\epsilon\sigma\mu\iota$, $\epsilon\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$. The combination of two auxiliaries, as in *es-bam*, we also find in the third person plural of the perfect tenses ending in *si*, as *clau[d]-s-erunt*, where *s* is universally admitted to be the substantive verb, and *erunt* for *esunt* is a surviving form of the original present tense; and, in case Mr. Bopp is right, which we do not think, *fui* instead of *fufu-vi*, *fufui*, *fui*, *fui*, is a compound of itself as a verb, and itself as a suffix. No doubt the suffix of the perfect subjunctive is also a double composition of the substantive verb, *scrip-s-erim* for *scrip-s-esim*, or *scrip-si-rim* or *sim*, just as *ausim* is instead of *auds-sim*. We do not hesitate to regard the future *bo* as having descended from *bom*, *bam*, and thus consider it as originally identical with the suffix of the imperfect tense. It is our opinion that the formation of the imperfect tense is older than that of the future, since the function of the future tense was originally also performed by the present tense, and on account of the close connection between these two tenses, the ending *am* of the future tense was changed into *om*, *o*, as in the present tense, both of which followed in this particular the later form *egom*, *ego*.

Mr. Bopp (§§556—558, pp. 435—437), tracing the perfect ending *vi* (*ui*) to the substantive verb *fuo*, can indeed support his theory by the formation of the imperfect and future tenses, which is admitted by us; still, by so doing he merely establishes the possibility of such a formation, but nothing more. Several objections have been raised against this theory. First of all it has been justly observed by the opponents of this view that, whether we derive the suffix *v* or *u* from the letters *f* or *u* of the root *fuo*, $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\omega$, this verb cannot be pretended to express an accomplished fact or

state; moreover, in the above two tenses, though they are compounded of the Sanscrit *bhu* or Latin *fu*, this verb rather expresses *becoming* than *being*. The oldest form of this perfect tense, also, is not *fui*, but *fuvi*, and thus it appears provided with the very same suffix which Mr. Bopp endeavors to explain by means of itself. We are, therefore, compelled by these considerations to endeavor to find another explanation of this form.

In eight members of the Arian family there are more or less traces of a form of the perfect tense, which, with the help of Mr. Bopp, we shall endeavor to examine more closely. In the Sanscrit there is still preserved in the participle of the reduplicated perfect tense a certain suffix which expresses a being endowed or furnished with something. This suffix appears in three degrees as regards strength, *van*s, *vat*, *us'* (= *oosh*), and of *us'* or *oosh*, which is the weakest of all, is formed the feminine *us'i* (= *ooshee*). The shortest form *oosh*, according to Mr. Bopp (§ 788) is found in a single instance in the Gothic tongue, in *bêrusjô*s, *the parents*; in all other instances this form of the participle has been lost in this language (we should like to compare with this form the expression *οἱ γενόμενοι* in Herodotus, instead of *οἱ γονεῖς*). In the Old Prussian, also, some forms are found which appear connected with this original perfect form (cf. Bopp, § 787); as *murrawuns*, *having murmured*, *klantiwuns*, *having cursed*. The vowel *u* in *wuns*, just as in the ordinary form *uns*, and also the vowels *o* and *a* in *ons* and *ans*, which latter vowel, when after a consonant, is equivalent to *e* in the Lithuanian *ens*, have become, according to Mr. Bopp, weakened of *a*, which was originally *ā*. This participle is generally used in the Old Prussian as a circumlocution of the perfect indicative; as, *asmai murrawuns bhe klantiwuns*, *ye have murmured and cursed*. The future, also, which is wanting in the Old Prussian, is always expressed by the auxiliary *to become*, and the participle of the perfect tense; as, *madliti, tyt wirstai ious immusis* (where the vowel *u* of the plural form *usis* is organic, and identical with the Sanscrit *u* of that stem which is used in the weakest cases, and also

in the feminine *us*, it is also identical with the letter *u* in the corresponding Lithuanian forms), *laukiti tyt wirstai ious aupallusis*, *pray, then you will take* (literally, *then you become having taken*), *seek, then you will find* (strictly, *having found*). The weakest form of the Sanscrit suffix of the participle likewise appears in the Lithuanian in the oblique cases of the masculine, yet with the inorganic addition of *ia*. The nominative case, *sùkens*, as regards its termination, is based upon the strong Sanscrit theme *vâns*; the letter *s* in *sùkens* remains in the nominative and vocative cases, while in the Sanscrit, in both these cases, the sign of the nominative case, as well as the final consonant, is dropped, for it does not tolerate two consonants at the end of a word; as *rurudvân'* for *rurudvâns*, in the vocative case *rârudvan*. In the Zend, according to Mr. Bopp, § 787, the letter *s* of the nominative case is changed into *o*, as *dad'vâo*, *having created*, *vid'vâo*, *knowing* (εἰδώς). In the weakened cases, as well as before the feminine character *î*, like the Sanscrit suffix it is contracted into *us*ʹ.

With the form *vât*, of which, in the Sanscrit, are formed the middle cases of the perfect participle, as has been correctly stated by Mr. Bopp, § 789, the Greek *or* is connected, in which the primitive accentuation has been preserved, but the digamma given up, which, as a general thing, is rejected in the middle of words, especially in the suffix *εντ*, which corresponds to the Sanscrit *vant* of the strong cases. As, therefore, ἀμπελόεντ compares with the Sanscrit forms, such as *d'ana-vant*, *endowed with riches*, so also τετυφ(F)or compares with *tetupvat* (we would rather say *τετυπFor*), with which latter form, moreover, agrees the neuter form *τετυφός* in the nominative, accusative, and vocative cases. The feminine form in *vîa*, which is a mutilated form of *voîa* (οοîa, οο[y]a), corresponds with the Sanscrit *tutupn'sî*. We here add that in the Sanscrit the simple (strong) aorists, or imperfect tenses in the participle, were represented by the reduplicating aorist or the perfect tense, while in the Greek they went further, and employed the suffix *vanis* in two forms,—*vâ'ns* (*vâ's*), and *vâ'n*, in both of which the suffixed

syllable received the accent, and the form *vâis* was afterwards employed to express the strict idea of the perfect tense, and the other form *vân* to express the aorist. This last form was applied both in the case of the reduplicating and the non-reduplicating aorists. Between these two forms of *vâis*, employed in the Greek, there is still another difference. Although the stronger form *vân's* (*vd's* = *ωs*) is made use of in the nominative singular of the masculine gender in those forms of the aorist which were afterwards used in the sense of the perfect tense, yet in all the oblique cases, and also in the nominative singular of the neuter gender, the weaker form *vât* (*or*) is employed with the accent upon the suffix, while in the strong or second aorists the stronger form *vant* (*vont*) is preferred throughout in all cases of the masculine and neuter gender, with the accent also upon the suffix. These two forms, however, again agree in this, that both, in the feminine gender, give a preference to a shorter form, as in *πεποιθ[F]ός*, *πεποιθ[Fv][σ]ία*, *πεποιθ[F]ός*, and *πεπιθ[F]ών* [Sanskrit *vân*], *πεπιθ[F]ούσα* [Sanskrit fem. *ōsī* or *ooseē*], *πεπιθ[F]όν* [Sanskrit *vân*], *λαβ[F]ών*, *λαβ[F]ούσα*, *λαβ[F]όν*. The same derivation is very justly attributed by Mr. Bopp to the ending of the participle in the Slavonic perfect, where, indeed, according to him, the tense corresponding to the Sanscrit and Greek perfect tenses (and to the Germanic preterite), has been lost in the indicative mood, as has been the case in the Lettic languages, but where, even as in the Lettic idioms, the form of the participle has been preserved, which had been generated from the perfect tense, before these languages had separated from the other members of the Arian stock. The root of this suffix in the nominative and vocative cases of the three numbers of the masculine and neuter genders, and also in the accusative case of the dual, is *vās'* or *us'*, the letter *s'* of which, according to a law in this language, is suppressed in those cases of the singular number which do not receive any additions (compare Bopp, § 790, p. 156, and Prof. M. Rapp's *Verbalorganism* on the Old Slavonic, Bk. III., p. 99, ff). The original *vav* of this ending, in the Slavonic as

well as in other members of the Arian family (see Bopp, § 822), passed also partly over into the liquid *l*; for, in addition to this original participle of the active voice, there exists another participle in the Slavonic language, *lu, la, lo*, which, with the auxiliaries, forms compound preterite tenses, and which, in the later northern tongues, replaces the entire preterite. But we cannot agree with Messrs. Bopp and Rapp,¹ who derive this *l* from an original *d* or *t*, instead of from the letter *v*, which lies much nearer; and we wonder that Mr. Bopp, who very properly derives the Latin suffix *lent* in words such as *corpulento, opulent-, vinolento, somnolento, violento, temulento*, instead of *corpuvento, opuvent-, temuvento*, from the Sanscrit *vant, vas, vat*, does not recognize it in this shortened form of the Slavonic perfect tense, where *l* in the place of *v* is evidently a later change of letters, which also occurs in the Georgian language, and where the accent is on the suffix, just as in the Sanscrit and the Greek. As regards the *v*, or digamma, it has disappeared from the Greek written language like the consonantal *y*, and is found only in inscriptions and the writings of grammarians, yet in a great number of verbal forms, where it has not passed over into any other sound, its former existence may be inferred with sufficient certainty, so that there no longer remains any doubt as to the function of *v* in the formation of the perfect tense. We refer the reader to the examples furnished by Dr. Buttmann (§ 97, Obs. 10, and in other places), as, *βεβαρηώς, κεκαφηώς, κεκμηώς, κεχαρηώς, πεπτηώς, τετηώς, τετληώς, πεφύασι, πεφυυῖα, γεγάσι, γεγάτε, δεδάσι, μεμίασι*, etc., instead of *βεβαρη Φώς, κεκαφη Φώς, πεφύ Φασι, γεγά Φατε, γεγά Φασι, μεμά Φασι*. The *v*, or digamma, however, has not only been dropped, as in these and many other instances, but also makes its appearance again in the form of a hard breathing, as in *ἐσπέρα*, Lat. *vesper*, and therefore aspirates the preceding labials and gutturals, as *τέτυπά* (*τέτυπάμ* for *τέτυπ Φαμ*), *τέτυφα, πεπραγ-ά* [*πεπραγάμ*], *πέπραχα*. In other members of the Arian family also, it may be seen

¹ Professor Moriz Rapp's "Verbal-Organismus der Indo-Europäischen Sprachen." Stuttgart: 1859.

that this *h* developed from *v* may be hardened into *k* or *c*, as in Latin, *niv-*, *niv-s*, *nic-s*, *nix*; *viv-*, *viv-si*, *vic-si*, *vixi*; *conniv-*, *conniv-si*, *connic-si*, *connixi*; *nav-*, Ags. *naca*, *nacho*; Sanscr. *dēvdra*, Ags. *tacor*, Old High Germ. *zeihur*, which makes *zeihura* equivalent to *dēvdra*. The *v* of the Gothic root *quiva*, nominative *quiv-s*, Sanscr. *giva-s* (living) corresponds to the Anglo-Saxon, directly descending from the Gothic, *quick* for *quikk*, and to the High German *quek*. At all events, the fact that in the Greek language *v* through *h* passes over into *k*, and thus that *k* may replace an original *v*, will not be denied by the learned scholar; and from the above examples, which we have extracted from a list of Mr. Bopp's (§ 19), it may be clearly seen that this letter *k* cannot be regarded as inorganic. In this manner of forming the perfect tense the Greek coincides with the more archaic Latin, and the suffix of the perfect tense, which it has in common with other members of the Arian family, appears in this language not only in the ending *lent*, which was treated of above, and where the letter *v* is replaced by *l* (*opulent* for *opuvent*, etc.), but it is also mediately or immediately added to roots in the formation of adjectives, as *vac-*, *vac-i*[*i* = *ay*]-*vo-*, *vos*, *vus*, *vac-vus*, *vacuus*; *noc-i-vus* [*i* = *ei* = *ay*], *noc-vus*, *nocuus*; *conspic-vus*, *conspiciuus*; *perpet-vus*, *perpetuus*; *contin-vus*, *continuus*, etc.; also *cap-to-*, *cap-tus*, *capti-vus*, like the Sanscrit *uk-ta-van*, in the indicative, subjunctive, and infinitive moods of the perfect and in the future perfect; or it is added to verbal roots in the formation of tenses, — that is, preterite, perfect, and pluperfect tenses (as in the Slavonic and Sanscrit), where it is either followed by the mere pronoun or by the substantive verb,¹ and where

¹ It is true that the Oscan forms *priffed*, *aamana-ffed*, *aikda-fed* (see Mommsen *Unteritalische Dialecte*, p. 234), and the Umbrian *pihafi*, *pihafei*, Lat. *piavi*; *ambresurent*, Lat. *ambiverint* (see Th. Aufrecht and A. Kirchhoff *Umbriische Denkmäler*, Vol. i. p. 144), are adduced in favor of the derivation of this suffix from *phō*, *fuō*. But so far from admitting the validity of these proofs, on the strength of the facts advanced above, and seconded by Mr. Mommsen himself, we utterly reject the derivation of *amavi* from *amafui*, *monui* from *monefui*, *audivi* from *audifui*, and hold that the Oscan and Umbrian *f* and *ff*, in the above words, have been hardened from *v*, as has been done in other places, and especially in

the letter *a* (*va, vat*) coalesces with the personal pronoun *im*, which is shortened from *am*, *vai* from *vaim*, first passed over into *ei*, and finally into a long *i* (Engl. *i* in *machine*), and the final *m* at first began to be sounded very weak, and at last was dropped altogether. Finally, this theory is proved by the formation of the Vedic aorists in *im*, which have not yet been reduplicated, as *badh-im*, *I killed*, *kramim*, *I mounted*, instead of the later *ab'adisham*, *akramisham*.

ARTICLE IV.

JONATHAN EDWARDS, HIS CHARACTER, TEACHING, AND INFLUENCE.¹

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., NEW YORK.

WHEN Jonathan Edwards, at the age of fifty-four, was chosen to the Presidency of Nassau Hall, at Princeton, New Jersey, he alleged as difficulties in the way of accepting "that important and arduous office," — first, "his own defects, unfitting him for such an undertaking," and secondly, that "course of employ in his study, which had long engaged and swallowed up his mind, and been the chief entertain-

an adverb formed by means of this very suffix, *statif* for *stative*. If we even grant an original *f* in the Oscan and Umbrian, yet we are not authorized thereby to transfer this at once to the Latin, since each of these idioms, in many respects, has taken its own course. We are much rather inclined to think that the forms *benurent*, *venurint*, *fucurent*, *fecerint*, *procanurint*, *procinuerint*, present an abridged form of the suffixes *v* or *va, ve*; for if these forms are not for *benverent*, *venverint*, *facerint*, *procanverint* or *-ent*, there would not be a single trace of the perfect tense in these forms of the future perfect.

¹ The following article was originally prepared as one in a series of lectures before the Young Men's Christian Union, of Boston, upon "the influence of representative religious men on the moral and religious life of their own denominations and that of Christendom." It was subsequently delivered before the students of Andover and Yale Theological Seminaries. This statement will explain the rhetorical cast of the article, and the occasional use of the first person, which could not be avoided without changing its whole structure.

ment and delight of his life." Of defects he wrote: "I have a constitution in many respects peculiarly unhappy, attended with flaccid solids; vapid, sizzly, and scarce fluids, and a low tide of spirits; often occasioning a kind of childish weakness and contemptibleness of speech, presence, and demeanor, with a disagreeable dulness and stiffness, much unfitting me for conversation, but more especially for the government of a college. . . . I am also deficient," he continues, "in some parts of learning, particularly in algebra and the higher parts of mathematics, and in the Greek classics; my Greek learning having been chiefly in the New Testament."¹ Such was the modest and evidently candid estimate which Edwards gave of his constitutional temperament and his acquirements in scholarship, as related to the Presidency of a college. What the detractors of Paul said of him at Corinth, Jonathan Edwards wrote of himself,—that "his bodily presence was weak, and his speech contemptible." Yet the pen of Edwards, like the letters of Paul, was "weighty and powerful," and when he turned from his own defects,— "many of which," said he, "are generally known, besides others which my own heart is conscious of,"—and enumerated to the Trustees the studies in which he found "the delight of his life," unfolding his method of study, and sketching the plans of his projected works, Edwards drew a psychological portrait of himself that looks upon us still with a calm and sacred majesty.

First, describing his habit of pursuing to the utmost anything "that seemed to promise light in any weighty point," and the materials of thought he had thus accumulated; next, expressing his earnest desire to write out "many things against most of the prevailing errors of the day;" he proceeds to sketch "a great work" which he "had long had on his mind and heart," "a History of the Work of Redemption," a body of divinity in the form of a history; "beginning," he says, "from eternity, and descending from

¹ Jonathan Edwards's Works, Vol. I. pp. 86, 87, First Worcester edition. This edition is referred to throughout, unless another is indicated.

thence to the great work and successive dispensations of the infinitely wise God in time, considering the chief events coming to pass in the church of God, and revolutions in the world of mankind, affecting the state of the church and the affair of redemption, which we have account of in history or prophecy, till at last we come to the general resurrection, last judgment, and consummation of all things; concluding my work with the consideration of that perfect state of things, which shall be finally settled, to last for eternity." Did even Milton rise to the height of so great an argument? Yet under infirmities of bodily temperament, and disabilities of literary position, Edwards could project this grand epic of the universe simply for his own profit and entertainment. With the same delight in study and in truth, he had "done much towards another great work, the *Harmony of the Old and New Testament*," in the course of which, he says: "there will be occasion for an explanation of a very great part of the Holy Scriptures," a work alone sufficient for the lifetime and the powers of any man. "Some of these things," he meekly adds, "if Divine Providence favor, I should be willing to attempt a publication of."¹—Already he had published his "*Narrative of Surprising Conversions*," "*Thoughts on the Great Revival*," his searching analysis of the "*Religious Affections*," his touching "*Memoir of David Brainerd*," his essay on "*Qualifications for Communion*," and his "*Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will*;" this profoundest contribution of New England to metaphysical theology having been written while its author was conscientiously and laboriously teaching the Stockbridge Indians the English alphabet and the simplest truths of the gospel. "So far as I myself am able to judge of what talents I have for benefiting my fellow creatures by word, I think I can write better than I can speak;" and so, because of his defects and his studies,—because he is of flaccid muscle and sizzly blood, and his mind is swallowed up in the "*History of Redemption*" and the "*Harmony of the Scriptures*,"—he is

¹ Works, Vol. I. pp. 87—89.

much at a loss whether he ought to accept the Presidency of Nassau Hall; nevertheless, he will proceed "to ask advice of such as he esteems most wise, friendly, and faithful, with respect to the way of duty in this important affair."¹ How can we measure such a man? Is there a key that will unlock both mind and heart, and reveal his whole life and character?

In the vale of Chamouni, while gazing upon the awful sheen of Mont Blanc, I chanced to notice at my feet a tiny snowdrop peeping through the grass to catch the warmth of the sun. It recalled that curious calculation of Professor Whewell's, touching the adaptation of the force of gravity to the growth and sustentation of flowers, by which he proves that "an earth greater or smaller, denser or rarer, than the one on which we live, would require a change in the structure and strength of the footstalks of all the little flowers that hang their heads under our hedges;" so that we may consider "the whole mass of the earth, from pole to pole, and from circumference to center, as employed in keeping a snowdrop in the position most suited to the promotion of its vegetable health."¹ The same divine law that lifts the mountain to the skies feeds and sustains the humblest floweret of the vale. So when we gaze, with a feeling akin to awe, upon the "dilating mind" of Edwards, which, like some monarch mountain, "As in its natural form swelled vast to heaven," we recall his own exquisite picture of humility: "the soul of a true Christian appears like such a little white flower as we see in the spring of the year, low and humble on the ground, opening its bosom to receive the pleasant beams of the sun's glory; rejoicing, as it were, in a calm rapture; diffusing around a sweet fragrancy, standing peacefully and lovingly in the midst of other flowers round about; all in like manner opening their bosoms to drink in the light of the sun." His thoughts rose ever toward God; his heart abased itself ever before God, by the same divine law of dependence and adoration. He whose mind aspired

¹ Works, Vol. I. p. 90.

² Bridgewater Treatise, Cap. III.

to grasp "God's last end in the Creation," etc., writes: "my heart panted after this, to lie low before God as in the dust; that I might be nothing, and that God might be ALL, that I might become as a little child."

In studying a character like that of Edwards we must guard against two quite opposite tendencies; a tendency toward an unquestioning veneration for the man as a whole, which would invest his character with impeccability and his teachings with infallibility; in other words, that tendency toward the canonization of saints and worthies which marks the Romish side of human nature; and that other tendency toward an empirical judgment of a character and life by individual qualities or defects, which marks the extreme Protestant side of human nature. Of the first we have an example in the Latin inscription by President Finley on the tombstone of Edwards at Princeton, and in these couplets of President Dwight:

"From scenes obscure did Heaven his *Edwards* call, —
That moral *Newton*, and that second *Paul*, —
Who, in one little life, the gospel more
Disclosed than all earth's myriads kenne'd before."

Of which an early biographer of Edwards judiciously observes: "the reader will consider this proposition as *poetically strong*, but not as *literally accurate*."¹

On the other hand, if we take up the traits of Edwards piecemeal, and give to each or to any an exaggerated individuality, we shall form a character out of harmony with itself and with the reality. Reading, for example, in his resolutions and diary such expressions as these: "Resolved never to lose one moment of time;" "Resolved never to speak anything that is matter of laughter on the Lord's day;" "Resolved to inquire every night, as I am going to bed, wherein I have been negligent, what sin I have committed, and wherein I have denied myself; also at the end of every week, month, and year;" "Resolved to inquire every night, before I go to bed, whether I have acted in the

¹ Jonathan Edwards's Works, Vol. I. p. 98.

best way I possibly could with respect to *eating* and *drinking*;" "After the greatest *mortifications* I always find the greatest comfort;" "intend to live in continual *mortification* without ceasing," especially "in eating, drinking, and *sleeping*;" — reading such passages only, we should say: This is another Anthony in his desert cave,¹ or a Jerome in his student-cell at Bethlehem — a monk of the fourth century. Again, reading only his extatic descriptions of the love of God, of self-annihilation and absorption into Christ, of almost supernatural visions of the glory and grace of God coming upon him in the fields and the groves, we should say: This is another Tauler or Gerson — a mystic of the Middle Ages.²

Or, reading only such resolves as these: "to endeavor to my utmost to act as I can think I should do if I had already seen the happiness of heaven and hell's torments;" "that I will act so, in every respect, as I think I shall wish I had done if I should at last be damned;" and such passages as these in his sermons: "God holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider or some loathsome insect over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; you are ten thousand times as abominable in his eyes as the most hateful and venomous serpent is in ours. . . . It is a great furnace of wrath that you hang over by a slender thread, with the flames of divine wrath flashing about it, and ready every moment to singe it and burn it asunder."

¹ In one respect Anthony was strikingly like Edwards. Neander says of the Egyptian ascetic: "severe to himself, Anthony was mild to all others"; and President Finley wrote of Edwards: "*pietate praeclarus, moribus suis aegerus, ast aliis aequus et benignus*." Jerome, while differing from both in his asperity toward others, more resembled Edwards in his zeal for polemical theology, writing "many things against most of the prevailing errors of his day;" and also in his earnest study of the scriptures, upon the principles of "grammatico-logical interpretation."

² Tauler, while a mystic in speculation, was earnest and practical as a preacher; and Gerson was an energetic reformer. Edwards had both these qualities, while yet he seemed at times to lose himself in mystic contemplations and experiences of the divine love. These two phases of character—the devoutly mystical and the practical and reformatory—are often united in the same person.

"After you shall have endured the torments of hell millions of ages — when you shall have worn out the age of the sun, moon, and stars in your dolorous groans and lamentations — your bodies, which shall have been burning and wasting all this while in these glaring flames, yet shall not have been consumed, but will remain to waste through an eternity yet;"¹ — reading such words only, we should say: This man was a fanatic in his creed, the very high priest of what Isaac Taylor styles "a malign theology."

And yet again, when we hear him say: "I very often think with sweetness and longings and pantings of soul, of being a little child taking hold of Christ, to be led by him through the wilderness of this world. I love to think of coming to Christ to receive salvation of him, poor in spirit and quite empty of self, humbly exalting him alone, cut off entirely from my own root in order to grow into and out of Christ, to have God in Christ to be all in all, and to live by faith on the Son of God a life of humble, unfeigned confidence in him,"¹ — reading such sweet words, we should say: Here is no theological Torquemada, but a very Fenelon for gentleness of spirit and purity of love.

Reading only his treatise on Original Sin, which some theologians devour as eagerly as if it were itself the apple of Adam, so ready are they to fasten upon themselves participation in his transgression; or the essay on the Freedom of the Will, — touching which there has been the most wilful freedom of appropriation by opposing schools, — one would say: here is Augustine revived in his subtle metaphysics, here is Calvin again incarnate in logic. Then, turning from the metaphysical to the historical and devotional, we find in the crude outlines of his *Work of Redemption* — for his ideal of that book was never filled out — a conception worthy of the genius of a Michael Angelo, and the eloquence of a Macaulay. But it is a Michael Angelo digging out untried ochres from their

¹ Sermons on "Sinners in the Hands of an angry God," and the "Eternity of Hell Torments," Works, Vol. VII. pp. 419, 496.

² Jonathan Edwards's Works, Vol. I. p. 41.

native bed, and therewith mixing new colors for frescoes of magnificent proportion, which he might not live to finish; and the second Edwards, in his preface to this posthumous work of his father, reminds us that "as to elegance of composition, which is now esteemed so essential to all publications, it is well known that the author did not make that his chief study."

If we would group together gifts and characteristics so various and diverse, we may say with an appreciating critic: "Edwards was the instaurator of the science of theology. His independence as a thinker, and his power as a reasoner, the originality with which he struck out new principles and arguments, and the systematic order and demonstrative force with which he linked them together, have placed some of his theological works on the same high level with Euclid's Elements of Geometry. At the same time his private journal and some of his practical treatises evince a liveliness of imagination and a glow of emotion which, if cultivated, might have won for him a high niche in the temple of sacred poetry. Furthermore, these high endowments of reason and imagination were combined with a personal experience, with a knowledge of the human heart, with a power of discriminating character, and impressing truth, and realizing invisible objects, which made him the most powerful of preachers. And, to crown all, his intellectual gifts were guided and adorned by such integrity and piety, such moral and Christian graces, as are too seldom seen in union with genius, but when thus united, produce a constellation of surpassing brilliancy, and, even alone, shine with a lustre superior to genius itself."¹ President Davies speaks of him as "the *great* Mr. Edwards," and makes special mention of his "deep judgment" and "calm temper."

The external biography of Edwards is little to our present purpose. Graduating at Yale College in 1720, at the age of seventeen, licensed at nineteen to preach the gospel, he was designated for a pulpit in New York by a number of

¹ Professor Tyler, in *Bib. Sac.* 1855, p. 295.

ministers in New England, who acted as a committee of supply for a congregation of Presbyterians in that city, who had withdrawn from the original congregation in Wall Street from disaffection towards its minister.¹ Thus early did Calvinistic Presbyterianism do homage to that New England whence it has ever since derived so much of its divinity, and so much of its intellectual power. Had Ed-

¹ The "Documentary History of New York" (Vol III. pp. 278—281) sheds some light upon this difficulty. In Sept. 1720, Rev. James Anderson, then minister of the Presbyterian Congregation in the city of New York, with the elders and deacons of the same, applied to the Captain-General of the Province to be incorporated as a congregation for "the free use and exercise of their said religion, in its true doctrine, discipline, and worship, according to the rules and methods of the established Presbyterian Church of North Britain." At the same time a memorial against this application was filed by Gilbert Livingston and Thomas Smith, who represent themselves as "persons most nearly concerned, and who have all along been deeply engaged in the carrying on the said work." They object that the charter in the form proposed "will confirm the meeting-house now building to the actual possession of the Rev. Mr. James Anderson as sole minister therein, and wholly bring it under the command of those that adhere to him"; they believe the church "under very languishing circumstances during Mr. Anderson's abode among us, whom we cannot but think, after more than two years trial, very unsuitable for advancing our interest in New York, because several that joined with us at first have forsaken the congregation upon his account, and we are also fully persuaded he has not been established among us by very just and honorable methods." Referring to "the temper of these men" who upheld Mr. Anderson, they set forth "how great a hardship this will be upon us who have borne the burden and heat of the day, to be turned off without so much as the privilege of bringing in a minister whom we may sit under with pleasure and delight, especially considering we think ourselves (notwithstanding all the advantages that have been taken against us) *very little inferior either in number or quality* to them who by their unfair proceedings have brought in Mr. Anderson." They humbly crave the privilege of the grant of a charter, "to have the meeting-house confirmed to us, and to the minister procured by us, at least on equal terms with those who first desired it."

The Anderson party prevailed, and it would seem that the remonstrants withdrew and formed a separate congregation. The controversy appears to have been partly between a Scotch and a New England element. In August 1772, the seceders invited young Edwards. They do not seem, however, to have attained to a corporate existence. In 1766 there is still but one Presbyterian Church in New York, and in a memorial for enlarged privileges, they refer to the great increase of the congregation "under the pastoral charge of Mr. Ebenezer Pemberton, the *second* minister thereof," the successor of the unacceptable Anderson. In that year, 1766, the associate congregation, since known as the Brick Church, was formed; the two congregations remaining for several years as one church, under the same associated pastorate.

wards, however, listened to the repeated calls of this infant congregation to become its pastor, the Presbyterian church as a whole might not have profited so much by the New England theology. But "the smallness of that society," only a few score of persons, perhaps not even organized into a church, and "some special difficulties," led Edwards to relinquish so unpromising a field. "Charitable contributions from the colony of Connecticut" had helped to buy the ground on which the First Presbyterian Church was built, and thirty years later that church, still divided in feeling, looked again to New England, and called Bellamy to its pulpit, but without success.

It was in the eight months of his sojourn in New York, in the maiden freshness of his ministry, that Edwards wedded his soul to Christ with a love that gives a tone of rhapsody to his diary and resolutions. The philosopher of half a century should not be held too closely by the ardent utterances of the novice of nineteen; and yet, in the peculiar character of these religious experiences is found a key to much of the after preaching and philosophizing at Northampton and Stockbridge. Could we find any memoranda of that favored John Smith who was the intimate companion of the youthful preacher, in his meditative walks and "sweet religious conversation" on the banks of Hudson's river, or any traditions among his descendants, we might gain a clearer view of Edwards at this moulding period of life. But those footsteps of piety on the river side were long ago effaced by the tide of population, and the name of John Smith repeats itself many hundred times in the New York Directory. Burying himself for three years in study as tutor at Yale, we find Edwards at twenty-three inaugurated in the pastoral office at Northampton as colleague with his maternal grandfather. The name of Solomon Stoddard is associated with "a particular tenet of the Lord's Supper" which gained much currency in Massachusetts. This was not, as is sometimes represented, the doctrine that the Lord's Supper may be used indiscriminately by *all* as a converting ordinance, throwing open the Table to

non-believers, but that the children of visible believers were "ecclesiastically holy," and that "they that are in external covenant with God [by baptism] if neither ignorant nor scandalous, may lawfully come to the Lord's Supper, though destitute of a saving work of God's Spirit on their hearts." As Mr. Stoddard explained his view, it was not that non-believers of whatever grade should use the Lord's Supper as a saving ordinance, but that those whom he regarded as nominally in church connection by baptism, though timid and unsatisfied as to their spiritual state, should use this ordinance as a means of grace. He preached earnestly and powerfully upon the necessity of regeneration and a holy life in order to salvation ;¹ yet, practically, the church at Northampton was demoralized by Mr. Stoddard's doctrine and practice touching church-membership. The mind of Edwards, so rigid in self-scrutiny, so rich in its experience of divine grace, so abhorrent of sin in thought, emotion, or affection, so penetrated with the love of holiness as the ideal of the Christian, was scandalized at this mixed communion-table where the regenerate and the unregenerate partook upon equal terms of the same body and blood. With deference, however, to the views and position of his grandfather, and with a sound discretion, he refrained at first from controverting in the pulpit the usage of the church, searching the scriptures for further light, and devoting his ministry to such awakening, searching, and discriminating presentations of truth as might bring his hearers to an experience of the inner life of godliness. As the result of this style of preaching, and of God's favor upon such a ministry, we have the record of the two memorable revivals of 1734 and 1740 which Edwards has incorporated in his "Narrative of Surprising Conversions," and his "Thoughts on the Revival of Religion." A product of his pastoral experience in these scenes was the treatise on the Religious Affections, of which it has been said that if one can read it honestly through, without abandoning his Christian hope,

¹ See the appendix to the author's Memoir of David Tappan Stoddard.

he need have no fear for the future. With a calm philosophical judgment upon evidence is here associated that rare spiritual insight which discerns motives and detects the lurking sophistries of the heart, so that every reader stands revealed to himself. In the introduction to this treatise Edwards declares his belief that "it is by the mixture of counterfeit religion with true, not discerned and distinguished, that the devil has had his greatest advantage against the cause and kingdom of Christ;" and adds, "by this he prevailed against New England, to quench the love and spoil the joy of her espousals, about one hundred years ago." He had reference here to the practice known as the Half-way Covenant, which came in during the last half of the seventeenth century, which admitted to baptism children of parents who themselves were baptized in infancy, though not in communion with the church; and the consequent practice of admitting such baptized persons to communion without visible evidence of regeneration. "The consideration of these things," says Edwards, "has long engaged me to attend to this matter with the utmost diligence and care, and exactness of search and inquiry, that I have been capable of. It is a subject on which my mind has been peculiarly intent ever since I first entered on the study of divinity." Thus the work of Edwards as a reformer in the spiritual life of the churches had its origin in his own early, vivid experience of the grace of God.

The growth of that experience, and the convictions consequent upon it, brought Edwards, in the forty-seventh year of his age and the twenty-fourth of his pastorate, to that crisis of his life which deprived Northampton of the ablest preacher of his time, and gave to New England the ablest of her theologians. "The great thing," says Edwards, "which I have scrupled in the established method of this church's proceeding, and *which I dare no longer go on in*, is their public assenting to the form of words rehearsed on occasion of their admission to the communion, without pretending thereby to mean any such thing as any hearty consent to the terms of the gospel covenant, or to mean

any such faith or repentance as belong to the covenant of grace, and are the grand conditions of that covenant." In other words, Edwards wished to free his church from formalism, worldliness, insincerity, hypocrisy, and to maintain in profession and in practice the just distinction between spiritual believers in and imitators of Christ, and persons of a worldly spirit, or mere nominal Christians. If a church of Christ exists for any rational purpose, it must be to make manifest this distinction. But in insisting upon reforming the practice of his church in this particular, Edwards betrayed no narrow, dogmatic, bigoted spirit, but manifested an enlightened charity and a Christian gentleness. He would have been satisfied to receive church members upon a simple and broad declaration of the substantial things of faith, if borne out by a sincere and devout life. "For I call that a profession of godliness," he says, "which is a profession of *the great things wherein godliness consists*, and not a profession of one's own opinion of his good estate." And he adds, "that in whatever inquiries are made, and whatever accounts are given, neither minister nor church are to set up themselves as searchers of hearts, but are to accept the serious, solemn profession of the well-instructed professor (of a good life), as best able to determine what he finds in his own heart."¹

Unless a church of Christ can properly demand a credible profession of "the great things wherein godliness consists," as a condition of membership, we may as well fall back upon the notion of John Adams, that religion consists simply in having a conscience. Adams wrote to Jefferson: "The most abandoned scoundrel that ever existed never yet wholly extinguished his conscience, and while conscience remains there is some religion. Popes, Jesuits, and Sorbonists, and inquisitors, have some conscience and some religion. So had Marius, and Sylla, Cæsar, Catiline, and Antony, and Augustus had not much more." In all this Adams meant to cavil at the common doctrine of man's

¹ Preface to Farewell Sermon at Northampton, and correspondence touching the same.

depravity and need of regeneration. But is there any tenable ground between the doctrine of Edwards, that a church of Christ should include only such as profess the great things wherein godliness consists, and this notion of Adams, that would recognize popes, pirates, and pagans as religious, because human nature everywhere retains "indelible marks of conscience"? Does the fact that a man has a conscience, and is therefore capable of knowing right and wrong, capable of responsibility, and therefore capable of *sinning*, does that fact make a man *religious*, and qualify him for membership in the church of Christ? But this principle of Edwards, and the attempt to apply it to members and manners in his own church, provoked an unhappy controversy, which issued in his dismissal from Northampton. Then the reformed churches of Christendom were pretty much against him. No orthodox congregational church now questions the soundness of his position. When Dr. Bellamy was called, in 1754, to the First Presbyterian Church in New York, one of the prominent members of the church wrote him that if his views as to church communion were like those of Mr. Edwards, his coming "will infallibly make the rent in the church wider than it is, as the bulk of the people are against that sentiment." So much for the boasted superiority of "the Presbyterian way" in keeping the churches pure.

In six years of retirement at Stockbridge, in a mission to the Indians, Edwards produced the works that have given him his lasting reputation as a metaphysician and divine. A critical analysis of these works does not fall within our present scope, since our object is not a critical estimate of Edwards himself as a mental philosopher and divine, but a popular view of the salient points of his system in their bearing upon New England theology, and his influence on the moral and religious life of his own denomination and that of Christendom. The theology of Edwards may be stated in popular terms as *Calvinism harmonized with reason, with moral intuitions, and with the scriptures*; or a liberalized, rationalized, and harmonized Calvinism. His

greatest works were called forth by the Arminian controversy, and were projected with that view as early as 1747.¹ Believing that, *as a system*, Calvinism and not Arminianism is the theology of the Bible, Edwards sought to establish the harmony of its doctrines with reason and his own moral intuitions. This he did especially in two fundamental particulars, viz. that *sin* is strictly *the personal and voluntary act of the sinner*, and that *certainty*, with all its related doctrines of dependence, is consistent with *freedom*. Edwards sometimes applies the term *depravity* to that deteriorated constitution, by reason of which the posterity of Adam, left to themselves, *act* the bidding of their lower propensities; but he firmly held that man's *duty* is measured and limited by his *natural* ability to do that which is required of him, and that sin is the act of the will in choosing the wrong. In order to reconcile this with his notion of the connection of the race with Adam's transgression, which all divines of his school admit in *some* form, he adopted the theory of the literal oneness of the race with Adam in "one complex person, one moral whole," and hence of our actual participation in his guilt—not an inherited or transmitted *guilt*, but a theoretical participation in Adam's sin as one moral person, our individual consciousness and responsibility therefor being manifested by our "full and perfect *consent of heart* to it" in our first voluntary act.

There has been much misapprehension of Edwards's doctrine of "original sin," for want of a careful study of his terms as explained by himself in the course of his treatise on that subject. Augustine held, literally, that all *sinned* in Adam, because by his oriental theory of the simultaneous existence of the whole human family in Adam and of the propagation of souls,—this last being held by the Druzes at the present day, and belonging to the psychological systems of Persia and India,—he could speculate himself into the belief that the human race were literally in the loins of Adam. The Princeton divines, on the contrary, hold that Adam's sin

¹ Letter to Erskine, Dwight's Memoir, p. 250.

is ours, not in any sense of personal participation in his guilt, but by a divine imputation which holds and treats us as guilty of the sin of our first parent, because of his representative character as the federal head of the race. The view of Edwards differs from both. When carefully analyzed it is found to have nothing in common with the Princeton doctrine of imputation without actual participation. He taught that the imputation is *because* of the actual *guilt* of posterity in the first transgression. But, on the other hand, Edwards did not hold to a participation by actual presence "in the loins of Adam," as did Augustine, but to a mystical participation through one complex moral person. By this metaphysical fiction Edwards maintained his self-consistency upon the cardinal point of the freedom of the human will in sinning. Though he does not always use the same terms with philosophical precision, yet when he really defines his position, it is plain that he did not hold either to a depravity in which there is no personal guilt, or to a transmitted or imputed guilt in which there was no personal participation. In Part iv. chap. ii. of the treatise on Original Sin, Edwards shows that "when God created man at first he implanted in him two kinds of principles;" — the *inferior* or *natural*, "being the principles of mere human nature," and the *superior* principles, "that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love;" — and that Adam sinned by suffering "the inferior principles of self-love and natural appetite, which were given only to serve," to supplant the superior and to become reigning principles.¹ Edwards does not regard the inferior principles in man's constitution as in themselves sinful, but as belonging to a well-balanced nature. "The superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart: the other to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all things were in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in their proper and perfect state." But, as Edwards proceeds to

¹ Throughout these quotations the *italics* are those of Edwards.

show, when man exalted the gratification of his inferior passions above the rules and limits of the divine law of holiness, then man's total corruption of heart ensued, "*without God's putting* any evil into his heart, or *implanting* any bad principle, or *infusing* any corrupt taint, and so becoming the *author* of depravity. Only God's *withdrawing*, as it was highly proper and necessary that he should, from rebel man, being, as it were, driven away by his abominable wickedness, and men's *natural* principles being *left to themselves*, this is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely corrupt, and bent on sinning against God. And as Adam's nature became corrupt without God's implanting or infusing any evil thing into his nature; so does the nature of his posterity. God dealing with Adam as the head of his posterity (as has been shown), and treating them as one, he deals with his posterity as having *all sinned in him*. And therefore as God withdrew spiritual communion, and his vital, gracious influence from the common head, so he withholds the same from all the members, as they come into existence; whereby they come into the world mere *flesh*, and entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles; and so become wholly corrupt as Adam did."

'This is neither more nor less than Dr. Taylor means when he speaks of the balance of constitutional propensities as being so disturbed in the posterity of Adam, in consequence of his sin, that all men invariably sin in their first moral act, and in every succeeding act until renewed by the Holy Spirit. Mankind, with one consent, yield to an inordinate self-love, and thus, in their natural state, are "entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles." Equally explicit is Edwards in defining the relation of Adam's sin to his posterity, so as to retain the doctrine that sin is always the personal voluntary act of the sinner. "The *first existing* of a corrupt disposition in their hearts is not to be looked upon as sin belonging to them, *distinct* from their participation of Adam's first sin; it is, as it were, the *extended pollution* of that sin through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted *union* of the branches with the root;

or the *inherence* of the sin of that head of the species in the members, in the consent and concurrence of the hearts of the members with the head in that first act." This *consent and concurrence* are always with Edwards essential to the fact of sin. For, he continues, "the derivation of the evil disposition to the hearts of Adam's posterity, or rather the *coëxistence* of the evil disposition, implied in Adam's first rebellion, in the *root and branches*, is a consequence of the *union* that the wise author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity; but not properly a *consequence* of the *imputation* of his sin; nay, rather *antecedent* to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequences of that established union, but yet in such order that the evil disposition is *first*, and the charge of guilt *consequent*, as it was in the case of Adam himself.¹

The following statement clearly marks the distinction between the theory of imputation held by Edwards, and that propounded by the Princeton divines. "From what has been observed, it may appear there is no sure ground to conclude that it must be an absurd and impossible thing for the race of mankind truly to partake of the *sin* of the first apostasy, so as that this, in reality and propriety, shall become *their* sin, by virtue of a real *union* between the root and branches of the world of mankind (truly and properly availing to such a consequence), established by the Author of the whole system of the universe, — to whose establishments are owing all propriety and reality of *union* in any part of that system, — and by virtue of the full *consent* of the hearts of Adam's posterity to that first apostasy. And therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs merely because God *imputes* it to them, but it is *truly* and *properly* theirs; and on that *ground* God imputes it to them." This statement, as italicized by Edwards himself, shows how resolutely he held that the personal voluntary act of the individual is essential to any imputation to him of the sin of Adam.

¹ "Original Sin," Part IV., Chap. iii.

True, we can no more conceive of this "one moral person" as an entity, than we can conceive of that "organic humanity" apart from the individuals of the species, or of that "coming Man," of which philosophers of another school continually speak. Yet the theory of Edwards, however impossible its mystical conception to plain common sense, has the merit of self-consistency upon the vital point that sin is voluntary. Whatever that is in human nature — disorder, disturbance, propensity — that precedes, and even leads to, voluntary wrong action, Edwards does not call it sin. He speaks of certain inferior and involuntary principles which belong to the nature of man, such as self-love and natural appetites and passions, which are "like fire in a house, a good servant but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction." These propensities meant for good, in the original constitution of man, are perverted to evil, since the withdrawal of spiritual influences, consequent upon the fall. "Man did set up himself, and the objects of his private affections and appetites as supreme; and so they took the place of God." The doctrine which Edwards really maintained, through all the mysticism of his theory of imputation, — that sin consists in voluntary action, and that mere constitutional propensities, however liable to perversion, are not in themselves sinful, has thoroughly penetrated the New England Theology. But we do not know of any respectable New England divine who clings to the mystic notion of "one moral person" in Adam; while the notion of hereditary depravity, or the taint of evil transmitted by mere physical law, is pretty much left to Mr. Emerson in his "Conduct of Life," and Dr. Holmes in his rattlesnake story, — the latest specimen of "mythical theology," in which a serpent appears, not as the tempter, but as the author of evil in man. Both these gentlemen teach that the taint of evil *runs in the blood*, — a dogma which Edwards and the standard Orthodox divines have long ago repudiated as contrary to reason, and abhorrent to our intuitions of the divine justice and good-

ness. The doctrine that sin is a matter of entailment by natural law belongs fairly to that materialistic philosophy which makes man and the universe alike creatures of an invisible and irresistible law. The doctrine that sin is the voluntary transgression of the moral law of an all-wise and all-holy Being, belongs to that rational and elevated conception of man which invests him with power to do right or wrong, as a free, capable, and therefore responsible, subject of the government of God.

The mind of Edwards has also impressed itself upon the New England theology in his mode of harmonizing Freedom and Certainty, or in his own phraseology, *Liberty and Necessity*. Mr. Ralph Waldo Emerson, with his striking antithesis, says: "If we must accept Fate, we are not less compelled to affirm Liberty, the significance of the individual, the grandeur of duty, the power of character. This is true, and that other is true. . . . We are sure that, though we know not how, necessity does comport with liberty, the individual with the world, my polarity with the spirit of the times. The riddle of the age has for each a private solution." Mr. Emerson would solve the riddle by asserting each factor to the full—the "irresistible dictation of Fate," the "formidable power of will,"—and then placing these side by side to correct "any excess of emphasis." Edwards dove deeper, and brought up that pearly thought of "*moral necessity*," which is the purchase of our freedom. Moral necessity—the simple necessity given in *certainty*,—this, as the second Edwards says, "implies, and in all cases secures, the *consent* of the will; and *natural* necessity cannot possibly affect the will or any of its exercises." In the realm of volition there is no such thing as what Mr. Emerson styles Fate, or irresistible dictation.

An analysis of the "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will" would be foreign to our present design, which is to show, in a general way, the influence of Edwards upon the theology of his own and later times. No better summing up of that treatise could be given than is furnished by the author in his "Letter to a Minister of the Church of Scot-

land," appended to most editions of the "Inquiry." Edwards defines liberty as "*the power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases, or conducting in any respect, according to his pleasure* ; without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is." By this Edwards meant to assert the highest liberty "consistent with the nature of a rational, intelligent, designing agent." This liberty Edwards maintained is consistent with that previous *certainty* of action which he describes as *moral necessity*, — thus qualifying a term which is liable to "perversion and misapplication." He declares that "the connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts of men's wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of *necessity* improperly, and that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's wills, is more properly called *certainty*, than *necessity* ; it being no other than the certain connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence." And he adds, with emphasis : "Nothing that I maintain supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity from doing, and even willing and choosing, as they please, with full freedom, yea, with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive ;" and again, "such a moral necessity of men's actions as I maintain, is not at all inconsistent with any liberty that any creature has, or can have, as a free, accountable, moral agent, and subject of moral government." It was by establishing this distinction between certainty and natural necessity that Edwards silenced the Arminians of his day, and restored Calvinism to its supremacy in the realm of biblical and philosophical theology. Isaac Taylor, while he criticises the "Inquiry" of Edwards as giving *occasion* to the fatalists against Christianity, and by "mingling what is purely abstract with facts belonging to the physiology of the human mind," and "metaphysical demonstrations with scriptural evidence," impairing its own "consistency as a philosophical argument," — nevertheless awards it the praise of a "classic" in meta-

physics, because of its "exact analysis," its "penetrative abstraction," and its "philosophic calmness." He gives it as his deliberate judgment that "Edwards achieved his immediate object — that of demolishing the Arminian notion of contingency, as the blind law of human volitions; and he did more than this, for he effectively redeemed the doctrines called Calvinistic from that scorn with which the irreligious party, within and without the pale of Christianity, had been used to treat them." Of the bearing of the Inquiry upon Calvinism, this thoughtful critic further says: "Notwithstanding this accidental result of the argument for moral causation [its perversion by deistical and atheistical writers], as conducted by Edwards, this treatise must be allowed to have achieved an important service for Christianity, inasmuch as it has stood like a bulwark in front of principles which, whether or not they may hitherto have been stated in the happiest manner, are of far deeper meaning than is any sectarian scheme of doctrine, and apart from which, or if they were disowned, the Christian community would not long make good its opposition to infidelity. If Calvinism, using the term in its modern sense, were exploded, a long time would not elapse before evangelical doctrine of every sort would find itself driven into the gulf that had yawned to receive its rival.

"Whatever notions of an exaggerated sort may belong to some Calvinists, Calvinism encircles or involves great truths which, whether defended in scriptural simplicity of language or not, will never be abandoned while the Bible continues to be devoutly read; and which if they might indeed be driven out of sight, would drag to the same ruin every doctrine of revealed religion. As much as this might be affirmed and made good; although he who should undertake to say it were so to conduct his argument as might make six Calvinists in seven his enemies."¹

The power of Edwards as a preacher lay largely in his views of *the nature of sin and of moral agency*. In address-

¹ "Logic in Theology," p. 9.

sing a congregation he felt that he was speaking, not to machines that could move only as they were moved upon, nor to atoms held by some eternal law or fate, but to *men* who were both capable of volition or choice, and had "liberty to act according to their choice," to men who, because of this power of free agency, were severally and personally guilty of sin, responsible to God, and under obligation to repent and obey. Hence it was that Edwards came into such close quarters with the consciences of his hearers, and urged the truth upon them with such force of logic and earnestness of conviction. His view of sin, and especially his estimate of his own sins, has been thought exaggerated and extravagant by those who regard sin as a mere creature of accident or circumstance, a fault of education, or a defect of physical constitution. But when we look upon God as a being of infinite wisdom, purity, and love, the rightful head and sovereign of the universe, who has given a *law* of perfect wisdom, equity, and love, obedience to which would make all creatures supremely happy, and then look upon man as pitting his will and his selfish interests and desires against such a being and such a law; when we think of a pride that would set up the *Ego* above the universe and above its Lord, — till it rises to the audacious announcement of the Hegelian professor, "To-morrow, gentlemen, I will make God," — we find no terms too strong for a holy mind to express its detestation and abhorrence of sin.

In like manner, his view of moral agency enabled Edwards to use the *doctrine of divine sovereignty* with great practical effect in his preaching. He was not hampered by a materialistic fatalism, nor by an arbitrary predestinarianism. He held that the world "is in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent that presides, not as the soul of the world, but as the sovereign Lord of the universe, governing all things by proper will, choice, and design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of anything before, above, or without himself;" and yet this universal sovereignty — altogether different

from the "irresistible dictation of fate" — he held to be "consistent with whatever *liberty* is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege, or benefit, or anything desirable in any respect for any intelligent creature." Therefore Edwards, recognizing man's absolute freedom in sinning, and his full natural ability to obey God, could make the sinner feel that his dependence upon divine grace, arising out of his moral aversion to holiness, was at once his encouragement and his peril, an incitement to hope and a warning against presumption; that the sovereignty of God is at once to be loved and to be feared.

And so, again, the view that Edwards held of sin and free agency led to his strong convictions touching *the future punishment of the ungodly*. Nowhere in the writings of Protestant divines is the doctrine of eternal punishment set forth in terms so vivid and earnest as are found in the sermons of Jonathan Edwards. Some of his expressions upon this subject — such as are quoted above — are in violation of all modern canons of taste. But such grossness of imagery, and such details of merely physical horrors, were in accordance with the standards of literature in his age. His sermon on Joseph's temptation and deliverance could not well be read aloud in the presence of woman and ingenuous youth. Yet it was preached from the pulpit of Northampton by a man of singular pureness of heart and life, with a view to the reformation of manners. But how much of the English literature of the latter part of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth must now be expurgated, not only because bald and coarse in manner, but also, as Macaulay characterizes it, "foul and ignoble" in spirit, at once "inelegant and inhuman." Inelegant and inhuman! No severer judgment than this could be pronounced upon Edwards's comparison of a sinner to a spider roasting over the flames. Let us not visit upon the pulpit alone vices of style that belonged largely to the age.

On the point in question the Reformation had not wholly purified religious literature from the materialistic conceptions of hell which abounded in the Romish Church in the

Middle Ages. That church, dealing with rude unlettered minds, had recourse to a *pictorial* language which we have outgrown, but whose influence we trace far down in Protestant theology. We cannot, therefore, charge Edwards with a malign spirit or "a malign theology," because he wrote according to the standards of his age. His was not a mind of the highest literary culture. His books were few, and these chiefly professional and controversial; — he speaks of himself as in "a remote part of the world" with respect to literature, — and his taste, though equal to the most delicate perception of beauty, was often crude and homely in expression. In treating of future punishment his fault lay in literalizing and amplifying the vivid and intense figures of the Bible upon this subject. Enough of woe in the declaration of Christ that "at the end of the world, the angels shall come forth and sever the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire." It helps not the impressiveness of these few words for human imagination to surround them with inquisitorial devices of torture. Rather should we meditate in silent awe upon the stupendous woe couched in such words from the lips of love. The figure of fire, in the scriptures, represents a reality more terrible than itself; to literalize the figure in detail lessens its moral force.

But if the rhetoric and the imagination of Edwards were somewhat in fault in his awful sermons on future punishment, his logic was not in fault from his premises of sin, free agency, holiness, and the moral government of God. Men speak slightly of sin as too insignificant an act to deserve eternal punishment. But what act is so momentous in its character and bearings? Insignificant? Because the soul of man is so *great* in its powers, its capacities, its possibilities; because free agency is so *great* as an attribute of man; because God is so *great* in his holiness, which is love; because his law is so *great* in its purity and righteousness, which are also love; therefore sin is SO GREAT in its malignity and its destructiveness, and deserves a punishment great as the love it has outraged, and the law it has

defied; and therefore the work of Christ in delivering the soul from so great sin and so great punishment, is the great mystery of divine love which angels desire to look into. The scheme of Edwards is logically consistent: his starting-point the excellency and the blessedness of holiness, and man's power and obligation to attain thereto; hence the guilt of apostasy; hence the need of redemption and of regeneration; hence the righteousness of condemnation upon the unbelieving; and hence also the crowning joy to faith and love in heaven. Such a system exalts man in capacity even while it abases him in character. It exalts God in the sovereignty of his holiness and justice, while yet it attempers that sovereignty with benignity and grace. It exalts Christ as the one Mediator between God and man, reconciling the righteousness of God with the justifying of the penitent and believing soul.

In estimating the theology of Edwards, however, we should remember that he did not write or plan a theological *system*; that his contributions to theology as a *science* were chiefly upon a few leading points to which his attention was turned by his own experience as a pastor, or by the controversies of his time; and therefore, as is usual in controversial writings, the points in dispute are urged with an emphasis out of proportion to their place in a general system, while other points are treated in the common technical language, without rigid scientific discrimination. Hence we must not be surprised at finding in Edwards errors, and even contradictions, upon topics that he had not elaborated with the care he bestowed upon certain leading inquiries, or at finding scholastic or traditionary expressions not in harmony with his prevailing philosophy. Hence his theology must be ascertained, not by distorting isolated expressions, but by mastering its general scope, with special reference to the theology that preceded it. *That* theology, a compound of Antinomianism and Arminianism, had run itself out in the spiritual inaction and general formalism of the churches. Edwards, rejecting the doctrines of man's inability and of ecclesiastical grace, brought in a new type

of theology which has ever since marked the New England divinity.

From this fragmentary outline of his life and writings it is evident that Orthodox Congregationalism is largely indebted to Jonathan Edwards for that *spiritual reformation of the eighteenth century*, which restored to practice the primitive idea of a church as a fellowship of believers in Christ; not an hereditary state, or an outward condition to which men are introduced by birth or baptism; not a civil institution existing by any alliance, direct or indirect, with the state, but a society of believers, held together by consent of heart, in faith, love, and purity, under the headship of one Lord and Master, even Christ. This principle, so scriptural, so just, so necessary to the purity and vitality of a Christian church, was clearly enunciated by the synod of elders and messengers held at Cambridge in 1648. "The matter of a visible church are saints by calling, i.e. such as have not only attained the knowledge of the principles of religion, and are free from gross and open scandals, but also do, together with the profession of their faith and repentance, walk in blameless obedience to the word, so as that in charitable discretion they may be accounted saints by calling." But this idea of a church constitution had well nigh fallen into disuse in New England when Edwards rediscovered it by a patient and prayerful study of the scriptures. No sooner was his own mind clear as to the New Testament constitution of a church, than he modestly but conscientiously avowed his opinions, though he thereby alienated many friends in his own parish, and among neighboring ministers, and excited a controversy that led to his dismissal from Northampton. As early as 1749 he wrote to his correspondent Erskine, in Scotland: "A very great difficulty has arisen between my people relating to qualifications for communion at the Lord's table. My honored grandfather Stoddard, my predecessor in the ministry over this church, strenuously maintained the Lord's supper to be a converting ordinance, and urged all to come who were not of scandalous life, though they knew themselves to be unconverted.

I formerly conformed to his practice, but I have had difficulties with respect to it, which have been long increasing, till I dared no longer to proceed on in the former way, which has occasioned great uneasiness among my people, and has filled all the country with noise."

This conscientious regard for the authority of the scriptures and for the spirituality of the churches cost Edwards his personal ease and his pastoral office; but with unflinching courage he maintained the right, and thus recovered the congregational churches of New England from a demoralizing worldliness and formalism. It was the very spirit of heroism, the spirit that under a Mary, a James, or a Charles would have made him a confessor or a martyr, that led him to hazard all, and at last to relinquish all, through a conscientious obedience to the word of God. Every son of the Puritans, who has not degenerated into a bigot, will admire and honor that act of Jonathan Edwards.

The influence of Edwards upon New England Congregationalism is to be traced also in *that vigorous use of logic which characterizes its theology and its pulpit*. The province of reason in theology, — which has perplexed some more recent divines, — Edwards defined by his 11th and 28th Resolutions. "*Resolved*, when I think of any theorem in divinity to be solved, immediately to do what I can toward solving it, if circumstances do not hinder." He knew that there were theorems in divinity yet unsolved by any theological formula, and felt that it was his duty to do what he could towards solving them. This was his province as a teacher in Christ's house. Resolved "to study the scriptures so steadily, constantly, and frequently, as that I may find and plainly perceive myself to grow in the knowledge of the same." These early resolutions define what was one grand endeavor of Edwards in after-life, — a *rational Biblical theology*. Edwards was never restrained from the philosophical investigation of revealed truth by the fear of intruding reason into the province of faith. "There is no need," said he, "that the strict philosophic truth should be at all concealed from men; no danger in *contemplation and profound discov-*

ery in these things." He would not have the friends of the great truths of the Gospel "obliged to dodge, shuffle, hide, and turn their backs," because they could not meet their adversaries in the field of metaphysical discussion. The investigating spirit, ever resolving new theorems in divinity yet ever loyal to the authority of the scriptures and to the great system of evangelical doctrine wrought out by the ages,—this characteristic feature of New England theology, is that wherein Edwards chiefly lives in his successors; and where these two traits are fairly combined in a theological instructor, there is a school of Edwards, even though in some respects his own phraseology may be superseded. Hopkins says of his teacher and friend: "He studied the Bible more than all other books, and more than most other divines do. He took his religious principles from the Bible, and not from any human system or body of divinity. Though his principles were Calvinistic, yet he called no man father. He thought and judged for himself, and was truly very much of an original."¹ Yet some who now-a-days affect the guardianship of the Edwardean theology, look upon an original mode of stating the doctrine of depravity as even more heinous than original sin.

We owe much to Edwards in the way of *harmonizing the theology of the Bible with the reason and the moral intuition of man*. Some find that theology hard to be understood, and therefore treat it as a mystery, not to be investigated. Some, failing to reconcile it with their reason or their intuitions, reject it, and the Bible with it. Some seek to explain away the more obvious theology of the Bible, derogating from the authority of the book, and using it only as it may serve their own rational eclecticism. Edwards did neither. While he saw the doctrines and their difficulties he mastered both, and held fast by his moral intuitions on the one hand, and the doctrines of the Bible on the other, till he bound them together by a compact and glowing chain of logic. "From my childhood up," he says, "my mind had been full

¹ Life of Edwards, p. 47. Ed. 1799.

of objections against the doctrine of God's sovereignty, in choosing whom he would to eternal life and rejecting whom he pleaseth. . . . It used to appear like a horrible doctrine to me. But I remember the time very well, when I seemed to be convinced and fully satisfied as to this sovereignty of God, and his justice in thus eternally disposing of men according to his sovereign pleasure." This Edwards afterwards ascribed to a divine influence upon his heart; but he also adds, "now I *saw* further, and my reason apprehended the justice and reasonableness of it. My mind rested in it, and it put an end to all those cavils and objections. . . . I have often since had not only a conviction, but a delightful conviction. The doctrine has very often appeared exceeding pleasant, bright, and sweet." Let no one reject that doctrine as contrary to reason, till he has at least mastered Jonathan Edwards on God's end in Creation and the Freedom of the Will. Edwards was the great exemplar of New England theologians, in teaching how

"We may assert eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to men."

But he shines no less brightly as an example of personal holiness. Jonathan Edwards had an affinity for all that is pure and good. In his youth, while himself enjoying the highest experiences of the religious life, hearing of one whose spirituality of mind was as remarkable as her beauty of person, he wrote: "They say there is a young lady in New Haven who is beloved by that Great Being who made and rules the world, and that there are certain seasons in which this Great Being in some way or other invisible, comes to her and fills her mind with exceeding sweet delight, and that she hardly cares for anything except to meditate on him, that she expects after a while to be received up where he is, to be raised up out of the world and caught up into heaven, being assured that he loves her too well to let her remain at a distance from him always. There she is to dwell with him, and to be ravished with his love and delight forever."

Thirty-five years after, Edwards, dying at Princeton, away from his family, left for that same lady this parting message: "Give my kindest love to my dear wife, and tell her that the uncommon union which has so long subsisted between us has been of such a nature as, I trust, is spiritual, and therefore will continue forever."

A few months later that Great Being who had loved Sarah Pierrepont Edwards from a little child, "loving her too well to let her remain at a distance from him always," called her also to be with him. Hardly had the cloud of sorrow gathered over her,

"When, sudden, from the cleaving skies,
A gleam of glory broke,"

and she departed, to be ravished with divine love and delight. Her body was laid beside her husband, and those two holy souls were joined again in a spiritual union that shall last forever.

One theological seminary preserves as a relic the old doorstep of the house where Edwards was born; another guards with sacred jealousy the stone that marks his grave. But that great intellect towers above all limitations of place and time, and the saintly purity of that life still blooms as the white flower at its side.

ARTICLE V.

ON THE READING "ONLY-BEGOTTEN GOD," IN JOHN I. 18;
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE STATEMENTS
OF DR. TREGELLES.¹

BY EZRA ABBOT, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε· ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς [al. θεός], ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο.

IN John i. 18, which reads in the common version: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him," it has long been known to scholars that important critical authorities, instead of the expression ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός, "the only-begotten Son," have the remarkable reading μονογενὴς θεός, "only-begotten God." The manuscripts that contain it, though not numerous, are of the very highest rank, including both the famous Vatican manuscript, and the newly discovered *Codex Sinaiticus* of Tischendorf. This reading has also a respectable support from the ancient versions, and has been *supposed* to be attested by a great majority of the ancient Fathers, both Greek and Latin. Though not adopted into the text of any edition of the Greek Testament yet published, its genuineness has been maintained by Dr. S. P. Tregelles, the most eminent among English scholars in the department of textual criticism; and it will undoubtedly be presented as the true reading in his long expected edition. It would also have been

¹ "An Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament; with Analyses, etc., of the respective Books. . . . By the Rev. Thomas Hartwell Horne, B. D. The critical part re-written and the remainder revised and edited by Samuel Prideaux Tregelles, LL. D. Second Edition." London: Longman, etc., 1860. 8vo. pp. xxvii., 801; pp. 751—784 being "Additions" and "Postscript," which alone distinguish this from the former edition. These Additions, with the Postscript, have also been published separately.

received by Lachmann into his text, had he been aware of the authorities by which it is supported.

It is evident from this brief statement of the claims of the reading *μονογενὴς Θεός*, that the question of its genuineness well deserves a critical investigation, while its theological character gives it a special interest, which, however, must not be suffered to bias our judgment. This investigation is the more necessary in consequence of the circumstance that in respect to one very important branch of the evidence, — the quotations of the passage by the ancient Fathers, — no critical edition of the Greek Testament gives even a tolerably complete and accurate account of the facts in the case. On the contrary, the most important editions which have been published since the time of Wetstein, as those of Griesbach, Scholz, Tischendorf, and Alford, not only neglect to state a very large part of the evidence, but contain almost incredible errors in regard to the authorities which they professedly cite.¹ Many of these errors were repeated by Dr. Tregelles in his remarks on the passage in his "Account of the Printed Text of the Greek New Testament" (London, 1854), in which he maintained the genuineness of the reading *Θεός*.² His observations led to an examination of the evidence on the subject by the present writer, the results of which were published in a note appended to the second edition of Mr. Norton's "Statement of Reasons for not believing the Doctrines of Trinitarians" (Boston, 1856), pp. 448—469.

I cannot better introduce the discussion proposed in the present Article, than by quoting from the note just referred to a statement of some of the conclusions arrived at. After mentioning the fact that Wetstein, in his note on the passage, has fallen into extraordinary errors, many of which

¹ In his recent edition of the Greek Testament, "Editio septima critica major," Lips. 1859, Tischendorf has considerably corrected and enlarged his former account of the evidence of the Fathers on this passage. But his note is still very defective, and contains important mistakes.

² See pp. 234, 235.

have been blindly copied by subsequent editors, it was observed:

"One who should take the statements in Wetstein's note to be correct, would suppose that not less than *forty-four* Greek and Latin writers, in the first eight centuries, have quoted the passage in question with the reading *μονογενὴς Θεός* or *unigenitus Deus*; and that the number of distinct quotations of this kind in their writings, taken together, is not far from *one hundred and thirty*. I have examined with some care all the passages specifically referred to by Wetstein, and the whole work, or collection of works, cited, when his reference is general, — as '*Epiphanius* duodecies,' '*Hilarius* de Trinit. passim,' '*Fulgentius* plusquam vicies,' not confining my attention, however, to these particular passages or works. The following is the result of this examination. Of the forty-four writers cited by Wetstein in support of the reading *μονογενὴς Θεός*, there are but *four* who quote or refer to the passage with this reading only;¹ *four* quote it with both readings;² *nine* quote it with the reading *υἱός* or *filius* only, except that in one of the quotations of Titus of Bostra *υἱὸς Θεός* occurs;³ *two* repeatedly allude to it, — sometimes using the phrase '*only-begotten God*,' and sometimes '*only-begotten Son*,' in connection with the words '*who is in the bosom of the Father*,' — but do not distinctly quote it;⁴ and *twenty-five* do not quote or allude to it at all.⁵ Of the particular passages referred to by Wetstein, a great majority have no bearing whatever on the subject, but merely contain the expression *μονογενὴς Θεός* or *unigenitus Deus*, with no trace of an allusion to the text in question, — an expression often occurring, as will hereafter

¹ "It is thus quoted in the '*Excerpta Theodoti*,' and also by Clement of Alexandria and Epiphanius. It appears to be once referred to in the Epistle of the second Synod of Ancyra."

² "Irenaeus, Origen, Basil, and Cyril of Alexandria."

³ "Eusebius, Athanasius, Julian, Gregory Nazianzen, Titus of Bostra, Maximinus the Arian bishop, Hilary, Vigilius of Tapsa, Alcuin."

⁴ "Gregory of Nyssa and Fulgentius."

⁵ "That is, all the remaining authorities cited by Wetstein, for which see his note."

appear, in writers who abundantly and unequivocally *quote* John i. 18 with the reading *υἱός* or *filius*. Indeed, in some of these passages we do not find even this expression, but only the term *γεννητός* [al. *γεννητός*] *θεός*, or *genitus Deus*, applied to Christ.¹ Sufficient evidence that these assertions are not made at random will be given in what follows, though the mistakes of Wetstein cannot here be all pointed out in detail.

"We may now examine the witnesses brought forward by Dr. Tregelles. Of the *twenty-five* writers whom he has adduced in support of the reading *μονογενῆς θεός*, but *four*, I believe, can be relied on with much confidence, and even their testimony is far from unexceptionable; *three* may be regarded as doubtful; *eight* really support the common reading; *two* merely allude to the passage; and *eight* have neither quoted nor alluded to it."²

These statements were supported by a detailed exposition of the facts in the case, accompanied in every instance by precise references to the passages in the Fathers bearing on the subject. In addition to the correction of these enormous errors in respect to the evidence alleged for the reading *θεός*, I produced, as the result of original investigation, quotations of the passage, supporting the reading *υἱός*, from no less than *eighteen* Greek and *six* Latin ecclesiastical writers, whose testimony had never before been adduced to this purpose in any critical edition of the Greek Testament, — twelve or thirteen of them belonging to the third and fourth centuries. The examination made of the works of the Fathers enabled me also to give the evidence much more fully and accurately than had before been done in the case of many other writers who *had* been cited, on one side or the other, in editions of the Greek Testament. In this exposition of the evidence I was scrupulously careful to mention not only

¹ "As in the following: '*Origenes* in Psalm. i. ap. Epiphanius,' see Epiphanius Haeres. LXIV. c. 7, Opp. I. 531^b, or Origen, Opp. II. 526^e; '*Eusebius*, D. IV. 2,' i. e. Dem. Evang. Lib. IV. c. 2; '*Prudentius* in Apotheosi,' viz. line 895; '*Claudianus Mamert.* de statu animae l. 2,' where Lib. I. c. 2 must be the place intended."

² Norton's Statement of Reasons, etc. Appendix, Note C, pp. 451—453.

every quotation of the passage which I had found with the reading *Θεός*, but every allusion to it which might be imagined to favor this reading, even in cases where it seemed clear that no real argument could be founded on these allusions.

In the Postscript to the second edition of his Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament (pp. 780, 781), Dr. Tregelles has taken notice of my remarks on this passage, which "have led," as he says, "to a reëxamination of the whole of the evidence." After exhibiting the authorities for the different readings, he says in a note :

"In this one instance I have given at length the evidence for and against the reading, so as to show what authorities do really support *μονογενὴς Θεός* and what uphold *μονογενὴς υἱός*. The statement is here given just as it stands in my Greek Testament, with the precise references to the Patristic citations."

The conclusion to which he comes is thus expressed :

"It appears to be most clear that not only is *μονογενὴς Θεός* the ancient reading of MSS. and some versions, but also of the Fathers *generally*; for those that have both readings in the present copies of their works, evidently do support that which is not in the *later* Greek text, with which those who copied their writings were familiar; and the doubtful passages must give way to the *express* mentions of *Θεός* by the same writers as the reading in this place."

Here a regard for the truth compels me to state some facts which may give an unfavorable impression concerning Dr. Tregelles's character for fairness and accuracy. No one can regret this more than myself; and in simple justice to a scholar whose services to biblical criticism have been so valuable, and who has often shown himself superior to the influence of dogmatic prejudice, I must beg the reader not to regard his note on John i. 18 as a specimen of his usual manner of dealing with evidence.

Dr. Tregelles, it will be observed, professes to give at length the testimony for and against the reading *Θεός*. In doing this, he does not confine himself to the chronological limit generally followed in his Greek Testament, so far as

the Fathers are concerned, but comes down to the latter part of the eighth century, including the latest author (namely Alcuin) who has ever been cited in favor of the reading "only-begotten God." He leads us to expect a full and accurate statement of the evidence on both sides, which, in a case like this, it was unquestionably his duty to give. How is it, then, in reality?

I answer that, for some cause which I do not pretend to explain, his account of the evidence is most deceptive and untrustworthy. He has entirely omitted to mention the greater part of the facts in the case, though they were placed directly before his eyes. In stating the evidence for the reading *Θεός*, it is true, he has not been guilty of the sin of omission. On the contrary, he not only appears to have availed himself very freely of the matter which I had for the first time collected that seemed to favor that reading, even copying my references, in one instance at least, without verification,¹ but he has repeated many mistakes in the evidence alleged for this reading after they had been clearly pointed out. He has referred, in various instances, to places in different authors where John i. 18 is not quoted or even alluded to, but which merely contain the *expression* *μονογενὴς Θεός* or *unigenitus Deus* applied to Christ by the writer, and has intermixed these references indiscriminately with those to actual *quotations*, thus leading the unwary reader

¹ I had cited the Dialogue of Cyril, "Quod Unus sit Christus," Opp. Tom. V. P. i. p. 786^e, for the reading *Θεός*. The reference should have been to p. 768^e instead of p. 786^e. Dr. Tregelles has copied this mistake in reference, though an examination would have shown that the treatise ends on p. 778.

The only acknowledgement made by Dr. Tregelles of any indebtedness to my researches on this passage is the following: "He points out rightly that I had incorrectly alleged *Phoebadius* for the reading *μονογενὴς Θεός* (an error which originated, I believe, in revising in the proof-sheet the name which had been intended for *Prudentius*)." This statement has not mended the matter. *Prudentius* has not only never quoted John i. 18 with the reading *unigenitus Deus*, but has never used this *expression* even, in any part of his writings. As to *Phoebadius*, I not only pointed out the fact that the same remark was true of him, but that he had expressly quoted the passage with the reading *unigenitus filius* (*Contra Arianos*, c. 12). Of this Dr. Tregelles, in his account of the evidence, takes no notice. Why should he not be as ready to adduce the testimony of *Phoebadius* on one side as the other?

to suppose them to denote quotations, and to attach to them undue weight.

But how fares the evidence on the other side? The answer to this question may well astonish the reader. Of the *twenty-three* Greek and *thirteen* Latin writers whom I had cited as supporting the reading *υἱός*, giving in every case exact references to their quotations of the passage, Dr. Tregelles notices only *seven*! Of the twenty-nine witnesses whom he thus ignores, at least *twenty-six* are as ancient as Alcuin, whom he cites, though erroneously, in favor of the reading "only-begotten God;" and a great majority of them belong to the third and fourth centuries. Even this is not all. His exhibition of the testimony of the authorities which he does cite as containing the reading *υἱός* is far from complete. See the note below.¹

¹ For the convenience of Dr. Tregelles, and those of his readers who may happen to see this Article, I will here point out in order some of the principal errors and defects in his note on John i. 18. A fuller discussion of various questions will be given hereafter.

Authorities cited for the reading μονογενῆς θεός.

Lines 4, 5. "*Orig. Int. IV. 92^d.*" To be omitted. Merely an instance of the use of the expression "unigenitus Deus Salvator noster," without any reference to John i. 18.

Line 5. "*Marcel. ap. Eus. 19^c.*" To be omitted for a similar reason. Eusebius simply says of a letter of Marcellus, containing his creed: Γέγραφε πιστεύειν εἰς πατέρα θεόν παντοκράτορα, καὶ εἰς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ θεόν, τὸν κτίριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἕγιον.

Lines 5, 6. "*Eus. c. Mcl. 67^d.* ὁ μονογ. υἱὸς ἢ μονογ. θεός." This should be quoted with the context, τοῦ εὐαγγελιστοῦ διαρρηθῆναι αὐτὸν υἱὸν μονογενῆ εἶναι διδάσκοντος δι' ὃν ἔφη, θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε πρόποτε· ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός, ἢ μονογενὴς θεός, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον, κ. τ. λ., which makes it, I think, evident that the words ἢ μονογ. θεός are a marginal gloss which has crept into the text; and that the proper place for the reference is among the authorities for *μονογενὴς υἱός*, where five other places are cited, in which Eusebius has expressly quoted the passage with this reading.

Line 6. "*Eus. c. Mcl. 124^c.* θεὸν δὲ καὶ μονογενῆ." Irrelevant. Eusebius simply says here that Christ is represented by the Evangelist "as God and only-begotten," *not* only-begotten God, "inasmuch as he alone was truly the Son of the God over all."

Ibid. "*Hil. 1124^c seq.*" etc. To be omitted. The passage is not a quotation of John i. 18, except so far as the words "in sinu patris est" are concerned, as was shown in the Appendix to Norton's "Statement of Reasons," p. 465, note, and will be fully shown below. The stress of Hilary's argument, such as

Under such circumstances, no apology can be necessary for offering a restatement of the evidence for the various readings of the passage in question. In doing this, I may

it is, rests wholly on the word *est*. The "et in sequentibus saepe" which Dr. Tregelles adds is altogether deceptive, as it will naturally be understood to signify that Hilary has "often" quoted John i. 18 with the reading *unigenitus Deus*. The truth is, that he has *never* quoted the passage with this reading, but has, on the contrary, expressly quoted it *seven* times with the reading *filius*; and not only so, but has *commented* upon it in such a way (De Trin. Lib. VI. c. 39) as to demonstrate beyond question that he thus read the passage.

Lines 18, 19. "*Epist. Synodi Ancyranæ* 2^o [2^{da}] ap. Epiph. . . . Haer. lxxiii. 8 (i. 854^c)."
It is quite proper to adduce this among the authorities which favor the reading *θεός*, but as it is not an express quotation of the passage, it would be more accurate to add the Greek: *ὁ δὲ* [sc. *Ἰωάννης*] *τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν λόγον μονογενῆ θεόν . . . φησί*. The imprudence of a confident reliance on references of this kind was illustrated in the Appendix to Norton's "Statement of Reasons," pp. 454, 455, note, and will be shown below.

Line 23. "*Cyr. Alex.* V. p. i. 786^e. For 786^e read 768^e."

Ibid. "*Fulgentius interdum.*" *Dele.* Fulgentius has never quoted the passage. His allusions to it were given in full in the "Appendix" just referred to, and will be again exhibited below.

Lines 23, 24. "*Isidorus Pel.* 6. iii. 95 (ap. Wetst.)." *Dele.* Isidore of Pelusium has nowhere quoted or alluded to John i. 18. The passage referred to by Wetstein, as was pointed out in the Appendix to Norton's "Statement of Reasons," p. 460, note, contains merely the expression "only-begotten God," — *ὁ μονογενὴς γοῦν θεὸς ἐπιδημήσας, φησί, κ. τ. λ.* This is the only place in his writings in which Isidore uses even this expression.

Lines 24—29. "*Scriptores Graeci et Latini saepissime habent verba μονογενὴς θεός, unigenitus Deus, tanquam nomen Jesu in Scriptura tributum; e. g., Greg. Nyss. saepissime, Greg. Naz., Bas. Sel., Arius, Lucianus (s. pseudo-Luc.), nec non Eunomius, Tit. Bostr., Gaudentius, Ferrandus, Prudentius, Vigilius, Alcuinus, etc.; quod ab hoc loco ut videtur pendet.*" Here it is to be observed: 1. That it is not pretended that any of these writers *quotes* the passage in question with the reading "only-begotten God;" on the other hand, *four* of them, *Greg. Naz., Tit. Bostr., Vigilius, and Alcuin*, do expressly quote it with the reading "only-begotten Son." 2. Two of them, *Titus of Bostra* and *Prudentius*, have never even used the phrase "only-begotten God" in their published works. 3. Four of the remainder, *Bas. Sel., Arius, Lucianus* (or *Pseudo-Luc.*), and *Gaudentius*, instead of employing this expression "*saepissime*," have used it but *once* each, in their extant writings; and it occurs very rarely, perhaps only once, in those of *Gregory Nazianzen*. 4. None of the writers named speak of it as "applied to Jesus in Scripture," except *Gregory Nyssen*; and his assertion, as I shall show, is very poor evidence that he ever found it there.

Authorities cited for the reading μονογενὴς υἱός.

Line 29. After "1." insert "69.," a manuscript of great value, ranking with 1. and 33.

be pardoned for saying, that so far as the testimony of the Fathers is concerned, nothing whatever will be given at second hand. When it is affirmed that a particular Father has not quoted John i. 18, or has never used in his writings even the expression *μονογενὴς Θεός*, or, on the other hand, that he *has* used it a certain number of times, the statement is founded on a personal examination of the whole of his published works. It would be presumptuous to assert that in this examination, extending over so wide a field, nothing has escaped my notice; I can only say that I have aimed at accuracy, and have had no object but to ascertain the truth. The new note of Dr. Tregelles has added nothing to the evidence which was presented in the Appendix to Norton's "Statement of Reasons," except one reference to Didymus of Alexandria, confirming the two citations which I had given from him in favor of the reading *Θεός*;¹ and, on the other side, the fact (already mentioned in Tischendorf's last edition of the Greek Testament), that

Liçq 31. Add "*Iren.* 189 (unigenitus filius Dei), et vid. seqq." Add also "*Orig.* IV. 102^d, δ μ. *vids* τοῦ Θεοῦ ap. De la Rue, δ μ. *vids* Θεός ap. Huet.; cf. δ μ. *vids* Θεός, Clem. 956. *Orig. Int.* III. 91^e, unigenitus Dei filius."

Line 32. For "197" read "297."

Line 33. *Dele* "123^b." There is no reference here to John i. 18.

Line 34. Insert among the references to *Hil.*, "799^e," and for "852^e" read "852^c."

Ibid. For "vid. *Tert. adv. Prax.* 8" read "*Tert. adv. Prax.* 15." Dr. Tregelles omits the place where Tertullian has quoted the passage with the reading *unigenitus filius*, and refers instead to a place where he has merely alluded to it in such a way as not to determine the reading.

Ibid. For "*Athanas.*," which is out of place, read "*Athanas.* I. 219^e (diserte), 227^d, 530^d, 638^a (dis.); cf. 628^{ef}, 631^d, 634^f, 635^a, ed. Benedict." Athanasius quotes the passage four times, twice *commenting* on the word *vids*, and refers to it in three other places in such a way as to show, in each of them, that he unquestionably read *vids*.

Within the chronological period to which Dr. Tregelles has confined himself, namely, the first eight centuries, I shall further adduce in support of the reading "only-begotten Son," the testimony of not less than *thirty* writers whom he has not mentioned; to which, for the sake of completeness, will be added that of ten or twelve others of later date.

¹ Not having been able to procure at that time the treatise of Didymus "De Trinitate," I was compelled to cite it at second hand from the work of Guericke, "De Schola quæ Alexandriae floruit catechetica," carefully stating, however, this fact in a note. Didymus was the only author thus cited.

the Aethiopic version, as edited by Mr. Platt, supports the reading *υἱός*. The very few other apparent additions are merely errors.

I may here advert to an extraordinary statement in the note of Dr. Tregelles, which, if correct, would make this whole investigation on my part an absurdity. He says: "Mr. Abbot has entirely failed in his endeavour to show that Patristic citations are wholly a matter of uncertainty" (p. 781). There is not the slightest ground in my note for ascribing to me such a preposterous "endeavor." I did endeavor to show that the evidence of some of *Dr. Tregelles's* "Patristic citations" was very uncertain; I called attention to the indisputable fact that several of his principal authorities were notorious for the general looseness and inaccuracy of their quotations; I pointed out the importance of carefully distinguishing express *citations* of a passage from mere *allusions* or *references* to it; and I proved that it was not always safe to rely on the assertion of a Father that a particular expression was found in scripture. But I can assure Dr. Tregelles that had I endeavored "to show that Patristic citations are wholly a matter of uncertainty," I should not have taken pains to adduce *eighty* of them, from *thirty-six* different writers, in opposition to the reading which he defends as genuine. The evidence of the Fathers in regard to various readings always needs to be carefully weighed and sifted; the references to it in all critical editions of the Greek Testament hitherto published are very incomplete, and often untrustworthy; but it is frequently of great importance.

WE will now examine the evidence for the reading *μονογενὴς θεός* as compared with that for *μονογενὴς υἱός*. The testimony of the *Greek manuscripts* is first to be considered. It is here important to observe, that the words *υἱός* and *θεός* in the abbreviated form in which they are written in the most ancient codices (*ϣ̄c*, *θ̄c*), differ in but a single letter, so that one might easily be substituted for the other through the inadvertence of a transcriber.

The reading θεός is found in the MSS. $\aleph^*$ B C* L, 33; only five in number, but three of them of the highest antiquity, and all of great value. $\aleph$, the *Codex Sinaiticus*, which has the reading *a prima manu*, was probably written, according to Tischendorf, about the middle of the fourth century; B, the Vatican manuscript, is of nearly the same age; C, the Ephrem manuscript, is about a century later; L is of the eighth century, but remarkable for its affinity with the Vatican and the Ephrem; and 33 is a cursive manuscript of the eleventh century, also very remarkable for its agreement with our oldest copies. It is one of the three manuscripts of this class which reads ζς in 1 Tim. iii. 16.

The reading υἱός, on the other hand, is found in $\aleph^{**}$ A C*** E F G H K M S U V X $\Delta\Delta$, also in 1. 69., and all the other cursive manuscripts containing the passage (so far as is known), amounting to four or five hundred in number, but many of them imperfectly collated. $\aleph^{**}$ denotes the *Codex Sinaiticus* as corrected; A is the Alexandrine manuscript, of the fifth century; C*** denotes the Ephrem manuscript as corrected in the ninth century; X and Δ are manuscripts of the latter part of the ninth century, but distinguished from the others of that period by their more frequent agreement with the most ancient documents; this is particularly true of X, the text of which is of great excellence. The other uncial manuscripts range in date from the eighth century to the tenth; 1 and 69 are cursive manuscripts, the first of the tenth, the second of the fourteenth century, but of uncommon value on account of the accordance of their text with that of our oldest copies; a remark which applies, in a somewhat inferior degree, to a considerable number of others, especially 13, 22, 118, 124, 157, and 209.

The concurrence of three out of our four most ancient manuscripts in the reading θεός is remarkable; but some circumstances may lessen its apparent weight. The testimony of $\aleph$, which has the reading *a prima manu*, cannot be properly estimated till we know something respecting the date of the *correction*, which possesses an authority, of course, equal to that of a manuscript at the time it was made. The

alterations which $\aleph$ has undergone are by many different hands, but Tregelles remarks (p. 784) that "it will apparently be found that one at least of these has carefully corrected the errors of the original scribe; indeed it seems not improbable that such a corrector may have been the person whose business it was to revise what had been written by a mere mechanical copyist. For a full apprehension of the value, etc., of the corrections, we must wait the appearance of Tischendorf's edition." Should it appear that the original διορθωτής, or a very early corrector, altered the reading of $\aleph$ from Θεός to υἱός, the importance of its testimony to the former would be greatly diminished, or even nullified; on the other hand, if the change was made by a *late* corrector, the alteration would be of little consequence. That the original transcriber was careless or sleepy when he copied John i. 18 is evident from the fact that he has omitted the words ὁ ὢν before εἰς τὸν κόλπον. Another circumstance may be regarded as weakening in some measure the authority of $\aleph^* B C^* L$ in this passage. They all agree in reading μονογενὴς Θεός instead of ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός. It seems hardly possible that this omission of the *article* can be correct; but if this be an error, it throws some suspicion on the reading which accompanies it.

The balance of evidence in the case of the manuscripts will be estimated differently by different critics according to the school to which they belong. Tregelles would attribute greater weight than Tischendorf to the preponderance of the few most ancient manuscripts in favor of Θεός, while Mr. Scrivener would lay greater stress than either on the testimony of the later uncials and cursives. It may be sufficient to say here that the united testimony of the manuscripts of the ninth century and later, though numbered by hundreds, cannot disprove the genuineness of a reading which is supported by a great preponderance of the more ancient evidence; and on the other hand, that the coincidence of the MSS. $\aleph B C L$ in a reading, though entitled to grave consideration, is far from being decisive. The testimony of several of the ancient versions and Fathers goes

further back than that of our oldest manuscripts; and that of the versions, in particular, is of great importance in cases like the present, where, from the similarity of the questionable words in the Greek, a transcriber might easily mistake one for the other.

We will proceed, then, to examine the evidence of the *ancient versions*. The following support $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$:—1. the Peshito Syriac, which has been assigned to the second century, but the text of which is regarded by Dr. Tregelles and others as having been greatly corrupted and modernized, especially in the Gospels, by a later revision;¹ 2. the Harclean or Philoxenian Syriac (A. D. 616) in the *margin*; 3. the Coptic or Memphitic (third or fourth cent.); and, 4. the Aethiopic (fourth or fifth cent.) in the Roman edition.

The following support $\nu\acute{\iota}\acute{o}\varsigma$:—1. the Old Latin or Italic, of the second century; 2. the Vulgate, of the fourth; 3. the Curetonian Syriac, probably of the second century;² 4. the Harclean or Philoxenian Syriac (A. D. 616) in the *text*; 5. the Jerusalem Syriac, of uncertain date, but representing a very ancient text; 6. the Aethiopic (fourth or fifth cent.), as edited in 1826 by Mr. Platt; and, 7. the Armenian, of the fifth century.

It will be perceived that the weight of authority, so far as the ancient versions are concerned, greatly predominates in favor of the reading $\nu\acute{\iota}\acute{o}\varsigma$. The evidence of the Old Latin and the Curetonian Syriac is particularly important.

The testimony of the *ancient Fathers* is next to be attended to. We will examine the evidence, 1. of those which favor $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$; 2. of those which support $\nu\acute{\iota}\acute{o}\varsigma$; and, 3. of a few which have quoted the passage with *both* readings, and may be regarded as doubtful. I add, for convenience, the time at which they flourished as assigned by Cave.

I. The following favor the reading $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$.

1. Clement of Alexandria, A. D. 194, who has once quoted

¹ See his *Introd. to Textual Criticism*, pp. 265, 266; comp. p. 757.

² Of this version Dr. Tregelles observes that "its readings are in far greater accordance with the oldest authorities of various kinds than is the case in the previously known Peshito."—*Ibid.* p. 267. It has been printed from a MS. of the fifth century.

the passage with this reading (Stromat. Lib. V. c. 12. p. 695 ed. Potter). This evidence is however somewhat weakened by the fact, that in another place, in alluding to the text, he has the words ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς Θεός, "the only-begotten Son, who is God."¹ He does not *comment* on the passage, in either case, in such a way as to show how he read it; and as Dr. Tregelles has remarked (p. 333), "he often gives his own phrases instead of those of any writer whom he may cite." Indeed, he is one of the most remarkable among the Fathers for the looseness of his quotations from scripture.

2. The "Excerpta Theodoti," or "Doctrina Orientalis." This is a compilation of uncertain authorship, but supposed by many to have been made by Clement of Alexandria, with whose works it is generally printed. "Theodotus" is several times cited in it, but more frequently "the followers of Valentinus." The quotation of John i. 18 occurs in an account of the manner in which the Valentinians understood and explained the first chapter of John. It is a very important testimony to the reading Θεός, both on account of its high antiquity, and because it is *express*:—ἀντικρὺς Θεὸν αὐτὸν δηλοῖ λέγων, Ὁ μονογενὴς Θεός, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο.²

3. Epiphanius, Bp. of Constantia or Salamis in Cyprus, A. D. 368, has quoted the passage three times with the reading Θεός. (Haer. LXV. c. 5, *bis*, and LXX. c. 7. Opp. I. 612^c and 818^a ed. Petav.) In the remark, however, which follows the quotation in the first passage, Θεός and υἱός are interchanged:—Καὶ φησι, Ὁ μονογενὴς Θεός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἐστὶν ἐκ πατρὸς γεννηθείς, ὁ πατὴρ δὲ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη· διὰ τοῦτο μονογενὴς υἱός. He also speaks of John as "calling Christ only-begotten God:"—Μονογενὴ Θεὸν αὐτὸν φάσκων Περὶ πατρὸς γέγραπται, ἀληθινοῦ Θεοῦ περὶ υἱοῦ δέ, ὅτι μονογενὴς Θεός. (Ancorat. c. 3. Opp. II. 8^{ed}.) . A little before, however, in a quotation of John i. 18, ὁ μονογενὴς is given

¹ Καὶ τότε ἐσκατεύσεις τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, ὃν ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς Θεὸς μόνος ἐξηγήσατο. — Quis dives salvetur, c. 37. p. 956.

² Excerpta Theodot. c. 6, ap. Clem. Alex. Opp. p. 968 ed. Potter; also in Fabricii Bibl. Graec. V. 136, and in Bunsen's Analecta Ante-Nicaena, I. 211.

without either *Θεός* or *υἱός*. But here the context renders it probable that *Θεός* has been omitted after *μονογενής* by the mistake of a transcriber, though the text, both in what precedes and follows, appears to be corrupt.¹

4. Didymus of Alexandria, A. D. 370, has quoted the passage twice with the reading *Θεός*. (De Trinit. Lib. I. c. 26, and Lib. II. c. 5; pp. 76, 140 ed. Mingarel., or in Migne's Patrol. Graeca, XXXIX. 393^a, 495^a.) He also says, *ὁ υἱὸς κέκληται μονογενὴς Θεὸς λόγος, καὶ εἰς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*. (*Ibid.* Lib. I. c. 15. p. 27, or col. 313^a ed. Migne.) But here it may be doubted whether a comma should be placed after *μονογενής*, or after *Θεός*, or after neither.

The four writers whose testimony has now been adduced, comprise *all* who have expressly quoted John i. 18 with the reading *μονογενὴς Θεός* alone, and are all who can be cited in its support with much confidence. There are four others who have quoted the passage with *both* readings, namely, Irenaeus, Origen, Basil the Great, and Cyril of Alexandria. The first of these favors *υἱός*; the last, perhaps, *Θεός*; while the two remaining are altogether doubtful. Their evidence will be considered hereafter.

There are, however, some *allusions* and *references* to the passage which may be supposed to favor the reading *Θεός*, but in regard to which there is room for a difference of opinion. A statement of the facts will enable the reader to form his own judgment.

1. The Second (semi-Arian) Synod of Ancyra, A. D. 358, *may* have read *Θεός* in John i. 18, but the evidence is not decisive. After quoting Prov. viii. 22, *etc.*, Col. i. 15, *etc.*, and the first verses of the Proem to the Gospel of John, without any allusion, however, to John i. 18, the Fathers of this Synod state their conclusion as follows:—"So that we

¹ After having quoted and remarked upon John xvii. 3, Epiphanius says: *Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τίνα; ἀληθινὸν Θεόν. Εἰ δὲ Θεὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, ὡς λέγει περὶ αὐτοῦ ὁ Ἰωάννης, Ὁ μονογενὴς, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, αὐτὸς ἐξηγήσατο. Εἰς Θεὸς τοίνυν ὁ πατήρ, κ. τ. λ.*—Ancorat. c. 2. p. 7^c. Here *εἰ δέ* must be wrong unless the whole conclusion of the sentence has been lost. Perhaps we should substitute *οἶδε* (comp. Basil. de Spir. Sanct. c. 8, p. 14^c) or *οἶδατε*, though *οἶδε* may seem at first an easier emendation.

have testimony 'from the mouth of two or three witnesses' in proof that the substance of the Son is like that of the Father; for one [Solomon] calls the wisdom of the [all-] Wise his Son; another [John] calls the Logos of God only-begotten God; another [Paul] calls the Son of God his Image."¹ We have no reason to suppose, *a priori*, that the reference to John is verbally accurate any more than that to Proverbs, where we find neither the word *υἱός*, nor the expression *ἡ σοφία τοῦ σοφοῦ*. It is not uncommon with the Fathers to give as the language of scripture, expressions formed from several passages combined, or which they regard as fully authorized by scripture, though not occurring there in so many words. The Logos being called "God" in John i. 1, and the Son being called "the only-begotten" in John i. 18, nothing was more natural than that they should unite the two passages, and speak of John as calling the Logos "the only-begotten God." This would be done the more readily by many of the Fathers, as they regarded the terms "Son" and "only-begotten" as necessarily implying a participation of the Divine nature, and as in themselves justifying the appellation *θεός*. Thus the Epistle of this Synod says, a little after the passage just cited, *υἱὸς θεὸς μὲν, κατὰ υἱὸς θεοῦ, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, κατὰ υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου*. (Cap. 9. p. 855^b ap. Epiph.) So Eusebius says that Christ is *τοῦ θεοῦ μονογενὴς υἱός, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θεός* (Dem. Evang. Lib. V. c. 4. p. 227^b), and an indefinite number of passages might be quoted to the same purpose.

2. In one place Gregory of Nyssa (A. D. 370) says: *Εἰρη-
ται παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς περὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντος λόγου, ὅτι ὁ μονο-
γενὴς θεός, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*. (De Perf. Christ. Forma. Opp. III. 291^a.) Some may regard this as a clear proof that Gregory read *θεός* in John i. 18. One, however, who has become accustomed to the style in which scripture is quoted and referred to in the writings of the Fathers, will

¹ Ὡς ἔχειν τὴν ἐπὶ στόματος δύο ἢ τριῶν μαρτύρων [f. μαρτυρίαν, Petau.] εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν πρὸς πατέρα τοῦ υἱοῦ ὁμοιότητος. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σοφοῦ τὴν σοφίαν υἱόν· ὁ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν λόγον μονογενὴ θεόν· ὁ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν υἱὸν εἰκόνα φησί. — Apud Epiphani. Haer. LXXIII. c. 8. Opp. I. 854^{bo}; or Concilia, ed. Coleti, II. 872^g.

be more likely to regard it as affording but a slight presumption of this fact; a presumption altogether outweighed by the consideration, that he has nowhere expressly quoted the passage, though the deity of Christ is so prominent a subject in his writings. If he had actually read Θεός in John i. 18, it would have been a testimony too remarkable to be overlooked. It is not easy to perceive why it should not have been quoted as often as John i. 1. But we have not far to seek for an illustration of the imprudence of a confident reliance on such references to scripture as the one before us. Turning back a few leaves in this same treatise of Gregory Nyssen we find the assertion that, among the names which the Apostle Paul has given to Christ,—"He has called him a propitiation *for souls*, and first-born of the *new creation*, and *only-begotten Son*, crowned with glory and honor," etc.¹ In another place he expressly quotes the words "whom God hath set forth as a propitiation *for our souls*" as the language of the Apostle.² But it would be idle to suppose that he had anything corresponding to the italicized words in his manuscripts in Rom. iii. 25, or that his Greek copies contained the expression "*new creation*" in Col. i. 16; still more that his copy of the Epistle to the Hebrews contained the words "*only-begotten Son*," a phrase occurring only in the writings of John. The looseness and inaccuracy of such references to scripture in the writings of the Fathers might be much more fully illustrated.

Though Gregory of Nyssa has nowhere quoted John i. 18, he has repeatedly *alluded* to it, using the words ὁ ὢν ἐν τοῖς κόλποις τοῦ πατρὸς *eight* times in connection with the expression ὁ μονογενὴς Θεός, *twice* in connection with the phrase ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός, and *once* with the phrase ὁ ἐν ὑψίστοις Θεός. For examples and references see below.³ The

¹ Αὐτὸν ἐκάλεσε ἱλαστήριον ψυχῶν, καὶ τῆς καὶνῆς κτίσεως πρωτότοκον, καὶ υἱὸν μονογενῆ, δόξῃ καὶ τιμῇ ἐστεφανωμένον, κ. τ. λ. — De Perf. Christ. Forma. Opp. III. 276, 277.

² Ὁς [ὁ ἀπόστολος] φησιν· ὅτι ὃν παρέθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἱλαστήριον τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν. — De Vita Mosis. Opp. I. 225^d.

³ Ὁ μονογενὴς Θεός, ὁ ὢν ἐν τοῖς κόλποις τοῦ πατρὸς, οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ δεξιὰ τοῦ ὑψίστου. — De Vita Mosis. Opp. I. 192^b. See also In Cantic. Hom. xiii. Opp. I.

expression ὁ μονογενὴς Θεός is a favorite designation of Christ in the writings of this Father. I have noted *one hundred and twenty-five* examples of its occurrence in his treatise against Eunomius alone. But this expression, as we shall see, is also a favorite one with other Fathers who unquestionably read "only-begotten Son" in John i. 18.

3. We may here take notice of the allusions to John i. 18 in the writings of a Latin Father, Fulgentius, who flourished A. D. 507. They are so instructive as to deserve to be quoted in full. Taken together, they show clearly how little can be inferred concerning the reading of a passage from such allusions, and may serve to guard us against hasty conclusions from those of Gregory of Nyssa. See the note below.¹ Neither Fulgentius, nor any other Latin Father, has ever *quoted* John i. 18 with the reading *unigenitus Deus*. This is only what might be expected, as both the Old Latin version and the Vulgate read *Filius*. But if Fulgentius had found the reading *Deus* in his copies, the nature of his writings is such that he could not have failed to quote it frequently in proof of the deity of Christ.

663a. — Contra Eunom. Orat. II., *tris*, III., VI., X. Opp. II. 432^b, 447^a, 478^d, 506^e, 595 [605]^a, 681^a.

Ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός, ὁ ὢν ἐν τοῖς κόλποις τοῦ πατρὸς, ὁ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὢν, κ. τ. λ. — Epist. ad Flavian. Opp. III. 648^a. See also Contra Eunom. Orat. II. Opp. II. 466^c.

Ὁ ἐν ὑψίστοις Θεός, ὢν ἐν τοῖς κόλποις τοῦ πατρὸς, κ. τ. λ. — In Cantic. Hom. XV. Opp. I 697^a.

¹ Fulgentius has alluded to John i. 18 six times.

1. In connection with the phrase *unigenitus Deus*. "Ut ille unigenitus Deus, qui est in sinu Patris, non solum in muliere, sed etiam ex muliere fieret homo." Epist. xvii. c. 3, in Migne's Patrol. LXV. 272^b. "De Deo unigenito, qui est in sinu Patris, ut dixi, omnia hæc personaliter accipe." De Fide, c. 20, col. 681^b, ed. Migne.

2. With *unigenitus Filius*. — "Quis enim natus est Deus verus ex Deo vero, nisi unigenitus Filius, qui est in sinu Patris?" Ad Trasim. Lib. III. c. 4, col. 272^b. "Si vero unigenitus Filius, qui est in sinu Patris, post æternam nativitatem," etc. Epist. xvii. c. 15, col. 459^e. "Dei ergo Filius unigenitus, qui est in sinu Patris, ut carnem hominis animamque mundaret," etc. De Fide, c. 17, col. 679^e.

3. With *unigenitus* alone. "Quia unigenitus, qui est in sinu Patris, secundum quod caro est, plenus est gratiæ," etc. De Incarnat. c. 18, col. 583^e.

The expression "unigenitus Deus" occurs in the writings of Fulgentius about ninety times.

II. The following Greek Fathers, with one Pagan writer, support the reading *υἱός*. They expressly quote the passage with this reading, unless the contrary is stated.

1. Irenaeus, Bp. of Lyons in Gaul, but educated in Asia Minor, fl. A. D. 178. According to the very early Latin version in which his work against Heresies has come down to us, he has quoted the passage once with the reading *Filius*; once with *Filius Dei*; and once with *Deus*. As *Filius Dei* is a merely trivial variation of *Filius*, and as the words which follow his quotation in one passage confirm the latter reading, his testimony may be fairly regarded as favoring *υἱός*.¹

2. Hippolytus, Bp. of Portus Romanus, A. D. 220. *Λέγει γὰρ Ἰωάννης· Θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε, μονογενὴς υἱός, ὃ ὦν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, αὐτὸς δηγήσατο.* (Cont. Noet. c. 5. In Routh's Script. Eccles. Opusc. I. 58 ed. alt., or Migne's Patrol. Gr. X. 812*.)

3. The Third Synod at Antioch (A. D. 269), in their Epistle to Paul of Samosata. (Concilia, ed. Coleti, I. 869*; also in Routh's Reliq. Sacr. II. 473, or III. 297 ed. alt.)

4. Archelaus, or rather the "Acta Disp. Archelai cum Manete" (about A. D. 300?), as preserved in a Latin version. (Cap. 32. In Routh's Reliq. Sacr. IV. 213, or V. 121 ed. alt.; also in Migne's Patrol. Gr. X. 1479*.)

5. Alexander, Bp. of Alexandria, A. D. 313. (Epist. ad Alex. Constant. § 4, ap. Theodoreti Hist. Eccl. Lib. I. c. 4 (al. 3); or in Migne's Patrol. Gr. XVIII. 553*.)

6. Eusebius, Bp. of Caesarea, A. D. 315, quotes the passage with the reading *υἱός* not less than *six* times. In one case, indeed, which has already been briefly noticed, the words *ἡ μονογενὴς θεός* are added *after* *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός*, and

¹ The passages are as follows: 1. "Deum enim, inquit, nemo vidit unquam, nisi *unigenitus Filius Dei*, qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit. Patrem enim invisibilem existentem ille qui in sinu ejus est *Filius* omnibus enarrat." (Cont. Haer. Lib. III. c. 11. § 6. p. 189 ed. Mass.) 2. "Quemadmodum in Evangelio scriptum est: Deum nemo vidit unquam, nisi *unigenitus Filius*, qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit." (*Ibid.* Lib. IV. c. 20. § 6. p. 255.) 3. "Quemadmodum et Dominus dixit: *Unigenitus Deus*, qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit." (*Ibid.* Lib. IV. c. 20. § 11. p. 256.)

on this ground Dr. Tregelles claims his authority in support of the reading *Θεός*. This passage *alone*, however, when carefully examined with the *context*, seems enough to disprove this claim; and when it is taken in connection with at least *five* other unequivocal quotations in which Eusebius reads *υἱός*, there really appears to be no room for doubt. The facts are given below.¹

¹ Eusebius quotes John i. 18 with the reading *υἱός*, De Eccles. Theol. Lib. I. c. 20. §§ 4, 5. p. 86^{ab}. In the remarks which follow the last quotation, he repeats the expression *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός*, and uses the words *οὕτω καὶ ὁ υἱὸς εἰς τὸν κόλπον ἦν τοῦ πατρὸς* in such a way as to afford strong confirmation of that reading. A little further on (p. 86^c) he enumerates the appellations given to Christ by the Apostle John, *in their order*, in such a manner as to demonstrate that he read *υἱός* in John i. 18. He calls upon us to observe how the Evangelist, *μετὰ τὸ ἀπαξ ὀνομάσαι λόγον* (John i. 1), *καὶ δευτὴν αὐτὸν ἀνείπειν* (ver. 1), *καὶ φῶς ἀποκαλέσαι* (ver. 7), *καὶ μονογενῆ φάναι* (ver. 14), *καὶ υἱὸν θεοῦ ὁμολογῆσαι* (ver. 18), *οὐκ ἔτι λόγον ὀνομάζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν λοιπὸν ἱστορεῖ τὸν σωτῆρα οὐ λόγον ἑαυτὸν ἀποκαλοῦντα, ἀλλὰ υἱόν, καὶ μονογενῆ, καὶ φῶς, κ. τ. λ.*, quoting John iii. 16, etc. Now the only place before this citation from the third chapter, in which *the Evangelist*, in his own person, applies the name *Son* to Christ, is in the passage in question. Eusebius *must*, therefore, have read *υἱός* in John i. 18; and the arbitrary hypothesis that in all his apparent quotations of the passage with this reading, *Θεός* has been changed to *υἱός* by transcribers, falls to the ground.

Eusebius also reads *υἱός*, De Eccles. Theol. Lib. I. c. 20. § 7. p. 92^d; Lib. II. c. 23. p. 142^c; and Comm. in Psalm. lxxiii. 11, in Montfaucon's Coll. Nova, I. 440^a. We may add his Comm. in Is. vi. 1, where we find *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός*, *ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς*, though not introduced as a formal quotation (Montf. Coll. Nova, II. 374^d). It may here be observed that no various reading affecting the word *υἱός* is given by Nolte, who made use of four manuscripts in revising the text of Eusebius de Eccles. Theol. published by the Abbé Migne in his Patrol. Graeca, Tom. XXIV.

Let us now examine the passage on which Dr. Tregelles relies, De Eccles. Theol. Lib. I. c. 9. p. 67^d. Here the quotation is introduced by the assertion that the Evangelist "*expressly teaches that Christ is the only-begotten Son in the following words*," and is succeeded by a quotation of John iii. 16, where the same expression also occurs, in which Eusebius says that "*our Saviour confirms this*." Τοῦ εὐαγγελιστοῦ διαρρήδη αὐτὸν υἱὸν μονογενῆ εἶναι διδάσκοντος δι' ὃν ἔφη, *Θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε πώποτε· ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός, ὃς ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο*. Under these circumstances, an impartial critic will probably think that no clause ever more clearly betrayed itself as a marginal gloss, than the words *ὁ μονογενὴς Θεός* in the present instance. It is perhaps hardly worth while to mention that they are so regarded by the original editor, Bp. Montagu, who says of them in his note: "*Non sunt hæc evangelistæ, sed nec credo Eusebii, nisi forsan, ἔχουν μονογενὴς Θεός*."

The only passage that I have found in Eusebius which might seem at first view to countenance the reading *μονογενὴς Θεός* is in his treatise De Eccles.

7. Eustathius, Bp. of Antioch, A. D. 320. (De Engastrimytho, c. 18, in Galland. Bibl. Patr. IV. 563^c, or Migne's Patrol. Gr. XVIII. 652^c.)

8. Athanasius, Bp. of Alexandria, A. D. 326, has expressly quoted John i. 18 with the reading *υἱός* four times, and referred to it in such a way in *three* other places as to show in each of them that he had this reading.¹

9. Pseud-Athanasius, fourth cent.? (Contra Sabellian. c. 2. Opp. II. 38^d.)

10. Cyril of Jerusalem, A. D. 350, *probably*. He has nowhere expressly quoted the passage, but *alludes* to it as follows:—Πιστεύομεν τοίνυν εἰς ἓνα Θεὸν πατέρα . . . ὃν ἀνδρώπων μὲν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν, ὁ μονογενὴς δὲ μόνος ἐξηγήσατο. (Cat. VII. c. 11. Opp. p. 117 ed. Tout.) Here the omission of *υἱός* after *μονογενὴς* affords no ground for supposing that it was absent from his Greek copies in John i. 18, because its omission does not affect the sense. But if he had read *Θεός* in this passage, it is improbable that he would have neglected so important a word. To this it may be added, that in his Eleventh Catechesis, it is his special object to prove that the *sonship* of Christ implies his *divinity*, or, as he expresses it, that *Θεὸς Θεὸν ἐγέννησεν*. Such being the case, had

Theol. Lib. III. c. 7. pp. 174, 175. After having quoted Eph. iv. 5, 6, he says of the Father: "He alone may be called (χρηματίζοι ἄν) the One God, and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; but the Son [may be called] only-begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father (ὁ δὲ υἱὸς μονογενὴς Θεός, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς); and the Paraclete, Spirit, but neither God nor Son." Here it will be observed that Eusebius does not assert that the Son is called "only-begotten God" in scripture, but only that it is proper to give him that name. This passage, therefore, does not weaken the force of his express quotations of John i. 18 with the reading *υἱός*.

¹ The direct quotations of Athanasius are, De Decret. Nic. Synod. c. 13: Περὶ δὲ τοῦ κυρίου εὐαγγελιζόμενος λέγει: 'Ο μονογενὴς υἱός, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον, κ. τ. λ. Εἰ τοίνυν υἱός, οὐ κτίσμα, κ. τ. λ. (Opp. I. 219^e, ed. Bened., Par. 1698.) *Ibid.* c. 21. p. 227^d. Orat. II. cont. Arian. c. 62. p. 530^d. Orat. IV. cont. Arian. c. 26. p. 638^a: Πάλιν δὲ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Ἰωάννῃ εἰρημένον, 'Ο μονογενὴς υἱός, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον, κ. τ. λ. δείκνυσιν τὸν υἱὸν ἀεὶ εἶναι. 'Ὅν γὰρ λέγει ὁ Ἰωάννης υἱόν, τοῦτο χεῖρα ὁ Δαβὶδ ψάλλει λέγων. "Ἰνα τί ἀποστρέφεις τὴν χεῖρά σου . . . ἐκ μέσου τοῦ κόλπου σου (Psalm lxxiii. al. lxxiv. 11). Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἡ χεὶρ ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ, καὶ ὁ υἱός ἐν κόλπῳ, κ. τ. λ. The references to the reading *υἱός*, which in this case are as explicit as quotations, are found in Orat. IV. cont. Arian. c. 16. p. 628^{ef}; *ibid.* c. 20, p. 631^d; and c. 23. pp. 634^f, 635^a.

he read *μονογενὴς Θεός* in John i. 18, he could hardly have failed to quote the passage; none would seem so likely to suggest itself. But he has not referred to it.

11. The Emperor Julian, A. D. 362, has quoted the passage *twice* with the reading *υἱός*. (Ap. Cyril. Alex. Lib. X. cont. Julian.; Opp. VI. ii. 333.)

12. Titus of Bostra, A. D. 362. (Cont. Manichaeos, Lib. III. c. 6, in Galland. Bibl. Patr. V. 332^b, or Migne's Patol. Gr. XVIII. 1224^b.) He has also once quoted the passage with the reading *υἱὸς Θεός*.¹

13. Gregory of Nazianzus, A. D. 370. *Ἐπειδὴ υἱὸς μονογενής· ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός, ὁ ὦν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο*. (Orat. XXIX. al. XXXV. c. 17, p. 535^d ed. Bened.) Euthymius quotes this passage from Gregory with the same reading. (Panopl. Pars I. Tit. xi.)

14. *Pseudo-Basilii* (4th cent. ?), that is, the author of a Homily published with the works of Basil. (Hom. in Psalm. xxviii. c. 3, in Basilii Magni Opp. I. 359^f ed. Bened.)

15. Rufinus Syrus or Palaestinensis, about A. D. 390, as preserved in a very early Latin translation. (De Fide, Lib. I. c. 16, in Sirmondi Opera Varia, I. 166^a, ed. Venet. 1728.)

16. Chrysostom, A. D. 398, not less than *eight* times. In several of these instances he so *comments* on the word *υἱός* as to show beyond question that he had this reading.²

17. Theodore of Mopsuestia, A. D. 407, in his comment on John i. 29. *Εἰρηκῶς ἐνταῦθα ὁ βαπτιστής, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν*

¹ *Ibid.* c. 11, ap. Galland. Bibl. Patr. V. 338^c, or Migne, XVIII. 1240^a. Here *Θεός* may have been added by Titus from John i. 1 to indicate, as he says in the following sentence, that the *υἱός* was *υἱὸς γνήσιος ὁμοῖος τῷ γεγεννηκότι*. Compare the insertion in the next sentence to this, where he quotes Matt. iii. 17 (or xvii. 5) thus: *Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς μου ὁ μονογενὴς καὶ ἀγαπητός, ἐν ᾧ ἐγὼ ἐδόκησα*.

² De Incomp. Dei Natura, Hom. IV. c. 3, *his*; *ibid.* c. 4; *ibid.* Hom. V. c. 1; Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt, c. 3; In Is. cap. vi. § 1; In illud, *Filius ex se nihil*, etc. c. 6; In Joan. Hom. XV. al. XIV. cc. 1 (text), 2. Opp. I. 475^{ae}, 476^b, 481^a; III. 470^b; VI. 64^a, 264^d; VIII. 84^b, 86^c, cf. 87^{be}, ed. Montf. Of these passages, those first referred to will be found, on examination, to exclude the possibility of the supposition that Chrysostom really quoted the passage with the reading *Θεός*, and that transcribers have substituted *υἱός*. I may also remark that neither Savile nor Montfaucon have noted in their manuscripts, in any of these instances, any various reading affecting *υἱός*.

ὁ αἴρων τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου, οὐκ εἶπεν Ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός, οὐδέ, Ὁ ὢν ἐν τοῖς κόλποις τοῦ πατρός, οἷα φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω εἰρηκώς (i. e. in John i. 18).—Ap. Maii Nov. Patr. Bibl. Tom. VII. P. i. p. 397, or in Migne's Patrol. Gr. LXVI. 733^d.

18. Nonnus, of Panopolis in Egypt, A. D. 410, *probably*. In his poetical Paraphrase of the Gospel of John, he has no trace of the reading Θεός, which he would hardly have failed to express, had he found it in the original. He uses *μονογενής* alone, which implies *υἱός*.

19. Theodoret, Bp. of Cyrrhus, near Antioch, A. D. 423, at least *four* times. (Comm. in Psalm cix. 1;—Dial. I;—Haer. Fab. Lib. V. cc. 1, 2. Opp. I. 1392, and IV. 20, 379, 383, ed. Schulz.)

20. Proclus, Patriarch of Constantinople, A. D. 434. (Orat. XV. c. 2. Analect. p. 440, ed. Riccard., or in Migne's Patrol. Gr. LXV. 801^a.)

21. *Pseudo-Cyril*, fifth century? I refer under this name to a work, "De sanctâ et vivificâ Trinitate," ascribed to Cyril of Alexandria, and published as his by Cardinal Mai. Dr. Tregelles, however, to whose judgment I have deferred, regards it as the production of a later writer than Cyril.¹ In this work (cap. 6) John i. 18 is quoted with the reading *υἱός*.²

22. Andreas, Bp. of Crete, A. D. 635? (Orat. in Transfig. Opp. p. 44^a ed. Combefis.)

23. *Pseudo-Caesarius*, seventh century? (Quaest. et Respons., Dial. I. Resp. 4, ap. Galland. Bibl. Patr. VI. 8^b.) The work here cited has been attributed, but it would seem erroneously, to Caesarius, the brother of Gregory Nazianzen. It was accredited as his in the time of Photius, who has described it.

24. Joannes Damascenus, A. D. 730, *three* times. (De Fide Orthod. Lib. I. c. 1;—Adv. Nestorianos, c. 32, *bis*. Opp. I. 123^c, 562^e ed. Le Quien.)

¹ Account of the Printed Text of the Greek New Test., p. 232, note †.

² In Maii Script. Vet. Nov. Coll., Tom. VIII. P. ii. p. 31, and in his Nov. Patr. Bibl. II. 5; also in Migne's Patrol. Gr. LXXV. 1153_p.

25. Theodore Studites, A. D. 813, *twice*. (Antirrhet. III. 14, and Epist. II. 56. Epist., etc., pp. 108^d, 349^e, as edited by Sirmond in his Opera Varia, Tom. V.)

26. Andreas the Presbyter (9th or 10th cent.?), in his Catena on 1 John iv. 11—17. (Cramer's Catenae, VIII. 134.)

27. The Catena on John i. 18, published by Cramer. (Cramer's Catenae, II. 189.)

28. Theophylact, A. D. 1070. (Comm. in loc. Opp. I. 519^e ed. Venet.)

29. Euthymius Zigabenus or Zygadenus, A. D. 1110, *thrice*. (Comm. in loc. III. 35, 39 ed. Matth.; and Panopl. P. II. Tit. xxiii. (Adv. Bogomilos) c. 6, p. 10, ed. Gieseler.)

It is hardly worth while to go lower than this, but two or three more writers may be added for completeness.

30. Elias Cretensis, A. D. 787, according to Cave, 1120 Oudin. (Comm. in Greg. Naz. Orat. I., in the App. to Greg. Naz. Opp. II. 210^a, ed. of 1630.)

31. Zacharias Chrysopolitanus, A. D. 1157. (In Unum ex Quat., Lib. I. in loc., according to the Latin version in Max. Bibl. Patr. XIX. 762^d.)

32. Nicetas Choniates, A. D. 1200, *four* times. (Thes. Orthod. Lib. I. c. 27; IV. 31; V. 41, 60, according to the Latin version in Max. Bibl. Patr. XXV. 75^f, 130^e, 165^e, 176^b.)

We will now attend to the testimony of the Latin Fathers. Some of them, as Tertullian, Hilary, Victorinus Afer, Ambrose, and Jerome, were acquainted with Greek, and occasionally, at least, consulted the original; but the evidence of the majority bears only on the reading of the Old Latin and Vulgate versions. Notwithstanding the extraordinary statements of Dr. Tregelles, and various editors of the Greek Testament who have been misled by Wetstein, no quotation of John i. 18 with the reading *unigenitus Deus* has ever been produced from a single Latin Father. The following quote the passage with the reading *Filius*:

1. Tertullian, A. D. 200. (Adv. Prax. c. 15.)

2. Hilary of Poitiers, A. D. 354, at least *seven* times.

(Tract. in Psalm. cxxxviii. c. 35 ; — De Trin. Lib. II. c. 23 ; Lib. IV. cc. 8, 42 ; Lib. V. cc. 33, 34 ; and Lib. VI. c. 39. Opp. coll. 520^d, 799^e, 831^c, 852^c, 873^d, 874^a, 905^e, ed. Bened.µ

3. Phoeadius (or Phaebadius), Bp. of Agen in Gaul, A.D. 359. (Cont. Arian. c. 12, in Galland. Bibl. Patr. V. 253, or Migne's Patrol. XX. 21^d.)

4. Victorinus Afer, A. D. 360, *six* times. (De Gen. Verb. Div., ad Candidum, cc. 16 (unigenitus Dei Filius), 20 ; — Adv. Arium, Lib. I. cc. 2, 4 ; Lib. IV. cc. 8, 33. In Migne's Patrol. VIII. 1029, 1030, 1041, 1042, 1050, 1119, 1137. In the last instance he had the Greek before him. — Adv. Arium Lib. I. c. 15, he omits *Filius*.)

5. Ambrose, Bp. of Milan, A. D. 374, at least *seven* times.

¹ In the last passage referred to (De Trin. Lib. VI. c. 39) Hilary has *commented* on his quotation of John i. 18 in such a way as to demonstrate that he read *Filius*. He remarks ; " Naturae fides non satis explicata videbatur ex nomine *Filii*, nisi proprietatis extrinsecus virtus per exceptionis significantiam adderetur. Praeter *Filium* enim, et *unigenitum* cognominans, suspicionem adoptionis penitus exsecuit."

The only passage, so far as I know, in all Hilary's writings, which has even the appearance of supporting the reading *unigenitus Deus*, is in his work De Trin. Lib. xii. c. 24. This is partially quoted by Dr. Tregelles, and has already been adverted to. We will now compare it with the context, which will make it clear that it affords no reason for supposing that Hilary read *Deus* instead of *Filius* in John i. 18. Having quoted Exod. iii. 14, " Misit me ad vos *is qui est*" (Sept. *ὁ ὢν*), and remarking " Deo proprium esse *id quod est* non ambigens sensus est," he goes on to argue that this expression implies eternity, and then says : " Quod igitur et per Moysen de Deo significatum . . . id ipsum unigenito Deo esse proprium Evangelia testantur : cum in principio *erat Verbum* (John i. 1), et cum hoc apud Deum *erat* (*ibid.*), et cum *erat* lumen verum (ver. 9), et cum unigenitus Deus in sinu Patris *est* (ver. 18), et cum Jesus Christus super omnia Deus *est* (Rom. ix. 5). *Erat* igitur, atque *est* ; quia ab eo est, qui quod est semper est."

From this it will be perceived that Hilary's argument rests wholly on the word *est*. When he says " cum unigenitus Deus in sinu Patris *est*," there is no more reason for regarding the words " unigenitus Deus " as quoted from John than there is for supposing them to be quoted from Paul a page or two below (c. 26), where Hilary says, " cum secundum Apostolum ante tempora aeterna sit unigenitus Deus," referring to 2 Tim. i. 9.

The expression " unigenitus Deus " is a favorite one with Hilary. It occurs in his treatise De Trinitate about one hundred and four times. The frequency of this expression in his writings, with the *certainty* that he read *Filius* in John i. 18, shows how futile it is to argue from the mere use of this phrase in the works of a Father, that he found it in scripture.

(De Jos. c. 14, al. 84; — De Bened. Patr. c. 11, al. 51; — In Luc. Lib. I. c. 25; Lib. II. c. 12; — De Fide, Lib. III. c. 3, al. 24; — De Spir. Sanct. Lib. I. c. 1, al. 26; — Epist. xxii. c. 5. Opp. I. 510^d, 527^f, 1274^d, 1286^b; II. 501^e, 605^f, 875^e, ed. Bened.)

6. Jerome, A. D. 378. (In Ezek. c. xlv. Opp. III. 1023, ed. Mart.)

7. Faustinus, A. D. 384, *three* times. (De Trin. Lib. I. c. 2. § 5, in Migne's Patrol. XIII. 54^{ab}.)

8. Augustine, Bp. of Hippo, A. D. 396, *three* times. (In Joan. Tract. xxxi. c. 3; xxxv. c. 5; xlvii. c. 3. Opp. Tom. III. P. ii. col. 1638, 1660, 1734, ed. Migne.)

9. Adimantus the Manichæan, A. D. 396. (Ap. Augustinum cont. Adimant. c. 9, § 1. Opp. VIII. 139, ed. Migne.)

10. Maximinus, the Arian bishop, A. D. 428, *twice*. (Ap. Augustini Collat. cum Maximin. cc. 13, 18. Opp. VIII. 719, 728, ed. Migne.)

11. The author of the work against Virimadus ascribed to Idacius Clarus, A. D. 385, *three* times. (Adv. Virimad., in Max. Bibl. Patr. V. 731^e, 740^{bc}.)¹

12. Vigilius of Tapsa, A. D. 484, or the author, whoever he was, of Libri XII. de Trinitate. (De Trin. Lib. IV. in Max. Bibl. Patr. VIII. 783^a, or in Athanasii Opp. II. 615^a, ed. Montf.)

13. Junilius, A. D. 550. (De Part. Div. Legis, Lib. I. c. 16, in Migne's Patrol. LXVIII. 22^c.)

14. Alcuin, A. D. 780. (Comm. super Joan. in loc. Opp. I. 472, 473, ed. Froben., or in Migne's Patrol. C. 752^c, cf. 753^a.)

Other Latin Fathers, as Paschasius Radbertus, Bruno Astensis, &c., might be cited to the same purpose; but it is useless to go any further.

III. The three following Fathers have quoted the passage with *both* readings, and their testimony may be regarded as

¹ Montfaucon ascribes this work, and also the first eight books of the one next mentioned, to Idatius the chronicler (A. D. 445). See his edition of Athanasius, II. 602, 603.

doubtful; namely, Origen, Basil the Great, and Cyril of Alexandria. The last, on the whole, favors Θεός; but as it seems not improbable that they all had both readings in their copies of the Greek Testament, we will consider their evidence together.

1. Origen, A. D. 230, according to the text of the Benedictine edition (De La Rue) has the reading Θεός twice; on the other hand, he has υἱός once, once υἱός τοῦ Θεοῦ, and once *unigenitus Dei Filius* in a work preserved only in the Latin version of Rufinus.¹

2. Basil of Caesarea, A. D. 370, according to the text of his Benedictine editors (Garnier and Maran), has Θεός once, and in another passage he mentions True Son, Only-Begotten God, Power of God, and Logos, as names given to Christ in scripture; but he twice quotes the text in question with the reading υἱός.¹

¹ Origen has Θεός, In Joan. Tom. ii. c. 29, and xxxii. c. 13 (Opp. IV. 89^b, 438^d, ed. De La Rue). In both these passages, however, the very literal version of Ferrari, made from a manuscript now lost, reads *unigenitus* alone, without either *Deus* or *Filius*. If he had υἱός in his Greek copy, the omission would be unimportant; but if he had Θεός, the neglect to translate it would be strange and inexcusable. — On the other hand, we have υἱός, Cont. Cels. Lib. II. c. 71. Opp. I. 440^f. Θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε πώποτε· ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός, ὃς ἦν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο. So De La Rue and Lommatsch, from two manuscripts; the earlier edition of Hoeschel, founded on a single manuscript, instead of ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός reads καὶ μονογενὴς γὰρ ὃν Θεός. But this, it will at once be perceived, bears the marks of a marginal gloss, which, by one of the most common of mistakes in manuscripts, has been substituted for the text. Compare the similar gloss in Eusebius, De Eccles. Theol. Lib. I. c. 9, noticed above. Τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ occurs, In Joan. Tom. vi. c. 2. Opp. IV. 102^d, as edited by De La Rue and Lommatsch from the Bodleian manuscript, which appears to be an excellent one; the earlier edition of Huet, which was founded on a single manuscript, reads υἱός Θεός. A little after, in two allusions to the passage, ὁ μονογενὴς is used alone. Opp. IV. 102^e, 114^e. — *Unigenitus Dei Filius*, In Cant. Lib. IV. Opp. III. 91^e.

² Basil reads Θεός, De Spir. Sanct. c. 6. Opp. III. 12^b. Comp. *ibid.* c. 8, p. 14^e, where he says: Οἶδε γὰρ [ἡ γραφή] τὸ ὄνομα ὑπὲρ πάντων ὀνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ υἱὸν ἀληθινὸν λέγειν (al. λέγει), καὶ μονογενῆ Θεόν, καὶ δύναμιν Θεοῦ, καὶ σοφίαν, καὶ λόγον. — On the other hand, he has υἱός, De Spir. Sanct. c. 11, Opp. III. 23^a, where the six manuscripts of Garnier appear to agree in this reading, though one of Matthaei's Moscow MSS. has Θεός (see Matthaei's Nov. Test. Graec. I. 780). He again has υἱός, apparently without any variation in the ten MSS. of Garnier, Epist. 234 (al. 400), c. 3. Opp. III. 358^b. Here Matthaei's Moscow MS. also reads υἱός.

3. Cyril of Alexandria, A. D. 412, as edited by Aubert, has *Θεός* four times, and *υἱός* three times. His commentary on the passage, as printed, favors *Θεός*, but its evidence is somewhat weakened by various readings.¹

The whole of the *external* evidence for the different readings of the passage in question, so far as I am acquainted with it, has now been stated. If one should look into Wetstein, and find apparently a considerable number of authorities which have not been noticed, he may be assured that they have all been carefully examined, and that they amount to nothing. The same is true of the vague references to "*alii permulti*," "*alii multi*," in the last edition of Tischendorf, and of similar references in other critical editions of the Greek Testament, all founded on Wetstein's note.² They relate without exception, not to quotations of

¹ Cyril reads *Θεός*, Thes. Assert. xiii. and xxxv. Opp. V i. 137^b, 237^a. The correctness of *Θεός* in his text in the last instance is confirmed by the citations of this passage of Cyril in Catenae, from which it has been printed in his Comm. on Luke ii. 7 in Mai's Nova Patr. Bibl. III. 123^a, and Migne's Patrol. Gr. LXXII. 487^a; also in the Catena published by Cramer (VI. 305) on Col. i. 16. He has *Θεός*, moreover, in the Dialogue "Quod Unus sit Christus," Opp. V. i. 768^e. In his Comm. on John i. 18 he has *υἱός* in the text, Opp. IV. 103^e; but toward the end of his remarks he quotes the passage with the reading *Θεός*, p. 107^b. He also says: *Ἐπιτηρητέον δὲ πάλιν, ὅτι μονογενῆ Θεὸν ἀποκαλεῖ τὸν υἱόν*, p. 105^b. But here the scholion in one of Matthaei's Moscow manuscripts cites him as saying, *Ἐπιτηρητέον τοίνυν, ὅτι καὶ μονογενῆ ἀποκαλεῖ τὸν υἱόν*, omitting *Θεόν*. Still, the commentary on the whole confirms the reading *Θεός*.

He has the reading *υἱός*, Thes. Assert. xxxv., and Adv. Nestorium, Lib. III. c. 5. Opp. V. i. 365^e, and VI. i. 90^b. This reading is also found twice in an extract which he gives from Julian, in his work against that emperor. Opp. VI. ii. 333^c.

In an *allusion* to John i. 18, we find *ὁ μονογενὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος, ὁ ἐν κόλποις ὢν τοῦ πατρὸς*. Apol. adv. Orient. Opp. VI. 187^e.

² It may be worth while to say that the *Opus Imperfectum*, a Latin commentary on Matthew cited by Tischendorf and others as an authority for *Θεός*, contains no quotation of John i. 18. It has the expression "*unigenitus Deus*" in the remarks on Matt. i. 20, v. 9, xix. 17, and xxiv. 41. The work is appended to Tom. VI. of the Benedictine ed. of Chrysostom.

It may be satisfactory to refer here also to the places where this expression occurs in some other writers, who have been erroneously cited as authorities for the reading *μονογενὴς Θεός* in John i. 18. See Pseudo-Ignat. ad Philad. c. 6 (the larger recension); Const. Apost. iii. 17; v. 20; vii. 38, 43; viii. 7, 35; Arius ap. Athanas. de Syn. c. 15, Opp. I. 728^e, but *not* ap. Epiph. Haer. LXIX. c. 6,

the passage in question, but merely to examples of the phrase *μονογενὴς Θεός* or *unigenitus Deus*, employed without any allusion to John i. 18. After all that has been said, it will hardly be pretended that the mere use of this expression by a Greek or Latin Father affords any evidence that he read it in this passage. We might as well argue from the frequency of the expression *ὁ Θεός λόγος* in the writings of the Fathers from the third century downwards, or of *Θεοτόκος* and *Deipara* applied to the Virgin Mary, or of "God the Son" in modern theological works, that these precise phrases must have been found in scripture by those who have so freely employed them. Though the phrase has now become unusual, there were good reasons for its popularity in ancient times. The Arians, who laid great stress on the fact that the Father was "unbegotten" and "without beginning," *ἀγέννητος* and *ἀναρχος*, were fond of calling the Son "the only-begotten God," because, while the term expressed his high dignity, it brought into view his derived existence. *Begotten* by an act of God's will, he could not, they argued, be eternal. The Orthodox, on the other hand, who saw no absurdity in the idea of eternal generation, were fond of the expression, because they regarded it as indicating his derivation from the *substance* of the Father, as it is explained in the Nicene Creed, *γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τούτέστιν, ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ*. Both the Arians and the Orthodox freely applied the term *Θεός* to Christ.

Before proceeding to consider the *internal* evidence for the different readings, it will be convenient to present the results of the preceding examination in a tabular form, so that one may see at a glance the authorities for each. The figures added to the names of the Fathers denote the time when they flourished.

Opp. I. 731^d, *πληρὴς Θεός, μονογενής*; Asterius ap. Athanas. de Syn. c. 18, p. 732^b; Eunomius, Expos. Fid. c. 3, and Apol. cc. 15, 21, 26 (ap. Fabric. Bibl. Græc., Tom. VIII.); Greg. Naz. Epist. 202, ad Nectarium, Opp. II. 168^a; Gaudentius, Sermon. xix., in Migne's Patrol. XX. 990^b; Ferrandus, Epist. iii. cc. 2, 7, 9, 10, 11; v. 2, 5; vii. 12; in Migne, Tom. LXVII.

FOR THE READING *θεός*.*Manuscripts.*

κ* B C* L, 33.

Versions.

Pesh. Syr., Harcl. Syr. (marg.), Copt., Aeth. (Rom. ed.)

Greek Fathers.

Clem. Al.¹⁹⁴, Theod.¹⁹⁴, Epiph.³⁶⁸, three times, and one ref., Didym.³⁷⁰, twice, and one ref. (?); Cyr. Al.⁴⁴⁴, four times, and one ref. (?), but *viós* three times.

Perhaps, 2d Syn. An-cyr.³⁶⁸, one ref., and Greg. Nyss.³⁷⁰, one ref., and eight allusions, but both very uncertain. (See above, pp. 854 - 857.)

Latin Fathers.

None.

FOR THE READING *viós*.*Manuscripts.*

κ** A C³ X Δ, E F G H K M S U V Δ, 1. 69., and, with one exception, all the other cursive manuscripts, several hundred in number, which have been examined on the passage.

Versions.

Old Lat., Vulg., Curet. Syr., Harcl. Syr. (text), Jerus. Syr., Aeth. (Platt's ed.), Armen.

Greek Fathers.

Iren.¹⁷⁸ probably, Hippol.³²⁰, 3d Syn. Ant.³⁰⁰, Archel.³⁰⁰, Alex. Al.³¹², Euseb.³¹⁵ six times, and one allus., Eustath. Ant.³³⁰, Athanas.³³⁶, four or rather seven times, Pseud.-Athan.⁴⁴⁴ cont.[?], Cyr. Hier.³⁵⁰, probably, Julian³⁶⁸ twice, Tit. Bostr.³⁶⁸, Greg. Naz.³⁷⁰, Pseudo-Basil., Rufin. Syr.³⁶⁰, Chrysost.³⁶⁸, eight times, Theod. Mops.⁴⁰⁷, Nonnus⁴¹⁰ probably, Theodore⁴²³ four times, Proclus⁴²⁴, Pseudo-Cyr.⁵⁴⁴ cont., Andr. Cret.⁶³⁵, Pseudo-Caesarius⁷⁴⁴ cont.[?], Joan. Dam.⁷⁸⁰ thrice, Theod. Stud.⁸¹⁸ twice, Andr. presb.⁹⁴⁴ cont.[?], Caten. ed. Cramer⁹⁴⁴ or 10 cont., Theoph.¹⁰⁷⁰, Euthym¹¹¹⁰, thrice, Elias Cret.¹¹²⁰, Zach. Chrys.¹¹⁵⁷, Nic. Chon.¹²⁰⁰.

Latin Fathers.

Tert.³⁰⁰, Hilar.³⁵⁴ seven times, Phoebad.³⁶⁰, Victorin. Afer³⁶⁰ six times, Ambrose³⁷⁴ seven times, Jerome³⁷⁸, Faustin.³⁸⁴ three times, August.³⁸⁶, three times, Adimant.³⁸⁶, Maximin.⁴²⁶ twice, Idacius⁴²⁶ or 446 three times, Vigil. Taps.⁴⁶⁴, Junil.⁵⁶⁰, Alcuin⁷⁸⁰, and others.

Wholly doubtful. Origen³⁸⁰, Basil the Great³⁷⁰. See the full account of their readings above.

This exposition of the evidence makes it apparent that Dr. Tregelles has been somewhat incautious in asserting that *μονογενής θεός* is "the ancient reading of the Fathers generally."

In estimating the external evidence, it is important to consider the wide *geographical distribution* of the witnesses for *viós*. They represent every important division of the Christian world. The reading *viós* is attested by the Curetonian, Harclean, and Jerusalem Syriac; by the third Synod

at Antioch, Eustathius of Antioch, and Theodoret; by Titus of Bostra in Arabia; by Gregory of Nazianzus in Cappadocia, and Theodore of Mopsuestia in Cilicia; by the Armenian version; by Eusebius of Caesarea in Palestine, who paid particular attention to the text of the Gospels, and was commissioned by the emperor Constantine to procure fifty copies of the scriptures carefully written for the use of the churches at Constantinople; by Alexander and Athanasius of Alexandria; by Chrysostom and Proclus of Constantinople; by the Old Latin and Vulgate versions, and, apparently, the whole Western Church, without exception. On the other hand, the authorities for Θεός, besides being much more limited in number, are, so far as we know their locality, almost wholly Egyptian.¹

Comparing the readings in respect to *antiquity*, we find in favor of *υἱός*, *before the middle of the fourth century*, the Old Latin and Curetonian Syriac, Irenaeus (probably), Tertullian, Hippolytus, the third Synod at Antioch (A. D. 269), Archelaus, Alexander of Alexandria, Eusebius, Eustathius of Antioch, and Athanasius; on the other side, we have during this period only the Peshito Syriac (if that version in its present form is so ancient), Clement of Alexandria (somewhat doubtful), the Excerpta Theodoti, and the Coptic version. In the period that follows, though the few manuscripts that support Θεός are of the highest character, the weight of the whole evidence must be regarded as preponderating against it.

We come now to the *internal* evidence. It is urged in favor of Θεός, that *μονογενής* naturally suggests the word *υἱός*, so that a transcriber might easily inadvertently substitute it for Θεός. This consideration appears to be of some weight.

It is also urged in favor of *μονογενής* Θεός, that it is entitled to preference as the more difficult reading, being one at which transcribers would naturally stumble as an unexampled expression. This argument, however, will not bear examination. In the first place, if transcribers were struck

¹ The Harclean Syriac in the margin represents the reading of one or two Greek manuscripts with which it was collated at Alexandria, A. D. 616.

with the expression as remarkable, it is not probable that they would intentionally alter it. They would be more likely to reverence it as containing a mystery. In the second place, though *μονογενὴς Θεός* may sound strangely to us, it was not a strange or harsh expression to copyists of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries. On the contrary, it was, as we have seen, a favorite phrase with many writers of this period, being used with equal freedom both by the Arians and their opponents. So far from stumbling at it, transcribers may have been led, by their very familiarity with the expression, to introduce it unconsciously into the text. Let us look at the passage in John. In the clause immediately preceding *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός*, *Θεὸς ὁν* had just occurred, bringing *Θεός* before the mind of the copyist. Is it strange that in transcribing he should inadvertently connect this word with *μονογενής*, the combination being so familiar to him, the words *Θς* and *Υς* being so similar in ancient manuscripts, and *Θεός* being so much the more common of these two abbreviated words? Such a mistake, in some early manuscript or manuscripts, might have been easily propagated, so as to extend to the comparatively few authorities which exhibit the reading *Θεός*. It is much more difficult to account for such an ancient and *wide-spread* corruption as must have taken place, if *Θεός* proceeded originally from the pen of the Evangelist. If he *had* written *μονογενὴς Θεός* in this passage, so remarkable an expression must have early attracted attention, and stamped itself ineffaceably, like the language in the first verse of his Gospel, upon the whole Christian literature. It would have been continually quoted and appealed to.

But there is another aspect of the internal evidence, which must strike every one who reads the passage in question with attention. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten *God*, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." Is it not evident that the introduction of the phrase "only-begotten *God*," after the use of the word "*God*" *alone* and *absolutely*, immediately before it, is a harshness which we can hardly suppose in any writer?

Does not the word "Father," in a sentence like this, almost necessarily imply that the correlative "Son" has just preceded? And is there anything analogous to this expression, "the only-begotten God," in the writings of John, or in any other part of the New Testament?

In closing this discussion, the writer wishes to express his great respect for Dr. Tregelles, and the earnest desire that his life and health may be spared for the completion of the important work on which he has been so long engaged. No scholar of the present century, with the single exception of Tischendorf, has so high a claim on the gratitude of all who are solicitous to obtain the purest possible text of the original records of our religion. His labors for this object have displayed a patient, earnest, and self-sacrificing devotion worthy of the highest admiration. The reasons for differing from him in opinion in regard to the genuineness of *Θεός* in John i. 18, and for desiring a more complete and accurate statement of the evidence than he has given in this case, have now been laid before the reader, who will judge of the whole matter for himself.

ARTICLE VI.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

1—GERMAN TREATISES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY, PUBLISHED DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS.

It cannot be denied that the more recent German writers have contributed much to the advancement of ethical science. Notwithstanding their frequent speculative aberrations, they have studied the subject more industriously and more profoundly than their English contemporaries, and have established some fundamental principles which will hardly be set aside by any subsequent investigations. While one class of authors verge towards naturalism and found their systems exclusively on the human reason, another class, now in the ascendancy, aim at a broader and more comprehensive philosophy by including the principles of Christianity in their ethical systems. That there can be a philosophy equally true to nature and to Christianity, — a philosophy that is strictly systematic and homogeneous in all its parts and yet drawn from both of these sources, — can be doubted by no one who believes in the truth of both. What Christianity adds to the teachings of nature must be in harmony with nature; and these teachings themselves become much more lucid when viewed and interpreted in the light of revelation. That the German mind is capable of grappling with these subjects in a way that is both philosophical and evangelical, is proved by the writings of such men as Julius Müller, whose work on the Doctrine of Sin is unsurpassed by any other on the subject. It is a pleasing fact that the great ethical writers of Germany are approximating more and more to the pure Christian standard. In this respect there is an almost regular progression in the writers whose works we propose to notice.

It is not necessary to our purpose to refer to even the best of the older writers, such as Buddeus, Crusius, and Mosheim, or to Reinhard of later times, partly because their works, though valuable of their kind, are less theoretical than practical, and partly because they have exercised no sensible influence upon the more recent authors. The founders of the several philosophical schools, especially Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Herbert, opened new paths of inquiry, and multiplied the ways by which the science of ethics was approached. But an account of their ethical theories would require more space than we can give them. We must, therefore, take it for granted that these theories, in their general outlines, are sufficiently understood by our readers, and limit ourselves to such incidental notices of them as may be appropriate while speaking of the moral treatises of their disciples. Confining our remarks to those writers who have directed their chief attention to moral philosophy as a science, we need not go out of the period prescribed for this Article, except in the case of Schleiermacher. He

was the first great ethical writer of the present century who inaugurated a reconstruction of the science on more comprehensive and more rigidly philosophical principles. Although his system, as a whole, will not continue to stand without important modifications, he has laid down principles in regard to method which will not be allowed to fall into forgetfulness. He has also done good service in fructifying the science by detailed observations of great value. Having a mind uncommonly prolific, strongly ethical both by nature and by habit, and stored with all learning, he throws out, with liberal hand, ingots of gold from whatever mine he explores.

In respect to method, he did much to clear the science of a heterogeneous mass of adventitious matter and to place it upon a foundation strictly philosophical. One needs only look into Reinhard to see what a medley of empirical rules, maxims, and ecclesiastical traditions once constituted the bulk of works on moral philosophy. As practical works, they had and still have their value. Schleiermacher perceived that the term *philosophy* could be extended to them only by courtesy. He insisted on reducing the whole science to one comprehensive principle, capable of being unfolded into a complete system. According to him, nothing involved in that was to be omitted, nothing else was to be introduced. It is easy to perceive that such a view would give to the science its exact boundaries, would assign to each part its appropriate place, and would give proportion and symmetry to the whole. Even if it should be impossible to find such a principle with absolute certainty, any near approximation to it would improve the form of the science. If he himself did not succeed in discovering the right principle, that does not detract from the merit of maintaining that there is such a principle, and that it is discoverable. Others, following in the way which he has pointed out, may complete the work which he began. In point of fact, his method has been applied with much greater success by others than by himself.

Whatever doubt there may be about Schleiermacher's having reached and grasped the ultimate principle of moral philosophy, no one can question that he has approached it by announcing its three grand manifestations, the chief good, the right, and virtuous feeling. The last is distinguished from the first and second by being exclusively subjective and variable. It is perfect in proportion as it is directed to the chief good, and governed by the right. They all involve each other. They are not so many distinct parts of the general subject, but are rather so many aspects of one and the same thing. Although a tolerable system of ethics could be founded on any one of these, no system can be complete which does not embrace them all in a coordinate relation. That principle which comprehends them all, whatever it be, is the fundamental principle of ethics.

To this theory, so admirably laid down, Schleiermacher was hardly faithful in the execution of its parts. Indeed, he excelled rather in pointing out the way for others than in following it himself. He is a better writer on the method of moral philosophy than on moral philosophy itself. His view

of Christian virtue, as free and perfectly spontaneous, led him to adopt the good, rather than the right, as its standard. The pursuit of the good because one delights in it, was considered a higher moral act than obedience to law as an authoritative rule. The evil resulting from this partially manifested itself in the lax morality of those who adopted the system. It was quite natural that it should be left very much to the individual to judge what was good and what was evil, or, in other words, that his taste should become his rule in moral action. If men were as pure as angels, there might be little danger in being left to pursue the good as an object of desire without the positive restraints of law. But in our present imperfect state, we can free ourselves from the authority of law only so far as our approach to perfection supplies us with the love of the good and of the right as the principle of action. So long as any evil inclinations exist within us, the adoption of Schleiermacher's view, without restriction, will be perilous.

A still greater defect in his ethical works is the perpetual conflict in his mind between Pantheism and Christianity. His life appears to have been a gradual transition from the former to the latter. He has in fact, given us two systems of moral philosophy, the one Christian, the other more pantheistic than Christian.

The first particular work to be noticed, falling within our period is J. U. Wirth's "*Speculative Ethics*" (*Spekulative Ethik*) in two small volumes, published in 1841. It is Hegelian in its principles, but is the ablest and best proceeding from that school of philosophy. The first volume, which is but half the size of the second, is devoted to theoretical ethics; the remaining volume, to practical and political ethics. The former is sufficiently abstract and obscure; and if it do no good, it will do no harm to the American reader. The second, or practical part of the work is highly interesting and instructive. Every thought is like new coin fresh from the mint. The author has elaborated his work in the most thorough manner. His analysis is as acute as it is original, and his practical knowledge of the subject is extensive and accurate. He deals more in practical principles, clearly and concisely stated, and less in wire-drawn disquisitions and multiplied details, than is common with writers on this branch of the subject. Most writers give all their valuable thoughts in the theoretical part, the application of which in the practical part is so mechanical that it can be anticipated by a reader of active intellect. Wirth is like the sun below the horizon, and sending forth only gray twilight in the former, but risen and shining in an almost cloudless sky in the latter. That which was too abstruse to be understood — which appeared to be nothing but a dry and empty abstraction — when theoretically stated, assumes a concrete form in its practical application, and is then full of significance. The chief defect of the book is its Hegelianism. Its chief excellence is the truthfulness and soundness of its observations crowded into a small compass, which lose little of their real value by appearing under their thin, transparent Hegelian guise.

Next in the order of time is G. Hartenstein's "*Fundamental Principles*

of Ethical Science" (*Die Grundbegriffe der ethischen Wissenschaften*), which appeared in 1844. As a disciple of Herbert, he starts from a point just the opposite of that chosen by the disciples of Hegel. He begins, not in heaven, but on earth; not with the infinite, but with the finite; not with speculation upon the nature of the absolute, but with the facts of experience. He is more Aristotelian than Platonic in his method. Instead of speculating upon the Divine Nature, and deducing from it a system of morality to guide and govern the conduct of men, he observes the operations of the human mind, and discovers in it the same power to distinguish between right and wrong as between the true and the false. He finds in all men intuitive ideas, — models of the right and the good, — which are called out by experience, but not produced by it. As mathematical truth does not depend on observation for its existence, but has an independent existence of its own in the mind, and is only *illustrated* by material things, so "ethical ideas" belong to the nature of the mind, and are drawn out of it, and transferred to acts, instead of being introduced into it by induction from experience. But for this original intuitive power, and the moral ideas which spring out of the mind itself, there would be no standard by which the mind could judge of its first moral act. The moral faculty refers directly to the will. Its office is simply to pronounce judgment upon the acts of the will. These acts have a moral quality in themselves. There is something in their very nature, aside from their being useful or agreeable, or the contrary, that is praiseworthy or censurable, and with the perception of this quality alone is the conscience concerned. Both the reason and the aesthetic faculty may find other qualities in the same act, but they are not identical with the former, — they only coëxist with them. It is the confounding of these distinct qualities that has given rise to the various forms of eudaemonism.

The author maintains that this immediate morality of an act of the will, without reference to anything else, constitutes the only basis on which moral science can rest. This it is that separates it from every other science. If either utility or eudaemonism were the ultimate principle, the science which we call moral would be nothing but an economical science. Anything which degrades morality to the rank of a mere means to a higher ulterior end, strikes a blow at the nature of morality itself. The nature of the Deity may be useful both to himself and to others, but that would not justify the statement that the Divine Nature is nothing but a means to a higher end.

We remark, by the way, that if the nature of a moral act is intuitively perceived, it is perceived as it is in itself. The utility which results from it is discovered by the reason, not by the conscience. These two things are separable. Either may exist in the mind without the other. The utilitarian may see mere utility, and nothing that is strictly moral. A child may perceive that a thing is right without knowing that it is useful.

Again, the love of happiness has no moral quality. It is common to all

men. It becomes virtuous only when it includes the right, and because of including it. Strictly speaking, we *desire* happiness, and love the virtue which produces it. The one is subjective, the other is objective. For the latter there must be a moral affinity, for the former it is not necessary. Virtue can be directly sought, happiness cannot. The man who seeks virtue is happy, the man who seeks only happiness does not find it.

If virtue is not loved for its own sake, without regard to the pleasure it gives, it could never have a beginning. There could not be a first act of virtue, because the effect — the happiness which it produces not having been experienced — cannot enter into the motive. The opposite theory involves the absurdity that an effect can precede its cause.

The desire of individual happiness, even though it be without injury to others, cannot embrace the whole principle of virtue. Both reason and revelation teach that the radical principle of active virtue is the love of God. Instead of resolving the love of God into rational self-love, we must resolve the latter into the former. By so doing, we love ourselves and others alike, as the creatures of God, holding the same relations to him. To attach more importance to our individual happiness than to the happiness of others, would be putting ourselves at variance with God, who allows no such distinction. Our individual happiness ought then to be a subordinate motive, and not the predominant motive of action. The supreme love of God, and the coördinate love of ourselves and others is the divine rule of Christian morality. If it be said that we are so constituted that the desire of happiness is always the controlling motive of our actions, we reply that this is at best but a psychological theory which has not sufficient authority to set aside the decalogue. We know that the selfish principle is deeply rooted in fallen human nature; but we doubt if all the acts even of a sinner can be explained by so narrow a system of psychology.

But to return from our digression. The author, after exploring the ground of his science, and defining its nature and fixing its scope, proceeds to enumerate and explain what he terms "ethical ideas," first in the abstract, and then in their concrete social relations. His analysis of the subject is so different in form from that to which we are accustomed, that it is no easy matter to give a clear view of it in a few words. His first or abstract conception of the subject is ideal. It does not take into the account the abnormal state of the mind and the hinderances to virtue arising therefrom, but the whole discussion proceeds as though there were no difficulties of this kind to contend with. The abstract ethical ideas are four in number, neither more nor less, namely, the ideas of inward freedom, of benevolence, of legal right, and of reasonableness. The starting-point in every case is the will, which presents to the moral philosopher two questions: first, What is the moral character of its acts in themselves considered? second, What judgment does the conscience of the individual pass upon those acts? When these agree, the conscience is pure, and when such a conscience is obeyed, the act is virtuous. By inward freedom the author

understands that state of the mind in which there is nothing to prevent the will from being led by the conscience. It is opposed to that state of the mind in which motives of pleasure, gain, conceit, or fancy deter the will from following its proper guide. Such a state of inward freedom (inclination) to do right without a corresponding freedom (inclination) to do wrong is necessary to perfect virtue. The idea of it as one of the elements of a faultless character is an "ethical idea."

Benevolence is the proper relation between the will of one person and that of another. If I will what is rationally agreeable to the will of another, and do it for that reason, I practice the virtue of benevolence toward him. If I do the same thing from any other motive, it ceases to be benevolence; if from a contrary motive, it is malevolence. Now let the two opposite cases of pure good-will and pure ill-will be presented to any mind uninfluenced by passion, and it will instinctively approve of the one and condemn the other. This is a matter of direct and immediate moral perception without the aid of any reasoning process. This idea of benevolence is also necessary to the conception of perfect virtue.

The idea of right in a legal sense is not founded on the direct relation of one will to another, but on the relation of both, whether consciously or not, to a third object, the object of desire to both. Two minds that are entirely indifferent to each other, and stand in no direct relation with each other, may both desire the same object, and, if it cannot be enjoyed in common, like the light of the sun, a question of right immediately arises, which is to be decided by the principle of justice. Otherwise there will be contention. Contention itself, without a just cause, is intuitively perceived to be wrong. A virtuous mind will necessarily desire to avoid contention. It can never love it for its own sake. When both parties know what is just, and desire that, and that only, the moral wrong of strife is avoided without producing any evil consequences. Benevolence, though more comprehensive than justice in some respects, cannot of itself properly dispose of a case of strife. If both parties abstain from the object of their desire, the object will be of no utility. If one party yields, and the other does not, the object may pass into the hands of the wrong individual. An idea of right between man and man is therefore necessary to moral perfection.

We cannot follow the author through his prolix description of the characteristics of reasonableness as distinguished from benevolence and justice. It is enough to say that it is supplementary to them as a court of equity is to law. It relates particularly to the adjustment of rewards and punishments, the degree of which is not fixed by any absolute rule of justice. Being of a supplementary character, it of course exhausts the subject. In the application of these principles to the actual relations of men, the order is changed. The first questions which arise in society are those of right, and the first object of government is to prevent strife or compose it. The author therefore begins with the subject of law as established by society for the purpose of securing to men their rights. Next follows the principle of

reasonableness, as explained above. Thirdly, benevolence is applied to government, inasmuch as it is to be administered for the public good. The last in order is inward freedom, being the latest fruit of civilization, the point to which all the institutions of society should tend. This part of the work, though well executed, strikes us as altogether too artificial.

The author next treats of what he terms "regulative principles." "Ethical ideas" are mere conceptions existing in the mind, which have no degrees of perfection or imperfection, and which are never fully realized in society. "Regulative principles" are those necessary relations under which all the varieties of moral action must be viewed. In this respect they correspond to the categories of Aristotle and Kant. The first is the degree of perfection which marks the intensity or quantity of a virtue or vice. The second is the degree of directness or indirectness in which an act is virtuous or vicious, involving the moral relation of means and ends to each other. The third, which introduces the second subdivision, is virtue, to which all the varieties and degrees of good acts must be referred. It differs from moral freedom (right inclination) by being concrete or actual, variable in degree, and consequent upon the act of the will. Duty, as a thing required and yet to be performed, and the good, as something desired or chosen, complete the list. The discussion of these topics is more satisfactory than the arrangement.

The "regulative principles" are considered as an intermediate link between "ethical ideas" and the actual relations which exist in society. Hence the next general topic is "man in nature and in society," embracing, 1. the individual as such; 2. the individual in his relation to other individuals; 3. society; and, 4. government. The work closes with a discussion of the various duties which grow out of all these relations.

To sum up, in a word, our judgment of the merits of this elaborate production, we may name as its chief excellences its thoroughly matter-of-fact and inductive character; its acuteness and penetration on all the topics it discusses; its completeness and fulness without redundancy; its masterly and candid criticism of other systems; and its sound and healthy tone within the limits prescribed by the theory. Its faults are no less marked. It is so exclusively psychological as to cut off all light from a higher source. In avoiding theology, it ignores Christianity. Its eye is turned downward to man and to the earth, like the ethics of Aristotle, and catches no glimpses of the divine, like the soaring genius of Plato. The arrangement of the system, though ingenious and elaborate, is neither simple nor natural. It has to be explained at every step. The reader has to spend too much time to study it; for as an end it has no value, and as a means it gives us no aid. It were well if the writer had thrown off the shackles imposed on him by his master in philosophy. By referring everything to the human will, and constructing a theory of duty upon the relation of one human will to another or to others, he never rises to the source of all right — the divine will. The whole system is consequently cold and uninspiring. It is a book to be consulted rather than adopted.

We now pass to a series of works professedly Christian, and more or less theological; and first, R. Rothe's *Theological Ethics* (*Theologische Ethik*), in three substantial volumes, of which the first appeared in 1845, and the third in 1848. We shall not notice that portion of the work which was given in a former number of this journal.¹ By "theological ethics" the author does not mean ethics founded on a system of theology, but ethics founded on "the religious consciousness," or the experiences of the inner religious life of the Christian. The ground-work of the theory is purely speculative. It is supposed to be in harmony with the teachings of inspiration, though not deduced from them. The deductions of reason, after they have been made, are often verified and illustrated by passages of scripture. Such being the author's general aim, it is not strange that he enters upon a very wide field of inquiry. Partly from a desire of completeness, in which he is not untrue to his German origin and education, and partly because he carries his originality to all that borders upon his subject, he goes even beyond what would appear to be necessary to his design. Nature, material and immaterial, philosophy in its widest sense, religion in its relations to theology as well as to ethics, all come within the range of his discussion. Indeed the introduction, which extends through more than two hundred large octavo pages, is a sort of philosophical and religious encyclopaedia.

His leading principle is that morality consists in subduing and controlling physical nature and using it for spiritual purposes, thus idealizing life. Though Hegelian in his method, he is tinctured with the doctrines of Schelling as modified by Schleiermacher. This is apparent in his perpetual recurrence to the idea, that the union of the individual mind with external nature is the true aim of life.

The body of the work itself is divided into three parts, which treat respectively of the chief good, virtue, and duty (*die Güterlehre, die Tugendlehre und die Pflichtenlehre*). By "the good," he means moral perfection as the product of moral action, morality as an attainment complete in all its parts, or the state of man in actual and entire harmony with nature. This is viewed as the chief good, because it is contemplated simply in the light of a desirable end to be attained. Virtue is more subjective, relating rather to what a man is than to what he has, and may exist in various stages of imperfection. Duty is distinguished from both, by relating directly to obligation and to the future. Of course these are not three distinct things, but, as has been already remarked, are only three phases of one and the same thing. They all imply each other. This appears to us a sufficient reason for not regarding the division as a logical one, and for objecting to making it the ground-work of the plan of a book. The author, however, is not deterred from such a plan by any fear of repetition, but, submitting to the inconvenience of redundancy for the sake of

¹ See the April No. of 1861, p. 241, for the metaphysical view of Rothe's theory.

completeness, he spares neither himself nor his readers. He is led to adopt this cumbrous method by his rejection of the ordinary division of ethics into theoretic and practical, as being unphilosophical, and having no foundation in nature. While we admit that the division is artificial, and made merely on the ground of convenience, we maintain that it is the most convenient division, and as philosophical, to say the least, as the one adopted by him. If all the principles of moral philosophy are to be applied to the various social relations of man in the connection in which they are first stated, the duties growing out of those relations will not be classified at all. Now, we must either contemplate the duties of the domestic relation, for example, out of all connection with each other, and associate them individually with the principles to which they respectively belong, or we must view them in their organic relation to each other, and refer them to principles previously established. Is it not easier to carry these principles in the mind, and to understand the references to them, than to hold in our memory the disconnected facts and discussions relating to husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant, and the like, scattered over a whole work? By the author, the chief good, virtue, and duty, which ought to go together to give a complete view of any subject in morals, are separated from each other, and the whole range of topics suggested by external relations made to pass before us three times in solemn review. It is true the repetition is rendered tolerable by some variation in the arrangement of the topics, and by the new aspects which each one is made to present; but, in our view, it would be much more simple and convenient to divide the whole subject into two parts, theoretic and practical, laying down the great principles of the science in the former, and there introducing the threefold view above mentioned, and in the latter dividing the subject according to the various relations of men in nature and society. The theoretic part would then fall into three divisions reciprocally depending on and completing each other, and the practical part into as many as should be deemed natural and expedient.

The author, after discussing the chief good at great length in the first volume, and in the larger part of the second, disposes of the subject of virtue in about one fifth of the same space. His leading positions are as follows: Virtue, a purely subjective and active principle, is the cause of the chief good. When from small beginnings and through hard struggles it becomes completely dominant, then, and not till then, is the chief good attained. Virtue is always attached to personality, and, consequently, must have the individuality which characterizes each person. But as man is in an abnormal state, having peculiar difficulties to encounter in his moral progress, we shall better understand this complex subject if we first examine the nature of virtue in the abstract, and then take a view of it in its actual processes in the concrete. It is the nature of virtue to bring both the body and the external world under the control of the person in whom it resides. (This is evidently beginning at the wrong end.) Inasmuch as

the process of moral development is one in which the spiritual nature gains the ascendancy, virtue is spirituality, — a holy, normal spirituality. (This holy, normal *intellectualism* should be placed near the end of the series, rather than near the beginning.) Virtue, being a moral peculiarity of the individual, is, in a religious point of view, a gift (charisma). It is at the same time a divine gift and a human attainment. The very act of virtue is the appropriation of the chief good, and the state of the mind, meanwhile, is one of spiritual beatitude. In this sense Spinoza is right when he says: *Beatitudo non est virtutis præmium, sed ipsa virtus*. But so long as virtue is only an approach to perfection, the beatitude is relative and imperfect, in which there is a longing for something not yet attained. As a power ruling over nature, virtue shows itself in vigor of character, by which one controls himself and influences others. In this manner the author proceeds still further to develop what he calls the material principle of virtue. Having given this specimen of his method, we may drop the train of thought.

The formal principle, next considered, is resolved into two parts, virtuous feeling, and virtuous habit (*Fertigkeit*), or power of virtuous action. The explanation of the system of virtues forms a separate chapter. The arrangement of such a system must always be more or less arbitrary. The material point is to see that no individual virtue is overlooked, and that the whole number grow naturally out of the one all-comprehensive principle. Strictly speaking, the principle of virtue is not only one, but is indivisible. There can be no one genuine virtue that does not involve every other.

Leaving the abstract view of the subject, and passing to the concrete, the author begins with vice (*Untugend*), as it exists "in the natural man," describes its nature, its material, and its formal principle, and classifies the individual vices, and brings them into a system answering to his system of the virtues. He then enters upon the discussion of "virtue in the new man," and presents a theological view of the Christian virtues or graces.

The third part of the whole work, the doctrine of duties (answering to the right, or the moral law), occupies eleven hundred pages, being equal in extent to both the other parts, and comprises within itself a complete system of practical ethics. This is the volume which will be most prized by the majority of readers. Here the metaphysical fog has mostly passed away, and the cheering light of weighty, indisputable truth shines forth in its splendor. The whole subject of duty, and of law, its counterpart, is spread before us in its vast richness and variety. A spirit of ardent piety and of sound practical sense breathes in almost every line. The writer lays aside the scholastic stiffness which characterized the preceding volumes, and yielding to his enthusiasm pours out a warm current of thought and feeling that carries the reader resistlessly along with him. His heart makes his intellect both greater and clearer. Christianity and philosophy united are here set forth as presiding over the interests of society. By his vivid portraiture of human life, as it is designed and destined to be, he creates in

the mind of the reader a strong desire to see the grand idea realized. Aiming at utility chiefly in this part of his work, he has inserted, in notes, the best passages of all the great German writers on the subject, forming a rich collection of observations on almost every point of morals. This volume would lose but little of its value if it were to be published separately.

On the whole, Rothe is the most powerful writer on ethics since Schleiermacher. But, like the latter, he satisfies neither the friends nor the foes of orthodoxy. Though more orthodox, by far, than Schleiermacher, in his general scheme of Christian doctrine, he sometimes bolts from the faith of the church in a most daring manner. His scepticism, however, is but occasional; on most points he is boldly Christian. Where he is right, he is perfectly magnificent; where he is wrong, he is very wrong. In making our relations to the physical world a fundamental part of morality, he puts everything out of its just relations. A subordinate and dependent principle is made chief. He even goes so far as to make right relations to the physical world independent of religion, and coördinate with it. But for such a mistaken notion, harmony with the will of God would have been made the fundamental principle, and harmony with the outward world the necessary effect. The perpetual recurrence to nature, and the disproportionate, and even irrelevant, discussion of physical topics, render that part of the work which relates to "the good" somewhat tedious. We at first wonder at being taken through all this lower creation to find the good in morals, and at last become weary of the pursuit.

The mind of the author, though highly speculative and systematic, is nevertheless not always well balanced. He is sometimes artificial, creating a mechanical system for his materials, rather than discovering a natural one in his materials. His good judgment seems, at times, to forsake him, and then he gives utterance to opinions which one would not expect to hear from so great a man. But, in most cases, he goes to the bottom of his subject, and, whether he comes out right or wrong, he compels those who come after him to be no less thorough. The good elements of his philosophy are well stated by Chalybäus; the bad are pointed out and exposed by Wutke.

Chalybäus is well known by his "History of Speculative Philosophy from Kant to Hegel." But those who know him only from this work, as a fine analyser of intricate thought, and a clear and vigorous thinker, will be surprised to find him so sincere a Christian and so good a theologian as he shows himself in his "System of Speculative Ethics" (*System der Speculativen Ethik*), published, in two volumes, in 1850. None of the writers hitherto noticed are so uniformly sound and judicious in their ethical views. The author's philosophy, as well as his spirit, is eminently Christian. The fact is never lost sight of that a complete morality is produced only by Christian influence, and that moral evil is nowhere fully explained except in the Christian revelation.

Rothe taught that a Christian state represented the most perfect condition

of society, and that, when the state shall become what Christianity proposes to make it, the family and the church will be subordinate to it, if not absorbed by it. The work before us, on the contrary, is founded on the idea that the family, the state, and the church, are independent institutions, and that, though they all are to be entirely pervaded by a Christian spirit, and are adapted to support each other, each has an end and an aim of its own, which cannot in any manner be answered by either of the others. The family is not merely the handmaid or the primary society of the state; it has an object by itself—domestic happiness—which is as peculiar, and as important in its place, as the object of civil government. The same is true of the church. The author has undertaken to explain Christian morality, on philosophical principles, in its application to these three distinct spheres of life,—the family, the state, and the church.

Two tendencies have manifested themselves in the history of moral philosophy, the ideal and the real, of which Plato's and Aristotle's systems are respectively the types. The one gives the form of morality, and teaches in the abstract what ought to be, but is not, and is weak in the application of its lofty ideas to the actual condition of man; the other, proceeding inductively from experience, is deficient in ideal conceptions, as pure models of excellence, finding the actual materials or substance of morals only in real life. But these materials are low and beggarly, and, consequently, the philosophy founded on them never rises to a principle of absolute moral perfection. The former leads to a species of gnosticism, a revelling in an intellectual world of Platonic ideas, the latter to sensualism, or the science of happiness. It is the aim of the author to avoid both these extremes. But here a new danger arises, namely, that of adopting two principles of philosophy, and arbitrarily following the one or the other as convenience requires. Believing that both the speculative and the practical elements belong to the subject, and that there can be no true moral science, if either be overlooked, he endeavors to find a higher principle in which these two are united, in order to give unity as well as completeness to the science. He finds this in the true idea of moral freedom. This enters equally into the two realms of morality, the ideal and the real. Around the moral freedom of the will, as a centre, everything in the science of ethics revolves. When it is in its normal state, it has love for its active principle and truth for its guide. But even such a will may become abnormal, and turn aside from virtue and from truth. Without this possibility there could be no morality, no accountability. The will, thus designed with respect to its material and its regulative principle, and thus constituted with reference to possible evil, presents a common ground on which to rear a system of ethics alike theoretical and practical. This subject of human freedom, as related to morality, is discussed with great psychological acuteness, and the matter of accountability set in a very clear, practical light. Next follows a chapter on moral evil, as growing out of the abuse of the free will, and the origin of virtue, and its struggle in overcoming evil.

After the general topics, containing his theoretical principles, and occupying two-thirds of the first volume, have been disposed of, the author enters upon the more specific task of developing his system of ethics, as applied to the different spheres of social life. The first of these is the family. The culture which the individual is to bestow upon himself for the purpose of perfecting his own nature, contrary to what would be expected, is taken up and treated in this connection. The reason obviously is that the author regarded the family as the place where the character of the individual is formed. It would be as useless to discuss the question whether the individual precedes the family, or the family the individual, as it was for the ancients to debate the question, whether the egg produced the hen, or the hen the egg. The author first finds the individual in the family, and afterwards the family springing from the individual.

His theory of the domestic relations may be briefly stated thus: The peculiar end of the present life, in itself considered, and the enjoyment of life itself, are found in domestic love and domestic happiness. Not the life of an individual being, and the solitary enjoyment of it, but social life, as it is in the family, constitutes human happiness. The secret of happiness is love between persons who belong together, as do the members of a family, — *cariſas*, or parental love, and *pietas*, or filial love, together with the natural love of brother and sister. The former, parental and filial love, foreshadow religious love, or that subsisting between the Creator and his creatures; the latter, the love of our fellow-men, as the offspring of God with us. This is shown, in part, in the history of the word *piety*. The family is a microcosm, the home being to that little circle what the world is to the great family of mankind. The family begins in human love as the world originated in divine love. God reveals himself to the religious sentiment through the medium of the world, as the parent reveals his love in the domestic economy. When the love that unites the parents descends in a modified form to their offspring, and awakens in the latter a pure, filial affection, and unites all the members of the household in one common bond, we have an earthly image of a heavenly state, a picture of happiness the brightest and best which this world can afford. Not only are the domestic virtues figures of the Christian virtues; they may, in a psychological sense, almost be said to be the religious virtues *in nuce*. The love of the child to the parent must in *fact* precede his love to God, because it furnishes the elementary idea out of which arises the idea of God as a father. But there is this important difference, that the former is awakened by a natural process, whereas the latter has a purely moral cause. The love of God, if it existed in a proper degree, would regulate all human love. The filial love of a child, while it illustrates the love due to God, neither creates nor regulates the latter. It is indeed true that the domestic virtues, if they are what they should be, contain the germ of the more public, social, and of the religious virtues, or those which relate to the state and to the church. But these last cannot be developed out of the first, except as the first are

founded on a religious principle. Natural filial love is, therefore, rather the psychological condition than the moral source of love to God. However much life in the family may fit one for life in the state, the entire change that must take place when a young person passes from the one to the other, clearly shows the difference between the two. In the family, all live for each other, and are happy in each other's happiness. Laws and rights are kept in the back-ground. With men, as members of civil society, all is changed. A state is too large for universal personal affection. The majority of individuals are unknown, and stand out as abstractions. The government itself is not founded on affection, but on interests and rights. Its great instrument is law, and it knows not individuals; it only knows human beings, no matter who they are, in their legal relations. Thus it appears that the family has a sphere and a mode of life quite peculiar to itself.

The essential idea of a family, and its peculiar relations within its own circle, will be best perceived when regarded in the following light: two individuals, having been bred and educated in their parents families, unite to found a new family. If they have been trained successfully, and the union has been formed by means of pure and virtuous affections, there is in their hearts and characters a fountain from which all the domestic virtues may flow. As an organism made up of connected parts, the family in its moral functions will stand thus; 1. the conjugal relation and the virtues peculiar to it; 2. the relations of the children to their parents and to each other, requiring the exercise of parental, filial, and fraternal love. With the affection existing between brothers and sisters naturally spring up friendship, or love for others, which leads out of the family circle into the wider world, and finally results in the formation of new families by individual members of the older ones; 3. the family itself as a whole, a complete household, with its peculiar organization, safe-guards, and enjoyments. Out of this primary society civil government may be evolved, but not without the great changes indicated above.

After such an analysis and arrangement of the domestic relations, the author proceeds to the discussion of these several topics in their order. His treatment of them in detail, though judicious and interesting, is less extended, and perhaps we should add less thorough, than that found in the work of Rothe.

Under the head of the state, which is the next general branch of the subject, are comprised the legal relations or the rights and duties of men. Morality, as applied to the rights and duties of individual members of society, prescribing the laws of intercourse between persons who stand on the ground of equality, is altogether too broad a subject to be discussed, even in the most summary manner here. In the work before us it is treated with great circumspection, critical accuracy, and sagacity. Civil and corporate rights and duties, which constitute the second subdivision, and political rights and duties, or those which relate to the government, which constitute

the third topic, all receive the same attention and careful consideration of the author that are apparent in the first.

In the last general division he treats of religious duties, Christian morality, and the church. He here resumes the principle laid down at the beginning of the work, that there can be no perfect system of ethics without Christianity; and in fact only gives form and substance to what has been incidentally said in other connections, and what was substantially implied everywhere in the previous discussions. This part of the book would of itself furnish interesting materials for an entire Article. To the theologian it would appear to be the most valuable part. It is only by referring the reader directly to it that we can do it any sort of justice. We have already said that Chalybäus is the most Christian of all the authors that we have thus far noticed. We may add that he is not inferior to any of them in philosophical acumen. He has none of the fundamental defects of Schleiermacher, nor of the idiosyncracies of Rothe. He is clearer, as well as sounder in his theory, than Wirth; and in the practical part more genial, though less compact and weighty. In philosophical power he and Hartenstein are nearly on an equality, though they were trained in different schools, and though the former is vastly freer from the authority of his master than the latter. Indeed, Chalybäus has renounced the doctrines of Hegelianism, retaining only its discipline, while Hartenstein is still a follower, though by no means a servile follower, of Herbert.

Wutke's work, entitled "A Manual of Christian Ethics" (*Handbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre*), which has come to light the present year, is an unfinished work. Judging from what we find in the first volume, we suppose that the theoretical part is finished, and that only the practical part remains to be executed. It has already been intimated that, in point of religious sentiment, Wutke belongs to the same class with Chalybäus. The minds of both are perfectly imbued with the spirit of evangelical religion. The difference is, that the latter is much more metaphysical, we do not say more philosophical, than the former. The one searches long and carefully for a speculative basis for his doctrines; the other goes directly to his point, states his position, and fortifies it. The one begins each topic with an elaborate disquisition and ends with his conclusion; the other states his conclusion first, and then proceeds to explain and establish it. The one shows the flaws of the Hegelian logic as applied to moral philosophy; the other demonstrates the deviations of the different schools of philosophy from the Christian standard and from well-established practical truth. The one gives what he regards as the Christian type of speculative philosophy; the other, what in his view is the sound and sober philosophy of Christianity. The former reasons out and establishes every position; the latter, where the case will allow, lays down what is obviously true, and points out the logical contradictions involved in an opposite view, while, on difficult and complex subjects, he is more elaborate in his argument, and applies his critical knife effectively to the ingenious theories which he feels obliged to

reject. As the titles of their books indicate, the one professes to be a Christian philosopher, the other a philosophical theologian. At any rate, such are the features which distinguish them from each other.

Nearly one half of the volume before us is devoted to the history of the science of ethics from the time of Socrates to the present, containing an admirable critique of every important system. As De Wette, in his history of the same subject, is better than Stäudlin, and Feuerlein better than De Wette, so is Wutke better than Feuerlein.

The author, after explaining the nature of morality and its connection with religion, develops his own system in six divisions: 1. Man, as the subject of moral accountability. 2. God, as the ground and standard of whatever is morally right. 3. The persons to whom our moral acts relate (God directly, and man indirectly, both ourselves and others). 4. The subjective principle from which our acts proceed (moral feelings and motives). 5. Moral action itself. 6. The ideal aim of all right action, the highest attainable perfection, or the chief good. This scheme covers the whole ground of theoretical ethics. Man is considered first in his spiritual, and then in his material nature. As a spirit he understands, wills, and feels (why not rather say, understands, feels, and wills?). His body is in some manner related to morality. It is an instrument of the mind and connects the latter with outward nature; and is to be cultivated for spiritual uses. Man, as having body and mind united in one person, is next considered in his diversities of age, temperament, sex, and nationality.

In the second division, God is represented as having a will essentially holy, as being the ultimate standard of right, as the disposer of the events in nature and history, and as a holy lawgiver. He reveals his will in the scriptures, in the human reason, and in the conscience. (Thus the author treats of the conscience not in its connection with the nature of man, but in connection with divine revelation. It is God's law within us.) The third division is treated very briefly, the details being referred to the fifth. In the fourth, great prominence is given to Christian love as the soul of morality. The fifth division embraces a great variety of topics:

(1.) Abstaining from what we have no right to do, and yielding to others what is their due. (2.) Acquisition or appropriation, material and spiritual. By material appropriation is meant that which comes through the senses,—animal appropriation. It characterizes the brute, and is predominant in the child. Being purely natural, it is, in itself considered, neither right nor wrong. When a rational being makes it the object of life, it is wrong. When it is but the natural expression of a spiritual appropriation, that is, when it proceeds not merely from sensual appetites, but from love, not so much to the object as to the giver of it, then it is right and praiseworthy. With the good man, the material appropriation never predominates over the spiritual. The former is for the sake of the latter, and should not be sought apart from it. Spiritual appropriation has a much wider range. While it may and should extend to all material things, it embraces directly those that

are immaterial and spiritual. In respect to intellectual acquisition, it has the character of universality, inasmuch as truth, its object, is universal in its nature, and the acquisition ought to be made for the benefit of all. The pursuit and attainment of happiness are more individual. Self is its immediate object. To render the pursuit of happiness or pleasure moral, we must keep sensual enjoyment in subordination to that which is rational; must see that it be but a true expression of joy in God, of love and gratitude to him, and that, founded on such a principle, it also manifest a tendency to increase, and never to diminish, the happiness of others. The highest enjoyment is found in the consciousness of being a child of God, and being in sympathy and union with him; and every other enjoyment is sanctified by being associated with this.

3. Culture. This also may be either material or spiritual. Material culture is the application of intelligence to physical objects, and the improvement of them for rational and moral purposes. It is the subduing of nature, and using its agencies according to the design and will of God. Spiritual culture relates to intelligent beings. It is the duty of every man to strive to promote this both in himself and in others.

In respect to *manner*, culture, like appropriation, may be individual or general. Culture is individual so far as it is for the temporal benefit of the individual. This kind of productive culture is what we call labor. Everything that a man does for his temporal advantage may be called labor, whether it relate to matter or to mind. When industry is directed to the ideal, and is designed and adapted to elevate and improve society, according to the will of God, it becomes directly moral, and even religious. General culture is that which has for its object the intellectual and moral improvement of society. Even material things then assume a spiritual form. This culture aims not so much at mere outward prosperity or utility as at the elevation of man, rendering him morally attractive, and making him, not merely a useful citizen or artisan, but a beautiful and inspiring specimen of humanity. The higher the spheres of appropriation and of culture, the more perfect will be their coincidence with each other. As they both aim at something better than present realities, they have an ideal character, and involve a love of ideal excellence, something not yet realized. A life directed to such objects is one of faith and hope. He, on the contrary, who is bent solely on individual acquisition and enjoyment, is out of harmony with the moral world, and is so far immoral.

Moral action in its relations to its different objects, forms the second part of this general division. These objects are God, one's self, other men, and the material world. The last three are derived from the first, and are comprehended under it.

The moral act of appropriating God is at the same time the highest moral culture of the individual. The result is twofold; namely, that God is for us, and we for God. By faith we bring God down to us; by worship we elevate ourselves to him; and these two are inseparably connected. While

faith is the principle by which we appropriate what is divine, knowledge is the means by which the sphere of faith is enlarged.

Moral action in relation to ourselves is the recognition of ourselves as the creatures of God, and the development of our true nature according to his will.

Moral action in relation to others is the recognition of their rights and a benevolent regard to their happiness.

Moral action in relation to external nature is the act of contemplating it as God's work, and using it as he designed.

Such is the naked frame-work of this branch of the subject. It ramifies into numerous subdivisions, to which are attached extended and highly interesting discussions.

The sixth and last division treats of the highest good, or the perfection of our nature, as the end and aim of all moral action. The want of space forbids our following the author in his treatment of this most inviting theme.

There are two works of a highly evangelical character that have been omitted in the preceding enumeration, the "Christian Ethics" (*Christliche Ethik*) of Harless, which has passed through five editions, and the "Doctrine of Holy Love" (*die Lehre von der heilige Liebe*) by Sartorius, of which a third edition has been issued. The former is almost exclusively theological and exegetical; the latter popular and rhetorical. Both are excellent in their way. But as neither of them attempts to go deeply into the subject of philosophy, or brings out any new results adapted to advance the science materially, we pass them by in this Article, not, however, without recommending them to the clerical reader.

HAGENBACH'S HISTORY OF DOCTRINES.¹

THE merits of Hagenbach, as a historian of Christian Doctrine, have already been carefully stated in previous volumes of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* (IV. 552; V. 394). We do not propose to enter into any further analysis; but would direct attention to this very excellent edition of the work. It is seldom that a manual receives such substantial additions and improvements from the hand of an editor. The translation has been carefully revised, and the new matter contained in the last German edition has been skilfully interpolated, with here and there a valuable passage from other writers in the department of Dogmatic History. Hagenbach is one of those Germans who combine some English traits with their national peculiarity. His mode of thinking is lucid, and his style simple and transparent. His text-book is

¹ A Text-Book of the History of Doctrines. By Dr. K. R. Hagenbach. The Edinburgh translation of C. W. Buch revised, with large additions from the fourth German edition, and other sources, by Henry B. Smith, D. D., Professor in the Union Theological Seminary of the city of New York. Vol. I. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1861.

by far the best of any for English and American readers. As a survey of the whole field, it is comprehensive and accurate. With respect to particular subjects, especially the difficult ones, it is as profound as it is possible for a manual to be.

The value of the work has also been enhanced by references to English sources. At the same time we think the editor has referred too frequently to periodical literature. It is rare that an essay or article possesses sufficient originality to be worthy of citation as authority in a scientific treatise. Some of the references of this kind, in this edition, would send the student to second-rate and superficial sources of information.

BRONSON'S SERMONS.¹

MEMORIAL volumes are usually interesting only within limited circles. This is particularly true of volumes of sermons. The parish in which the person was settled, the neighboring congregations to which he occasionally preached, and the personal friends to whom he was dear, always find a charm in his literary remains. But it cannot generally be expected that the great world will participate in this feeling.

This thought would be suggested upon merely seeing the title of this volume; but it would be qualified upon reading it through. These sermons are not ordinary productions. There is in them, a freshness, a chastened fluency, a flexible logic, and an earnest evangelical ardor, that carries the reader along with pleasure and religious profit. Such discourses, composed in the very first years of a youthful ministry, give promise of an effective pulpit career, had life been continued. And they are worthy of special examination, as showing how the very best rhetorical qualities may be combined with didactic and religious ones. These sermons, in literary respects, would be attractive to a fastidious assembly, and yet they are highly instructive, closely applicatory, and edifying.

The Memoir, by Dr. Sprague, is a beautiful tribute to the character and worth of a young minister, who unquestionably owed much to his indirect and unconscious influence. It delineates the natural traits with felicity, reveals a steady growth in the divine life, and a rapid ripening in the last years. We concur in the judgment of the biographer, that "these Discourses will prove an enduring memorial of their author;" and that, "though they are printed under the disadvantage of not having been designed for the press, or undergone the author's revision, they will take rank with the ablest and best published sermons of the day."

WORKS AND MEMOIR OF DR. EMMONS.²

DR. EMMONS has been long known as an independent *thinker*. His testi-

¹ Sermons by Rev. Oliver Bronson, with a Memoir of his life by William B. Sprague, D. D. Albany: Wm. B. Sprague, Jr. 1861.

² The Works of Nathanael Emmons, D. D., Third Pastor of the Church in

mony in favor of the truth is like that of an original witness. He did not take his opinions on trust. When we examine the writings of some commentators and theologians, we too often find that a mode of expression adopted by one is repeated by his successors; and even that a mistaken reference, inserted by the preceding writer, is copied by those who come after him. There are too many indications, that each of these authors has been more anxious to agree with his predecessor, than to examine the truth anew. But Dr. Emmons thought for himself. If he had not, in a strictly independent investigation, become satisfied with the truths of the evangelical system, he would not have defended them. If he had thought that he discovered preponderating evidence against them, he would have opposed them openly. Hence his strict Calvinism is the honest result of his own thought. It deserves attention, because it is the matured fruit of a patient, practical, and long-continued study. The fact that his readers will not agree with all his conclusions, is one reason why they should persevere in acquainting themselves with his modes of thought. An original and able thinker who differs from us, often affords a keener stimulus to the mind than is furnished by an author who more nearly resembles us. One of Emmons's theological opponents, Dr. Lathrop of West Springfield, after reading a new volume of Emmons' sermons, remarked: "So far as discipline in thought and style is concerned, I would rather be the author of that one book than of all my five volumes,"

SPRAGUE'S ANNALS.¹

THE title page of this volume informs us, that it was printed in 1859. The Preface, however, is dated December 18, 1860, and contains allusions to our present national rebellion, which was not openly inaugurated until the closing months of 1860. This incident merely illustrates the fact that errors will creep into the most accurate of human works, and that they will often present themselves where they are least expected. Such a *lapsus* in the Bible would be conclusive proof, to the minds of some, that the Bible is a forgery. The very fact that this trivial error displays itself on the *title page*, is rather a proof that the work is an honest one. We allude to this

Franklin, Mass., with a Memoir of his life, edited by Jacob Ide, D.D. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, 23 Chauncy Street. 1861. 8vo. Vol. I. pp. 799, Vol. IV. pp. 842.

Memoir of Nathanael Emmons, with Sketches of his Friends and Pupils, by Edwards A. Park. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, 23 Chauncy Street. 1861. pp. 468, 820.

¹ Annals of the American Pulpit; or Commemorative Notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of various Denominations, from the early settlement of the country to the close of the year eighteen hundred and fifty-five. With Historical Introductions. By William B. Sprague, D.D. Vol. VII. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. 8vo. pp. 848.

incident, partly because it sets off by contrast the pains-taking accuracy of Dr. Sprague. Amid the complicated mass of dates and numbers, the names of persons and of places, it is remarkable that so few mistakes should have been made, as are found in the seven volumes of his *Annals*. He has expended such an amount of labor and care on these volumes, as can be appreciated by few men and even by few authors. The German-diligence which "will hunt through lexicons to rectify a syllable," receives but a meagre reward from the unthinking crowd.

The seventh volume of the *Annals* is devoted to the Methodists. Like the preceding parts of this great work, it is candid, catholic, and generous. It cannot fail to exalt the denomination in the esteem of fair-minded critics. It acquaints us with preachers but little known to fame, who were marked by sound sense, vigor, perseverance, a benevolent and self-sacrificing spirit, and a rich spiritual life. For ourselves we have been particularly interested in the narratives of Francis Asbury, Thomas Coke, Enoch Mudge, Elijah Hedging, John Emory, Henry B. Bascom, Wilbur Fisk, John Summerfield, Stephen Olin, George G. Cookman, Jonathan Edwards Chaplin, and Robert Emory. But we perceive that other editors have been captivated with other characters delineated in this volume. Here, again, we notice the fertility of the work. It engages the interest of different men on different grounds, and it will increase in value as it shall become more ancient in time.

WESTCOTT ON GOSPEL MIRACLES.¹

THESE discourses are earnest and spiritual. The Notes are judicious and not deficient in learning. The common theory of demoniacal possessions is defended in the sermons, but not in an elaborate or powerful style. What the author says of Miracles in general, may be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of his own sermons. "They belong to the believer, and not to the doubter: they are a treasure rather than a bulwark; they are in their inmost sense instruction and not evidence, p. 7." We are surprised to find among the Fellows and even Professors of Cambridge, not infrequent instances of grammatical carelessness. Thus, Mr. Westcott says, p. 113 "We are conscious, *each within ourselves*," etc.

MISSIONARY MEMORIAL.²

WE have been interested in examining the printed sheets of this volume. It opens with a sketch of the Jubilee meeting in 1860, and with a sermon

¹ Characteristics of the Gospel Miracles. Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge. With Notes. By Brooke Foss Westcott, M.A. Formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, etc., etc. Cambridge: MacMillan & Co. London, 1859. 18mo. pp. 122.

² Memorial Volume of the First Fifty Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Boston: Published by the Board. 1861. pp. 462. 8vo.

preached by Dr. Hopkins at that meeting. It then gives a general view of the Board, in successive chapters. These chapters may properly bear the following titles: The Origin of the Board; Reminiscences in regard to its early History; Its Charter, and the action of the Massachusetts Legislature in regard to it; The Constitution and Membership of the Board; The Relation of the Board to Ecclesiastical Bodies: Its Meetings; Its Prudential Committee, — Its Places of Business; Its Correspondence — Library — Cabinet; The Finances of the Board; Its Agencies; Its Relations to Governments; Its Deceased Secretaries; The Founders of the Board.

This Series of Chapters is followed by another on the Missions of the Board. The second Series is divided into chapters on the following themes; The Constitution and Origin of the Missions; The Development of the Missions — Their Laws of Growth, — Their Completion; The Missionaries; The Churches; Schools; Preaching and the Press; Deputations; Literature of the Board and of its Missions; The Field and the Work at the Close of the past half-century.

These Chapters are followed by an Appendix and an Index. The entire volume forms an important contribution to our missionary literature, and is adapted to enkindle a new zeal in the missionary enterprise. It defends sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, the principles which have controlled the action of the American Board. The policy of the Board will be more clearly understood now, than it has been heretofore.

HISTORY OF LATIN CHRISTIANITY: including that of the Popes to the Pontificate of Nicholas V. By Henry Hart Milman, D. D., Dean of St. Paul's. In eight volumes, 12mo. New York: Sheldon and Company. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1860—61.

THE publishers of this work merit the gratitude of every scholar for their enterprise in pressing it forward to its completion, amid the turmoil which prevails throughout the land. They have not been intimidated by the shock of arms; but have now presented to us eight volumes, beautifully printed, of a work which delights and instructs us in the time of war as well as the time of peace. Dr. Milman has many admirable qualifications as an historian; and his present contribution to our historical literature is the most valuable which has yet been made by him. We bespeak an extensive sale for these attractive volumes.

METHOD OF CLASSICAL STUDY: Illustrated by Questions on a few Selections from Latin and Greek Authors. By Samuel H. Taylor, LL. D., Principal of Phillips Academy, Andover, Mass. Boston: Brown and Taggard, 25 and 29 Cornhill. pp. 154. 12mo.

THIS Manual presents a few extracts from the classical authors, and appends to each extract a rich variety of questions pertaining to the struc-

ture of the words, their relations to each other, their signification, history, etc. The questions are so pertinent and exact, that they will, almost by necessity, arouse and sharpen the intellect of the pupil. They are admirably fitted to awaken his enthusiasm in classical study, and to discipline his mind for all study. A thorough mastery of the analyses in this manual will impart a more healthful tone to the scholarship of a young student, than he can derive from the cursory perusal of a Latin or Greek folio.

Index to the Catalogue of Books in the Upper Hall of the Public Library of the City of Boston. Boston: Press of Geo. C. Rand and Avery, Printers to the City 1861. pp. 902. Royal octavo.

This is a magnificent Index, prepared with singular skill, and published with rare accuracy. It is an admirable model for the Catalogues of Public Libraries, whether in our cities or in our universities. We hope that it will be generally imitated. It has been published under the superintendence of Prof. C. C. Jewett.

Among the volumes of which brief notices have been prepared during the last twelvemonth, but are now necessarily excluded from our pages, we may name the following:

Lectures on Natural History; its relations to Intellect, Taste, Wealth, and Religion. By P. A. Chadbourne, Professor of Natural History in Williams College, and Professor of Natural History and Chemistry in Bowdoin College. New York: A. S. Barnes & Burr, 51 & 53 John St. 1860. 12mo. pp. 160.

Principia Latina; an Introduction to the Latin Language. By Charles D'Urban Morris, M. A., Rector of Trinity School, New York; formerly Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. New York: published by Mason Brothers, 5 and 7 Mercer Street. 1860. 12mo. pp. 295.

A Church History of the First Three Centuries, from the Thirtieth to the Three Hundred and Twenty-third Year of the Christian Era. By Milo Mahan, D.D., S. Mark's in the Bowery, Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the General Theological Seminary of New York. New York: published by Daniel Dana, Jr., 381 Broadway. 1860. 12mo. pp. 428.

The Organon of Scripture; or the Inductive Method of Biblical Interpretation. By J. S. Lamar. "The Logic of Science is the Universal Logic, applicable to all Inquiries in which man can engage." — *Mill*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1860. 12mo. pp. 324.

Philosophia Ultima. Charles Woodruff Shields. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1861. 8vo. pp. 96.

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